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23 SEPT 1970

#38-70 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

23 September 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 38)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1970

<u>Moscow (3682 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2644 items)</u>		
Middle East	(5%)	9%	Domestic Issues	(41%)	35%
[Jordan	(--)	4%]	[CCP Central	(25%)	12%]
[Golda Meir	(--)	1%]	Committee Plenum		
in U.S.			Indochina	(21%)	11%
Indochina	(6%)	8%	[DRV Economic	(1%)	9%]
[Vietnam	(5%)	6%]	Delegation in PRC		
Luna 16	(--)	5%	[Cambodia	(5%)	3%]
UN General	(--)	5%	USSR-FRG Treaty	(2%)	10%
Assembly			Middle East	(3%)	9%
China	(4%)	3%	U.S. Automobile &	(--)	8%
USSR-FRG Treaty	(1%)	3%	Railroad Workers		
British CP, 50th	(--)	2%	Nonaligned Conference	(6%)	7%
Anniversary			in Lusaka		
Singapore Premier	(--)	2%	Ma's Inscription for	(--)	6%
in USSR			Japanese Workers,		
			8th Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

DRV media gave wide publicity to PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's statement at the 17 September session of the Paris talks in which she declared that if the United States agrees to a total troop withdrawal by 30 June 1971, there can be immediate discussion of the question of releasing prisoners as well as the question of security for the withdrawing troops. There has been no substantive Hanoi comment, however; and Xuan Thuy, in his brief statement at the session endorsing Mme. Binh's eight-point "clarification" of the 10-point position, mentions neither the timetable for withdrawal nor the explicit call for the formation of a new Saigon "administration," excluding Thieu, Ky and Khiem, as the first step toward a coalition government.

Moscow promptly reported the substance of the PRG "initiative," and supporting propaganda includes a commentary by TASS' Kharkov on the 21st which says the question of how soon the prisoners of war are released now depends only on Washington's decision. TASS reports on the 23d that Chairman Podgorny, speaking at a luncheon honoring visiting Indian President Giri, praised the PRG's "new, constructive proposals" and said that the world public expects "reciprocal steps" from the United States. Judging from the TASS account, he mentioned none of the substance.

Peking media have not discussed the PRG proposal. But in keeping with the practice of reporting almost all statements from Sihanouk's government, NCNA on the 23d carried a brief 18 September statement from the Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) which supports the proposal put forward "at the Paris conference" as an "explanation and clarification of the 10-point solution." Peking generally ignores the Paris talks; it not only has failed to endorse the NFLSV 10-point solution of May 1969 but did not even mention the existence of the proposal until October--in reports of a Peking speech by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho.\*

In a 17 September message to the Khmer Buddhist monks, Sihanouk denies Phnom Penh charges that he has allied himself with Vietnamese communist "aggressors" in Cambodia and urges that the absence of recognition of his government by "certain European communist countries" does not signify support for the Lon Nol regime, but rather can be explained by "certain interests" of these governments.

## PARIS TALKS: EIGHT-POINT "ELABORATION" OF PRG'S 10 POINTS

Hanoi has given unusual publicity to the 84th session of the Paris talks on 17 September at which PRG Foreign Minister Binh submitted

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her eight-point "elaboration and clarification" of the NFLSV position. As in the case of the 8 May 1969 session when the NFLSV's 10-point solution was introduced, DRV media carried the full texts of both Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's formal statements rather than the usual summaries.\* VNA first carried an "account" of the session which included lengthy extracts of the communist speeches but totally ignored the allied statements. VNA followed this shortly with a transmission of the full texts of Binh's and Thuy's statements. The VNA press review of the 18th notes that all Hanoi dailies announced the news of Mme. Binh's presentation in "big headlines" and carried the full texts of the communist statements. Hanoi radio carried the VNA account of the session promptly on the 17th and rebroadcast it four times the following day. The radio normally carries a report of the session the following day. In a rare move, VNA also carried reports of the post-session briefings by the DRV and PRG delegation spokesmen.\*\* There has been no independent comment from DRV media, but Hanoi has disseminated Front comment and rounded up favorable foreign reaction.

In addition to carrying the text of the PRG statement, Front media on the 18th carried an LPA commentary recapitulating the proposal and followed up on the 19th with a dispatch from LPA's Paris correspondent Truong Tung providing local color. Tung-- whose last known dispatch was carried by Liberation Radio on 29 November 1969--says the session of 17 September can be compared to the first session in January 1969, the 8 May session when the NFLSV's 10-point solution was introduced, and the 12 June session dealing with the formation of the PRG. Tung adds that the 84th session at which Mme. Binh's "important document" was presented will also be recalled as an "important event" because it was the first session at which all four chief negotiators were together since late 1969, when Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his post.

FIRST POINT: U.S. Point one of Mme. Binh's proposal, with its  
WITHDRAWAL, POWS new call for a U.S. decision to withdraw  
from South Vietnam by 30 June 1971, is an  
"elaboration" of the call for unconditional U.S. withdrawal out-  
lined in the second of the NFLSV's May 1969 10-point solution.

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\* See the 14 May 1969 TRENDS, pages 2-5, for a discussion of the 10-point proposal.

\*\* There were precedents for this in March and April 1969.

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The current proposal is also a variation of one first made at the 44th session on 11 December 1969; at that time Mme. Binh proposed that if the United States would agree to withdraw in six months, the parties could then enter into a discussion on ensuring the safety of withdrawing troops. PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi explained at the 30 December session that a six-month period had been selected because only a rapid withdrawal would bring a prompt end to the war and that this length of time was long enough to effect the withdrawal. The six-month proposal has been repeated periodically since December, most recently at the 6 August and 3 September sessions.

A totally new element in point one is the suggestion that once the United States agrees to the 30 June timetable, the question of the release of prisoners can be discussed immediately. In the 10-point solution the prisoner-of-war issue was cited in point nine--which said that "to resolve the aftermath of the war, the parties will negotiate the release of the military men captured in the war." VNA's report of DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's press briefing includes his statement that "the question of captured military men would include U.S. pilots captured in North Vietnam." LPA Paris correspondent Truong Tung says in his 19 September dispatch that when the DRV spokesman made this statement, there was visible enthusiasm among the newsmen, "especially the American newsmen."

The PRG's "elaboration" on troop withdrawal leaves unclear the status of the final point in the 10-point solution: Point 10 says that the parties shall reach agreement on "international supervision" of U.S. and allied withdrawal of troops and materiel.

FOLLOWUP COMMENT      The LPA commentary reviewing the PRG proposal, carried by the news agency and Liberation Radio on the 18th and published in NHAN DAN on the 19th, calls the time limit regarding withdrawal "reasonable and logical." And an article in the NFLSV journal GIAI PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 22d, says that the first point, with its proviso for a discussion of the release of prisoners given U.S. agreement to withdraw by next June, is a very good basis for the United States to "honorably extricate itself" from South Vietnam.

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 19th makes no reference to the PRG proposal when it cites numerous calls in U.S. political circles for a fixed timetable for a total U.S. withdrawal.

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It recalls the Democratic Party resolution last February which suggested an 18-month timetable as typical of opposition to President Nixon's three conditions for continued "piecemeal" troop withdrawal. And it quotes from articles by Senator Muskie and Townsend Hoopes opposing the Administration's policies. (Hanoi radio on 30 August broadcast lengthy excerpts from the Muskie article which appeared in the 5 July New York TIMES.)

COALITION, Point three\* of the PRG "elaboration" contains  
OTHER POINTS standard denunciations of the "warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration." But it goes on to say directly that the restoration of peace necessitates "the formation in Saigon of an administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem." This demand in the past has been in terms of the "overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" and formation of a "peace cabinet."

+ Point four of the "elaboration" is similar to points four and five of the 10-point proposal. It calls for free general elections to elect a new general assembly that would work out a constitution; it says that "no party shall usurp for itself the right to organize general elections and lay down their modalities," and it calls for the formation of a provisional coalition government to organize the new elections.

+ Point five now stipulates explicitly that a provisional coalition government will include three components: persons from 1) the PRG, 2) the Saigon administration--"really standing for peace," and 3) various political and religious tendencies standing for peace, independence and neutrality, and democracy, including those who for political reasons have to live abroad.

Included in point five is the statement that the "provisional" coalition government would pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. The sixth of the 10 points said "South Vietnam" will carry out a policy of peace and neutrality.

The LPA commentary on the 18th presents the PRG as being particularly conciliatory in suggesting that a provisional coalition government made up of three factions prepare general elections.

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\* Point two of the PRG "elaboration" is point three in the 10-point solution--the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves.

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It says that the PRG does not demand for itself a monopoly in this regard, although it is "defeating the United States and is controlling a majority of South Vietnamese territory." The latter claim, in the past a staple of Front comment, has been absent from recent propaganda; and no Front propaganda since December has repeated the old claim to control over four-fifths of the territory; the last known claim using the figure in Hanoi propaganda was in July 1969.

+ Point six describes the process of reunification in terms similar to point seven of the 10 points.

+ Point seven is a new interjection which says merely that "the parties will decide together on measures aimed at ensuring the respect and correct implementation of the provisions agreed upon."

+ Point eight, unlike the 10 points, explicitly mentions a cease-fire. But it says only that "after the agreement on and signing of accords aimed at putting an end to the war and restoring peace in Vietnam, the parties will implement the modalities that will have been laid down for a cease-fire in South Vietnam."

XUAN THUY STATEMENT, In his formal statement at the Paris session  
OTHER DRV SUPPORT Xuan Thuy declared that the DRV delegation "fully approves and supports these elaborations by the delegation of the PRG" because they are in keeping with the 10-point solution which the DRV has "unreservedly approved and supported." Xuan Thuy added that Mme. Binh's eight-point proposal is of "very great significance," and he called on the U.S.-GVN side to "carefully study" it. "I hope," he added, that "you will give a serious response so that our conference may get out of its deadlock and promptly reach a correct peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem." However, he repeated none of the substance.

Further DRV support for the proposal is offered in a speech by Fatherland Front representative Hoang Quoc Viet and in a resolution adopted at a 21 September meeting in Hanoi marking the 25th anniversary of the Nam Bo resistance. Speaking at the same meeting, according to the 22 September radio account, Truong Cong Dong, acting chief of the PRG special representation in the North, hailed the proposal and said it had been "fully approved and supported" by the DRV. (The original 10-point proposal had been welcomed in a statement adopted at a special meeting of the Fatherland Front Presidium.)

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ALLIED REMARKS        There is no mention in the VNA account of the remarks made at the session by Ambassadors Bruce or Lam. However, VNA's report of Nguyen Thanh Le's post-session briefing says that Le "sharply criticized" Ambassador Lam's speech and also criticized the prepared statement of Ambassador Bruce as containing "empty words." VNA notes that Le referred to Bruce's additional remarks to the effect that the United States will not impose any government on the South Vietnamese people and respects their right to self-determination. VNA further quotes Le as commenting that these remarks are an "old trick" of the Nixon Administration to maintain the "puppet regime" and U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam.

LPA correspondent Truong Tung's dispatch also comments on the allied side's reaction by claiming that GVN delegation spokesman Nguyen Trieu Dan, in his press briefing after the session, was "embarrassed" when he said there was "nothing new" in Mme. Binh's statement even after an American journalist questioned him on the points concerning captured military men and the provisional coalition government.

FOREIGN REACTION        Liberation Radio on the 20th and VNA on the 22d carried reports playing up favorable worldwide reaction to the PRG proposals, including comment from the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cuba, and the Lao Patriotic Front. Support in the Sihanouk government's 18 September statement is singled out in separate Hanoi radio and VNA items on the 22d.

Hanoi radio on the 21st also says "U.S. political circles are welcoming the new peace initiative." It cites reported remarks of Senator Cooper urging that the proposals be studied and quotes Senator Gore as commenting they are "very interesting." According to Hanoi, "U.S. senators paid special attention" to Mme. Binh's statement that if the United States agrees to withdraw allied forces by 30 June 1971, the PLAF will not attack the withdrawing forces.

#### SOVIET MEDIA ON PRG PROPOSALS AT PARIS

Moscow's first reports of Mme. Binh's Paris statement came in brief Russian- and English-language TASS dispatches from Paris at 1334 and 1352 GMT on 17 September, respectively, which reported her call for agreement by the United States to withdraw

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its troops by 30 June 1971. But the dispatches went on erroneously to quote her as saying that in this event the PRG "is ready to set free all prisoners of war captured during the conflict." This incorrect formulation was repeated in some English-language newscasts. However, it appears to have been a Moscow error in translation and not a deliberate distortion, since a longer TASS dispatch from Paris some hours later, as well as a prompt domestic service newscast and subsequent comment, have rendered her formulation accurately.

For example, a TASS dispatch from Paris transmitted in English at 1828 GMT cited Mme. Binh as having said that if the U.S. Government declares it will withdraw its troops before 30 June 1971, "the sides will be able to immediately open talks on the question of guarantee of withdrawal from South Vietnam of all troops of the United States and the troops of its camp and on the question of release of prisoners of war." A TASS report printed in PRAVDA on the 18th said that "the PRG proposes to hold talks to come to an agreement on measures to guarantee the security of the withdrawal of all American and allied troops. At the same time, the PRG is ready to discuss the question of freeing all prisoners of war."

Followup Soviet comment praising the "new, important initiative" stresses the points on troop withdrawal and on formation of a coalition government. A foreign-language commentary by Soltan, broadcast widely on the 18th, says that the PRG's "principled stand" on the "pivotal point" on total withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops is "unchanged," but that to show its good will the PRG has "advanced many new proposals" clarifying the 10 points, the implementation of which could bring a political settlement "out of the present stalemate." Soltan stresses the point regarding the announcement of a U.S. withdrawal by 30 June 1971, after which the sides would "immediately engage in discussions about" the questions of the security for the withdrawal and the release of prisoners of war. Soltan also emphasizes the point on formation of a "provisional government of broad coalition" consisting of members of the PRG, certain members of the Saigon administration, and representatives of various forces in Vietnam and abroad.

A similar line is taken in a RED STAR article by Col. Aleksey Leontyev and in an IZVESTIYA article, both on 19 September. Leontyev concludes by noting that although the U.S. delegate

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"reacted negatively" to the initiative, it may not be the United States' last word; he adds that if the United States reacts seriously to the proposals, "it will have a real opportunity" to extricate itself from the war. The IZVESTIYA article says that the United States and Saigon delegates were "obviously caught unawares" by the PRG statement and that the U.S. representative's statement at the press conference that the proposals "contain nothing new" was met with "laughter among the journalists." A TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 21st says the United States has long been trying to "move to the forefront" the question of prisoners of war, and now the timing of their release depends on Washington's decision.

TASS has also promptly publicized some favorable comment from U.S. senators on the PRG statement. On the 18th TASS reported that U.S. Congressmen are particularly interested in the assertion that the PRG would not attack withdrawing U.S. troops and would be willing to reach agreement on measures to guarantee their security. It cited Senator Cooper as saying that "this proposal should not be turned down" and Senator Gore as calling the initiative "interesting." Other TASS reports cite Senators Brooke, Hatfield, and Dole as urging the Administration to study the initiative carefully. On the 23rd TASS says that Senator Muskie, also calling for a study of the initiative, told the Senate that "the solution of the question of American war prisoners could be achieved only through a political settlement of the Vietnamese problem at a conference table."

#### MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES ON BINH STATEMENT

All of Moscow's East European allies have reported Mme. Binh's "new initiative" in Paris, and all except Prague thus far are known to have briefly reported in the press her proposal that if the United States agrees to withdraw troops by 30 June 1971 the sides could immediately engage in discussions on measures to ensure the security of the withdrawing troops and on the release of all American prisoners.

The only comment on the prisoner issue thus far comes from Warsaw. A 19 September TRYBUNA LUDU article says it will no longer be possible to continue "anti-Vietnam propaganda on the question of the 'unknown fate of American POW's,'" since their release now depends entirely on Washington's own decision. A 19 September ZYCIE WARSAWY editorial on the initiative similarly

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says that "the possibility of rapidly freeing American prisoners of war undercuts the argument of war forces in the United States who assert demagogically that responsibility for the fate of these prisoners rests with the Vietnamese side."

#### SIHANOUK PRESSES RGNU LEGITIMACY, SENDS DELEGATION TO DPRK

Statements by Sihanouk and his government defending the legality and legitimacy of the RGNU continue to be publicized. In a "special message to the Khmer Buddhist monks" dated 17 September-- carried by NCNA on the 20th and by the FUNK radio from the 20th to the 22d, but apparently not by VNA--Sihanouk calls upon the bonzes to support his government and not be led astray by the Lon Nol regime.

Among other things, Sihanouk rebuts Phnom Penh's argument that he has "collaborated with communism" and allied himself with the "Red Vietnamese aggressors in Cambodia," charging that the Americans and their "puppets" are trying to shift the blame for aggression onto the Vietnamese communists. On his own authority Sihanouk denounces charges of "so-called communist Vietnamese aggression" and "imaginary" Vietnamese "invasion" of Cambodia. But he cites an 11 September USIS cable in responding to reports by the Phnom Penh regime that the head of the Mohanikay Buddhist sect called members of the VPA "bandits." The cable, he says, quotes a Cambodian officer as saying that "if the Viet Cong comes next time, don't send us the South Vietnamese soldiers. We can handle the Viet Cong better than we can handle the South Vietnamese." Sihanouk further quotes the cable as saying that "the North Vietnamese soldiers" reportedly go out of their way to show respect to the Cambodians and that there has never been a reported case of "extortion or racketeering by North Vietnamese on any highway in Cambodia."\*

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\* VNA has apparently ignored this Sihanouk message, although Hanoi did acknowledge an earlier Sihanouk reference to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. Hanoi radio reported Sihanouk's references to Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia in his 20-21 March statement, quoting him as saying that "the Vietnamese resisting American imperialism infiltrated into our country. This infiltration, which I myself have denounced to the world many times, is not a new question. Moreover, the infiltrations have been reduced considerably in recent days." See the TRENDS of 25 March 1970, page 13.

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Further responding to charges that he collaborates with communism, Sihanouk asks rhetorically if the Lon Nol group does not also "collaborate with communism," since it has "extravagantly lauded" the USSR and most of the East European countries for "standing on the side of its government" and for having refused to recognize the RGNU. Later in his message Sihanouk lists the 24 regimes which he claims have recognized the RGNU and asserts that the only countries which have recognized the Lon Nol government de jure are imperialists and colonialists who do not have Cambodia's interests at heart. He argues that the communist states of East Europe, despite Lon Nol's claims of their support, have not given their "official recognition" to the regime in Phnom Penh. Some have publicly acknowledged Sihanouk as the legal head of state of Cambodia, says the message, and the political parties and fronts of these countries have "officially recognized" the FUNK. Sihanouk adds that the "refusal" of "certain European communist countries" to recognize the RGNU does not signify that they support the Lon Nol regime, but can be explained rather by "certain interests of their own of these governments."\*

APPOINTMENT OF VICE MINISTERS      On 19 September NCNA carried a "communique" by the FUNK Political Bureau and the RGNU, dated the 17th, announcing the names of "seven persons now fighting in Cambodia" whose "nomination as vice ministers" has received the "highest approval" of Sihanouk. The communique--also carried by VNA on the 21st and by the FUNK radio on the 22d--adds that the "competence of several ministries will be transferred into the country in the near future."

The communique repeats the claim that "more than two-thirds" of the country, embracing "nearly three million inhabitants," is already "completely liberated" and that the city of Phnom Penh is "actually isolated and encircled by the peoples' forces." (Sihanouk's message to the bonzes reiterates that

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\* On 13 July NCNA carried a RGNU foreign ministry statement rebutting a "distorted report" by a Canadian correspondent which cited Sihanouk as saying he was "disappointed" with the USSR's refusal to recognize his government. The statement said Sihanouk had in fact told the correspondent that the Soviets may not have recognized the RGNU merely because "the interests of the Soviets and ours do not coincide."

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five provinces are "completely liberated" and lists some 16 others as being "half liberated.") For these reasons, says the communique, it was decided at the FUNK Central Committee meeting of 20-21 August to enlarge the responsibilities of the leading members fighting in Cambodian "liberated areas" and to appoint Khieu Samphan--one of the three ministers said to be in Cambodia--as deputy prime minister concurrently with his post as minister of defense.\*

DELEGATION TO NORTH KOREA            On 17 September Pyongyang's KCNA reported the arrival, at the invitation of the DPRK Government, of a RGNU delegation led by Dr. Ngo Hou, minister of public health, religious, and social affairs. Ngo Hou had previously led a FUNK delegation which visited Laotian "liberated areas" from 19 to 25 July at the invitation of the NLHS.

The group was received in Pyongyang on the 18th by DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Tam and was entertained at a Cabinet banquet that evening, according to KCNA reports on the 19th. At the banquet the Korean speaker, the chairman of the agricultural commission, claimed that Sihanouk's recent visit to North Korea (15 June-1 July) had further developed the "militant friendship and solidarity" of the two peoples and recalled that Kim Il-song at that time promised continued "moral and material assistance."

#### LAOS: CONTACTS APPARENTLY SUSPENDED DURING SOUVANNA'S TRIP

The Pathet Lao news agency on 23 September publicized another message from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma in the continuing exchange between the two princes on the matter of the site and level of talks between the Laotian parties. Dated the 20th, the message expresses "regret" that Souvanna has gone abroad, thereby "dragging out" preparations for a meeting of plenipotentiaries of the two princes in Khang Khay. Scuphanouvong complains that he has received no official reply to his 30 August message in which he announced the

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\* A 22 August "press communique" on the FUNK Central Committee meeting, carried by NCNA and VNA on the 24th, had noted that the nomination of "several vice ministers from the personages who are now fighting in Cambodia" was approved, but did not give any names.



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nomination of his plenipotentiary, Phoune Sipraseuth, and asked Souvanna to appoint his own plenipotentiary. Souphanouvong says in the current message that his special envoy, Tiao Souk Vongsak, who has been conducting preliminary talks with Souvanna, "will return to Sam Neua to report to me about the situation." He concludes by suggesting that Souvanna, upon his return to Vientiane, indicate whether he "deems it necessary to pursue the discussion on the preparation for the meeting between our two plenipotentiary representatives."

Souphanouvong's message fails to mention Souvanna's 29 August message to Tiao Souk Vongsak naming Pheng Phongsavan as his plenipotentiary and suggesting that they meet in Vientiane during Souvanna's absence, a suggestion Souk had rejected in a message publicized by Pathet Lao media on 1 September. There is no available Pathet Lao response to a 10 September letter to Souk from Pheng saying that he was prepared to meet with Phoune at a date and place to be mutually agreed upon.

Souphanouvong also fails to mention Souvanna's suggestion, made at the time of his departure for his trip abroad on 2 September, that the two princes meet in Paris. This suggestion had been denounced by plenipotentiary Phoune Sipraseuth in a 7 September Pathet Lao news agency interview, but in a "press communique" on the same day Tiao Souk Vongsak did not flatly reject the idea, noting that he had reported the suggestion to Souphanouvong and was awaiting instructions. He expressed the belief that Soth Pethrasy, the permanent NLHS representative in Vientiane who had gone to Sam Neua last month to report to Souphanouvong on the progress of the talks, would soon return to Vientiane with Souphanouvong's views. On 22 September the Pathet Lao radio reported Soth Pethrasy's return on the 18th, but cited him only as complaining in an arrival statement that Souphanouvong's 30 August message had received no official reply.

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## MIDDLE EAST

Soviet propaganda stresses the need for an end to the fratricidal fighting in Jordan and cautions that outside intervention would only further complicate and widen the crisis. A low-keyed TASS statement of 19 September, issued on the third day of the fighting between Jordanian and Palestinian forces, calls for an Arab solution and admonishes unidentified parties against foreign armed intervention. And Podgorny, in a speech on the 23d at a luncheon honoring the Indian president, puts the Soviet Union "firmly on record for inadmissability of external interference in the developments in Jordan, whatever the pretext."

Soviet media publicize a succession of statements by U.S. officials and press reportage on military preparations, pointing out that the United States is again, as in the past, planning armed intervention on the "pretext" of protecting American citizens. Moscow's cautious attitude regarding any Soviet action is exemplified by the fact that a single commentary--broadcast in Arabic and Turkish on the 18th--voices the stereotyped slogan that the "Soviet people" "cannot remain indifferent" toward the bloody events in Jordan.

Moscow for the most part provides carefully balanced, factual accounts of the developments. Jordan's charge of Syrian intervention is noted, along with Syria's denial. Following Secretary Rogers' 20 September statement condemning Syria's intervention, Moscow implies that the forces involved are Palestinian and--without denying Syrian action--cites Damascus' rebuttal of the U.S. accusations. Husayn's request to the Big Four for assistance in obtaining a Syrian rollback, which according to U.S. press reports was delivered on the 21st, has not been acknowledged by Moscow.

Soviet commentators see Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's visit to the United States as aimed primarily at obtaining further military deliveries and economic assistance, as well as U.S. support for Israel's obstruction of the Jarring mission, and at persuading the United States either to intervene in Jordan or to approve Israeli intervention.

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Moscow's profession of concern that the Jarring talks should proceed is underlined in a Nikolayev article in the 22 September IZVESTIYA which rejects accusations that the UAR is violating the cease-fire agreement, and countercharges that it is Israel which is violating the truce. The article is notable for its implicit acknowledgment of Soviet involvement in the problem of resolving the missile emplacements on the Suez Canal and reinstating the Jarring mission.

#### TASS URGES ARAB SOLUTION, NO FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN JORDAN

The short TASS statement of 19 September, essentially an appeal for avoidance of outside intervention in the Jordanian conflict, is vague as to the identity of the foreign circles said to be contemplating such actions. The statement does express "alarm" at reports of movements in the eastern Mediterranean by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which has "more than once" been used against the Arab national liberation movement. But it goes on to refer to "other reports" of plans of foreign military intervention by "definite circles in certain countries"--which could apply to Syria as well as to the United States or Israel. Reflecting Soviet concern at the prospect, TASS says such a development of events would aggravate the conflict in Jordan and the situation in the Middle East, and would "essentially complicate" the international situation.

TASS expresses the hope of "Soviet official circles" that the peoples, governments, and leaders of Arab countries and Arab organizations will do everything possible to achieve the speediest cessation of the fratricidal war in Jordan. Reiterating Soviet opposition to foreign intervention, TASS mildly declares that all who cherish peace and come out for strengthening international security "cannot put up with" such a development. And it concludes with a generalized pledge of Soviet support for the Arabs' "just struggle" for full independence and "national development" and peace in the world.

#### MOSCOW GIVES FACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF JORDANIAN SITUATION

Developments in Jordan have been reported factually, with a virtual absence of editorializing. Comment is careful to avoid blaming either side: Thus a Shishkin article in the 19 September

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RURAL LIFE observed that "dual power" has long existed in Jordan, with both regular Jordanian army and "quite large and strong subdivisions of Palestine guerrillas" stationed on its territory. Asserting that the guerrillas "react violently" every time Israel "makes a further attempt to sabotage a peaceful settlement," Shishkin said that the Palestinians denied "rumors" that the guerrillas were responsible for the apparent assassination attempt against Husayn on 1 September, and that the Palestinian resistance holds "reactionary elements incited by Western intelligence agents" responsible for the armed skirmishes which followed.

In its reportage on developments, TASS on the 16th noted the statement of the new military government stressing that its main task was to end the army-fedayeen clashes and achieve implementation of their cease-fire agreements; it also reported fedayeen leader Arafat as stating that events in Jordan were aimed at striking at the Palestinian movement, which would defend itself. On the 17th TASS in reporting the fighting which erupted that day duly took note of charges by both sides.

TASS on the 19th reported Nasir's request to Husayn for a temporary cease-fire "for even 24 hours," and Husayn's intention, in reply, to order a cease-fire; "however," TASS said, Jordanian commander in chief al-Majali just an hour later issued an ultimatum to the guerrillas demanding their capitulation within three hours. Noting Nasir's message to Arafat with an appeal for a cease-fire, TASS said that no answer had yet been received but that a guerrilla spokesman in Baghdad had declared that the cease-fire proposal would not be accepted by the guerrilla leadership. Later that day, TASS reported that Husayn had given orders for a cease-fire and the Palestinians had been informed of this decision by Nasir's representative visiting Amman. The following day TASS reported that despite Husayn's cease-fire order to his troops, fighting had flared up in the north with new force.

#### REPORTS OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION, DAMASCUS DENIALS NOTED

Moscow's first report on Syrian intervention came in a TASS roundup of developments on the 20th, which reported Amman radio as saying that a Syrian armored brigade crossed the

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Jordanian border near ar-Ramtha and attacked Jordanian troops. Units of the regular Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), based in Syria, are in action in the north, TASS added (on the previous day it had reported that PLA regular units "with a base in Syria" had joined the battle on the guerrillas' side). The Jordanian Government, TASS said, sent a protest to the Arab League against the entry of Syrian troops into Jordanian territory and demanded an urgent meeting of the League Council to discuss the situation. But, TASS added, according to a REUTERS report from Beirut, Syrian head of state al-Atasi denied the Amman radio report "on fighting between Jordanian troops and the Syrian armored brigade as an invention." A domestic service broadcast of this reportage, also on the 20th, failed to mention the Syrian denial, instead adding a sentence citing a Jordanian command communique as saying that as a result of fierce fighting the Syrian tanks were stopped and turned back. But an Arabic-language broadcast included the Syrian denial.

ROGERS                    Moscow's first reference to Secretary Rogers'  
STATEMENT                20 September statement regarding Syrian interven-  
                              tion appears in reportage by Moscow radio's Beirut  
correspondent Seyful-Mulyukov, broadcast in Arabic and the  
domestic service on the 21st. He noted that the Jordanian  
situation is becoming more complex despite efforts by the UAR  
and unspecified "other powers"--he did not say Arab--to end  
the dispute; the cryptic remark could denote Soviet efforts to  
intervene with the Syrians. Taking the tack that the units  
involved in the ar-Ramtha fighting are Palestinian forces, the  
correspondent noted fighting in the area between Jordanian units  
and PLA forces and "regular units of the Palestine resistance  
which had not hitherto taken part in armed clashes." No sooner  
were reports of these battles published, he said, than "Washington  
and London started shouting about an armed attack by Syria against  
Jordan." He said that Secretary Rogers "directly accused Damascus"  
but that the Syrian Government immediately rebutted the American  
accusation, pointing out that the United States was seeking a  
pretext to intervene in Jordan. The correspondent added that  
Washington and London, pursuing "this very purpose," were  
disseminating "provocative rumors about the so-called Syrian  
danger."

Subsequent mentions of the Rogers statement have obscured its  
application to Syria: A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on  
the 21st said only that the Secretary had spoken of the "possibility  
of further expansion" of the Jordanian dispute, and the domestic

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service on the same day similarly cited Rogers as saying the Jordanian events are "fraught with the danger of an extension of the Middle East conflict."

Rounding up news agency reports on the fighting, Moscow's domestic service on the 21st noted an AFP dispatch from Damascus that the Syrian Foreign Ministry denied that its forces are participating in military operations on Jordanian territory, and cited the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as reporting that the Palestinians now control the northern area of Jordan. In an Arabic-language broadcast late on the 21st, Moscow noted that Jordanian military governor al-Majali, in a statement broadcast by Amman radio, said that Syrian armored units were participating with the fedayeen in battles in ar-Ramtha and Irbid. The Jordanian statement, the broadcast added, pointed out that two battalions of armored vehicles were advancing toward Irbid from the border. It is known, Moscow said, that Syrian head of state al-Atasi has denied Amman radio reports about Syrian forces' entry into Jordan and participation in operations against the Jordanian army. Moscow domestic service broadcasts on the 22d continued to portray "resistance detachments" as holding the northern areas of the country, citing the Palestinian radio for reports that Jordanian planes for the first time bombed PLA positions in the Irbid area.

PODGORNYY ON INTERFERENCE      In his 23 September speech Podgorny seems to implicitly acknowledge that the Soviets have made representations to Syria with regard to intervention in Jordan. He says it is "urgently necessary" to put an end as soon as possible to bloody clashes in Jordan, to terminate discord between Arabs, and attain "a just agreement between the Jordanian Government and organizations of the Palestinian resistance movement." The Soviet Union, Podgorny goes on, "has been consistently coming out for this also in its appeals made recently to a number of states, both those belonging and not belonging to the area, firmly stressing the inadmissibility of external interference in developments in Jordan under any pretext whatsoever."

IRAQ,  
LIBYA                      In a roundup of 18 September TASS and AFP dispatches on the situation, PRAVDA on the 19th said that Amman radio had warned against any foreign intervention whatsoever. PRAVDA attributed to AFP a report that the Cairo AL-AHRAM said that despite the Palestinians' appeal for interference on their side, Iraqi

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troops had been withdrawn from az-Zarqa, and that "many people believe" the Iraqi forces, which have been in Jordan since the June 1967 war, were preparing to return to their own country.

Moscow has apparently not acknowledged the 20 September Libyan statement proposing the formation of a joint Libyan-Algerian force "to prevent new clashes" or, if necessary, unilateral Libyan action to deal with the situation.

#### MOSCOW NOTES ARAB "WORKING CONFERENCE" IN CAIRO

Nasir's acceptance of a proposal by Tunisian President Bourguiba for an Arab summit conference in Cairo to discuss the situation was reported by Moscow on the 20th. Late on the 21st, TASS and Moscow in Arabic reported that the conference would be held in Cairo on the 22d, and listed the countries which had expressed readiness to attend; the Arab broadcast included Syria, but TASS, about an hour later, did not. Moscow is not known to have reported Syrian head of state al-Atasi's arrival in Cairo and meeting with Nasir on the 21st.

Both the TASS and Arabic-language reports noted that Arafat had stated his willingness to participate, but TASS on the 22d, reporting postponement of the opening of the conference, said Arafat had informed the participants that "because of the situation" there was no possibility of his coming to Cairo, and suggested the conference participants come to Amman. TASS added that at Tunisia's suggestion a "special delegation" of four--representing Tunisia, the UAR, Sudan, and Kuwait--left for Amman to meet with Husayn and Arafat, and that the conference would begin after studying the results of the delegation's visit.

A commentary in Arabic on the 22d underscored the need for "effective tangible steps urgently" to stop the bloodshed in Jordan and settle the differences between the Jordanian authorities and the fedayeen. The decisive word in this "naturally" rests "above all with the Arabs themselves," it said. Calling the emergency summit meeting in Cairo "an urgent vital necessity," the broadcast added that the "personal meeting of the majority of Arab leaders" is necessary to "establish collective effective measures" to rectify the situation in Jordan as soon as possible.

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## USSR NOTES U.S. MILITARY MOVES, NIXON MEDITERRANEAN VISIT

Both prior and subsequent to the TASS statement, propagandists express concern at statements and press reports in the United States and Israel on the possibility of armed intervention in Jordan. Comment broadly accuses Tel Aviv and "imperialist circles" of striving to split the Arab world, weaken the Arab "liberation movement," and ultimately wreck efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. Moscow says no Arab side can gain from the bloodshed in Jordan, and calls for a quick end to the fratricidal struggle and prevention of outside interference, which, it cautions, would further aggravate the dangerous situation.

In his 23 September speech Podgorny says the fratricidal conflict in Jordan gives rise to "serious concern and anxiety, particularly in connection with the threat of direct interference of external forces, indicative of which are movements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and other facts."

Matveyev and Glukhov, writing in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA, respectively, on the 19th, cited only the "suspicious activity" of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean as evidence of imperialist designs to stir up tension in the region and exploit the deteriorating situation. In the 20 September PRAVDA, Strelnikov pointed to Pentagon reports that U.S. aircraft carriers and assault ships with Marines have been sent to the Middle East, and that C-130 transports have been transferred to American bases in Turkey and Greece, while the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg has been brought to combat readiness. Strelnikov said that an "official group" in the White House headed by Kissinger is studying "two possible alternatives--intervention by Israeli troops, or American intervention."

Strelnikov, and other comment, picks up the Chicago SUN-TIMES report, "after Nixon's chat" with the paper's publishers and editors, that Washington is weighing possibilities of interfering in Jordan "under the pretext of 'defending and evacuating American citizens.'" TASS on the 19th had referred to the Miami HERALD's report that the President, at a news briefing in Chicago on the 16th, did not exclude the possibility of armed intervention by "the United States or Israel" in Jordan, and had said that in certain conditions the United States "would prefer that Israel undertake this intervention."

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Vasilyev, in RED STAR on the 20th, also pointed to the Miami HERALD report, representing it as saying that at a private briefing for journalists President Nixon said that "safeguarding the security of U.S. citizens in Jordan" would be a pretext for U.S. armed interference. Noting Pentagon reports that additional ships and over 1,000 Marines are being transferred to the Mediterranean, and that this "show of military force" is being presented merely as "'certain measures' in the event of having to 'evacuate'" Americans from Jordan, Vasilyev scoffed that the scale and nature of the military preparations led one to doubt this explanation. Such a number of aircraft and warships with tanks and Marines, he said, are not necessary to evacuate about 300 Americans from Jordan.

The propaganda also links reports on a U.S. decision to resume full-scale arms shipments to Greece with the situation in the Middle East. A Kuznetsov article in PRAVDA on the 22d, according to TASS, recalled that Greece is the only country in the eastern Mediterranean which grants unrestricted use of its ports to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. He cited the New York TIMES as "acknowledging" that the Administration would like to have free use of Greek airports "for military purposes in case it wants to intervene" in the Middle East crisis. Comment also points to activity at the British sovereign bases in Cyprus. And Kobyshev in the 20 September IZVESTIYA noted "confused and contradictory" statements by British officials appearing in the press, a defense ministry representative declaring, for example, that Britain is "not taking any military steps caused by the crisis in Jordan," but at the same time confirming the arrival in Cyprus of detachments of British commandos.

A Shakhov commentary broadcast in the domestic service and in English to Great Britain on the 22d found the present situation reminiscent of the summer of 1958 when "U.S. and British interventionists attacked Jordan and Lebanon" after similarly concentrating troops in the eastern Mediterranean..

PRESIDENT'S TRIP      Moscow media promptly report the 15 September announcement that President Nixon is planning an eight-day trip to Europe beginning on 27 September which will include the viewing of Sixth Fleet maneuvers aboard the carrier Saratoga in the Mediterranean, as well as visits to Italy, Spain, Britain, and Yugoslavia.

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The focus of propaganda is on the implications for the Middle East, although the visit is also portrayed as an effort on the part of the President to aid the Republican Party in the upcoming congressional elections and to assess the situation in Europe in the wake of the signing of the FRG-Soviet treaty.

Barsukov, writing in IZVESTIYA on the 17th, asserts that while the White House announcement says the trip is important for promoting "the start of the era of negotiations," U.S. observers "are regarding it as a military demarche and a demonstration of U.S. military strength in the Mediterranean, which is directly adjacent to the center of the Near East conflict." Barsukov goes on to take note of the fact that the President will visit NATO headquarters in Naples and view naval maneuvers, and quotes NBC for the observation that the visit "is to serve to remind the Arab countries of the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean."

A Ratiani international review in PRAVDA on the 20th cites the New York DAILY NEWS for the assertion that the President decided on the trip "after the obvious failure of U.S. policy in the Near East" and the Washington POST's observation that the main aim of the trip "is a show of military force during the visit to the Sixth Fleet." According to Ratiani, observers link the trip with "the patronage which Washington is giving the Israeli aggressors, with the attempts to squeeze the Arab countries, and also with a desire to raise the spirits of the NATO warlike circles somewhat." Like Vice President Agnew's trip to Asia in August, Ratiani says, the President's tour in Europe and the Mediterranean is meant to demonstrate the U.S. presence.

Ratiani does not directly link the President's trip to reports of possible U.S. intervention in the Jordanian crisis, although earlier in his article he says that the United States, "under the pretext of a 'possible need to defend' American citizens and other foreigners in Jordan," has moved the Sixth Fleet closer to the Middle East. And Arabic-language broadcasts on 18 and 22 September, pegged to the Jordanian crisis and Sixth Fleet movements, take note of the President's scheduled trip.

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An Arabic-language commentary on the 21st, touching briefly on the trip, says the Mediterranean stopover represents "a flexing of muscles," the picking up of a "cudgel . . . to hinder and weaken the Arab peoples' national liberation struggle." And a participant in the domestic service commentators roundtable on the 20th says the visit to the Sixth Fleet "cannot be considered a contribution to the cause of peace in that vast and restless area."

#### NO MENTION OF AIRLINE HOSTAGES, HIJACKINGS "REGRETTED"

Moscow predictably does not refer to the fate of the airline hijacking hostages still held in Jordan, but Soviet disapproval of the hijackings is again made evident in passing references: Mayevskiy in the 17 September PRAVDA mentions this "regrettable incident" perpetrated by "extremist groups" of Palestinian partisans, and notes that the Palestine Liberation Organization's central committee disassociated itself from such actions. Mayevskiy cites the British CP organ MORNING STAR as criticizing the hijackings but at the same time calling it hypocritical to condemn one side and ignore Israel's "repressive actions," many times "in excess of the Palestinian extremists groups' terrorist acts."

In NEW TIMES No. 38 (Russian edition 18 September), an article by Ustakov on the hijackings underlines denunciations by "many Arab press organs" and recalls the Security Council's 9 September resolution expressing concern at the threat to civilian lives and calling for the immediate release of all passengers and crew without exception. NEW TIMES, too, while condemning these "extremist acts," says the "progressive world public" cannot close its eyes to the cause. The hijackings, it explains, "extreme though they may be," are a reaction to Israel's anti-Arab policy.

#### COMMENT ON MEIR TRIP ATTACKS U.S. AID, ENCOURAGEMENT TO ISRAEL

Moscow's propaganda on Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's four-day visit to the United States (17-20 September) views the trip as an effort to "coordinate" the policies of the two countries in the Middle East. PRAVDA correspondent Strelnikov on the 20th says the aim of the trip was threefold: to make arrangements

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for new deliveries of American weapons and for economic assistance to Israel; to "obtain the solidarity" of the United States for Israel's "tactics of sabotaging the contacts" with Jarring; and "to attempt to coax the United States into military intervention in Jordan or to receive a mandate for Israel to intervene." IZVESTIYA correspondent Barsukov, also on the 20th, sets forth essentially the same three aims of the Meir visit. Moscow says that in addition to her quest for U.S. military and economic aid Mrs. Meir had "other business" in the United States. Strelnikov in PRAVDA, for example, says that she came to the United States "to organize a campaign for the recruitment of American citizens of Jewish nationality into the Israeli army and also a campaign for monetary" support for Israel from Zionist organizations.

On balance, Moscow's propagandists conclude that Mrs. Meir was satisfied with the results of her trip. TASS and Radio Moscow on the 21st, for example, publicize her television remark of the previous day that her request for arms deliveries and new loans "had been received with understanding and sympathy." And a domestic service commentary on the 20th, citing REUTERS, says that Israeli Ambassador to the United States Rabin "was very pleased." He "could not contain himself," the broadcast says, telling Western journalists that "we have got all we wanted." Scattered comment does point to some dissatisfaction on the part of Israel. But an Arab-language commentary on the 21st concludes that hints in the U.S. press of "alleged differences" between the United States and Israel are "nothing more than a smokescreen" to try to conceal the fact that the "U.S. ruling circles met in full all the Israeli extremists' demands."

Drawing on Western press reports, commentators state that the sum total of military and economic aid to be granted Israel by the United States following Mrs. Meir's talks with President Nixon and other U.S. officials on the 18th is in the range of 500 million to one billion dollars. They note that she had hoped to obtain consignments of such "offensive weapons" as Phantom and Skyhawk jet aircraft, helicopters, missiles, radar equipment, and other arms; in Strelnikov's words, she is not returning to Tel Aviv "empty-handed."

An 18 September TASS report on Mrs. Meir's meeting with the President picks up the New York TIMES report on that day that the United States will supply Israel with "another 32 Phantoms," and that even before the White House meeting Washington had agreed to supply Hawk, Shrike, and Walleye missiles. A participant in the 20 September domestic service commentators' roundtable program also takes note of the story, observing that the United States will provide Israel "not with 18 Phantoms, as was indicated earlier, but with 32." In connection with the supply of missiles, a domestic service report on the 18th says that "at present a group of U.S. instructors is in Israel training Israeli pilots in the use of Shrike missiles."

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TASS on the 19th reports Secretary Rogers' meeting the previous day with Arab diplomats who expressed concern over press reports of new arms shipments. The group's spokesman, the Kuwaiti Ambassador, is quoted as saying that Washington's consignment of arms to Israel "will undermine a search for a peace settlement in the Middle East."

BORDER QUESTION TASS on the 21st, reporting Mrs. Meir's New York address to Zionist organizations, says that she asserted Israel must have borders which would ensure its security and which could be defended, "a thesis repeatedly used by Tel Aviv extremists as a cover for their plans to annex the occupied Arab territories." A 19 September TASS report of Mrs. Meir's press conference in Washington the previous day said that she confirmed she had sought Washington's support for the establishment of "so-called 'safe borders of Israel.'" According to this plan, TASS added, Israel does not intend to withdraw its troops from Arab Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, Sharm ash-Shaykh, and the strip of the Sinai Peninsula along the Aqaba Gulf to Sharm ash-Shaykh.

#### USSR SUPPORTS JARRING MISSION, ATTACKS ISRAELI OBSTRUCTION

Comment on the Meir visit routinely assails Israel for its "torpedoing" of the Middle East peace talks under Jarring. Propagandists assert that the United States, with its "encouragement" of Israeli "expansionist" ambitions, forgets its own declarations about its efforts for a peaceful settlement and "dangerously helps Tel Aviv" in sabotaging Jarring's mission. And Moscow complains that the White House "brought no new pressure to bear to bring Israel back to the negotiating table."

An Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th of an IZVESTIYA commentary said that Mrs. Meir in her arrival statement in New York asserted that Israel would agree to the resumption of contacts under Jarring "only if certain conditions were created, and that this was the essence of her scheduled talks with President Nixon." The commentary did not spell out these conditions--the rollback of missiles allegedly emplaced following the 7 August cease-fire.

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Propagandists reject the Israeli allegation that UAR "violations" of the cease-fire standstill by emplacing missiles in the Suez Canal have justified Tel Aviv's withdrawal from the peace talks. They counter that it is Israel which is in fact violating the cease-fire and that continuing "obstruction" of the Jarring mission is nothing more than an effort to retain the occupied Arab territories indefinitely. TASS on the 16th reported the State Department statement that d., "officially admitting" that Israel violates the cease-fire agreement, and observed that State Department spokesman McCloskey "tried to give the impression" that the violations are limited to reconnaissance flights in the prohibited zone at the Suez Canal.

A RED STAR editorial on the 19th, in the course of routinely castigating "imperialist" machinations around the world, also charged that the "Tel Aviv rulers," using "false accusations against the UAR as a pretext," are openly sabotaging the contacts aimed at a Middle East political settlement. The editorial would seem, however, to be mainly for internal consumption: The concluding passage brings up the forthcoming 24th CPSU Congress, noting that it will be marked by new achievements in "strengthening the USSR's economic and military might."\*

USSR SUPPORT           The Soviet Union's own continued support for  
FOR TALKS               the Jarring contacts is reaffirmed in the  
                          Nikolayev article in the 22 September morning  
edition of IZVESTIYA. Defensive in tone, the article  
rebutts at length "crude insinuations" against the UAR  
and the Soviet Union "trying to accuse them of frustrating

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\* The editorial, after affirming the USSR's "love of peace," goes on in standard fashion to state that the Soviet Union remains ready "at any time and at any place to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor if he dares to encroach on the security of our great motherland, and of its allies and friends." This formulation in which "friends" as well as allies would be protected has been used by Soviet leaders periodically since at least early 1965. For example, Brezhnev, speaking in Leningrad on 10 July 1965, said that while the USSR is constantly striving for a lessening of international tension, "our country is ready to give a resolute rebuff to any encroachments on the security of the Soviet people and their friends and allies."

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the Middle East political settlement." While Nikolayev cites the American press and "various groups" of Israeli supporters as the authors of these charges, he at one point says that "the United States" desires, through "creating a fuss about imaginary 'UAR violations' and insinuations against the USSR," to conceal Israel's desire to aggravate the situation in the Middle East. At another point, referring to publicity in the United States for "all sorts of American 'initiatives' and 'constructive proposals' on 'saving' peace" in the Middle East, Nikolayev--seemingly alluding to behind-the-scenes activity--says that under cover of "occasional insignificant actions and diplomatic activity, the United States" is giving direct support to Israel's "aggressive policy."

Nikolayev insists that the UAR "is observing" the cease-fire and that Israel's charges of UAR violations "appear, at least, false"; they have been "explained" in the UAR Government memorandum which says "no new missiles" have been placed "by the Egyptian side" in the Suez Canal zone since the cease-fire. He countercharges that Israel is violating the agreement with reconnaissance flights over Egyptian territory and strengthening of its installations along the Suez Canal, facts "acknowledged" by the State Department.

The article complains specifically of comment by Joseph Alsop calling the cease-fire "a 'flagrant provocation' and the Soviet Union's approval of this important constructive step 'down-right deception.'" And it complains that Roscoe Drummond "bemoans the fact that 'the Kremlin has destroyed our faith in the possibility of the establishment of a stable peace in the future.'" Nikolayev adds that "certain Americans" who "in other situations enjoy the reputation of being relatively sober and responsible people" are speaking in union with Alsop. It would not be worth drawing attention to this "anti-Soviet escalation of the American press," Nikolayev adds, were it not so "damaging politically, clouding both the chances of a Middle East peace and the entire international situation."

Outlining the Soviet position, Nikolayev declares that the USSR, not being a party to the cease-fire agreement, "has supported and is ready to support it." He recalls that the Soviet Union has submitted its "own plan" for a settlement, aimed at establishing not a shaky armistice but a just and stable peace. And he says that contacts through Jarring could become a "workable form" for achieving agreement between the conflicting parties, and that the temporary armistice creates a favorable atmosphere for these contacts, and "for this very reason" was supported by the Soviet Union.

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## PEKING SAYS U.S. INSTIGATED ATTACKS ON GUERRILLAS IN JORDAN

Following a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 19 September which offered Peking's first authoritative comment on the fighting in Jordan, a PRC Government statement on the 21st condemns the United States for "instigating the reactionary Jordanian military authorities" to attack the Palestinian guerrillas and vaguely warns the United States against launching "a new military adventure" in the Middle East. The statement calls on "the Palestinian and other Arab peoples" to "persist in unity, persevere in armed struggle, fear no threat and refuse to be deceived" in order to frustrate "all military attacks and political schemes" of the United States.

As in other Chinese comment and reportage, the statement does not mention King Husayn, referring to the Amman regime as "the reactionary military government of the Kingdom of Jordan." While thus taking account of a possible accommodation in Jordan preserving a monarchy which the Chinese may not wish to repudiate, Peking has also left its commitments in the conflict so indeterminate as to allow maximum flexibility in responding to developments. The statement says the Chinese government and people "firmly support" the Palestinian guerrillas in "fighting back in self-defense." As for possible American intervention, the statement merely forecasts that the United States would "inevitably end up in ever more tightening the nooses around its neck."

Both the government statement and the Commentator article call attention to U.S. military moves in the Eastern Mediterranean and other contingency plans. Commentator quoted a State Department spokesman as having "brazenly" announced that U.S. military intervention in Jordan could not be ruled out. An NCNA report on the 20th claimed that the Nixon Administration summoned Israeli Premier Meir to Washington for secret talks to work out "coordinated plans for encircling and attacking the Palestinian people's armed forces."

Peking's reaction to the fighting in Jordan began with an NCNA report dated the 18th which claimed that the military government was established according to U.S. instructions in order to suppress the Palestinian armed struggle, split the Arab countries and people, and realize "the 'Middle East Munich' scheme." The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator, noting that "an extremely grave situation" has emerged in Jordan, linked this development with the Rogers plan for a Middle East peace settlement. Commentator warned that the United States and

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Israel are colluding with "pro-U.S. forces in the Arab countries" to wipe out the Palestinian guerrillas and to pave the way to a peace settlement.

As before the current outbreak of fighting in Jordan, Peking has been carrying a stream of reports citing radical Arab elements opposed to the Middle East peace initiatives and in favor of armed struggle. An NCNA dispatch datelined Damascus on the 19th reported a rally on the previous day at which Syrian head of state al-Atasi categorically rejected the November 1967 Security Council resolution and the Rogers plan while pledging to place "all we possess in this country at the disposal of the Palestine revolution." Daily NCNA reports on the Jordanian situation have not broached the question of Syrian participation in the fighting. The reports play up the exploits of the Palestinian guerrillas and feature the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Peking has not directly attacked the Soviet position in the course of the current fighting in Jordan, though NCNA on the 21st transmitted an Albanian commentary which characteristically denounced "the Soviet social imperialists" as well as the United States for plotting against Arab unity. The initial NCNA report on the Jordan fighting had alluded to the Soviets in saying the Rogers plan had been undertaken "in collusion with another 'superpower,'" and the government statement contains a passing reference to the "collaborator" of the United States.

BACKGROUND: The PRC had last issued a government statement on Middle East developments on 6 June 1967 in connection with the Arab-Israeli war. That statement expressed support for the UAR, Syria, "and other Arab states" and people waging war against Israel. The statement harshly assailed Moscow for allegedly having connived with Israel and revealing itself as a betrayer of the Arabs.

The last previous PRC Government statement was on 4 May 1970 in reaction to the U.S. military incursion into Cambodia.

#### EAST GERMANY, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA ISSUE STATEMENTS ON JORDAN

East Berlin is the first of Moscow's East European allies to come out with authoritative comment on the current Jordanian crisis, with an ADN statement on 22 September calling for "an immediate end to the bloodshed" and "an immediate understanding" among the Arab states. "Competent quarters in the GDR," the statement says, "express concern that this fighting seriously harms the anti-imperialist movement of the Arab peoples and harbors the danger

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of a new military conflict in the Middle East." It adds that "threats of intervention" by the United States and Israel are "dangerously aggravating the situation."

A statement made for TANJUG by Yugoslav Premier Ribicic on the 20th, Tito's remarks in his Zagreb speech the following day, and an Albanian Government statement on the 22d constitute the only other authoritative East European reactions to date. Romania has abstained entirely from comment, and there is little available comment from elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Poland's ZYCIE WARSZAWY and Bratislava PRAVDA, however, notably depart from the general avoidance of criticism of either side. The Polish paper censures the "extremists" for giving Husayn an opportunity to attack them, while the Slovak paper denounces the Jordanian Government for serving "imperialist and reactionary" interests:

+ ZYCIE WARSZAWY's 19 September article, entitled "Blood on Jordanian Sands," blames the bloodshed on "the irresponsible extremism of Dr. Habbash and his comrades" who flaunted "the law and humanitarian principles" and dealt "a deadly blow to all that the Palestinians have achieved and what Fatah led by Arafat has managed to win." According to PAP's review of the article, it adds that Husayn "has only been waiting for an appropriate opportunity, and this has been provided to him by Dr. Habbash's conduct."

+ Bratislava PRAVDA's article on the 21st, reviewed by CTK, calls "the attack of the Jordanian military government against the Palestinian guerrillas" an "organized part of the efforts of the imperialist and reactionary circles which are interested in heightening the differences in views in the Arab world on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Despite "certain differences" among the Arab states, the paper argues, they should resist "imperialist" pressure by coordinated action.

YUGOSLAV REACTION      Yugoslav Premier Ribicic's statement for TANYUG on 20 September appeals to the Jordanian Government and the Palestinian organizations to stop the bloodshed and seek a negotiated settlement to their differences. The statement emphasizes that "any foreign interference or military intervention in the Jordan events, under any pretext, will be a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and a further violation of the territorial integrity of Jordan that will further complicate the already extremely dangerous situation."

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In his Zagreb speech the next day, largely devoted to internal matters, Tito expressed serious concern over the Jordanian developments: "Things are becoming more entangled among the Arabs themselves, and the Sixth Fleet is coming nearer and nearer; and Israel desires this to extricate itself in this manner, to make its aggressive ventures against the Arabs pay . . . ."

ALBANIAN STATEMENT      The Albanian Government statement on 22 September warns that the situation in the Middle East "constitutes a great danger to peace and international security." It predictably accuses the United States and the Soviet Union of being mainly responsible for the Jordanian fighting, alleging that "the main aim of the United States is direct military intervention in Jordan." Also characteristically, it professes confidence that the Palestinian guerrillas will defeat "Jordanian reaction" and "destroy all revisionist-imperialist plans."

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## BELGRADE WELCOMES ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

Belgrade has reacted cordially to the 16 September announcement that President Nixon will visit Yugoslavia during his 27 September-5 October trip to Europe. All the Yugoslav dailies played up the announcement on their front pages, in many cases accompanied by a picture of the President. The daily POLITIKA on the 17th carried a dispatch from its Washington correspondent hailing the planned visit as an example of "the era of negotiation, which replaces the era of confrontation." The dispatch also called the visit "confirmation of the long years of friendly atmosphere in American-Yugoslav relations" and went on to say that the American press has stressed the view that "Washington esteems Yugoslavia's honorable and independent position." The other major Belgrade daily, BORBA, on the same day carried a dispatch from its London correspondent quoting the TIMES as saying the Yugoslav leg will be "the most important stage of the tour."

Commenting on the projected visit in his regular press conference on the 17th, as reported by TANYUG, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman Vujica remarked that "mutual cooperation in various fields is developing favorably between Yugoslavia and the United States" on the basis of "independence, mutual respect, equality, and noninterference." Despite existing "differences" between the two countries, he said, good relations and dialogue "are contributions to coexistence."

SOVIET, EAST            Moscow has reported without comment that the  
EUROPE MEDIA            President's itinerary will include Yugoslavia.  
                             Sparse East European comment includes the  
observation by Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on 17 September that the  
projected meeting with Tito "is explained by American sources  
as consultations with 'Nasir's friend,' who could transmit  
Washington's views to the UAR President, and also as 'a  
demonstration of friendship toward a communist state which is  
not a Warsaw Pact member.'"

A 21 September Tirana radio commentary on the trip mentioned in passing that the President will visit Yugoslavia. Tirana denounced the entire tour as "a counterrevolutionary plot" to step up "blackmail and threats against the peoples of this area, especially the Arab peoples."

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## TITO CALLS FOR NEW GOVERNMENT BODY TO PRESERVE COUNTRY'S UNITY

Moscow's TASS reported promptly but very briefly on 22 September President Tito's Zagreb speech the day before in which he called for a sweeping reorganization of the Yugoslav Government under a new "authoritative body with full responsibility" that would "secure the unity" of the country. Noting only that Tito announced plans for a "collective presidency," TASS reported none of his rationale for a move clearly designed to counter potential threats, both external and internal, to the integrity of the Yugoslav state following his departure from the scene.

As quoted by TANYUG and Radio Zagreb, Tito spoke of the need for a collective body, among other things, to counter speculation "abroad" that the Federal Republic might "disintegrate" when he departs--and, by implication, that the situation would then be ripe for foreign exploitation. He remarked that speculation in Yugoslavia itself on his possible successor underlines the possibility that a "grave crisis" would develop over constitutional rights that had been given to him as president--rights which, he added cryptically, "are sometimes violated." He said the reorganization "will not suit some" and will "pull the rug out from under the feet of certain tendencies which are present in some circles of our country."

The new body, Tito said, would promote efficiency in government and prevent "disagreements" between the republics and the Federation, chiefly related to economic problems. The allusion is evidently to efforts by the richer republics--such as Slovenia and Croatia--to pit their increasing authority against federal powers to channel investment funds into less developed republics. An apparent aim of the new collective body would be to strengthen the Federal Government's hand in coping with mounting economic problems and in insuring that economic development is spread evenly throughout the country.

Tito emphatically denied that the reorganization plans were initiated from below as a device to remove him from office. He mentioned that he had been in office for "a long time" but "would nevertheless wish to have a little more possibility to engage a little more in some other things." In an evident appeal for broad consensus, he envisaged the new "presidency" as including leading republic and party officials as well as representatives of "all principal social-political organizations."

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The new body, he noted, will "free the League of Communists and its leadership from those everyday matters in which they are now engaged." He announced that the party would consider the plan at its next session but that it was still subject to "changes" and that no final decision would be taken until a broad debate had taken place--presumably in the republics, where any effort to enhance the Federal role may be expected to encounter opposition.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## REGIME HARDLINER JOINS APPEAL FOR INTELLECTUAL INVOLVEMENT

Underscoring the Husak regime's concern over continued hostile noninvolvement on the part of the country's intelligentsia, until recently the leading target of conservative attacks during this year's "exchange of party cards," arch-conservative CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Vasil Bilak has shifted to a more conciliatory tack in stressing the indispensability of the country's intellectuals. In a 20 September speech at a peace rally in Gottwaldov, Moravia, Bilak echoed the speech made 10 days earlier in Ostrava by the more moderate Husak in declaring that "socialism is growing from the work of workers and farmers, but it cannot do without the active participation of the intelligentsia." This point was highlighted by CTK in its report of Bilak's speech.

The former Slovak CP First Secretary also echoed Husak in insisting that "we are not casting out or rejecting anybody, not even those people who wavered recently because they let themselves be deceived," and in denying any intent to "install some sort of 'barracks communism'" or to "imprison our opponents."

HUSAK SPEECH           The Czechoslovak party's more conciliatory  
IN OSTRAVA             stance toward the predominantly liberal  
                          intelligentsia apparently has Soviet approval.  
TASS on 11 September and PRAVDA the next day carried extensive  
accounts of Husak's 10 September Ostrava speech spelling out  
the new, softer policy toward the intellectuals.

The Soviet accounts reported the CPCZ First Secretary as stating that "in the past year the CPCZ was backed in its work primarily by the working class and working peasantry" while "a large part of the intelligentsia stood aside to a considerable extent." The latter group, Husak added, "found itself in a greater state of confusion in 1968 and 1969 than were the workers." He went on to declare that "the time has come to embark on big political work among all the strata of our intelligentsia," claiming in the same breath that "the process of differentiation has reached such a degree by now that a considerable--even the decisive--part of the intelligentsia has crossed over to our positions."

Registering a desire "to give everyone the opportunity to demonstrate with concrete deeds his attitude toward socialism,

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to the political course pursued by the CPCZ," Husak said "no artificial walls should be erected which would push into our adversaries' camp anyone who is not an opponent of socialism and does not wish to be one."

At the same time, Husak was less explicit than before in again denying that political trials were impending. He remarked only that "no permanent purges are being prepared in Czechoslovakia" and "the Central Committee plans nothing of the kind."

INTERVIEW WITH MOC           Balancing the TASS and PRAVDA accounts of Husak's conciliatory Ostrava speech, the Moscow domestic service on the 21st carried a hardline interview with RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Moc on the occasion of the paper's 50th anniversary. Moc told Radio Moscow's Prague correspondent that in 1968-69 "the then leader of the Central Committee, Dubcek, willingly" tolerated alleged demands by the "rightists"--intellectuals--to free the paper from Central Committee control and make it an organ of "the whole party, responsible to no one."

The Moscow domestic service's initial brief report of a speech by Husak at a Prague meeting on the RUDE PRAVO anniversary--attended by PRAVDA editor Zimyanin and other foreign communist editors--singles out Husak's orthodox rejection of any peaceful coexistence or compromise in the sphere of ideology.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SHORTAGES IN RAW MATERIALS OPENLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY RED FLAG

An article in RED FLAG No. 9, broadcast by Radio Peking on 17 September, has openly acknowledged that some raw materials are in short supply. The article blames the shortages on "the rapid development of industrial production," which has resulted in "temporary difficulties, encountered in the course of advance."

Through appeals for increased local efforts to fill gaps in the supply of certain materials, especially fuels, Peking has often implicitly indicated that specific shortages do exist, but the usual formula is that raw materials are plentiful and can be uncovered through perseverance. The current article allows for new discoveries, but its main point is that old products must be made out of new materials. In one example a coal mine used stones as props instead of wooden poles, and in another a paper mill has utilized straw in its operation.

Following usual practice, the article warns that state aid is not possible in most cases and the localities must solve their own problems; but no unit is to accept the notion that "production is not possible when raw materials run short." As another means of ending shortages, the article postulates a basic rule of development: knowledge of the economical use of raw materials develops constantly, and once "the characteristics of a raw material are understood" its consumption rate per unit of product will be reduced. This thesis has been a feature of the frequent campaigns to save on coal consumption, calling for the development of more efficient stoves.

One factory is said to have reduced the weight of its major products by one-third and to have used lesser quantities of high quality steel through new product design. But the quality of the new products apparently still worries some people, to whom RED FLAG imputes the argument that "if new raw materials are used the quality of the products cannot be certain." The article derides this idea as conservative, pointing out that "the history of the development of modern industry" shows that materials used in products do change with time.

While local units are expected to bear the brunt of their own shortages, they are not to act in complete isolation. "Upper-level organs and supply departments" are to exert all efforts

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to expanding the sources of raw materials, and efforts should also be made by all units to supply "fraternal" units with needed materials. This theme of coordination of raw materials was sounded a number of times during the spring, especially by Shanghai, which issued a number of pleas that the country be treated as a "coordinated chessboard." Articles at that time indicated that one reason for the current shortages is the regime-inspired expansion of small plants, which drain off some supplies from the large producers.

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## CHILEAN ELECTION

## PEKING REACTS CAUTIOUSLY AND BELATEDLY TO ALLENDE VICTORY

Peking waited until 17 September to report and comment, cautiously, on the 4 September electoral victory of leftist coalition candidate Salvador Allende in Chile. An NCNA commentary on the 17th, widely broadcast by the Peking radio, avoids any reference to Allende's professed Marxism or to the support he received by the pro-Soviet Chilean Communist Party, describing him simply as the "candidate of the Popular Unity coalition and leader of the socialist party" and ascribing the election outcome to "mass struggles." The commentary also avoids any mention of Allende's public commitment to establish relations with the PRC.

Allende's success posed a dilemma for Peking. Ignoring it entirely would have scorned a development that could afford the PRC a unique opportunity to establish a diplomatic presence in Latin America, while playing it up too enthusiastically would place Peking in the position of approving a product of the "parliamentary road to socialism" which it is on record as opposing.\* The NCNA commentary thus skirts the ticklish aspects, discoursing on Allende's election victory as a product of "struggles" in the form of strikes and land seizures, against a background of mounting Chilean popular opposition to "U.S. imperialism's ruthless oppression, plunder, and exploitation."

NCNA duly notes Allende's failure to win a majority and the consequent necessity for the Chilean congress to choose between Allende and Allesandri. Unlike Havana and Moscow, however, it says nothing about alleged efforts to bar his accession to power.

Consistent with Peking's position on the parliamentary road and its attitude toward the Soviet-backed local communist party, Peking media had carried no comment on the election campaign. But an article appearing in the pro-Peking Chilean publication CAUSA MARXISTA-Leninista, edited by NCNA's Chilean correspondent, censured Castro for endorsing the Chilean electoral route to socialism. As trans-

\* Peking does not comment frequently on Latin American affairs. But its position on the parliamentary road was spelled out, for example, in a 25 January NCNA commentary reviewing Latin American anti-U.S. "struggled" in the sixties. The commentary concluded that Latin American revolutionaries have "gradually realized that only by opposing counterrevolutionary armed force with revolutionary armed force can they completely overthrow the reactionary role of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys." NCNA added that these revolutionaries "firmly repudiated 'peaceful transition,' the 'parliamentary road,' and other fallacies spread by the modern revisionists in an attempt to undermine their armed struggle."

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mitted to Havana in an information dispatch from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent, the article said "Fidel Castro publicly espouses the opportunist fallacy of 'to socialism through elections,' which has tragically awakened the people who trusted in the pacifist farce."

#### MOSCOW STRESSES ALLEGED MACHINATIONS TO BAR ALLENDE FROM OFFICE

Soviet comment on the Chilean election outcome continues to depict a concerted effort by U.S. and Chilean "reaction" to keep Allende from assuming office, at the same time emphasizing the Chilean people's determination to frustrate such conspiracies. While some Moscow propaganda has implied that Christian Democratic Party support for Allende in the 24 October congressional vote is almost a foregone conclusion, a 16 September Moscow domestic service commentary by Valentine Mashkin suggested that the issue was far from decided and broached, uncritically, the notion that Allende would have to make concessions to the Christian Democrats in order to gain their support. Observing that the Christian Democratic Party "holds in its hands the key" to the selection of Chile's next president, Mashkin noted that the Christian Democrats were demanding guarantees that Allende will not pursue an ultraleftist course:

The Christian Democratic Party can be defined as one standing to the left of center. Allesandri's line is seen by the party as too far to the right. Allende is more acceptable to them as a politician. However, many of the Christian Democrats are afraid lest Allende stands too far to the left. It is precisely this fear that prompts the Christian Democrats to ask Allende beforehand and obtain guarantees from him that his policies will not be of an extreme left nature.

Commenting that the Christian Democrats are in "a very strong position" to get their way, Mashkin acknowledged obliquely that their aim is to secure guarantees that a democratic system will continue: The party, he said, wants to retain constitutional protection for "freedom of action for the rightwing press and rightwing trade union centers."

#### HAVANA WARNS OF MILITARY COUP OR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION

Havana comment highlights the possibility of a military coup or an assassination to prevent Allende from taking over the presidency,

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at the same time evoking a threat of Argentine military intervention. Thus a Radio Havana commentary on the 16th, reporting that Argentine army chief General Alejandro Lanusse was visiting Washington, declared that Argentina is acting "as a loyal servant of the Yankee imperialists" and playing the role of "a sort of special gendarme to put pressure on neighboring countries having difficulties with popular movements." It would not be "strange," Havana concluded, for Lanusse "to play a top role in Yankee imperialism's schemes concerning Chile--schemes being denounced by Salvador Allende." In the course of the 1 August interview with Chilean newsmen in which he endorsed the Chilean electoral path to socialism, Castro had warned of alleged U.S. plans to use Brazil and Argentina as policemen on the continent, playing "the same role as that of Thailand in Indochina," but concluded that their intervention in any Latin American country would only precipitate a continental revolution. He also said it was important for Chile to be assured that Peru "cannot be used by imperialism" as a weapon against her. More recently, in a 10 September speech to the Lusaka nonaligned conference, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa mentioned the Allende victory and remarked that in Latin America "there is no lack of pseudogovernments that aspire to play the repugnant role of a Latin American Thailand."

**PUBLICITY FOR** On the 17th Havana media carried a communique  
**MIR STATEMENT** issued by the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a Castroite organization dedicated to armed struggle and hostile to the electoral path pursued by the forces it pejoratively terms "the traditional left." While hailing Allende's victory as signifying "a tremendous advance in the political conscience of the workers," the MIR indicated that it would support Allende only if he "takes over without an alliance with the Christian Democrats and without compromising his program." The communique indicated that the MIR's faith in the eventual necessity for armed struggle had remained unshaken by the Chilean election. Alleging that Allende's victory has produced "an impasse" between the workers and the landholders and industrialists, it concluded:

This will be resolved only through a confrontation between the rural and urban poor and the holders of riches and power. This confrontation has been put aside for now, but sooner or later it will have to come about, and it will undoubtedly be violent . . . . The armed struggle is today more than ever in force.

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The communique stated that the MIR's "armed apparatus" is prepared to contribute to the defense of Allende's electoral victory. There is no available Havana comment on the communique.

There had been considerable conflict between the Chilean CP and the MIR during the election campaign, with the communists alleging that the MIR, by provoking violence, was abetting "rightist" plans to prevent an Allende electoral triumph. Radio Havana reported on 31 August that the Chilean CP organ EL SIGLO had accused the MIR of acting as "a counterrevolutionary agent." According to the broadcast, the paper charged that an MIR statement urging workers to prepare for a general strike and the occupation of plants, as well as to stockpile explosives and firebombs, coincided with "rightwing plans to create chaos and prevent the triumph of the joint leftist candidate." A Santiago radio station reported that Chilean CP Politburo member Orlando Millas, addressing a central committee plenum on the 14th, had offered "amnesty to members of the MIR as long as the MIR militants behave well and do not create new problems."

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