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#35-70 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda

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2 September 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 AUGUST 1970

Moscow (3188 items)

Kazakh ASSR 50th Anniversary	(2%)	23%
[Brezhnev Speech]	(--)	11%]
Warsaw Pact Meeting	(8%)	11%
China	(6%)	6%
Middle East	(3%)	5%
Indochina	(5%)	4%
Vice President's Asian Tour	(1%)	4%

Peking (2756 items)

Domestic Issues	(28%)	37%
Indochina	(27%)	26%
[Cambodia]	(20%)	11%]
[Vietnam]	(17%)	10%]
[Laos]	(--)	4%]
Middle East	(7%)	9%
Romanian Liberation	(4%)	4%
Vice President's Asian Tour	(--)	1%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Pham Van Dong, speaking on 31 August at the annual Hanoi meeting marking the anniversary of the DRV's founding on 2 September 1945, voiced a standard endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution but went beyond the usual perfunctory formulations on the proposal in stressing the suitability of a coalition form of government to unite the South Vietnamese people.

Dong noted that the insurgents in South Vietnam have been concentrating on defeating the Vietnamization policy and claimed that their fight is taking place under more favorable conditions in the wake of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia--a "military setback" and "political disaster" for the United States. He also offered the first explicit DRV support for the Laotian princes' agreement to hold a meeting of their plenipotentiaries.

Departing from the pattern of his anniversary speeches in 1968 and 1969, Pham Van Dong specifically cited the Soviet Union and China in expressing gratitude for foreign assistance. Moscow marks the DRV anniversary in generally standard fashion, with the Soviet leaders' message repeating promises of "all-round assistance" and avowals of support for the DRV stand on a settlement. The Chinese message also predictably promises "support and assistance" and assails U.S. "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" and "schemes and machinations."

Vietnamese communist delegates at the 27 August session of the Paris talks called routinely for a change in U.S. policies and attempted to demonstrate that U.S. actions and statements contradict professions of American good will in the search for a settlement. The delegates echoed attacks in North and South Vietnamese communist media on recent statements by Vice President Agnew.

Peking's first reaction to the Vice President's 22-30 August Asian trip came on the 31st with the broadcasting of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, which routinely links the trip to plans for "U.S. imperialist aggression in Asia."

HANOI MEETING, PHAM VAN DONG SPEECH MARK 25TH DRV ANNIVERSARY

The 2 September anniversary of the DRV's founding was marked with the usual meeting, this year on 31 August, attended by all the regular members of the VWP Politburo except Pham Hung, who has

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not been reported present in North Vietnam since his attendance at a Hanoi reception on 29 September 1967.* Following traditional patterns, Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the major address on the occasion. Opening remarks, however, were made by President Ton Duc Thang, where in recent previous years the opening remarks have been made by Truong Chinh. As is normal, Pham Van Dong also held a reception in celebration of the anniversary; no reception was held last year, perhaps because of Ho Chi Minh's illness.

POLITICAL Pham Van Dong, in his address to the 31 August
SETTLEMENT national day meeting, predictably supported
 the NFLSV/PRG 10-point proposal and stressed
the need for a U.S. withdrawal and the formation of a provisional
coalition government to organize the election of a coalition
government.

Dong had not gone beyond a reiteration of this familiar position last year. This time he went on to elaborate on the suitability of a coalition form of government in meeting the problems in South Vietnam today. He declared that the NFLSV's proposal for a coalition government stems from "national spirit and humanism," and he added that "after years of wars and chaos, the most important thing, the prerequisite for the restoration of the normal life of the society and of each Vietnamese, is the realization of the policy of great national union and national harmony without discrimination as expounded in the political program of the NFLSV." He maintained that this will have a direct effect on the people, "arousing their enthusiasm, their mutual love and confidence, which are very necessary for stabilizing the political and social situation in South Vietnam." Dong added, in this context, that NFLSV and PRG policies do not countenance reprisals and are intended to eliminate all enmity amongst the people.

* While Tran Quoc Hoan, alternate member of the Politburo, was listed at some DRV festivities marking the anniversary, Van Tien Dung, the other alternate Politburo member, was not mentioned. His last known appearance was on 18 May at celebrations of Ho Chi Minh's 80th birth anniversary. He was present at National Day festivities in 1969, 1966, and 1965, but was not listed as present in 1968 and 1967.

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Although Hanoi statements do not usually discuss the role of a coalition government in this fashion, the 10 points themselves indicate that the tasks of a provisional coalition government would be, among other things, to "achieve national concord and a broad union" of various elements and to "prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination." These stipulations in the proposal have been recalled periodically. For example, LPA quoted PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien as stating at the 30 July session of the Paris talks that "those Vietnamese who cherish the supreme interests and legitimate aspirations of the nation, including many persons in Saigon political circles and even in the present Saigon administration, have clearly seen the spirit of national concord and broad union" in the NFLSV's proposals for the formation of a provisional coalition government.

In claiming that there is growing opposition to Vietnamization, Pham Van Dong professed to see a "new element" emerging particularly in allied-controlled areas in South Vietnam and in the United States. He described this element as a "new outlook on the war, its origin and the dangers it carries as well as the new undertakings to end the war and restore peace" Attempting to link the communists with antiwar elements in South Vietnam, Dong said that the "struggle of the broad masses of people" in Saigon, Da Nang, Hue, and other cities "bears an important and profound significance" and that this "patriotic movement" represents a "happy meeting" between the masses in South Vietnam's cities and towns and the NFLSV's and PRG's "great policies."

Earlier, in his discussion of U.S. domestic opposition to Vietnamization, Dong said that "contradictions among the U.S. ruling circles have become acute" and "many well-known figures" in Congress have done "all in their power" to oppose Vietnamization. Describing their position as though it were virtually identical to Hanoi's, he said they "strongly protest against the Nixon Administration's committing U.S. troops to Cambodia and Laos and widening the war to the whole of Indochina. They demand that the Nixon Administration bring all American troops home in a short period of time, that the Saigon puppet administration be

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toppled, that a coalition government be set up, and that negotiations be stepped up to end the war at an early date."*

NFLSV/PRG OBSERVANCE OF DRV ANNIVERSARY DRV National Day was marked in the South with a meeting on 25 August and publicity for a joint NFLSV/PRG message signed by Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. Last year the PRG and the Front sent separate messages to the DRV leaders, and no meeting was reported. PRG President Phat delivered the principal address at the 25 August meeting, held in a "liberated area" and under the joint auspices of the PRG, NFLSV, and Vietnam Alliance. The speech was carried in full by Liberation Radio on the 27th. The next day Liberation Radio reported a speech at the meeting by Vietnam Alliance Secretary General Ton That Duong Ky, but there is no other available information on who was present.

Phat condemned the United States for, among many other things, resorting to "peace frauds to cover up its failures and intention to de-escalate from a 'position of strength.'" As would be expected on the occasion, Phat called on the Vietnamese people to carry on the struggle until "we wipe out all U.S. and lackey troops, liberate the South, protect the North, and advance toward peacefully reunifying the country."

Other propaganda on the DRV anniversary includes a combined appeal, carried by Liberation Radio on 1 September, issued by various Front, PRG, and Alliance components including trade union, women's, peasant, and youth organizations.

* DRV media have continued to publicize expressions of dissent from the Administration's Indochina policies. In a notable recent example, Hanoi radio on 30 August broadcast lengthy excerpts from Senator Muskie's 5 July NEW YORK TIMES article including reference to his proposal for a U.S. troop withdrawal within an 18-month timetable. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's excerpting early last month of portions of Townsend Hoopes' book "The Limits of Intervention" was another example.

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MOSCOW AND PEKING MARK DRV ANNIVERSARY WITH MESSAGES, MEETINGS

MOSCOW Soviet media mark the DRV's 25th anniversary with the usual leaders' message and account of a Moscow meeting. Signed as usual by Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin, the message is addressed to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong; last year's was addressed to Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Reaffirming that the USSR will continue to give "all-round assistance and support" to the Vietnamese people's struggle, the message again endorses the DRV position on a Vietnam settlement, calling for "unconditional withdrawal" of U.S. and allied troops, but does not refer to the Paris talks. The message last year had similarly promised the DRV "comprehensive assistance" and expressed support for the DRV's efforts aimed at settling the Vietnam problem, singling out the demand for troop withdrawal, without mentioning Paris. The Paris talks had been cited in the 1968 message. This year's message criticizes new U.S. "provocations" which have "spread the front of imperialist aggression to the whole of the Indochinese peninsula," but unlike Peking it does not specify Cambodia or Laos.

The Moscow meeting, attended by Politburo member Mazurov and Secretary Katushev, was addressed by the chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet. Last year's meeting was attended by Politburo member Demichev and addressed by the Moscow gorkom secretary. A Vietnam-USSR Friendship Society delegation is in Moscow for the anniversary, and its leader, Tran Huu Duc, Minister Attached to the Office of the DRV Prime Minister, also addressed the meeting. No Soviet delegation is reported to be in Hanoi.

Moscow radio and TASS briefly summarize PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on the anniversary which point to Soviet assistance to Vietnam. IZVESTIYA recalls that the DRV leaders have repeatedly expressed gratitude for Soviet aid and specifically mentions the 20 October 1969 communique on Pham Van Dong's Moscow visit as stressing Vietnamese resolve to strengthen solidarity and friendship with the USSR. A PRAVDA editorial has been customary on the anniversary, although inexplicably there was none last year.

Other publicity includes a TASS interview with Pham Van Dong and a press conference by the DRV Ambassador, both of whom again thanked the Soviets for their assistance. There is no report thus far of the usual DRV Ambassador's reception.

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Anti-Chinese polemics are held to a minimum in anniversary comment; a 31 August broadcast in Mandarin contains the only available comment with polemical overtones, recalling the Soviet role at the 1954 Geneva conference as well as Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese people's building of socialism and struggle against U.S. "aggression." It asserts once again that "if the Chinese leaders responded to repeated calls of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community for united action to support the fraternal Vietnamese, the anti-U.S. struggle would achieve greater victories." Last year several routine-level commentaries had decried the anti-Soviet "slander" contained in the Chinese leaders' message on the anniversary.

PEKING The usual leaders' message from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai is addressed to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, the customary address of past messages having been to Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. It praises the struggle of the North and South Vietnamese people and adds that the "three Indochinese peoples'" war against U.S. aggression has entered a "new stage," with the situation improving all the time. Responding to the call of the Indochinese peoples' summit conference, it says, the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, "uniting closely and growing ever stronger through the fight," have dealt telling blows to the United States. In order to extricate itself from its difficult position, the message says, the United States is "pushing its counterrevolutionary dual tactics," plotting "all kinds of schemes and machinations" while expanding the war.

The message promises "support and assistance" to the "three Indochinese peoples" and expresses the conviction that the three peoples, "strengthening their unity" and persevering in "protracted people's war," will win. It describes the Chinese people and the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as "brothers and comrades in arms." There are no anti-Soviet references in the message this year, where the 1969 message had accused the Soviets of "collusion" with the United States.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial praises the Vietnamese people's struggle and quotes Mao's 20 May statement that "the people of a small country can certainly defeat a big country" if they "dare" to rise in struggle. The editorial repeats the claim that the revolutionary situation in Indochina is "excellent," the Cambodian "patriots" having liberated two-thirds of their country

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and the people of South Vietnam and Laos having won many victories. It declares that the people of the three Indochinese countries have formed a "strong united front" against U.S. aggression, but that the United States, unreconciled to its defeat, is stepping up its "trick of counter-revolutionary dual tactics," carrying out a "troop withdrawal fraud" while intensifying aggression.

PEOPLE'S DAILY quotes Ho Chi Minh as having said that the Vietnamese will fight until "all the aggressors are driven out," and it adds that by following Ho's teachings and persisting in a "protracted war" the Vietnamese will surely drive out the U.S. aggressors. The editorial concludes by asserting that China and Vietnam are related like "lips and teeth," that the 700 million Chinese people provide a "powerful backing," and that China's territory is the "reliable rear area" of the Vietnamese people.

Chou En-lai was the ranking official present at the Peking rally, which was addressed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and the DRV ambassador. Such a rally has been a standard feature of the anniversary observance, although none was held in 1969 when a Peking "reception," hosted by friendship societies and attended by Li Hsien-nien, was held instead. In 1965, on the 20th anniversary, Chou En-lai had attended the rally and Peng Chen, then a Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, delivered the address. Li Hsien-nien's current rally speech includes an anti-Soviet reference when it repeats the charge that "social-imperialism" and U.S. imperialism are "colluding," specifically to promote a "so-called peaceful settlement" in the Middle East and Indochina.

As in Moscow, there is no report so far of the usual reception given by the DRV ambassador which Chou En-lai has habitually attended in the past. A Chinese journalists' delegation and a medical delegation went to Hanoi to attend the anniversary observance and for a "friendly visit," but there is no report of a DRV delegation in Peking.

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COMMUNISTS IMPUGN SINCERITY OF U.S. STATEMENTS AT PARIS TALKS

At the 81st session of the Paris talks on 27 August, PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien, according to the VNA and LPA accounts, impugned U.S. good will and sincerity in seeking a settlement at Paris while "intensifying and widening" the war in South Vietnam and Indochina as a whole. VNA says Tien gave "concrete figures" on increased allied war activities and "repression" of the South Vietnamese, but it omits his documentation--references to U.S. B-52 strikes, use of toxic chemicals, naval bombardments, and the like.

Also omitted from VNA's account is a reference to remarks by Vice President Agnew on the 23d in Guam, at the beginning of his Asian trip. Tien claimed that Agnew "blatantly" said the United States "would not hesitate" to send U.S. forces back to Cambodia. His distortion of the Vice President's statement occurred in the course of a passage seeking to demonstrate that events have contradicted President Nixon's statements about restrictions on the use of U.S. combat troops in Laos and Cambodia and limitations on U.S. air strikes in Cambodia, as enunciated in the President's 30 June speech.

VNA and LPA report Tien's charge that the Nixon Administration is deceiving public opinion when it says that the level of fighting and the number of U.S. casualties in South Vietnam have decreased. VNA notes his claim that during the first six months of 1970 nearly 230,000 allied troops were put out of action, including 70,000 American and "satellite" personnel.

VNA's account of the statement by DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy is shorter than usual and touches only briefly on his denunciation of recent statements by Vice President Agnew. VNA notes Vy's assertion that while the U.S. delegate in Paris "repeatedly spoke of 'conciliation' and 'concession' and 'respect' of the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew in his 17 August speech and 23 August statement called for war intensification and military victory."

VNA does not report the particulars of Vy's charge; he specifically decried remarks by the Vice President about a potential "bloodbath"* following a U.S. withdrawal from

* Vy also referred to Townsend Hoopes' July FOREIGN AFFAIRS article, quoting it as arguing that a bloodbath already exists in South Vietnam.

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South Vietnam and about the "domino theory" and observed that "it is difficult to find" in such statements "what the U.S. delegate has called here 'a genuinely conciliatory atmosphere,' a 'process of compromise,' and a 'desire of narrowing differences.'" VNA also omits Vy's allusion to the Vice President's remark about the possible return of U.S. forces to Cambodia in order to protect U.S. troops in South Vietnam--a condition Vy described as an "arrogant pretext."

VNA reports Vy as saying that the Nixon Administration's "fallacious" talk of peace as well as its "hysterical" calls for war can in no way shake the resolve of the Vietnamese people to fight on, together with the Lao and Cambodian peoples, against the United States.

VNA deals with the allied delegates' remarks at the session in a single catch-all sentence, declaring that Ambassadors Lam and Bruce "rehashed the same obdurate and perfidious allegations they had made in the previous sessions."

RADIO COMMENT There is comment on the Paris talks, an infrequent occurrence, in a 30 August Liberation Radio broadcast which reviews the allied and communist negotiating positions at the end of 19 months of the four-sided talks. The commentary advocates the 10-point solution in routine terms and condemns the "unjust and illogical" stand of the Nixon Administration and the United States' adherence to the "very absurd demands" for a mutual troop withdrawal and recognition of the Saigon administration as legal and constitutional. It also derides U.S.-GVN proposals for "free general elections" and the "restoration of the DMZ."

RETURN OF XUAN THUY VNA reports on 27 August that DRV chief delegate Xuan Thuy arrived in Paris the day before and was greeted by PRG delegation members Nguyen Van Tien and Dinh Ba Thi, DRV general delegate to France Mai Van Bo, and others, including Soviet and Chinese diplomats and a representative of Sihanouk's government in France. VNA reports that in remarks responsive to correspondents' questions at the airport, Thuy reaffirmed the PRG 10-point solution, called Agnew a "warmonger," and said that President Nixon is still pursuing his Vietnamization policy and wants to prolong the war and apply neocolonialism in South Vietnam.

Hanoi as usual fails to report the post-session press briefing and hence does not publicize DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's remark that Xuan Thuy will attend the next session of the talks.

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FURTHER CRITICISM OF VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TRIP

HANOI The DRV press treats the conclusion of Vice President Agnew's 22-30 August Asian tour in standard fashion with comment in the 1 September NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, reviewed by VNA on the same day. VNA quotes NHAN DAN as saying that Agnew's mission was "far from being a success" and that "what he would report to Nixon would be a far cry from what he told the press." It describes as a "plain lie" the observation by the Vice President that the Asian allies have accepted the idea of withdrawal of the U.S. military presence as their capabilities for self-defense increase.

Portraying the Vice President as treading a tightrope in seeking support for an Asian policy that combines a reduction of American forces with reassurances to U.S. allies, NHAN DAN comments that these "contradictions" can best be seen in South Vietnam where the combined U.S.-GVN military cannot handle the situation. It asks rhetorically how the United States can hope to bring the Asian peoples to their knees if "puppet" troops are left alone to fight with American material and financial support.

Of all the capitals visited, NHAN DAN says, the only place where Agnew was warmly received was Phnom Penh, where the government, "drowning" under the "Khmer people's struggle," regarded the stopover as a "lifeboat." The Cambodian Government leaders "rejoiced," according to the commentary, at a "deeper" U.S. commitment, an unlimited U.S. air war in Cambodia, and the "veiled promise" of a renewed American invasion of Cambodia. (A Hanoi radio news dispatch of the 29th, reporting on the Vice President's trip to Phnom Penh, quotes him as calling that visit a warning to the communists that "the United States cannot resign itself to folding its arms and remaining inactive when other countries freely stage an invasion.")

The NHAN DAN commentary says Agnew was received "coldly" in Bangkok by the Thai leaders, who were urging the United States to increase its military and economic aid to Thailand in return for the dispatch of Thai "mercenaries" to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

MOSCOW Routine-level Moscow comment continues to denounce the Vice President's tour as an effort to implement the Nixon doctrine, showing that the United States plans to continue military, political, and economic interference in Asia.

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A TASS commentary on 31 August also suggests that the trip was made for reasons of "narrow political partisanship" in view of the forthcoming congressional elections.

Commentators note that Agnew assured the South Koreans of additional military aid and say that he promised resolute support to Chiang Kai-shek with a view to turning Taiwan into a B-52 base. U.S. aggressive plans toward Cambodia are said to have been revealed by the trip, in the wake of the U.S. announcement of 40 million dollars' worth of military aid to the Lon Nol regime. Moscow says that in Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh Agnew stressed the Vietnamization program and assured the allies of increased aid, particularly the financing of operations of Saigon and Thai troops in Cambodia. TASS comments on the 31st that this violates Senator Fulbright's amendment forbidding the financing of "mercenaries" on the territory of Laos and Cambodia.

Brief reports say that in Phnom Penh Agnew discussed "the possibility of a new intrusion into Cambodian territory" and that the Lon Nol regime asked for stepped-up U.S. aid. Commentators interpret the visit as a gesture confirming U.S. intent to continue "all-round support" to the Lon Nol regime.

A number of commentaries now bring up Agnew's 23 August remarks raising the possibility that a decision to re-enter Cambodia could be made if necessary to protect the security of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. A TASS commentary on the 31st says these remarks have raised "serious alarm." In PRAVDA on the 27th, Shchedrov says "the U.S. militarists are threatening Cambodia with a new intervention," pointing to unspecified "hints" by Agnew during his trip as well as to alleged evidence of growing U.S. interference in Cambodia. Shchedrov adds that "official U.S. propaganda" is putting forth a "new thesis" that Vietnamization and the security of U.S. troops in South Vietnam depend on the "durability" of the Lon Nol regime. A panelist in the 30 August domestic service roundtable, noting that Agnew had "directly linked" Cambodia and South Vietnam in tying the security of American troops in South Vietnam to the situation in Cambodia, commented that one gets the impression that Washington is preparing for a new "direct military interference" in Cambodia.

PEKING Peking's first comment on its own authority on Vice President Agnew's trip comes at the conclusion of his tour in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, broadcast on the 31st. The article says routinely that the object of the trip was to make further plans for U.S. aggression in Asia and

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to peddle the "bankrupt" Nixon doctrine. On the latter point, it comments that the failure of Washington's plan to rely on its allies in Asia was demonstrated by the dispatch of U.S. troops to Cambodia, but that "after receiving a severe beating, the United States has again had to place its hopes on its running dogs." In line with this analysis, the article says that in Saigon the Vice President supported the GVN in stepping up the war "under the guise of 'Vietnamization'" and that in Bangkok his objective was to drive more Thai "mercenaries" onto the Indochina battlefield.

A 31 August NCNA report on the Vice President's trip similarly pictures the United States as beset with problems in implementing the Nixon doctrine. NCNA contrasts recent Administration promises to back the Asian allies with a statement by the President calling for Asian "self-help."

The Commentator article briefly notes that "before Agnew's arrival in Phnom Penh, he flagrantly announced that the Nixon Administration will do its utmost to support" the Lon Nol government. The article does not mention reports that the Vice President also raised the possibility of U.S. troops returning to Cambodia; but Peking accounts of foreign reaction to the trip include an NCNA account of an LPA commentary which says the Vice President declared that the issue of Cambodia is "related to the security of U.S. forces in South Vietnam" and that if that security is threatened, "U.S. ground forces will once again be dispatched to Cambodia."*

ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY, RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

Sihanouk again argues the case for the legitimacy of his Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) in a 29 August statement, carried by NCNA on the 31st, refuting "slanders" by the Indonesian and "Malayan" governments. These governments, he says, have been trying to prove that the RGNU is a "government in exile" and a "government without territory." Although the statement does not mention the forthcoming nonaligned conference in Lusaka, Zambia, it is evidently prompted by the question of Cambodian government representation.

* See the Sino-U.S. Relations section of this TRENDS for a further discussion of Peking's comment on the Vice President's trip.

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Sihanouk repeats claims that the RGNU occupies two-thirds of Cambodian territory, that it has its own army, and that three RGNU ministers are "leading the people's and national administration" in Cambodia. He adds that Western reporters recently released by the FUNK "formally recognize" the existence of the Front and its army. Asserting that his government "has all the attributes of the legal government of the Khmer state," he recalls that in his "open letter" to the leaders of nonaligned states (carried by NCNA from 9 to 14 August) he had made a case for the illegality of the Lon Nol regime. He insists that it governs only Phnom Penh and that its authority over nearby territory is ensured solely by Saigon troops, and he concludes that the arguments of Indonesia and "Malaya" should be rejected by the states of the third world.

The recognition issue is raised sharply in a 25 August "commentary" by the "information bureau of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the FUNK," carried by NCNA on the 27th. Commenting on the seizure of the Cambodian embassy in Prague on behalf of the FUNK, the commentary says "certain people" who call this action a "patriotic act" at the same time brand it an "illegal occupation." It argues that to describe the takeover of the embassy by a diplomat of the FUNK, "whom the Czechoslovak Government has recognized as such," as an illegal occupation is tantamount to saying that "the liberation and present occupation of two-thirds of Cambodia by our national liberation armed forces are also illegal"--unless, it adds sarcastically, one recognizes the "fascist, antipopular regime of the traitorous Lon Nol/Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh clique" as the only legal representative of the Khmer people.

In previous messages to President Svoboda on the episode, Sihanouk had more politely asked the Czechoslovaks to "clarify" their position on recognition. On 18 August a Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement had said that the seizure violated the laws of the host country.

Belgrade's TANYUG reports on 1 September that a Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman said the secretary who had seized the Cambodian embassy had agreed to leave the building on the understanding that the ambassador representing the Lon Nol regime would not return to it. Prague media have not so far carried such a report.

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HANOI PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONES

A 27 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, reported in Hanoi media that day, protests alleged U.S. "acts of war" in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The protest says the United States used "many airplanes, including B-52's,* for repeated attacks" on Huong Lap village from 14 to 25 August and fired artillery on Vinh Son village "from south of the DMZ" on 19, 21, and 24 August. It also charges that U.S. aircraft spread toxic chemicals on Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, Vinh Son, and Vinh Thanh villages on 25 August, "poisoning many people." According to the reports, all the villages are located in the northern part of the DMZ.

Hanoi radio claimed on 23 August that the army and people of Quang Ninh Province, "competing to score merits to mark" the 25th anniversaries of the August Revolution and National Day, had shot down an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane that day. The alleged downing brings Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,360.

LAOS: CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRINCES CONTINUE

Pathet Lao propaganda continues to complain that Souvanna Phouma is avoiding the issue of a meeting of the plenipotentiaries of the two princes despite his 25 June suggestion that representatives meet at Khang Khay. On 27 and 28 August Pathet Lao media reported that Souphanouvong's envoy, Tiao Souk Vongsak, met Souvanna Phouma for the fifth time on the 21st and took him to task for "evading the question of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two princes" and for appointing a delegation of "his illegal administration" for negotiations. The report added without elaboration that Tiao Souk Vongsak and Soth Pethrasi, the NLHS permanent representative in Vientiane, also met the French and Indian ambassadors in Vientiane on the 21st.

The Pathet Lao radio reported on 28 August that Soth Pethrasi had "recently" returned to Sam Neua to report to Souphanouvong on the progress of the contacts. And on 1 September the Radio

* The last previous DRV charges of the U.S. use of B-52's appeared in a 13 August foreign ministry spokesman's statement. See the TRENDS of 19 August 1970, page 13.

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of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces reported that as a result of his talks with Soth Pethrasi, Souphanouvong sent to his envoy in Vientiane an "urgent order" to arrange with Souvanna Phouma for a meeting between the two princes' plenipotentiaries at Khang Khay "at the earliest date." The order, according to the radio, stated that Souphanouvong had appointed Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth as his plenipotentiary, and it once again criticized Souvanna Phouma for designating a "so-called government delegation" in order to avoid a meeting of plenipotentiaries.

HANOI Pham Van Dong's 1 September DRV National Day speech contains the first direct expression of DRV support for the contacts between the two princes, although Hanoi media had previously mentioned that the activity was taking place. Dong says the United States' "failures" in its war in Laos prompted "many personalities in Vientiane who have so far relied on the United States" to start worrying about the consequences of American "aggression." In this situation, says Dong, an exchange of letters has taken place between Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma which led to agreement on a meeting of their plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. "Our people welcome this event of positive significance," Dong declares.

MOSCOW Moscow expresses satisfaction with the contacts in a radio commentary broadcast in English to South Asia on 26 August. It calls the agreement on a meeting of "authorized delegates" of the two sides in Khang Khay "a definite advance" in the contacts, and it adds that "those who want peace in Laos now hope that a peaceful settlement will be reached."

The commentary does not mention the subsequent controversy over the meeting of plenipotentiaries or the appointment of Vientiane's "government delegation." Charging that U.S. intervention is what stands in the way of a settlement, it says that every time there is a hint of a peace settlement, the United States whips up tension in Laos. "It can hardly be a coincidence," the commentator adds, that as soon as the possibility of contacts emerged, the United States sent Saigon troops into the Saravane region--the charge made by Souphanouvong in his 13 August message to Souvanna Phouma.

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PEKING Peking continues to avoid all mention of the current contacts. The subject is unmentioned in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, carried in the Peking domestic service on 31 August, supporting the 15 August NLHS Central Committee statement which protested the alleged U.S. dispatch of Saigon troops into Laos. PEOPLE'S DAILY says the alleged U.S. move indicates that "while playing the trick of troop withdrawals," the United States is at the same time stepping up aggression against the three Indochinese countries with the object of converting "the whole of Indochina into its colony and military base."

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MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV CALLS FOR REALISM, RESPONSIBILITY IN MIDEAST

In contrast to his usual relatively brief, pro forma remarks on the Middle East, Brezhnev gave considerable attention to the crisis in his 28 August Alma-Ata speech, with notable stress on the need for "honest observance" of the cease-fire agreement and "real steps" toward a peaceful settlement. He noted with approval the UAR and Jordanian agreement to a three-month cease-fire--with no mention of the U.S. initiative--which "compelled" Israel also to agree to the cease-fire and to declare for the first time its readiness to comply with the November 1967 Security Council resolution. Mentioning that the sides have held their first contacts through Ambassador Jarring, Brezhnev said the USSR takes a "positive view" of such developments and looks with satisfaction on the UAR's "constructive position."

Brezhnev declared that there are now opportunities for approaching the settlement of the conflict "from positions of realism and responsibility." In an admonition clearly directed at Israel, he said what is needed now is "not new provocations and subterfuges designed to circumvent or violate the cease-fire agreement, but an honest observance of the agreement reached and real steps in favor of peace." He added that those who have been trying to "impose their will 'from a position of strength'" on the Arab countries should abandon this "hopeless adventurist line dangerous to world peace."

Brezhnev seemed also to address a warning to militant Arabs and Palestinians who reject a peaceful solution when he said this "little step" toward peace has already "met with sharp opposition from supporters of continued military actions and all adherents of an aggressive course." It is very important, he added, for the peace forces in the region not to let the initiative for settling the conflict out of their hands and not to let "the foes of peace undermine the agreement reached or use it as a cover for their aggressive designs."

It is in the general interests of the peoples, Brezhnev concluded, that the cease-fire become a good beginning for a fair, durable, and lasting peace. Earlier in the speech, he expressed the Soviet Union's "profound conviction" that an end to the conflict

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would meet the vital interests of both the Arab countries and Israel. Here he made the point--which has appeared in other recent propoganda--that the Arabs need peace to pursue their economic development. In the same vein, in a 5 August speech at a luncheon for an Iraqi delegation, Mazurov had called peace an "imperative condition" for the success of the Arabs' "progressive socioeconomic transformations."

As in his 12 June election speech, Brezhnev made no mention of the United States, referring only to Israeli actions dictated by "international imperialist circles"; in June he had referred to the Tel Aviv rulers "and all those who encourage them." He again expounded the Soviet view that there can be no reward for the "aggressor" and that peace can only be insured through full Israeli withdrawal. And he again affirmed the right of Israel to exist while repeating the standard Soviet formulation on Palestinian "rights," calling for assurance of the national rights, security, and independence of all states of the area, "including assurance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine." PRAVDA's Belyayev, in the 30 August domestic service commentators' roundtable, asserted that this statement dealt a "shattering blow" to all those who allege that the Soviet Union "wants to destroy the state of Israel or supports certain forces who would like to do so." And in a PRAVDA article on 2 September, reviewed by TASS, Belyayev says that fulfillment of this condition would create a possibility to "guarantee the territorial integrity of both the Arab countries and the state of Israel."

MOSCOW ACCUSES ISRAEL OF OBSTRUCTING JARRING TALKS

Soviet propagandists express concern over the delay in the Arab-Israeli contacts, accusing Israel of trying to obstruct Jarring's mission by delaying appointment of its representatives, then calling home its UN envoy, Tekoah, for consultations and postponing his return to New York. TASS reported on the 31st that Jarring had expected Tekoah's return to New York that day, making it possible to place contacts "on a more permanent basis and start the discussion of more essential issues." On 2 September TASS noted that since the Israeli cabinet failed to adopt any "specific decision" in its meeting the preceding day, Tekoah again postponed his return, and therefore Jarring cannot continue his contacts.

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Commentators claim that these delays, as well as Israel's continued charges of UAR cease-fire violations, are aimed at creating difficulties for Jarring's mission and ultimately at preventing fulfillment of the Security Council resolution, or at least at gaining some sort of advantage "by means of threats." In effect shrugging off charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations, Moscow insists that the important thing is to get the talks under way. Commentators continue to express guarded optimism, but complain that such optimism could be more justified were it not for Israel's behavior and statements by Israeli leaders.

In this connection, Moscow's domestic service on the 29th cited remarks by Israeli Information Minister Galili that a situation might arise in which Israel would be forced to withdraw from the "preliminary talks." Israeli leaders are continuing their "verbal blackmail," the radio said, in an effort to condition public opinion to the idea that the talks could end without results. And panelists in the domestic service roundtable program on the 30th quoted Prime Minister Meir to the effect that Israel would break off the talks if the Arabs did not submit to Tel Aviv's demands.

Roundtable panelist Belyayev, referring to Arab and Israeli charges of respective cease-fire violations, said the important thing is not mutual accusations but "really concrete measures" to find a way to a peaceful settlement. In his PRAVDA article on 2 September, Belyayev urges that in the interests of speedy restoration of peace Israel should stop its "sabre rattling" and delays and get down to business, "to the advancement of concrete proposals" for complete fulfillment of Resolution 242. Similarly, Mayevskiy commented in the 30 August PRAVDA that it was time the Israeli leaders put an end to their "unrealistic approach" and switched to serious steps for a peaceful solution.

CEASE-FIRE Moscow continues to dismiss as fabrications Israeli charges of UAR cease-fire violations, claiming that such assertions have "repeatedly been officially denied" by Cairo. Thus TASS on the 31st maintained that official UAR spokesmen have made it clear that the UAR has not contravened the cease-fire agreement and "strictly adheres to it." At the same time, Moscow reports--without special emphasis--UAR, Jordanian, and Lebanese protests against Israeli actions. Belyayev, in the commentators' roundtable on the 30th, noted Arab press reports of Israeli violations in the form of

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construction of "new fortifications" and repair of roads and airfields on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Speculating on the motive behind these efforts to "prepare the military arsenal," Belyayev said it might be to start a "new round of some kind of military adventures," or the Israelis could have "some other provocative purposes in mind."

Reporting Nasir's remarks to a World Peace Council delegation which the Egyptian President received on 30 August, TASS the following day cited his statement--with regard to Israeli charges of movement of UAR missile units in the Suez Canal zone--that "these missiles were there long before the cease-fire agreement came into force." Moscow's domestic service on the 31st went on to cite Nasir's further remark that it was these batteries which shot down Israeli Phantoms.

The domestic service commentary, by Ryzhikov, makes Moscow's second known reference to U.S. air surveillance of the cease-fire zone, claiming that the "complete groundlessness" of Tel Aviv accusations "has been confirmed by data from aerial photographs taken by American spy satellites and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft" which were "illegally" sent up "over Egypt to check Israel's complaints." A Shulyukin article in TRUD on 25 August, in what was apparently Moscow's first reference to U.S. monitoring of the cease-fire, represented Israel as making the "brazen demand" that "U.S. aircraft exercise control over the cease-fire line between the UAR and Israel." Moscow was not heard to mention the UAR's rejection--according to Cairo radio on the 21st--of monitoring by "U.S. satellites or U-2 espionage planes."

U.S. MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL TASS on 1 September reported without comment that Defense Secretary Laird, in a letter to Senator Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the United States should allocate credits for arms shipments to Israel on a much larger scale than was planned last February. TASS added that Laird demanded Congressional approval of the part of the military sales bill which "gives the government power to help Israel" with planes and other types of armaments. "As to arms shipments to Israel during the temporary cease-fire," TASS said, Secretary Laird in his letter said the United States "is taking all the necessary steps to keep the arms balance in favor of Israel."

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On 2 September TASS reported that the Senate, "under government pressure," adopted an amendment to the military procurements bill which gives the government "unlimited opportunities" to provide Tel Aviv with modern military equipment on easy terms. The government did everything possible to gain Senate approval of the expansion of military aid to Israel, TASS said, recalling that Laird in his letter to Stennis before the vote "especially insisted" on the adoption of the amendment to the bill giving the government powers to supply Israel with combat planes and other weapons.

A Kolesnichenko article in the 2 September PRAVDA, reviewed in Moscow's domestic service, observes that the U.S. Government "officially admitted that it dispatched to Israel . . . during the period of the cease-fire agreement," a new consignment of weapons whose delivery is effected "under the pretext of preservation of the balance of power."

BIG TWO Moscow has taken no note of U.S. press reports
PEACE FORCE on remarks by Administration officials at a
press background briefing in San Clemente on
24 August concerning a possible U.S.-Soviet peace-keeping role as part of practical security arrangements stemming from a political settlement. Nor has there been any acknowledgment of President Nixon's remark on 31 August to CBS correspondents that he did not believe such suggestions would be particularly helpful at a time when the Jarring mission is going forward.

Earlier, in a 7 August Arabic-language broadcast, Moscow had rejected the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet peace-keeping force as suggested in a 4 August Washington POST editorial. A broadcast in Arabic on 6 August recalled that Kosygin, in his 25 June 1967 press conference at the United Nations, had "refuted the statement that the two major powers" should lead the world and dictate their conditions to it.

FULBRIGHT TASS on 23 August provided a short summation
STATEMENT of Senator Fulbright's Middle East proposals . . .
released that day, pointing to his recommenda-
tion for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and noting that he drew attention to "the grievous position of Palestinian refugees" and welcomed the UAR's and Jordan's "realistic and constructive" stands.

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TASS made no mention of the Senator's suggestion of a bilateral U.S.-Israeli treaty which would be supplementary to UN guarantees following a settlement. But IZVESTIYA and a Soltan foreign-language commentary on the 25th called attention to a "warmongering speech" by an Israeli politician of the Free Center demanding, according to IZVESTIYA, that Israel be "tied still more strongly to the American military chariot through the conclusion of a military pact with the United States or even by the inclusion of Israel in NATO."

Belyayev, in the 30 August commentators' roundtable, made the only other available propaganda reference to the Fulbright statement. Speculating on the U.S. position with regard to a Middle East settlement, Belyayev found it "difficult to guess the position and what it will be like--it has not yet been revealed"--but added that he thought Senator Fulbright's speech "worthy of attention." Belyayev went on to point out that the Senator "is for the complete withdrawal" of Israeli troops from "all" occupied Arab territories.

EVENTS IN JORDAN GIVEN MINIMAL PROPAGANDA ATTENTION

Having maintained virtual silence on events in Jordan, Moscow on 2 September reported the apparent assassination attempt against King Husayn the day before. TASS cited Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) for an Amman radio report of the firing on Husayn's car and for reports of armed clashes between Jordanian army troops and fedayeen forces. TASS went on to attribute to the Cairo AL-AHRAM a series of related reports of Palestinian and Jordanian charges and countercharges, Amman denying that Jordanian troops fired on Palestinian guerrillas while Palestinian spokesmen denied the attack on Husayn and called the report an attempt to justify Jordanian army firing against resistance headquarters.

TASS also picked up a MENA report that the Palestinian resistance movement had appealed to the Iraqi authorities to intervene; but it did not mention Baghdad radio's 1 September report that the Iraqi foreign minister told the Jordanian ambassador that Jordan must stop "measures against the fedayeen" or "the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi army stationed on the eastern front will take all necessary measures to protect fedayeen action."

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Moscow had ignored fedayeen confrontations with Jordanian forces just prior to and following the 27-28 August emergency session of the Palestine National Council in Amman, held to discuss measures against the U.S. plan for a settlement of the Middle East crisis. Moscow's Arabic-language service, in a dispatch from its Beirut correspondent on 28 August, carried the sole report on the opening of the "urgent" Council session. The account guardedly said the Council would study the Middle East situation and "prospects for developing the Palestinian movement in view of the situation in the area due to the UAR's initiative" regarding a political settlement. It noted that Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, speaking at the session, "dealt with the results of his recent talks in Cairo." (TASS on the same day cited AL-AHRAM as saying Nasir's recent meetings with a Palestinian resistance delegation "demonstrated Cairo's loyalty to all the Arab nation--the struggle for the restoration of lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine.")

A brief Moscow domestic service report on the 30th of King Husayn's speech the day before made no mention of Husayn's remarks regarding the fedayeen, representing him merely as "again supporting the UAR's peaceful initiative" regarding the settlement of the Middle East crisis. Husayn's speech also revealed the new definition of "Arab fighting fronts" and arrangement for command approved at the 5-6 August meeting in Tripoli, Libya, of foreign and defense ministers of the "front-line" states--the UAR, Jordan, Syria, Libya, and Sudan, with Iraq and Algeria absent. The recommendations provided, Husayn explained, for the dissolution of the former "eastern front" and for the general commander, UAR War Minister Fawzi, to exercise control over three fronts--the western or UAR front, the northern or Syrian front, and the eastern or Jordanian front. Husayn added that the order provides that Arab forces on the territory of any of the three states are under the orders of that state's command--a situation which places Iraqi forces in Jordan under Jordanian command.

TASS on the 31st reported an AL-AHRAM account of this decision to set up three Arab fronts; it noted that the new eastern front will include the troop contingents from Iraq and Saudi Arabia and that all three fronts will interact in accordance with the plans of the joint Arab command headed by General Fawzi. TASS has not reported subsequent AL-AHRAM accounts, carried by MENA, of Iraqi objections to the "new plan for the eastern line of confrontation."

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FRG - SOVIET TREATY

BREZHNEV AT ALMA-ATA HAILS ACCORD ALONG STANDARD LINES

Brezhnev's widely publicized remarks in Alma-Ata on 28 August, his first extensive discussion of foreign policy issues since his 12 June pre-election speech, highlight Moscow's continuing propaganda attention to the Soviet-FRG treaty, signed on 12 August.

Aside from his denial--in response to "fabrications and slander" in the "imperialist" press--that the treaty with West Germany was sought to free Moscow's hands for stepping up pressure on China, Brezhnev's comments on the accord repeat routine propaganda themes. Calling the treaty "a very important event," he says it is important for the development of relations between the two countries as well as for the easing of tension in Europe. On the latter score, Brezhnev stresses that the treaty gives "clear and unequivocal recognition to the inviolability of existing borders" in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line and the border between the two German states.

Brezhnev calls the treaty the product of the prolonged efforts of the USSR and the socialist states "with whom we remained in close contact," and he recalls that the 20 August meeting in Moscow of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee voiced approval of the treaty. He gives due credit to the "realistic approach" taken by the FRG Government and calls Bonn's recognition of postwar realities "a wise step along a correct political path." He observes, however, that the treaty "will present all its opportunities only when it is ratified by both sides and goes into effect."

While Brezhnev does not touch on the economic advantages of improved FRG-Soviet relations, routine commentaries continue to play on this theme. A domestic service talk on 30 August, for example, cites "economic circles" in Bonn for the observation that trade with the USSR should be more extensive. The commentary reports that Hamburg's WELT AM SONNTAG has complained that West German imports from the Soviet Union are no higher than German imports from Russia on the eve of World War I. It adds that a West German businessman has stated that with the treaty the possibility has been created "to more than double the trade" between the two countries in the near future.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING DECRIES AGNEW VISIT TO TAIWAN AS SERIOUS PROVOCATION

In the first comment originated by Peking on Vice President Agnew's Asian tour, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article broadcast on 31 August claims that "this god of plague" sought to prop up U.S. allies in "aggression in Asia" and denounces his visit to Taiwan as "particularly intolerable" and a serious provocation. An NCNA report dated the 31st goes to greater length in discussing the Vice President's visit to Taiwan as well as other evidence which it takes as indicating that the United States "will never give up its plot for invading China and Asia." Like the Commentator article, NCNA views the visit as a "serious provocation" to China, a charge Peking has used in protesting against activities that might enhance the Chiang regime's legitimacy and strength.

Peking's reaction to the current visit is similar to its treatment of the Vice President's Asian tour early this year. In each case Peking reported that the United States had reaffirmed its treaty commitment to Chiang and its intent to prevent the Chinese from "liberating" Taiwan. An NCNA report on 5 January included the additional charge that the United States remains "stubbornly hostile" to the Chinese.* On both occasions Peking has cited evidence that the United States has expanded military installations on Taiwan. Unlike the North Koreans, however, Peking has not reacted to reports that an airfield has been extended to accommodate B-52's.

Though Peking's reaction to the Agnew visit and its recent treatment of the Taiwan question in general have registered a sharp sense of being affronted by what the Chinese regard as trespassing on their own territory, Peking has not reverted to the hard line on Sino-U.S. relations which it followed after canceling the session of the Warsaw talks scheduled for 20 February last year. While stressing that U.S. support for

* Four days later Peking announced that agreement had been reached to hold a session of the Warsaw talks on 20 January.

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the Chiang regime remains the central obstacle to improved relations, Peking has not drawn on portrayals of a hostile encirclement of China to represent the United States as a threat to the PRC and as a partner of the Soviet Union in efforts to contain it. As the manner of Peking's postponement of the Warsaw meeting set for 20 May suggests, Peking appears to have given priority to its patronage of the Sihanouk government in exile and its campaign for Asian anti-U.S. unity, while suspending official contacts with the United States. During the same period Sino-Soviet relations have been relatively calm, reducing one of the motives for Peking to make use of the Warsaw channel.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV TAKES CONCILIATORY LINE IN COMMENT ON CHINA.

In his major policy address on 28 August, Brezhnev offered the most conciliatory gesture toward China since the early period of the Peking talks. Brezhnev chose Alma-Ata, the capital of a border republic and headquarters of the new Central Asian military district facing the PRC, as the site for reassuring the Chinese that the Soviets have no aggressive designs and for reaffirming Moscow's commitment to the negotiations and normalization of relations.

Brezhnev's remarks represent the first authoritative comment on the Peking talks since Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev arrived on 15 August to serve as the new chief Soviet negotiator. There has been no further report on the talks, nor has there been any announcement on the session of the joint river navigation commission since its opening on 10 July. Last year's session, which opened on 18 June, ended on 8 August with the signing of a protocol. Some measure of success in achieving agreement was reflected on a low level in a report carried by Radio Moscow on 23 August that trade exchange accounts had been settled between local Soviet and Chinese trade organizations along the river border.

Brezhnev did not mention an impending exchange of ambassadors, which has not been confirmed in Soviet media. Kosygin acknowledged in his interview published in the Indian paper PATRIOT on 10 August that agreement had been reached to exchange ambassadors, but the content of the interview has not been carried in Soviet media.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev's current remarks on China were notably more moderate than in his 12 June election speech-- his last public comment on Sino-Soviet relations-- and were reminiscent of his 27 October 1969 appeal to the Chinese to reciprocate good will in the settlement of bilateral questions through the Peking talks, which had opened a week earlier. Speaking in Alma-Ata on the 50th anniversary of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan, Brezhnev introduced his comments on China with a rebuttal of Western speculation that the recent signing

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of the Soviet-FRG treaty freed the Soviet Union to increase pressure on the PRC. Moscow has seemed intent on reassuring the Chinese that it is not seeking to apply military pressure tactics; Kosygin in his PATRIOT interview had similarly deplored speculation that the Soviets might undertake a pre-emptive strike against the PRC.

While acknowledging that the Peking talks are "going slowly," Brezhnev did not place the blame on the Chinese, as both he and Kosygin had done in their election speeches in early June, and he stressed that Moscow is "not losing hope" and will "continue to display a constructive and patient approach" in the hope that the Chinese "will respond in the same way." Calling for a broader accommodation than simply the restoration of correct bilateral state relations, Brezhnev asserted that the Soviet party and government are ready to contribute "not only" to the normalization of state relations "but also to the restoration of good neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples and the unity of their efforts in the struggle against imperialism and reaction." He had mentioned both the party and government in his speech last October but not in June; in each instance, however, there has been no reference to party relations.

While calling for normalization of relations in the mild terms of last October, Brezhnev added the usual reminders that the Soviets will look after their national security and will continue to struggle for communist unity based on "the unshakable foundations of Marxism-Leninism"--a passing reference to the ideological dispute. He did not, however, attack the Chinese for their ideological positions, as he had done in June.

Brezhnev's conciliatory comments may have been timed to give a boost to the Peking negotiations following the arrival of Ilichev, just as he had put his authority behind the talks shortly after they opened last October. Apart from developments relating directly to the Peking negotiations, Moscow may be taking a cue from Peking's polemical restraint and its resurgent diplomatic activity in order to seek relief from the strains of the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Brezhnev's remarks on China may also be viewed in a broader context as part of an effort to foster an atmosphere of detente around Soviet policies in several key areas of tension, as his conciliatory comments on West Germany and the Middle East as well as China suggest.

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BORDER RIVERS Soviet media have recently carried material on activities along the border rivers--such as the 2 August SOVIET RUSSIA article discussing agricultural development of two Soviet-held islands near Khabarovsk--indirectly buttressing Soviet claims to disputed islands but not raising the territorial dispute as such. As in dealing with other contentious issues, however, it has been left to Moscow's East European allies to present the Soviet side of the dispute in more explicit terms.

On the same day the SOVIET RUSSIA article appeared, Budapest's weekly MAGYARORSZAG published the first in a series of articles on Sino-Soviet relations which reviewed the border dispute and explained the different Soviet and Chinese positions on the status of an island strategically situated at the point at which the Ussuri River joins the Amur near Khabarovsk. Acknowledging that "this little plot of land has no importance as such," the article quoted a Soviet contention that accession to the Chinese claim to the island--it did not mention that the Chinese base their claims on the central channel as the border line--would mean that "one of our most important Far Eastern cities would be situated near the border." But while raising this issue, the article was generally optimistic regarding the future of Sino-Soviet relations, reporting the absence of border incidents and pointing to a number of agreements by the two sides to hold negotiations and their willingness to exchange ambassadors.

A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 11 August referred to the first two articles in the Hungarian weekly's series, but it omitted any mention of the border dispute. None of the articles has thus far been reprinted in the Soviet weeklies, which have carried several East European commentaries on China.

PEKING SUSTAINS POLEMICAL RESTRAINT TOWARD MOSCOW

In keeping with its general polemical restraint toward the Soviets, Peking has refrained from commenting on the Soviet-FRG treaty, limiting itself to a reprint of an Albanian denunciation of the treaty as designed to free the Soviets to confront China (NCNA, 14 August) and publicizing a GDR statement on the arrival of the FRG President in West Berlin which stressed that the city does not belong to the FRG (NCNA, 27 August).

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Apart from its propaganda standdown on Sino-Soviet issues, Peking's abstention from comment on the German issue may also reflect its concern not to offend elements in Eastern Europe which the Chinese have been wooing. At the time of the visit to the PRC of a high-ranking Romanian delegation in June, Peking not only sought common ground with the Romanians in denouncing military blocs in Europe but also struck notes which may have sounded discordant to Romanian ears. Thus Chou En-lai, speaking on 11 June, coupled his attack on military blocs with a warning that the danger of a revival of West German "militarism" has become "ever more serious." He questioned whether there could be any talk about peace and security in Europe in these circumstances, thereby implicitly denigrating efforts toward a detente in Europe. The next month, during the visit of the Romanian defense minister, the Chinese ignored the German question and European security. On both occasions the Chinese ignored the Middle East, another area in which they diverge from the Romanian position.

Attacks on Moscow now appearing in PRC media consist largely of pickups of foreign comment, particularly a steady stream of attacks on the Middle East peace initiative and Moscow's role in seeking a settlement. On its own authority Peking continues its effort to score points among the lesser powers by rebuking the "superpowers" for exerting an undue influence in a variety of areas. In a characteristic use of the new formula, Chou En-lai's 31 August message to the African summit meeting in Addis Ababa concluded by declaring that Africa belongs to the African people, "and not to any colonialism, imperialism, or 'superpowers.'"

References to the "superpowers" began to appear in Chinese comment in mid-July, apparently in response to President Nixon's remarks on the Middle East in his 1 July television interview in which he spoke of the dangers of a collision of the superpowers in that area. Speaking at the Iraqi embassy on 16 July, Li Hsien-nien assailed the notion of a balance of power in the Middle East as an effort by the superpowers to contend for spheres of influence there. Peking has made frequent use of the formula to express disapproval of Moscow's policies without reverting to its formerly harsh anti-Soviet polemics.

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C U B A

CASTRO WARNS STATES BACKING EXILE INVASION PLANS

At a 23 August ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), Castro concluded his speech by reiterating a threat of retribution against states that permit their territory to be utilized by Cuban exiles to launch armed expeditions against Cuba. He singled out Nicaragua and Costa Rica as countries conspiring with "imperialists" and counterrevolutionary "worms" in anti-Cuban plans, warning that his government "feels free" to carry "the war to the territory of that country which lends itself to the organization of any invasion of our country."

Castro had made similar remarks in a 19 May speech greeting returning Cuban fishermen who had been abducted to the Bahamas by an exile organization. He promised then that Cuba would "find a way to mount war" on the territory of states that think they can launch "wars against [Cuba] with impunity."

NEED FOR AIRCRAFT Although Castro's retaliatory threats may be related to genuine fears that Central American states will provide bases for aggressive forays against Cuba, they may also be aimed in part at impressing the USSR with the magnitude of the alleged military menace to Cuba in order to buttress a case for more extensive Soviet military assistance. Thus, in both speeches, Castro bemoaned the fact that Cuba did not have the long-range aircraft that would be useful as a deterrent against raids launched from neighboring Caribbean states. In his remarks on the FMC anniversary, he declared:

Our arms, as you know, are eminently defensive, unfortunately. I am sure that if we had bomber squadrons, these gentlemen would not be walking around with such effrontery . . . organizing expeditions against us, because we could then turn their expeditions into dust, and them too. We could, we said, if we had the bomber squadrons. The fact is that we do not have the bomber squadrons.

Castro concluded by noting that while Cuba lacks offensive weapons its "men are offensive," ready "to take on any mission on any soil." Similarly, in his speech last May Castro

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lamented that Cuba "unfortunately . . . does not have long-range aircraft," concluding that if it did "some of those puppets of imperialism would be somewhat more careful in providing bases for acts of aggression against our country." He noted that during the crisis over the kidnaped fishermen Cuban MIG-21's-- which "unfortunately . . . have a very limited range"--had flown as far as they could, to the northern edge of the Bahamas.

Castro prefaced his warning to Nicaragua and Costa Rica on 23 August with a reiteration of remarks made during his Lenin Day speech, scorning suggestions that Cuba sever its "military ties with the USSR" in exchange for a lifting of the economic blockade. "Instead of severing our military ties with the Soviet Union," he said, "our disposition is to establish, if possible, even more military ties with the Soviet Union." In the Lenin Day speech Castro had lauded Soviet military aid to Cuba, alleging that Moscow had provided "1.5 billion pesos in arms," and had vowed that he would "always be ready to have closer military ties with the Soviet Union."

Soviet-Cuban military ties have been underscored by the unprecedented visit of a Soviet naval squadron to Cuba in July 1968, the "friendly official visit" of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko to Cuba in November 1969, reciprocated by a month-long "friendly official visit" to the USSR by Cuban Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro in April and May of this year, and the May 1970 visit to Cuba of a Soviet naval squadron which included a nuclear-powered submarine. Although it seems likely that the question of future Soviet arms aid was discussed during the Grechko and Raul Castro visits, neither Havana nor Moscow propaganda during the visits shed any light on the matter. Raul Castro lauded Soviet military and economic assistance in publicized statements in Moscow but did not suggest any anticipated change in the quantity or quality of the aid. Soviet and Cuban reports of a 12 May Brezhnev meeting with Raul Castro, also attended by Grechko, did not mention Soviet military assistance.

In reporting Castro's 23 August speech, Moscow media cited his expression of determination to strengthen Cuban-Soviet relations-- it did not specify military relations--and noted that he said Cuba's "defensive capacity" must be strengthened to meet the "incessant threats of a new aggression from American imperialism and its flunkies in Central America." No mention was made of Castro's retaliatory threats.

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DEFENSE OF 26 JULY For the second time since he delivered
ADMISSION OF FAILURES his 26 July speech, in which he
 catalogued and accepted responsibility
for Cuban economic failures while admitting that Cuba's
"enemies are right" in noting discontent and dissent in Cuba,
Castro felt constrained to defend his remarks. In a 1 August
discussion with a Chilean delegation to the 26 July festivities,
Castro evinced concern over alleged distortion of his speech by
the Chilean rightist press as part of its effort to defeat
leftist presidential candidate Salvador Allende. In his
23 August speech he appeared concerned lest his admission of
domestic discontent embolden exiles plotting military action
against Cuba. Referring to his 26 July admissions, he stated:

Some of the revolution's enemies . . . were on the
verge of thinking that the revolution had failed
or that the pointing out of deficiencies was some
sort of swansong for the Cuban revolution
Our enemies say that there is discontent here, and
we say that they are right. How stupid they are
that they do not understand to what degree this
attests to the strength and consciousness of the
revolution . . . ! When we speak of discontent or
disagreement, we speak of discontent within the
revolution, not against the revolution; to
improve the revolution, not to destroy the
revolution The reactionaries do not
realize that revolutions are irreversible, that
revolutions go forward despite man's errors, man's
deficiencies.

Havana's sensitivity to reports of internal discontent and its
effort to tie such reports to counterrevolutionary invasion plans
were illustrated by a PRENSA LATINA item of 23 August, built
around a Cuban Interior Ministry spokesman's denial of foreign
press allegations that three dynamite explosions had occurred in
Cuba the preceding week. PRENSA LATINA termed the increased
circulation of "false information regarding alleged events which
would confirm the development of active internal opposition to
the revolution" part of a "psychological offensive" launched by
Jose de la Torriente, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cuban birth
who Havana alleges is active in preparing an invasion of the
island. This tactic, PRENSA LATINA remarked, had been used
prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and had "only served to
'convince' the mercenary groups who were in training in Guatemala
under the direction of the CIA."

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THE ROLE OF Castro's complaints about Nicaraguan and Costa
TORRIENTE Rican involvement in anti-Cuban plans came
after Havana media had publicized Torriente's
visits to those countries, alleging that he had secured the
support of Presidents Somoza and Figueres for a new attempt to
invade Cuba. During his 1 August dialogue with the Chilean
delegation, Castro referred to the "Torriente plan" whereby a
counterrevolutionary army being prepared in the Caribbean
countries and Mexico would be utilized to disguise a direct
U.S. invasion of Cuba. Castro had previously mentioned the
Torriente plan during his Lenin Day speech when he read a UPI
dispatch discussing it.

Both Castro's remarks on Torriente and comment on the alleged plan
in Havana media depict Torriente as providing a facade for
projected U.S. "aggression" against Cuba. Thus a Radio Havana
commentary on 18 August described him as "an anonymous and
insignificant individual who Yankee imperialism made into an
indisputable chief of the counterrevolution." Alleging that
the anti-Cuban plans will be formulated "by the Pentagon," it
concluded that

imperialism is recruiting, arming, and leading the
mercenaries. Torriente cannot define his plans
because he does not know them. He is only a
puppet, and Washington is pulling the strings.
His mission is to pretend that he is acting on his
own, but Yankee imperialism is behind all his plans.

The 23 August PRENSA LATINA report of the Interior Ministry
statement commented that Torriente had said his plan
included "the preparation of a volunteer army "with the
collaboration of the U.S. and Central American governments"
and an invasion of Cuba by 15,000 men "within 120 days."
PRENSA LATINA claimed that he counted on "the unrestricted
support of Washington--which will supply air cover and naval
support for the aggression--and the support of the OAS,
under whose banner the new adventure would be carried out.

CHARGES AGAINST Castro has continued to hold President Nixon
PRESIDENT NIXON personally responsible for plans to mount
"aggressions" against Cuba. In the course
of his remarks on 1 August he reviled the President as "a
cynical and treacherous guy" who has "never given up the idea
of a lightning invasion by his troops." He observed that

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"imperialism" had not carried out an attack on Cuba only "because it is tied up in Vietnam." The "danger of such aggression is very obvious," he said, "more so than ever before." Castro also attacked the President in passages in his FMC anniversary speech on the need for Cuba to maintain its military preparedness. Noting a report alleging that Senator Smathers said he had discussed with President Kennedy the possible assassination of Castro and the organization of a spurious attack on the Guantanamo Naval Base to justify an attack on Cuba, he concluded: "If Kennedy conceived such things, . . . if Kennedy planned such things, what must Johnson have been capable of? Gentlemen: What must Nixon be capable of? Nixon! I can assure you that Kennedy had no scruples, but Nixon even less."

Castro's personal attacks on the President for plotting anti-Cuban actions began with a 19 April speech delivered at the funeral of Cubans killed fighting exiles who had landed near Baracoa. On that occasion he said President Nixon had assigned to the Pentagon the task of "organizing and recruiting mercenaries for new aggressive plans" against Cuba and described the President as an "enthusiastic" supporter of the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his Lenin Day speech Castro accused President Nixon of "preparing a new, imminent adventure" against Cuba.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

LEADERS USE SLOVAK UPRISING ANNIVERSARY TO ATTACK REFORMERS

The 26th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising provided an occasion for new regime attacks on the 1968 reformers--by Husak in a 28 August speech in Nizna Orava, central Slovakia, as well as by the hardlining CSSR Premier Strougal in a 27 August speech at Povazska Bystrica, also in central Slovakia, and by CPCZ Presidium candidate and secretary Alois Indra at a party meeting at Hodonin, in south Moravia near the Slovak border, on the 28th. The uprising, an armed revolt against the German occupation which broke out in Banska Bystrica on 29 August 1944, was organized by the communists--led by Husak, Smidtke, and Novomesky--as well as by Social Democrats and ordinary Slovak citizen groups. It continued as a partisan movement in Slovakia until it was joined by the advancing Soviet forces in October 1944. The communists claim exclusive credit for the uprising.

Husak scored the 1968 reformers for alleged attacks against the "heritage" of the uprising, charging that they "sowed discord between the Slovak and Czech peoples" and "attacked" relations with the Soviet Union. In a somewhat lower key, Strougal hailed the "close collaboration with the Red Army" at the time of the uprising and registered a striking endorsement of Husak's leadership, both in the 1944 event and in the "consolidation" of the country following "the critical situations which all of us witnessed up to April 1969." Strougal appeared to be pointedly underscoring his own role as governmental rather than political leader by devoting the major portion of his speech to economic affairs.

In characteristically vitriolic terms, Alois Indra charged that "the makers of the so-called Czechoslovak model of socialism" had "desecrated the importance of the Slovak National Uprising and betrayed its bequest in their slanders of the history of the Communist Party." Indra went on to attack historical "juggling" of the Communist Party's role in the uprising--aimed at the Dubcek regime's efforts to achieve a modicum of historical objectivity both with regard to the Slovak uprising and to the role of American forces in liberating the country in 1945. The "rightwing opportunists" of 1968-69, Indra declared, "made light of the liberating role of the Soviet Union" in World War II. He also recalled that "in the

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hour of mortal danger for Czechoslovak socialism two years ago," the Soviet Union and its allies "once again tendered us their helping hand" in support of "the sound forces" in Czechoslovakia.

INDRA REMARKS ON FEDERATION Of the three top leaders giving speeches on the Slovak National Uprising anniversary, only Indra delved into the sensitive subject of the country's federative system, in which the Slovaks have the largest stake but whose future is in doubt under the Husak regime. The federation of two equal Czech and Slovak nations was a principal tenet of the Dubcek regime's April 1968 "action program" and--in the face of stony silence from Soviet media on the subject--was implemented on 1 January 1969.

Since becoming First Secretary in April 1969, Husak has dropped hints to the effect that the federative system has "gotten out of hand" and needs to be "reexamined." Now Indra said that while the present system "has created legal and organization preconditions for complete equality" of the Czech and Slovak nations, it is a "complicated" business and "certain mistakes" have occurred in its implementation. He went on to stress the primacy of "the requirements of a united state" over "artificial, narrowly national interests of both the Slovaks and the Czechs." Husak in his speech pointedly called for strengthening "a single, independent and sovereign state of Czechs and Slovaks" and for "Czechoslovak and socialist patriotism." TASS duly reported Husak's remarks but did not publicize Indra's speech.

TASS IGNORES HUSAK REMARKS ON INVASION ANNIVERSARY

Sensitive to any airing of the idea that the anniversary of the August 1968 invasion could provoke popular disturbances in Czechoslovakia, TASS' lengthy account of Husak's 28 August Nizna Orava speech--also published in PRAVDA--omits entirely remarks expressing gratification over the calm which prevailed in Czechoslovakia on the second anniversary of the invasion. Moscow did not report any of the substance of the speech the preceding day by Strougal, which contained more candid remarks on the subject. TASS' exclusion of Husak's remarks on the anniversary accords with generally low-keyed Soviet propaganda treatment of the apparently uneventful observance in the CSSR, evidently kept under control in part by some 6,000 arrests of "criminal, antisocial elements" during the anniversary period.

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In the recorded version of his speech carried by the Bratislava domestic service and Prague TV on the 28th, Husak remarked that "in the past few days Western radios and periodicals have noted with great astonishment or shown interest in the fact that around 21 August the days in our country passed peacefully." He added that "they waited for some disturbance or something" but "the working people worked normally" as on "any other day," which "shows a high degree of political consolidation." He went on to claim in this connection, increased support and "trust" of his leadership by the populace.

Strougal recalled that "only a year ago . . . we were compelled with socialist power to suppress open actions of the counter-revolutionary elements and antisocialist forces and of various criminal elements and to intervene very drastically to restore order and peace in our country." This year, he added, "peace reigned," the regime "in essence was not forced to intervene," and the people did not "take the bait" but "worked" during the anniversary.

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