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#3170 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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in Communist Propaganda

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5 AUGUST 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 31)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 JULY - 2 AUGUST 1970

<u>Moscow (3566 items)</u>		<u>Peking (2783 items)</u>	
Indochina	(8%) 6%	PLA Anniversary	(--) 23%
Potsdam Agreement, 25th Anniversary	(--) 6%	[Joint Editorial	(--) 5%]
China	(4%) 5%	Korean Topics	(6%) 20%
Middle East	(11%) 5%	[Armistice Anni- versary	(1%) 9%]
UK Dock Strike	(0.2%) 2%	[Military Delega- tion in PRC	(4%) 6%]
		Indochina	(28%) 14%
		Middle East	(4%) 13%
		Chou En-lai on French TV	(--) 3%
		Romanian Military Delegation in PRC	(5%) 3%
		South Yemen Delegation in PRC	(--) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 30 July press conference in Los Angeles is seized upon by Hanoi and the Front as documentation of the perennial charge that the United States does not want a political settlement and is bent on maintaining the Thieu-Ky "puppets" in power. Particular exception is taken to the President's opposition to a coalition government. Both Hanoi and the Front point to the "coincidence" of the press conference and President Thieu's 31 July TV address, but they completely gloss over the substance of Thieu's speech in which he reiterated the GVN's 11 July 1969 election proposals and discussed various cease-fire options.

Routine-level Moscow comment on the President's press conference similarly casts doubt on the sincerity of the U.S. desire for peace and attacks U.S. support for Saigon's opposition to a coalition government. A 1 August PRAVDA article by a candidate of juridical sciences questions U.S. arguments regarding the legality of the American dispatch of troops into Cambodia.

Peking's declining but still substantial volume of propaganda continues to attack the U.S. "peace talks fraud." Implicit accusations of Soviet "collaboration" with the United States are repeated in current propaganda, including the joint Chinese army day editorial published in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Moscow directly responds to the editorial in Mandarin-language radio comment with attacks on the PRC's Indochina policy.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S 30 JULY LOS ANGELES PRESS CONFERENCE SCORED

HANOI AND THE FRONT Reaction to the President's 30 July press conference comes promptly on the 31st in radio commentaries from both Hanoi and the Front. Both radios acknowledge that the President was questioned about domestic issues and the Middle East crisis and other foreign policy questions as well as about Vietnam. Most of the comment obscures the precise nature and context of the President's exchanges with reporters and falls back on broad generalizations that he refused to comply with demands for a total, rapid troop withdrawal--thus indicating that the stubborn attitude will be

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maintained at Paris following Ambassador Bruce's appointment as delegation head--and that he repeated his opposition to a coalition government.

The initial Hanoi radio broadcast on the 31st says that "Nixon had to recognize that the U.S. economic and financial situation is dangerous and that the U.S. social situation is in disorder, but he did not mention that the foremost cause of this is the fact that he has continued to prolong and extend the war in Indochina." An LPA commentary on 2 August says that Nixon called the press conference "to hide the heavy defeats of the United States on the battlefield and the serious troubles in the United States." It claims that days before the conference, the "U.S. psywar machine" had been set in full motion in an attempt to make believe the President would have something new to announce, in addition to appointing Ambassador Bruce to the Paris conference. But LPA concludes that "public opinion had every reason to be disappointed."

Explicit acknowledgment of the exchange in which the President was asked whether the chances for a negotiated peace have improved or worsened since the invasion of Cambodia was voiced by the Vietnamese communist spokesmen in Paris. Thus, as issued on the 31st and carried by VNA on the 1st, the DRV spokesman's statement noted accurately that the President expressed his opinion that the Cambodian operation "has weakened the other side" and thus opened brighter prospects for peace talks. The spokesman went on to claim that two facts were demonstrated by this: that the Nixon Administration is likely "to change white into black and defeat into victory," and that the Administration "advocates military victory on the battlefield in order to win a strong position at the conference table." The PRG spokesman's statement--also made on the 31st and released by Vietnamese communist media on the 1st--was somewhat less explicit regarding the details of the exchange on Cambodia and negotiations. He said only that "Nixon once again boasted about the false victories" in Cambodia, and "tried to deceive public opinion by saying that the prospects for peace through negotiations were brighter." However, the LPA commentary, cited above echoes the DRV spokesman in quoting the President's remark that "the enemy position is weaker" than before the Cambodian operation.

Other comment notes the President's remark that Ambassador Bruce had been sent to Paris with wide latitude in negotiations, without indicating that the remark was made in the exchange on

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the prospects for the Paris talks in the wake of the Cambodian operation. Thus, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d cites the reference to Bruce and goes on to say that the Paris talks remain deadlocked because "of the obdurate U.S. attitude." (English-language transmissions refer to an "editorial" in the army paper, but Vietnamese-language casts call it a "commentary.") NHAN DAN on the 3d refers to Nixon's "boast" that he had appointed a senior negotiator, and observes that given the U.S. position one might ask what Bruce can negotiate at Paris except some questions to elude the basic problems "such as the POW question that Nixon has given so much publicity." (Communist media did not acknowledge that the President was asked whether Bruce had received a special briefing about the "hundreds of prisoners held by the DRV.") NHAN DAN says that Nixon "especially extolled traitor Nguyen Van Thieu" whose position with regard to negotiations he said "was on all fours with ours." But NHAN DAN does not acknowledge that the President's comment was in response to a question as to whether Thieu has some positions that would take away from Ambassador Bruce's flexibility in Paris.

As reviewed by VNA, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 2d distorts the President's remarks when it claims that he "even threatened" if peace could not be achieved in negotiations, the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique would seek it through military victory. (The paper thus glosses over the exchange in which the President was asked about Thieu's reported remark that he hoped for military victory in three years and responded that if a settlement had not been reached when the United States had withdrawn under the Vietnamization policy, then the road to take would be up to the GVN.) QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as well as other Hanoi and Front propaganda quotes the President's statement that the United States opposes a coalition whether imposed or negotiated, and concludes that this again demonstrates U.S. hypocrisy regarding South Vietnamese self-determination.

A Liberation Radio broadcast on the 3d of a commentary from the 1 August QUAN GIAI PHONG notes that President Nixon "repeated the U.S. stubborn and warlike stand," and says therefore the arrival of new negotiator Bruce will change nothing. It repeats the standard line that a change in basic U.S. policy, not a change in negotiators, is what is needed and demands that the United States "must" agree to the NFLSV 10-point solution, give up the Thieu regime, and agree to a provisional coalition government.

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A spate of comment on President Thieu's 31 July TV address completely glosses over such details as his reiteration of the 11 July 1969 election proposals and his discussion of various cease-fire options, claiming that he "imitated his master" in "muttering such words and phrases" as goodwill for peace, self-determination, and elections.

MOSCOW As usual, Moscow reacts promptly to the President's press conference, with TASS on the 31st noting that he "expressed support" for the Thieu regime, asserted that Thieu's position "is the same as ours," and opposed a coalition government, "negotiated or imposed."

TASS also says that the President claimed that the invasion of Cambodia, "which extended the war" in Indochina, "improved the prospects of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam." A brief English-language newscast on the same day says that he tried to "justify" the invasion of Cambodia, saying that it brought a peace settlement in the area nearer, but that at the same time he "made it clear" that the American position at the Paris talks will "not change" with the appointment of the new delegation chief.

A Moscow domestic service commentary on 29 July again took issue with Washington's claim that the appointment of Ambassador Bruce as the chief delegate in Paris shows U.S. readiness to take a step toward peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The commentator referred to a disparaging remark made by Ky in Da Nang about the appointment, evaluating it as merely an attempt to calm public opinion. The commentator also cited the coincidence of Bruce's consultations with the leaders in Saigon and the move into Cambodia of additional GVN troops, and his visit to Thailand during which the Thai foreign minister reportedly informed him of Bangkok's "negative attitude" toward a coalition government in Saigon. The commentator concluded that these reports and events "give grounds for serious doubts about the alleged peace-making nature of the mission entrusted to him."

PARIS TALKS: U.S. POLICY ROUTINELY ASSAILED AT 77TH SESSION

PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's routine charge that no progress has been made at Paris because of the U.S. obstructionist policy aimed at continuing the "occupation" of South Vietnam is duly noted in the VNA and LFA accounts of the 77th session on 30 July. Both also note Tien's criticism of the U.S. limited troop withdrawal and his ridicule of President Nixon's stand on free elections and the "non-negotiability" of the South Vietnamese right to self-determination; but there is no indication that he was responding to the President's 20 July press conference remarks.

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LPA reports that Tien asserted that those "who have clearly seen the spirit of national concord" in the PRG's proposals on the formation of a provisional coalition government "include many persons in Saigon political circles and even in the present Saigon administration." But the VNA account more ambiguously says only that Tien referred to "public opinion at home and abroad" in this regard.

Tien's remarks are reminiscent of those made by Mme. Binh at the sessions last year from time to time. For example, at the 21 August 1969 session, when speaking about the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution, she said that the PRG makes a clear distinction between those who deliberately betray the country, such as Thieu and Ky, and "the persons who, for one reason or another, still serve in the puppet administration and the Saigon army but have come to realize the truth ever more clearly and stand for peace and independence."

The terse VNA account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement duly notes his repetition of the two basic communist demands--total U.S. withdrawal and the establishment of a provisional coalition government. Without supplying details, VNA says that he "roundly condemned" the Nixon Administration for prolonging and expanding the war in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while continuing to encroach on the DRV's territorial integrity and sovereignty. In noting his claim that the Nixon Administration's attempts to secure a position of strength at the conference table are "but illusory daydreams," the account does not detail Vy's discussing the "real situation" on the Indochinese battlefields over the past few months. Thus, the account fails to report Vy's citing the abandonment of firebase Ripcord in northern South Vietnam, the "liberation" of Attapeu and Saravane by the Lao armed forces, and the control of half of Cambodia by the Sihanouk government as belying the "boastful fabrications of President Nixon and U.S. psywar organs." The account also fails to note Vy's sharply worded remarks aimed at the U.S. delegate for his engaging in the "farce of sham-negotiation and sham-goodwill" that can deceive no one, however well-acted it may be.

The VNA portrayal of GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong's statement is typical when it says that he "stubbornly opposed" the demand for an unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal and the formation of a provisional coalition government. As for Habib's statement, the account says that he "tried to make black white, pretending that 'the United States has good will.'" VNA goes on to add on its own authority that "everybody knows, however, that the Nixon Administration has not changed a bit its aggressive stand and obdurate attitude."

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PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES ON INDOCHINA POLICIES

A declining but still substantial volume of Peking propaganda includes continued attacks on the U.S. "peace talks fraud" and implicit charges against the USSR for "collaboration." An "article by a worker-commentator group in the Lanchow refinery," carried by NCNA on 31 July, accuses President Nixon of trying to create a "worldwide Munich" in the Middle East, Indochina, and elsewhere in the world "with the help of a certain country." And the article goes on to specify that U.S. advocacy of a "peaceful settlement" of the Indochina question is aimed at creating a "Munich" so as to "hang on in the whole of Indochina." The Army Day joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, carried by NCNA on 31 July, attacks "social imperialism" and U.S. "imperialism" for colluding "to suit their own interests and ambitions" on the questions of the Middle East, Indochina, and the "revival of Japanese militarism," but does not explicitly mention an Indochina political settlement.

MOSCOW REPLY Moscow replies to Peking's joint editorial in a Mandarin-language broadcast on 4 August which says that it "falsely distorted" the Soviet stand on Indochina and "groundlessly" condemned the USSR for teaming up with U.S. imperialism to "redivide the world." The broadcast recalls that the Soviet leaders have repeatedly expressed the USSR's "resolute support" of the Indochinese people's struggle, referring specifically to Brezhnev's 12 June election speech in which he repeated promises of "all necessary assistance." Reviewing the "various stages" of the development of the Indochina issue, the commentary recalls that it was due to the support of the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements--which "protected the interests" of the people of Indochina and Laos--were achieved. It adds that "at that time, China acted in the unified ranks of the major forces struggling against imperialism."*

* Over the years Moscow commentators have periodically recalled that the USSR and China cooperated to attain the signing of the Geneva agreements. A 6 April Mandarin-language broadcast said in this connection that "at that time the leaders of China had not yet taken open action to split the anti-imperialist front."

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The broadcast reviews Soviet military, technical, and economic aid to the Vietnamese and it calls China's efforts to portray Soviet aid as "collusion" with the United States "very strange logic," concluding that the joint editorial once again reveals the "splittism" of the "current leaders of China."

Issue is also taken with the joint editorial's charge of Soviet-U.S. "collusion" in a Mandarin-language commentary over Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on the 3d. Among other things, it points out that the DRV and PRG leaders have time and again thanked the Soviet Union, and says the Vietnamese regard this "comprehensive and unselfish assistance" as the "decisive criterion" in their victorious struggle. The commentary calls the words of the Vietnamese an "appropriate repudiation" of the "absurd" Peking allegation of U.S.-Soviet collusion.

MOSCOW QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF U.S. OPERATION IN CAMBODIA

A 1 August PRAVDA article by L. Savinskiy, a candidate of juridical sciences, questions the legality of the U.S. military operation in Cambodia, taking issue particularly with the argument that the action was taken to protect American lives in South Vietnam. He says that one cannot "take seriously as an international legal argument" the President's statement in his 30 April speech that as Commander-in-Chief it is his duty to take measures to ensure the safety of U.S. soldiers. Savinskiy explicitly questions the 5 May message delivered by Ambassador Yost to the UN Secretary General which argued that the episode is a question of "collective self-defense on the part of the United States and South Vietnam." Savinskiy contends that not only is there "not even a hint of substantiation" of the U.S. argument that a threat to U.S. soldiers came from Cambodian territory, but that the justification for the invasion of Cambodia on the grounds of defending the security of American forces in South Vietnam is "untenable" for the further reason that the troops are in Vietnam for "criminal aggression, that is, illegally."

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT'S RADIO BEGINS BROADCASTING

The Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea began broadcasting on 1 August as Hanoi media on 28 July had announced it would. The first broadcasts air a Sihanouk message to the Khmer people on the occasion of the inauguration

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of the radio station, and a statement by Hu Nim, information and propaganda minister, announcing the founding of the radio.* The broadcasts also carry various items related to Cambodia which had been transmitted earlier by VNA, Liberation Radio, and the Pathet Lao news agency.

In his message, Sihanouk invites his fellow countrymen to listen to the radio because it is "the only authentic voice" of the Khmer people, Phnom Penh radio having been transformed into a "base voice of treason." He claims that the FUNK and its liberation forces have liberated "more than half" of Cambodian territory,** and he again calls upon the people to struggle to liberate the homeland and build a popular, democratic, and progressive regime.

Vietnamese communist attention to the new radio includes a congratulatory message to its board of directors from Tran Lam, chief editor of Hanoi radio, broadcast by Hanoi on the 1st. A Hanoi domestic service "article" on the same day praises the radio as another of the FUNK's victories, along with the liberation of "over half" of the country and the establishment of "people's administrations" in "many" provinces, districts, and villages. It says that along with Hanoi, Liberation Radio, and the Pathet Lao radio, the new station will contribute to the solidarity of the three Indochinese people in their fight against the "common enemy." Liberation Radio similarly praises the new Cambodian station in two commentaries on the 1st.

Peking media report the original announcement, aired by Hanoi on the 28th, that the radio would begin broadcasting. On 3 August NCNA briefly summarizes the statements by Sihanouk and Hu Nim in the inaugural program, and on the 4th carries a battle report attributed to the new radio. There has, however, been no comment from Peking on the new radio. The only available Moscow reference to the radio is a Cambodian-language broadcast on the 29th reporting the Hanoi announcement that the radio would begin broadcasting.

* Hu Nim is one of the ministers who Sihanouk claims is currently in the Cambodian "liberated regions."

** A 20 July statement by Sihanouk's government on the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements, publicized by Peking and Hanoi, had claimed that the government "has practically controlled two-thirds of the territory" of Cambodia.

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RECOGNITION OF PRG ANNOUNCED AFTER MME. BINH'S CEYLON VISIT

LPA on 3 August carries the announcement of the official granting of full diplomatic recognition to the PRG by the Ceylon Government. It says that the two heads of state, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and President Huynh Tan Phat, "have exchanged letters about this question" and that recognition dates from 14 July. An LPA editorial the same day, discussing the successful conclusion of PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's visit to Ceylon, says the South Vietnamese people note "with gratitude" the full diplomatic recognition granted by Ceylon to the DRV* and PRG.

The question of relations between the governments was raised earlier by a 29 July LPA report on Mme. Binh's 27 July arrival in Ceylon, which noted that Mme. Binh thanked the Government of Ceylon "for its decision to extend full diplomatic recognition" to the PRG. A 1 August LPA report rounding up Mme. Binh's activities during her three-day visit to Ceylon quotes her to the same effect. NCNA on the 27th had quoted her thanks for the decision to extend recognition, but on the 30th reported that at a meeting on the 28th she thanked the Ceylonese Government for "formally recognizing" the PRG.

The 1 August LPA report on the conclusion of the Binh visit reports, among other things, her meeting with Prime Minister Bandaranaike the day of her arrival and says that on the afternoon of the 29th, Mme. Binh and her delegation "left for home." TASS notes her brief stopover in India following her Ceylon visit. On the 31st, it says she "left Calcutta for home" that day upon completion of her "official" visits to India and Ceylon. Indian media on the 30th and 31st report that she was going to Hanoi.

KIRIROM, OTHER CAMBODIAN "VICTORIES" HAILED

Vietnamese communist comment on the fighting in Cambodia continues to portray a strongly advancing struggle, a 1 August Liberation Radio commentary typically claiming that in only four months of armed struggle the Cambodian liberation forces have "liberated many vast areas, including a number of

* VNA on 15 July reported the Ceylon Foreign Ministry announcement that day of full diplomatic recognition of the DRV as of 24 June.

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provincial and district capitals, set up people's administrations, and swiftly developed their strength in all respects, while encircling Phnom Penh." Battle reports, as well as commentaries, highlight "victories" in the Kirirom area of Kompong Speu Province and in Kompong Cham and Kampot provinces.

VNA on the 4th summarizes a NHAN DAN commentary of the same day hailing the "big victories" of the Cambodian liberation forces when they "wiped out" or "routed" five battalions of government troops in late July and "liberated" Kirirom township. The Kirirom engagement, according to NHAN DAN, demonstrates that the Cambodian liberation forces have grown "quickly" and are in a position to attack the enemy at "many places at the same time." NHAN DAN adds that the achievement "proved" that the Lon Nol government cannot be saved from collapse, despite all the support it is receiving, including the "massive use" of U.S. B-52's.

A commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 4th, summarized by Hanoi radio on the same day, claims that on 27 and 28 July Cambodian liberation forces captured 50 tons of ammunition and supplies and routed three government battalions at Kirirom. The paper comments that this "second great victory" at Kirirom marks the rapid growth and progress achieved by the liberation forces in terms of combat standards.

ACTION IN VIETNAM, "VICTORY" AT FIREBASE RIPCORD REVIEWED

Comment on the military situation in South Vietnam includes a 31 July Liberation Radio broadcast of an LPA recapitulative report summarizing PLAF achievements during July. The report says that since late June the PLAF have intensified their attacks and stepped up the struggle, and it quotes the Western press as describing the "gloomy military picture" of U.S.-GVN forces in the northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien where the allied situation is "more critical than in any other area."

Communist propaganda continues to focus on the "victory" on hill 935 in Thua Thien Province when U.S. firebase Ripcord was abandoned on 23 July. Liberation Radio on the 30th carries a short article by one of its regular commentators, "Nguoi Ban Tia" (the sniper), who says that the U.S. 101st Airborne Division suffered more casualties at the firebase than it experienced on "Hamburger Hill" in May 1969. In

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view of these losses, he asks rhetorically how the U.S. military commanders can claim the abandonment to be a "victory" or a "favorable troop redeployment." Making a similar point, another Liberation Radio commentary on the same day says that the "Americans have been well known for turning defeats into imaginary successes." On the 31st VNA carries an LPA account of the 23-day battle around the firebase and LPA the same day transmits a commentary hailing this "brilliant victory" over the Americans.

The situation in southern Trung Bo (GVN Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Thuy, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong provinces) is discussed in an LPA commentary of the 31st. It says that the "most striking aspect" of the situation in southern Trung Bo in the past six months is that the guerrilla and regional forces have "unceasingly developed their roles in mobilizing the masses to oppose the enemy's pacification plan."

DRV AGAIN CHARGES B-52'S ATTACK DMZ, CLAIMS PLANE DOWNED

Hanoi radio on 4 August broadcasts a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement released that day "strongly condemning" the United States for "launching air and artillery strikes against the area in the northern part of the demilitarized zone." The statement claims that on 31 July U.S. aircraft bombed Huong Lap and Vinh Son villages, and that on the following day U.S. aircraft "of various types," including B-52's, again bombed Huong Lap village. It adds that U.S. "heavy guns installed south of the DMZ and naval guns" at the same time shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Thanh villages which are "in the northern part of the DMZ." (Hanoi on 28 July had charged in a spokesman's statement that U.S. B-52's had bombed Huong Lap village on three consecutive days, 23-25 July.)

Hanoi radio on 2 August reports the alleged downing of an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane over Thanh Hoa Province that day, bringing Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes to 3,358.

COMMUNIQUE RECOUNTS U.S. "WAR CRIMES" FOR JULY

The Vietnam War Crimes Commission on 1 August released a communique on alleged U.S. "crimes" committed in both South and North Vietnam during July, according to a 4 August VNA

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report. The unusually brief account lists routine charges against the United States. In South Vietnam, it says the United States "launched operation 'Pickens Wood' . . . to terrorize and massacre civilians," "wantonly raided" South Vietnamese villages and fields with U.S. planes including B-52's, and used toxic chemicals in a number of areas. It scores the Saigon administration for "muzzling" the press.

In North Vietnam, it charges that U.S. artillery from the 7th Fleet and from south of the DMZ "in 26 bombardments fired about 190 shells" on Vinh Son, Vinh Thanh, Vinh Ha, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Lam villages in Vinh Linh area.

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS VISIT NORTH VIETNAM

VNA on 31 July reports that two ministers of Sihanouk's government--Chau Seng, minister charged with special missions, and Thiounn Prasith, minister in charge of the coordination of efforts of struggle for national liberation--visited the DRV from 23 to 30 July. They reportedly had talks with Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Chau Seng has been a member of the government since it was announced on 5 May, and Thiounn Prasith was appointed on 15 July.

The delegation of Sihanouk's government and the FUNK which had visited Laotian "liberated areas" from 19 to 25 July reportedly "recently" stopped over in Hanoi. A VNA report on the 30th said they were "seen off," but did not specify whether or not they were returning to Peking. This group was also seen by Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. A joint communique on the delegation's Laotian visit is carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 31 July and by NCNA on 1 August. Both accounts of the communique indicate that it says that the two peoples "enjoy direct assistance of the fraternal Vietnamese people," thus going beyond the general references to "support" among the Indochinese people in the joint communique of the 24-25 April Indochinese people's summit conference and in other propaganda. A VNA summary of the Lao-Cambodian communique, on 31 July, omits this reference to Vietnamese assistance. However, mutual "assistance" among the three Indochinese peoples is currently mentioned in the North Vietnamese slogans on the anniversaries of the August Revolution and DRV National Day, discussed below.

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DRV PARTY ISSUES SLOGANS, INSTRUCTIONS ON ANNIVERSARIES

SLOGANS VNA on 4 August releases 17 slogans issued by the party Secretariat to mark the 25th anniversary of the August Revolution on 19 August and the 2 September founding of the DRV. For the most part, the current slogans are similar to those released by VNA on 18 January on the occasion of the 3 February North Vietnamese party (VWP) anniversary, but there were a total of 31 slogans on the party anniversary.*

A change in the slogan on Indochina appears to strengthen Hanoi's public commitment to the wars in Cambodia and Laos. The current slogan, as transmitted by VNA in English, advocates that the peoples of the three Indochinese countries "assist" one another, whereas slogans on the occasions of the VWP anniversary and May Day called for mutual "support" among the three peoples. Two additional slogans now hail victories of the Lao and Cambodian peoples in their anti-U.S. struggle.

Among other changes, the current slogans offer thanks for the "great and valuable support and assistance" of the fraternal socialist countries; slogans on the party anniversary and May Day specifically referred to the Soviet Union and China, for the first time since 1967. The party anniversary slogans addressed to individual groups in the DRV--intellectuals, youth, women, etc.--are omitted from the current slogans, as they were from the ones on May Day.

INSTRUCTIONS 1 August instructions from the Secretariat on the celebration of the two anniversaries are also publicized on 4 August--carried in full by Hanoi radio and summarized by VNA. The instructions state that, on the basis of the VWP Politburo's resolutions on the organization of important anniversaries in 1970** and on the present situation

* For a discussion of the party anniversary slogans, see the FBIS TRENDS of 21 January 1970, pages 13-14.

** The April 1969 Politburo resolution on the four major anniversaries in 1970 was not released until 8 July 1969, when it was broadcast by Hanoi radio. For a discussion of the resolution and surrounding propaganda see the FBIS SURVEY, 17 July 1969, page 13.

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and tasks, the objectives of the celebration of the two anniversaries "are to mobilize all party members, people, and militarymen to step up the implementation of the immediate tasks in order to put into effect the slogan: 'all for defeating the U.S. aggressors and successfully building socialism.'" They call for implementation of party and state resolutions and Ho's testament by satisfactorily carrying out the movements on productive labor, developing democracy and strengthening the cooperative members' collective ownership, and improving party members' qualities, and heightening the role of the people's democratic state.

Spelling out the "main propaganda themes" for the anniversaries, the instructions hail successes in North and South Vietnam in the past 25 years. They condemn the U.S. Vietnamization policy as a way to prolong and expand the war, warning that the Vietnamese people still face "difficulties and hardships." And they detail the DRV's duties, "as the great rear of the revolution," to be "combat ready and support with might and main the frontline" while building socialism. Among other domestic tasks, the instructions specify the "urgent task" of boosting agricultural production, light industry, and handicrafts.

The instructions also spell out seven "concrete tasks" for the organization of the anniversaries, including the launching of a political study drive on the history of the Vietnamese revolution and the party's revolutionary line. The documents to be studied include the selected works of Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan's "recapitulative" February article on the VWP's 40th anniversary, parts two and three of Truong Chinh's 1968 Marx anniversary report, Pham Van Dong's speech to be delivered on the 25th DRV anniversary, and documents which will be published on the occasion of the August Revolution anniversary. The instructions call for the study drive to be carried out "neatly and in a short time" during August and September, "with the possibility of each unit or locality setting its own schedule"--injunctions which probably reflect concern that the study not interfere with production schedules.

Other tasks include satisfactorily organizing the second phase of recruiting Ho Chi Minh class party members and "Learning

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from the first phase in order to carry out the second phase more satisfactorily,"* and launching a two-month production drive in August and September aimed at fulfilling the 1970 state plan.

LAOS: SOUPHANOUVONG MESSAGE DELIVERED TO SOUVANNA PHOUMA

The first acknowledgment by the Pathet Lao that the NLHS emissary from Souphanouvong arrived in Vientiane on 31 July comes in a 3 August Radio Pathet Lao report that upon his arrival he "published an announcement in the newspapers."** According to the broadcast, the announcement--dated the 31st--says that his mission is to deliver to Souvanna Phouma a message "which discusses some problems in connection with conditions for negotiations between delegations from both sides," and it adds the hope that his trip to Vientiane will be successful. Pathet Lao media have not yet been heard to report that the message has actually been delivered although Vientiane media reported that Souvanna Phouma received it from the emissary on 3 August.

While the broadcast of the announcement speaks ambiguously of "conditions" for negotiations, a Radio Pathet Lao commentary on 4 August says the emissary in Vientiane has come to discuss problems concerning the cessation of U.S. bombing and security measures "to create conditions for the high-ranking plenipotentiary representatives of both sides to meet." And the radio commentary routinely characterizes this as evidence of NLHS sincerity in the face of U.S. "escalation" and Vientiane's stubbornness.

* The VWP Politburo resolution setting guidelines for a movement to improve the quality of party members and to recruit new members, broadcast by Hanoi radio on 25 April, announced that the period for recruiting new members would be from 19 May 1970 (Ho's birth anniversary) to 19 May 1971. VNA on 19 June reported that the "first drive" for the admission of new party members "had obtained satisfactory results" and that party branches were preparing for the next drive to be launched on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the August Revolution and DRV founding.

** Pathet Lao media had reported that the emissary left Sam Neua on 28 July, and according to VNA on 1 August he "stopped over" in Hanoi on 30 July--as had Souphanouvong's emissary in March--continuing his journey to Vientiane on the 31st.

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BACKGROUND: The reference in the emissary's 31 July announcement to negotiations between delegations "from both sides" is consistent with a remark by a NLHS Central Committee spokesman at a 21 July Sam Neua press conference called to publicize the NLHS Central Committee memorandum of 20 July. Thus, the spokesman referred to a meeting of plenipotentiaries of "the two sides." However, the memorandum had called for talks among "the Lao parties concerned"--language consistent with that in the 6 March NLHS five-point plan--leaving ambiguous whether or not a role for the neutralists is envisaged. On 10 March Pathet Lao media said that Souphanouvong sent a message--similar to one sent Souvanna Phouma--to Khamsouk Keola, the chairman of the Alliance Committee of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces, saying he would shortly send an emissary. Keola's reply, dated 12 March and carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 14th, expressed the hope that "our meeting will be held as soon as possible." No such exchange with the Patriotic Neutralist Forces is known to have been publicized in connection with Souphanouvong's current initiative.

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MIDDLE EAST

Soviet media have not yet reacted to Israel's 4 August official reply to the U.S. initiative on a Middle East settlement. But Israel's 31 July announcement of agreement is described by Moscow as "yes" drowned in qualifications and conditions. Moscow's stress is on the UAR's far-sighted "political initiative," with most comment failing to mention that it concerns acceptance of the U.S. proposals. When the connection is acknowledged, the U.S. initiative is largely written off as nothing new, failing to go beyond the November 1967 Security Council resolution. Comment disparages Arab "extremist" opposition to Nasir's "initiative," rounding up statements of support by various Arab states and leaders, and couching its disapproval of Iraqi recalcitrance in terms of regretful "surprise." While not specifically acknowledging Palestinian denunciations of the UAR action, Moscow goes to some pains to argue that Nasir's initiative toward a political settlement will not jeopardize Palestinian "rights." Regarding two chief elements in the U.S. initiative--resumption of the Jarring mission and a cease-fire--Moscow endorses the former, meanwhile reiterating its standard objection to direct Arab-Israeli talks. It remains imprecise in its infrequent references to a cease-fire. Soviet propaganda continues to call Israeli withdrawal the "decisive condition" for restoring peace but avoids definition of final borders.

MOSCOW NOTES ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO U.S. INITIATIVE

Moscow first acknowledges Israel's 31 July "agreement" to the U.S. political initiative in a 1 August TASS Russian dispatch datelined London, which says that "the news agencies report" that the Israeli Government in a statement on the 31st said that it "decided to support" the U.S. proposals. Moscow did not directly acknowledge that the Israeli statement on the 31st said that a ministerial committee would prepare a resolution "on the exact formulation" of the government's reply. But the TASS dispatch reported that according to news agencies the reply is conditional and that REUTERS cites in particular a British Foreign Office statement saying that "precise formulations of the Israeli reply are being defined."

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The Israeli reply, presented to the United States and announced by Prime Minister Meir in the Knesset on 4 August, has not yet drawn Soviet comment, but propagandists, anticipating the response, predicted that the official answer would contain a "great number of conditions designed to guarantee the possibility of new maneuvers."

TASS followed up the London-dated dispatch on the 31st with another TASS Russian dispatch quoting President Nasir's statement to reporters in California that the acceptance of the U.S. proposals by the governments concerned is only a first step. He warned, TASS says, that there is still a long way to go on the path to a peaceful settlement, but said that the United States will continue to further the joint efforts of the Big Four begun in 1969.

Noting Israel's acceptance, a Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on 1 August says Israel put up a show of "alleged political independence," but observers had long predicted that Israel "would never dare go against the diplomatic maneuvers of Washington" in the Middle East. It pointedly recalls that President Nixon, at his 30 July press conference in Los Angeles, said the United States would "carefully watch" to see that the correlation of strength between Israel and the Arabs is maintained, and that "in case of necessity the United States would supply all required aid to Israel."

TASS on the 31st, reporting the Los Angeles press conference, said the President noted that Israel had not yet responded to the U.S. initiative and that he "reaffirmed the U.S. promise to Israel to maintain the so-called 'balance of power,'" using this as a pretext to try to "build up Israel's military superiority over the Arab countries." The President in fact recalled his statement in his 1 July television interview in which, he said, he indicated the U.S. Government's position "insofar as Israel's security is concerned and our commitment to maintaining the balance of power in the Mideast."

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BELYAYEV DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL, JARRING MISSION

CEASE-FIRE Moscow reports on the 30 July press conference and the President's remarks the following day to reporters do not touch on his stress that neither side should improve its military position during a cease-fire. The propaganda has been vague in its references to the cease-fire aspect of the U.S. initiative; in the most specific statement thus far, PRAVDA's Belyayev observes in the 2 August domestic service roundtable program that a three-month cease-fire* "is proposed for the Suez Canal zone as well as for the other fronts of the Arab-Israeli war." He brings up the subject again in a 4 August domestic service commentary, saying that the American proposal calls for resumption of Jarring's mission and efforts to be made with his help to bring the sides to an agreement on a "temporary or partial" cease-fire for three months. According to Belyayev, the Soviet Union considers that "in the case of a partial cease-fire, it is essential that an undertaking to this effect be made not only by the Arab countries" but by Israel too, and that Tel Aviv "must make such an undertaking clearly and precisely without any trickery." It is unclear whether by "partial" Belyayev means a cease-fire on only certain fronts, or involving concerned governments but excluding irregular forces, or a suspension of military buildups in cease-fire areas.

U.S. ASSURANCE The 1 August English-language Radio Peace
ON WITHDRAWAL and Progress commentary cites "Washington sources" for a report that the United States has assured Israel that it will not insist on Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. And Vishnevskiy, in the 2 August PRAVDA, similarly points to the London DAILY MAIL as reporting that the U.S. Government has assured Tel Aviv that it will provide Israel with any aircraft and armaments required, and will not insist on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all captured Arab territories.

* Commentators earlier noted Israeli opposition to a temporary cease-fire, Petrov remarking in NEW TIMES No. 28 of 10 July that Israeli Prime Minister Meir in speaking to the Knesset had criticized "the proposal concerning a temporary cease-fire, emphasizing here that Israel 'will continue its present military operations' against the UAR."

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Belyayev in the 2 August commentators' roundtable, again spells out the Soviet position on withdrawal: The USSR, he says, holds that the "decisive condition" for restoring peace is "Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 conflict." Belyayev adds that the Soviet Union includes in its formula "the question of the security of Israel's recognized frontiers along the lines existing before the 1967 conflict." In the same vein, Belyayev declares in the 4 August commentary that it is "particularly important" for the Tel Aviv leaders to clearly announce that they recognize the "necessity of the departure of Israel's troops from Arab territories."* In that event, he says, the questions of recognition of Israel's borders "along the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967 and of peace in the Middle East would be positively settled."

In neither instance does Belyayev insist on withdrawal from "all" occupied territories, but this stipulation continues to appear in the propaganda, and was reiterated in the 17 July communique on Nasir's visit to Moscow. However, it was not spelled out in the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement on the Middle East, which called for observance of the November 1967 Security Council resolution "in its entirety." Along this line, Belyayev declares in the 4 August commentary that in the Soviet view it is essential for the sides involved in the conflict to declare their readiness to implement all the points in the resolution. He notes, in the roundtable program, that one cannot say that all clauses of the resolution "have always been regarded as favorable for the UAR," but that Nasir nevertheless considers that all clauses must be implemented.

BACKGROUND: Stipulation of the pre-5 June 1967 lines as the final borders has been infrequent for many months: Malik at the 19 May Security Council session maintained that Israeli withdrawal "to the positions they held before 5 June 1967 is a key matter for a peaceful political settlement."

Petrov in his article in NEW TIMES No. 28 cited a New York TIMES article of 7 May 1969 as saying that the chief point of disagreement between the Soviet and U.S. representatives at the Big Four consultations was the question of withdrawal. The TIMES pointed out, Petrov said, that "at the time" when the Soviet Union deems essential Israeli withdrawal to the

* This is reminiscent of Kosygin's remark on Israeli avoidance of a "clearcut statement" on withdrawal in his 20 May message to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. See the FBIS TRENDS 27 May, page 21.

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5 June line, the U.S. position is that Israel should withdraw to "secure and recognized borders." Turning to the October 1969 U.S. proposal to the UAR, Petrov said that "despite the Security Council resolution's clear requirement concerning the withdrawal of Israeli troops" the new U.S. proposal questioned their withdrawal from the Gaza region, "which up until 5 June 1967 had been under UAR administration." Petrov left the impression that Gaza might be a subject of bargaining, for he went on to make the distinction that Sharm ash-Shaykh is "primordial UAR territory" whose return, under the U.S. proposal, would also be subject to negotiations.

JARRING MISSION Belyayev explains in the 2 August roundtable that "the 'new American plan'" is a proposal to renew the mission of Ambassador Jarring, who has been authorized to "maintain contacts with the Arab countries involved" as well as with Israel with a view to attaining a political settlement. Belyayev declares that the Soviet Union has always viewed Jarring's mission as useful and believed it should be given every support. In fact, he says, it was the Soviet representation at the Security Council which "emphasized that the Swedish ambassador is not some kind of mailbox but an actively engaged representative of the United Nations working to restore peace in the Middle East." In the 4 August commentary, Belyayev notes that Jarring's earlier efforts brought no results but that his mission is being reinstated because, "in the first place, direct talks between Arab countries and Israel are not possible." He reiterates Moscow's standard line that under circumstances of Israeli occupation of their territories, the Arabs view direct talks with Israel as complete capitulation.

Belyayev does not recall Nasir's statement, in his 23 July speech, that Ambassador Jarring should receive directives from the four great powers. But he does go on to say, on the roundtable program, that the USSR "has taken and continues taking a most active part in the four-power consultations" and "has maintained and continues maintaining contacts with the United States in an effort to find a formula for a political settlement." He declares that the Soviet Union intends to continue making efforts to insure that peace in the area should be stable and "that we should no longer have to contend with either sporadic or prolonged crises, as is the case now." He explains in the

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4 August commentary that the Soviet efforts to restore peace do not constitute "some sort of opportunist attitude" but represent a "consistent line reflecting the interests of world peace." He acknowledges that much must be done to reestablish peace, and says the peoples of the world do not want to see "President Nasir's initiative" wasted.

USSR PRAISES "CAIRO INITIATIVE," ATTACKS "ARAB EXTREMISTS"

In a stream of praise for Nasir's "wise, far-sighted" move, Moscow attempts to bolster the UAR's position in the face of criticism of his acceptance of the U.S. initiative and charges of a sellout on the Palestinian issue. Arab opposition was first directly acknowledged in a TASS report on 29 July on the "stand of Arab countries" noting Kuwaiti and Sudanese approval of the UAR's action and reporting tersely from Baghdad that the Iraqi Baath leadership "published a statement from which it appears that Iraq does not approve of the proposals of U.S. Secretary of State Rogers." The same day, a broadcast in Arabic hinted at difficulties in discussing two "opposing lines" in the Middle East, one--supported by the Arab countries and the Soviet Union--aimed at insuring freedom and independence for all the area's peoples, and the other--proponents unidentified--aimed at increasing trouble and tension in the region.

PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in an article in the 30 July issue, makes it clear that Arab "extremist sentiments" are presenting a problem, but does not name the dissenters. Dealing with the recently concluded Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Congress in Cairo, Glukhov takes note of Nasir's remarks on the American initiative, then turns to the UAR's "peace initiative." Without linking the two, Glukhov depicts Cairo as having "expressed agreement" to enter into a three-month provisional cease-fire, to a resumption of the mission of U Thant's special envoy Jarring, "invested with the appropriate powers," and to implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution. Glukhov rejects the notion that this "desire for peace could be taken for a sign of weakness."

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Glukhov says that in advancing a peace initiative, it "was also necessary to overcome extremist sentiments in the Arab world," and that it required "great political courage to criticize these sentiments, as President Nasir has done." In what is apparently Moscow's first reference to the ASU question-and-answer session on 24 July, although not so identified, Glukhov says that "one question" put to Nasir concerned "a possible decline in the President's personal prestige," and that Nasir replied it was not a question of his personal popularity or unpopularity but of the interests of the country and the entire Arab nation.

On 31 July, a broadcast for Arab listeners applauds the UAR's readiness "to realize practical measures for a political settlement" as an action "indicating wisdom and firmness," received with the understanding and support "of all progressive forces throughout the world." While refraining from suggesting any opposition, the commentary pointedly describes as "completely correct" the "Arab officials and newspapers" which support the UAR attitude. As if answering criticism, the commentary argues that the UAR stand "leaves no loophole for any anti-Arab plan by the aggressors and their protectors."

On 1 August, the Moscow domestic service carries a commentary by its Cairo correspondent Rassadin who maintains that "any objective political observer" can see proof of the sincerity of Cairo's policy in the fact that the Egyptian leadership, headed by Nasir, "has firmly dissociated itself from the extremist tendencies in the Arab world." Rassadin maintains that the "overwhelming majority of the Arab states" have given full support to Cairo's diplomatic initiative.

ATTACK Iraqi opposition to Nasir's action is finally
ON IRAQ spelled out in a 1 August PRAVDA article
 which points to support for Nasir's "peace
initiative" by the Egyptian people, says it was welcomed
by Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan, and quotes the Kuwaiti
foreign minister as observing that agreement to resume
Jarring's mission "would hardly interfere with the
Palestinian Arab's struggle." In the light of such
reactions, PRAVDA says, one "cannot but be surprised" by
the attitude of the leadership of the Iraqi Baath Party.
The party issued a special statement "several days ago"--

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on 28 July--formally concerning the Middle East settlement, PRAVDA says, but "actually, as is seen from its contents, replying to the UAR Government's position." In Baghdad, PRAVDA adds, "they suddenly began to talk of 'attempts to liquidate the Palestinian problem' finally and so on--and this is said at a time when President Nasir stressed that the UAR's reply takes special note of the need to restore the Palestinian Arabs' legitimate rights." The Iraqi Baath's negative attitude to Nasir's initiative does not help the "genuine struggle against the aggressor" and the imperialist and Zionist forces supporting it, PRAVDA concludes.

A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on 4 August, without mentioning Iraq, seems to echo Nasir's 2 August letter to Iraqi President al-Bakr when it charges "those who are loudly rejecting the peace initiative" with neglecting to mention that the UAR is "assuming the main burden of the armed response to Israel." Tsoppi finds it significant that "those who are taking little or no part in warding off the Israeli aggression are the ones who oppose the UAR policy and favor immediate war until victory," and he calls this a "cheap kind of extremism."

IRAQI DELEGATION The formalities were observed in the reception of an Iraqi party-government delegation which arrived in Moscow on 4 August--a week after Baghdad radio announced, on 27 July, that the Soviet ambassador had that day extended the invitation. Baghdad radio says the Iraqi delegation, led by Saddam Husayn in his state and party posts, includes the foreign, economy, and agriculture ministers and a "large number of military and civilian experts." Other than a TASS report of a statement by Saddam Husayn on the "friendship visit," Moscow has not characterized the nature of the visit. In reporting the first session of "the talks, which are to continue," TASS on the 5th merely says the two sides "discussed" questions of wider and stronger Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in various spheres and "exchanged opinions" on the Middle East and other international issues.

SILENCE ON SYRIA Moscow has avoided mentioning Syria's position in the Arab lineup, and apparently has not taken note of the Syrian Baath Party statement of 31 July rejecting the November 1967 Security Council resolution and, "in particular," Secretary Rogers' plan. Syria has, however, sent a delegation to the conference of

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Foreign and defense ministers of "confrontation states" opening, after a delay, in Tripoli, Libya, on the 5th; Iraq has flatly refused to attend. A TASS report from Cairo on the 2d noted that the ministers planned to hold a conference "soon" in Tripoli to discuss "questions concerning a settlement of the Middle East situation."

PALESTINIAN QUESTION Moscow has failed to acknowledge denunciations of Cairo by various Palestinian organizations for "liquidating" the Palestine question by its acceptance of the American proposals. But Radio Peace and Progress, in a Yiddish broadcast to Israel on 4 August, plays up leaflet "printed by the Palestinian liberation organizations" and distributed in occupied territories welcoming Egypt's decision. The leaflets, the broadcast points out, say that the UAR supports a Middle East settlement in which the "rights of the Palestinian nation will be respected."

Sensitivity to the Palestinian issue is displayed in a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 4th which asserts that implementation of the Security Council resolution is bound to "make Tel Aviv take into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinian people." The broadcast complains that "quarters in some Arab countries" try to "cause confusion" about this matter, even portraying the struggle for withdrawal as in conflict with the Palestinians' struggle for their rights. The commentary argues that the struggle against the "Israeli policy of occupation and annexation is the best and most effective method to consolidate the just struggle of the Palestinian people for national liberation." No talk about the Palestinians' rights "can take the place of genuine practical actions in this field," it declares.

CORRECTION

In the FBIS TRENDS of 29 July, page 14, second paragraph, first sentence, the phrase "transmitted in the Russian service while Nasir was still speaking" should be deleted.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PEKING ACCUSES SOVIETS OF MASSING TROOPS IN BORDER AREAS

Peking has marked Army Day on 1 August by calling attention to the Soviet military buildup along the border while generally maintaining its polemical restraint on Sino-Soviet issues. A joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY charges that "social imperialism" has "not for a single day relaxed its preparations to attack China" and is massing troops in border areas, claiming simultaneously--in order to weaken Chinese vigilance and delude world opinion--that it poses no threat to China. The editorial stresses a need for high vigilance and seeks to counter any tendency within the PLA to relax its guard.

In contrast to the joint editorial, whose primary focus is on the Soviet problem, PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's speech at a Peking reception marking the anniversary consisted mainly of attacks on the United States. Consistent with recent Chinese comment, Huang obliquely rebuked Moscow for aiding the United States in promoting "Munich plots" in Indochina and the Middle East. Huang's approach, before an audience that included DPRK and Romanian military delegations among foreign visitors, typifies Peking's effort to enhance its standing among anti-U.S. forces while muting its rivalry with Moscow.

The joint editorial's reference to hostile Soviet troop deployments seems designed to portray the PRC to the world as the innocent party in the dispute and to underscore for the Chinese the importance of continued vigilance. In context, and particularly considering Peking's propensity for using anniversaries as the occasion to air grievances against its adversaries, the editorial appears to reflect more the relative easing of tension since last year rather than any adverse development in Sino-Soviet relations. Unlike last year's joint editorial on the PLA anniversary, the current one does not mention the border clashes nor point to any recent incidents, and it avoids the direct attacks on the Soviet leadership that marked not only last year's editorial but also the polemical blast at Moscow on the occasion of the Lenin centenary this April. While calling for preparedness against surprise attacks by "imperialism and social imperialism,"

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the editorial evinces little concern over an imminent attack and refers to efforts by the two superpowers "to subvert" China in the hope of dividing up the country "some day."

That Peking is making use of the PLA anniversary to remind the army and people of the continuing need for vigilance is suggested by the editorial's insistence that the PLA "absolutely must not relax in the least" its will to fight. An added reproof directed at "any thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy" seems to imply that there is a tendency toward laxity or toward lowering the priority of war preparedness measures. The editorial calls on the PLA and all the people to be able to cope with "complex situations of any kind," and it urges that the PLA's combat effectiveness be raised in "an all-round way."

The vigilance theme is made more pointed in propaganda on nationwide celebrations of the anniversary. An NCNA report said fishermen using the Ussuri River related "many facts they saw which laid bare the crimes of social imperialism in massing its troops" along the border. Also mentioning an area in Sinkiang where clashes occurred last year, the report said frontier troops "spoke of their own experience to expose and condemn the monstrous crimes perpetrated by social imperialism." On 1 August last year NCNA issued an account of Soviet oppression of minorities in Central Asia which included charges that the Soviets had established missile sites and concentrated troops in the area and had carried out armed provocations on the border.

As on the occasion of the May Day rally and again at the time of the rally on Mao's 20 May statement, Peking has signaled its intent to sustain the Sino-Soviet border talks--notwithstanding its anti-Soviet polemics--by singling out the presence of Soviet negotiators at the talks. NCNA's account of the Army Day reception noted the attendance of V. Gankovskiy, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation and the ranking representative in the absence from Peking of the chief negotiator.

SOVIET COMMENT Moscow has used its broadcasts to China to present its own version of the PLA's history and to rebut Peking's anti-Soviet charges. A 1 August commentary in Mandarin carried in Radio Moscow's program for the PLA reminded listeners of the exploits of

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such PLA heroes as Chu Te, Ho Lung, and Peng Te-huai and expressed regret over their present state of near-oblivion or disgrace. A Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the anniversary, giving Moscow's line on the perversion of the PLA's role during the cultural revolution, pointed out that the dismissal of Peng was the prelude to the appointment to PLA leadership of those loyal to the personality cult.

Another Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress, on the 3d, took issue with the Chinese joint editorial's charges of Soviet collusion with the United States on the Indochina and Middle East questions. It also took exception to the passage on Soviet troop deployments, which it interpreted as charging a Soviet intention to invade China. Radio Peace and Progress on the 4th complained that the Chinese have used the anniversary to fan anti-Soviet sentiments. Mentioning the border talks, it quoted Brezhnev's 12 June speech charging that the Chinese have impeded the negotiations.

Soviet central media have continued to refrain from originating comment on China, though Moscow has been drawing on the growing body of East European comment to convey the Soviet bloc's views on Chinese developments. LITERARY GAZETTE on 29 July carried a Czechoslovak article on Peking's foreign policy--the third such article from East European papers to be reprinted in Soviet weeklies in late July.

Overtone of border tensions were contained in an article in SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 August discussing reclamation and agricultural development of two Soviet-held islands in the Amur near Khabarovsk. The article referred to the islands' "military history of glory" in citing past examples of border fighting during the Civil War and during the Japanese occupation of northeast China. There was no reference to the current Sino-Soviet border dispute, but the discussion of the economic benefits to be derived from cultivation of river islands suggests a Soviet determination to stand firm on claims to disputed islands. Earlier, a PRAVDA book review on 7 July was used to denounce Chinese territorial claims on Siberia and to

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express Moscow's resolve to hold its ground in the dispute. The annual session of the Joint Sino-Soviet commission for border river navigation opened on 10 July; there have been no announcements since then.

ROMANIAN RESISTANCE TO SOVIET PRESSURE DRAWS CHINESE PRAISE

Romania has used the visit of its defense minister to Peking to reassure the Chinese that its military obligations within the Soviet bloc are directed toward Europe and do not embrace Sino-Soviet relations. Speaking at a Peking banquet on 30 July, Defense Minister Ionita declared that in case "imperialism launches aggression in Europe," Romania will "fulfill its duties as a Warsaw Treaty state." He followed this by reiterating the Romanian line of friendly relations with "all" the socialist countries and went on to offer an encomium to Sino-Romanian relations.

On the same occasion Huang Yung-sheng praised the Romanians for resisting Soviet pressures aimed at further integrating the Warsaw Pact countries' armies. Huang observed that the Romanian armed forces have repeatedly frustrated the attempt of "those assuming the posture of an overlord" to issue orders "to the armies" of other countries and have safeguarded Romanian control over the army. Huang cited Romanian party chief Ceausescu's pointed remarks that only the Romanian leaders can issue orders to their army.

BRATISLAVA PAPER WEIGHS CSSR OBLIGATION TO FIGHT CHINESE

A Czechoslovak commentary on 28 July addressed itself in the most specific terms of any of Moscow's European allies to date on the sensitive subject of the obligation to fight on the Chinese borders under the terms of its bilateral mutual defense treaty with the USSR. Keyed to the 6 May Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty as "the basis of our security," the article appears on the eve of the second anniversary of the repressive 3 August 1968 Bratislava Declaration and in a Bratislava source--the trade union daily PRACA. Czechoslovak propaganda on the anniversary has stressed the "international duty" to "defend socialist gains," a formulation from the Bratislava document that was incorporated in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty.

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While noting that Article 10 of the bilateral pact "now" obligates "the two states" to "render comprehensive assistance in the event of an armed attack by any state," Horak's article candidly views the sending of CSSR troops to the Far East, in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, as a possibility but as not a very likely eventuality. Thus it takes unprecedented liberties with the "equality" doctrine in Soviet-allied relations in pointing out that "Soviet aid to us" would be "decisive" and the mutual obligation "primarily serves Czechoslovakia," since the latter's aid to the USSR "can always be only auxiliary."

Acknowledging that "Western propaganda has started to develop theories on Czechoslovakia's duty to send its soldiers to the Chinese border" in the event of a USSR-PRC war, the article registers abhorrence of such a conflict, adding that while such a war would constitute "a world crisis" the "direct participation of Czechoslovak soldiers would hardly be in the forefront of consideration."

At the same time the article develops a rationale for possible CSSR troop involvement in the Far East. It points out that in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia "we would be sent Soviet soldiers coming from the most eastern parts of the USSR," as it recalls was the case in World War II.

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CHINA'S ARMY DAY

PEKING RECEPTION AND JOINT EDITORIAL HIGHLIGHT OBSERVANCE

The 1 August Army Day was greeted in standard fashion with a joint PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial, a speech by Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, and personal appearances by Chou En-lai and other Politburo members. The editorial and Huang's speech stressed issues of international relations,* although they referred briefly to the PLA's cultural revolution role and its continuing tasks in the work of "three supports and two militaries." In contrast, last year's joint editorial, even though it sharply attacked the USSR for "armed provocations" on the border, primarily stressed the PLA's role in domestic affairs. It quoted a "latest instruction" from Mao on the need to "work meticulously" in the domestic area; it noted that the cultural revolution "continues to develop in depth"; and it enjoined the PLA to "energetically support and help consolidate the revolutionary committees at all levels." This year's editorial makes no reference to the revolutionary committees, nor does Huang.

The reception given by the Ministry of National Defense was attended by most of the active Politburo members usually in Peking except for Mao and Lin. Wu Fa-hsien, who had been out of public view for a month, was present. Chu Te, who had not surfaced for May Day, also appeared, although none of the other old and inactive marshals showed up and Peking chief Hsieh Fu-chih remained absent. Of the provincial leaders, only Shanghai chiefs Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan were in Peking, making a rare joint appearance there.

FOREIGN Greetings on the anniversary follow the pattern
MESSAGES of recent years, with messages from friendly
countries such as the DRV, the DPRK, and Romania
but none from the Soviet Union or its orthodox allies. The
Albanian message, as well as editorial comment, is punctuated
with attacks on the Soviets by name; these are duly reported
in PRC media. The last Soviet message on the anniversary was
in 1967.

* Discussed in the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this publication.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

FORTUNES OF TOP KGB LEADERS APPEAR TO HAVE SHIFTED

Shifts in the KGB command appear to have occurred in recent months. In June the first deputy chairman of the KGB, N.S. Zakharov, was apparently shunted aside, and possibly supplanted, by the other first deputy chairman, his junior, S.K. Tsvigun.* In July the longtime chairman of the Ukrainian KGB was replaced by an official apparently sent from Moscow.

In June there were two signals that Zakharov's status is in doubt. He failed to sign the obituary of the deceased Ukrainian KGB first deputy chairman, B.S. Shulzhenko, even though other USSR KGB deputy chairmen did so: S.K. Tsvigun, V.M. Chebrikov, A.M. Malygin and L.I. Pankratov (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 6 June). Subsequently, in the mid-June Supreme Soviet elections, he was not reelected a deputy; the former KGB chairman who had promoted him to first deputy chairman, Semichastnyy, also was not reelected a deputy. KGB first deputy chairman Tsvigun was reelected, however.

In 1966 Zakharov had been the only KGB deputy chairman elected to the Supreme Soviet (Tsvigun was elected as Azerbaydzhan KGB chairman), and only he and deputy chairman S.G. Bannikov were elected delegates to the 1966 party congress. Zakharov had been promoted from an administration chief to first deputy chairman in 1963 under KGB chairman Semichastnyy. But when Semichastnyy was demoted in May 1967 and replaced by Yu. V. Andropov, Andropov quickly brought in two new men who had previous ties with Brezhnev. Maj. Gen. S.K. Tsvigun, a Ukrainian, was released as Azerbaydzhar KGB chairman on 22 June 1967 to become KGB first deputy chairman. Dnepropetrovsk second secretary V.M. Chebrikov left the Ukraine soon afterward to become KGB deputy chairman; he was relieved as chairman of a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet commission in October 1967.

* Zakharov rose to high position under former KGB chiefs Shelepin and Semichastnyy. Tsvigun was appointed first deputy chairman under the current KGB chief Andropov.

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Tsvigun had been a leader of the Moldavian MVD--presumably deputy minister--during Brezhnev's tenure as Moldavian Central Committee first secretary from July 1950 to October 1952; Tsvigun was elected a candidate member of the Moldavian Central Committee in 1952 and 1954 and worked in state security organs throughout this period.* Chebrikov had worked under Brezhnev's protegee V.V. Shcherbitskiy in Brezhnev's home base of Dnepropetrovsk.

Since mid-1967 there have been two first deputy chairmen, Zakharov and Tsvigun, but Tsvigun's influence may have exceeded that of his senior. Tsvigun's former deputy G.A. Aliyev (Azerbaijani KGB deputy chairman 1964-1967) was chosen by Moscow in mid-1969 to take over party leadership in Azerbaijan--a very unusual promotion for a KGB leader--and to initiate a thorough purge in the republic. Aliyev has demonstrated his pro-Brezhnev sympathies by devoting much more attention to Brezhnev in his speeches than have most other such leaders. Further, since mid-1969 Tsvigun has been more in evidence than Zakharov, greeting or seeing off Brezhnev and Podgorny on 3 October, 14 October and 18 October 1969, speaking at higher party school courses (IZVESTIYA, 4 November) and representing the KGB at an MVD meeting (RURAL LIFE, 10 December). Zakharov did greet the returning Brezhnev and Podgorny on 23 July 1969, but his only other recent appearance was before a seminar of leaders of Shelepin's trade unions (TRUD, 25 March 1970).

UKRAINE On 20 July V.F. Nikitchenko, longtime chairman of
KGB CHIEF the Ukrainian KGB, was transferred to unspecified
 other work (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 21 July). The
transfer may have been unexpected inasmuch as Nikitchenko had
been reelected to the Supreme Soviet just a month earlier.

It is worth noting that Nikitchenko's replacement apparently came from Moscow rather than from among his subordinates. The new chairman, Lt. Gen. V.V. Fedorchuk, presumably of Ukrainian origin, has made speeches in Moscow and written articles on intelligence matters for Moscow journals in recent years. He has had no apparent official connection with the Ukraine and was not among the Ukrainian KGB officials signing first deputy chairman Shulzhenko's obituary in June.

* Another Ukrainian now in a top security job--present USSR MVD Chief N.A. Shchelokov--worked in Dnepropetrovsk with Brezhnev and followed Brezhnev to Moldavia in 1951 to take a leading post there.

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Nikitchenko had been Ukrainian KGB chairman since 1954; he was appointed to the post while Podgorny was cadre--second--secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Nikitchenko was a deputy secretary of Kharkov obkom from 1944 until sometime around 1950; Podgorny was Kharkov first secretary during the period 1950-1953.

SHELEST SNIPES AT DNEPROPETROVSK OBLAST LEADERSHIP

At a Ukrainian Central Committee plenum in late July Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest pointedly criticized the party leadership of Dnepropetrovsk, the home base of Ukrainian Premier and CPSU Politburo candidate member V.V. Shcherbitskiy, as well as of Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Shelest's sniping appears part of the longstanding rivalry between him and the Dnepropetrovsk faction, which is represented in the nine-man Ukrainian Politburo by both Shcherbitskiy and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko. This move may be a result of Shelest's strengthened position since he weakened the second most powerful faction--the Donetsk group--by shunting its leader, Ukrainian Second Secretary A.P. Lyashko, into the ceremonial post of president in mid-1969 and by removing Lyashko's protege V.M. Tsybulko from the key post of Central Committee cadres chief in April 1970.

Although Shelest did not criticize oblast first secretary Vatchenko by name, he focused criticism on a Dnepropetrovsk rayon and held the oblast leadership responsible for the shortcomings. With Vatchenko awaiting his turn to speak, Shelest singled out "the Nikopol rayon of Dnepropetrovsk oblast" for low grain yields and for fulfilling grain plans only three times in the last nine years. Even while acknowledging that agricultural leadership in Nikopol has shown some improvement and that the rayon would gather a respectable harvest this year, he turned the rayon's past shortcomings into criticism of the oblast leadership: "But how was it possible that the lagging of one of the oblast's biggest rayons was tolerated for so many years? Can one call this effective, skilled and demanding leadership?" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 July). Citing the number of farms failing to fulfill the plan in Dnepropetrovsk and five other oblasts, he warned that every nonfulfillment of grain plans "must be evaluated as political failure in work, and principled party conclusions must be drawn from this."

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In referring to the past nine years, Shelest also encompassed the period of Shcherbitskiy's tenure as Dnepropetrovsk leader (July 1963-October 1965). Although Shelest implied that Nikopol leaders had worked poorly for many years, they were being warmly praised for their successes in 1967--in, for example, a 9 January 1967 PRAVDA article by Yuriy Chernichenko and a 26 January 1967 PRAVDA editorial.

Shelest's relations with the Dnepropetrovsk organization have probably been strained since his rapid promotion from Kiev first secretary to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary (August 1962) and then to first secretary (July 1963) under Podgorny's patronage. When Podgorny was promoted from Ukrainian first secretary to CPSU Central Committee secretary in mid-1963, he reshaped the Ukrainian leadership in his own interests. Shelest became first secretary and Podgorny's Kharkov protege N.A. Sobol became second secretary, while Brezhnev's associate Shcherbitskiy was demoted from premier to Dnepropetrovsk first secretary. Former Donetsk first secretary I.P. Kazanets became premier, and his protege in Donetsk, Lyashko, moved up to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary. At the December 1963 CPSU Central Committee plenum Shcherbitskiy lost his candidate membership in the CPSU Presidium and his seat was given to Shelest.

After Brezhnev defeated Podgorny's challenge in 1965 and humbled Podgorny's Kharkov proteges, Shcherbitskiy was returned to the post of premier and also candidate member of the CPSU Presidium.

The latest divisive episode appeared to be Dnepropetrovsk's 1968 campaign against writer Oles Honchar's novel The Cathedral. Shelest ignored the campaign, which apparently because of lack of top-level support failed to shake Honchar's position as Ukrainian Writers Union head.

Shelest is now certainly a power in his own right and, while the Dnepropetrovsk group has remained a rival faction, he appears to enjoy good relations with Dnepropetrovsk patriarchs Brezhnev and Kirilenko. Ukrainian press treatment of Kirilenko--who as Dnepropetrovsk first secretary 1950-1955 had promoted Shcherbitskiy and Vatchenko to be his top deputies--has been especially favorable.

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LATIN AMERICA

HAVANA REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO REVIVED BOLIVIAN INSURGENCY

So far Havana has provided only reportage, without comment, on the 19 July attack by the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN--the guerrilla organization founded by Che Guevara) on a U.S.-owned goldmining installation in Bolivia. A PRENSA LATINA report on the 24th did note that the ELN foray led to all Bolivia being placed under a state of siege, "just as it was three years ago." The report went on to observe that the conversion of three provinces into military zones "could affect the guerrilla operations," and it concluded that the government "seems to have control of the situation."

Havana has reported that Cuba will furnish asylum for 10 ELN members who were released from jail in Bolivia and flown to Chile in exchange for two West German technicians captured in the ELN raid. Statements by the released ELN members have also been publicized in Cuban media. Two documents released by ELN following the 19 July attack were transmitted by PRENSA LATINA's office in Chile to Havana on 22 July and broadcast the next day by Radio Havana in a Quechua-dialect program for Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador--but not in other monitored Havana broadcasts.

CASTRO'S DILEMMA Havana's relatively cautious propaganda reaction to the ELN's long-awaited "return to the mountains" probably reflects a desire to avoid any implication that the ELN is operating under Cuban tutelage. Following up his renewal of trade relations with Chile earlier this year, Castro would like to overcome Cuba's hemispheric isolation by restoring bilateral relations with several Latin American states. But he does not want to leave himself vulnerable to charges by Latin American revolutionaries that he is betraying the guerrilla cause on the continent for the sake of national self-interest.

This quandary was illustrated in Castro's 22 April Lenin Day speech, in which he defended himself against charges--made by Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo, once supported by Castro--that he had forsaken the cause of Latin America in order to develop the Cuban economy. He promised to continue to support "genuine" revolutionaries, but not the revolutionary

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"imposters" he had backed in the past. At the same time, he embraced a doctrine of revolutionary pluralism for Latin America; noting that no two revolutionary paths are ever identical, he affirmed that Cuba's support for revolution is not confined to guerrilla movements solely but extends to any government that follows progressive domestic policies and attempts to free itself from the "Yankee imperialist yoke."

Castro also appears to be attempting to mend his relations with the orthodox Latin American CP's, a probable outgrowth of his much-improved relations with the USSR. A high-ranking Chilean CP official recently visited Havana and had lengthy talks with Castro. Although Castro in the past scored the Chilean party for its reliance on traditional politicking rather than revolutionary action, PRENSA LATINA on 24 July reported a statement by the party official affirming that relations between the party and Cuba "were never broken" and asserting that Castro told him "we might have had differences of opinion but never a problem."

To Cuban-oriented Latin American guerrillas, Castro's overtures toward "bourgeois reformist" Latin American regimes, his interest in mending relations with Latin American CP's, and the Moscow-Havana rapprochement may well appear as a betrayal of revolutionary principles. Although Castro's 26 July speech dealt exclusively with domestic matters, in a postscript to the speech, announcing that Guevara's hands and death mask had been received in Cuba, he appeared to reaffirm, defensively, Cuba's continuing commitment to revolution in Latin America:

We do not want to construct a paradise on the edge of a volcano. We work with zeal and with confidence in the future One day we will have to be a part of the community of Latin American peoples, of the revolutionary peoples of Latin America. Some day our fatherlands will cease to be fragments of a continent that is subjugated by imperialism. We are the pioneers of this revolutionary path, the first but not the only ones.

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ELN DOCUMENTS PROCLAIM A CONTINENT-WIDE STRUGGLE

The documents released by ELN--noted above--stressed that the liberation struggle must follow a continental strategy. One document was entitled "We Have Returned to the Mountains" and signed by ELN commanders, including "Chato" Peredo, self-proclaimed successor to his brother as chief of the ELN. It was largely a reaffirmation of Guevara's thesis that the Bolivian struggle is a key part of a continent-wide struggle; in explaining why non-Bolivians are enlisted in ELN ranks, it declared:

For us, as for Bolivar and Che, the fatherland is America, the fatherland is not just where one is born, but rather where one is ready to die or conquer in the struggle against the enemy of the peoples Foreigners are the agents of the CIA and their collaborators in our country. A revolutionary is not a foreigner anywhere.

The other document issued by the ELN, entitled "To the People of Latin America" and signed by Chilean, Peruvian, and Brazilian ELN members, expanded on this point. It emphasized that the Bolivian people view as strangers only those who have "always divided America in order to devour her more fully," not those who "come to offer their lives for Bolivian liberation." It recalled Che's notion that Bolivia was "the key territory" for initiating the continental war of liberation, a "Vietnam" which will "radiate outward." The foreign ELN members defined their task as the concentration of "our best efforts" in Bolivia while "preventing the enemy from concentrating his forces here."

The document signed by the ELN commanders derided the Bolivian CP, which Castro has accused of betraying Guevara. It scored the CP's efforts to forge an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, and contrasted the alleged effectiveness of the guerrillas with the impotence of the communist parties: "While 15 years ago the communist parties were of little concern to Yankee imperialism, today the guerrilla nightmare does not let it sleep." Alleging that Guevara's death "proved" the efficacy of guerrilla warfare and "the force of the theory of the guerrilla centers," it issued

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a thinly veiled blast at orthodox communists, terming them "pseudorevolutionary species" who "continue 'creating conditions' indefinitely, letting their organizations 'ripen' until they rot, and talking abstractly about the revolution."

The commanders indicated that the ELN for the present must "do without the traditional party methods and ways and organize ourselves politically with a basically military structure." This thesis is consistent with the doctrine expounded by French Marxist Regis Debray, who argued in "Revolution in the Revolution?" that autonomous rural guerrilla organizations operating independently of urban political parties would constitute the revolutionary vanguard.

The document sought to win adherents from the Bolivian CP and other leftist parties by noting that the commanders who signed it formerly belonged to various leftist organizations, including the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking Bolivian CP's, and had found them "inadequate for the necessities of the revolution." It noted that statements of support from political parties backing the ELN were "not enough," and that the guerrillas did not need "applause" or "counsellors." Calling for participation in the armed struggle, "which is what now defines a revolutionary," it expressed a need for "comrades to fight by our side and share with us the risks and victories." ANSA on 24 July reported that the Bolivian CP youth organization had issued a note disavowing the guerrillas. The note said that the decision of "many university leaders who have returned to the mountains, with all the heroism it entails, does not seem to us to be the most responsible attitude," but a reflection of "the despair of ultraleftist groups."

TUPAMAROS On 1 August Havana media reported on a letter sent by ELN leader "Chato" Peredo to the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan urban guerrilla movement. The ELN leader lauded the collaboration between his movement and the Tupamaros, and he said that the latter's assistance facilitated the ELN's "return to the mountains." This cooperation, Peredo said, "eliminates artificial frontiers" and demonstrates that "the ideas of Bolivar and Che have begun to take root." The letter did not

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Indicate what form collaboration between the two organizations had assumed, but it stated that "in the immediate future, we must give more evidence of integration not only with cooperation but also in the exchange of comrades."

In this context, it may be noted that in signing the document noted above, "To the People of Latin America," the Chilean, Peruvian, and Brazilian ELN members indicated that they also represented others who could not sign for reasons of security. Peredo's letter lauded the Tupamaros for providing an "example . . . worthy to us and to all revolutionaries," and he indicated that the ELN would try "to imitate" the Tupamaros, although in contrast to its urban-centered actions the ELN would operate "in the mountains."*

* Havana comment last June praised the Tupamaros as an example for other Latin American revolutionaries, and claimed that their tactics have been adopted throughout the southern cone of South America. See the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, pp. 36-38.

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