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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

22 JULY 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

22 July 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 29)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 JULY 1970

<u>Moscow (3713 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2450 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Session	(--)	23%*	Domestic Issues	(23%)	35%
Indochina	(7%)	8%	Indochina	(33%)	22%
[Supreme Soviet	(--)	3%]	[Cambodia	(26%)	12%]
Statement			Tanzanian, Zambian	(5%)	7%
Middle East	(4%)	8%	Government Dele-		
[Nasir in USSR	(0.2%)	3%]	gations in PRC		
[Supreme Soviet	(--)	3%]	Vice President of	(--)	5%
Statement			Congo-B in PRC		
China	(5%)	6%	PRC-DPRK Friendship	(5%)	4%
CPSU CC Plenum	(4%)	4%	Treaty Anniversary		
Iraqi Revolution	(--)	2%	French National Day	(--)	3%
Anniversary					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* The Supreme Soviet's statements on Indochina and on the Middle East are included here as well as in the figures on Indochina and Middle East.

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## INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 20 July press conference is typically reported promptly and briefly by TASS. The report says that the President "completely supported" the GVN's stand opposing political settlement and the formation of a coalition government and that he said the United States "does not intend" to speed up troop withdrawal. It also notes that he "confirmed" U.S. policy regarding Laos, particularly that the bombing there will continue.

The 16th anniversary of the Geneva agreements on 20 July prompted the customary DRV Foreign Ministry statement, which rejects U.S. avowals of respect for the agreements and reiterates Hanoi's position that the DRV and Front proposals, as well as the Laotian Patriotic Front's five-point solution and Sihanouk's 23 March statement, "fully and clearly reflect" the principles embodied in the accords. The statement recalls that Ho Chi Minh's appeal on the anniversary last year had expressed the Vietnamese people's resolve to continue fighting until U.S. troops are completely withdrawn and the Saigon government collapses.

Peking publicized an anniversary statement by Sihanouk's government, which rules out participation in "any negotiations or conference" aimed at "legalizing" the Lon Nol regime or "partitioning" Cambodia. There is little other Peking attention to the anniversary, although Chinese media publicize Vietnamese comment on the occasion.

Moscow media, recounting the usual public meetings and messages from public organizations on the anniversary, have broadcast comment routinely accusing the United States of violating the Geneva agreements. There is no Soviet editorial comment on the occasion, but editorials in PRAVDA on the 19th and in RED STAR on the 18th reiterate the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement's expression of support for the Indochinese peoples.

The DRV's NHAN DAN published the Supreme Soviet statement on the 17th, along with an editorial stating that the Vietnamese have constantly received "strong support and great assistance" from the USSR. The Front welcomed the statement in an LPA editorial on the 19th.

## HANOI, FRONT COMMENT ON 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ANNIVERSARY

HANOI Following the practice of previous years, the DRV Foreign Ministry issued a statement to mark the anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on 20 July 1954.

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On the 18th VNA also carried a communique issued the preceding day by a joint session of the National Reunification Commission of the DRV National Assembly and the South Vietnam deputies to the Assembly, condemning the United States for "having seriously and systematically undermined" the agreements. Hanoi media recall Ho Chi Minh's appeal on the occasion of the anniversary last year, but no statement comparable to Ho's annual anniversary appeal has been issued.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement, dated 19 July and broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, includes routine charges that the United States has sabotaged the agreements and ignored the fundamental national rights of the three Indochinese peoples. It censures the Nixon Administration for "clinging to its stubborn stand" in the Paris negotiations and refusing to withdraw U.S. forces completely and unconditionally, as well as for trying to maintain the Saigon government in order to oppose the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. It says that to deceive public opinion and cover up its "crimes," Washington has "advanced many cunning arguments" to make people believe it has been respecting the Geneva agreements and the Indochinese people's right to self-determination. But it asserts that "all the deceitful tricks on peace" have "failed to fool anybody."

Declaring that the Indochinese peoples, for their part, have continuously safeguarded the principles of the Geneva agreements, the statement asserts that the DRV government's four-point stand, the NFLSV's 10-point solution, the Laotian Patriotic Front's five-point solution on Laos, Sihanouk's 23 March five-point statement, and the joint statement of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese peoples have "fully and clearly reflected these principles."

After recalling Ho Chi Minh's 20 July 1969 appeal in which he asserted the Vietnamese people's resolve to carry on the war "until the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops and until the total collapse of the puppet army and administration . . . ," the statement avows the determination of the Vietnamese to strengthen solidarity with the Khmer and Lao peoples and jointly to oppose the United States and its allies "until total victory." It declares that "no impudent threat can shake this iron-like determination."

A 20 July NHAN DAN editorial, carried by VNA that day, largely echoes the foreign ministry statement and the communique. But

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in ridiculing the notion that President Nixon has respected the Geneva agreements and the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, it comments that the President has spoken "vaguely" of free elections and democracy and questions how they can be realized if "such 'elections' would be carried out by the U.S. lackeys under American bayonets."

NFLSV/PRG        There is little available Front comment on the Geneva agreements anniversary. Liberation Radio on the 19th broadcast a radio editorial marking the occasion with routine charges that the United States has "systematically" sabotaged the agreements over the past 16 years. The editorial reviews the current military and political situation in Vietnam and Indochina in glowing terms. Among other things, it reaffirms the 10-point solution as the basis for a settlement in Paris and repeats the view that the naming of Ambassador Bruce to head the U.S. delegation at the Paris talks was an effort to "fool public opinion" into believing the United States wants to end the war.

Also on the 19th, Liberation Radio broadcast an editorial which it said was published in a special Geneva agreements anniversary issue of the clandestine journal THOI SU NHAN DAN (People's Current Events). The editorial discusses the anniversary only briefly; it concentrates on favorably assessing the current Indochina situation and reasserts the southern people's determination to fight until final victory.

The anniversary has been marked in previous years by official statements from the NFLSV, PRG, and Vietnam Alliance.

#### MOSCOW MARKS ANNIVERSARY, SCORES PEKING ON UNITED ACTION

ANNIVERSARY,        Moscow marked the Geneva agreements anniversary  
OTHER COMMENT        with the usual meetings and messages from  
                          public organizations and with a "solidarity day."  
The occasion was also marked with a solidarity day in 1966,  
although a solidarity month has been observed in the intervening  
years.

Commentators routinely denounce the United States for violating the Geneva agreements and express support for the proposal for a political settlement advanced by the "patriots" of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, stressing the demand that the United States withdraw its troops from Indochina. The United

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States is blamed for the "deadlock" at the Paris talks and is charged again with using the talks as a cover for continued aggression. A commentary broadcast in foreign languages on the 20th says Washington is currently trying to give the impression that it attributes prime importance to the talks in order to counter the negative impression created by the Cambodia operation. The commentator notes that President Nixon referred in his 1 July TV interview to a "new contribution" to the success of the talks, but it adds that this contribution turned out to be only the appointment of Ambassador Bruce. The net result, says the commentator, is simply "a renewal of the situation that prevailed at the talks half a year ago."

While the customary Soviet press editorials on the anniversary have not appeared, editorials in PRAVDA on the 19th and in RED STAR on the 18th, or the results of the Supreme Soviet session, sustain the Soviet propaganda denunciation of U.S. "aggression" in Cambodia and echo the expression of support for the Indochinese peoples in the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement on Indochina. Both editorials repeat the statement's demand for an "immediate, complete, and unconditional" withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops, but they do not reiterate the statement's remarks on a political settlement in Laos.

An IZVESTIYA article carried by TASS on the 17th says the "military success" claimed by the United States in Cambodia was actually a strategic and political defeat. The article says "observers" believe that "the Lon Nol regime will be short-lived," that it controls only about half the territory of Cambodia, and that the capital is "under threat of capture by the patriots."

ATTACKS ON Moscow continues routine-level attacks on  
PEKING Peking's Indochina policies, with a broadcast  
in Mandarin to Southeast Asia on 17 July  
pointing to the Supreme Soviet statement as evidence of the USSR's support for the Indochinese peoples. The commentary says the USSR's aid to the Indochinese has dealt a blow to Peking's propaganda "fabrications" about Soviet-U.S. collusion. It recalls that the Chinese leaders did not react to the call, in the 5 May Soviet Government statement on the U.S. incursion into Cambodia, for unity of all socialist, anti-imperialist, and peace-loving forces. U.S. expansion of the war in Indochina

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has "threatened the security of China," it adds, and the Chinese should realize this danger and unite with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to take "unified action."

A commentary broadcast in Mandarin by Radio Peace and Progress the same day similarly takes the Chinese to task for failing to understand the importance of strengthening the unity of all anti-imperialist forces in support of the Indochinese people. It repeats the charge that Peking is "intentionally trying to alienate the Indochinese people from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" and "underrates the significance of the socialist commonwealth" to the world anti-imperialist struggle. It once again charges that Peking has rejected the USSR's proposals for a united front in support of Vietnam, thereby abetting U.S. escalation.

#### PRC ON POLITICAL SOLUTION; SIHANOUK ANNIVERSARY COMMENT

AGREEMENTS           The only original Peking attention to the  
ANNIVERSARY           Geneva agreements anniversary is a 20 July NCNA  
                          Chinese-language item offering "background"  
on the agreements. The brief item reviews the contents of the agreements and says that they "frustrated the scheme of the United States to expand the Indochina war" but that the United States "quickly turned its back on its promise" not to obstruct the agreements. Reviewing U.S. "aggression" in Indochina, it concludes that the dispatch of American troops to Cambodia expanded the war throughout Indochina, "thereby completely wrecking the Geneva agreements." Peking media also carried the text of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the anniversary.

The Sihanouk government declares in its anniversary statement, carried by NCNA on the 20th, that it "refuses to participate in any negotiation or conference directly or indirectly aimed at legalizing the puppet regime of the traitors Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, partitioning Cambodia in any way and camouflaging the U.S. aggression." The "only just solution in conformity with the spirit of the Geneva agreements," it says, is "the immediate cessation of U.S. aggression, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of the puppet troops of South Vietnam, Thailand and other satellites, and the immediate cessation of all acts of war against the fraternal Laotian and Vietnamese people." The statement expresses the conviction

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that the Khmer people, "closely united" with the peoples of Vietnam and Laos, "firmly supported" by the PRC and DPRK, and enjoying the "militant solidarity" of the people of "other socialist and progressive countries," will be victorious.

POLITICAL PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien denounced the notion  
SETTLEMENT of a political settlement in Indochina in successive speeches during the past week. At a banquet for a visiting Congolese delegation on the 15th and at an Iraqi embassy reception the next day, he derided U.S. proposals for a political settlement in both the Middle East and Indochina, accusing the United States in the latter speech of "peddling the swindle of a so-called political settlement" in both areas.

In the speech of the 15th, after charging the United States with advertising a "peaceful settlement" in Indochina while continuing the war under the "camouflage" of troop withdrawal, he stated that "so-called" peaceful settlements in the Middle East and Indochina are simply "refurbished versions of the Munich policy of the 30's" aimed at stamping out the armed struggles of the peoples and at "realizing the division of the world by the super powers at the expense of small nations."

At a 5 July Peking banquet for Sihanouk, Chou En-lai, in a remark presumably aimed at the Soviets, had claimed that President Nixon wants to intimidate "certain countries" into helping him create a "Munich" in the Middle East, Indochina, and elsewhere.

#### PARIS TALKS: U.S. ACCUSED OF SABOTAGING GENEVA ACCORDS

The communist delegates at the 75th session of the Paris talks on 16 July marked the Geneva agreements anniversary by devoting their presentations to charges that the United States has sabotaged the accords, thereby bringing about the conflict in South Vietnam. Following recent practice, the VNA and LPA accounts of the session are highly selective, focused chiefly on denunciations of U.S. "crimes" by the PRG representative and on general charges of U.S. aggression by the DRV delegate.

VNA notes that PRG deputy head delegate Dinh Ba Thi, speaking first, recalled the process of U.S. "intervention and aggression" in South Vietnam, charging that the United States had "sabotaged the various clauses" of the Geneva agreements and committed "countless crimes." Neither the VNA nor the LPA version records

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Thi's full argumentation on how the United States has "sabotaged" the agreements--his charges that the United States had "illegally" set up the GVN administration and ordered it to "repudiate all consultations for general elections," had introduced its troops and war material, and along with the GVN had "carried out a series of terroristic reprisals."

The LPA and VNA accounts only briefly report Thi's listing of alleged U.S.-GVN crimes, although Thi devoted more than a third of his text to them. VNA--but not LPA--reports his claim that from mid-1954 to late 1964, the United States and GVN had "killed nearly 170,000 persons, wounded, or tortured to disability almost 800,000 others . . . and jailed more than 400,000." And VNA notes Thi's charge that since early 1965 "persecution and destruction have been intensified" and "hundreds and thousands of bloody massacres" have been carried out.

The accounts mention Thi's charge that "barbarous" methods of torture are practiced by the United States and the GVN in South Vietnamese jails. Neither reports his lengthy, graphic descriptions of alleged torture and conditions in the jails, (including Con Son,) but both note his assertion that the United States should be held responsible for "the penitentiary regime" since it has "organized, trained, equipped, paid, and commanded the puppet administration in this matter."

VNA reports briefly that in their supplementary speeches the PRG and DRV delegates "again condemned the towering crimes committed by the U.S. puppets in South Vietnam, especially the barbarous regime in the prisons set up by them, and refuted all the U.S.-puppets' perfidious allegations."

VNA reports that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy "condemned the United States for systematically sabotaging" the Geneva agreements and "conducting intervention and aggression" in Vietnam. It ignores Vy's brief general charges about the buildup of the war and 16 years of alleged U.S. "crimes," but it does note his claim that the United States came to the Paris conference on Vietnam "due to its heavy defeats" and his charge that it "still refuses to give up its scheme of aggression." VNA says Vy recalled the "U.S. maneuvers and acts of aggression" in Laos and Cambodia and condemned the Nixon Administration for expanding the war to all of Indochina.

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It omits the detail he devoted to these charges, as well as his recitation of victories allegedly scored by the Indochinese people.

Vy, according to VNA, refuted justifications of U.S. policies of "aggression and war prolongation" in Vietnam based on arguments about the security of the United States, the protection of honor, and avoidance of humiliation and defeat. Vy charged that such arguments are meant to "incite chauvinism and appease the opposition" of the American people to the Vietnam policy.

Both communist delegates praised the NFLSV's 10-point solution as the correct one for the Vietnam problem. PRG delegate Thi concluded that whether the war "will or will not end soon, whether peace will or will not be restored promptly in South Vietnam and Indochina," depends on the Nixon Administration's readiness to give up its "aggressive" policy. The DRV delegate placed the responsibility for the stalled Paris talks on the U.S. Administration.

ALLIED REMARKS        VNA gives only cryptic, one-sentence coverage to the allied presentations. It says that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "did his best to distort the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and to slander the DRV" and that U.S. delegate Habib "repeated his shopworn allegations on 'mutual troops withdrawal,' 'free elections,' and 'POWs' questions."

#### MADAME BINH VISITS INDIA, WITH STOPOVER IN HANOI

Liberation Radio on 17 July said that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh would visit India "in the near future" at the invitation of Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Included in her delegation, according to the report, is Ly Van Sau, PRG advisor to the Paris conference. Mme. Binh was reported to have been in Peking in mid-June, and on 14 July Front media said she had reported to the PRG and Front on the situation at the Paris talks. VNA on the 18th and LPA on the 20th reported that Mme. Binh had "stopped over in Hanoi on her way to visit India." She was received by Premier Pham Van Dong and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh. Trinh saw her off along with Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV Government's delegation in Paris. The only available Vietnamese attention to Mme. Binh's activities in India is a 21 July VNA report which notes her arrival on the 18th and reports that she met with Indian President V.V. Giri on the 20th.

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Moscow media have carried several reports on Mme. Binh's activities in India, and a Radio Moscow broadcast in Bengali on the 18th noted that this was the second "important contact between the leaders of India and the patriotic forces in South Vietnam." The broadcast recalled that a delegation of the NFLSV had been accorded "a warm welcome in India" in January.\* It commented that "these goodwill visits prove that the Indian Government is anxious to develop close relations with the patriotic forces in South Vietnam." (Indian press reports on the visit say that Mme. Binh is pressing the Indian Government for formal recognition of the PRG.)

On 21 July TASS reported a meeting between Mme. Binh and Swaran Singh at which they "touched on questions of mutual relations and possibilities of a peaceful settlement of Indochina's problems." TASS on the 19th reported a press conference at which Mme. Binh, touching on the Paris talks, charged that the United States continues "its aggression in South Vietnam and impedes peace talks." PTI the following day said she indicated in an exclusive interview with its chief diplomatic correspondent that "she was willing to return to Paris for the Vietnam talks with David Bruce."

PTI reports on 18 July that Mme. Binh will make a three-day official visit to Ceylon after her stay in India. The report said the Ceylon Government has recognized the PRG and that "an official announcement of the visit will soon be formally made simultaneously by both governments."

#### NLHX MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON LAOS

The NLHX marked the eighth anniversary of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos (23 July) with the usual central committee memorandum, dated the 20th and carried by the Pathet Lao news agency the next day. There appears to have been no mention this year of the 23 June anniversary of the founding of the tripartite government, marked jointly

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\*A joint NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien made a "friendship visit" to India from 13 December to 8 January. See the TRENDS of 14 January 1970, pages 7-8, and 17 December 1969, page 10.

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with the Geneva agreement anniversary last year in an NLHX Central Committee memorandum dated 23 June.\* The two anniversaries had been marked separately in prior years.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT The current memorandum asserts that the NLHX has persistently sought a political solution to the Laos problem and recalls that it has "many times put forth proposals" and has taken the initiative of sending representatives to "attend meetings and peace talks among the Lao parties concerned." These talks have so far failed, it says, because of "sabotage" by the United States and its agents.

The memorandum describes the NLHX's five-point peace program of 6 March as "consistent with the realities in Laos and the fundamentals of the 1962 Geneva agreements, creating the current basis for a peaceful settlement of the Lao question." Pointing to international support for the 6 March program, it recalls--in addition to statements by the DRV, PRG, and Sihanouk--that the USSR supported the plan in a 16 March letter from Kosygin to President Nixon. It recalls that Kosygin said "favorable conditions" for a meeting of the "Lao parties concerned" could be created only when the United States ends the bombing of Laos "totally and unconditionally."\*\*

The memorandum stresses the need for a "complete and unconditional" end to U.S. bombing, "a legitimate and urgent demand" of the Lao people that "will create favorable conditions for the Lao parties concerned to meet at an early date." So far, it says, there has been "no progress" toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of the five-point proposal because "no conditions have been created for the Lao parties concerned to meet at the same table, the immediate obstacle being the continuation of the U.S. bombing of Lao territory." It recalls that Souphanouvong, in his

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\* The Geneva agreement anniversary was marked again in an NLHX Central Committee statement on 22 July.

\*\* In this letter, summarized by Radio Moscow on 15 March, Kosygin rejected President Nixon's call for consultations between the signatories of the Geneva conference on Laos. See the 18 March TRENDS, page 12.

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12 June message to Souvanna Phouma, expressed readiness to meet other parties concerned "immediately after the complete and unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombardments against Lao territory."

Also on 21 July, Pathet Lao radio carried a statement read by an NLHX Central Committee member at a press conference called in Sam Neua to publicize the memorandum. Replying to a question about "new peace efforts the NLHX is undertaking," he replied that "recently" Prince Souphanouvong sent Thao Souk Vongsak, his personal envoy, to Vientiane to deliver a personal message to Prince Souvanna Phouma and hold discussions "which will make it possible for plenipotentiaries of the two sides to meet," and to discuss the cessation of bombings which would guarantee security for such a meeting.\*

BRITISH COCHAIRMAN      The NLHX Central Committee member was asked another question about the NLHX attitude toward the British Government, "which unilaterally sent a letter" to the 1962 Geneva agreement signatories "after it had received a request from the Vientiane administration concerning the movement of the ICC in Laos."\*\* He replied that the Vientiane administration is not the legal tripartite government and therefore does not have the right to ask for action from the British Geneva cochairman, and he praised the "correct stand" taken by the Soviet cochairman, who opposed the "illegal" unilateral British action.

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\* On 13 July Vientiane media and Paris AFP reported that NLHX delegate in Vientiane, Soth Pethrasi, called on Souvanna Phouma the day before to inform him that a messenger from Souphanouvong would come "in the immediate future."

\*\* On 8 July Vientiane media publicized a letter from Souvanna Phouma--dated 12 June--to the Geneva conference cochairmen which recalled that on 29 May he had requested the ICC to inspect Saravane for the presence of North Vietnamese troops. He complained that the uncooperative Polish attitude made it impossible for the ICC to comply with his request, and he asked the cochairmen to do their utmost to check Hanoi's aggression in Laos. Also on 8 July, the British cochairman unilaterally circulated this letter to the Geneva signatories after failing to enlist Soviet cooperation.

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The British move is also criticized in a 16 July NLLX Central Committee spokesman's statement, carried by the Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces on the 20th, which praises the Soviet Government for expressing opposition to U.S. aggression in Laos "many times" and scores the British Government for "colluding" with the United States. It recalls that Souvanna Phouma sent a message to the Geneva cochairmen "blatantly ignoring the NLLX and the DRV" and that the British Government, "ignoring the Soviet protest," sent messages to the Geneva conference signatories requesting ICC inspections of Laos.

#### NEW MINISTRIES CREATED IN SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT

According to NCNA on 16 July, Sihanouk the previous day appointed Keat Chhon "minister delegate to the Prime Minister" of the Royal Government of National Union and Thiounn Prasith "minister in charge of the coordination of the efforts of struggle for national liberation." These are apparently new ministries, added to the original 12.

Keat Chhon, former industry minister in Lon Nol's government, announced his decision to join the FUNK in a statement datelined Paris, 10 July, and carried by NCNA on the 15th. Also on the 15th, NCNA reported his arrival in Peking that day. Thiounn Prasith is the brother of Thiounn Mumm, minister of economy and finance in Sihanouk's government.

#### YEMEN, TANZANIA RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT

Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union adds Yemen and Tanzania to the list of countries which recognize it, bringing the total of states or regimes it claims have recognized it to 22.

A "press communique" issued by the government, carried by NCNA on 19 July, says the Yemeni ambassador told Sihanouk the day before that Yemen "does not recognize" the Lon Nol government and "has never ceased recognizing" Sihanouk as the only legal head of state, thus recognizing only his government as legal. The communique adds that the position taken by Tanzania is "identical" to that of Yemen, and therefore the Royal Government of National Union counts these two states among those which have recognized it "de jure."

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## REPORTS ON CAMBODIAN MILITARY ACTION

The Sihanouk government statement on the Geneva agreements anniversary, publicized by Peking and Hanoi, claims that the National Union government "has practically controlled two-thirds of the territory" of Cambodia. And a lengthy statement by Sihanouk, carried by NCNA on the 18th and summarized by VNA on the 19th, charges the Cambodian Government with trying to prevent the residents of Phnom Penh from finding out about the true situation outside the capital. An 18 July Hanoi broadcast says AFP reported that B-52's bombed near Phnom Penh on the 18th and charges that U.S. planes have been used to support Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops, thus "exposing Nixon's deceitful argument that aircraft have been used to attack only the enemy's supply routes."

Hanoi and Front reports on military action in Cambodia pay particular attention to engagements in Kompong Cham and Kompong Speu provinces. A 16 July Liberation Radio commentary says that in the course of fighting around the city of Kirirom in Kompong Speu, the Cambodian liberation forces annihilated nearly 1,000 "enemy" troops, captured "hundreds" of others, completely annihilated three government battalions, seized an armaments factory, and severed Route 4 linking the capital to the country's seaport. The commentary says Kirirom was captured on the 11th and alleges that almost all provinces south of Phnom Penh are occupied by the Cambodian "patriotic forces," which are vigorously attacking the enemy.

VNA reported in its press review on the 17th that QUAN DOI NHAN DAN that day said the "Khmer patriots" had seized control of Kirirom and the Kamani military subsector, in Kompong Speu Province, on 11 and 13 July. The army paper commented that forces of "the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique, backed by U.S. and Saigon troops, are doing their best to consolidate the defense perimeter of Phnom Penh, but their repeated failures in Kompong Cham, Kompong Speu, and elsewhere have driven them into a serious position of being encircled."

A 15 July Liberation Radio account of a FUNK information bureau commentary describes the Cambodian struggle in highly generalized terms. The commentary claims that the Cambodian "revolutionary administration is strongly developing in the rural and urban areas, is effectively leading our people in combat and production, and is mobilizing manpower and riches to serve the frontline

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and the development of guerrilla warfare." Discussing the recent allied ground operations in Cambodia, it also says the allies wanted to destroy the South Vietnam PLAF on Cambodian territory but were "unable to find this invisible and dreadful opponent in Cambodia." American statements about thousands of Viet Cong killed in Cambodia are rebutted in the PUNK commentary, which claims that "actually these were innocent Khmer people and honest Chinese and Vietnamese nationals barbarously massacred by the U.S.-puppets."

#### COMMENT ON WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Routine Vietnamese communist battle reports cite scattered actions throughout South Vietnam. VNA's press review notes that NHAN DAN on 21 July announced that the PLAF shelled Saigon's Independence Palace early on the 20th.

An undated QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 19th, reviews U.S. "defeats" sustained during the first half of 1970 in implementing the clear-and-hold strategy as part of the Vietnamization program. Stating that the overall U.S.-GVN military and political situation has "further deteriorated," it claims that "despite their intensive implementation of the clear-and-hold strategy, the U.S. aggressors could not maintain a secure foothold, could not reduce U.S. troop casualties, could not keep the puppet army and administration from declining, could not 'sweep' the PLAF's main force units, could not check the development of the guerrilla warfare movement, and could not destroy the southern revolutionary bases."

On the 20th Hanoi radio carried another QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, dated the 19th, which reviews in standard terms the "very great" military-political achievements since the 1968 Tet offensive and the worsening U.S.-GVN position.

#### CONTINUED EXPLOITATION OF CON SON PRISON CRITICISM

Vietnamese communist media continue to give considerable play to reports of prisoner maltreatment at Con Son prison. DRV and Front publicize statements issued by their respective "war crimes" commissions denouncing the U.S.-GVN "crimes," "inhuman treatment," "tortures," and "horrors" at Con Son

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and in the GVN penal system as a whole. The DRV statement, publicized on the 15th, claims that the United States and the GVN are experiencing "unprecedented isolation" as a result of the Con Son revelations and that the "irrefutable" evidence of their "crimes" cannot be denied. It calls for world condemnation of the Con Son "tiger cages" and the GVN detention system.

A South Vietnam crimes commission statement, dated the 12th and broadcast on the 15th, details charges of Con Son atrocities allegedly committed during the past several years. And on the 21st Liberation Radio carried a 16 July statement from the commission which reiterates criticism of Con Son and the GVN penal system and urges worldwide demands for prompt adoption of "effective measures to immediately check the Thieu-Ky clique's bloody hands in the prisons in South Vietnam." It demands changes in the prison system and the release of "patriots," and it insists that the PRG and Front have always treated enemy prisoners well.

Additional propaganda exploitation includes a 16 July VNA account of an interview with an inmate of Con Son under the Diem regime, Nguyen Duc Thuan--now vice president and secretary general of the North Vietnamese Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions. Also on the 16th, Hanoi radio and VNA summarized a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the same day which calls the U.S.-GVN airlifting of 500 inmates out of Con Son to the Chi Hoa prison in Saigon a "clumsy trick" aimed at mollifying the outraged U.S. and world peoples. An 18 July LPA commentary added that the transfer of the 500 prisoners was also aimed at dispersing and disposing of witnesses necessary for an investigation into the GVN prison system.

#### FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U.S. ATTACKS ON DRV

A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 22 July, broadcast by Hanoi radio the same day, accuses the United States of attacking a number of areas in Quang Binh Province and the northern part of the DMZ. It claims that U.S. F-4's and F-105's "strafed a number of areas" in Tuyen Hoa district, Quang Binh Province, on the 19th and that on the 21st U.S. aircraft "dropped many demolition and steel-pellet bombs onto a number of localities on the outskirts" of Dong Hoi, the capital of Quang Binh. On 20 July, according to

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the spokesman, U.S. artillery, from positions south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), shelled Vinh Tan and Vinh Thanh villages in the northern part of the DMZ. The statement says the DRV Government "vehemently denounces and sternly" condemns these "acts of war" and demands that the U.S. authorities "cease forthwith all gross violations" of DRV sovereignty and security.

The most recent previous spokesman's protests were issued on 27 and 30 June. The 30 June statement protested U.S. plane and artillery attacks against two villages in the northern part of the DMZ. The statement of the 27th charged the United States with a 25 June aerial attack on Dien Chau district, Nghe An Province.

**DOWNINGS OF U.S. PLANES**      On 18 and 19 July Hanoi radio reported that two unmanned U.S. reconnaissance planes were downed--the first in Vinh Linh on the 17th and the second in Thanh Hoa Province on the 19th. The claims bring Hanoi's total of U.S. planes downed in the DRV to 3,356.

#### TRUONG CHINH AND TO HUU ADDRESS SCIENCE MEETING

On 18 July Hanoi radio reported that the first improvement course was held "recently" for 135 deputy chairmen of propaganda and education committees in charge of scientific and educational activities in the DRV. The radio noted that the meeting was held to implement the party Secretariat's "instructions" and was meant to help the cadres better understand party policies and better fulfill their tasks. It said that the trainees studied Le Duan's major February article, which emphasized the importance of scientific and technical training, and "carefully studied party policies and lines concerning the educational task, the training of scientific, technical, and managerial cadres, the scientific and technical task, the medical task . . . ."

Politburo member Truong Chinh and Secretariat member To Huu addressed the trainees, according to the broadcast. Truong Chinh pointed out the role of the scientific and educational task and added that "it is impossible to detach the economic building task, the strengthening of national defense, and the anti-U.S. resistance from the scientific and education development

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task." He stressed that it is insufficient to have only political, economic and military knowledge; scientific and education tasks must also be understood. He warned against dismissing the party's scientific and educational organizations as "unnecessary," and he cautioned--without amplification--that "the slight reduction in the scientific and educational personnel" should not be used to assign cadres to other jobs. He declared that "party echelons must choose qualified and experienced cadres to build and strengthen the scientific and educational committees." The radio account noted that he said the scientific and educational task is new and "will encounter many difficulties" and that he enjoined students to constantly study the party's line and policies and "strive to overcome difficulties."

To Huu in his address also stressed the position and responsibility of the scientific and educational task at present, stating that it must be considered as important as the military and economic fronts. He called upon the scientific and educational branches to improve their work quality "at all costs."

Like Truong Chinh, To Huu took note of personnel limitations. He urged students to build scientific and educational organizations "with the limited number of personnel prescribed for various levels by the party central committee," and he stated that "because of limited personnel, great attention must be paid to choosing good cadres" who must continually improve themselves.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## UAR-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTS MIDEAST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The widely publicized communique concluding UAR President Nasir's 29 June-17 July visit to the Soviet Union underlines the objective of a political settlement of the Middle East problem, stating that the sides discussed "further steps which they believe must be taken" to achieve such a settlement and "declared for further coordination of their efforts in this direction." A political settlement was specifically not mentioned in the communique on Nasir's last official visit to the USSR, in July 1968, although the idea was implicit in the two sides' support for settling the crisis on the basis of the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

TASS' summary of the 1970 communique highlights the sides' support for "efforts undertaken in the UN framework" aimed at such a settlement--presumably a reference to the Big Four talks. Brief TASS announcements of Big Four consultations in New York invariably describe them as meetings "on a peaceful political settlement." As would be expected, the communique contains no reference to the U.S. or Soviet proposals for a settlement. A Petrov article in NEW TIMES No. 28 of 10 July, discussing the recent U.S. initiative, wondered to what extent the U.S. Government, "in advancing its 'political initiative,' has utilized the existing mechanism of the four-power consultations within the UN framework."

The communique calls for unspecified "urgent measures" to end Israel's armed attacks on the Arab countries, for withdrawal from "all" occupied territories in accordance with the principle of nonacquisition of territories through war, and for complete implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution and of UN decisions on the Palestinian refugees. The 1968 communique had specified Israeli withdrawal to positions held before 5 June 1967. The growing importance of the Palestinian resistance organizations is reflected in the solidarity expressed by both sides in the current communique with "the Arab people of Palestine conducting the courageous anti-imperialist national liberation struggle." In 1968, the communique went no further than the customary vague Soviet formulation on "heeding the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people in Palestine."

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The communique routinely asserts that Israel is able to conduct its "aggressive, expansionist policy" because of the "invariable support of the imperialist circles, above all the United States." It goes on to accuse Israel of violating the UN Charter and principles, raiding Arab territories, and carrying out measures aimed at annexation of the "temporarily occupied territories" and subjecting the Arab population of these territories to "terror and repressions." However, the communique fails to include a series of pro forma, propagandistic charges present in the 1968 communique, which additionally called Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory a threat to the Arab countries' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The 1968 document professed to see a link between Israeli "aggression" and imperialist policy; it charged "imperialist and aggressive forces" with using Israel as their tool and concocting new plots and provocations against the Arab states.

The 1970 communique places stress on the "particular importance" of Arab unity and expresses satisfaction with "growing inter-Arab solidarity" and cooperation. As in 1968, the document touches on such international topics as Vietnam, Africa, disarmament, and Europe, additionally pointing to the United Nations as "an important instrument of peace and security," confirming the sides' allegiance to UN principles, and calling for observance of the UN Charter.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS** Soviet military assistance to the UAR gets muted treatment in the communique. In the context of the Middle East situation, Nasir expresses gratitude for Soviet political, economic, and "other" support to the UAR and other Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli "aggression," and the Soviet side declares readiness to give the "necessary assistance" to the Arab peoples in their struggle for national independence, sovereignty, and freedom. The only explicit reference to military matters is in the section on bilateral relations, in which Nasir thanks the Soviets for "all-round assistance" and the sides confirm their efforts to further develop and strengthen "friendly cooperation" in political, economic, and defense fields. In 1968, the UAR had expressed gratitude for Soviet aid to the UAR economy and "defense potential," while the USSR had said it would continue to offer the UAR political and economic support and "assistance in enhancing defense ability"; the sides were said to have considered several practical measures to expand cooperation in the political, economic, and military fields.

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With respect to party relations, the current communique says the sides discussed ways of further extending CPSU-ASU contacts and agreed to continue the "fruitful and useful practice" of exchanging party delegations and information. In 1968 the sides had welcomed the "establishment and development of friendly contacts" between the CPSU and the Arab Socialist Union. As in 1965 and 1968, Nasir was invited in his capacity as ASU chairman as well as UAR president.

The communique concludes with the acceptance of an invitation to Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin to visit the UAR--an invitation not extended in the 1968 communique, although that document did note the sides' agreement on expanding Soviet-UAR consultations. In the current communique the sides express confidence that Nasir's visit and the "wide and open exchange of opinions" will promote the extension of Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation. The talks are characterized as having taken place in an atmosphere of "openness, friendship, and complete mutual understanding."

As transmitted by TASS, the communique says that during the "exchange of opinions the sides confirmed their similarity of views" on the Middle East situation and topical international questions; the version published in PRAVDA on the 18th, however, describes the views as identical rather than similar. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) renders the passage "confirmed that agreement exists between the views." The 1968 communique, in the vein of the one issued on Nasir's 1965 visit, had referred to a "frank" exchange of views on matters of bilateral cooperation and the Middle East situation and "agreement of views" on important international problems.

MOSCOW COMMENT Followup comment on the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement and the 17 July Soviet-UAR communique stresses Moscow's support of a political settlement. A panelist on the 19 July domestic service roundtable program maintained that interest in such a settlement is "the most important thing" about the Soviet-Egyptian talks. Comment pegged to the Supreme Soviet statement reiterates its vague warning that either the military escalation will continue if the aggressor is not curbed, or measures must be taken to insure a political settlement. At the same time, propagandists point to the statement's assertion of the right of all Middle East states to national existence, declaring that this demonstrates the absurdity of allegations that the Soviet Union threatens the Israeli state.

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Commentator Tsoppi, in a foreign-language broadcast on the 16th, says escalation of the military danger in the Middle East may lead to a new explosion that would endanger world peace. But the USSR does not believe such an outcome inevitable, he adds; the "aggressor must cease fire" and return all Arab territories "without exception," for only then will peace be restored and sovereignty of the Arab states and Israel be insured.

The Supreme Soviet statement's new formulation--that the peoples and government of the Middle East states should be the masters of the situation in the region--is not picked up in available propaganda.

#### BELYAYEV REJECTS CHARGES OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

PRAVDA's Belyayev in a series of recent comments has addressed himself to charges of Soviet involvement in Egyptian military operations more openly than Moscow propagandists have done up to now. Comment has heretofore been confined largely to acknowledgment of the presence of "Soviet experts" in the UAR and to vague mentions of "the so-called Soviet penetration of the Arab world" and charges of a "Soviet threat" to Israel. Now, in the 19 July domestic service roundtable broadcast, Belyayev mentioned Israeli, U.S., and West European charges "about some sort of foreign intervention in the war," including even charges that "the Soviet Union is directly involved" and that Israeli Phantoms were brought down "by rocket installations serviced by Soviet personnel." He dismissed such charges as unfounded and unsupported "by a single real fact."

In a 20 July domestic service broadcast Belyayev stated that following Israeli air losses in the Suez Canal zone, Israeli generals made assertions to the effect "that the Soviet Union is all but operating on the Egyptian front," and Israeli politicians began declaring that an almost fatal threat, not from the Arabs but from the Russians, hung over Israel. As in the roundtable program, when he noted that President Nixon had attacked the Arabs "in an unusually sharp way," Belyayev stated that the President in his 1 July television interview "accused the Arabs of wanting to throw Israel into the sea and called the Arab countries the aggressors." He added that American and Israeli papers seek to depict the situation as though the Soviet Union is sabotaging a Middle East settlement, a portrayal which he said does not correspond with reality.

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In an article in the 21 July PRAVDA, as reported by TASS, Belyayev again turned to Israeli and Western press "clamor" about "the alleged danger to the state of Israel and about 'participation' of the Soviet Union in the military actions on Egypt's side." Here he cited the UAR official spokesman as saying that military actions in the Suez zone are conducted only by Egyptians. One gets the impression, Belyayev said, that Israel and "those supporting it" are taking steps on purpose to aggravate the situation in the Middle East.

U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL      Belyayev in PRAVDA traced the "noise" in Washington and Tel Aviv about a change in the Middle East balance of power to an improvement in the Arab countries' defense capacity and a diminution of Israel's "much vaunted military advantages." He called it not accidental that the "panicky" Israeli statements about "Soviet 'interference' and 'presence'" coincided with stepped-up demands to the United States for new consignments of aircraft and speedy delivery of other armaments. Claiming that such equipment as howitzers and radar jamming instruments are being sent to Israel from the United States, Belyayev concluded that if anyone is disturbing the balance of power in the region, it is Israel.

Other propaganda has also dealt with the issue of U.S. arms deliveries: A RED STAR military review on 18 July said the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in Israel is aimed at distracting attention from "growing U.S. interference" in the conflict, and it cited reports about the delivery of howitzers, electronic equipment, and Phantoms to Israel. U.S. aid is not confined to arms and credits, RED STAR added, pointing to "Western information agency" reports that Washington is placing at Israel's disposal intelligence information on the location of Egyptian troops acquired with the aid of spy satellites.

A Tsoppi commentary, broadcast in Arabic and in German to Austria on the 17th, claimed that the "spying American satellites" collect information for Tel Aviv on Arab armies, fortifications, and weapons. Tsoppi called this a "criminal violation of the treaty on the peaceful use of space signed by the United States," proving that the United States "has taken over the political command of the Israeli aggression." Soviet propaganda over the years has routinely assailed U.S. use of satellites for "espionage" and other military purposes, but has only infrequently gone on to charge that their use is a violation of international accords.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## SUSLOV REAFFIRMS SOVIET DESIRE FOR SALT AGREEMENT

While Soviet media remain virtually silent on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna, a Japanese news agency report on 17 July quoted CPSU Politburo member Suslov as saying that although the United States was seeking an agreement "which would weaken the Soviet power," the Soviets were "still hoping" to conclude "a limited agreement." A Tokyo KYODO dispatch from Moscow on a meeting there between a Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation and Suslov reported that he believed SALT would "recess shortly."

Mazurov's 4 June Minsk election speech in which he expressed hope for a successful conclusion of the Vienna talks is the last Soviet leader statement on SALT to be carried in Soviet media, which have not acknowledged Suslov's reported comments. The JSP-CPSU communique, published in PRAVDA on 19 July, notes the JSP's "high appraisal" of the Soviet quest for nuclear disarmament and says both sides consider it necessary to continue efforts to ban and destroy nuclear weapons, but does not mention SALT.

In Moscow's INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 7, signed to the press 23 June 1970), A. Zimin, in the course of a review of the Nixon Administration's first 18 months in office, concluded that although the Administration's foreign policy actions have "by no means promoted the relaxation of international tension," the Helsinki and Vienna SALT are among the "positive features" of U.S.-Soviet relations since January 1969. Sustaining Moscow's attacks on recent speeches by Defense Secretary Laird advocating the development of various kinds of strategic weapons systems in response to a Soviet threat, Zimin contended that such an attitude has "a direct bearing" on SALT. Agreement is possible, he said, only if both parties "proceed from the need to insure the equal security of the sides, with simultaneous and complete consideration of the tasks of reducing the military danger and strengthening peace."

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## FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS

## USSR REPORTS BILATERAL TALKS TO RESUME, DOWNPLAYS PRESS LEAKS

The USSR continues to devote scant propaganda attention to the FRG-Soviet talks on a renunciation-of-force agreement which, according to Hamburg's DPA, are scheduled to resume in Moscow on 27 July. TASS reported briefly and without comment on 17 July that Foreign Minister Scheel is to arrive in Moscow on the 26th "for talks with the Soviet side on questions of mutual interest." Consistent with this circumspection, available TASS reports on Scheel's brief visits to London and Washington last week fail to mention the impending Moscow talks. A 19 July dispatch does say, however, that the foreign minister "tried to secure American approval for the new Eastern policy proclaimed by Chancellor Brandt."

Propaganda has taken due note of the West German leaks to the press of the 10-point agreement purportedly negotiated earlier by State Secretary Bahr and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,\* but it has laid the blame at the feet of the CDU/CSU and has not suggested that the leaks have adversely affected the talks. An article in PRAVDA on 14 July by A. Yulyev says that the CDU/CSU bloc--"the banner-carrier of the most reactionary chauvinistic forces in West Germany"--has resorted to "organizing 'a leakage' of government secrets" and to charging treachery to undercut the policies of the Brandt-Scheel government. Yulyev comments that the government has shown a degree of realism in evaluating the situation in Europe but that "even the very idea that the FRG may have normal relations with socialist countries on the basis of the existing order of things meets with fierce resistance" from the CDU/CSU bloc.

A 13 July broadcast for German audiences over Moscow's "Radio Peace and Progress," reporting the "speculation" in West Germany about the causes of the disclosures and allegations in BILDZEITUNG and QUICK, charged that the "main purpose" is to prevent all talks between the FRG and the socialist countries and "not to allow any realistic" assessments in

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\* Hamburg's BILDZEITUNG on 12 June published the first four points of the purported agreement and followed up with publication of the last six on 1 July. QUICK on 30 June published all 10 points.

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West Germany's foreign policy. A representative of Radio Moscow, in a broadcast carried by the East Berlin radio on the 17th, criticized an "anti-Soviet attack" recently shown on FRG television, calling it part of the rightist attack on the FRG-USSR talks. The attack has further manifested itself, the spokesman said, in the "purloining and publishing of the confidential papers of the Federal Government."

GDR ON FRG- SOVIE' TALKS In a 16 July speech during Baltic Week celebrations in Rostock, Ulbricht reaffirmed his support for the Soviet-FRG exchange of views on a renunciation-of-force agreement and voiced the hope that such an agreement "will be signed as soon as possible." He added that it should then "be possible to conclude an agreement on equal relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of international law."\* In his speech at the 13th plenum of the SED Central Committee, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 June, Ulbricht had "wished success" to the forthcoming Soviet-FRG talks, concluding that they "could have a favorable influence on relations between the GDR and the FRG." He had also touched on the Bonn-Moscow exchange in an interview published in Hamburg's DER SPIEGEL on 6 July. He concluded in the interview that the Brandt government "constitutes progress," citing as evidence the "more realistic assessment of the limits in the negotiations with the Soviet Union."

Other regime spokesmen have joined Ulbricht in endorsing the renunciation-of-force talks. SED Politburo member Norden, at a Rostock rally on 18 July reported by ADN, stated that the Soviet move to conclude an agreement with the FRG "serves the cause of preserving peace." The GDR, he added, "would welcome the conclusion of such a treaty because it would constitute an important step toward European security, because it would have favorable effects on shaping relations between the GDR and the FRG." And Foreign Minister Winzer, at a 13 July press conference in Rostock, was reported by Hamburg's DPA as having said that the Moscow-Bonn talks "could favorably influence" talks between the two German states.

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\* Ulbricht did not take the occasion in Rostock to repeat the call--made last month at the 13th plenum of the SED Central Committee--for a third round of talks between the heads of the FRG and GDR governments. He did suggest, as he had done in the plenum speech, the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level and the application by both German states for UN membership.

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## JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

## JCP CONGRESS UNDERSCORES INDEPENDENCE IN WORLD MOVEMENT

At its 11th congress, held 1-7 July, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) reaffirmed its independent line in the international communist movement, attacking policies of both the CPSU and the CCP and underscoring the strength of autonomist sentiment in the world movement. The proceedings of the congress, recounted in the JCP organ *AKAHATA*, were reported only briefly in Soviet media and totally ignored by the Chinese. The Japanese communists rebutted contentions of "certain foreign parties" that the JCP had become internationally isolated by pointing to the attention given the congress by a number of "fraternal parties," including "sincere messages" from the ruling North Korean and North Vietnamese parties and the Laotian and South Vietnamese fronts.\*

The tone of the congress was set by the draft resolution made public on 18 May, which denounced "big-power chauvinistic intervention in Japan's revolutionary movement" by both the CCP and the CPSU and itemized alleged errors of both parties in some detail.

STRAINS BETWEEN JCP AND SOVIETS      Strains between the JCP and the CPSU crystallized around the latter's message to the congress. While formally acknowledging messages from various other parties, including those of East Germany and Poland, the JCP in effect rejected the CPSU message and simply ignored one from Bulgaria.

The CPSU message, carried in Soviet media, was addressed to the congress delegates "and all Japanese communists," a formulation which the JCP cited to charge continuing Soviet intervention in the JCP's internal affairs. The point at issue was alleged Soviet support for the expelled "Shiga group," a source of strained relations dating back to factional struggles and Soviet pressures during the Khrushchev era. In addition to citing the offensive phrase in the CPSU message, the JCP claimed that Soviet embassy personnel attended a meeting sponsored by the Shiga group.

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\* The North Vietnamese message to the JCP congress was carried in the same issue of *NHAN DAN*, on 1 July, as the North Vietnamese greeting on the CCP's anniversary.

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The JCP leadership explained at the congress that because of Soviet intervention in its affairs it had decided not to invite a CPSU delegation or to request a message. Presidium Chairman Miyamoto, in his concluding speech at the 6 July session of the congress, cited the absence of such a request as the reason for not reading the CPSU message, commenting that "we would read any message here no matter what it said if we had requested it." Miyamoto added that the CPSU message to the 10th JCP congress, in October 1966, was identically addressed and was similarly not read to the congress.

OTHER PARTIES Messages from the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties and from the South Vietnam NLF seemed to show deference to JCP sensitivities, being addressed to the congress "and through the congress" to all members of the JCP. Both parties' greetings to the 10th JCP congress had used the same formulation.

The East German and Polish messages to the current congress evaded the issue by directing their greetings simply "to the 11th Congress of the JCP." But the Bulgarian greeting to "the delegates to the 11th Congress of the JCP and the Japanese communists"--available only from Sofia media--apparently fell into the same pitfall as the CPSU message and was not acknowledged by the JCP. Moreover, again like the CPSU message, it contained tendentious appeals for struggle against ideological deviations and for internationalist communist unity, and it even went beyond the CPSU message in citing the June 1969 Moscow conference, which the JCP had boycotted.

RELATIONS WITH CCP The JCP's troubles with the CCP were also aired at the congress. Putting his finger on a basic issue which divided the two parties, Miyamoto called on the CCP to change its stand from one based on "an anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet united front" to a united front in which the anti-Soviet dimension was removed. This had been the burden of the JCP's mediatory effort in 1966, at a time when the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership was seeking to regain influence in the Asian wing of the communist movement by its line of united action focused on the Vietnam conflict. While acknowledging that he had "no optimism" about improvement in JCP-CCP relations, Miyamoto renewed his party's expression of hope for an Asian anti-imperialist front which would include China.

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The congress' draft resolution had attacked the CCP and Mao Tse-tung by name for "ultra-left opportunism," for their attacks on the JCP, and for aiding antiparty elements in attempts to overthrow the JCP leadership.

The CCP had sent a message to the JCP's 10th congress but apparently not to this one. Reflecting the strains in the two parties' relations growing out of Peking's adamant rejection of united action with the Soviets, the message was cool in tone and pointedly called for struggle not only against the United States in support of Vietnam but also against "modern revisionism with the leadership of the CPSU as its center."

#### SOVIETS LAUNCH POLEMICAL ATTACK ON EVE OF CONGRESS

The Soviet party put on record its side of the contentious issues straining CPSU-JCP relations in an article in PARTY LIFE (No. 13) which Radio Moscow broadcast in Japanese on 27 June, four days before the opening of the congress.

While acknowledging the right of each party to have "its own independent policy line" and denying the right of any party to interfere in the internal affairs of another, the PARTY LIFE article cited as its rationale for discussing JCP affairs the draft resolution's treatment of "general problems of the international communist movement which concern not only the JCP itself but also other fraternal parties," as well as the fact that the draft resolution contained "an unwarranted and open attack" on the CPSU and its policies "which our party can never accept."

PARTY LIFE alleged that in refusing to participate in the Moscow conference of June 1969 the JCP leadership became "responsible for an open attack" against the unity of the international communist movement and "rendered assistance" to the enemy of that movement. It denounced the JCP leadership--although without singling out individuals--for its policies on such issues as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Czechoslovakia, and the "Kuriles problem." While accusing the JCP of "a plot of forming a third force" in the international communist movement, PARTY LIFE simultaneously charged the JCP leadership with aiding the Peking leadership's efforts "to ease itself out of political isolation by splitting the communist movement."

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As for CPSU-JCP relations, PARTY LIFE sought to place full blame for their deterioration on the JCP leadership and denied that the CPSU was intervening in JCP affairs. The Journal did not directly acknowledge the JCP's specific charge that Moscow's intervention took the form of support for the "Shiga group." But it noted that "according to reports" some lectures and programs given by officers of the Soviet pavilion on the Expo 70 grounds "were attended by some expelled JCP members," and it disparaged the idea that this constituted evidence for such a charge.

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## ALBANIA - ROMANIA

## TIRANA WELCOMES ROMANIAN TRADE UNION DELEGATION

As part of its low-key campaign to further improve relations with Romania, Tirana has given a warm welcome to a Romanian trade union delegation headed by Romanian TU Central Council chairman and RCP Executive Committee member Danalache--the highest ranking Romanian official to visit Albania in recent years. Radio Tirana reported that the group arrived in the Albanian capital on 15 July for a "friendly visit" at the invitation of the Central Council of Albanian Trade Unions and was greeted by its chairman, Rita Marko, also a member of the Albanian Politburo. The delegation stayed until the 20th.

The Albanians went beyond the requirements of protocol at a dinner given by Marko for the delegation on the 19th. According to Radio Tirana, it was attended by Politburo member Myftiu and Foreign Minister Nase, as well as by numerous district party officials. Bucharest's AGERPRES reported that the Romanians and a DRV National Assembly group were honored on the 16th at a concert attended by Marko and the People's Assembly President Shtylla.

Since the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which apparently raised Albania's apprehensions about its own security, Tirana has signaled its desire to improve relations with its Balkan neighbors. Editorials in ZERI I POPULLIT on 14 April and 4 September 1969 underlined a common bond with Romania, as well as with Yugoslavia, in the face of Soviet pressures. And Albanian party chief Hoxha, addressing a mass rally in Kukes on 28 May, pledged Albanian support for Romania in its efforts to resist "shameful" Soviet pressures. "You are strong," he told his Romanian "brothers," whereas "your enemies are weak; stand firm, for you have numerous friends in the world who love you and back you on your just road."

Albanian and Romanian moves to improve bilateral ties have been paralleled by Romanian-Chinese efforts to cement cordial relations. Romanian Vice President and Presidium member Bodnaras led a party-government delegation to the PRC on 9 June, and AGERPRES announced on 13 July that a military delegation led by Defense Minister Ionita had left for "friendly" visits to Pyongyang and Peking. NCNA carried a fairly lengthy report on the Danalache visit to Albania the day after it ended.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PARTY DAILY EXPLAINS DUBCEK OUSTER, REBUKES HARDLINER

The Husak regime's dilemma in having to contend with both the strong residual popularity of Dubcek and hardline pressures for an intensified purge is underscored in lengthy defensive articles in RUDE PRAVO on 16 and 17 July. The articles were given unusually full treatment by other Czechoslovak media, which normally summarize press commentaries: the 16 July article on Dubcek was carried in full on the same day by CTK in English, and the one of the 17th denouncing dogmatist Professor Lang was carried virtually in full that day by the Prague domestic service. Soviet media have ignored both articles.

ARTICLE ON DUBCEK      The unsigned article justifying Dubcek's expulsion from the CPCZ appears calculated to appease both the hardliners and, to a lesser degree, the moderates. The fallen leader is portrayed, on the one hand, as unrepentant, blinded by his popularity, and therefore--by implication--ripe for prosecution in a political trial. "The party, socialism, and the internationalist fraternity of the working people," the article concludes, "were lost behind countless 'egos' in his speeches," and "it was he himself who caused his expulsion from our ranks." He took "the easier road of agreeing with the rightist and counterrevolutionary forces, which finally led him to their platform." These forces "paid him for this by creating the 'Dubcek legend' in which he believed and continues to believe."

On the other hand, the article departs from the practice of other recent denigrations of Dubcek in paying due tribute to the former first secretary as having personified, initially, a necessary break with the discredited Novotny era. While calling the choice of Dubcek for this role a "surprise" and a "compromise," the article emphasizes that the party was on solid ground in selecting him because he had "spent his youth in the Soviet Union," and it recalls that "communists and the overwhelming majority of the citizens received the change in the party leadership with great approval."

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Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and other "rightists," the article adds, were opposed to the choice of Dubcek at first. But when he displayed his "weakness" and failed to curb their "disruptive" activity during the first half of 1968, they rapidly developed a "downright personality cult" around him. The communications media "glorified his every move," showing him diving into a swimming pool or "receiving various delegations bringing him resolutions with antisocialist demands."

The remainder of the article follows previous patterns in recounting the development of Dubcek's "rightwing opportunism," as manifested in his failure to deal decisively with the June 1968 ultraliberal "2,000 Words" manifesto, his boycott of the July 1968 meeting of the Warsaw Five, and his acquiescence in the 21 August 1968 CPCZ Presidium statement condemning the invasion. In his speech on his return from Moscow at the end of August, "he again posed in the role of a misunderstood messiah," the article says.

DENUNCIATION OF DOGMATIST In denouncing a leftwing dogmatist at some length, the 17 July RUDE PRAVO article by two members of the CPCZ Secretariat, Jan Fojtik and the paper's chief editor Miroslav Moc, marks a departure from the policy laid down in March in an authoritative Bratislava PRAVDA article which ruled out a "two-front" ideological struggle against both right and left as only serving the interests of the "rightwing and antisocialist" forces. The RUDE PRAVO article takes its cue rather from Husak's implicit warning to the ultraconservatives, in his 5 July Devin speech, that "differences within the leadership" help the enemy at home and abroad and from his avowal of determination in that speech to achieve "principled unity."

Under the title "To Denigrate Everything Again?", the article by Fojtik and Moc attacks an article by Prof. Dr. Jaromir Lang in issue No. 13 of the military-political biweekly LIDOVA ARMADA which had pointedly cited the Czech poet S.K. Neumann (1875-1947) as exemplifying "irreconcilability" toward antisocialist forces and support for the USSR. According to RUDE PRAVO, Lang had charged, among other things, that "the CPCZ's present leadership is afraid" to hold a public "dialog on questions of culture and policy" and is too lenient toward "the so-called mistaken" persons of the 1968 liberalization.

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Terming Lang's "slander" identical with that of "the rightwing and foreign reaction," the authors underscore Soviet support for the Husak regime's moderate course in declaring that its "positive results are again winning the confidence of the internationalist forces at home and abroad." They add that "to denigrate this credit, as Comrade Lang does, is extremely dangerous and hazardous."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## REPUBLICAN LAWS AGAINST "PARASITES" PUBLICIZED BELATEDLY

In the wake of attacks on labor indiscipline and loafing by the December plenum of the Central Committee, new legal measures have been adopted on the republic level against "parasites" who have avoided any sort of regular job. Although adoption of the republican laws began in late February, the campaign was kept very much under wraps throughout the first half of 1970. Most of the republican laws were adopted quietly, some with no immediate publicity at all.

Now the campaign has been publicized on the national level for the first time, in an 11 July PRAVDA article by USSR Prosecutor General R.A. Rudenko entitled "Everyone is Required to Work." Rudenko complains that some people simply refuse to work, serving as a "harmful influence" on others and frequently leading juveniles into crime. Condemning the authorities' laxness toward parasitism, begging and vagrancy, he informs the public that union republics have adopted new tougher laws in these areas.

The first such law--cited as the model by Rudenko--was adopted by the RSFSR on 25 February. It stipulates that those not engaged in socially useful labor will be called into the local MVD offices and warned to get a job within 15 days. Anyone who fails to comply is assigned a job. If he refuses to accept it, he can be sentenced to confinement or corrective labor for up to one year. Those convicted of vagrancy or begging can be sentenced to up to two years. Second offenses receive longer sentences (NEWS OF THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET, 2 April).

Identical laws were adopted on 18 March by the Ukraine (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 9 July), on 25 March by Kirgizia (SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 24 June), on 27 March by Azerbaydzhan (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 29 March), in late March by Uzbekistan (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 28 March), on 30 March by Belorussia (SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 7 June), in early April by Moldavia (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 7 June), on 29 April by Lithuania (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June), in early May by Tadzhikistan (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 6 May), on 14 May by Georgia (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 21 May), in mid-May by Armenia (KOMMUNIST, 20 May), and on 29 May by Turkmenia (SOVET TURKMENISTANY, 27 June).



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In contrast to the campaign against labor indiscipline, these moves have received little publicity. Only five of the 12 republics (Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Armenia) appear to have announced the new laws in the press at the time of enactment. In the case of the RSFSR there appeared to be deliberate concealment: The 25 February session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which adopted the new RSFSR laws, was reported and described in the 26 February SOVIET RUSSIA, but there was no mention of parasites or new laws in the report.

The anti parasite campaign appears to have been limited to the republic level until 11 July, the date of Rudenko's PRAVDA article. Despite the noisy campaign against "violators of labor discipline, rolling stones, loafers and drunks" early this year, parasites, beggars and speculators--those not in the public labor force at all--appear to have been ignored on the national level. Even as late as June, the leaders' election speeches failed to mention this problem, although Brezhnev and Polyanskiy may have had parasites in mind also when they criticized those who flout the "rules of socialist society" and "norms of life."

The only apparent reason for the secrecy is Soviet sensitivity to unfavorable foreign publicity. An article in the 18 June SOVIET RUSSIA by assistant RSFSR prosecutors A. Kogan and M. Shapkin attacked foreign "inventions" about a "tightening of the screws" in the USSR following Brezhnev's 12 June comments on law and order. Secrecy was perhaps no handicap in this instance because the new laws provide that the MVD contact each "parasite" personally and inform him of the new obligation that he immediately find a job.

TARGETS OF LAWS      Lithuanian Prosecutor A. Kayryalis declared that the "main purpose" of the new laws is to draw into socially useful labor "persons who have strayed from the correct path" (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June). The main targets appear to be youths who simply refuse to work and kolkhozniks who live off private enterprise and speculation. Adoption of the new laws followed revelations of the existence of large numbers of persons not employed in the public economy in some republics.

Complaining of a severe labor shortage in industry at a 24 December Azerbaijan Central Committee plenum, Azerbaijan First Secretary G.A. Aliyev stated that there were many people not engaged in social production: "Part

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of the nonworking population is occupied with their own private livelihoods, but there are also those who carry on a parasitical way of life and engage in speculation in vegetables, fruits, flowers and other agricultural products, not only in our republic but even outside it" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 27 December). He declared that "we must adopt all measures to draw the entire able-bodied population into social production."

PRAVDA's correspondent L. Tairov on 13 January reported that there were over 100,000 able-bodied persons in Azerbaydzhan who should be drawn into vacant industrial jobs. He also noted that many young people had not had a job for a long time or continually changed jobs.

Although Tairov noted that Azerbaydzhan's jobless rate was much higher than the national average, the problem is apparently serious in some other republics too. Youthful parasitism and the crimes engendered thereby have recently been complained about in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia also.

At the February-March Georgian Komsomol congress, Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze admitted that "we still have young people who lead an idle, parasitic way of life and do not engage in socially useful labor" (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 1 March). These "parasites," declared Mzhavanadze, "neither study nor work." Mzhavanadze also told of punishing "many young people" for using and selling narcotics. Georgian prosecutor A. Takidze, in discussing the new antiparasite laws in the 21 May ZARYA VOSTOKA, complained that existing laws against those who refused to work had proved ineffective.

At the March Kazakh Komsomol congress, Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev complained of youths' "scornful attitude toward labor, study and civic duty" and of the "still large number of crimes committed by youths" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 March). Kazakh MVD chief Sh. Kabylbayev expressed alarm over "street crimes" in Alma Ata and urged a stricter attitude toward "drunkenness, parasitism and disrespect for the rules of socialist society" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 March).

Moldavian MVD chief N. Bradulov told of youths who get jobs for a few days, quit and loaf for many months, and then repeat the cycle (for example, 14 times in four and one-half years) or simply refuse to work at all (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA,

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7 June). Bradulov said that in the two months that Moldavia's new law has been in effect it has had a "sobering effect" on many parasites, influencing them to get jobs, although there are still some who stubbornly refuse.

Armenian, Moldavian, and Lithuanian commentary on the new laws indicates that kolkhozniks who shirk kolkhoz labor in favor of their own private activities and speculation are intended targets also. Such people "exert a harmful influence" on others and often draw youths into criminal activities (KOMMUNIST, 20 May). Bradulov noted that there are "many parasites" in rural areas and some sell illegal home brew and home-made wine (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 7 June). Lithuanian Prosecutor A. Kayryalis also mentioned kolkhozniks who produce home brew and do not work (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June).

#### EDITORIALS INDICATE CONCERN FOR STRENGTHENED DEFENSE

In editorials on the Central Committee plenums of 2-3 July and 13 July, PRAVDA, RED STAR and RADYANSKA UKRAINA expressed a concern for strengthening defense that was not voiced in the similar editorials in other central and republican papers. The RED STAR editorials seem to be no more than routine examples of that paper's normal absorption in defense matters. But the editorials in the other two papers are of more interest. PRAVDA's editorial support for defense parallels its favoring of continued heavy industrial priority in its 2 July editorial. The Ukrainian paper's promotion of defense conforms to Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest's election speech statement on further strengthening of the "economic and defensive might of our fatherland" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 2 June). Shelest himself worked for years in the defense industry.

PRAVDA on 5 July said that the 2-3 July plenum's decisions "have historic significance for further strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the USSR at the present stage." RED STAR on 5 July declared that agriculture is so important that "without its comprehensive development, moving ahead successfully, the further strengthening of the economic and defensive might of the motherland and raising of the living standard of the Soviet people is impossible."

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In two successive editorials, RADYANSKA UKRAINA stressed defense. On 5 July it cited the "steady raising of the economic and defensive might of the socialist fatherland and of the welfare and culture of the workers" since the 23d congress. On 7 July (there was no paper on 6 July) it repeated PRAVDA's formulation that the agricultural tasks have "great significance for further strengthening the economic and defensive might of the USSR at the present stage." No other central or provincial newspaper editorials even mentioned defense--although eight republic papers played it safe by simply reprinting PRAVDA's editorial.

Again, in the 17 July editorials on the decision to call the 24th party congress, only PRAVDA and RED STAR raised the defense issue. PRAVDA said that "the further strengthening and development of the economic and political bases of the Soviet system and the growing defensive might of our country determine the continually growing influence of the Soviet Union in international conditions." RED STAR noted that the USSR had created "a powerful economic potential making possible the maintenance of its defensive capability at the proper height," and declared that "the party and government intend also in the future not to weaken concern for the Soviet armed forces." The nearest any other central paper came to backing defense was the 18 July TRUD editorial's statement that in recent years "the economic and defensive might of the country has been strengthened and the living standard of the workers has been raised."

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## CCP-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE RELATIONSHIP AGAIN DISCUSSED

Propagandists continue to show concern over the problems inherent in the division of authority between the revived party committees and the established revolutionary committees. Assertions that the revolutionary committees will continue to play a leadership role are coupled with warnings that party committees must play the leadership role.

On 14 July Shanghai radio reported on the difficulties of establishing unified party leadership in a local factory while at the same time sustaining the role of the revolutionary committee. After the setting up of the factory party committee, some nonparty members of the revolutionary committee came to feel that, four years having passed since "they fought their way out at the beginning" of the cultural revolution, "their historical mission had ended with the formation of the mill's party committee." Members of the revolutionary committee lost their initiative and let the new party committee solve "a lot of work problems." Under the leadership of the factory's party committee, however, the revolutionary committee soon realized that strengthening party leadership does not mean that the "party committee should monopolize all routine work." After study, members of the revolutionary committee understood that "they should continue to work under the leadership of the party committee," realizing the party's objectives.

On 12 July NCNA released a RED FLAG article on the party building experiences in a Shenyang plant which set up its new party committee in August 1969 after a year of work. The article was critical of those members of the party committee who then "felt that . . . the ideological building of the party was about completed" and "found satisfaction in the normalization of party life." The article told in general terms how this problem was solved by reliance on the masses, but then it turned to a specific condemnation of those members of the masses "who had been more seriously affected by the anarchist trend of thought" and "wanted to participate in every meeting of the party and to inquire into all the party's business." The RED FLAG article noted that at one party committee meeting, held to readjust

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basic-level leading groups, a leader of a mass organization asked, "Why didn't you people ask me to participate in your meeting to discuss problems?" The party committee dismissed this question as reflective of "an incorrect attitude," and asserted: While "there was a time when our party committee adopted a compromising attitude toward interference from the left," a "line of demarcation" must now be established between relying on the masses and succumbing to "tailism" which would nullify the party's leadership role.

Similar problems were outlined in a 19 July Chengchow radio report on a Honan provincial conference on party building held from 23 June to 16 July. The conference called on the masses to assist in the creation of a new leadership to counter "those erroneous trends which negate party leadership and place the mass organizations above the party organizations." Propaganda teams are to be formed to carry out Mao's line on party building so that those who "pursue bourgeois factionalism" do not "join the leadership groups" nor by any means become "the number one men."

The Honan conference also concluded that "it is necessary to put on the party's agenda the work of rectifying and building the Young Communist League," a suggestion originally advanced in last year's joint editorial on the anniversary of the CCP but ignored in the propaganda attention to the party anniversary this year. Reconstruction of the YCL was not mentioned in other recent reports on provincial-level meetings on party rebuilding held in Heilungkiang, Kwangtung and Hunan.

#### HEILUNGKIANG FARM SHIFTS MESSHALLS TO LOWER UNITS

A 9 July Harbin radio report on conditions at a farm for reeducating young intellectuals has sharply criticized large-unit messhalls, a basic innovation of the "great leap forward." While many communal messhalls were abandoned after the leap period, there were a few references to messhalls during the cultural revolution and certainly no criticism of the basic concept of large-scale feeding. The youth farm report now strikes at the heart of the system in arguing that "it took a long time to serve a meal because of the large number of people," thus affecting production. The farm reduced the messhall unit from the branch farm to the "company" level, with the result that "meals are better and can be served in a relatively short time."

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HOPEH PROVINCIAL SERVICE RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING

The Hopeh provincial service was heard broadcasting a local program, of routine interest, on 22 July, its first known break from a solid relay of Radio Peking since October 1968. Only three provincial-level radios are still limited to relaying Radio Peking, carrying no local broadcasts: Inner Mongolia (since 5 January 1970), Kweichow (since 30 September 1969), and Szechwan (since 19 November 1969).

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