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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

29 APRIL 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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29 April 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 17)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 APRIL 1970

Moscow (3014 items)

Lenin Centenary	(55%)	69%
[Brezhnev Speech,	(--)	22%]
21 April		
Indochina	(3%)	8%
[Cambodia	(0.1%)	5%]
[Vietnam	(2%)	3%]
[Laos	(0.1%)	--]
Middle East	(5%)	3%

Peking (1666 items)

Lenin Centenary	(6%)	29%
[Joint Editorial	(--)	21%]
First PRC Satellite	(--)	18%
Indochina	(42%)	17%
[Cambodia	(40%)	15%]
[Vietnam	(2%)	1%]
[Laos	(0.2%)	--]
Domestic Issues	(20%)	17%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Soviet UN representative Yakov Malik's 16 and 18 April remarks on a new Geneva conference are attacked by a Peking NCNA correspondent on 24 April as a "vain attempt by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to act in collusion with U.S. imperialism" to stabilize the "rightist" regime in Cambodia and oppose the anti-U.S. struggle of the Indochinese peoples. Although LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY on the 21st reported PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's comment at a Paris press conference that Mr. Malik apparently "held that a Geneva conference is not practical," Soviet propaganda has maintained total silence on Malik's various remarks. Apart from the NCNA commentary and a Tirana broadcast, no communist propaganda source has acknowledged President Nixon's remark in his 20 April TV speech that the United States had noted Malik's statements on a possible new Geneva conference "with interest."

Moscow's avoidance of the Geneva-conference issue is pointed up by a 27 April Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin which scores--without identifying--NCNA's latest "fabrications" about Soviet-U.S. collusion on Cambodia. Moscow's caution regarding Cambodian developments is further evident in a TASS statement of the 24th on "massacres" of Vietnamese residents--the most authoritative Soviet propaganda to date--which says that U.S. escalation in Indochina "cannot but cause concern among those interested in the earliest resolution of the dangerous conflict and a peaceful settlement of the problems of Indochina."

Vietnamese communist propaganda highlights the summit conference of Indochinese peoples that was reportedly convened on Sihanouk's initiative on 24-25 April in "a locality on the Lao-Vietnam-China border area." NHAN DAN observes editorially on the 28th that "the finest result of the conference, as the joint declaration pointed out," is the reassertion of the three peoples' "determination to fight until complete victory and of their solidarity and mutual support" The declaration avoids direct mention of a new Geneva conference but censures any attempt by "the United States, its agents, and other Asian reactionaries" to use any organization or international conference to legitimize the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 25th says the Vietnamese "categorically" oppose any conference on Cambodia which, like the one proposed by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, would defend the Lon Nol "clique" rather than Cambodia. Moscow and Peking have both scored Adam Malik's proposal in routine propaganda.

ISSUE OF NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

PEKING ON USSR-
U.S. "COLLUSION"The 24 April NCNA commentary denouncing Soviet
UN delegate Yakov Malik's 16 and 18 April
remarks on a new Geneva conference is Peking's

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statement expressing concern about the spread of the Vietnam war to Laos and Cambodia and proposing general negotiations leading to a "zone of neutrality and peace." The NCNA commentary now lists among developments in the U.S. "peace talks fraud" the urging of the Cambodian regime "to accept the French proposal on the convening of a new Geneva conference to discuss the Indochinese situation."

Peking radio's rebroadcasting of the NCNA commentary, which levels a bitter attack at "Soviet-U.S. collusion" to oppose the Cambodian people's struggle, has been surprisingly limited. The commentary was broadcast three times in the domestic service and twice in French to Southeast Asia on the 24th and 25th, as well as belatedly in Vietnamese on the 27th, but no version of it has been heard in Peking's Russian, Cambodian, or Lao service. The limited dissemination of the commentary may possibly be explained in part by the concentration on the Chinese satellite launching in Peking's broadcasts on the 25th and 26th.

The timing of the NCNA commentary is intriguing, coming as it does four days after President Nixon's favorable reference to Malik's 16 April press conference remarks and PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's Paris press conference at which she chose to comment only on Malik's second statement--to the effect that a new Geneva conference is not practical at this time. Peking may have wished to defer comment on Malik's remarks until after the Vietnamese communists had acknowledged them. But Mme. Binh mentioned only the negative side of Malik's remarks, and NCNA reports his statements of both 16 and 18 April. Observing that Malik's statement on the 16th--that the Soviet Union was paying the closest attention to the reconvening of a Geneva conference--immediately aroused considerable interest in "imperialist" circles, the NCNA commentary cites President Nixon's 20 April expression of approval as well as earlier statements by Secretary Rogers and UN Secretary General U Thant. The commentary adds that this put Malik in a tight spot, and he "feared that his undisguised and stupid commitment would enable the people of the three Indochinese countries to see through the Soviet revisionists as renegades." NCNA adds that Malik consequently changed his tune after only two days and said it was "unrealistic" to consider convening a conference at present. But "words once spoken cannot be retracted," NCNA concludes.

PRC-DRV RELATIONS The NCNA commentary was released while North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho was en route from Moscow to Hanoi. There is no propaganda evidence of recent Sino-Vietnamese consultations. As usual, the media carry no reports of the presumed stopovers in Peking by First Secretary

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Le Duan enroute to Moscow for the Lenin centenary celebrations or by Le Duc Tho on his way back to Hanoi after attending the celebrations. Moscow reported that Le Duc Tho had left the Soviet capital, on the 24th, and VNA subsequently reported his arrival in Hanoi on the 26th. TASS reported on the 24th that the Le Duan delegation was received by Brezhnev and that the two held "friendly conversations" in which fraternal DRV-USSR cooperation was noted. TASS added that "topical questions" of developing party and government relations were discussed. VNA's 25 April report of the meeting said it took place in a cordial atmosphere of "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."

MOSCOW DECRIES CAMBODIAN "MASSACRES," REBUTS PRC CHARGES

In a Mandarin-language "Radio Peace and Progress" broadcast on the 27th Moscow takes exception to NCNA's "once again engaging in anti-Soviet fabrications by trying to show that the Soviet Union and the United States are colluding to bolster the tottering reactionary regime of Cambodia's rightist clique." But the broadcast does not acknowledge that NCNA's charge concerned Malik's remarks about a new Geneva conference; it says merely that "the concoctions made by NCNA concerning Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia are not exceptional." The broadcast claims that Chinese propagandists are not only trying to distort Soviet policy but are hoping to "distract the Chinese people's attention from a major step advanced by the Soviet Union--that is, the TASS statement issued on the Cambodian question."

Radio Peace and Progress sets out to demonstrate that the TASS statement--which had been issued on the 24th--expressed the "Soviet people's indignation over the Cambodian military authorities' persecution of Vietnamese residents and firmly denounced U.S. imperialism's policy toward this area."* The broadcast, however, fails to mention that the TASS statement said U.S. escalation throughout Indochina "causes concern among those who are interested

* The most recent previous TASS statement on Indochina, on 28 February, criticized the "considerable escalation" of U.S. armed interference in Laos. A 10 December 1967 TASS statement condemned alleged U.S. plans to expand the war to Laos and Cambodia, but the last TASS statement dealing exclusively with Cambodia was on 19 October 1965 in connection with the USSR's refusal to receive a visit from Sihanouk at that time.

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in the earliest resolution of the dangerous conflict and a peaceful settlement of the problems of Indochina."* It does record TASS' concluding warning that attempts to undermine the neutrality of Cambodia and to widen aggression in Indochina "may have most serious consequences for the cause of peace and security in Southeast Asia."

The massacres of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia are also denounced in a 26 April PRAVDA article which, again without directly naming Lon Nol, scores Cambodian pursuit of a "policy of genocide." The "Cambodian authorities," says PRAVDA, are acting as the executors of a "broad plan aimed at extending the war in Southeast Asia, a plan whose authors must be found in Washington." While denouncing Cambodian actions against Vietnamese residents, available Moscow comment has not mentioned the various Vietnamese communist denials of the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia; Moscow has reported such denials in the past.

SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLES

DRV media revealed on the 27th that a "summit conference of the Indochinese peoples" was held on 24-25 April in a "locality on the Lao-Vietnam-China border area." According to the joint declaration broadcast on that day, the conference was convened on the initiative of Prince Sihanouk, who in addition to being cited as Cambodian head of state is for the first time referred to as the "President of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK)." The DRV delegation was led by Premier Pham Van Dong, and the Lao group was headed by NLHX Chairman Prince Souphanouvong. The PRG-NFLSV delegation was led by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho. This is Tho's first reported appearance since 22 November 1969, when he reportedly left Moscow after his visit there for the October Revolution anniversary.

JOINT DECLARATION The declaration says that the conference reached a "unanimity of views" on the present situation in Indochina and on the struggle of the three against the United States and its "agents." It also reviews--in standard terminology--the "brilliant victories" of the three Indochinese peoples, stating that the 1965 Indochinese people's conference together with the

* This appears to be Moscow's most forthcoming statement on an Indochina settlement since the coup in Cambodia, although Moscow had gone on record before as being in favor of a speedy settlement. Last October, for example, at a banquet for the visiting Pham Van Dong, Kosygin said the USSR comes out for peace in Vietnam "without delay and procrastination."

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current meeting "greatly contribute to the strengthening and consolidation" of fraternal friendship and militant solidarity. The declaration adds that it is "crystal clear" that the United States is seeking every means to prolong and widen the war in Indochina and calls the "smashing" of the U.S. "scheme" an "urgent demand at the present time." It contains the usual "earnest" call on the Indochinese peoples to "strengthen their solidarity and wage a heroic and tenacious fight" against the United States and the appropriate "lackeys."

The conference declaration enumerates the "combat objectives" of the Cambodian, Lao, and South Vietnamese parties--which the DRV "unreservedly" supports--as the familiar standard ones: independence, peace, neutrality, prohibition of the presence of all "foreign" troops or military bases on their soil, nonparticipation in any military alliance, and prohibition of the use of their territories by any foreign country for purposes of aggression against other countries.

According to the declaration, the conference showed "special concern" for the present situation in Cambodia and expressed "resolute support" for the struggle of the Khmer people, who are responding to Sihanouk's appeal and "with arms in hands" are struggling to overthrow the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique." The conference also "strongly" condemned all attempts by "the United States, its agents, and other Asian reactionaries at misusing the name of the United Nations or any organization or any international or Asian conference in order to legitimize the illegal Lon Nol-Sirik Matak reactionaries and to interfere in Cambodia."

The declaration contains a passage which could conceivably be regarded as justification for Vietnamese communist troop presence in Cambodia: "Proceeding from the principle that the liberation and the defense of each country are the business of its people, the various parties pledge to do all they can to give one another reciprocal support according to the desire of the party concerned and on the basis of mutual respect."

In pledging to abide by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, the declaration says the parties affirmed that "all problems" between the three countries "can be solved through negotiations." It adds that "the parties agree that meetings will take place when necessary between summit-level leaders or between competent representatives for exchanges of views on problems of common interest."

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CONFERENCE A 27 April report attributed to a VNA "special
SPEECHES correspondent," briefly recounting the main speeches
 of the four delegation heads, notes that the
24 April session included opening remarks by Prince Sihanouk
who pointed to the changes in Indochina since the 1965 Indochinese
conference in Phnom Penh. Next, Prince Souphanouvong decried the
"perfidious maneuvers" and "unavoidable failure" of the United
States, recalled the NLHX five-point stand, and expressed his
support for Sihanouk's five points, the NFLSV-PRG 10-points, and the
DRV's four points. Pham Van Dong reportedly recalled and
elaborated on a passage from Ho's testament expressing the
Vietnamese people's resolve to fight on until victory. Nguyen
Huu Tho asserted that the "revolutionary storms" in Indochina
will sweep away the United States.

When the conference resumed on the 25th, according to the VNA
correspondent, Cambodian delegation member Huot Sambath, also a
member of the conference's secretariat, presented the draft
joint declaration. The four delegation heads consulted one
another and quickly reached "unity of views," and the declaration
was adopted and signed "amid thunderous applause." Pham Van Dong
addressed the gathering again and voiced the Vietnamese people's
"deep gratitude" to the Lao and Cambodian peoples and "leaders"
for having "generously supported and assisted our resistance"
against the United States. He added that the DRV and Vietnamese
people are determined to strengthen the "great militant solidarity"
of the Indochinese peoples, "united in the national united front
of each country."

In the concluding speech to the gathering Sihanouk reportedly
exposed the "deceitful and perfidious character" of President
Nixon and mentioned his 20 April address in this context. Sihanouk
condemned schemes of unnamed "'big powers'" in the West, as well
as Asian "reactionaries" and "stooges" such as Indonesian Foreign
Minister Adam Malik who sought to "interfere" in Cambodia through
the UN and other international organizations and conferences.

DRV, Front, and Pathet Lao media on the 28th carry the full text
of the opening speeches of their respective delegation heads.
Sihanouk's remarks are also carried in full by DRV media that day.

DRV, FRONT Considerable Vietnamese communist attention to the
COMMENT summit meeting includes Hanoi radio's report on the
 27th of a news conference held that day by Hoang
Quoc Viet, the deputy head of the DRV delegation to the meeting.
VNA on the 27th reports the convening on the same day of the

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presidium of the DRV's Fatherland Front, which issued a communique welcoming the results of the summit meeting. VNA reports on the 28th that a "grand meeting" was held that day in Hanoi under the sponsorship of the Fatherland Front. Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong were reported present and Hoang Quoc Viet delivered the report on the conference. On the 28th VNA reports that "all" Hanoi dailies that day "warmly" hail the meeting. NHAN DAN's editorial says, among other things, that the summit meeting's joint declaration constituted "a victory of paramount importance" for the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Lao peoples. It adds that the summit conference met the "urgent requirement of the three peoples' fight against U.S. aggression . . . and opened up fine prospects for a powerful development of that fight."

Liberation Front media repeat the full text of the conference's joint declaration, and an editorial broadcast by the Front radio on the 28th says the meeting "possessed the fullest competence and prestige to assess the situation, to set forth the Indochinese peoples' tasks, and to draw up a special platform governing their solidarity, their determination to fight against the common enemies . . . and their longterm cooperation, because the conference represented the voice of the most genuine delegates of the three peoples who are courageously fighting and winning."

BACKGROUND ON 1965
INDOCHINA CONFERENCE

The 1965 Indochinese people's conference, held in Phnom Penh in early March and lasting nine days, was not a summit meeting but a gathering of various official and self-styled "front" organizations in Indochina at that time. The highest ranking DRV officials present were Fatherland Front members Hoang Quoc Viet and Hoang Minh Giam, both of whom were members of the DRV delegation at the April 1970 summit meeting. The NFLSV delegation was led by its Secretary General Huynh Tan Phat, now PRG President.

In addition to denouncing the United States and expressing Indochinese solidarity, the Phnom Penh conference record contains a general resolution which, as summarized by NCNA on 10 March 1965, called for new international conferences on both Cambodia and Laos. According to NCNA, the resolution held "that a new international conference on Cambodia to provide it with legitimate guarantees concerning its neutrality and territorial integrity and a new international conference on Laos to insure the strict implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements will help to create a favorable atmosphere and to facilitate a restoration of peace in Indochina."

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PEKING, OTHER BLOC TREATMENT OF INDOCHINESE LEADERS' MEETING

PEKING Peking hails the joint declaration of the Indochinese leaders with a PRC Government statement* released on 28 April. The PRC statement praises the unity of the three peoples in the face of the "common enemy," U.S. imperialism, and scores alleged U.S. "aggression and "counterrevolutionary tactics." The Americans, it says, are trying to pull together the puppets of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand in an attempt to turn "the three Indochinese countries and the whole Indochinese peninsula" into "an important military base for its aggression against China and other Asian countries."

The notion that the United States wants to establish a base in Indochina for attacking China has not been pressed in authoritative PRC statements since 1966, although dangers to China posed by the Vietnam war were cited in some comment during 1967. Some recent Peking comment in connection with Laos has noted that military actions are taking place near the Chinese frontier. The 26 March PRC Foreign Ministry statement observed only that Laos is "China's close neighbor," but an NCNA commentary on 13 March noted that American airmen fly support missions in "liberated areas" of Laos and in "areas close to the borders of China and the DRV."

The PRC Government statement charges that the United States has "torn to shreds" the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and, "under the signboard of 'peace talks,'" is pressing Vietnamization in Vietnam and intensified aggression in Laos and Cambodia. The statement warns that the Chinese Government and people are "closely watching with concern the development of the present situation" in Cambodia and "firmly support the Cambodian people in taking up arms" in response to Sihanouk's call. It opposes U.S. schemes to undermine the Cambodian people's struggle by "utilizing the UN or any other international organization or conference." It does not, however, echo the earlier warning on Laos that the Chinese people "will not stand idly by."

* This the first Chinese Government statement on Cambodia since 2 May 1965, when the PRC endorsed Cambodian conditions laid down for the convening of an international conference on the Cambodian situation. Peking has occasionally issued foreign ministry statements on Cambodia, most recently on 26 November 1969 denouncing U.S. bombing of Dak Dam. The most recent PRC foreign Ministry statement on Indochina was on 26 March when Peking warned that it would "not stand idly by" while the United States committed aggression in Laos.

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OTHER MEDIA Of the other communist media, Albania and the DPRK so far have greeted the conference with government statements, and Pyongyang also publicizes a 23 April telegram from Kim Il-song to the summit conference. TASS promptly summarized the joint declaration on the 27th, and a TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 28th praises the meeting as "another milestone along the road of further rallying the national liberation forces" of Indochina. The TASS report of the joint declaration gives the titles of the leaders of each delegation except for Sihanouk, thus omitting his title of Head of State as well as the new title President of the National United Front of Kampuchea. As a rule, Moscow comment generally has avoided referring to Sihanouk by any title. On the other hand, Moscow has generally referred to the Lon Nol regime as the Cambodian or Phnom Penh "authorities," or "ruling circles," usually avoiding such epithets as "puppet" or "clique." In rare cases, including an 8 April LIFE ABROAD article and a 25 April domestic service commentary, Moscow has actually mentioned a "Lon Nol government."

NCNA, VNA OMIT SIHANOUK REMARK ANTICIPATING JOINT STATEMENT

A 21 April Peking broadcast in Cambodian of Sihanouk's "third message to the Khmer people" included his remark that "in the next few weeks" signatures would be put on a "Khmer-Vietnamese-Laotian joint communique," but the "full text" carried by NCNA on the 22d deleted this sentence. NCNA also softened Sihanouk's comment in connection with his discussion of the formation of a new government of national union, representing him as saying that there is "a very sharp demarcation" between the working people and progressive and socialist youth and the ruling clique. The Cambodian-language version says that the "people's liberation movement" and progressive and socialist youth are "struggling to exterminate" the rulers and create a "people's socialist regime." This is the first time Peking is known to have edited a Sihanouk statement.

VNA's report of the Sihanouk message omits all the controversial portions, including his references to the formation of a government of national union and to local "people's resistance authorities," although VNA has periodically reported the formation of "provisional committees" of the National United Front of Kampuchea. VNA omits the references to the forthcoming "joint communique" as well; it follows the NCNA version's reference to the "sharp demarcation" between the workers and progressives and the regime in Cambodia rather than the call for "extermination."

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HANOI REJECTS INDONESIAN SUGGESTION FOR ASIAN CONFERENCE

A series of statements beginning on 19 April by Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik concerning the convening of an Asian national conference to discuss the Cambodian situation has generated vituperative comment from Hanoi.* On the 28th Hanoi media carried a report that on the 27th the Indonesian charge in Hanoi was called to the DRV Foreign Ministry where he was handed a memorandum demanding that the Indonesian Government cease its "slandorous arguments against the DRV" with regard to Cambodia. The memorandum "severely condemns and resolutely rejects the convening of the so-called conference of Asian countries to discuss the Cambodian affair," terming such a conference "illegal and valueless." The memorandum further accuses Foreign Minister Malik of supporting the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "clique," being prepared to give military aid to Phnom Penh, and of "actively" maneuvering in favor of convening an Asian nations conference on Cambodia. Similar comment in routine-level DRV media over the past week has included denunciations of his suggestion that the ICC be reactivated as an effort to "legalize" the Lon Nol clique.

USSR, PRC SCORE INDONESIAN PLAN FOR ASIAN MEETING

MOSCOW Moscow denounces the Indonesian proposal in some press comment which calls Indonesia an accomplice in U.S. aggressive plans in Cambodia. A 27 April PRAVDA article by Demin, for example, notes that Malik discussed the idea with the U.S. and Japanese ambassadors. Demin acknowledges that the Indonesian Foreign Minister proposed the conference to "avert civil war and foreign intervention in Cambodia and reactivate the ICC,"** but he says that civil war is already being waged in Cambodia and that there is evidence of "direct U.S. interference" there. Demin says the "overwhelming majority" of the participants in the proposed conference are members of SEATO and ANZUS who are "linked with the imperialist

* According to Indonesian reports, Malik intimated that the objectives of the proposed conference would be the "prevention of civil war and foreign intervention in Cambodia," and also the "reactivation of the ICC" there. Malik reportedly said that North Vietnam, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are to be among the countries invited.

** Moscow never mentioned Lon Nol's 30 March request that the 1954 Geneva conference cochairmen reactivate the ICC and that the UN Security Council send an observer team to Cambodia to check Vietnamese communist involvement.

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powers" and either "responsible" for the Vietnam war or support the Saigon regime in some way. He concludes that such a conference will be only a "verbal screen concealing imperialist interference in Cambodia's affairs" and "will not help to overcome the dangerous tension throughout Indochina."

An IZVESTIYA article summarized by TASS on the same day says Cambodia must remain a neutral state as provided for in the 1954 Geneva agreements, and "no conference can be vested with the right of deciding her destiny."

PEKING Peking briefly acknowledges the Indonesian proposal, NCNA on the 26th asserting that he made the suggestion "in an attempt to take a hand in the intervention and aggression against Cambodia." NCNA notes that U.S. Ambassador Galbraith immediately declared that the proposal conformed with the attitude of the U.S. Government and that the U.S. lackeys in Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, and India "danced to the same tune." On the 26th NCNA carried a 25 April NHAN DAN article denouncing the proposal.

HANOI, PEKING, MOSCOW DENOUNCE FOREIGN AID TO CAMBODIA

HANOI White House spokesman Ziegler's 23 April announcement that the United States had approved the supply of some weapons to Phnom Penh and that the latter's request for U.S. aid is "under consideration" is denounced in a 24 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, carried by VNA on the 25th, and in a 25 April statement by the DRV Paris delegation spokesman, reported by VNA on the 27th. Both statements accuse the Americans and their "lackeys" of intensifying their "intervention and aggression" against Cambodia; both predictably ignore the fact that the weapons sent were captured from communist forces in South Vietnam.

PEKING Peking criticizes foreign aid to Cambodia in some low-level propaganda. A 24 April NCNA report says the Cambodian clique is "begging more and more urgently" for U.S. arms aid, citing a Western report quoting "Nixon Administration officials" as stating that such an appeal has been received in a letter from Lon Nol and that the United States is "considering" the request. On the 25th NCNA cites Western reports of Ziegler's and McCloskey's 23 April statements on the shipment of weapons to the Cambodian regime through South Vietnam.

NCNA cites Western agencies for a report that the United States is also "sending arms" to Lon Nol regime through its Indonesian "lackey" and adds that the Australians also are "considering" a Cambodian aid request. A 26 April NCNA commentary charges that the Indonesians are sending "military advisers and weapons."

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MOSCOW Moscow continues to denounce U.S. aid to the Cambodian regime in low-level propaganda, and commentaries claim that the United States is trying to turn Cambodia into a bridgehead in the struggle against the patriots of South Vietnam and Laos. A number of brief TASS and radio items note that arms have already been sent via the South Vietnamese government. On the 23d TASS quotes Ziegler as saying that the transfer of arms was undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the United States. On the 26th TASS notes that the U.S. public is "apprehensive" about the Nixon Administration's decision on "direct military interference in Cambodia" and reports that White House and State Department officials now describe the action in Cambodia as "foreign interference." TASS cites speculation in the Washington POST that this description of the situation will be used to justify U.S. interference.

A foreign-language broadcast on the 27th says the United States is in "no hurry" to answer the Cambodian request for aid, "hoping that other Asian countries will do this beforehand." It cites Secretary Rogers as saying on the 25th that the United States was looking for ways to enable the organization of aid by other countries, expressing "special pleasure" at the attitude of Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia.* The commentator cites AFP for a report that Indonesian equipment is already arriving in Cambodia. On the 25th TASS mentions an AP report that the Thai Prime Minister announced his government's intention to review the question of cooperation with Cambodia and to consider increasing its aid. TASS says "observers" interpret this as no personal initiative, but as linked to U.S. policy.

HANOI AND THE FRONT ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S 20 APRIL SPEECH

PARIS SESSION VNA's account of the 64th plenary session of the Paris talks on 23 April dismisses the allied speeches in the statement that "Philip Habib merely repeated the stubborn and perfidious contentions in President Nixon's 20 April address" and that Pham Dang Lam "hastily joined his master in extolling that address and reported about the so-called good will of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique." The account indicates that both Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh--heading the PRG delegation for the first time since 5 March--and Nguyen Minh Vy focused their attacks on the President's speech, but it omits many of their detailed remarks, particularly those by Vy. Liberation Radio, which frequently carries the full text of the PRG delegate's statement, was not heard to carry any report of last week's speech.

* Moscow does not acknowledge that Rogers was speaking of "international political action" as well as aid and that he criticized the USSR's "negative attitude" toward its treaty responsibilities as a Geneva conference cochairman.

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VNA quotes Mme. Binh as saying that the "maneuver" of a drawn-out troop withdrawal of 150,000 men from now until spring 1971 cannot conceal the continuation of the war in South Vietnam and U.S. expansion of the war to all of Indochina. But the account does not report her comment that the President announced the 150,000-man troop withdrawal to give the impression that it is meaningful, when in fact the withdrawal of some 12,000 troops per month is no better than the previous "piecemeal ones." Mme. Binh also scored the President's statement that the timing and pace of new withdrawals would be determined by the current military and diplomatic situation: She observed that "the situation" as viewed by the President includes Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam, and she concluded that such allegations "aimed at paving the way for a U.S. delay in withdrawals." She quoted U.S. press reports in support of the contention that the President's announcement gives him much greater flexibility, since he could suspend withdrawals for months.

Mme. Binh referred to the President's three criteria for withdrawal without specifying them--progress in training of South Vietnamese, progress at the Paris talks, and the level of enemy activity--saying only that "we have sternly criticized them many times." Predictably, both delegates claimed that the President reiterated his "threat against the Vietnamese people" if they stepped up their attacks against withdrawing U.S. forces. Mme. Binh also observed that the President "boasts of success of Vietnamization but for over a year it has met with repeated setbacks," and she claimed that the pacification program has received "staggering blows."

The VNA account says DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy "quoted a statement" issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry on the President's plan "to bring a just peace to Vietnam" and to withdraw 150,000 more troops. (While Vy's remarks were similar to the foreign ministry statement, he did not directly refer to it in his formal speech.) VNA presents Vy's remarks in even less detail than Mme. Binh's and only briefly reports his generalized denunciation of U.S. Indochina policy. Vy echoed Mme. Binh in seeing the withdrawal rate as no better than the previous ones and in commenting that even if the 150,000 were withdrawn there would still be over 280,000 American troops left.

The President's comments on the principles of a "just political settlement" were glossed over by both the PRG and the DRV delegates. Thus Mme. Binh--after declaring that the President opposes a provisional coalition government--noted his remark that "a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces." She went on to say that everyone is aware that

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"the Thieu-Ky-Khlem administration's existence is exclusively due to American bayonets." She ignored the President's subsequent statement that the United States recognizes the complexity of shaping machinery that would fairly apportion political power in South Vietnam and that the Administration is flexible and has offered nothing on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Vy did not acknowledge the passage on the relationship of existing forces at all, instead noting the President's remark on accepting the free decision of the South Vietnam people while ignoring President Nixon's statement that Thieu agrees to this. None of these remarks are acknowledged in the VNA account. Vy also repeated the proposal for a provisional coalition government and the subsequent establishment of a new formal government; he asked how Mr. Nixon could so distort such a "fair" process and solution into the "forcible imposition of a communist government upon the people of South Vietnam." Vy claimed it is the Nixon Administration and "no one else" that is imposing on the South Vietnamese people a "U.S. neocolonialist regime."

Both communist delegates repeated the allegation that the United States "engineered" the 18 March coup in Cambodia and is escalating the war in Laos. In the latter connection, Vy referred to the release of the report on last fall's hearing before a Senate subcommittee, saying, among other things, that it revealed that U.S. bombing of Laotian territory started as early as June 1964 and that the raids had doubled last May and tripled in August.

FOREIGN MINISTRY, Hanoi on the 23d and Liberation Front media on
ROUTINE COMMENT the 24th carry DRV and PRG foreign ministry
statements, issued on the respective dates,
denouncing the President's address.* Making the same points as the
DRV representative at the Paris meeting on the 23d, the DRV Foreign
Ministry statement notes the President's remarks on North Vietnamese
aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam, saying
he "brazenly distorted the patriotic struggle" of the Vietnamese,
Cambodian, and Lao peoples and "odiously and slanderously accused"
the Vietnamese people, who are resisting U.S. aggression, of being
the aggressors in Indochina. The PRG Foreign Ministry statement
calls the withdrawal announcement an "extremely tricky move" to
fool public opinion in the United States and asserts that the
presidential address is also "full of threats, slanders, and distortions
of the just cause" of the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples.

* The DRV and the PRG responded to President Nixon's 3 November speech last year with government statements.

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Hanoi radio and VNA on the 22d and Liberation Radio on the 21st comment on the address, with the Hanoi radio commentary seeing "nothing new." It notes the President's remark that the Vietnam war is the longest, costliest, and most difficult in U.S. history. As for the withdrawal announcement, it observes that while the 150,000 figure is "relatively large at first hearing," the withdrawal would be extended over a year. The radio, like other media, cites Senator Muskie's reported comment that the address is full of vagueness and ambiguity. The VNA commentary says the President was "bragging" when he spoke of moving away from a period of "cut-and-try" withdrawals to a longer-range replacement program. VNA also takes issue with the President for holding the DRV-PRG side responsible for the Paris deadlock, saying it is "clear" to everyone that the United States is downgrading the talks, and causing them to mark time. It adds that in order to divert American opinion, the President "did not forget to peddle his favorite theme about the so-called 'prisoners of war.'"

A NHAN DAN commentary on the 23d, as carried by VNA the same day, also accuses the United States of playing down the Paris talks by not appointing an official chief delegate. Ridiculing U.S. claims of pacification progress, NHAN DAN says the "fact" is that the liberation forces are "firmly" on the offensive and are causing increased allied casualty rates. NHAN DAN also invokes remarks made by Truong Chinh at a Lenin Day reception in Hanoi in which he denounced the Vietnamization program.

LPA comments on the 25th that President Nixon "dangled the withdrawal ploy" in such a way as to assist the Republican Party's fortune in the 1970 elections and eventually his own bid for another presidential term. The commentary says the President tried to "stir up" the American people to oppose the antiwar movement's call for a total pullout of U.S. troops by declaring that the "'unilateral and unconditional'" withdrawal of U.S. forces would mean "'humiliation and defeat for the United States.'" It argues that the struggle of the American people against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam will be victorious. The commentary also charges that the President "pretended" to show compassion for the deaths of American and Vietnamese in the war and "pretended" to be concerned with captured American personnel.

MOSCCW ON PRESIDENT'S TROOP-WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT

In typically prompt reaction to President Nixon's 20 April TV speech, a TASS Russian report early on the 21st complains that he "confirmed his previous position" as laid down in the Guam doctrine in which the main emphasis is put on Vietnamization of the "war in

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Indochina." Other comment, including articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, similarly maintains that the President said "nothing new," merely offering variations of the Vietnamization program.

The initial TASS report typifies Moscow comment in acknowledging that the President, "forced to take account of public opinion on the eve of this autumn's congressional elections," announced his intention to withdraw 150,000 troops, but that he promised to do this "only" over the period of a year. Noting that he repeated that the period for a withdrawal would depend on "the progress of negotiations in Paris and the level of enemy activity," TASS asserts that these "conditions" give the Administration a "propaganda excuse" to justify prolonging the war. A Leontyev commentary on the President's speech, broadcast in English to North America on the 25th, says that the American public has been "deliberately deceived" about the successes in arming and training the GVN troops and asserts that they "will hardly ever be prepared" to replace the Americans.

The TASS report says the President "threatened" that in the event of more active operations in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia endangering the remaining U.S. military forces he would not hesitate to take "firm and effective measures"--which, TASS says, "can only mean a new stage in the escalation" of the war. Krichevskiy, in a foreign-language commentary on the 23d, remarks in this context that "concern" is felt throughout the world that the President for the first time linked troop withdrawal with the situation not only in South Vietnam but also in Laos and Cambodia.

TASS' account says "Washington journalistic and political circles" view the speech as a "concession" to the "hawks" who insist on the continuation of a "rigid aggressive course" in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Available Moscow comment does not allude to the President's statement that a "fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces" in South Vietnam. The PRAVDA article on the 25th does say that "there was no lack of assurances about the United States' aspiration toward a 'just peace' in Vietnam" in the speech, but adds that nevertheless the address contained only "old plans" to continue aggression.

WAR IN THE SOUTH: DAK SEANG CEASE-FIRE FOR PRISONER RELEASE

An 11-hour cease-fire at Dak Seang to release wounded ARVN POW's is called for by the communists in a communique from the "PLAF" command of the Dak Seang front," issued on 28 April and broadcast that day by the Front radio. The communique says the prisoners, from the ARVN 1st and 3d battalions and 42d regiment, were

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captured on the Dak Seang front. It outlines the terms of the release, which it says will take place on the 29th from 0900 to 1700 hours, Saigon time, in an area two to three kilometers north-northeast of Dak Seang. The allies "must stop all military activities when the release begins until three hours after the release ends," states the communique, adding that the POWS may be picked up in unarmed helicopters with Red Cross insignias.

The communique says the release will implement "instructions of the RSVN's PRG representation in central Trung Bo."* Earlier, on 15 April, LPA announced the "on the spot" release by the northern Kontum PLAF of four ARVN rangers captured at Dak Seang, but made no request for a cease-fire and did not mention any "instructions" from the PRG representation. Typically, no explanation for either the present offer or the earlier release is given, the communique merely noting that the prisoner release is "in conformity with the lenient and humanitarian policy" of the NFLSV and the PRG.

A Hanoi broadcast on the 29th announces the release on 22 and 26 April of 82 wounded ARVN soldiers captured at Dak Seang by the northern Kontum liberation troops. It reports the soldiers were bandaged and provided with medical care and had repented of serving as American mercenaries.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CHARGES U.S. AIR ATTACK

A 23 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement scores alleged U.S. air raids against populated areas in the North, claiming that on the 19th "successive formations of aircraft" attacked a number of populated areas in Minh Hoa district, Quang Binh Province. The statement says that the planes dropped demolition and steel pellet bombs and fired rockets and that there were "heavy losses in lives and property." (The last foreign ministry spokesman's protest of alleged U.S. air attacks was issued on 3 February; it charged that U.S. planes the previous day had strafed populated areas in the Bo Trach district of Quang Binh, but made no mention of losses.) A special communique of the DRV War Crimes Commission on the alleged 19 April attack, released on the 26th, provides details on the incident. It claims that 25 sorties of jets were dispatched to fly 10 missions against the populated areas, lists the number of bombs dropped, and says that four civilians were wounded. The communique charges that this is the 880th attack on populated areas of the DRV since President Nixon took office.

* A ceremony marking the formation of the "PRG representation in central Trung Bo" was held on 22 March, according to a 29 March Hanoi radio report. (See the 1 April 1970 TRENDS, page 2, for a discussion of this report.)

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FRONT, HANOI NOTE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF VIETNAM ALLIANCE

The only available attention to the second anniversary of the Vietnam Alliance on 20-21 April consists of an appeal by the Alliance to the urban people, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 21st, and a message to the Alliance from Fatherland Front president Ton Duc Thang, dated the 21st, and broadcast by Hanoi on the 23d. On the first anniversary the Alliance was greeted with a message from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho as well as the Fatherland Front, and was hailed in the DRV's May Day slogans. That anniversary was also celebrated by the fourth Alliance conference held on 20-21 April, and the occasion prompted a NHAN DAN editorial on the 29th.

This year's Alliance appeal claims that the organization has widened the national solidarity front, "gathering patriotic forces" and cooperating with the NFLSV. It claims the Alliance has "gathered peaceful and neutralist tendencies" which have developed in the GVN and ARVN as well as among opposition parties. It adds that the Alliance has several times "negotiated with the NFLSV" to find a way to peace, and it praises the joint action of the Alliance and Front in setting up the PRG last June. There are also routine attacks on Vietnamization and pacification. Thang's message hails the Alliance and its cooperation with the NFLSV, and indicates that its role is to appeal to the urban population.

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WVP POLITBURO RESOLUTION SETS CRITERIA FOR PARTY MEMBERS

A Vietnam Workers Party (WVP) Political Bureau Resolution broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service on 25 April sets guidelines for a movement to improve the quality of party members and to recruit new members. A party Secretariat circular broadcast 18 January, outlining instructions for observance of the party's 40th anniversary on 2 February, had foreshadowed the resolution in a passage directing preparation and implementation of "the task of heightening the quality of party members and admitting members of the Ho Chi Minh generation into the party in accordance with the party Political Bureau's resolution, to be sent later"

An April 1969 Political Bureau resolution on the 1970 anniversary observances--released in July--had also called for the selection and preparation of outstanding individuals for admission to the party in 1970; predating Ho's death in September, the April 1969 resolution referred to new party recruits as "the 1970 party members class." The present resolution--like Le Duan's major 14 February article--takes note of the Central Committee's decision to "admit a new class of party members called 'the Ho Chi Minh class'" and goes on to announce that the period for recruiting new members will be 19 May 1970 (Ho's 80th birth anniversary) to 19 May 1971.

While paying pro forma tribute to the "fine revolutionary qualities" of the "majority" of cadres and party members, the current resolution complains that most of them are limited in standards of "class enlightenment, organizational ability, ability in economic management, scientific and technological knowledge, and so forth." It states that "a number" of them are not worthy of being party members and that others have been unable to carry out their tasks, while "a few others" have lost their motivation or have low ethical standards and "revolutionary enlightenment." Such people, the resolution says,

have status and power or have often relied on the prestige of the party or of the administration to encroach upon the people's interests, have disregarded party discipline and state laws, have behaved in an excessively arbitrary and bureaucratic manner, or have often protected one another, thus causing a lack of internal unity and jeopardizing the common interests.

The resolution also points to problems with new members "who have not had enough time to study."

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There are now "more than" 1.1 million party members, according to the resolution. In a December 1967 speech, published in the February 1968 TUYEN HUAN, Le Duc Tho had placed the figure at more than 800,000; a 6 January 1960 NHAN DAN editorial on the party's 30th anniversary had said that the party then contained "nearly half a million members."

Turning to the task of improving the quality of party members, the resolution recalls the long-standing campaign for "four-good" chapters, "chi bo" (the basic party branch), and members. It also notes that "early in 1969, President Ho urged all cadres and party members to improve revolutionary ethics and wipe out individualism"--an apparent reference to the widespread campaign against "individualism" launched last year by the publication of an article attributed to "T.L." in the 3 February 1969 NHAN DAN. The resolution outlines the standards expected of party members, among other things repeating the standard demand for unity and unanimity; it points out that a member may express his opinion, but that once a vote is taken he must follow the will of the majority.

REMEDIAL MEASURES The resolution calls for the expulsion of those who "are not qualified to be a party member, who move backward politically and in virtue, who infringe the discipline of the party and the laws of the state, who seriously impair the people's interests and the party's prestige, and who are disliked and distrusted by the masses." It instructs the party also to release "those who have too low a political level and who cannot make progress after the organization has adopted the plan to help and improve them."

The need to expel party members who fail to measure up has been raised periodically in the past: Le Duan, in his 14 February article, said it was "necessary to resolutely oust from the party degraded elements who are detested by the masses and unworthy of being members of a revolutionary vanguard party"; and Truong Chinh, in his August 1968 Marx anniversary report, declared that simultaneously with the admission of new members, the party should "quickly expel . . . the provocateurs, the antiparty elements, the factionalists, and those who are politically retarded, as well as those poorly qualified" for membership.

Outlining measures for improving the quality of present members and admitting new ones, the resolution calls for improvement of basic party organizations and of members' education, stronger control and internal management, and use of the masses as a base for party work. It states that the party Secretariat will issue an instruction "pointing out the concrete demands of this movement in 1970 and 1971" and that experimental movements to heighten members' quality and recruit new members should be launched to gain experience. It

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announces that "the Political Bureau has decided to found a guiding committee in charge of assisting the Secretariat in implementing this resolution, undertaking the experimental work, and following up, controlling, guiding, and carrying out the aforementioned movement."

LE DUAN The resolution concludes with the notation: "Le Duan, on behalf of the Politburo." The reason for the appearance of Le Duan's name on the resolution is not known. Typically, the April 1969 Political Bureau resolution on the 1970 anniversaries was published and broadcast without any signature.

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CHINESE SATELLITE

PEKING CELEBRATES FLIGHT AS VICTORY FOR MAO'S THOUGHT

A 25 April press communique announces the successful launching on the 24th of the first PRC satellite, "marking a good beginning in the development of China's space technology." The communique and followup progress reports have been widely publicized throughout the PRC and in Peking's international broadcasts.* The major credit for the achievement is laid to Mao's thought, and the communique opens with a previously unreleased Mao quotation: "We too should produce man-made satellites." The communique does not indicate when or where Mao made the alleged statement.**

Peking uses the proxy of pro-Chinese communist parties to discuss the strategic implications of the satellite launch, while generally avoiding the subject in its own comment. Thus NCNA on the 28th publicizes a message from the Communist Party of Burma which states that the launch dealt "heavy blows to U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism," shattering "their monopoly over nuclear weapons and rockets." A message from the secretary general of the Afro-Asian Journalists Association, carried by NCNA on the 29th, equates the Chinese success with that of the "Afro-Asian people" in deflating the arrogance of "U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism." According to NCNA on the 28th, the clandestine "Voice of the People of Thailand" hailed the launch on 27 April as a "forceful" demonstration of China's rapidly growing power. A 28 April NCNA summary of an Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT editorial selectively omitted the claim that China "possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and guided missiles," but retained other attacks on the USSR and the United States.

* The volume of publicity for the PRC's first space satellite reached 60 percent of total Peking radio comment on 25 and 26 April, the first two days after the launching. Peking devoted greater attention to a scientific or military development only in connection with the PRC's first launching of a missile with a nuclear warhead on 27 October 1966, which drew 79 percent of total comment the first two days. The PRC's first nuclear test on 16 October 1964 occasioned 43 percent of total comment in a comparable period.

** The press communique on the June 1967 hydrogen bomb test opened with the new claim that Mao "as far back as June 1958" said "it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time."

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The communique announcing the launch follows the general pattern of PRC nuclear test announcements dating from the launching of a "nuclear missile" on 27 October 1966. With overriding emphasis on the role of Mao's thought, it stresses the policy of "self-reliance," the "general line of going all-out," the "grasping of revolution," and "preparedness against war with concrete actions" as factors which made the achievement possible. Central Committee congratulations to the personnel involved, including PLA personnel, revolutionary cadres, and the militia, warn against arrogance and call for further scientific developments through vigorous application of Mao's thought.

The communique does not identify specific objectives of the flight, whose propaganda value is underlined in several NCNA listings of times the satellite will pass over various PRC and foreign cities. The communique also gives the radio frequency on which the world can pick up the strains of "The East Is Red," being broadcast by the satellite. An NCNA dispatch on 27 April says scientists at the Peking Astronomical Observatory noted that the flight "would provide very important conditions for the development of research in astronomy, the atmosphere, physics, and other fields of natural science."

PROVINCIAL RALLIES Peking and provincial media have carried numerous accounts of local celebrations, in the pattern followed after all of Peking's nuclear tests except for the two last September--reported belatedly on 4 October in an apparent effort not to undercut the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks. Rally participants and local press editorials echo the themes of the press communique, but more openly call the feat a blow to "imperialism" and "social imperialism." The strongest such statement appears in a 26 April joint editorial in the HUPEH DAILY and YANGTSE DAILY, which terms the launch a "stunning blow" to all of China's enemies: "Surrounded by the people of the whole world, the nuclear blackmail policy and plots for aggression by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists have become more bankrupt. Their death knell has sounded."

BACKGROUND Peking propaganda contained no advance hint that a space launch was imminent and alluded over the years only infrequently to the existence of a PRC space program. Most notably, the 5 October 1967 announcement of the successful "trial production" of a "transistorized universal computer" cited the development as evidence that the "Chinese people have climbed another new peak in their march to catch up with and surpass the world's most advanced scientific and technological level." At one point, the announcement said the machine would make new contributions to the modernization of China's industry, agriculture, "national defense, science, and technology." In an earlier passage it called the computer an indispensable aid to "such highly developed techniques as atomic energy, rocketry, and space navigation."

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More recently, on 4 October 1969 NCNA publicized an article from RED FLAG (No. 10) noting the rapid advances which culminated in the June 1967 hydrogen bomb detonation and forecasting that by following Mao's instructions the PRC would be able to scale the heights of world science and technology. "Regardless of the atomic bombs, the guided missiles, and the hydrogen bombs that Imperialism may have," RED FLAG declared, "we will leave them behind us."

BUCHAREST, BELGRADE SEND MESSAGES; OTHER REACTIONS STANDARD

Most communist media have followed customary patterns of reaction to Chinese nuclear testing. The responses range from Albanian jubilation to terse, noncommittal acknowledgments of the Chinese announcement by Moscow's allies and include congratulatory messages to the top PRC leaders from the North Korean, North Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese communists as well as from the Albanians.

In the only available comment from the Soviet bloc, the Polish paper DZIENNIK LUDOWY on 29 April describes the Chinese launching as "an important political event" which may influence many significant international problems, including questions of disarmament. While underscoring China's importance in determining the future of the world, the paper takes note of the Soviet bloc's opposition to Maoist policies.

Romania and Yugoslavia sent congratulatory messages from the respective premiers to their PRC counterpart, Chou En-lai. Romania, while customarily more forthcoming than Moscow and its orthodox allies in publicizing details of Chinese nuclear test announcements, has heretofore confined messages to such formal occasions as PRC national day; no publicized Romanian message on a Chinese nuclear test is on record. The Yugoslavs have not only not sent messages in the past but have drawn Peking's ire by criticizing Chinese testing. The current congratulatory message reflects the warming trend in Sino-Yugoslav relations, marked also by the appointment of a Yugoslav ambassador to Peking.

VIETNAMESE, North Korean, North Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese
DPRK COMMENT communist comment hails the Chinese feat as providing encouragement to the revolutionary cause. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th takes note of the PRC's strategic development, pointing out that the Chinese have tested nuclear bombs and a guided missile with a nuclear warhead and now, having launched a satellite, have moved into "the rank of the world powers having advanced science and technology." An editorial in the DRV military paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, as reported by NCNA on the 28th, describes the PRC's first satellite as "very important progress in space science and technology" following China's earlier testing of its first atom bomb and subsequent "continuous, spectacular successes in mastering nuclear energy."

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It adds that the Vietnamese fighting against "U.S. imperialist aggressors" regard this "brilliant" space achievement as "valuable encouragement" to the Vietnamese in their "war of resistance to U.S. aggression."

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 26th introduced another theme in claiming that the Chinese launching has contributed to the strengthening of "the common strength of the socialist camp." While Hanoi still invokes the notion of a socialist camp, reflecting its interest in united bloc support for its vulnerable position, Peking has long since discarded the term and has explicitly declared that the socialist camp no longer exists. NCNA's report on Hanoi's comment makes no mention of the socialist camp.

ALBANIAN COMMENT Albanian comment, including an editorial in the party daily, has filled in what Peking's own comment leaves unsaid in expounding on the strategic significance of the satellite launching and in denouncing both the United States and "the Soviet revisionist clique." The Albanian message of congratulations, relayed by Peking, refers to the strengthening of the Chinese defense capability and terms the PRC "a faithful friend and secure defender" of the revolutionary people of the world. According to ZERI I POPULLIT on the 26th, the PRC today possesses "a powerful modern defense" which includes nuclear weapons and guided missiles-- "everything needed to smash any aggressor or coalition of aggressors that would dare to touch it."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PROPAGANDA ACCENTS IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY, IGNORES TALKS

The polemical exchange timed for the Lenin centenary has accentuated the fundamental ideological hostility dividing the two sides and has further clouded the atmosphere surrounding the Peking talks. Neither side has related the most recent polemics to the talks, however; Moscow's treatment of the China question during the centenary celebrations was relatively restrained, while Peking's major attack in the 22 April joint editorial article may be viewed as an ideological effort to discredit Moscow's authority rather than as a reflection of sharpening bilateral tensions.

Chinese propaganda following up the joint editorial article, which was given massive worldwide dissemination by Peking, has continued to subject the Brezhnev leadership to sharp attack. NCNA's roundup of celebrations of the centenary in China is marked by slaps at Brezhnev personally, including the slogan "Down with the Brezhnev renegade clique!" and forecasts that "Brezhnev, Khrushchev the Second," is bound to suffer the same fate as his predecessor. On the 22d NCNA again returned to the sensitive subject of Soviet economic troubles to mock the Brezhnev regime for getting the economy into even worse condition than it was under Khrushchev. Playing on widespread speculation about tensions within the Soviet leadership growing out of the economic problems, NCNA portrays factional infighting and confusion over such issues as the economic reform. In another effort to embarrass the Soviets, Peking on the 24th seized upon Soviet UN delegate Malik's remarks about reconvening the Geneva conference as a sign of Soviet-U.S. collusion in support of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia (discussed in the Indochina section of this TRENDS).

Chinese resentment toward Soviet military and propaganda mobilization in recent years--reflected in the joint editorial's introduction of the charge of "social militarism" along with the standard epithets of social fascism and social imperialism--is shown in NCNA's report on the centenary celebrations. Members of a PLA unit in Peking are quoted as denouncing the Soviets for "pushing social militarism" and as pledging to be ready to "wipe out any aggressor who dares to intrude."

A hint of the sort of tensions that plagued Sino-Soviet relations during the turbulent phases of the cultural revolution appears in a 24 April TASS report deriding Peking's observance of the Lenin centenary. The report notes briefly that a "group of Macist thugs" carrying a portrait of Mao and shouting anti-Soviet slogans passed by the Soviet embassy in Peking while a reception on the centenary was being held. Peking has not mentioned the incident.

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MOSCOW CITES LENIN DAY GATHERING AS ANSWER TO PRC ATTACKS

Although Moscow has not yet replied authoritatively to the scathing attacks in Peking's joint editorial article of 22 April, Soviet propaganda has sought to underscore CPSU leadership of the international communist movement by contrasting the large-scale pilgrimage of foreign party leaders to Moscow for the Lenin celebration with Peking's isolation and by picturing the editorial article as "spear-headed" against the Soviet Union, the socialist community, and the unity of the international movement.

The initial Soviet reaction, in broadcasts beamed to China on the 22d, combined personal attacks on Mao with foreign communist testimonials to the Soviet Union's fealty to Lenin's teachings and fulfillment of its internationalist obligations. TASS on the 24th charged the Maoist leaders with celebrating the Lenin anniversary by intensifying anti-Soviet hysteria throughout China, and a panelist in a 26 April Radio Moscow roundtable program expressed indignation that the Chinese had paid tribute to Lenin only through publication of the offensive editorial article.

Of the foreign communists who addressed the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow, Mongolian party chief Tsedenbal was the only one to complement Brezhnev's 21 April denunciation of the Chinese with censure of Peking by name, although Ulbricht expressed "full accord" with Brezhnev's speech and both Czechoslovakia's Husak and Bulgaria's Zhivkov deplored anti-Sovietism, disruption of the communist movement, and charges that the CPSU has become anti-Leninist.

Though there was nothing like the parade of support for Moscow's criticism of China at the international communist conference last June, Moscow's foreign radio commentaries on the centenary celebrations--particularly those beamed to Chinese and Albanian listeners--cite the presence of delegations from "more than 100 countries" as "convincing proof of the high authority and the esteem" which the CPSU enjoys among the communist parties of the world and among all revolutionaries.

ATTACKS ON MAO Soviet broadcasts to China have sustained the direct attacks on Mao which reappeared on 18 April after a six-month hiatus. Highlighting the criticism of Mao for his questionable training in Marxist theory, his lack of links with the workers' movement, and the disastrous results of current Maoist policies, a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 25th paints a virulent portrait of Mao's allegedly shady marital history, his hatred of his Soviet-educated son for his "friendly sentiments toward the Soviet Union," and his treatment of the Chinese people as "inanimate objects" to be humiliated and abused.

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Reviving another polemical approach that was suspended after agreement was reached to hold talks, a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 28 April tells Chinese listeners that Mao and Lin Piao struck a deal in which Lin provided army support to a vulnerable Mao in exchange for being named number two in the hierarchy. Though remarking that Mao can expect support from Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta in the Politburo Standing Committee, the commentary maliciously suggests that "these men of treachery" might have struck a deal with Lin behind Mao's back. The commentary does not mention Chou En-lai, who has generally been spared in Moscow's polemical probing of infighting among the Peking leaders.

A commentary carried in Radio Moscow's program for the PLA appeals to the Chinese military to see through Maoist propaganda evoking the specter of a Soviet attack on the PRC. The commentary observes that Chinese troops have been moved near the border with the Soviet Union and that military construction has been undertaken in these regions. Deriding the alleged Soviet threat to China, it claims that Mao has promoted anti-Soviet hysteria in order to suppress opposition and to divert discontent over his policies.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

MOSCOW CONTINUES LOW-VOLUME ATTACKS ON OPPONENTS OF AGREEMENT

Moscow gives minimal propaganda attention to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which opened in Vienna on 16 April. A Druzhinin commentary, broadcast for both domestic and foreign audiences beginning the 23d, reviews the first week's proceedings, routinely stressing the need for good will on the part of both sides. Druzhinin attacks recent statements by Secretaries Rogers and Laird on U.S. plans to move forward with such weapons systems as the Safeguard ABM and MIRV. Commenting that "the world public judges the U.S. position by words which are presently uttered in Washington," he adds: "One gets the impression that the pressure exerted by those U.S. circles which openly do not desire a solution to the problem of halting the strategic arms race evidently continues to be a powerful factor."

Foreign-language--but not the domestic--versions of the Druzhinin commentary rebuff Administration references to the existence of a "Soviet threat" justifying a U.S. defense buildup. They stress the adequacy of Soviet defenses to "check any aggressor" and warn, as Brezhnev did in Kharkov, that the USSR is ready "to answer any attempts to achieve a superiority over the Soviet Union with an appropriate increase of its own military potential."

While propaganda remains silent on the nature of the Soviet proposals offered at Vienna, a participant in the 26 April domestic service commentators roundtable show takes note of one possible area of agreement. Citing a recent article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, the commentator says that in the opinion of "many U.S. Government specialists," the "most probable attainable agreement will be the one on freezing the number of ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Whether this will or will not be so, the future will show."

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USSR AND EAST EUROPE

KADAR DEFENDS HUNGARIAN ROAD IN MOSCOW: LENIN DAY SPEECH

As he had done in Brezhnev's presence in Budapest earlier in the month, Janos Kadar used the occasion of the Lenin centenary in the Soviet capital to reassert his party's resolve to press forward with the uniquely Hungarian two-front ideological struggle and with freewheeling economic policies at home and abroad. At the Hungarian liberation jubilee in Budapest on 3 April, Brezhnev had endorsed the "creative" Hungarian approach to socialist construction while reminding Kadar of his own past statements to the effect that national interests must be secondary to those of proletarian internationalism.

Kadar arrived in Moscow for the Lenin festivities on the 20th, as did most of the other leaders of the European communist countries, but was the last to leave for home, departing on the afternoon of the 24th. His brief speech on the 21st, the first day of the two-day meeting, was carried by MTI and the Moscow domestic service the same day and in PRAVDA on the 22d. PRAVDA carried it next to last after the speeches of Brezhnev, Gomulka, Ulbricht, Le Duan, Duclos, and Husak, followed only by Zhivkov's. Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG published a 5,000-word summary of Brezhnev's keynote speech, including all the main points.*

In his Moscow speech Kadar interspersed praise for the Soviet Union and support for ideological "purity" with reassertions of Hungary's particular approach--the same device he had used in his 3 April Budapest speech and in his 9 April Lenin anniversary article in PRAVDA. Where Brezhnev emphasized the problems of "right and leftwing opportunism" and "nationalism" in the world communist movement, Kadar led off his discussion of ideology by recalling Lenin's "priority attention to realities" and "the demands of the actual situation" rather than "abstract theories." Lenin's theory, he added, is "not a dogma" but a guide to action. He noted that Lenin demanded due attention to national characteristics and peculiarities, as well as "an internationalist demeanor"--"an uncompromising policy on principle," but "flexibility in practice." Kadar described "our view" of applying Leninism as combining a

* Poland's TRYBUNA LUDU also carried a summary, incorporating Brezhnev's main points. The Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German party dailies carried the full text. The Bucharest SCINTEIA carried a sanitized 3,200-word report; Romania's behavior on the centenary is discussed in more detail in the second article in this section of the TRENDS.

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strengthening of the party's leading role with "finding the Marxist-Leninist answer to the new problems presented by the changing situation."

Secondarily, the MSZMP leader paid due tribute to the USSR's role in liberating Hungary and defending its security and called for defense of ideological "purity" against right and left opportunism and nationalism and for strengthening the Warsaw Pact against the "imperialists." He refrained from an explicit defense of the primacy of international over national interests, but he supported the orthodox line that in defending "the principle of internationalism" and the concept of socialism, "we thereby defend the interests of the working class and working people of our country."

Dramatizing the Hungarians' preoccupation with this problem, an article entitled "National Interests and Internationalism" in the Hungarian Government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on 26 April, by its chief editor, Darvasi, declares that "true national interests must be interpreted," among other things, as meaning that the nation must be able to "freely exercise control of the fatherland--that is, the territory it occupies" and "choose freely its economic and political system in its own national state." The article reflects Hungarian efforts to reconcile a posture of moderate independence with the dictates of "proletarian internationalism." In an oblique reference to the Czechoslovak affair, Darvasi remarks that "fundamentally favorable international prerequisites insure that the national interests of the peoples living in a socialist society can prevail." Analysis of the problem "in a Leninist manner," he observes, makes it clear "how senseless is the debate among socialist countries on nonintervention, independence, and equality, because all these are at hand."

BACKGROUND Moscow's uneasiness about the Hungarian road had been accentuated since the onset of the Czechoslovak episode. Though participating as one of the Warsaw Five in the August 1968 invasion, the Hungarians both before and after the invasion repeatedly voiced sympathy with the Czechoslovaks' aspirations toward "socialist democracy" as akin to their own, making it clear that they deplored only the excesses of the Prague experiment out of fear of a repetition of the 1956 Hungarian "counterrevolution."

In February 1969 PRAVDA belatedly reported an article on Hungary's "socialist democracy" which had appeared in NEPSZABADSAG the previous December, but distorted it to portray its main thrust as a warning about "imperialist" efforts at "softening" socialism through support of right and left opposition elements. In November, Soviet media predictably ignored a NEPSZABADSAG series manifesting concern over

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repressions in Czechoslovakia by the Soviet-sponsored Husak regime. The same month, a commentary by Radio Moscow's Budapest correspondent stressed CEMA's "exceptional significance for Hungary," which he said cannot meet its own needs through domestic production and has "limited raw material resources"--evidently responding to articles in NEPSZABADSAG hailing Budapest's increasingly "successful" trade and economic cooperation with the capitalist world.

In December, Soviet media ignored a Husak interview with MTI, following a visit to Prague by Kadar, in which the Czechoslovak leader said he appreciated "Comrade Kadar's very open approach to problems and the fact that he shows such understanding for the situation in Czechoslovakia." Also in December, the TASS and PRAVDA reports of a Kadar interview with the Italian CP daily L'UNITA omitted entirely Kadar's remarks on domestic affairs, which were largely devoted to a defense of Hungary's relatively liberal "economic reform."

At the same time, the Hungarian party has been a prime mover and defender of the June 1969 international party conference in Moscow. A Varnai article in the 4 March 1970 NEPSZABADSAG--seven weeks before the Lenin centenary gathering in Moscow--openly called to account both ruling and nonruling communist parties which had boycotted or taken dissident positions at the June 1969 conference.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF STRAINS IN ROMANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

The speeches delivered by Ceausescu at the Lenin celebrations in Moscow on 22 April and at Miercurea Ciuc on the 24th, following his return home, indicate that the latest Soviet exercise in communist unity has done little to bring Moscow and Bucharest closer together. Although in Moscow Ceausescu toned down the more forceful reassertions of Romanian policies contained in his 17 April Lenin anniversary speech in Bucharest,* he again made it clear that he has no intention of backing down from his unorthodox positions.

In the speech to the party gathering in the Soviet capital, broadcast live by Radio Moscow, the Romanian leader in effect challenged the view expressed earlier by Brezhnev that Marxism-Leninism was a collection of immutable "laws." Lenin, Ceausescu told his Soviet audience, saw in Marxism not a collection of dogmas, of inviolable and eternally valid theses, but a living guidance for action" Portraying the Soviet model of socialism as only one among many, he added that the RCP "is constantly analyzing socialist construction in our country . . . and

* The 17 April speech and Ceausescu's article in PRAVDA on the 19th are discussed in the 22 April issue of the TRENDS.

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taking account of the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as the achievements of human knowledge worldwide, and their creative applications under Romanian conditions."

While he made no reference to the sensitive issue of China, Ceausescu reaffirmed the RCP's "central" policy of "cooperation and fraternal alliance with all the socialist states." He also repeated his familiar call for efforts to resolve differences between parties on the basis of mutual respect and strict observance of the principles of interparty relations. In an apparent thrust at the Soviets, he went on to remark that Romania's economic success "proves that only a free people, complete masters of their fate, can successfully build socialism and communism." He concluded that the greatest tribute parties can pay to Lenin's memory is "to intensify our efforts aimed at the all-sided development of our own homeland."

Ceausescu used the occasion of a meeting of agricultural and industrial workers in Miercurea Ciuc on 24 April to assure the Romanian people that the RCP will continue to give priority to national development. In remarks reported in SCINTEIA the following day, he hailed the workers' achievements as contributions to Romania's development and thus as indirect contributions to world socialism. He went on to express hope that the principles of respect for national independence and noninterference in internal affairs would be established "even more lastingly" as the only basis on which the free flourishing of each individual nation and the overall progress of socialism can be achieved. Declaring that national independence and international solidarity are united, he promised that the RCP and all the Romanian people "will permanently act in this spirit."

Sensitivity to the references to contentious issues in Brezhnev's Lenin Day speech was reflected in the way in which SCINTEIA sanitized the speech. The 3,200-word account in the 22 April issue omits the Soviet party chief's references to opportunism, nationalism, China, Czechoslovakia, and the Warsaw Pact and takes only brief note of his remarks on differences within the socialist community. Citing Brezhnev on the "new type of relations--fraternal relations, based on the principles of internationalism," established among the socialist countries, the SCINTEIA report continues:

But as experience shows, the speaker stressed, such relations among the countries of socialism do not appear automatically. A principle-minded policy of the socialist states is needed to create and develop them, to liquidate certain complications and contradictions which appear sometimes in this field. As for the Soviet Union, we firmly support socialist internationalism, the reestablishment of good relations among the socialist countries wherever they are shaken.

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By reporting the latter statement while ignoring Brezhnev's remarks justifying the intervention in Czechoslovakia and his call for a strengthened Warsaw Pact, SCINTEIA portrayed for the Romanian people a conciliatory Brezhnev not in evidence in the full context of his remarks.

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C U B A

CASTRO AFFIRMS PRO-SOVIET STANCE IN LENIN ANNIVERSARY SPEECH

Fidel Castro used the occasion of Lenin Day to deliver his most extensive exposition of Cuban foreign policy since 23 August 1968, when he gave qualified backing to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and to carry forward the trend toward warmer Cuban-Soviet relations that was apparently triggered by the 1968 address. In his 2 January 1969 speech marking the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, Castro had acknowledged the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba for the first time in three years. In the present speech he pays effusive tribute to the "decisive" role of Soviet aid and levels a counterattack against those who have objected to his testimonials on the subject. For the first time, he takes up the cudgels against the anti-Sovietism of unnamed "superleftists" and defends his support for the invasion of Czechoslovakia against the criticisms of "leftist pseudowriters."

The speech is punctuated with signs of sensitivity to the notion that Cuba might be betraying her revolutionary principles for the sake of economic self-interest and for the sake of good relations with the Soviet Union upon which the Cuban economy relies. In the course of an apparent indirect attack on Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo, whom Castro had praised lavishly in the past for his break with the Soviet-linging Venezuelan Communist Party, the Cuban leader lambasts people who condemn his country's preoccupation with economic development and declares that Havana "never has nor will it ever deny support to a revolutionary movement." Bravo had accused Castro of betrayal in a document released last January, charging that "he has dedicated himself to the Cuban economy and denied help to the Venezuelan guerrilla movement" which he had once supported.

Virulent anti-U.S. attacks seem calculated to underscore Cuba's continuing militant anti-imperialist credentials as a counterweight to Castro's retreat from uncompromising revolution-mongering. Castro repeats his 19 April charge of U.S. complicity in the landing of Cuban exiles near Baracoa on the 17th, accuses President Nixon of hatching "a new, imminent adventure" against Cuba, and pledges that Cuba will never break political and military ties with Moscow for the sake of resuming relations with Washington. He also indicates that he will not be a party to multilateral agreements designed to curb hijackings and the kidnapping of diplomats. He is adamant in rejecting the notion that Cuba might rejoin the OAS in its present form, describing the inter-American organization as "an indecent garbage heap" and a "political house of prostitution."

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RELATIONS WITH USSR Castro has praised Soviet aid to Cuba on a number of occasions since his 2 January 1969 speech recognizing its "decisive" importance, but he has never been so effusive in his praise of Soviet largesse. He specifies that Soviet arms aid has totaled 1.5 billion pesos. With Cuban propaganda on record in the past as censuring Moscow for unwillingness to take the necessary risks in helping North Vietnam and for giving the Arabs insufficient backing during the June 1967 war with Israel, Castro now extolls Soviet military aid to both Vietnam and the Arab states. He declares that

the value of [Soviet] arms freely received by countries amounts to billions of pesos. In our case, what would we have done without these arms? We will not mention oil and some other items that were decisive and basic at specific moments The existence of the Soviet state is, objectively, one of the greatest privileges of the revolutionary movement.

On record in the past with thinly veiled critiques of Soviet policies as too soft, the last of these appearing in the August 1968 speech as a qualifier to his support of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Castro now excoriates anti-Soviet "supertheoretical revolutionaries, superleftists, real supermen, who are capable of smashing imperialism in two seconds with their tongue"--people who deem it "a sort of crime that the Soviet Union exists," sham revolutionary writers in the pay of "imperialism" who attack the USSR with "unbelievable fury."

In denigrating those "from Rome and Paris who construct hypothetical and imaginary worlds," Castro may be expressing his pique at Rene Dumont, a French agronomist who in the past was sympathetic to the Cuban revolution but whose recent book entitled "Cuba: Is It Socialist?" criticizes Castro's unfettered personal power and the militarization of the Cuban economy. AFP on the 16th reported a lecture in Paris in which Dumont severely criticized Cuban foreign and domestic policies, including Castro's stance on Czechoslovakia and submissiveness to Moscow. In upholding his August 1968 position, Castro reaffirms that if the "counterrevolutionary process" in Czechoslovakia had not been aborted, only "the imperialists" would have profited.

REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA Defensive in his attacks on "pseudorevolutionaries" in Latin America, Castro suggests that he has himself been deceived in the past. Pledging continued aid to "genuine" revolutionaries, he declares that "this is not to be confused with support of any imposter just because he is using the name of revolutionary. The sad thing is that we have

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occasionally believed the tale." He promised to expose those "assassins of revolutions" who had had the chance to lead a revolution and "fumbled it." Douglas Bravo--one of the evident targets of this diatribe--had been defended by Castro in the past against the "pseudorevolutionaries" who advocated peaceful methods in the Venezuelan Communist Party.

Castro's current remarks seems similar to statements he reportedly made on 5 January to delegates attending a meeting of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students. Unreported in Cuba's own media, Castro's remarks on that occasion were reported by Sergio Munoz Riveros, of the Chilean CP youth organization, in an interview published in the Chilean party organ EL SIGLO on 28 January. Munoz Riveros quoted Castro as denouncing Latin American "ultraradicals" whom Cuba had once supported but who proved to be "all talk." Cuba, Castro is alleged to have complained, risked too much for men "who have proved to be worthless"--guerrillas who had "done everything contrary to what they should have done." A communique issued by the Cuban communist youth organization on 4 February exhibited sensitivity to the notion conveyed in EL SIGLO that Castro, disenchanted with Latin American guerrillas, was ready to embrace the peaceful strategy epitomized by the Chilean CP's approach: the communique said EL SIGLO had distorted Castro's position.

Prior to Castro's speech, the only statement by a Cuban leader to broach suggestions that Cuba had altered its policy of armed struggle in deference to the Soviet Union had appeared in an interview with Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in the Castro-oriented Chilean publication PUNTO FINAL on 30 September 1969. Asked about the closeness of Cuban-Soviet relations and their impact on the Cuban policy of continent-wide armed struggle, Rodriguez replied that relations were "excellent" but denied that this had any effect on "Cuba's political concepts." He insisted that Cuba still supported a continental strategy of armed struggle, "in particular guerrilla struggle."

RELATIONS WITH L.A. REGIMES On the score of relations with Latin American governments, Castro claims in the Lenin Day speech that he is simply repeating what he said in his 14 July speech in asserting readiness to reestablish relations with hemisphere regimes that repudiate the OAS anti-Cuban resolutions. But his praise of the Chilean regime--which he has damned in the past as "bourgeois reformist"--for permitting Cuba to buy Chilean agricultural products and his praise of Trinidad and Tobago for condemning the economic blockade of Cuba suggest a softening of Cuba's stand on renewing relations. He also reiterates his prior favorable attitude toward the Peruvian military regime.

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While declaring that countries willing to disregard OAS agreements in order to establish ties with Cuba are "very few for the time being," Castro makes it clear that he will not allow doctrinal considerations to stand in the way of closer ties. As part of a pitch to foster interest in relations with Cuba, he appears to embrace a concept of revolutionary pluralism which is a far cry from his long-held contention that guerrilla warfare on the Sierra Maestra model is virtually the only legitimate path to revolution: ". . . in the history of mankind there have never been two identical cases, no two circumstances exactly alike. Now will there be two revolutions that develop exactly the same? New possibilities and new ways are being born."

He points to the radicalization of segments of the church and military in Latin America, emphasizing particularly the example of Peru. Cuban support for revolution "does not have to be exclusively for guerrilla movements," he says, but can extend to "any government that sincerely adopts a policy of economic and social growth and is for liberating the country from the Yankee imperialist yoke." He adds that "regardless of how such a government has come to power, Cuba will support it"--a vague formula that could conceivably extend to any Latin American government which institutes modest domestic reforms and enacts mild restrictions on U.S. investments.

Castro's softened stance on resuming relations with Latin American nations was foreshadowed in recent statements by two Cuban leaders. In a statement in Lima reported in a 17 April ANSA dispatch, Cuban CP Central Committee member and National Fishing Institute Director Captain Emilio Aragoles Navarro declared that Cuba "is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any American country." Made in Lima following an international fishing congress, Aragoles' statement may have been aimed chiefly at Peru. It was not carried in Cuban media, but Radio Havana reported that Aragoles met with the Peruvian fishery minister and "discussed the possibility of exchanging technical assistance in the fishing industry." PRENSA LATINA, but not the Cuban press, reported a statement by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, at a luncheon at the United Nations late last month, that if relations are to be restored the process must take place "without any conditions" being imposed on Cuba--an apparent allusion to the possibility that Latin American governments might insist on a suspension of Cuban support for hemisphere revolutionary movements. Significantly, however, available reports of this statement, as of Aragoles' remarks, made no mention of Cuban conditions for a resumption of relations.

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SOVIET REACTION PRAVDA on 25 April carried a lengthy TASS summary of Castro's speech which includes his praise of Soviet aid, censure of Moscow's detractors, and defense of his position on the invasion of Czechoslovakia. While reporting Castro's defense of Cuban concern about economic development and his statement that Cuba will never desist from supporting revolutionary movements, the Soviet account excludes his comments on relations with Latin America and the OAS. No Soviet comment on the speech is available.

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P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

SHANTUNG ACTIVISTS MEET, RC CHAIRMAN IS ABSENT

On 25 April Shantung opened a province-wide congress of Mao activists, the 17th province to hold such a congress since 1967. Contrary to general practice, the occasion was not marked by the appearance of the revolutionary committee (RC) chairman. Shantung RC Chairman Wang Hsiao-yu has made only one official appearance in the province since March 1969, on the 1 October National Day.

The leading figure at the congress was Yang Te-chih, party core group member, RC first vice chairman, and commander of the Tsinan military region; unofficial sources have indicated that he opposed Wang Hsiao-yu during the upheavals of the cultural revolution. Wang, who became a prime example of a revolutionary leading cadre during the cultural revolution, was elected a full member of the Central Committee last year, and his absence does not necessarily mean he is out of favor. Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao has been in Peking recently, and other provincial leaders may have gathered there for discussions in advance of May Day.

KIANGSI In another departure from the usual pattern of activists' POPULATION congresses, the Shantung meeting was attended by delegates from other provinces and PLA units, including Kiangsi.

A 25 April Shantung broadcast summarizing the day's events at the congress noted that the Kiangsi representative spoke "on behalf of the 25 million sons and daughters of Chingkangshan." The population figure used in the media during 1969 was 23 million, itself up one million from the 1968 figure. As with all population statistics offered in the media in the wake of the cultural revolution, the basis for the new estimate is unknown. The pattern of the figures suggests, however, that they are not selected completely at random.

FEWER PLA UNIT NUMBERS MONITORED FROM BROADCASTS

The number of references to PLA unit numbers has declined sharply in both central and provincial broadcasts monitored by FBIS Okinawa Bureau since 1 January. From January through March an average of only 15 references were monitored per month compared with an average of 40 per month for the previous seven months. References to army unit numbers have declined steadily from the peak average of 132 per month during the period February 1968/May 1969. The decline may reflect to some degree a desire to play down the PLA's role in domestic affairs vis-a-vis the party's authority. But in light of continued widespread propaganda for PLA activities generally, most of the falling off probably indicates a decision to give less publicity to the unit numbers.

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