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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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15 APRIL 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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15 April 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 15)

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W A R N I N G

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 12 APRIL 1970

Moscow (3818 items)

Lenin Centenary	(21%)	35%
[WPC Moscow Meeting]	(7%)	7%
Middle East	(3%)	6%
Indochina	(6.5%)	5%
[Vietnam]	(3%)	2%
[Laos]	(1%)	2%
[Cambodia]	(0.3%)	--]
China	(5%)	4%

Peking (3372 items)

Chou En-lai in DPRK	(1%)	50%
Indochina	(51%)	23%
[Cambodia]	(49%)	20%]
[Vietnam]	(1%)	2%]
[Laos]	(1%)	0.02%]
Domestic Issues	(30%)	11%
PRC Economic Delegation in Pakistan	(--)	3%
Albanian Leader Gogo Wushi's Death	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi media's first allusion to the 1 April French cabinet statement suggesting general negotiations leading to "a zone of neutrality and peace" in Indochina comes in VNA's 12 April report of Le Duc Tho's response to reporters' questions upon his departure from Paris on the 10th. But the cryptic VNA report does not acknowledge the substance of the French proposal, noting only that Le Duc Tho expressed hope for a "translation into deeds" of Foreign Minister Schumann's "recent" declaration to him that "the French Government was pursuing de Gaulle's policy regarding Indochina." And VNA ignores Tho's concluding observation--which TASS reported on the 10th--that a Vietnam settlement is the necessary basis of a settlement for all of Indochina.

Vietnamese communist media's continued focus on Cambodian developments features DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements protesting the "massacre" of Vietnamese residents by the Lon Nol regime. A declining but still substantial volume of Peking propaganda on Cambodia continues to publicize Sihanouk's statements, including the one thanking Chou En-lai for his expression in Pyongyang of PRC Government support for the deposed prince. Minimal Soviet propaganda on Cambodia stresses alleged U.S. involvement in Cambodian affairs and includes reports on the "massacre" of Vietnamese civilians.

Souvanna Phouma's 9 April response to Souphanouvong's message last month on a Laos settlement is summarized on the 13th by the Patriotic Neutralist radio, which cites Vientiane radio as its source. Pathet Lao media report that the reply was handed in Vientiane to an NLHX official who stopped in Hanoi "on his way to a liberated area" to deliver it to Souphanouvong. A commentary monitored with poor reception from the Patriotic Neutralist radio on the 13th and 14th denounces Souvanna's reply, among other things complaining that he denied that U.S. "intervention and aggression" is the crux of the Laotian question and placed the blame on the DRV. The broadcast calls Souvanna's letter a "trick to avoid settlement."

PARIS TALKS: LE DUC THO DEPARTURE, 9 APRIL SESSION

Hanoi media did not acknowledge Le Duc Tho's 10 April departure from Paris until the 12th, when VNA said that "the special advisor" to the DRV delegation "left for home last Friday." TASS on the 10th had promptly reported his departure, and on the 11th a brief Moscow domestic service item said he had arrived in Moscow as a "member of a party delegation" to the Lenin birth centenary celebration.

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While glossing over Tho's remarks on the French proposal for general negotiations,* VNA reports Le Duc Tho's reiteration of the standard communist charge that the United States is expanding the war to the whole of Indochina in an attempt to make use of military pressure to negotiate from a position of strength. VNA also notes that Tho prefaced his routine remarks on the Paris talks with the statement that "the course of events last week was not what the United States had expected" and cites his forecast that with their "militant solidarity" the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would achieve final victory. Tho's characterization of the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia as "extremely reactionary" is noted by VNA along with his assertion that should the French Government back Lon Nol, "far from contributing to the restoration of peace in Indochina, it would harm the basic interests of the Indochinese people. . . ."

PARIS SESSION The communist delegates at the Paris session on 9 April gave relatively cursory attention to Cambodia, in contrast to their detailed remarks in recent weeks. Thus, PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien made no direct reference to the coup. DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy mentioned it only in passing when he said that the Nixon Administration, far from keeping its promise to end the war, has escalated the war in Laos, "staged a coup d'etat in Cambodia," and attempted to expand the war to the whole of Indochina. In the context of U.S. "crimes" against the Lao and Cambodian peoples, Tien said without elaboration that U.S. infantrymen stationed in South Vietnam have on "many occasions" encroached upon Lao and Cambodian territory. He also declared that a rapid, unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam would not only be the "key" to the end of the Vietnam war but would "help settle the Laos and Cambodia problems."

Tien buttressed his standard denunciations of the pace and size of the U.S. troop reductions with assertions that "several American generals still arrogantly urge military victory and demand the suspension or indefinite prolongation of the 'piecemeal troop withdrawal' program, which has already been severely condemned by public opinion at large." Tien asked rhetorically whether the call for a suspension of the withdrawals was not therefore "an avowal of the fiasco of the Vietnamization of the war."

* At 1715 GMT on 10 April the VNA service channel from Hanoi to Paris requested "urgent" transmission of the text of "Comrade Le Duc Tho's answers to questions concerning the French proposal." The DRV press spokesman, in his briefing after the 9 April session of the Paris talks, had said that his government had not yet stated its position on the French proposal. As usual, Hanoi media did not report the press briefings.

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Nguyen Minh Vy claimed that the "credibility gap" between the Administration and the U.S. public had become "wider and deeper." He pointed to the "recent and unprecedented" event when "the state of Massachusetts endorsed a bill prohibiting the President from sending its citizens to fight in Vietnam," which Vy said might be called "the mutiny of one entire state."

The VNA account as usual glosses over the allied speeches, saying U.S. delegate Habib put forth "the well-worn proposal on 'the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Vietnam' and again raised the so-called 'POW question.'" VNA thus ignores Habib's remark that the increase in the level of communist military action in South Vietnam is incompatible with serious negotiations; it also ignores his supplementary remarks in which he specifically rejected communist allegations concerning events in Cambodia and Laos as well as in South Vietnam. VNA says GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam voiced the "slander" that the DRV has "interfered" in Laos and pursued an "expansionist policy."

DRV, PRG SCORE "MASSACRE" OF VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS IN CAMBODIA

The Vietnamese communists authoritatively denounce the alleged 9-10 April massacre by Cambodian troops of Vietnamese residents near Prasaut, Svay Rieng Province, with DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 12 and 13 April.*

The DRV statement asserts that the Cambodian authorities "herded" more than 300 Vietnamese residents--mostly old people, women, and children--into a camp and shot and killed about 100 of them during the night. The statement adds that since the Lon Nol regime took power it has launched "an anti-Vietnam campaign by persecuting Vietnamese residents," trying to "sow discord" between the Vietnamese and Khmer people, and claims that the massacres are calculated to hide the fact that the regime serves U.S. imperialism. The statement says the massacres also show "the clique's confusion" in the face of the Khmer people's growing struggle and the "righteous indignation" of people throughout the world. The "peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia," it declares, are resolved to unite in "opposing the reactionary policy" of the Lon Nol regime.** It concludes with demands

* Hanoi continues to expand its Cambodian-language radio programming. The addition of a half-hour in Cambodian on 5 April was followed by the addition of another half-hour on the 10th, bringing the total to six half-hour programs daily.

** A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 29 March, denouncing the Lon Nol regime's anti-Vietnamese terrorism, does not include this formulation.

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that the regime stop its repression of the Vietnamese residents, compensate the victims' families, and answer for the safety of all Vietnamese residents.

The PRG statement calls the massacre an attempt by the regime to cover up its opposition to the South Vietnamese people's "just resistance" and to "mislead" the Khmer people who, responding to Sihanouk's appeal, are "resolutely opposing" the coup-makers and their "U.S. bosses." Echoing the list of demands in the DRV statement, it demands in addition that the regime set free all Vietnamese who are "groundlessly detained." The PRG statement concludes with a call upon the "people and governments of the freedom- and justice-loving countries, the democratic and humanitarian organizations the world over," to condemn regime acts of persecution and massacre of Vietnamese residents and to "take effective measures to check their criminal acts."

A "condolence message" sent to the DRV Government and the PRG from Sihanouk in Peking, reported in Hanoi and Front media on the 13th and 14th, condemns the massacre and asserts that the "crime" will only further tighten the "friendship, brotherhood, and militant solidarity" between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, who will stand "shoulder to shoulder" in fighting to overthrow the "traitors" in Phnom Penh and Saigon.*

DENIALS OF VC PRESENCE The foreign ministry statements on the massacre do not explicitly bring up the issue of the Vietnamese communist military presence in Cambodia. However, a 12 April NHAN DAN article does comment briefly that the "atrocities" are part of an effort by Khmer "ultrarightists" to level a "trumped-up charge" of "aggression" against the Vietnamese. Other Hanoi and Front comment not pegged to the massacre continues to directly deny the Vietnamese communist presence in Cambodia. A Liberation Radio commentary on 12 April, for example, once again scores the Lon Nol government's claim that the Vietnamese "directed" pro-Sihanouk demonstrations and that the Viet Cong have attacked the provinces along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. It also cites the BBC as saying

* On the 14th Phnom Penh issued an Information Ministry communique denying that a massacre occurred, asserting rather that the Vietnamese civilians were caught in a crossfire and that their deaths were an "error of war." The statement does add, however, that it must be noted that "Viet Cong forces have repeatedly used Vietnamese residents in Cambodia as an auxiliary force in their aggression."

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on 31 March that "the news that many Viet Cong units were advancing toward Phnom Penh originated from panic, and no one believed it." An 11 April LPA commentary denounces as "shameless calumny" a Phnom Penh radio report that Sihanouk "received a big sum from the PRG and the NFLSV in exchange for the Cambodian head of state's assistance to them."

Continued Hanoi criticism of Lon Nol's request that the 1954 Geneva Conference cochairmen reactivate the ICC and that the UN Security Council send an observer team to Cambodia to check Vietnamese communist involvement comes in an 8 April NHAN DAN article, which repeats charges that this is an effort to "legalize" the coup d'etat and to propagate the "slander" that Vietnam is committing "aggression" against Cambodia.

LPA on 15 April carries an "authorized" statement regarding claims by news agencies of the United States and the Lon Nol "clique" that the liberation armed forces "captured some foreign correspondents in Cambodia." LPA labels such claims a "dirty trick" to "slander" the liberation armed forces and to mask U.S. interference in Cambodia.

U.S. AID A 15 April Hanoi domestic broadcast denounces Lon Nol's announcement the day before that he considers it necessary to accept "all foreign aid from whatever sources," asserting that he thus "openly asked the Americans to give military aid to Cambodia." Hanoi says this statement reveals the "clique's" intention to ask for U.S. weapons to suppress the "patriotic struggle movement of the Khmer people and to resist the South Vietnamese people," but it does not acknowledge Lon Nol's remarks on the Vietnamese communist military presence in Cambodia. The broadcast also says the British DAILY TELEGRAPH revealed a "secret agreement" according to which Saigon "will supply Cambodia with U.S. weapons." Peking's NCNA also reported this British story on the 14th.

The 8 April NHAN DAN article denouncing an ICC and UN role also documents the Lon Nol regime's pro-U.S. character despite its claim to neutrality. NHAN DAN repeats that the regime "recently said it 'might' ask for military aid from the United States," reiterates the charge that U.S. weapons were shipped by the "Columbia Eagle," and adds that other U.S. vessels also delivered weapons even before the coup.

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HANOI, FRONT MEDIA EMPHASIZE SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK

Vietnamese communist media publicize 12 April messages to Sihanouk on the occasion of the Cambodian new year from the DRV's Ton Duc Thang and Pham Van Dong and the PRG's Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. The messages express pleasure over the Khmer people's struggle for their national rights in response to Sihanouk's call for "national salvation," and both reassert DRV and PRG policies of respect for Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity within her existing borders.

On the 11th, VNA reported an 8 April communique issued by Sihanouk's "private secretariat" denouncing the UN Secretariat for failure to publish a communication from Sihanouk on the grounds that it was a "nongovernmental communication." VNA scored the UN Secretariat's argument that it deals only with "authorities which are apparently in control of the government of a member country," calling this "ridiculous" inasmuch as the Secretariat refuses to deal with the "authorities in control" in China, dealing instead with a "tiny group of puppets" in Taiwan.

On 10 April VNA carried a statement by "three Cambodian National Assembly deputies" expressing "full support" for Sihanouk's 23 March proclamation. The statement does not mention Sihanouk's 4 April message to his compatriots, but the deputies do say that "renouncing our personal interests and departing from our beloved families and parents, we have left for the jungle to join the people in conducting political and armed struggle during the past few years" with the aim of realizing the ideal of uniting the entire people in the anti-U.S. struggle. The statement denounces the Lon Nol regime and claims that it is "in utter confusion before the Cambodian people's political and armed struggle, which is spreading throughout the country in both town and countryside, and even within the administration of the coup-makers." (On the 14th Phnom Penh released an Information Ministry statement saying that Sihanouk had accused the three deputies of being Khmer Reds and that they had relinquished their functions and vanished three years ago.)

VNA EDITING OF SIHANOUK Sihanouk's "second message to his compatriots," which NCNA transmitted textually on 4 April, was carried in truncated version by VNA on the 7th. While reporting some of Sihanouk's references to the Cambodians' "resistance and armed revolution," the VNA version deletes two paragraphs in which he requested his compatriots "not to hold peaceful demonstrations"--which could cost unnecessary lives--but to "go into the jungle" and join the resistance where "the zones held by our guerrillas are numerous."

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Also deleted is Sihanouk's message to compatriots in the army, police, and other administrative posts to the effect that "U.S. imperialism" would not be able to continue to protect for more than one or two years "its lackeys Thieu-Ky and company in Saigon, Souvanna Phouma and company in Vientiane, Kittikachorn and company in Bangkok, and Lon Nol-Sirik Matak and company in Phnom Penh." And VNA omits Sihanouk's reference to "socialist Vietnam, North and South," having recognized Cambodia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its existing frontiers as well as his statement that "upon the word of its very high-ranking leaders and in the presence of no less important witnesses, it has only recently again committed itself solemnly to make its nation, people, and youth respect all this in the future."

PEKING PUBLICIZES FURTHER PRC SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK

Chou En-lai's official expression of Chinese "Government" support for Sihanouk, voiced in Pyongyang on 5 April, is followed by another expression of support for Sihanouk's five-point declaration of 23 March in the joint PRC-DPRK communique on Chou's visit, released on the 8th.* Sihanouk's 6 April message to Chou expressing "lasting and unbounded gratitude" for the "firm, clearcut, and powerful support" of China, "our greatest and most faithful friend," was carried by NCNA on the 9th and has been widely rebroadcast by Peking radio.

Peking continues wide dissemination of other Sihanouk statements and of pickups of foreign statements of support for Sihanouk. There are editorialized reports--usually pegged to foreign sources--of developments in Cambodia, including the alleged massacre of Vietnamese residents and continued pro-Sihanouk demonstrations. NCNA also picks up Hanoi comment denouncing Lon Nol's call for a reactivation of the ICC and the dispatch of a UN observer team. An 11 April NCNA commentary denounces U Thant's recognition of the new government in Cambodia and his refusal to circulate a communication from Sihanouk, but Peking does not refer to Taiwan in this connection as VNA did.

* The volume of Peking's propaganda pegged specifically to Cambodian developments dropped from some 50 percent in the past two weeks to 20 percent during the week ending 12 April. This figure does not, however, include the expressions of Chinese support voiced by Chou En-lai in Pyongyang and contained in the PRC-DPRK communique. Fifty percent of Peking's broadcast comment during the past week was on the PRC-DPRK talks.

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A "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield column article" carried by NCNA's domestic service in Chinese on 8 April charges that the United States instigated the Cambodian coup to expand the war in Indochina, having met with "miserable defeat" on the battlefield in Vietnam and Laos. It adds that the coup was carried out under a "smokescreen of 'peace,'" the United States whitewashing its "counterrevolutionary crimes" with talk of peace.

NONALIGNED CONFERENCE NCNA items of 12 and 13 April report that Penn Nouth, the "personal representative" of Sihanouk, led a delegation to the preparatory meeting of nonaligned countries in Dar es Salaam. NCNA publicizes a press release by the delegation stressing the "illegality" of the Lon Nol regime, mentioning that it also sent a delegation to the conference. The statement asserts that the Lon Nol government is not nonaligned and therefore should not be admitted to the conference, but there is no acknowledgment that the delegates to the conference voted to set up a subcommittee to study the question of Cambodian representation.

BREZHNEV SCORES VIETNAMIZATION, IGNORES CAMBODIA AND LAOS

In his 14 April Kharkov speech Brezhnev denounces the U.S. Vietnamization policy but does not mention Laos or Cambodia. He says the Americans have given a new "facade" to their failing Vietnam policy, replacing escalation with Vietnamization, but maintains that this does not mean a suspension of aggression--merely a conversion of it into a "fratricidal war" between the Vietnamese. Stating that the Vietnamese are resolved to achieve the freedom and independence of their homeland by any means, military, political, and diplomatic, he concludes that the Soviet people are on their side and wish them the "speediest implementation" of their "national aspirations" and a "stable peace." He does not mention the NFLSV 10-point program for a settlement. Criticizing Vietnamization in a 16 October speech at a dinner for the visiting DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, Kosygin had said Vietnam needs not Vietnamization but a "just and honest peace," the basis of which should be the NFLSV's 10 points.

ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM CALLED "WIDESPREAD OFFENSIVES"

Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to report the stepped-up military action since 31 March. VNA on the 14th typically cites Western sources in reporting the shelling of Saigon on the night of the 13th. The first substantial comment comes in a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 14th of an article in QUAN GIAI PHONG (Liberation Army) attributed to Commentator which characterizes the attacks this month as "widespread offensives and uprisings." Commentator claims the

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recent "victories" prove that no force can stop the PLAF's strong offensive initiative. Reviewing the attacks since late March, he says they have resulted in the annihilation of many allied troops and much materiel. Commentator also claims that these victories have resulted from the close coordination of the military, political, and proselyting struggle, and he cites alleged uprisings in this connection. He concludes with the routine claim that the current victories have dealt a heavy blow to the Vietnamization and pacification plans.

Other current attention to pacification and Vietnamization includes a commentary by "Cuu Long" (Mekong) broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 11th. Cuu Long wrote a similar commentary on Vietnamization which was broadcast by the Front in installments from 11 through 13 January. Leading off his current commentary by examining the "substance" of Vietnamization and claiming it is a "new phase of defeats," Cuu Long defines the objectives of the plan in routine terms: to strengthen ARVN and the GVN so that U.S. troops can be withdrawn, and to prolong the war to achieve U.S. objectives in Vietnam.

As in his January commentary, Cuu Long elaborates on the cruelty and "crimes" of Vietnamization in general and claims that the allies are using pacification in an effort to undermine the people's solidarity and devotion to freedom. Examining the long-term "scheme of Vietnamization," he says the allies are creating a basis for protracted fighting, actively organizing political forces to continue opposing the revolution in the future, and seeking ways to implant spies in the revolutionary ranks in order to undermine the revolutionary administrations.

Discussing the "actual situation of Vietnamization and its prospects," Cuu Long cites defeats in key areas such as the delta, increased U.S. casualties, and lack of confidence in the program. He concludes that Vietnamization is a "hopeless path" leading to defeat and to President Nixon's "political grave." The allies are trying to "beset our people with difficulties," he says, but they will overcome every hardship and continue attacking, thus "smashing" Vietnamization.

CURRENT ACTION Attention to particular actions in the recent fighting includes comment on the siege at the Special Forces camp at Dak Seang. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 13th calls the siege a "new defeat" for clear-and-hold and for Vietnamization which proves that the ARVN cannot "avert disastrous defeat." A Liberation Radio commentary on the 11th claims that after annihilating almost half the allied forces in the initial attack on the camp, the PLAF has firmly encircled and isolated it. Citing attacks on allied reinforcements, the commentary says the situation continues to be "very critical."

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On the 12th VNA quotes UPI as saying that at least 595 allied troops have been "wiped out" around Dak Seang, and on the 11th VNA cites U.S. military authorities as disclosing that 651 allied troops were wiped out there. An LPA account on the 12th of the attacks in northern Kontum on the 25-kilometer defense line from Dak Seang to Tan Canh claims that more than 1,200 allied troops, including 22 Americans, were wiped out. The item says more than 200 allied troops were killed or put out of action at the camp during the first week in April.

Comment hailing the communist "victory" at Song Mao, Binh Thuan Province, on the night of 31 March includes a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article summarized by Hanoi radio on 8 April. The army paper applauds action in which the communists allegedly controlled the battlefield in an hour, calling it proof of the progress of PLAF combativity and offensive prowess. A VNA mention of the same article, also on the 8th, reports it as stressing that Song Mao was a blow to Vietnamization. A commentary broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 8th claims that more than 1,000 allied troops, including more than 200 GI's, were killed or captured at Song Mao.

DRV CLAIMS DOWNED PLANE, SCORES PEROT MISSION ON U.S. POW'S

The latest of Hanoi's periodic claims of downed U.S. aircraft comes in an 11 April Hanoi radio report that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed over Haiphong that day, bringing Hanoi's total to 3,337. The last previous claim was that an RF-4C was downed over western Quang Binh Province on 30 March.

H. Ross Perot's recent trip to Vientiane and Saigon in connection with his attempts to contact U.S. prisoners in the DRV is scored in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 9th and in two Hanoi radio commentaries the next day. The most detailed attack on this "new psychological warfare farce of the Nixon Administration" comes in a broadcast in Vietnamese to the South: It notes that Perot had chartered three planes to transport "nearly 100 journalists" and U.S. "aggressor pilots' dependents" to Saigon, and it ridicules the notion that the prisons where "U.S.-puppets have detained South Vietnamese patriots" are run humanely. The commentary dismisses as a "trouble-making plot" Perot's trip to Vientiane and his request at the DRV Embassy for permission to visit U.S. pilots in the DRV. Saying that he came to Vientiane again even though the DRV policy had been explained to him, the commentary recalls that in December he had arrived in Vientiane with food and medicine and "demanded" authorization to deliver the supplies to the POWs--an action aimed at "sabotaging" DRV regulations on sending packages to U.S. personnel.

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The Hanoi commentaries reiterate the standard line that DRV policy toward the prisoners is humane and just despite the fact that they are "war criminals" and that the DRV is not bound by the Geneva convention.

HANOI PREPARES FOR MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS, ISSUES SLOGANS

A circular on May Day celebrations issued 13 April by the Vietnam Workers Party Secretariat, carried by VNA on the 14th, says the stress this year will be on the achievements in fighting and production of both North and South Vietnam, on stimulating the productive labor movement in the North and tightening the "militant solidarity" among the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Also on the 14th, Hanoi radio carried the May Day slogans--a brief list of 12, as compared with 29 last year, containing generalized calls for support of the "anti-U.S. national salvation resistance" and socialist construction in the North. It seems likely that the list is abbreviated because a list of 31 slogans was issued on 18 January this year--published, VNA said, to celebrate the 3 February party anniversary.*

* See the TRENDS of 21 January 1970 for a discussion of this list and for background on previous May Day slogans.

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

BREZHNEV, SEMENOV HOPE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS IN VIENNA

In his wide-ranging speech in Kharkov on 14 April--broadcast in the domestic service--Brezhnev says the USSR would "welcome a sensible agreement" at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which open in Vienna on the 16th.* He states that if the U.S. Government sincerely desires a treaty and if the American public succeeds in overcoming "the opposition of the arms manufacturers and the military," prospects for the Vienna talks "may be viewed positively." Echoing the line current in Soviet propaganda since the first round of the talks in Helsinki, he asserts that the USSR for its part will try to see that the talks prove useful.

While reiterating Soviet support for disarmament measures, Brezhnev interjects the statement that the USSR has created "a reliable means of restraining any aggressor." In what may be an allusion to U.S. plans for proceeding with deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and MIRV's, he warns that "we shall answer any attempts by any party whatsoever to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union by making the required increase in our own military might to guarantee our defense." And a foreign-language commentary by Stolpovskiy on 14 April repeats--without attribution--Brezhnev's warning that the USSR will respond with a "corresponding increase" in the USSR's defense capability. A threat of possible countermeasures had appeared last month in routine propaganda on the U.S. decisions on ABM's and MIRV's.

* Since his 3 July 1968 speech, when he noted that an agreement had been reached between the USSR and the United States about an exchange of opinions on strategic arms limitation, Brezhnev had broached such an arms agreement only once. At the international communist conference in Moscow last June, he said the USSR was prepared to reach an understanding on general and complete disarmament, "on measures for limiting and restraining the arms race, above all the race for nuclear missile weapons."

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Brezhnev winds up his remarks on strategic arms with the observation that American circles "with an interest in the arms race" have become more active and have made "slandorous assertions that the USSR intends to increase arms production in any case"--an "old ruse of the militarists . . . to get more allocations for military preparations."

Politburo member Kirilenko touches briefly on SALT in a speech broadcast by the Yerevan domestic service on the 14th, like Brezhnev stressing that success depends on the United States. The talks, he says, "can produce positive results if an honest effort is made by the United States to solve all problems and not to try for unilateral gains."

In his arrival statement reported by TASS on the 14th, Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna talks, used language comparable to that of his opening statement in Helsinki last November in declaring that solution of the "important and complex" problems under discussion would be a major contribution to the strengthening of peace and security. The Soviet Government has instructed his delegation to hold talks in "a businesslike, constructive spirit," Semenov asserted, adding: "We would like to hope that the American side will display the same approach."

Prior to the Brezhnev and Kirilenko speeches, the last elite spokesman to bring up SALT was Kosygin, at the 5 March Moscow ceremony for deposition of the instruments of ratification of the nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet premier declared on that occasion that the USSR attached "great importance" to the dialog, that it was approaching the talks in "all seriousness," and that good will on the part of both sides was needed.

SENATE RESOLUTION Reporting on 10 April the passage of a Senate resolution calling on the President to introduce at the Vienna talks a proposal for an immediate halt in the deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic weapons, TASS says "political observers" have noted Senate concern over the Administration's "refusal to explain its position in its approach to the forthcoming talks." Attention is drawn, TASS says, to the fact that "President Nixon personally spoke against this resolution last month, describing it as 'inappropriate'"--an allusion to the President's comment at his 21 March press conference that the resolution is "irrelevant" since its subject "is what SALT is all about." Moscow did not report these remarks at the time, and the 10 April TASS item does not go on to explain why the President considered the resolution "inappropriate."

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KOSYGIN MESSAGE PLEDGES SOVIET AID IN RESCUE OPERATIONS

TASS on 15 April carried the text of Premier Kosygin's message to President Nixon informing him that the Soviet Government had instructed civilian and military authorities to use "all means" available to aid in the rescue of U.S. astronauts Lovell, Haise, and Swigert. The message says "we follow with concern" the flight of the disabled Apollo 13 and wishes the "courageous" astronauts a safe return to earth. Fifteen minutes after it transmitted the message, TASS reported that two Soviet ships in the Pacific had changed course "on order of the Soviet Government" and set sail for the area of the expected splashdown.

Minimal Soviet coverage of the early stages of the Apollo 13 flight had been straightforward, promptly reporting the blast-off on the 11th and noting that the mission was to land two astronauts on the moon. TASS and the domestic service reported early on the 14th that the main power unit on the spacecraft "became almost completely inoperative as a result of an oxygen leak," that the moon landing was cancelled, and that the craft would correct its trajectory for a return to earth on the 17th. Some three hours later the domestic service carried a fuller report on the "serious complications," saying that the reasons for an "explosion" on board the craft were not yet known. It added that NASA spokesmen indicated that there was "no direct threat to the lives of the astronauts."

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

BREZHNEV, KIRILENKO SPEECHES BREAK NO NEW GROUND ON CHINA

Speeches on 14 April by Brezhnev and Kirilenko--containing the first elite-level remarks on China since the same two leaders' speeches in October and February, respectively--fail to register any new movement in Sino-Soviet relations while reflecting the darker polemical atmosphere surrounding the half-year-old Peking talks. Viewed against the background of recent Soviet comment, whose major themes they echo, the speeches seem to indicate Moscow's intent to follow a middle course of persevering in the talks while seeking to isolate the Chinese in the international communist movement.

An approach on two levels, distinguishing state from party relations, is reflected in Brezhnev's statement in his 14 April Kharkov speech stressing a desire to contain ideological differences at the party level while persisting in the effort to reach an agreement that would turn the Sino-Soviet border into "a line of neighborliness, not hostility." That Moscow is holding to a firm bargaining stance at the talks seems indicated in his remark that the Soviets are not departing from their "legal and principled" position and are defending their borders. If there has been any breakthrough in the talks or an accommodation along the border, Brezhnev did not take this occasion to publicize it.

Moscow's polemical offensive after the propaganda standdown last fall is reflected in Brezhnev's 14 April speech as contrasted with his conciliatory remarks on 27 October, which included the unusual fraternal gesture of calling Chou En-lai "Comrade." Where the October speech avoided polemics, Brezhnev has now denounced the Chinese for impeding the talks by promoting an anti-Soviet war psychosis. Renewing a warning made in recent authoritative Soviet comment, he admonishes the Chinese that pressure tactics on their part will be futile and that the Soviets have "strong nerves." Brezhnev is vague in mentioning the Peking leadership, limiting himself to a reference to the "organizers of the war hysteria" in China.

The impression of immobility in Sino-Soviet relations is underscored by a comparison of Kirilenko's 14 April speech in Yerevan with his speech on 5 February to the French CP congress. Following substantially the same script in his remarks on China in both speeches, Kirilenko has again deplored the atmosphere created in China around the talks and has promised a further prosecution of Moscow's ideological case against Peking.

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OTHER LITERARY GAZETTE on 8 April carried three items on China:
COMMENT an article by a Chinese describing the mass deportation of cadres to "7 May schools" in the countryside, an article on extravagant Chinese claims of miraculous results from acupuncture under Mao's guidance, and a report commemorating a Chinese poet. The article on the 7 May schools--"essentially a type of concentration camp"--denounces Mao for subjecting cadres to arduous and cruel physical labor and ideological rectification in order to erase their "Marxist-Leninist world outlook."

An article in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 10th assails Harrison Salisbury for his books on the siege of Leningrad and on a possible war between the Soviet Union and China. Dealing only briefly with the latter book, which was the subject of a long PRAVDA article by Tikhvinskiy on 15 February, the article charges that Salisbury's "perfectly obvious" aim is to incite "the most adventuristic elements" in Peking to attack the Soviet Union.

The sensitive matter of the condition and treatment of minorities in the Central Asian borderlands has become the subject of a Soviet central press article for the first time since the agreement to hold the Peking talks was reached. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on 7 April, discussing an anthology of Uighur poetry printed over 20 years ago in what is now the Sinkiang region of the PRC, deplores the repressive impact of the cultural revolution on Uighur cultural figures and calls attention to the "hand of fraternal help" extended by the Soviet Union to "the unfortunate children of Eastern Turkestan"--language with provocative overtones of separatist sentiment and Soviet mischief-making among the non-Han peoples across the border. Although mild compared with inflammatory propaganda on this subject that has formerly appeared in the Soviet press, the article represents still another line of attack in Moscow's current polemical campaign ranging across a broad front.

One day after the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article, a broadcast in Tashkent's Uighur service--a principal forum for Soviet propaganda on the Central Asian minority peoples--evoked the memory of the "National Liberation Army of East Turkestan," the spearhead of a movement promoted by the Soviets which revolted against Chinese control in the 1940's. The broadcast pointedly reminded the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities in Sinkiang of this separatist movement and denounced Peking for reneging on promises of autonomy for the minorities. The Soviets had resumed broadcasting propaganda on this subject soon after the Peking talks had opened, long before anti-Chinese polemics returned to the central media.

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In broadcasts to China, Radio Moscow initiated a Mandarin-language series on 10 April responding to recurrent Chinese charges of a Soviet surrender of Siberia to exploitation by foreign interests. The broadcasts have insisted that Siberian development is being carried out by Soviet capital and technicians to serve the interests of the Soviet people.

One of Moscow's infrequent references to the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance appears on 12 April in the 46th in the now sporadic Kapitsa-Bedenchenko series in Mandarin on "Glorious Chapters in the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations." The reference appears in the course of a discussion of past examples of Soviet and PRC political and military cooperation on international issues, such as the Taiwan crises and the Korean, Vietnamese, and Laotian conflicts. A broadcast in Mandarin on the 10th, invoking Lenin on the need for unity of anti-imperialist forces, interprets Peking's line on the world countryside opposing the world cities as setting the colored peoples of the world against the white.

PEKING DENOUNCES SOVIETS FOR COLLABORATION WITH JAPAN

Following Chou En-lai's 5-7 April visit to the DPRK, with its clear overtones of opposition to Soviet dealings with Japan, a lengthy NCNA correspondent's report on the 13th details signs of growing cooperation between Moscow and Tokyo as evidence of a betrayal of the Soviet people by their "revisionist renegade clique." In addition to taking derisive note of letters from Podgorny and Kosygin calling for cooperation with Japan, the report characteristically takes a swipe at Brezhnev, this time for his proposal of an Asian collective security system. Strong Chinese attacks on the proposal last summer coincided with Peking's sharpened focus on Brezhnev as the chief Kremlin target.

While ignoring Peking's own current negotiations with Japan on trade, NCNA notes accusingly that the amount of the USSR's trade with Japan ranks first among Soviet trade "with Western countries." The report also claims that Soviet-Japanese cooperation is an "extension" of Soviet collaboration with the United States, though it does not develop the theme of encirclement of China which formerly marked Peking's polemics on Soviet-U.S. collusion. The emphasis rather is on Moscow's alleged interest in drawing closer to Japan in opposition to the PRC, providing still another sign of Peking's concern over Japan's assuming a pivotal role in Asia in the future.

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Consistent with Peking's general restraint in approaching bilateral Sino-Soviet issues, the NCNA report treads carefully in treating the military implications of Soviet-Japanese cooperation. Thus it charges that the Soviets have expanded economic ties with Japan in recent years in order to make use of Japanese economic strength to build "bases of aggression" in Siberia and the Soviet Far East, and it claims that Japanese exports to the USSR rapidly increased following Moscow's "intensified arms expansion and war preparations"; but there is no mention of the border conflict or of a Soviet threat to the PRC. Peking has remained silent on the border question and has ignored Moscow's propaganda campaign about Chinese war preparations.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR ASSAILS ISRAEL FOR RAID ON SCHOOL, MUTED ON SISCO TOUR

Moscow's propaganda attention to the Middle East, which had been gradually diminishing over the past four weeks, takes an upward turn again with prompt expressions of outrage over the 8 April Israeli attack that resulted in the death of Egyptian schoolchildren. Within two days Soviet media were reporting a scattering of protest meetings in the USSR and a series of statements by public organizations and individuals calling for punishment of the "aggressor," as well as rounding up foreign reaction. In the case of the 12 February Abu Zabal raid, on which Moscow built a voluminous propaganda campaign, protest meetings did not begin until four days after the release of a TASS statement, which was itself issued four days after the raid. The current protests do not seem to be gathering momentum, and it seems doubtful that the school bombing will spark a second campaign of similar proportions. Comment routinely charges the United States with hypocrisy in expressing regret over the incident while continuing to support Israel.

Limited, restrained comment on the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Sisco to Cairo points out that the Israeli raid was conducted with U.S. Phantoms on the eve of Sisco's Middle East tour and asks how the United States can befriend all countries in the area, supporting both the "aggressor" and his victim at the same time.

UAR SCHOOL INCIDENT On the 10th Moscow acknowledges the controversy over the target of Israel's 8 April raid, the UAR insisting that the Israelis hit a school in the village of Bahr al-Baqar in ash-Sharqiyah Province and Israeli Defense Minister Dayan maintaining in a statement on the 8th that the area hit was a military target where the Egyptians had "irresponsibly" located a school. A domestic service commentary says Dayan tried to justify the act by "alleging that the school was situated within a military target--an old device" and claims that raids on civilian targets are no accident but part of a premeditated policy aimed at forcing the Arabs to agree to a settlement on Israeli terms.

Commentator Tsoppi, in foreign-language broadcasts on the 10th and 11th, rejects Dayan's "monstrous arguments" that the Israeli planes attacked a military target, remarking that "Dayan, if anyone, knew there were no military targets in the vicinity." Similarly, a panelist in the 12 April domestic service roundtable program finds the idea that the children were killed because they were within a military target "absurd, fantastically unthinkable," and also insists there were no military targets "whatsoever" around the school.

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Comparing the Bahr al-Baqar incident to the Son My episode in Vietnam, the roundtable panelists and other commentators disparage the State Department statement on the school raid. Panelist Druzhnin sounds a common theme in arguing that without U.S. deliveries of arms and money and U.S. moral and political support for Israel, peace might have been restored long ago. A commentary in Arabic, broadcast on the 9th, asserts that if Washington really wants peace in the region it "should have promptly stopped the supply of any arms to Israel and checked the Israeli rulers."

SISCO IN UAR Moscow has given low-keyed attention to Assistant Secretary Sisco's 10-14 April visit to Cairo. TASS on the 11th, citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), briefly noted his arrival and his talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riyadh. In the conversation, TASS said, Riyadh set forth UAR views on the crisis, emphasizing the need to implement the November 1967 Security Council resolution providing for Israeli withdrawal and to restore the legal rights of the Palestinian people. Also on the 11th and again on the 14th, TASS played up unfavorable Lebanese press comment.

On the 12th TASS reported the Sisco-Nasir talks that day, and Moscow's domestic service on the 13th, noting that the meeting lasted over two hours, cited MENA for the report that no statement was published after the meeting. Moscow added that Sisco would fly to Jordan on the 14th and would then visit Israel (he in fact left Cairo for Israel via Cyprus on the 14th). Moscow said that "political observers" believe Israel intends to ask Sisco for new loans amounting to 1.5 billion dollars, an increase over the 1 billion "demanded" by Israel last September, in view of the "enormous armaments expenditure which has led to serious economic difficulties." The broadcast said Washington has "already met" the Israeli wishes, Secretary Rogers at a press conference in March having promised Israel 100 million dollars in economic aid.

Moscow's Arabic-language service reported on the 12th that Nasir in a speech the previous day had condemned the United States for supplying Israel with aircraft. A commentary in Arabic on the 13th pointed out that Nasir "strongly criticized" the United States at a time when Sisco is touring Middle East countries trying to dispel Arab "anger and indignation over Washington's anti-Arab policy." In view of U.S. support for Israel, the commentary dismissed as "hypocrisy" Sisco's remark in his arrival statement--not so identified in the broadcast--that the United States wants to be a friend of all countries in the area. Sisco's assurance, also in his arrival statement, that the United States favors implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution was disparaged by Tsoppi in a 3 April foreign-language commentary which stressed that the Arabs are ready to fulfill all points of the resolution, including those guaranteeing Israel's sovereignty, on condition that

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Israel withdraw its troops. Tsopim said that those who see a gleam of hope in the situation following Washington's decision to postpone the supply of further planes to Israel are deluding themselves, in that the United States has pledged to replace Israeli aircraft losses--"a guise for fresh deliveries."

BREZHNEV REAFFIRMS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS KEY TO PEACE

In his 14 April Kharkov speech, Brezhnev restates the Soviet position that withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories is the only road to a peaceful solution in the Middle East. This will be achieved, he says, "as soon as the U.S. leaders understand the entire hopelessness and danger of their present connivance with the Israeli aggressors." Brezhnev declares that the prestige of the United States and "other Israeli patrons" has never been as low as it is now in the Arab world and the world as a whole. But he holds "the imperialists," rather than the United States specifically, to blame for the "highly explosive situation" in the region, claiming that they are not reconciled to the fact that the people of the Arab countries are setting out on the path of independent development and social progress.

Podgorny, speaking at a banquet in Teheran on 25 March, had similarly characterized the situation as "tense and explosive" and had argued that Israeli "ruling circles, supported by imperialist and Zionist circles," were committing new armed provocations and sabotaging a political settlement. The Israeli Government's "reckless policy," Podgorny said, represented a danger to the peoples of the Middle East countries as well as to countries "in adjacent geographical areas" and to peace and international security.

In an uncommon formulation, Brezhnev says that "if it were only a question of securing the right to security of every state in the Middle East," peace in the area could have been restored long ago. He suggests that this has been prevented by the fact that the present Israeli leaders, with their "excessive ambitions and expansionist plans," and their "overseas patrons" both "need tensions." The Israeli Government is thus endangering the security of its own people, whose future lies in good-neighbor relations with the Arabs, he says. Soviet propaganda has argued in the past that Israeli policy operates to the detriment of the Israeli people, but references to the security angle are infrequent. In one such reference, a Shakhov foreign-language commentary last December complained that "what is called the guarantee of Israel's security" means the incorporation of occupied Arab lands.

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Having introduced his remarks on the Middle East with the remark that the "progressive" Arab regimes have withstood the "Israeli aggression" and become stronger and that Arab friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist world has also grown stronger, Brezhnev winds up the passage with a pledge of support for the Arabs. The socialist countries, he says, are ready to give the "Arab peoples" the "necessary aid" to thwart the "plans of aggression" in the Middle East. Soviet propaganda had seemed to draw a distinction in the past between Soviet "support" for the Arab "peoples" and Soviet assistance to Arab states. But for the past two months at least, there has been no distinct pattern in the support statements. Thus, in early February Kirilenko said at the French CP congress that the Soviet Union is rendering "all-round support and assistance to the people" of the Arab countries; the TASS statement of 16 February spoke of providing the "necessary support to the Arab states"; Podgorny was reported by TASS on 3 March as saying the USSR renders "utmost support to the Arab countries and peoples"; and routine comment has employed a variety of combinations.

In a speech in Yerevan on the 14th, Kirilenko calls it the duty of all communists and peaceloving forces to render comprehensive support, "including armed support," to people struggling against imperialism. The Soviet Union, he says, has rendered and will render to the Vietnamese and Arab people "such aid as is required by the interests of their just struggle."

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WEST GERMANY

SOVIET MEDIA SEE NO "TANGIBLE RESULTS" OF BRANDT-NIXON TALKS

Soviet commentators conclude that FRG Chancellor Brandt's 10-11 April talks with President Nixon "did not produce any tangible results," that "serious disagreements" between the United States and the FRG persist, and that the United States disapproves of Brandt's detente policy despite public expressions of support. Minimal comment from East German media reiterates the line established before the talks--- that both "imperialist" countries agree on most international issues and that Brandt is badly mistaken in linking his policy with the Nixon Administration.

Typical of Soviet comment, a Levin commentary broadcast in the Moscow domestic service on 13 April concludes that Press Secretary Ziegler's "claim" that the talks were "very valuable" only "expressed emotion lacking any specific basis." While observing that on a number of European problems the U.S. and FRG positions "are so close" that the exchange of views was only a formality, Levin says Ziegler gave a "diffuse" reply to a question on whether the President had "reassured" Brandt of support for the FRG's Eastern policy and even disagreed with the use of the term "reassured." Levin goes on to describe U.S. foreign policy as having "nothing in common with the interests of relaxing tension in Europe." It "gives a hostile reception" to any detente-oriented proposal, including proposals for a European security conference, the commentator adds, and "one should not be surprised if Washington tries to hamper Bonn if the latter wants to make even a minimal contribution" to solving European problems.

One of the most negative Soviet evaluations of the Brandt government in current propaganda appeared in a Zakharov commentary broadcast to German listeners on 9 April. Dwelling extensively on "militarist" aspects of the Brandt coalition, Zakharov said the U.S. visit by Brandt and Defense Minister Schmidt and their "military-political program for the Bundeswehr and NATO" demonstrate that the present Bonn cabinet's policy "is mainly a military" one and that Bonn "does not emphasize the necessity for detente in Europe." The U.S. talks confirm that "Bonn still has not" reconciled itself to the European status quo, Zakharov declared.

A panelist in a Moscow domestic radio roundtable on the 12th asserted that the Brandt-Nixon talks failed to settle the long-standing problem of FRG payments to maintain U.S. troops in Europe and added: "nor can this argument be settled." The same panel noted that "U.S. and West German imperialists" are united by their "common endeavor to strengthen the position of capitalism in Europe and to increase tension with the aim of perpetuating NATO and strengthening it."

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POLISH COMMENTATORS SEE U.S.-FRG DISCORD ON BRANDT OSTPOLITIK

Polish comment on Brandt's talks with President Nixon seized upon Brandt's "highly significant statements" on his Eastern policy at the National Press Club to assail him for lack of deeds to follow up his words, while suggesting that President Nixon has reservations about the FRG's Eastern policy.

PAP dispatches on the 12th and 14th stress that although President Nixon "in principle" and "generally" expressed approval of Brandt's Eastern policy, the President "refrained from taking a stand" on "individual moves" within that policy, and his press secretary "bypassed in silence many relevant problems" the two leaders discussed, particularly the U.S. "military presence" in Europe. A GLOS PRACY article on the 14th, quoted by PAP, points out that so far Brandt "has only declared his readiness" to reach agreements with the East but in fact has "made no concrete political moves yet." It adds that if Brandt continues to confine himself to "declarations and demonstrations of goodwill," he will only strengthen such rightwing leaders as Strauss, Barzel, and Kiesinger.

Polish impatience with the "slowness" of Brandt's Eastern policy moves is also reflected in an 11 April ZYCIE WARSZAWY commentary evaluating Brandt's first six months in office. Recalling initial cautions that Poland would judge Brandt by "deeds, not words," the paper concludes that so far Brandt's efforts to achieve his policy goals have been "a total fiasco." Granting that a "change in tone" is clear, the paper declares that the "avalanche of pronouncements and declarations" has by no means facilitated a West German "reappraisal" of policy toward Poland but has actually hampered it. West German publicity for the mere fact that Bonn has been talking with Warsaw represents a "conscious attempt to misinform international public opinion," the paper says. It adds that Brandt seeks to display to the world "not a real change" in West Germany's policy on Polish boundaries but only "the fact that it is holding talks with Poland," or "the appearance of a new game."

GDR TERMS FRG CHARGES AGAINST STOPH "GRAVE PROVOCATION"

A 14 April statement by "competent circles of the GDR Government," carried by ADN, vigorously denounces West German "fascists" for a "new grave provocation" against the GDR in the form of murder charges brought against GDR Premier Stoph. The charges were filed by a rightwing West German publisher on 10 April, evidently in hopes of preventing Stoph's scheduled second summit meeting with Brandt at Kassel on 21 May.

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The belated GDR reaction fails to spell out the substance of the charges against Stoph "and associates," which according to DPA on the 10th include "murder and other grave capital crimes committed at the Berlin wall and at the zonal frontier." DPA says they were filed by NATIONAL ZEITUNG editor Gerhard Frey. The GDR statement calls the action a "monstrous occurrence" and a "grave provocation against the GDR and its efforts to establish normal and equal international relations between the GDR and the FRG." It adds that the development casts a "revealing light" on the FRG situation, where "fascists are permitted to publicly pursue murderous incitement against GDR statesmen" and even FRG judicial organs "encourage such neonazi provocations."

The GDR statement makes no specific reference to the 21 May Kassel summit but demands the curbing of "neonaxism and revanchism" in the FRG. East Berlin television commentator von Schnitzler, however, remarks on the 14th that this and other steps by the West German Government "contrast" with FRG public statements in Bonn and at the Erfurt summit. Von Schnitzler adds that SPD leaders Wehner, Schmidt, Ehmke, and Franke are "nearing the standpoint" of such rightwing CSU leaders as Strauss, who seek to "disrupt all talks between Bonn and Berlin."

TASS has promptly and fully reported the GDR protest statement in its English transmission late on the 14th, but no Soviet comment is available.

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ALBANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

TIRANA, BELGRADE SHOW INTEREST IN IMPROVED STATE RELATIONS

Further signs of a warming trend in Albanian-Yugoslav relations are manifest in Belgrade's response to a lengthy ZERI I POPULLIT editorial article on 5 April which pays tribute to the Yugoslav role in World War II and stresses that despite ideological differences, the two countries' efforts to preserve their independence constitute a common historical bond.* The Yugoslav press and Foreign Secretariat have responded positively to the apparent Albanian overture, expressing cautious hope that bilateral cooperation may be improved.

ALBANIAN OVERTURE The Albanian editorial article is entitled "The Significance of the National Liberation Struggle in the History of the Yugoslav People." Pegged to the 29th anniversary of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, it is notable for praise of the bravery and historic revolutionary tradition of the Yugoslav partisans, as well as for vituperative condemnation of Bulgarian attempts to "belittle and negate" their achievements. The article argues that Bulgarian press efforts to demean the Yugoslavs' own contribution to their country's liberation serve "the hegemonistic and aggressive aims of the Kremlin tsars toward Yugoslavia." Zhivkov's "clique and its Moscow masters," the paper charges, hope that by such a campaign "they will be able to create a situation for their friends, the criminal Rankovic and company, to achieve their Great Russian aims."

Granting defensively that the Yugoslav "people" understand Albania's "irreconcilable ideological differences with the Yugoslav leadership," ZERI I POPULLIT nevertheless assures them that "the Albanian people will always be at their side" in the event that "common enemies" should threaten their freedom and independence. The assurance carries an implication of the obverse--the hope that the "courageous" Yugoslavs will reciprocate should Albania be threatened.

* Earlier signs of a shift in the Albanian line toward Belgrade in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia were apparent in an 11 April 1969 ZERI I POPULLIT editorial which praised the Yugoslav "people" and expressed Albanian readiness to support Yugoslavia in the face of "any aggression." See the 16 April 1969 issue of the TRENDS, page 12.

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YUGOSLAV RESPONSE An article in BORBA on 7 April, reported by TANYUG, notes with satisfaction "the tribute" paid to the Yugoslav people by the Albanian paper and accepts the idea that the two countries share a common bond in efforts to maintain their independence in the face of foreign pressures. Emphasizing the importance of their common interests as opposed to their continuing differences, the article says: "These interests may be simply reduced to the maintenance of national sovereignty, strengthening the independence of our two countries, and insuring equality in international affairs." This is especially true, BORBA concludes, "under conditions when the small countries are increasingly exposed to outside pressures and interference and when they are denied the right to the autonomous road of national development."

At a press conference in Belgrade on 9 April, replying to a question from Prague's RUDE PRAVO correspondent, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat spokesman Vujica assured him that Yugoslavia has always attached significance to developing relations with Albania and is currently "taking concrete steps to normalize them in every field in which there is mutual interest." He added, according to TANYUG, that he "favorably assessed" the ZERI I POPULLIT article concerning "the common struggle" of the peoples of Albania and Yugoslavia "to preserve the freedom and independence of their countries."

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HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PARTY SPOKESMEN DISAGREE ON TWO-FRONT IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Two recent pronouncements by leading Hungarian party ideologist Zoltan Komocsin--in Prague's RUDE PRAVO and Budapest's TARSADALMI SZEMLE--underscore the Hungarian party's determination to continue its line of balanced "two-front struggle" against rightist revisionism and leftist dogmatism, despite an expressed appraisal of the "counterrevolutions" in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as purely "rightist" deviations. Komocsin's statements amount to a rebuttal of the position taken in March by an official party spokesman in occupied Czechoslovakia to the effect that the main struggle must be directed against the rightists and that the two-front-struggle slogan inevitably leads to "centrism."

Consistent with the main document of the June 1969 international party conference, Moscow's propaganda since the 1968 Czechoslovak liberalization has stressed the struggle against right and left "opportunism"--the Czechoslovak and Chinese deviations, respectively--but has exhibited caution toward the Hungarians' application of the two-front-struggle concept to their "socialist democracy." Thus, Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Hungarian liberation anniversary meeting in Budapest on 3 April and PRAVDA's editorial on the occasion did not include any mention of right and left deviations, while Kadar's speech at the meeting duly cited the two-front struggle, with emphasis on the Hungarian party's avoidance of "rigid dogma" and "stereotyped patterns" in the building of socialism.

In his interview with RUDE PRAVO on 4 April, keyed to the Hungarian liberation anniversary, Komocsin declared that the need for "the struggle on two fronts is justified by objective reality." The requirements of the class struggle demand avoidance of "rightist revisionism," and "the struggle against pseudoleftist, sectarian dogmatism will ensure that . . . we can always approach the realization and solution of problems in a creative and revolutionary spirit." He added that "it is the deviation against which we do not fight that becomes the main danger"--a utilitarian paraphrase of the line of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conference documents that while revisionism is "the main danger," dogmatism can also become the main danger at different stages in the development of individual parties. Defensively, Komocsin asserted that concentration on both right and left deviations "naturally does not mean a centrist attitude." He added that "it is necessary to uncompromisingly oppose centrism, which wavers between the correct class Marxist-Leninist opinions and an open compromise and betrayal of class interests."

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The same line is pursued in Komocsin's anniversary article in the April issue of the Hungarian party monthly 'PARSADALMI SZEMLE'. According to the summary carried by MTI on the 8th, Komocsin "forcefully underlined the fact that a two-front fight 'naturally does not mean some kind of centrist conduct'" and that "we must continue to take uncompromising stands against centrism, which fluctuates between the Marxist-Leninist class view and open compromise, class treason." This disclaimer was preceded by remarks on revisionism and dogmatism which are virtually identical with Komocsin's comments on the subject in the RUDE PRAVO interview.

In both the interview and the article Komocsin reiterated past statements by Kadar--pointedly recalled by Brezhnev at the 3 April meeting--to the effect that national interests must not be asserted to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.

CZECHOSLOVAK POSITION Evidently with the Hungarians in mind, a four-part series of articles on ideology by Slovak Communist Party Secretary Ludovit Pezlar in the 10-13 March issues of Bratislava PRAVDA had wound up with a condemnation of the two-front ideological struggle notion. In the final installment, while granting that "the danger of a 'leftist' faction cannot be ruled out," Pezlar warned that

if the present Czechoslovak party leadership brought up in the present conditions in our country the slogan of a struggle on two fronts, it would not avoid being accused of centrism--of an attempt to waver between two extremes at the cost of serious compromises made first of all with rightwing forces.

Pezlar invoked "all the documents" since the November 1968 CPCZ plenum resolution in declaring that of "all the dangers" the Czechoslovak party must face, "the rightwing elements, their platform, and the rightwing faction in the party are the main targets" of the party's offensive. As in earlier installments, he pointed out that the danger from the left does not compare with that from the right, since "there is no 'leftwing' political platform." He concluded that "proclamation of the 'struggle-on-two-fronts' slogan would mean nothing but service to rightwing and antisocialist" forces and would "hamper the normalization process."

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BREZHNEV REITERATES COMPLAINTS MADE AT DECEMBER PLENUM

In Kharkov on 13 and 14 April, Brezhnev delivered two nationally televised and broadcast speeches in two days. The first of these was largely a rehash of themes apparently raised at the December plenum and made public in the 13 January PRAVDA editorial: a call for more progress in the scientific-technical area, improved labor discipline and productivity, structural changes in management, and criticism of unnamed officials for deficient sense of responsibility and discipline. Brezhnev's failure to make any sharp criticisms or new proposals reflects again the ineffectiveness of the present efficiency campaign in bringing about any meaningful changes.

Although new first deputy chairmen of Gosplan and the State Committee for Science and Technology were appointed sometime in early April, these changes simply point up the indecision characteristic of the campaign. (The appointments were announced only indirectly on 11 April when PRAVDA reported that T.I. Sokolov had been replaced as Orel first secretary and L.N. Yefremov as Stavropol first secretary so that they could take up their new posts in Gosplan and the science and technology committee.)

Serious shortcomings in Gosplan and the scientific-technical area were attacked at the December plenum, but no action was taken for four months. When moves to improve economic leadership finally did occur, they were on the second-string level, and there has still been no indication that anyone has been replaced: Yefremov apparently joins first deputy chairman V.A. Trapeznikov in the science and technology committee, and Sokolov joins three other first deputy chairmen at Gosplan (A.A. Goreglyad, V. Ya. Isayev, and V.M. Ryabikov). One notable feature of the move is the intrusion of career party officials Sokolov and Yefremov into organs formerly led exclusively by longtime government and economic officials.

In his 13 April speech, Brezhnev briefly noted that 1970 is to be "the year of another congress of our communist party."

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHANTUNG CORE GROUP LEADERS NAMED, VISIT "ADVANCED AREAS"

Tsinan radio, in a 4 April report on the dispatch of local study groups to advanced areas in the country, identified two more Shantung Provincial Revolutionary Committee (RC) vice chairmen, Li Shui-ching and Li Yao-wen, as members of the Shantung "party core leading group." Mu Lin, also an RC vice chairman, had previously been identified as a member of the core group, in a 12 March Tsinan broadcast.

The composition of the Shantung party core group indicates the growing influence of old cadres restored to power after being criticized in the cultural revolution. Mu Lin, former Shantung vice governor and party secretary, was recently promoted from the provincial standing committee to vice chairman of the RC. Li Shui-ching and Li Yao-wen have served as military leaders in Shantung since the 1950's.

There have been public references to provincial-level core groups for Inner Mongolia, Heilungkiang, and Kwangtung also in recent months, but core-group leaders have been identified only for Shantung. Shantung lags behind most other provinces, nonetheless, in reporting progress in reconstructing local-level party units. The Shantung study groups are going to visit Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Hunan, Honan, and Shanghai to learn from "their advanced experiences"--possibly in the field of party-building, although the propaganda is not explicit on this point. All these areas, except perhaps Shanghai, have reported fairly substantial progress in party reconstruction; Hunan and Heilungkiang widely publicized the setting up of the first new county party committees for their areas.

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