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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

1 APRIL 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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1 April 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 23 - 29 MARCH 1970

Moscow (3639 items)

Podgorny in Iran	(0.1%)	9.5%
Indochina	(18%)	8%
[Vietnam	(7%)	3%]
[Laos	(7%)	2%]
[Cambodia	(2%)	1%]
China	(7%)	6%
Middle East	(6%)	6%
RSFSR Writers'	(--)	5%
Congress		
Supreme Soviet	(1%)	4%
Elections		

Peking (3274 items)

Indochina	(23%)	58%
[Cambodia	(17%)	52%]
[Laos	(2%)	5%]
[Vietnam	(3%)	1%]
Domestic Issues	(37%)	23%
Middle East	(14%)	6%
Pakistan National	(--)	3%
Day		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

HIGHLIGHTS

PARIS TALKS: Both the DRV and PRG delegates at the 60th session of the talks on 26 March credited the United States with staging the 18 March "coup" in Cambodia and claimed that the U.S. intent is to expand the Vietnam war to all of Indochina. The VNA account of the session notes that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy read the DRV Government statement of the 25th which voiced full support for Sihanouk's five-point proclamation of the 23d. (VNA on the 30th reports that DRV delegation head Xuan Thuy, in Stockholm for the "International Conference on Vietnam," held a press conference on the 27th at which, among other things, he denounced the United States for "organizing the 18 March Cambodian coup," and for "escalating" the war in Laos.)

The VNA account of the Paris session typically ignores the fact that U.S. delegate Habib rebutted the communist interpretations of events in Cambodia and Laos. VNA also typically distorts the brief, formal remarks of the allied delegates. Thus, it complains that they again raised the problem of prisoners of war but ignores the GVN offer to repatriate 343 sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam.

Moscow routinely charges U.S. bad faith at Paris. And TASS on the 30th reports an IZVESTIYA dispatch as saying that "certain U.S. circles" regard the talks not as an opportunity for a peaceful settlement but as a "diplomatic cover" for "extremely dangerous expansionist plans" in all of Indochina.

STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE: DRV and Soviet media report that the conference on Vietnam which opened on the 28th was attended by representatives of some 50 countries, including Vietnam and numerous international organizations. A Mandarin-language broadcast over Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on the 31st reviews the conference proceedings and the resolutions and notes that the Soviet delegates stressed the need for solidarity among the supporters of the Vietnamese struggle. The broadcast notes that there was no Chinese delegation and says "the present Chinese leadership sabotaged this important political activity, as it has indeed been sabotaging every political activity which aims at bringing the quickest possible conclusion to the bloody war in Vietnam."

The only reference to the Stockholm conference in available Peking propaganda appears on the 31st in NCNA English and Peking domestic service broadcasts of Sihanouk's identical messages of greeting to the Stockholm conference and the preparatory conference of nonaligned countries in Dar-es-Salaam.

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MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM: Vietnamese communist attention to military developments includes the usual reports of scattered military action. The only available report of the series of attacks on the night of the 31st is an JPA item on 1 April which says only that "powerful" ground and artillery attacks were launched on a series of military targets throughout the South "causing serious losses" to the allies in lives and war means. On 30 March Hanoi radio broadcasts the first installment of an article by "Chien Thang" (Victor) which claims that U.S. partial troop withdrawal and the Vietnamization policy prove that the allies are being defeated. Other comment includes a 26 March Liberation Radio broadcast which discusses the development of urban guerrilla warfare and cites terrorist attacks in various areas including Saigon and Da Lat.

"PROVOCATIONS" AGAINST DRV: A 30 March DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, carried by VNA and Hanoi radio that day, denounces the United States for allegedly "raiding a number of populated areas in Noong De and Muong Xen, Ky Son district, Nghe An Province, on 27 and 28 March. The spokesman routinely calls for a halt to U.S. encroachments upon the DRV's sovereignty and security. Also on 30 March, Hanoi radio claims the downing that day of a U.S. RF-4C plane which was allegedly sent to "spy and attack the western area" of Quang Binh Province. This latest claim brings Hanoi's total of downed U.S. aircraft to 3,336.

PRG REGIONAL "REPRESENTATION": On 29 March Hanoi radio reports that a ceremony was held on the 22d in central Trung Bo marking the formation of "the PRG representation (ban dqaij dieenj) in central Trung Bo." The broadcast says that the delegates attending the ceremony--including representatives from the provincial revolutionary administrations, NFLSV committees, and the PLAF command in central Trung Bo "warmly welcomed the PRG decision to set up the representation." The "representation" reportedly consists of nine members, including a chairman and three vice chairmen. It is unclear what the relationship is between this body and the various provincial-level "People's Revolutionary Committees." Even those committees which were set up after the June 1969 establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government were not linked so explicitly with the PRG.

ATTACKS ON GVN: Liberation Radio on 25 March reacted to the land reform act, signed by President Thieu on the 16th, with a commentary calling the law "deceitful" and recounting allied "crimes" against the peasants such as bombings, defoliation, and "theft" of the land. On the 27th the radio calls the law a "deceitful maneuver to get the people's land" after the failure of pacification.

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Comment on the student strike beginning on 23 March in protest of the arrest of student leaders includes broadcasts of commentaries in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th and 30th and NHAN DAN on the 31st. The comment claims that the students feel that "their legitimate aspirations" can be realized only by defeating the Americans and overthrowing the GVN. VNA on 1 April reports that 12 students were arrested during a hunger strike in front of the National Assembly on the 30th, and that Saigon Buddhists have set up a committee to supply financial aid and support for the students.

Liberation Radio on 27 March broadcasts a summary of an appeal from the Bien Hoa People's Revolutionary Committee, dated the 20th, calling on the people to boycott the upcoming people's council elections and declaring that the committee will not recognize any form of administration "rigged up" by the Americans. Hanoi radio on the 29th claims that only one-third of the voters participated in recent people's council elections in Tay Ninh, and it condemns the councils as a tool to control the people and carry out pacification.

ACTIVITIES IN THE DRV: On 31 March VNA publicizes the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat instruction and slogans on the celebration of the Lenin Centenary. On the 30th VNA explained that as part of the centenary celebration it was republishing excerpts of Truong Chinh's speech which had marked Marx's 150th birth anniversary in 1968.*

The 39th anniversary of the Working Youth Union prompts a meeting on 24 March at which Truong Chinh spoke. According to VNA, the meeting's presidium included President Ton Duc Thang and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap as well as Chinh.

* VNA notes that Marx's birthday is in May, but it does not give the date of Truong Chinh's speech. A summary of the speech was carried by VNA on 23 August 1968 and the complete text was broadcast by Hanoi radio in five daily installments beginning on 16 September. That the speech was delivered in August was evident by Truong Chinh's reference to the eighth PLAF Command special communique of 5 August.

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PARIS TALKS: 26 MARCH SESSION

ALLIED REMARKS The VNA account of the 60th Paris session complains that the allies again raised the problem of prisoners of war, but it ignores the GVN offer to repatriate 343 sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam and the U.S. endorsement of this offer as a humanitarian gesture of good will which could lead to progress on other questions. VNA asserts that as in the previous 59 sessions, the U.S. and GVN delegates "continued to elude the fundamental problems": namely, a total, speedy and unconditional allied withdrawal and the formation of a provisional coalition government. GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong, according to the account, "tried his best to plead for the crimes perpetrated by the United States and its puppets, such as persecuting and illegally arresting and slaying Vietnamese patriots and other people in South Vietnam." It says that Philip Habib, "acting head of the U.S. delegation, endeavoured to defend the lackeys of the United States in Saigon."

DRV-PRG CRITICISM OF U.S. POSITION Both the DRV and PRG delegates routinely lambasted U.S. policy in Vietnam. Nguyen Van Tien, PRG delegate, speaking first after the allied side, denounced the United States for refusing to negotiate seriously, "thus keeping the Paris conference at a dead center," according to VNA. He charged that the U.S. Government did not consider Paris "as the place to correctly settle the Vietnam problem," and that instead it seeks to use Paris as a place to force the South Vietnamese people to accept U.S. domination. Thus, Tien condemned the United States for refusing to withdraw its troops and to renounce the Saigon administration, and for posing conditions for a U.S. troop withdrawal and "asking the Vietnamese to pay a price by 'mutual troops withdrawal.'" He also charged that the United States demanded elections, organized by the Saigon administration, "with a view to legalizing that puppet regime, and when this demand has not been met, seeks to play down the importance and reduce the contents of the Paris conference, so as to sabotage it." VNA notes that Tien also made standard denunciations against the Nixon Administration for intensifying the war in Vietnam, "piling up crimes," and stepping up Vietnamization and pacification.

DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, according to VNA, reiterated the claim that U.S. policy is not to end the war but to prolong it. And he charged that the "so-called Nixon doctrine" outlined in the President's foreign policy report on 18 February showed this. He also criticized the United States for allegedly stepping up military operations and bombing in the South and continuously violating DRV sovereignty and security.

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VNA, in reporting the communist delegates' additional remarks, says they "sternly condemned" the U.S. delegate's "stubborn attitude in deliberately eluding the fundamental problems in order to plead for" prolonging the war and blocking the Paris talks. It says they "rejected the threadbare allegations" of the allied delegates and pointed out that the United States and GVN must bear full responsibility for the continuation of the war and the Paris deadlock.

ATTENTION TO The PRG delegate routinely condemned the United
LAOS, CAMBODIA States for escalating the war in Laos and "massively
 bombing Laos' liberated zone," according to VNA.
He also criticized the United States for sending more U.S. military
personnel and Thai "mercenaries" to take part in the war in Laos.
VNA's account of DRV delegate Vy's remarks notes he claimed that the
United States is escalating the war in Laos "in an attempt to retrieve
its defeats in Vietnam." It reports his charge that the Nixon
Administration is sending Thai troops to Laos, in furtherance of the
U.S. policy of "using Asians to fight Asians." Vy, according to VNA,
recalled the 21 March statement of the Lac Patriotic Front and the
23 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. dispatch
of Thai troops to Laos and charging that the United States and
Thailand have "trampled" upon the 1962 Geneva agreements, of which they
are both signatories.

Both delegates credited the United States with staging the 18 March
coup in Cambodia. PRG delegate Tien charged that the United States
staged the coup in order to abolish the independence and neutrality
of Cambodia, "pushing Cambodia into the U.S. camp" so that the United
States could use it as a base to expand the war in Indochina. Vy
echoed this charge, claiming that the coup proved the U.S. intent
is not only to prolong the Vietnam war, but to expand it to all of
Indochina. VNA notes that he read an excerpt of the 25 March DRV
Government statement which it says voiced "full support to the five-
point proclamation" issued by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk on the 23d, and
"resolute support to the Khmer people's struggle led by Sihanouk
against the U.S. imperialists" VNA says that Vy pointed out
that recent events in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia show that the Nixon
Administration, while saying it wants peace, is "in fact stepping up
and prolonging the war," and while declaring there will be 'no more
new Vietnams,' is "in fact creating Vietnams in Laos and Cambodia."
Both delegates, according to VNA, point out that this is a "dangerous"
path to follow and can only lead to a more certain defeat for the
United States.

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MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH

Hanoi radio on 30 March broadcasts what is described as the first installment of an article published in a "recent" issue of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN by "Chien Thang" (Victor).* The article routinely describes claimed allied defeats since the Tet offensive and their allegedly forced shift from offensive to defensive strategy. Mentioning the Paris talks, the commentator claims that the Americans have had to seek a political solution, "thus recognizing that the PRG does exist in the South" and says that this is "tacit recognition" that the GVN has neither constitutional nor political force.

Liberation Radio on the 23d broadcast a roundtable discussion on pacification by "Saigon correspondents" which stresses ways of defeating pacification. These include annihilating support troops, destroying GVN apparatus and functionaries, and attacking allied bases and headquarters. It is suggested that putting the allies on the defensive would make them too busy for pacification. Describing the fight as a protracted one, the correspondents declare that the people must persist in waging a "see-saw struggle" until pacification is foiled.

One of the periodic commentaries on urban guerrilla warfare, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 26th, describes terrorist activities since January, including incidents in Saigon and Da Lat. The commentary points to the guerrillas' "close coordination with and assistance to the people's uprisings."

39TH ANNIVERSARY OF DRV WORKING YOUTH UNION

VNA on 26 March reports a "grand" meeting on the 24th which was sponsored by the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union to mark its 39th anniversary and welcome the party's decision to name the Youth Union, the Young Pioneers Organization, and the Children's Organization after President Ho Chi Minh.** According to VNA, the meeting's procedures included President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Vu Quang, first secretary of the

* Chien Thang's most recent previous article was one in May 1969 which reviewed the development of the war.

** VNA on 11 March carried the text of a resolution issued by the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee renaming the Vietnam Working Youth Union, the Vietnam Young Pioneers Organization, and the Vietnam Children's Organization after President Ho. See FBIS TRENDS, 18 March 1970, pp. 5-6.

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Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union, made the opening speech. On behalf of the party Central Committee, Truong Chinh delivered a speech and presented each of the three youth groups with banners embroidered with President Ho's portrait. The meeting unanimously adopted a letter to the VWP Central Committee which was broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 26th.

Truong Chinh's speech--broadcast by Hanoi radio on 25 March and summarized by VNA on the 27th--is routine in nature, calling on the three groups to follow Ho's virtues and teachings and urging them to continue their efforts in such areas as fighting, production, studies and training, and strengthening their organizations. A NHAN DAN editorial "highlighting the current stirring emulation movement among youth" to greet the anniversary and welcome the naming of their union after Ho is broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 26th and summarized by VNA on the same day. It hailed and listed a number of emulation drives launched among youths in the DRV. The paper noted that in order to maintain and develop their emulation movement, the youth must endeavor to raise their scientific, technological, and professional standards. In this context, NHAN DAN cites Le Duan's 14 February article--which continues to be cited frequently on a variety of subjects--in which he stressed the need to master modern sciences and techniques.

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CAMBODIA

INTRODUCTION

The 25 March DRV Government statement expressing "total support" for Prince Sihanouk's appeal on the 23d for a Cambodian liberation struggle to overthrow the Lon Nol regime is followed by a similar government statement by the PRG on the 26th. Hanoi gives further support to Sihanouk's appeal in comment in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN pegged to allied air strikes in Cambodia and to pro-Sihanouk demonstrations. The "temporary" suspension of diplomatic relations and other Vietnamese communist activities is reported by Hanoi and the Front. There has been no acknowledgment of the Lon Nol regime's renewed request, reported by Phnom Penh on the 30th, that the DRV and Front leaders enter into "immediate discussions" of their differences.

Peking has issued no high-level pronouncements of its own on Cambodia, but its coverage* of Sihanouk's pronouncements and other developments totals some 1700 commentary-length items, amounting to 52 percent of Peking's total weekly comment on all subjects. During the past five years Peking on no more than half a dozen occasions has devoted more than half of its weekly comment to a single international issue.

There is no Chinese press comment and the most authoritative Chinese reaction comes in a 30 March report by NCNA correspondents, carried by Peking radio as well as NCNA, denying a UPI report that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had told the Cambodian Ambassador that China was "embarrassed" by Sihanouk's presence in China.

Moscow's cautious reaction to Cambodian developments is illustrated by the fact that it did not acknowledge Sihanouk's 23 March call for the overthrow of the Lon Nol Government until the 27th. On that day TASS also summarized the DRV Government statement of the 25th, but Soviet media are not known to have carried to date the PRG Government statement of the 26th. Routine Soviet comment professes concern over the alleged U.S. intent to expand the Vietnam war to Cambodia.

* FBIS monitoring indicates that on or before 28 March Peking assigned two additional shortwave transmitters, presumably located in north and south China, to carry its three daily Cambodian-language programs. Transmitter behavior suggests that the newly added transmitters were introduced exclusively to augment the Cambodian service--they sign on and off as required to carry the Cambodian-language programs.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS SUPPORT "LIBERATION STRUGGLE"

The PRG Government statement* on the 26th voicing support for Sihanouk's 23 March call for a struggle to overthrow the Lon Nol Government notes Sihanouk's past "unreserved" support and assistance for the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the Americans. And it goes beyond the DRV Government statement when it says that now the Vietnamese side pledges to "support and assist" the Cambodian struggle "until victory." Both Hanoi and the Front see allied action in Cambodia as further evidence that the Lon Nol Government is a U.S. "stooge" and that the U.S. plans to widen the war beyond Vietnam. Liberation Radio on the 27th says that allied air strikes occurred in many areas "deep inside Cambodian territory." It says that these strikes as well as ARVN military incursions into Cambodia were carried out to "oppose by force the Cambodians' patriotic struggle." An indirect and derisive acknowledgment that these actions were aimed at Vietnamese communist military forces comes in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 29th which says that on 24 March the U.S. Air Force "flew into Cambodian airspace 'to attack the communists,' as they have described it." The continuous and "brazen" violations of Cambodian territory over the past few days, the commentary says, further demonstrate the "deceitfulness" of the new Cambodian government's repeated assertions of its desire to maintain Cambodia's independence, neutral policy, and territorial integrity.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the 28th notes reports of U.S. air strikes in Cambodia on the 24th and says that whereas in the past the Americans denied conducting air strikes against Cambodia, now they are overtly reporting them. The intent of these latest air strikes, the commentary alleges, is to "massacre the Cambodian people, expand the war, and repress the Khmer patriotic forces." The commentary adds that the 24 March air strikes are "very serious acts of war on the part of the Nixon clique," as well as acts of "shameless collusion" between the United States and its Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "lackeys," enabling the latter to protect themselves against the "patriotic struggle movement of the Khmer people."

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 29th carried by Hanoi radio claims, in noting Western press reports of pro-Sihanouk demonstrations in Cambodia, that the "struggle movement of the patriotic Khmer people has erupted" in Kompong Cham and Kampot provinces and "many" other

* On the 27th, VNA headquarters in Hanoi cabled its Moscow branch suggesting that it transmit to "our" diplomatic missions abroad the PRG statement in either English or French depending on the recipient concerned.

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places in Cambodia. The commentary and a Hanoi radio broadcast of the 28th specifically note the reported 26 March disturbances in Kompong Cham city where they say, citing Western sources, 600 persons "arose" and ransacked the Cambodian government offices. The 28 March Hanoi broadcast also notes similar demonstrations in Kampot Province, the city of Snoul, and it cites AFP in reporting that the "people in Ratanakiri Province have stood up" against the new Cambodian government. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary adds that the Vietnamese people and armed forces acclaim the "unsubmissive fighting spirit" of the Khmer people and says that Prince Sihanouk's 23 March "national salvation appeal" is currently being heeded by the Cambodian people. "The patriotic struggle of the Khmer people is developing and the national united front against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen is expanding," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserts. A VNA report on the 31st continues to cite instances of anti-government activities in Cambodia.

ZIEGLER STATEMENT On the 29th VNA--citing AFP--takes note of Press Secretary Ziegler's statement of the day before that U.S. military forces in South Vietnam may pursue the "enemy" into Cambodia in accordance with the inherent right of self-defense. VNA sees Ziegler's statement as further proof of the U.S. design to expand the war into Cambodia and says that "world opinion" regards this development as a "very serious act of war expansion," despite Ziegler's attempt to justify this rule of engagement as not implying any extension of the Vietnam war. According to VNA, this "new act of aggression" is "fraught with extremely serious consequences." It adds that the "Khmer people will resolutely oppose" the United States, its South Vietnamese "henchmen," and the pro-U.S. extreme rightists in Phnom Penh, all of whom "must bear full responsibility for the consequences arising from their acts."

HOC TAP COMMENTARY On the 28th Hanoi radio carried a commentary on Cambodia that it says appears in the March issue of the party's theoretical journal HOC TAP. The commentary repeats earlier propaganda in asserting that the "U.S.-engineered coup" lies within the framework of the U.S. "aggressive scheme" against Indochina and is aimed at serving the Vietnamization plan in South Vietnam. The commentary says the United States and its "lackeys" had "leapt with joy" in having successfully conducted the coup "in a relatively easy manner," but it adds, they are "short-sighted and stupid" in not foreseeing the "untold difficulties" for them resulting from the 18 March government changeover.

HOC TAP claims that within rightwing Cambodian ruling circles there are elements who are against the Lon Nol government and who have definitely "sided with the people." The commentary adds that

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"Cambodia's national united front against U.S. imperialism and its henchmen has been expanded with the participation of new forces," adding that the patriotic Cambodians are "holding aloft their national banner" in struggling for a "genuinely" independent, peaceful and neutral country. HOC TAP places the Cambodian struggle in the same context as the Vietnamese and Lao struggles in claiming that "closely united in the Indochinese people's united front against aggressive U.S. imperialism, the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are struggling resolutely and will surely win complete victory."

DENIAL OF VC, DRV INVOLVEMENT A Hanoi radio commentary on the 31st, citing Western press accounts, says that 17 Cambodian provinces are "in turmoil," that Phnom Penh is "cut off from many regions," and that as a result the Phnom Penh authorities are "thoroughly frightened" by the "struggle of the masses." The commentary says the regime has "noisily cried" that the pro-Sihanouk demonstrations were organized by the "Viet Cong," who in turn attacked several Cambodian towns and villages. It labels this a "fabrication" and part of Phnom Penh's "fraudulent tricks" to step up the "terrorism" against Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia. The commentary repeats that the Vietnamese people "unswervingly" and "scrupulously" respect Cambodian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and advocates noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

On the 1st Hanoi radio and VNA transmit a VNA authorized statement, dated the same day, which "flatly" rejects Phnom Penh's "deceitful claims" regarding Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia. VNA points out that since 11 March--when the DRV-PRG embassies were ransacked--the Phnom Penh authorities have conducted a "frenzied campaign" against Vietnam, "slandering the latter for aggression against Cambodia." VNA notes the Lon Nol regime spread such "rumors" as "North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have attacked six Cambodian frontier provinces" and that the Vietnamese people have "instigated and directed pro-Sihanouk demonstrations." These "odious claims," VNA adds, were put forward to distort the Khmer people's "just struggle," and they cannot cover up the regime's "crime of serving the United States in opposing the Cambodian people."

"TEMPORARY" SUSPENSION OF DRV, PRG ACTIVITIES The "temporary" suspension of diplomatic relations between the DRV and Cambodia is announced by VNA on the 28th--the same day that the DRV-PRG staff personnel arrived in Hanoi. VNA points out that in view of the developments since 18 March and the "feverish anti-Vietnamese campaign in Phnom Penh and a number of other places in Cambodia," the DRV has decided to "temporarily" suspend "all activities" of the DRV Embassy, commercial representation, and the VNA bureau in Phnom Penh and recall the staff of these organs.

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On the same day Hanoi radio also reports that in compliance with a decision of the PRG, the PRG Embassy temporarily suspended relations with Phnom Penh. The radio also says that Premier Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on the 28th welcomed the returning North Vietnamese personnel and greeted the PRG embassy and LPA bureau personnel who stopped in Hanoi "on their way back to South Vietnam."

An LPA commentary carried by Liberation Radio on the 27th said that the temporary suspension of activities of Vietnamese organs in Phnom Penh "does not at all mean that relations between Vietnam and Cambodia are cut off." On the contrary, it adds, these relations "will be strengthened more than ever, directing the spearhead of attacks on the common enemies--the U.S. imperialists and their country-selling lackeys."

The reported maltreatment of Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia is the subject of a 29 March DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. The statement "strongly" protests the "illegal" acts against Vietnamese nationals and demands that Phnom Penh cease them.

SIHANOUK-VIETNAMESE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES REPORTED

DRV, Liberation Front, as well as Chinese media all carry an exchange of messages, released by Sihanouk in Peking on the 26th, with DRV and Front leaders. NCNA as a rule initially publicizes the messages while Hanoi and Liberation media subsequently carry them. Thus, on the 26th NCNA publicizes messages of support sent to Sihanouk by Pham Van Dong on the 19th and Nguyen Huu Tho-Huynh Tan Phat on the 20th, respectively, and at the same time, carries the Prince's reply messages of thanks dated the 21st and 24th. Vietnamese communist media carry them on the 26th.

The same procedure is generally followed when Prince Sihanouk sent followup messages to Pham Van Dong (dated the 26th) and the PRG leaders (dated the 28th) thanking them for their respective government statements. Peking, followed by Vietnamese media, publicize these messages.

PRC BROADCASTS RECORD VOLUME, BUT NO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS

Despite the voluminous Peking attention to Cambodia,* there is little independent Chinese comment. Of the 1,700-odd items on Cambodia during

* During the past five years Peking has only on a half dozen occasions devoted more than half of its weekly comment to a single international issue: the Vietnam war has exceeded 50 percent of total Peking comment during four different weeks since February 1965, and most recently the Tet offensive in February 1968 accounted for 63 percent of total weekly comment; and during two weeks in March 1969 Peking devoted 54 and 77 percent of its weekly totals to the Sino-Soviet border dispute.

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the week--comprising 52 percent of Peking's total weekly comment--more than 40 percent is accounted for by reports of foreign reaction to developments, particularly reaction from Hanoi. Along with support for Sihanouk, Peking propaganda stresses alleged U.S. involvement in the ouster and the new government's pro-American slant.

NCNA on the 26th and 27th discusses both the alleged previous American attempts to undermine Cambodian independence and the "behind-the-scenes" U.S. machinations in sponsoring the 18 March removal of Prince Sihanouk. NCNA comments in its 27 March report that in the face of the U.S. "crimes of unbridled aggression," the Indochinese peoples "will unite more closely and fight to the end to smash all the plots and plans of aggression by U.S. imperialism in Indochina, and drive U.S. imperialism out of Indochina."

On the 27th, twice on the 30th, and on the 31st, NCNA notes reports of pro-Sihanouk demonstrations in Cambodia. On the 27th, NCNA cites Western press accounts of what it describes as the growing "mass struggle against the rightwing group." On the 30th, NCNA says that the demonstrations are spreading and, without citing any source, claims that "some 10,000 peasants and workers" reportedly demonstrated against the Lon Nol regime in Takeo Province. It adds that "impressive mass demonstrations broke out" in many areas of Prey Veng, Kratie and Kandal provinces and comments that the Cambodian struggle "is in an excellent position." Also on the 30th, NCNA notes reports of the Lon Nol government's stated intention to enlarge the Cambodian Armed Forces in the face of the "mounting discontent and resistance of the Cambodian people," according to NCNA. It adds that the Lon Nol regime is "sitting on a volcano" and that its attempts to "suppress the people's resistance by enlarging the armed forces can only bring about greater struggle of the Cambodian people." On the 31st, NCNA says that the "surging struggle" against the government is "gaining momentum and dealing telling blows at the clique."

On the 30th, NCNA transmits a report--also widely broadcast by Peking radio--relaying the Chinese Foreign Ministry's denial of a "rumor" attributed to Cambodian National Assembly deputy Trinh Hoan, who according to UPI said that the Cambodian Ambassador to China had asserted that the Chinese Foreign Ministry was reportedly "embarrassed" by Sihanouk's presence there. NCNA brands the report as a "sheer rumor spread with ulterior motives," one of which, it says, is aimed at "driving a wedge between China and Cambodian Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk." NCNA adds that "the solemn stand taken by the Chinese people in support of Cambodian Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is well-known. Nobody can undermine the profound friendship between the Chinese people and the Cambodian people." This is the strongest expression of support to date, but it seems noteworthy that it is credited to the Chinese "people," not the government.

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CAMBODIAN "COLLUSION" WITH U.S. ALLIES NCNA on 30 March discusses the departure of the new Cambodian government away from Sihanouk's policy of peace, independence, nonalignment, and maintenance of territorial integrity and says the Lon Nol regime is acting in "collusion with the U.S. lackeys in South Vietnam, Thailand, and other areas." NCNA cites GVN President Thieu's reported interest--in NCNA's words--of "collaborating militarily with the Cambodian coup clique to oppose jointly the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces," and NCNA says that "in fact" such military cooperation is "being intensified daily and has become more and more brazen." NCNA comments that "facts" show it was "sheer humbug" on the part of the new Cambodian government to declare its adherence to the policy of independence, peace, strict neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity. "Even western news agencies and papers admitted," NCNA adds, "that the coup clique in Cambodia had forced Cambodia to 'go into the American camp.'" NCNA on the 31st notes press reports that the Cambodian authorities are "eagerly begging" for U.S. military aid in "suppressing" the Cambodian people with U.S. weapons.

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LAOS

NLHX SUSTAINS ATTENTION TO PEACE PROPOSALS, U.S. "COMPLICITY"

Pathet Lao propaganda continues to press the NLHX five-point peace proposal of 6 March as the basis for a political settlement in Laos and to assail what it views as U.S. "aggression" in complicity with Thailand and the forces of Prince Souvanna Phouma. A 31 March Radio Pathet Lao broadcast reports that Souphanouvong's emissary, who had delivered a message on the peace proposals to Souvanna in Vientiane, returned to Sam Neua on the 29th. The broadcast says that while the emissary was carrying out his duties in Vientiane, "the U.S. imperialists and their hirelings mobilized many types of U.S. war-planes, including B-52's, to continuously bomb and strafe the Laotian free zones" and they "arrogantly sent more Thai troops to Laos." At the same time, the broadcast observes, Souvanna has not yet answered Souphanouvong's message and this "clearly shows that he and his men are ignoring the NLHX proposal to solve the Laotian question [and] have not ceased serving the aggressive U.S. schemes in Laos." Pathet Lao media apparently have not yet reported the 30 March decision of the Lao National Assembly to support the "idea of conversations" with the Pathet Lao without advance conditions.

A NLHX Central Committee statement on the 27th formally protests the use of B-52's in Laos,* citing instances dating from 17 February when these aircraft were employed in "saturation bombings" allegedly resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians. Endorsing the five-point peace proposal, the statement stresses that the United States must stop escalating the war in Laos and unconditionally halt the bombing of Laotian territory. On the 23d, NLHX Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, in an "urgent message" to the Geneva conference cochairmen, focused on the Thai involvement. This message too took note of the five-point peace proposal.

SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK Radio Pathet Lao reports Sihanouk's 25 and 29 March messages to Souphanouvong in which he spoke of a "united front" of Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese peoples against "imperialist oppression." And an NLHX Central Committee statement on 27 March, reported by KPL on the 28th and by Radio Pathet Lao on the 30th, discourses at some length on developments in Indochina, including the allegedly U.S.-engineered overthrow of Sihanouk on 18 March. The document welcomes Sihanouk's 20 and 23 March statements in which he "called on all Khmer people to unite and rise up to overthrow the reactionary clique." Noting the long-standing friendly

* KPL, in reporting the statement on the 28th, says it was issued on 27 March; Hanoi's VNA on the 30th, and NCNA on the 1st, however, indicate that it was issued on 26 March.

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relations of the NLHX with Cambodia, the Central Committee statement says that "the Laotian people and the NLHX will make every effort to support the Khmer people's just struggle as Cambodian Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk set forth in his 23 March statement." The Laotian people and the NLHX, the statement adds, will deal punishing blows against the U.S. aggressors and their allies in Laos "in order to protect the Laotian free zones and contribute to the Khmer and the Vietnamese peoples' efforts in the liberation struggle against the common enemy." The statement concludes that the Khmer people will join with the Laotian and Vietnamese peoples to carry out the struggle against "U.S. imperialism and its henchmen."

DRV TROOPS An adamant denial of the presence of DRV troops in Laos is issued by Sot Pretasi, the head of the Pathet Lao mission in Vientiane, on 29 March. In an interview published in Tokyo's SANKEI on 30 March, Sot Pretasi labels as U.S. fabrications the contentions "that a Ho Chi Minh trail runs through Laos, that North Vietnamese regulars are in Laos, and that North Vietnamese troops have been taken captive in Laos." Washington has "cooked up such unfounded rumors," he says, to camouflage its war of aggression in Laos.

PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY WARNS OF POSSIBLE COUNTERACTION

Peking's most substantial and authoritative treatment to date of current developments in Laos comes in the form of a 26 March Foreign Ministry statement voicing the "firm support" of the Chinese Government and people for the Laotian people. The last Chinese Foreign Ministry statement related to Laos, on 29 March 1968, protested U.S. bombing of the premises of the PRC's economic and cultural delegation in Khang Khay. The current statement, pegged to the 21 March NLHX Central Committee statement, assails the "criminal acts" of U.S. imperialism and the "reactionary" Thai authorities who have sent more "accomplice troops into Laos in the service of the United States."

The foreign ministry statement puts the Laotian conflict in the broader context of an Indochinese struggle, asserting that the "war of aggression" in Laos is related to the "Vietnamization" of the war in Vietnam and observing that "U.S. imperialism is the root cause of all aggression, intervention, and subversion in Indochina and the implacable enemy of the Indochinese peoples." The Chinese Government and people, the statement says, are closely watching the development "of the whole series of grave events" in which U.S. imperialism is stepping up intervention and the expansion of its war of aggression in Laos, Cambodia, and other parts of Southeast Asia.

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The statement observes that Laos is "China's close neighbor"* and warns that the Chinese people "absolutely will not sit idly by while U.S. imperialism acts wantonly in Laos." The vague threat of "not sitting idly by" has not appeared in Peking's elite propaganda on Laos in recent years. It was used with some frequency through 1964, however, in warning about encroachments against both "Indochina" generally and Laos specifically. The threat of not sitting idly by has also appeared in elite comment on Vietnam, Cambodia--but not during the current crisis--and Indonesia.

The last elite usage of the phrase in connection with Laos was by Chou En-lai in his 30 December 1964 report to the National People's Congress.** After condemning U.S. "aggression" in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, Chou said that "if the United States enlarges the war in Indochina, China will absolutely not sit idly by." A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 16 June 1963 on U.S. "aggression" in Laos, noting that China is a "next-door neighbor" to Laos, said that the PRC "will not look on idly while others violate the Geneva agreements, interfere in Laotian affairs, and threaten China's security." Chen I in an April 1961 press conference in Djakarta said that if SEATO troops are sent to take part in the civil war in Laos and "if the Chinese Government is requested by the legal government headed by Prince Souvanna, we will not remain idle." Chen I went on to warn against the use of "the 7,000 troops of the Chiang Kai-shek clique now concentrated in the vicinity of Luang Prabang," and recalled that the PRC "sent our volunteers to take part in the Korean war" when U.S. forces approached the Yalu River and when the United States sent forces to "occupy our territory of Taiwan."

OTHER COMMENT In addition to the widely broadcast Foreign Ministry statement, Kuo Mo-jo in a 24 March banquet speech for a visiting Japanese delegation also touches on the Laotian situation. Including Laos among those Asian countries which have suffered from imperialist aggression, he calls for strengthened unity

* On at least one other occasion during the current crisis Peking has noted that military actions are taking place near the Chinese frontiers: NCNA on 13 March said that American airmen fly support missions in "liberated areas" and in "areas close to the borders of China and the DRV."

** Three months later, in an interview with Edgar Snow, Chou said that China "will not stand by with its arms crossed" if the United States intends to conquer Indochina; his remarks, as carried on a Swiss television broadcast, did not include a reference to Laos specifically.

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of "the people of China and Japan, the countries in Indochina and other Asian countries" in order to "deal crushing blows to the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries for their new scheme of aggression in Asia."

Otherwise, Peking gives minimal attention to Laos. It continues to publicize the "victories" of the Laotian patriotic forces and to assail U.S. and Thai involvement. It maintains its silence on the substance of the NLHX peace proposal of 6 March. NCNA on the 31st does, however, note that a Radio Pathet Lao commentary the day before had "pointed out that after the Laotian Patriotic Front issued a statement recently on solving the Laotian problem, U.S. imperialism again sent more Thai accomplice troops into Laos." The 8 March NCNA report of the 6 March NLHX statement had also avoided acknowledging the fact that a peace program was outlined: It said only that the NLHX statement called for a settlement of the Laos problem "by the parties concerned" and demanded that the United States stop escalating the war and unconditionally stop the bombing "to create conditions for the Laotian parties concerned to meet."

NCNA on the 26th carries the text of Sihanouk's message to Souphanouvong in which the former stated that the "Khmer people and I myself have no other way out but to join the Laotian and Vietnamese people in forming a united front of struggle for completely liberating our three countries from oppression by the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys." And on the 29th, NCNA transmits Sihanouk's second message to Souphanouvong welcoming a 27 March NLHX Central Committee statement on developments in Indochina as encouragement to the Khmer people.

DRV PRESS SUPPORTS PEACE PROPOSAL, SUSTAINS ATTACK ON U.S.

Hanoi continues to attack U.S. involvement in the Laotian situation, with current comment being highlighted by articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Both articles, on the 27th and 29th, respectively, are critical of Secretary Laird's remarks on plans for the continuation of bombing in Laos and of Administration spokesmen's warnings of the possible introduction of U.S. ground forces. And both deplore the presence of Thai troops dispatched by the "U.S. imperialists."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, which is broadcast by Hanoi's domestic service, indicates continuing DRV support for the five-point NLHX peace proposal in noting that Souvanna Phouma, "on U.S. orders," refuses to accept the "logical and reasonable" peace plan. Citing AP, the article concludes that Souvanna continues to "shamelessly deny that there are Thai aggressors in Laos, and indicates that he will reject the Pathet Lao's proposal for an unconditional and total halt to U.S. bombings in Laos."

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VNA on the 28th reports that Souphanouvong's emissary to Vientiane was greeted during a brief stopover in Hanoi by DRV and Pathet Lao officials en route to Sam Neua. He told a VNA reporter, the dispatch says, that he had stayed in Vientiane for more than a week waiting for Souvanna's reply to the NLHX peace proposal, but his wait was "to no avail."

USSR ATTACKS U.S. ROLE, REFERS TO PRC INVOLVEMENT

Moscow propaganda continues to endorse the NLHX plan for a peaceful settlement in Laos and sustains its attack on U.S. involvement as an extension of the "aggression" in Vietnam and an attempt to exercise control in all of Indochina. A Radio Moscow commentary for North American listeners on the 29th, for example, cites Western news reports for the observations that "the war in Vietnam has spread to Laos" and that "there is a real prospect of the Vietnam war developing into another Indochina war like the one that ended in 1954." The same commentary says that developments in Laos "are beginning to resemble the first months of the escalation of the dirty war in Vietnam. There is the same sliding into war, the same denials, admissions, and misinformation." And the commentary concludes that Washington wants the people of Indochina "to give up neutrality."

TASS on the 29th reports that White House press secretary Ziegler has indicated that the U.S. command in South Vietnam "has a right to sanction the invasion of U.S. troops into the territory of Cambodia and Laos in case a military need arises." This statement, TASS observes, "corroborates the apprehensions that Washington's policies in Southeast Asia are fraught with the spread of war flames over to the territories of countries bordering on South Vietnam."

IZVESTIYA commentator Osipov, in an article in that paper on the 27th, says that the "sum total of recent reports from Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam gives rise to reflections such as the fact that the Washington Administration is still not content with its aims of establishing its system only in South Vietnam, but has decided to overturn the entire system of the 1954 Geneva agreements."

PRC PRESENCE The Chinese presence in Laos is mentioned in an article in NEW TIMES (No. 12, 19 March). It says that in January and March 1970 representatives of the Vientiane government "publicly admitted that that government is now worried about 'the construction of a highway which is being carried out by the Chinese' in northern Laos 'under the protection of six battalions of the Chinese Army.'" The article goes on to state that the half-brother of the Laotian king told a New York TIMES correspondent "that a provisional

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'line' has been established for the U.S. Air Force in northern Laos 'beyond which the United States does not carry out bombing in Laos.'" And it concludes by citing a West German paper for the observation that China has long considered Laos "'as some kind of zone of its own influence. The Laotian problem could serve as a first point for the . . . game between Washington and Peking.'" "

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

RED STAR CITES "PROVOCATIVE NATURE" OF PRC BORDER ACTIONS

The atmosphere surrounding the Peking talks has become still darker as the Soviet polemical campaign moves across a broad front. Following up earlier Soviet attacks on the PRC's war preparations campaign, the military paper RED STAR on 31 March accuses the Chinese of undertaking "openly provocative" military measures along the Soviet and Mongolian borders and expresses indignation over Peking's anti-Soviet campaign. The thrust of RED STAR's attack seems aimed at bolstering Moscow's position within the communist movement, an interest also reflected in a SOVIET RUSSIA article on 28 March criticizing Peking's schismatic line and a PRAVDA article by Poland's Gomulka on 31 March denouncing Peking for dividing the socialist camp. At the same time two of Moscow's allies, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, have gone on record in a joint communique signed in Ulan Bator deploring the effect on the communist cause of Chinese policies.

In one of Peking's occasional polemical sallies against the Soviets, a lengthy NCNA commentary on 24 March represents the first Chinese attack on Soviet internal policies since the talks began. The commentary is aimed at a particularly sensitive point in detailing Soviet economic woes and playing on widespread speculation over a consequent Kremlin leadership crisis.

MOSCOW Highlighting extensive Soviet press attention to China, the 31 March RED STAR article, signed by Col. I. Makarov, dwells on what is described as widespread Chinese military activities along the Soviet and Mongolian borders. As in other Soviet comment on Chinese war preparations, RED STAR seems intent on building a case proving Chinese provocation and Soviet restraint as the Peking talks drag on without any signs of movement. The article mentions the talks at the outset, observing that alleged Western efforts to aggravate Sino-Soviet relations intensified after the opening of the talks. Again reflecting Soviet sensitivity over appearing to be the intransigent and bullying party in the talks, the article objects to reports that the Soviets have concentrated military forces, including nuclear missile forces, against China in order to exert pressure at the talks. It offers an assurance--along the lines of the 14 March TASS statement and a 17 March Mandarin broadcast noting that the "Dvina" maneuvers did not take place along the Sino-Soviet border--that Soviet troops in the Far East and Central Asia are carrying out routine duties "within the framework of the usual plans and programs." Peking "cannot help knowing this too," the paper adds.

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RED STAR had previously discussed Chinese war preparations in a 21 January article which, while discounting Peking's present ability to mount an attack, called attention to the PRC's military development and its nuclear potential. In now presenting the Soviet defense posture, RED STAR declares that the Soviets "are not to be frightened by any threats or provocations" and will not indulge in saber-rattling or pressure tactics. Peking's "adventurist, chauvinist" line, the article concludes, is inflicting great harm to the socialist camp* and creating "a real threat to the Chinese people themselves." There is no mention of a threat to socialism in China.

Chinese damage to the communist cause is also the subject of a 28 March SOVIET RUSSIA article accusing the Maoists of dividing the socialist and revolutionary movements. Echoing a charge raised during the full-scale polemical campaigns prior to the opening of the talks, the article claims that the Chinese have opened "a second front" against the socialist countries and calls for a "resolute" struggle on this front. At a time of turbulent upheaval in Southeast Asia, SOVIET RUSSIA blames the Chinese for the "tragedy" that befell the Indonesian communists and for urging the Burmese communists to rise in arms against the Ne Win regime.

An attempt to rally the communist movement around Moscow's banner is reflected in Soviet press reports of other parties' attacks on Peking. The 31 March PRAVDA reported the Czechoslovak-MPR communique deploring Peking's policies and carried an article by Gomulka condemning the Chinese for splitting the communist ranks. On the 30th PRAVDA quoted the Luxembourg CP chairman as denouncing Mao as a heretic.

The extensive Soviet press comment on China includes a number of items on internal developments in the PRC and commentaries implying U.S.-Chinese collusion in anti-Soviet activities. A 25 March LITERARY GAZETTE article describes the continuing effects of the cultural revolution--characterized as "a Mao Tse-tung plot against everything that threatens his absolute rule and the military-bureaucratic dictatorship"; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the 26th exploits Chinese press material to depict the plight of Chinese education and youth; and a 27 March TASS report, carried in the daily press, claims that

* The 15 February PRAVDA article by Tikhvinskiy on Sino-Soviet relations also referred to the "socialist camp." Moscow appears to use the term "socialist community" to refer to the Soviet sphere of influence in East Europe while invoking the notion of a camp when discussing China's role.

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a new wave of public trials and executions in China to exterminate Mao's political opponents reflects "inner strife in the Maoist camp." SOVIET RUSSIA on 29 March, carrying its second article on China in two days, attacks current Chinese calls for a new "great leap forward" as being made in the name of preparations for war against the Soviet Union. LITERARY GAZETTE on the 25th and NEW TIMES (No. 13, 26 March) carried articles discussing the implications of a U.S.-PRC rapprochement.

PEKING The gleeful portrayal of Soviet economic troubles in the 24 March NCNA commentary--which was also broadcast in Radio Peking's Russian service--comes at a time of widespread speculation about challenges to the Brezhnev leadership resulting from dissatisfaction over the regime's economic performance. Taking note of Brezhnev's unpublished speech to the CPSU Central Committee plenum last December and the sober assessment of the economic situation given by PRAVDA in an editorial on 13 January, NCNA claimed that "grave economic difficulties" are "striking terror into the Soviet revisionist renegade clique." As in other polemical attacks on the Soviets since the opening of talks--attacks which were heretofore confined to international issues--the commentary denounced Brezhnev by name, and it concluded from the disarray in economic policy that "still fiercer strife" has developed within the Soviet leadership. Purges of lower-level officials have been instituted to absolve the leadership of blame, according to NCNA.

NCNA on 31 March returned to the attack by denouncing the "Brezhnev renegade clique" for selling out Soviet airspace by granting Japan an air route over Siberia. The report mentions a letter transmitted to the Japanese premier from "Soviet revisionist chieftain Kosygin"--a standard formulation when referring to a Soviet leader individually. In contrast to the Albanians and to Peking's own practice before last year, in which the Kremlin leadership was termed the "Brezhnev-Kosygin clique," Peking identifies the Soviet collective leadership with Brezhnev personally.

Typically, Moscow has used its Mandarin service to reply to the Chinese on a sensitive issue. In responding to NCNA's commentary on the Soviet economy, a Mandarin broadcast on 26 March sought to combine a defense of Soviet economic performance with a denigration of the Chinese economy; not unexpectedly, it avoided the question of Soviet leadership conflict.

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SINO-BURMESE RELATIONS

BURMESE INSURGENCY ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY PRC RESTRAINT

Peking's treatment of the 22d anniversary of the launching of the communist insurgency in Burma reflects a notably milder attitude toward the Ne Win government than the harsh attacks on the same occasion last year. Peking's handling of this anniversary accords with other recent indications that the PRC, while continuing its low-profile publicity for the armed struggle led by the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), is exercising a studied restraint toward the Ne Win government.

Peking propaganda on the 1969 anniversary of the Burmese communist insurgency employed the phrase "the Ne Win fascist regime," as did comment last August on the BCP's 30th anniversary. But since that time Peking's appellations have become progressively milder. Thus, a 9 October 1969 message from the CCP to the BCP referred to "the Ne Win military government," and a 28 November NCNA report referred only to "the reactionary government" without mentioning Ne Win. An NCNA article on 21 February this year, like those pegged to the current anniversary, limited its target to "Burmese reactionaries" and omitted any mention of Ne Win.

Peking marks the 22d anniversary on 28 March with several NCNA articles detailing recent actions of the BCP-led insurgents. A commentary in NCNA's "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield Column" on the 27th, broadcast in Burmese on the 28th, cites past successes and paints an optimistic future, but tempers this with a warning of hard times for the Burmese insurgents. The article observes that in 22 years of hard struggle the Burmese people have won "outstanding achievements," have successfully warded off the threats of "imperialism, revisionism, and reaction," and have "further expanded their revolutionary bases." But, tempering a forecast that the revolutionary situation in Burma "is getting better and better" with the warning that Burmese revolutionaries "will encounter various difficulties," the article offers the Maoist prescription that in order to attain final victory, the Burmese revolutionaries must "continue to display the spirit of waging hard and protracted struggle and persevere in their armed struggle under the leadership of the BCP." A 28 March NCNA article details successful attacks during the past year, giving credit separately to "the Burmese people's armed forces led by the BCP" and the "people's armed forces of various nationalities."

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Although NCNA acknowledges expressions of foreign communist support to the Burmese insurgents, it avoids implying any aid for the BCP by the PRC itself, and it omits any direct expression of Chinese support for its armed struggle. Thus, NCNA disseminates on the 29th an article from the Albanian newspaper BASHKIMI asserting that the Burmese armed struggle has "entered a new and higher stage and a new and greater tide is emerging" and claiming that Burmese "patriots" now control "a large part of the country." The Albanian article extended the Albanian people's "most cordial revolutionary greetings" to the Burmese people and wished them success in their struggles. A 30 March NCNA review of an item from the clandestine radio "Voice of the People of Thailand" includes assurances that the people of Thailand "led by the Communist Party of Thailand" would "unite and fight shoulder to shoulder" with the Burmese people.

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P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

CONGRESS ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL CALLS FOR CONTINUED STRUGGLE

A 1 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the first anniversary of the opening of the CCP Ninth Congress indicates that despite the advances made over the past year the struggle must continue on all fronts--political, economic, and international. Although a new party constitution has been in effect for nearly a year and the party organization is being rebuilt, the key to action is still, as during the cultural revolution, "acting according to Chairman Mao's instructions." (There has been no new release of instructions since 1 January, and those released at that time were not new.) Noting persistent dangers from factionalism and anarchism, the editorial calls for restudy of the congress documents, including the speeches by Mao never released in open media.

A 29 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial sounded a similar activist theme on the industrial front, calling for "self-reliance and arduous struggle" even though "a new high tide in industrial production is rising vigorously throughout the country." Like a 7 March editorial on agriculture carried by PEOPLE'S DAILY, the editorial warns that the class struggle is continuing in the economic realm and that each unit must strive to avoid waste and rely on its own efforts and not on the state. In urging efforts to fulfill "this year's plan for industrial production," the editorial invokes the Anshan Constitution, whose 10th anniversary has been widely hailed. The Anshan program calls for party control over enterprises, with a mass voice in decisions, and opposes the system of "one-man management" said to have been favored by Liu Shao-chi. The editorial, admitting that Liu's ideas "still perniciously influence the minds of some of our comrades," points out to them the current line that poorly equipped, small factories can turn out quality products by abandoning foreign conventions and using native ingenuity.

* * *

Shanghai propagandists have been strangely quiet in recent days. While they have gone through periods of dullness and unoriginality previously, they have normally had something to say about local affairs on an almost-daily basis. The Shanghai radio's morning press review has contained little but repeats of NCNA reportage over the past 10 days. The program's last item of a nonroutine nature, on 17 March, reviewed the first of an announced series of articles in Shanghai's LIBERATION DAILY on exchange of experience in building

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basic-level party organizations. Since the Ninth Congress, judging by published accounts of the formation of new party organs, Shanghai has been one of the less active areas in party reconstruction.

* * *

On 31 March, the Harbin radio hailed the fine situation in Hulunpeierh meng, placing it in "our province." There were previous indications in the media that Inner Mongolia had been stripped of its three northeastern meng, but no outright statement of this sort. While the Harbin item implies that the entire meng is now part of Heilungkiang, some broadcast evidence has indicated that Tuchuan county, the southernmost area of the meng, has been attached to Chelimu meng, now apparently part of Kirin province.

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BERLIN AND GERMANY

MOSCOW DOWNPLAYS FOUR-POWER TALKS, GDR DENIES WESTERN RIGHTS

East German media seize upon the opening of the four-power talks on Berlin on 26 March as an occasion to issue an authoritative denial of Western rights in Berlin, in sharp contrast to the virtual silence on these talks in Soviet media. Both East Berlin and Moscow propaganda continue a low-key campaign to promote West German recognition of the GDR "under international law" in the wake of the Erfurt summit, with some comment attributing Brandt's reluctance to take bolder steps to his concern about U.S. interests and his upcoming Washington visit. Followup comments on the Erfurt meeting by various East European media indicate the persistence of varied viewpoints toward the FRG's new Ostpolitik.

MINIMAL PUBLICITY FOR BERLIN TALKS Soviet and East German media on 26 March acknowledge briefly and factually the opening of the first four-power Berlin talks since 1959. Virtually identical items from TASS and ADN call the talks "an exchange of views on West Berlin" and recall that the ambassadors of the three Western powers "are simultaneously heads of the military administration" of these powers in West Berlin. Followup reports from the same sources late on the 26th stop referring to "West Berlin" as the subject, noting instead that the first meetings are devoted to "clarification of the standpoints of the parties," according to the TASS English service. Although the USSR, as a direct participant in the talks, would seem to have better news sources on them than the GDR, which is not a participant, TASS attributes its report to ADN, as though thereby to enhance the GDR's authority over Berlin and stress USSR-GDR unity. The TASS English account is the fullest provided by Soviet media and the USSR's only one to point out that the ambassadors agreed to keep the meetings "confidential" and provide "minimum coverage on their course." Published reports in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and some other central papers on the 27th (the talks were ignored by RED STAR, among others) are far more sketchy and buried on inside foreign news pages, as a rule. There is no Soviet comment on the talks.

HARDTKE ARTICLE DISPUTES "RIGHTS" A forceful presentation of traditional GDR arguments denying any "four-power responsibility" for Germany as a whole or Berlin is offered in a lengthy 25 March BERLINER ZEITUNG article signed by G. R. Hardtke. While making no specific reference to the new series of ambassador-level talks opening the next day, the article clearly is intended as an authoritative restatement of the GDR's views on any "West Berlin" questions to be discussed. Hardtke retraces at great length the

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historical and legal arguments against any "rights" the Western three powers might possess over all Germany or Berlin. He concedes that "naturally it is impossible to ignore" the fact that "West Berlin is still subjected temporarily to a regime of occupation." He says the concept of West Berlin as "an independent political entity" offers the "best possible" settlement for West Berliners, and notes that the GDR has "repeatedly declared its readiness" to make a "great concession" and "fix the status of West Berlin as an independent political entity in an international treaty."

Following in general terms the traditional GDR and Soviet line of argument on Berlin, Hardtke charges that "violation" of the Potsdam agreement by the three Western powers "robbed the principle of four-power responsibility of any basis whatsoever." He calls the Paris treaties "immaterial" as regards the "sovereign GDR," and claims that "certain small remnants of regulations" issued by the occupying powers in the initial postwar years "have actually lost their legal basis and today are merely an anachronism" and "cannot alter" the GDR's statements of principle denying any four-power responsibility. Hardtke argues that "the three Western powers never possessed, nor do they possess today, any 'originating' rights to occupy Berlin's western sectors," and he points out that "there are absolutely no agreements" on communications roads for civilian traffic between West Berlin and the Western zones.

Curiously, Hardtke reaches back to the time of Stalin and the 1948 Berlin airlift for his most peremptory denial of Western rights in Berlin--a Soviet Government statement which he says was issued in connection with the "violation" by the Western powers of an agreement on Soviet "monetary sovereignty" over all of Berlin. He quotes the Soviet statement: "Since the three governments have separated West Germany from East Germany, the right of these governments to administer Berlin loses all meaning. By their separatist proceeding in the Western occupation zones of Germany and the three sectors of Berlin, the United States, Great Britain, and France have destroyed the system of the four-power administration of both Germany and Berlin and thus have undermined the legal foundations which secured for them the right to participate in Berlin's administration." Further on he argues that because the USSR transferred its "rights of sovereignty" over "the entire territory of the former occupation zone" to the GDR, "all of Berlin lies on GDR territory."

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GDR ATTACKS While GDR media report the talks in restrained fashion
NATO OFFICE similar to that of Soviet media, they also exploit the
 opportunity presented by the Western suspension of
"temporary travel documents" for GDR citizens traveling in NATO countries--
announced as the talks opened--to denounce this system and the NATO
travel office in West Berlin. The suspension is labeled by NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND on the 28th, according to ADN, as "a long overdue and yet
halfhearted and grudging retreat" on this "notorious and illegal allied
travel office." The paper denies the step was "a sign of consideration
for the sake of easing tension," claiming the "hard pressure of realities"
forced the three powers to suspend the travel office's activities--both
because it had proved unable to prevent "the strengthening of the GDR
and its international standing" and because of "pressure by Bonn."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND alleges that the Western powers "chose" the opening
of the four-power talks to announce the suspension although they "would
have much preferred to pretend that this step was 'a result'" of the talks,
but this "attempt was rightly rejected by the Soviet Union." This is the
only available comment from GDR sources purporting to deal with the
substance of the ambassadors' Berlin discussion. A suggestion that the
GDR had advance knowledge such an announcement was imminent appears in
another NEUES DEUTSCHLAND comment on the 25th, which said it was "high
time" to abolish the travel office.

BRANDT POSITION The question of U.S. influence upon West Germany's
AND U.S. VISIT foreign policy is raised in a 31 March Zakharov
 commentary broadcast by Moscow for German listeners.
Noting that recently Brandt has exhibited "more reserve" regarding the
possible results of the FRG-GDR summit talks, Zakharov suggests "other
motives and causes" may have "altered" Brandt's viewpoint, beyond the
opposition from CDU-CSU Bundestag leaders. Zakharov interprets Brandt's
remarks--that his Washington visit will emphasize mainly "the role of
West Europe, and hence also of the Federal Republic, in U.S. foreign
policy plans"--to mean that Brandt's government "intends to exercise
a function in U.S. foreign policy plans." He adds that such an intention
"obviously cannot help" Bonn remove the "mountains of distrust" in
Europe, if Brandt persists in serving NATO and U.S. policy by his
"nonrecognition of European borders and the GDR." Like other Moscow
followup comment on Erfurt, Zakharov insists that Brandt must offer
"practical confirmation" that his efforts for detente are sincere by
"abandoning the illusion that the GDR allegedly is not a foreign
country to the FRG." PRAVDA correspondent Grigoryev, according to
TASS on the 29th, sees a "new element" in FRG politics arising from
Erfurt, in that the West German public is increasingly leaning toward
"a more sober appraisal of the existing situation" and greater
understanding of the need for "new political decisions and steps"
regarding recognition of the GDR.

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EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA SHOW VARIED REACTION TO ERFURT SUMMIT

The most favorable appraisals of the 19 March Erfurt summit are predictably offered by Yugoslavia and Romania, the only East European socialist states maintaining diplomatic relations with Bonn, while Hungarian media also indicate a relatively positive view. Polish and Czechoslovak media are less sanguine, while limited Bulgarian comment hews closely to the Soviet line. The necessity for FRG recognition of the GDR is stressed repeatedly.

YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA Authoritative Yugoslav foreign ministry comments reported by TANYUG on the 19th and 20th assess Erfurt as "very important and useful" and of potential "great significance" in reaching further agreements between the FRG and the GDR. A Belgrade domestic broadcast on the 20th praises both Brandt and Stoph for their resolve "not to break the contact that was established with such difficulty," and says both leaders "very intensively perceive the limits" for movement in their talks and "want to utilize them." Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu is quoted by AGERPRES in a speech on the 27th as "welcoming" the FRG-GDR talks and expressing hope that "positive results" will emerge from them in the form of recognition of borders, normalizing "inter-European relations," and recognition of the GDR. A pre-summit comment by SCINTEIA, reported by AGERPRES on the 16th, had declared Romania's "extremely positive" view of the fact that "the old immobility, isolation, and rigidity in inter-German relations have been overcome," and had specifically cited the FRG's recent "positive evolution in political life" toward "a realistic and lucid policy."

HUNGARIAN EVALUATION Hungarian press evaluations uniformly stress the "great political importance" of the first summit, according to MTI on the 20th. It adds, in a comment on Brandt's remarks that is manifestly in sharp contradiction to the GDR's own view, that Hungarian press reports "particularly emphasize" Brandt's statement advocating "that we search for those areas in which reciprocal interests make progress possible from the viewpoint of peace and humanity." (GDR commentators and Ulbricht himself have denounced Brandt's emphasis on such "side issues" and "fourth or fifth steps" and his unwillingness to recognize the GDR.) NEPSZABADSAG on 21 March says an awareness "that facts be faced rationally" is "emerging in the FRG at last," while it notes that a "long road" still must be traveled by the FRG if it is to become "a creative element of a European security system." The same paper notes that "both sides" at Erfurt realized their difficulties and also "expressed their willingness to reconcile their dissimilar positions" and move closer at later meetings.

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POLISH, CZECH
VIEWPOINTS

Polish comment on Erfurt reveals evidence of pique at the slow progress of Warsaw's own negotiations with the FRG on trade and political questions. Thus, PAP commentator Guz on the 20th charges that "contrary to the assurances of its chancellor," the FRG is "still chicaning the GDR in countless fields" of political and economic life and must settle "quite a number of matters" if it "really wants" to normalize relations with the GDR. Several Polish comments stress the significance of Brandt's visit to Erfurt itself, a 20 March ZYCIE WARSZAWY commentator calling this "a formal, material expression of recognition of the existence of two states" on German soil and thereby "a great historical victory of the socialist camp." A weekly POLITYKA commentator on the 27th makes the same point but adds that "by coming to Erfurt" Brandt "has proved his political realism" demonstrated in his early policy statements. More typically, most other Polish commentators assert that Brandt must still prove his realism by recognizing Polish borders and the GDR.

Czechoslovak comment, uniformly stressing the need for FRG recognition of the GDR and the theme that Brandt must prove his words by deeds, expresses doubt that he has offered much so far. Bratislava PRAVDA commentator Sliuka notes on the 20th that Brandt failed to make any statement on recognition of the status quo or Europe's present division, but adds hopes that at future talks Brandt will maintain "a more realistic policy." As have previous Czechoslovak comments on Brandt, post-Erfurt evaluations credit him with "a more realistic outlook on facts as they are in Europe" than his predecessors. A SMENA commentator on the 20th ties the Erfurt summit with FRG talks with Moscow and Warsaw, noting that Brandt "needs positive results" from the Moscow talks before his Washington visit so he can meet President Nixon "with at least some sort of success" in his Eastern policy. He terms the Erfurt results "extraordinarily significant" in broader respects than just German internal matters.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL IMPUTES TROTSKIYISM TO LIBERAL REFORMERS

The most serious charge against the 1968 Czechoslovak liberals to date is made in a 28 March RUDE PRAVO editorial by the paper's chief editor, CPCZ Secretariat member Miroslav Moc, who declares in effect that the liberals' deprivations were similar to and worse than those of the alleged 1931 Trotskiyite plot in the Soviet Union. In summarizing the editorial the same day, CTK underscores this central point by citing it both in the lead paragraph and the body of its summary. Moc's authoritative editorial raises the possibility of criminal trials of liberals who have been expelled from the CPCZ--most notably Josef Smrkovsky, whose expulsion was announced on 21 March, and Dubcek, whose "suspension" from the party was announced the same day. The progressive downgrading of Dubcek since April 1969 has followed step by step that of Smrkovsky.

Where the Trotskiyite movement of some 40 years ago was only a plot, Moc notes, similar ideas were actually implemented by the modern "rightists": "In 1931, the Trotskiyite plans for a counterrevolution in the Soviet Union were masked in a slogan of 'political reform' and led to demands for founding a 'new workers party.'" He adds that "we could see a similar process also in our country in 1968, but already put into practice and adapted to present conditions."

All but branding the Dubcek liberalization directly with the Trotskiyite label, Moc says "it is not difficult to determine its roots and unoriginal character," recalling that the "utopian" Trotskiyite plot's "theory of 'antibureaucratism' [also employed as the main line of attack against Novotny in 1968] influenced the final transition of its exponents to the platform of open, militant anticommunism." Presaging further intensification of the purge, the editorial adds that "only in the future shall we be able to assess and express in figures what 1968 had cost us, when opportunism had allowed counterrevolution to turn self-criticism into a murderous weapon." It extols the "cleansing political process" currently being carried out through the exchange of party membership cards.

Soviet broadcast media have not so far been heard to mention the Moc editorial. They have in the past manifested caution regarding a "Trotskiyite" role in the Czechoslovak liberalization. Soviet media did not mention an alleged Trotskiyite plot surfaced by Prague media in January which purportedly had aimed, with Western aid, at hampering the post-invasion "normalization" process and which had allegedly played a major role in the August 1969 riots on the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. Prague's publicity for the January "plot" did not--unlike the present RUDE PRAVO editorial--impute Trotskiyism to the whole 1968 liberalization movement itself.

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SMRKOVSKY ATTACKED
IN RADIO TALKS

The catalog of charges against Smrkovsky is spelled out in a series of two talks carried in the Prague domestic service on 28 and 29 March by Karel Janik, entitled "We Are No Longer With You; We Know You Now." The first talk takes a passing swipe at such other expellees from the party as Kriegel, Boruvka, Cisar, Mlynar, and Spacek in leading up to its main attack on "a politician who became the prototype for myths and illusions--Josef Smrkovsky." The second talk winds up with the ultimate charge that Smrkovsky's transgressions "were tantamount to a betrayal of the party."

Smrkovsky's continued popularity, as manifested by the fact that he still "hands out his autographs," is revealed anew as a major sore point to the conservatives through Janik's efforts to demonstrate Smrkovsky's rank opportunism and consequent unworthiness of such popularity. Among other things, the commentator charges that the fallen liberal leader, despite his imprisonment in the 1950's, was "one of the obedient crowd surrounding Novotny" and, before the January 1968 plenum which ousted Novotny as party leader, "offered his personal help in exchange for one of the offices held by Novotny." After the latter "rebuffed" him, Smrkovsky "joined the so-called men of January." The commentator also points out that the "two-faced" leader had initially condemned the ultraliberal "2,000 Words" document of June 1968, an attitude which brought him "into conflict with the journalists and pseudopoliticians," including "Dubcek, Cernik, and others." Thus, a few days later he publicly "made common cause" with the signatories of "this counterrevolutionary document."

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POLEMIC ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PRAGUE REOPENS DISPUTE WITH BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY

The Czechoslovak party press, which engaged in a heated polemical exchange with the Italian CP press only a month ago,* reopens its controversy with the British CP on 26 March with articles in the party paper RUDE PRAVO and the party youth organ MLADA FRONTA. While the polemic erupting last September between the Czechoslovak and British party press centered mainly on the latter's refusal to accept Czechoslovak materials justifying the August invasion,** the current furor appears to arise chiefly from British criticisms of actions by the present Prague regime.

For example, a RUDE PRAVO article by the paper's London correspondent Dusan Rovensky takes issue with an editorial in the British party paper MORNING STAR on 23 March which decried Dubcek's suspension from the party as an act "bound to arouse concern among communists outside Czechoslovakia," even though the conduct of Czechoslovak party affairs is "a matter for its members to decide." Rovensky in effect reiterates Prague's arguments of last year which implied that MORNING STAR had engaged in a biased evaluation of 1968 developments. "The greatest assistance" the British party press could provide to Czechoslovak communists, he argued, would be to reveal "what forces actually brought Czechoslovakia to the verge of economic and political catastrophe" and to show "the real profile of opportunism and its exponents."

The MLADA FRONTA article rebuts an article from the British CP youth publication COGITO, which is said to have charged that the changes in the Czechoslovak CP leadership last April had resulted from "pressure from outside," and to have made an "insulting" reference to a "Quisling government" which would "have to go." Stating that COGITO even "advises forces hostile to socialism [in Czechoslovakia] how they should proceed," MLADA FRONTA concludes that the British CP

* For a discussion of the polemic with the Italian CP, see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA for 12 March 1970, pages 10-12.

** For a discussion of last year's exchange between the British and the Czechoslovak party press, see the TRENDS of 31 December 1969, pages 24-25, and the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 4 December 1969, pages 18-20.

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"should not remain silent" on this egregious violation of "communist norms." Like previous Prague censures of the British party press, this one alleges that COGITO distorted "the events of August 1968 and the circumstances which led to them" and virtually ignored "the danger of the rightist center." Although MORNING STAR on the 28th carried a brief summary of the RUDE PRAVO and MLADA FRONTA articles, no comment on the Czechoslovak criticisms is available as yet.

Background: Among Moscow and its East European allies, Prague is virtually alone in attempting to rebut the continuing criticisms of Czechoslovak events appearing in some West European CP papers. While Moscow has frequently attacked anti-Soviet West European communist intellectuals repudiated by their own parties, such as the French CP's Roger Garaudy, ousted Austrian CP member Ernst Fischer, and the IL MANIFESTO group expelled from the Italian CP, it has not acknowledged the continuing criticisms of the Czechoslovak situation appearing in the press of several West European CP's. It evidently prefers to continue to depict the anti-Soviet dissidence in the West European parties that arose from the August 1968 invasion as being confined to only a few isolated heretics.

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ROMANIA AND USSR

ROMANIA REAFFIRMS RIGHT TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

An article in the Romanian party monthly LUPTA DE CLASA and a speech by Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu, both publicized on 28 March, register new Romanian defiance to Soviet integrationist pressures by reasserting the country's right to control its own armed forces, economic resources, and relations with other states.

From the Soviet side, another apparent salvo in the latest round of propaganda pressures against Bucharest is fired by Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Yakubovskiy in an article in KOMMUNIST No. 5, which escalates the Soviet line on the need to strengthen "collective" defense measures in the face of a growing imperialist threat. In the context of discussing the need to strengthen the Warsaw Pact, the article, as reviewed by TASS on 31 March, points out that "the concern for strengthening defenses is not only a national task of one or another socialist state but a matter of vital concern to the entire community." The TASS account singles out for direct quotation Yakubovskiy's blunt warning that "any weakening of this unity, even the slightest disregard for our common internationalist interests as far as the military defense of socialism is concerned, is inadmissible." The implications of such language for Romania seem to be clear.

ARTICLE IN LUPTA DE CLASA A lengthy article in the Romanian Communist Party theoretical monthly LUPTA DE CLASA, as summarized by AGERPRES on 28 March, vigorously rejects any view of proletarian internationalism that limits national sovereignty and pointedly reaffirms Romania's right to develop relations with socialist countries outside the Soviet bloc. It also reaffirms each state's right to control its own armed forces* and to use its natural resources as it sees fit. The article does not name the Soviet Union, but appears to be responsive to Soviet pressures for economic and military integration. It may also be read as a defense of Romania's apparent continuing reluctance to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its soil and its refusal to abandon its neutralist posture on the Sino-Soviet dispute at a time when Moscow is trying to organize its East European allies to meet the Chinese challenge.

* President Ceausescu, addressing military commanders and staff officers on 5 February, had expressed the same view in underlining that membership in the Warsaw Pact did not compromise Romania's right to control its own armed forces.

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Entitled "Sovereignty--An Inalienable Attribute of the States in the World Today," the article in effect challenges the Brezhnev doctrine by asserting that "national sovereignty cannot be reckoned as merely an idealistic 'invention,' and an 'abstract,' 'formal,' 'narrow' category of bourgeois law."* Socialist internationalism, it goes on to explain, does not diminish the sovereignty of a socialist state: "The world socialist system is not and cannot be a bloc where individual states weld into a whole, ceasing to exert their powers, their right to independently decide on the problems of domestic development and of international policy."

Asserting Romania's right to economic autonomy despite its membership in CEMA, the journal stresses that national sovereignty "presupposes the exclusive right of the socialist state to exert to the full its prerogatives concerning its national territory, the riches of its soil and subsoil . . . and to freely use all its available resources." It also presupposes the right "to independently exercise command of its armed forces, and to take necessary measures--both individual and collective--for defending the gains of socialism and peace." A belief in Marxism-Leninism and membership in the socialist commonwealth, the article underlines, have "nothing in common with the creation of suprastate bodies or organizations or with a supranational leading center to which prerogatives, responsibilities, or attributes of the individual communist parties or governments of the responsible countries would be transferred."

Mutual assistance and cooperation between states, the article concludes, can only be based on "steadfast observance of the principle of national sovereignty, in the spirit of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states," and can only be concluded by party and "constitutional state bodies of the respective countries"--an apparent reminder that the National Assembly must authorize any Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil.

By implication defending its close ties with the maverick Yugoslavs and its improving relations with the PRC and Albania, the journal insists that cooperation should not be "limited to a restricted group of socialist states, but should be expanded among all the socialist countries."

* Typical of the Soviet propaganda on this subject is a 29 January article in SOVIET RUSSIA by O. Pavlov which observed that the notion of sovereignty is meaningless "merely as a category in international law" divorced from its essential "class content."

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MANESCU SPEECH In a report to the Grand National Assembly on 27 March, Foreign Minister Manescu reiterates a proposal made by Romania at the Geneva disarmament conference on 5 March that would ban maneuvers on the territory of other states. According to a 28 March SCINTEIA account of his remarks, he also reaffirms that Romania is ready to develop "collaboration" with the Warsaw Pact states and to fight with them to repel aggression by "the imperialist" forces unleashed in "Europe" against a member state. He adds that Romania also extends its "collaboration with the armies of all the socialist states"--a familiar Romanian reminder that it has military friends outside the Soviet bloc.

Echoing a theme in the LUPA DE CLASA article, Manescu underlines Romania's "steadfast assertion" of "the right of the people to determine for themselves their fate, the roads of economic and socialist development, to be masters of their resources, and to use these resources for the benefit of their progress and of international collaboration and security."

The only new element in Manescu's report is a more conciliatory posture toward the Arab world, which he alleges has "misunderstood" Romanian policies. The Romanian Government, he says, is making efforts to remove such misunderstandings and is achieving "positive results," adding that "possibilities exist for the full normalization of relations with all the Arab countries." Manescu may have had in mind the signing of a UAR-Romanian five-year trade and payments protocol in Cairo on 5 March. Cairo media treated the event factually, reporting details of the agreement and briefly noting that Nasir received Romanian Foreign Trade Minister Burtica. Bucharest, on the other hand, embellished its accounts: AGERPRES noted the "spirit of cordiality and mutual understanding" in which the sides examined trade and economic relations, and the "constructive spirit" in which the meeting proceeded, while Bucharest radio described the Nasir-Burtica meeting as held "in a cordial and sincere atmosphere." A Romanian effort to improve relations with the Arab world may be interpreted as an effort to ease an area of tension with Moscow on a peripheral issue while remaining steadfast on the more central questions of relations with the PRC and of military and economic integration, questions which go to the heart of the problem of national sovereignty.

ROMANIAN MINISTER IN PEKING As if to underline Romanian determination to pursue good relations with the PRC, Romanian media on 27 March publicized Foreign Trade Minister Burtica's visit to Peking, where he was given high-level attention. Radio Bucharest reported on the 28th that Burtica was received by Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and was later feted at a dinner given by the acting foreign minister which was reportedly held "in an atmosphere of warm friendship." The radio also reported that a new trade pact signed between the two countries calls for "increased and diversified" trade in 1970.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW CALLS PHANTOM DECISION AN ATTEMPT TO PLACATE ARABS

Moscow initiates only a modest amount of comment on the U.S. decision on military and economic aid to Israel. Soviet media note Arab assessments that the decision signifies no change in Washington's commitment to Israel. TASS on the 28th cites the Cairo AL-AHRAM as reporting that the United States and Israel have reached a secret agreement on "deliveries of 'new combat planes from U.S. strategic reserves' to Tel Aviv" early in 1971, under which Israel will receive replacement aircraft for those lost in military operations. And on the 31st TASS reports without comment from Washington that a State Department spokesman said deliveries of U.S. arms, including artillery, armored cars, and spare parts for tanks and combat planes, began in mid-January this year.

Commentators on the Moscow domestic service roundtable program on the 29th pursue the line that the decision is an attempt to placate the Arabs and view it in the context of an attempt to "soften the impression" of U.S. unconditional support for Israel in light of a hardening Arab stance toward U.S. oil interests. A Matveyev article in IZVESTIYA on the 26th assesses the "contradictory" nature of the U.S. decision: If it really meant a rejection of aircraft deliveries to Israel, he says, Washington could be said to show an understanding of the dangerous consequences of further aggravation of the situation. But in fact, he says, the United States is not refusing Israel's request for planes but "reserving it for the very near future." Matveyev acknowledges that Secretary Rogers in his 23 March press conference "proposed talks on limiting arms supplies" to the Middle East, but goes on simply to remark that the Secretary said nothing about Israeli withdrawal, the "primary foundation" for any efforts to normalize the situation. TASS on the 26th also notes without comment that Nasir, in a 24 March speech before the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) parliamentary body, said the United States supports Israel by calling for a restriction on arms deliveries to the Middle East. (TASS omits Nasir's remark that the U.S. call comes at a time when the United States "admits that Israel is by far superior to the Arabs in weapons and air power.")

For its part, Moscow continues to insist on the righteousness of Soviet deliveries of "defensive" arms to the Arabs. A Samilovskiy foreign-language commentary on the 27th declares that "Zionist propaganda" is making a "terrible fuss" about Soviet arms deliveries to the UAR, ignoring the fact that the weapons are supplied "to the victims of aggression and for their self defense." Following the

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established pattern of citing UAR media and spokesmen for reports of military actions, TASS attributes to a UAR Interior Ministry spokesman a report on Israel's 31 March raids "on the northern part of the Nile River delta," targets identified in Israeli accounts as SA-2 missile bases.

USSR INTERESTS IN MIDEAST Moscow again defends the purity of its motives in the Middle East and rejects any notion that it is seeking to further its own interests there.

The Samilovskiy commentary on the 27th accuses "imperialist propaganda" of attempting to foster Arab mistrust of the Soviet Union and "to spread lies about special Soviet interests in the Arab East." He dismisses this "slander" as an effort to cover up the "aggressive plans" of the "imperialists and Zionists" in the area. Moscow also publicizes statements by UAR officials to demonstrate its selfless stance: TASS on the 26th, reporting a statement in Cairo by UAR Ambassador to the Soviet Union Ghalib, says he "emphasized that the Soviet Union pursues no selfish goals" in the region and that he "pointed to the fruitlessness" of "imperialist attempts to sow distrust" in UAR-Soviet relations. On the 29th TASS quotes UAR Vice President as-Sadat as telling a Cairo rally that any attempts to "cast doubt on the noble Soviet attitude toward the UAR only serve the interests of our enemies."

Panelists on the 29 March roundtable program complain of the "remarkable shamelessness" of some American newspapers in asserting that the Soviet Union "is edging its way toward Middle East oil" and therefore is reluctant to see a settlement of the conflict there. Commentator Shragin asserts that the Nasir speech unmasked such attempts to disrupt UAR-Soviet relations. He adds that Nasir said the United States had gone so far as to present the UAR with "an obviously unacceptable plan" for settlement of the crisis and to assert that it had been agreed upon with the Soviet Union and constituted a joint draft of the two powers. Nasir added, says Shragin, that the USSR "certainly does not regard this plan as one which expresses its view." (Nasir actually stated that "the truth became known when we asked the Soviet Union about it; it became clear that it was a U.S. plan and the Soviet Union did not consider it as representing its viewpoint.") Moscow made the same charge earlier, in a Tyssovskiy domestic service commentary on 27 January which claimed that the United States tried to create the impression that the U.S. proposals regarding the UAR and Jordan "were allegedly agreed upon with the Soviet Union," a "falsification" soon exposed by the Arab countries. The TASS account of the Nasir speech does not pick up this passage, although it remarks that Nasir "exposed and ridiculed attempts by the United States and its allies" to drive a wedge in UAR-Soviet relations.

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TASS represents Nasir as stating that the UAR agrees with the Soviet Union on the need for a political solution, but omits his qualifier "if there is a possibility of such a solution," and also his statement that the only alternative to a political solution is to regain Arab rights by force. Nasir also stated that the UAR "fully agrees with the Soviet Union on two points"-- complete Israeli withdrawal and Arab rejection of direct negotiations with Israel. The TASS account dissociates the USSR from the position on direct talks, presenting Nasir as saying there is complete UAR-Soviet accord on a political solution based on complete Israeli withdrawal, and as adding that the Arabs will not yield an inch of their land and will not agree to direct talks with Israel.

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PODGORNY IN IRAN

USSR HAILS BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING PODGORNY VISIT TO IRAN

Moscow gives voluminous publicity to the 25-31 March official visit to Iran by Podgorny, rebroadcasting his speeches at various functions and, as during past Soviet-Iranian visit exchanges, playing up the advantages to Iran of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the positive example this sets for the Middle East. The propaganda highlights Podgorny's visit in Isfahan to the steel mill and a pumping station of the trans-Iranian gas pipeline, projects being undertaken with Soviet assistance; these projects, and the Arak River hydroelectric project, are cited in the communique, and were also featured in material surrounding Kosygin's April 1968 visit to Iran. TASS recounts Podgorny's visit to Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, noting that it is one of the country's oil export centers and that the Soviet guests "welcomed with interest" the Iranian suggestion to visit Kharg and inspect industrial enterprises. Podgorny is not reported as having suggested Soviet readiness to assist Iran in making use of its natural resources of "oil, gas, and nonferrous metals," as Kosygin did during his visit.

Publicity for the visit--nine percent of total comment in the week ending 29 March--considerably exceeds that for Kosygin's April 1968 visit and the Shah's visit to the USSR in October of the same year, the former representing four percent and the latter less than three percent of total comment. The propaganda does not suggest any new developments in bilateral relations emanating from the visit, but the lavish propaganda treatment may conceivably underline a Soviet desire to stake out its interests in Iran in light of the scheduled British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Broadcasts in Persian, which began playing up the impending visit from the time it was announced on 25 February, largely avoided touching on sensitive issues: Only in an 11 March broadcast did Moscow refer to "dangerous" CENTO plans for the region, and comment on 8 and 18 March routinely attacked "imperialist" exploitation of Iranian oil.

Outlining views on various international questions as well as on bilateral relations, the unremarkable communique on the visit, carried by Moscow domestic service on the 31st, falls more in the pattern of the communique on Kosygin's visit than that concluding the Shah's Soviet trip in October 1968. During the Shah's visit, according to that communique, a "useful exchange of opinions" was held on bilateral relations and international problems, but other than a brief reference to the United Nations the communique was confined to bilateral--primarily economic--topics.

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The current communique, like that on Kosygin's visit, sums up views on the Middle East, Vietnam, and colonialism, and additionally touches on a European security conference and disarmament. The views of the sides are said to be identical or close "on a number of problems"; in the April 1968 communique this was rendered "on the problems discussed." One of Moscow's infrequent references to a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East appears in the disarmament passage, in which the sides confirmed that disarmament, as well as "the creation of zones free of nuclear arms, including those in the Near and Middle East," would constitute effective steps toward strengthening international security. The passage on the Middle East conflict reflects Moscow's standard position on implementation of "all provisions" of the November 1967 Security Council resolution and the view that Israeli withdrawal constitutes the "main condition" for a settlement. The sides also call for respecting the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the population of Palestine, and for observance of "relevant UN resolutions," which are not further identified, thus avoiding placing the Soviets on record as subscribing to the cease-fire as well as other UN resolutions.

On bilateral relations, the sides note "with special satisfaction" that the Soviet-Iranian frontier is one of peace and cooperation. Podgorny remarked in a banquet speech on the 25th that there had been no disputed border questions for a long time, and "the questions currently arising" are being resolved, he said, in a spirit of mutual understanding and good neighborliness. The communique also expresses the satisfaction of both sides with successes achieved within the framework of the joint economic cooperation commission in discovering prospects for expanding economic relations "for the next 12 to 15 years." The communique on the Shah's October 1968 visit had called on this commission to determine such prospects for a 12- to 15-year period, "having in mind a greater use of natural resources and other economic and technical resources" of both countries. Prior to Podgorny's visit, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev held talks in Teheran in mid-March on a new five-year trade agreement for 1971-1975, and Teheran radio had reported that a draft would be prepared "in the near future" and signed in Moscow. The communique notes that the recent Teheran trade talks will be continued in Moscow "with a view to signing a new trade agreement." With regard to scientific and technical cooperation, the sides deemed it necessary, the communique says, "to hold further talks" with a view to concluding an appropriate agreement.

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