

11 FEB 1970

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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11 February 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 6)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 FEBRUARY 1970

Moscow (3583 items)

Vietnam	(7%)	11%
[VWP Anniversary]	(0.2%)	7%
Czechoslovakia	(10%)	5%
[CP Plenum]	(6%)	4%
French CP Congress	(0.1%)	5%
Middle East	(4%)	5%
Criticism of China	(4%)	4%
Battle of Stalingrad Anniversary	(1%)	4%

Peking (2674 items)

Domestic Issues	(43%)	48%
VWP Anniversary	(0.4%)	8%
Middle East	(3%)	14%
[Chou En-lai Letter to Nasir]	(--)	7%
[Nixon Statements]	(--)	5%
Anniversary of Mao	(15%)	3%
Statement on Japanese People's Struggles		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Vietnamese communist attention to the Paris talks is confined to VNA's account of the 53d session on 5 February* which typically focuses on the PRG and DRV delegates' statements and dismisses those by the GVN and U.S. delegates with a single sentence each. Both Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and Ha Van Lau leveled the usual attack on the Vietnamization policy, which also continues to be derided in other Hanoi and Front propaganda. Opposition to Administration policy within the United States is noted in Hanoi reports of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and of the resolution on Vietnam issued by the Democratic Party Policy Council.

Monitored Vietnamese communist media have not carried the addresses at the French CP congress by DRV delegate Le Duc Tho and NFLSV delegate Dang Quang Minh. Le Duc Tho referred routinely to the United States having been "forced" to halt the bombing of the DRV and agree to the four-power talks, but he mentioned their current status only in saying that the United States is trying to reduce the scope of the talks while carrying out Vietnamization. Dang Quang Minh, on the other hand, charged that the United States at the conference "continues to stand on its position as an aggressor, failing to make a serious response to the NFLSV's 10-point overall solution." He added the standard charge that "recently" the United States has "downgraded the conference and sought to sabotage it."

Moscow continues to score Vietnamization and stresses that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings are mainly concerned with criticism of that policy. Soviet media promptly report the statement adopted by the Democratic Party Policy Council calling for troop withdrawal in 18 months. Commentators assert that Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon is aimed at showing Vietnamization in the best light possible in order to assuage criticism at home. Speaking at the French CP congress on 5 February, Kirilenko remarked briefly that in the year the present U.S. Administration has been in office any "illusions" concerning its intentions in Vietnam have been dispelled and the "course of events" has shown that the U.S. Government "does not want a peaceful, political solution of this problem."

* Liberation Radio did not carry Mme. Binh's formal statement at the conference last week. A dramatization of Tet preempted the broadcast at 0500 GMT on 6 February which would normally have carried the text of the PRG delegate's speech.

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Front propaganda on the PRG's four-day Tet cease-fire makes the usual claims of allied violations, with LPA charging that on the 5th the United States bombed areas in 14 provinces. It is also charged that "sweep operations" took place during the truce period. As usual, the allies are said to have been "appropriately punished" for the violations. Other attention to military action includes reviews of "victories" in January.

Tet holiday greetings from various organizations in the South include an unusual one from the Central Committee of the Vietnam People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)* to all members of the party and the People's Revolutionary Youth Group which refers to recent study of "the PRP Central Committee Resolution 9." Like greetings from the PRG Council of Ministers, the Vietnam Alliance, and the Saigon Alliance, the letter hails 1969 "victories" and expresses hope for greater ones in the coming year.

Tet activities in the DRV include a 5 February meeting organized by the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee. President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Nguyen Van Tien, head of the special representation of South Vietnam to the DRV, were reported present. Thang and Tien delivered greetings on the occasion. Other propaganda includes reports of visits to troops and the people by DRV leaders Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi.

In addition to the complaints at the Paris talks about U.S. "provocations" against the DRV, Hanoi claims that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed on 7 February over Ha Bac Province near Hanoi, bringing the total of downed planes to 3,332.

Hanoi continues to publicize the Vietnam Workers Party's 40th anniversary in propaganda including editorial comment and the broadcasting of routine speeches by representatives of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, the Democratic Party, and the Vietnam General Federation of Trade Unions at the "grand" meeting marking the anniversary. The speeches are broadcast on the 4th, 5th, and 6th, respectively.**

* The PRP, the communist party in the South that was formally established on 1 January 1962, has rarely been mentioned in propaganda over the last four years. However, it did get some attention when the PRG was established last June and during the September activities surrounding Ho Chi Minh's funeral. Liberation Radio in the last month has carried two articles from the PRP journal TIEN PHONG.

** VNA's 2 February reports of the meeting and Le Duan's speech did not indicate the date, but these later broadcasts indicate that the meeting was held on 1 February.

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domestic service roundtable discussion says the hearings concluded that Vietnamization will not alter the present situation in Vietnam and that the presence of American forces will be maintained even after implementation of the Vietnamization plan. Moscow cites calls at the hearings by Senators Goodell and McGovern for a total withdrawal by the end of the year and by Senator Mathias for a repeal of the Tonkin Resolution, as well as criticisms of U.S. "chemical warfare" and of the Phoenix pacification program. A 4 February domestic service commentary says "political observers" have noted that the hearings mark "the end of the temporary truce between the government and its critics in Congress."

On 8 and 10 February TASS reports briefly and without comment the statement drafted by the Democratic Party foreign relations consultative committee and adopted by the party's Policy Council calling for withdrawal of all troops within 18 months and criticizing the Administration for delaying appointment of a new head of the American delegation to the Paris talks.

Moscow's reports of Secretary Laird's trip to South Vietnam emphasize that the visit, coming at the time of the Senate hearings, is connected with "growing opposition" to the war among the American public. Commentators assert that Laird will try to cast the Vietnamization policy in the best possible light in order to calm critics, but they recall that past visits by Pentagon leaders to Saigon have usually led to further escalation and they speculate that this visit will be no exception.

REVIEW OF JANUARY "VICTORIES" IN THE SOUTH

On 4 February LPA claims that attacks during the month "on many important bases and strategic communication lines" put out of action 1,200 allied troops, including 259 Americans. And an article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast on the 8th, claims that 7,000 troops were "put out of action" during three weeks of fighting in the Mekong Delta and that 3,500 troops were killed or wounded during 10 days of fighting in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Da Nang, and Binh Dinh.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, in discussing the alleged allied casualties in the Delta from 3 to 22 January, claims that "the puppet Marine brigade A, far from fulfilling its role of reinforcing and supporting pacification operations in Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, and Rach Gia, was annihilated." The article says that "Nixon and Abrams want to prop up the puppet troops in order to carry out their Vietnamization scheme," but that these troops have "disintegrated further." The paper alleges that in the past month, in addition to civil guards, militiamen, and armed policemen being "punished," regulars of the "puppet" army were repeatedly hit everywhere.

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It adds that the Marines and paratroopers of the "puppet" strategic reserve forces in particular were dealt "painful blows in the Mekong Delta and in the outer defense line northwest of Saigon."

CELEBRATION OF TET IN THE SOUTH

Propaganda on the celebration of Tet is marked by stress on the past year's "victories" and optimistic forecasts for the coming year. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 8th ridicules President Thieu's Tet greeting, branding as "shameless and impudent" his "ballyhooing that he will strengthen democracy." The anniversary greetings from various organizations contrast the "people's victories" with alleged allied setbacks, and some of them specifically discuss Vietnamization: The policy is scored in the message to the Vietnam Alliance from the Fatherland Front Central Committee, and the Vietnam Alliance greeting says that Vietnamization "will be foiled."

Other messages* include the PRG Council of Ministers greetings to the people, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 6th; greetings from the Saigon Alliance signed by its chairman, Le Van Giap, to the people in the region, noted by LPA on the 5th; and a Thich Thien Hao message to Buddhists, broadcast by Hanoi on the 5th, which attacks allied "crimes."

TET ACTIVITIES IN THE DRV

HANOI MEETING Hanoi radio reports on 6 February that the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee held a "cordial" meeting the preceding day to greet "the new spring," attended by President Ton Duc Thang and Truong Chinh, a member of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee. President Thang, conveying greetings on the occasion, urged everyone to "eagerly advance, united around our party, with a determination to realize . . . President Ho's sacred testament to completely defeat" the United States and successfully develop socialism.

On behalf of South Vietnam's special representation to the DRV, the NFLSV Central Committee, the PRG and its advisory council, and all southerners, Nguyen Van Tien "presented New Year's wishes for good health to Uncle Ton." He expressed determination of the southern armed forces and people to carry out Ho's testament, "to fear no hardships and sacrifices, to stage successive attacks and uprisings, to fight until the Americans get out and the puppets are toppled" On behalf

* The PRP Central Committee letter will be discussed in the FBIS SURVEY of 12 February, along with an editorial from the PRP journal TIEN PHONG which, like the letter, discusses resolution 9.

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of the southern compatriots, he presented New Year's wishes for good health to the northern compatriots, "hoping that they will enthusiastically emulate in stepping up production and will over-fulfill the 1970 state plan, the first plan to comply with President Ho's sacred testament."

DRV LEADERS' A succession of brief VNA items from 6 to 9 February
TET VISITS report the visits of DRV leaders President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi to various units of the People's Armed Forces, to families of workers and cadres, and to South Vietnam's special representation to the DRV. Visits to various localities and army units on the occasion of Tet were reported last year to have been made by President Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh.

NEW DRV DECREE ON HONORARY AWARDS

On 9 February Hanoi radio reports that on 27 January President Ton Duc Thang signed an order, in accordance with Article 63 of the DRV constitution and a decree passed by the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee on 15 January,* establishing the "honorary state titles of Labor Hero and Hero of the People's Armed Forces." The broadcast also carries the National Assembly Standing Committee decree, issued in accordance with Article 53 of the constitution.** The broadcast says the decree is designed to recognize "outstanding services" of the people and armed forces in production, fighting, and public works. An additional goal is to encourage the development of revolutionary heroism, the patriotic emulation movement, socialism, defense of the fatherland, and defeat of the United States.

* VNA's special domestic transmission for elite cadres had reported on 17 January that the National Assembly Standing Committee met on the 14th and approved the decree on "national honorary titles of Labor Heroes and Heroes of the People's Armed Forces."

** Article 63 of the DRV constitution gives the President the power to promulgate laws in pursuance of the decisions of the National Assembly or its Standing Committee. Article 53 of the constitution gives the National Assembly or its Standing Committee the power to adopt decrees and to institute and decide upon the award of state orders, medals, and titles of honors.

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Signed by Truong Chinh as chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, the decree contains nine articles spelling out the qualities necessary in recipients of the honorable titles. The procedure for awarding the titles is spelled out in article five, which says that the National Assembly Standing Committee, basing itself on proposals of the Council of Ministers, will decide on the awards.

On the 10th, Hanoi radio broadcasts a NHAN DAN editorial of the same day which hails the decree as demonstrating party and state concern for the collectives and individuals "who have made outstanding contributions to the people and the country." The decree, NHAN DAN says, "contributes toward motivating and mobilizing our armed forces and people to strive to the best of their ability to overcome every hardship and difficulty"

In acclaiming Vietnamese revolutionary heroism, the editorial recalls that in the 22 years since President Ho launched the patriotic emulation movement the state has cited 85 heroic units and 289 heroes for outstanding achievements.

MOSCOW-PEKING POLEMIC ON VIETNAM POLICY

In his 5 February speech to the French CP Congress Kirilenko reiterated that the USSR will give the Vietnamese people "the aid--and the scale of aid--that the interests of their struggle demand." And in another response to the denigration of Soviet support for the Vietnamese in the 3 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the VWP anniversary, Radio Moscow on the 5th reviews for Chinese listeners the aid the USSR has given the Vietnamese over the past years.

In LIFE ABROAD (No. 5, 30 January), Shchedrov interjects an attack on Chinese obstructionism into a discussion of 50 years of Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Shchedrov says that in making the decision to attack the DRV the Americans took into account the PRC leadership's "hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union," and he recalls that they refused Soviet suggestions to create, "in accordance with the DRV Government's request," a "united front" for aiding Vietnam. Shchedrov also points out that "the only land routes" from the USSR to the DRV lie through Chinese territory. Although he does not explicitly charge the Chinese with obstructing deliveries of aid, this is the first known Soviet allusion to the subject since last summer, when routine-level radio commentaries occasionally referred to aid obstruction.

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Peking includes a criticism of the USSR in its only comment this week on Vietnam, a 7 February NCNA summary of an attack on Vietnamization in that day's issue of the Albanian paper BASHKIMI. Accusing the Americans of trying to push the Vietnam issue into the "notorious pitfall of 'peaceful settlement,'" it charges that in this connection they have made use of the "counterrevolutionary stand of Soviet revisionist social imperialism." The commentary also asserts that through Vietnamization President Nixon is trying to draw in more ARVN and "satellite" troops to fill the vacancies left by U.S. withdrawals, and it concludes with the assertion that the Vietnamese know they can defeat the United States only by fighting to the end.

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L A O S

NEUTRALIZATION OF PLAIN OF JARS REJECTED BY HANOI, PATHET LAO

Hanoi and the Pathet Lao promptly and authoritatively reject Souvanna Phouma's proposal on the neutralization of the Plain of Jars, discussed by him in a press interview on 31 January and officially proposed to the DRV by foreign office representative Khamphan Panya on 3 February.

HANOI A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman in a 6 February statement scores Souvanna Phouma's 31 January remarks on neutralization without getting into details. It merely notes that he has made neutralization of the Plain of Jars "a condition for cessation of U.S. bombing of this area," and does not mention that a withdrawal of DRV troops is involved. Neither does the statement acknowledge that the proposal has been formalized. The DRV spokesman elaborates on the alleged "intensified" U.S. aggression in Laos and demands that the Americans end their aggression and bombing, allowing the Laotians to settle their own affairs. And he assails President Nixon for making "slandorous accusations of the DRV" in his 30 January press conference. (In his press conference President Nixon had noted that there are 50,000 DRV troops in Laos.)

A Hanoi domestic service commentary acknowledges that Souvanna offered to go to Hanoi to negotiate the neutralization, but fails to report the proposal's substance, merely asserting that it is a "trick" to "legalize" the U.S. and RLG "occupation" of the Plain of Jars, the "recovery" of which is the Laotian patriotic forces' "just right." Since August, says the commentary, the Vientiane troops have "illegally" attacked and occupied the area and now are faced with the possibility of defeat and retreat. It notes that since 5 February U.S. aircraft have been used to airlift 20,000 residents out of the area. The commentary, in pointing to intensified U.S. aggression, recalls that President Nixon, in his press conferences of 26 September and 30 January, "although forced to admit a very small part of U.S. military activities in Laos, slandered the DRV."

A VNA report on the 10th also denounces the airlift of residents of the Plain of Jars and recalls a UPI report that "the U.S. had advised Vientiane "not to make any major military stand in the Plain because the patriotic forces probably could defeat them." A 5 February Pathet Lao news agency commentary had also briefly referred to the UPI report.

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PATHET LAO The Pathet Lao responded with an NLHX Central Committee spokesman's statement dated the 5th which similarly calls the proposal a trick aimed at "slandering and vilifying the DRV and hoodwinking public opinion" and at "legalizing" RLG attacks in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang area, which is "an important strategic area attached to the Laotian patriotic forces' free zone." The proposal, says the statement, is an effort to "reject the NLHX's right to retake the area," although Vientiane had "reluctantly recognized the legal status and role" of the NLHX and its "legitimate right to stay in the Plain of Jars."

Unlike Hanoi, the NLHX does acknowledge in its statement that the proposal was formalized, noting that "some days ago the Vientiane powerholders sent a letter concerning the problem to the DRV charge d'affaires in Vientiane." A similar statement issued by the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee dated 6 February is carried by the Pathet Lao radio on the 8th. The statements do not acknowledge the substance of the proposal, but they are preceded by a 5 February Pathet Lao news agency commentary which points out that the agreement "would involve a halt to U.S. bombing" of the region and placing it "under the control of the two neutralist forces." The commentary does not, however, acknowledge that the withdrawal of DRV troops is involved.

MOSCOW Moscow has not yet acknowledged the neutralization proposal, but a number of current commentaries discuss the fighting in the Plain of Jars area. An 8 February PRAVDA article by Shchedrov expresses concern with the intensified operations since last September and concludes that the "provocative acts by the American military aggravated the situation in Laos and created a situation fraught with dangerous aftermaths." He says that this "cannot but cause concern of all those who are interested in the relaxation of international tension and in the cessation of imperialist plunder by the United States on the Indochinese peninsula." Some comment acknowledges the evacuation of residents of the Plain of Jars, asserting that the United States intends to move some 10-15,000 people from their homes to "strategic villages," eventually moving over 600,000 persons into such villages.

PEKING The only available reaction from Peking thus far is a 10 February NCNA report summarizing the statements of the NLHX Central Committee spokesman and of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee.

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PATHET LAO, VIETNAMESE SCORE USE OF THAILAND IN LAOS WAR

An earlier flurry of official comment on Laos had been occasioned by an NLHX Central Committee "memorandum" on the use of the territory and forces of Thailand by the United States in the war in Laos. Dated 13 January and carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 16th, the memorandum reviews U.S. use of Thai air bases and Thai combat troops in Laos and calls upon "all members of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos, especially the cochairmen," to take measures to force the U.S. imperialists and their puppets to stop the war of aggression, first and foremost ending the bombing, and allow the Laotian people to settle their own affairs "on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreement and the concrete situation in Laos." Hanoi and the PRG offered the NLHX their usual support with foreign ministry statements dated 29 and 30 January respectively. The only available Moscow acknowledgement was a brief TASS report of the DRV statement. On 21 January Peking's NCNA reported the NLHX memorandum, and on 8 February an NCNA commentary condemned the "Bangkok reactionaries" for serving U.S. imperialism in its aggression in Laos.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW REJECTS "FALSE THEORY" OF MIDEAST BALANCE OF POWER

Soviet propaganda hews to established lines in calling for a political settlement that revolves around the "key element" of Israeli withdrawal. Commentators express concern that the crisis may flare into a war affecting not only the Middle East, and they deride the "balance of forces" formula through which the United States, it is charged, intends to increase arms deliveries to Israel. Soviet arms deliveries are again defended as aid to the "victims of the aggression," and there are references to "continuing" Soviet "all-round support" and assistance to the Arabs.

Soviet comment on the 7-9 February conference in Cairo of the "frontline" countries--the UAR, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan--cites continuing Israeli military actions, a Tsoppi commentary on the 10th branding Israel the cause of all clashes along the cease-fire line. Terming the conference a success, Moscow routinely underlines the importance of Arab unity and coordination. An Arabic-language commentary on the 10th calls the conference communique of "special significance" in that it points to "additional ways and means of struggle," adding that oil is among the effective means of "strongly influencing" those who support the "aggressors."

Concurrently, for the first time since October, there are specific reaffirmations of Israel's right to exist--in foreign-language commentaries by Tsoppi on 4 and 6 February and by Kushnir on the 9th, and in remarks, reported by TASS on the 4th, by the head of the Soviet delegation to an international parliamentary conference in Cairo. TASS quotes him as saying that the only reliable way to solve the Middle East crisis is through Israeli withdrawal and simultaneous recognition of the rights of all Middle Eastern states, including Israel, to independent national existence.

ARMAMENTS A Belyayev article in PRAVDA on the 7th, asserting that
DELIVERIES President Nixon "has now stated that Tel Aviv has been offered" more planes, says Washington considers that "the 'balance of arms' in the Middle East has allegedly been violated" and consequently has decided to increase its aid to the "aggressor." On the 5th, in an Arabic-language commentary, Radio Moscow denounces any "talk about the so-called balance of power" as a "terrible double-cross and hypocrisy" and asserts that if the United States were really interested in the balance of power in the Middle East, it would have ceased aid to Israel and "forced" it to withdraw. Unless this happens, the commentary says, there is no ground for serious talk about any balance of power.

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Panelists in the 8 February Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable assert that the decision to supply more fighter planes to Israel was made last year, during Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's visit to Washington. But "American propaganda," they say, has portrayed the sale of more planes to Israel "almost as a reply" to the French sale of Mirages to Libya, although the French agreement "will only come into effect in 1972" while Israel will get its Phantoms "immediately." Commentator Druzhinin observes that President Nixon, in his 25 January message to a conference of American Jewish leaders, said the United States "is allegedly concerned with the preservation of the balance or equilibrium of forces" between the Arabs and Israel (the President expressed preference for restraint in arms shipments to the area); the balance-of-forces formula, Druzhinin says, is a "kind of cover" for increased deliveries to Israel.

The roundtable commentators praise the "clear and precise" Soviet proposals for a settlement. They single out Moscow's position on withdrawal and termination of the state of war--as in the Tsoppi commentary on the 6th--and note that the United States "insists that the schedule and order" of troop withdrawal be decided during direct Arab-Israeli talks, thus "putting the cart before the horse." The "just" solution would be withdrawal to the pre-5 June 1967 lines, the panelists conclude, while the U.S. proposals seek to let Israel "include in its territory some of the land seized" in the June war.

FOUR-POWER
CONSULTATIONS

There are suggestions, both in the roundtable discussion and in an Osipov IZVESTIYA article on the 7th, that Moscow is interested in a continuation of the four-power talks in New York. The roundtable panelists charge that thanks to U.S. and other "imperialist" support, Israel "does not consider it necessary" to carry out the November 1967 Security Council resolution. This circumstance, they say, gives rise to "a whole range of problems that could be solved with the help of the great powers," and "it is to this end" that the talks are directed. According to Osipov, the situation demands that "all governments interested in restoring a just peace in the Middle East adopt the most urgent measures, including measures within the framework of the consultations of the four great powers," to put an end to Israeli military actions and "compel" it to implement the Security Council resolution.

Moscow has never acknowledged the Kosygin letters to the three Western powers and their replies, although TASS on 6 February did report without explanation that Kosygin had received the French and British ambassadors separately. But the exchange is the subject of comment by Polish, Hungarian, and Yugoslav media. The Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG on the 5th calls the Kosygin message a warning to the United States and an affirmation of solidarity with the Arabs; commentaries broadcast by

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Warsaw radio on the 5th and 6th point to a statement by the Soviet embassy in London as indicating that the Soviet Union regards the situation as serious but believes it can be solved by political means.

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WEST GERMANY

MOSCOW BREAKS SILENCE ON GROMYKO-BAHR DISCUSSIONS

Moscow's first direct acknowledgment of the preliminary negotiations between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German State Secretary Egon Bahr comes in a foreign ministry announcement carried by TASS late on 10 February and broadcast to domestic listeners the next day. The brief announcement notes only that "a number of meetings and conversations" between the two have been held and that Bahr recently arrived in Moscow "to take part in the exchange of opinions that began earlier on matters of interest" to the two states. The announcement thus implicitly refers, also for the first time, to the exploratory talks held in early December between FRG Ambassador Allardt and Gromyko. It adds that the exchange of views is continuing.

The West German DPA reports on the 10th that Gromyko became the first Soviet foreign minister to visit the FRG Embassy in Moscow since 1955 when he spoke at a luncheon given by Ambassador Allardt for the negotiating delegations. DPA adds that Gromyko stressed the "sincerity" of the Soviet side in the talks, expressed hope that they would be fruitful, and acknowledged "difficulties we must overcome." Soviet media so far have not reported the luncheon.

Prior to the foreign ministry announcement there had been only two Moscow references--both vague--to Soviet-FRG negotiations. A 25 December 1969 Moscow broadcast in Mandarin, reacting to Chinese charges of a "sellout" of the GDR,* described "the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the FRG in Moscow" as a "routine thing following the birth of the new administration in Bonn." An even vaguer reference appeared on 3 January 1970 in a Vasilyev review of 1969 political developments beamed to German listeners: In the course of a recital of successes in Soviet foreign relations with European countries, Vasilyev noted that "contacts were also established with the FRG."

USSR WARNS BONN AGAINST FURTHER "ILLEGAL" BERLIN ACTIONS

Soviet propaganda protesting the West German parliamentary meetings in West Berlin has dropped off sharply following the conclusion of the meetings and the release of a 1 February statement from the Soviet

* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion of a new Peking attack on Moscow in connection with Soviet-West German relations.

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embassy in the GDR. The embassy spokesman's statement, carried by TASS, implicitly acknowledges Soviet-GDR responsibility for travel "difficulties" from West Germany to West Berlin and warns of future such difficulties if Bonn again holds West German Bundestag meetings in Berlin.

Noting that the U.S., British, and French ambassadors to West Germany had sent identical letters to the Soviet embassy in the GDR expressing "concern over the recent difficulties in civilian travel," the spokesman declares that "there would have been no corresponding reaction on the part of the Soviet Union and the GDR" had there not been "continuing provocative actions of the Bonn authorities" in West Berlin, particularly the "recent unlawful" sessions of Bundestag bodies there. "Proceeding from the known four-sided responsibility for West Berlin," the spokesman says, "the Soviet side will further duly react to attempts by Bonn authorities to spread unlawfully their competence to West Berlin."

A 1 February foreign-language commentary by Inev on the Berlin question reaffirms Soviet readiness to negotiate on Berlin in standard terms: "The Soviet Government has stated it is ready for an exchange of views with its wartime allies on how to prevent complications over West Berlin, now and in the future." Inev adds that the USSR "would never agree to any steps prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the GDR or damaging to the special status of West Berlin." The "West Berlin" question, he adds, must take into account "the interests of European security."

MOSCOW DISAPPOINTED WITH BRANDT'S FIRST HUNDRED DAYS

Soviet commentators assess Chancellor Brandt's first 100 days in office in tones of manifest disappointment. They suggest that Brandt still has not found ways to implement his early promises that would be acceptable to opposition "reactionaries," and they pointedly advise Brandt to "plant both feet solidly on the ground of reality"--by recognizing the GDR, for example--if he wishes to achieve a detente with the socialist countries.

These views are summarized in a Melnikov article in the 27 January issue of the journal NEW TIMES. Reflecting on Brandt's 14 January state of the nation speech, Melnikov stresses the "many contradictions" in Brandt's speech and laments that "every step in the direction of realism is accompanied by such reservations that its value is in effect nullified." He refers to Brandt's recalcitrance on recognition of the GDR and calls Brandt's January statement on a European security conference "an outright departure" from his October position by its linking of this question with the achievement of progress in inter-German relations.

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A 27 January Sakharov commentary, broadcast to German listeners, assails Brandt for stressing in his January Bundestag speech that his government is "aware of its strength" and "has good friends" in NATO. Sakharov views these remarks as in contradiction to Brandt's avowals favoring renunciation of force and detente with the East and compares the Brandt regime to the pre-Nazi Stresemann regime in the Weimar Republic period.

On 11 February TASS summarizes a review of Brandt's first 100 days by the West German communist paper UNSERE ZEIT, which concludes that this period was notable for "further consolidation of the rightist and extremist forces in the FRG" and that so far Brandt has made "no cardinal changes" in FRG foreign or domestic policies.

NATURAL GAS DEAL SEEN AS BOON TO EAST-WEST DETENTE

TASS reports on 2 February the signing the preceding day in Essen, West Germany, of a major 20-year agreement between West German firms and Soviet foreign trade organizations whereby the Soviet Union will supply natural gas to West Germany in exchange for large-diameter pipes and West German credits to pay for the pipe and equipment.

Initial followup comment includes a 6 February Afonin commentary for Japanese listeners which cites the Soviet-FRG deal as a good example for forthcoming Soviet-Japanese trade talks. Afonin praises the agreement as proof that the USSR and the Western powers can attain "great achievements" in economic exchanges despite the different social systems. He cites the recent Soviet signing of a similar gas agreement with Italy as evidence that the USSR pursues a policy of peaceful coexistence and reciprocal cooperation with nonsocialist countries, adding defensively--with recent Peking criticism of such deals evidently in mind--that Lenin himself established this policy. Recalling earlier Western efforts to bloc steel pipe exports to the USSR and harm the Soviet economy, Afonin declares that the current agreements demonstrate the "complete failure" of Western attempts to obstruct Soviet economic development.

A 6 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article on the Soviet-FRG transaction stresses that it shows the "utterly senseless" and hopeless nature of the Western policy of embargo and trade restrictions against the socialist countries. The agreement is also said to focus attention on unused opportunities and potential reserves for developing USSR-FRG trade and economic ties, which would "undoubtedly be a sizeable contribution to the development and improvement of relations between our countries."

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WARSAW CALLS FIRST TALKS WITH BONN "USEFUL, BUSINESSLIKE"

Polish media announce that the first "exchange of views" with West Germany on "political subjects" on 5 and 6 February was "useful" and proceeded in "a direct and businesslike manner." Warsaw's PAP briefly chronicles each step of the first round in the Polish-West German exchange without amplifying on the subjects discussed. It notes in its 6 February report on conclusion of the first round of talks that they will continue in Warsaw in the second week of March. PAP also provides reportage on the participants from each side in the individual sessions and notes the arrival and departure of FRG spokesman Duckwitz. A ZYCIE WARSZAWY article on 3 February, immediately prior to the talks, declined to restate Poland's views at length, saying it is well known that definitive FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier remains Poland's primary aim.

While Soviet media so far have been silent on the Polish talks with the FRG, the East Berlin ADN reports the departure of the West German delegation from Warsaw after the exchange of views. The East Berlin radio had carried a lengthy summary of the 3 February ZYCIE WARSZAWY article, prefacing it with references to "rather ambiguous statements" by Bonn spokesmen and the "open aversion" to this dialog displayed by the Kiesinger opposition.

Favorable Czechoslovak interest, arising from Prague's own declared desire for negotiations with the Brandt government, is evident in a 5 February RUDE PRAVO comment summarized by CTK. The paper calls the opening of the Warsaw talks a "success" for Polish policy and also gives credit to the Brandt government for responding to Gomulka's May 1969 initiative.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

KIRILENKO: MOSCOW SEEKS NORMALIZATION, FIRM ON IDEOLOGY

In the first Politburo-level comment on Sino-Soviet relations since Brezhnev's conciliatory, guardedly optimistic remarks of 27 October, echoed by Podgornyy on the October Revolution anniversary, Kirilenko's speech to the French CP congress on 5 February reaffirms Soviet resolve to persevere in the talks in Peking despite the polemical climate. After a month of critical appraisals of PRC policies and rebuttals of Chinese charges, the Soviet central press has initiated no new commentaries on China for a week. The formulation of Moscow's policy as combining efforts to restore links with the PRC and "a firm rebuff to all possible provocations," contained in an AUCCTU plenum resolution published on 29 January, is reiterated in a Komsomol plenum resolution carried in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 5 February. Continuing low-level polemics, including rejoinders to Peking's swipes at Soviet policies on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, are currently confined to the broadcasts to China.

Published in the Soviet press on 6 February, Kirilenko's speech points up a distinction between party and state relations. On the one hand, it underscores the deep anxiety of the CPSU and other fraternal parties over the Chinese leaders' policy and invokes the widespread criticism of Peking at the June 1969 international party conference in this connection. Kirilenko declares that the CPCU, like "other Marxist-Leninist parties," cannot keep silent about the political and ideological aims of the Peking rulers. He counterbalances this notice of implacable ideological struggle with a reference to Soviet governmental initiative in getting the border talks started and with a pledge that Moscow will continue to seek normalized relations "between the USSR and the PRC, to restore good neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples," despite Peking's "malicious anti-Soviet campaign" and fanning of a war psychosis.

Moscow uses the proxy of French CP Politburo member Georges Marchais in an effort to garner international communist support in the ideological struggle against Peking. A TASS report of Marchais' speech to the French party congress--carried on the 5th in PRAVDA and in briefer form in IZVESTIYA--notes Marchais' reference to the aid "the Maoist line" is giving imperialism. The Soviet reports quote him as saying the dispute is not one that pits the USSR against China or a quarrel over some "special 'interpretation' of Marxism," but a conflict over "a policy that breaks with scientific socialism, a chauvinistic and adventurist policy of splitting the communist movement and the anti-imperialist forces." Marchais is quoted as recalling the Maoist

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leaders' "dangerous armed provocations on the Chinese-Soviet frontier last year" but as expressing hope that the Peking talks--begun at Soviet initiative--will bring positive results.

Complementing Kirilenko's reassertion of Moscow's desire to normalize state relations, a commentary in Mandarin on 5 February reviews CPSU initiatives over the past six years to improve Sino-Soviet relations and places blame for the present situation on "the anti-Sovietism adopted by the Chinese leadership in the 1960's." In other Mandarin broadcasts, particularly over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, Moscow again denies Chinese allegations about a Soviet threat, insisting that the Soviet Union has never threatened and does not intend to threaten or attack China. Typifying nostalgic appeals to Chinese audiences, a Peace and Progress broadcast in Mongolian on the 7th introduces a concert with an expression of hope that the Inner Mongolian people will recall the traditional happy spring festivals of "the old days."

PEKING AGAIN ATTACKS SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON GERMAN QUESTION

While refraining from a sustained polemical campaign against the Soviets, Peking has again raised a sensitive issue in Moscow's foreign affairs and has taken another shot at the Brezhnev leadership. An NCNA report on 9 February details recent contacts between the Soviets and West Germany to support a charge that Moscow is seeking "a dirty deal" with Bonn and has tacitly consented to the annexation of the GDR and West Berlin by West German "militarism." The report concludes with an attack on "Brezhnev and his gang" as "despicable renegades."

Since the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks Peking has avoided its former attacks on Soviet domestic policies while choosing various international issues on which to castigate the Kremlin leadership. The German question has previously figured in a scathing attack at the authoritative level of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 22 December. In more recent attacks, Peking on 30 January denounced the Soviets for their behavior in Czechoslovakia and on 3 February accused them of selling out the Vietnamese, in each case assailing Brezhnev by name.

Although maintaining a correct stance in not broaching the border question while the talks are in progress, Peking has continued to raise the spectre of a Soviet threat in its war preparedness campaign, mainly in provincial and local media. Border tensions have been reflected in current propaganda on the theme of army-people unity during the spring festival. An NCNA report on 7 February recounts

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several heart-warming cases of mutual support between the frontier guards and the populace in the Chenpao Island area, where "the Soviet revisionist renegade clique last March flagrantly carried out an armed intrusion" into China. The Chenpao incidents are also recalled in an NCNA report on 9 February, describing activities of popular support for the army in border areas around the country, which mentions a combat hero who earned an award for "his exploits in battle" on the island. On the same theme, an Urumchi broadcast on the 6th refers to "crimes of Soviet revisionist social imperialism" and cites demobilized veterans along the Sinkiang frontier as promising to take an active part in militia activities and to go to the frontline to wipe out any invaders.

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SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

PEKING DEPICTS UNITED STATES AS DECLINING POWER

President Nixon's State of the Union address and subsequent messages to Congress have occasioned a spate of PRC comment depicting the United States as skidding irreversibly from positions of dominance after World War II to a current state of crisis at home and diminishing power abroad. As in comment last year during the period surrounding the presidential inauguration and before the aborted session of the Warsaw talks in February, Peking has studiously avoided foreclosing its options toward the United States on fundamental issues directly affecting Sino-U.S. relations. Against this background, Peking's portrayal of the United States as encumbered by mounting liabilities suggests a view that the Nixon Administration, while persisting in its predecessors' aggressive intentions, is subject to powerful pressures to accommodate itself to changing realities in which U.S. global ambitions are vastly overextended and resources severely strained.

Peking's comment has been marked by a confidently mocking tone, contrasting a formerly preeminent U.S. power basking in the "American Century" with present conditions in which the President is constrained to deliver low-key messages pervaded with a sense of decline and trouble. There has been no authoritative editorial comment. The material consists mainly of NCNA reports on various aspects of the President's messages plus comment carried in the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield" column of NCNA's domestic service--a column frequently used as a channel for comment on the United States which is not carried in NCNA's international service.

Following NCNA's 31 January commentary picturing the State of the Union address as a confession that the United States faces a "terrible mess" at home and abroad, NCNA reports on 5 and 7 February discuss the President's economic report and budget presented on the 2d. According to NCNA, a new economic crisis is looming at a time when U.S. resources are inadequate to meet the demands of American domestic and foreign policies. Analyzing the budget, NCNA interprets the President's reference to "difficult choices" in allocating resources as indicating that the United States is locked in a series of dilemmas arising out of conflicting desires to expand its military capabilities while alleviating its economic woes. Despite these dilemmas, the agency adds, the President "does not want to give up his ambition of aggression" and has stressed that the United States wants to maintain sufficient military power to meet its international commitments. NCNA also observes that the Administration intends to expand its nuclear force and to engage in "nuclear blackmail." Peking has not mentioned China

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in discussing U.S. nuclear arms policy and has not reported the President's 30 January press conference in which he announced a new phase in ABM construction as a defense against a PRC nuclear capability.*

Two articles in NCNA's "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield" column, on 3 and 7 February, are pegged to the President's State of the Union address. The first article, claiming that the U.S. descent from its postwar hegemony confirms a prediction by Mao in 1947 that American might was only superficial and transitory, draws a picture of U.S. political isolation, military defeat, and economic crisis. While thus providing a picture which would serve to explain to the Chinese people how Peking might now find it auspicious to negotiate with its old adversary, NCNA also takes a precautionary line in advising "all revolutionary people" not to lower their vigilance and in repeating the prominent slogan calling for preparations against any war of aggression.

The 7 February article takes the President's enunciation of a "new partnership concept" in U.S. relations with other countries as further evidence of the decline of American power. The article describes French and West German independence of U.S. policies in Europe, and it echoes the 31 January NCNA English report on the State of the Union address in expressing concern over Japan's role in the Administration's new Asian policy and in noting the President's hopes for "collusion with social imperialism." Like the 31 January report, the article ignores the President's references to Vietnam and Sino-U.S. relations, though it contains a passing mention of Vietnam as a battleground on which the United States has been "badly beaten."

* In contrast, NCNA on 16 March 1969, reporting the President's press conference two days earlier, denounced the proposed ABM system for having "its spearhead pointed at China." In that period, following cancellation of the scheduled Warsaw session and at a time of Sino-Soviet border clashes, Peking had shifted to a markedly tougher line reflecting a view that the new Administration was implacably disposed toward the PRC and was intent on improving relations with Moscow at Chinese expense.

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PHILIPPINES

MOSCOW, PEKING DIFFER ON MOTIVE FOR ANTI-MARCOS RIOTS

In a moderate volume of comment, Moscow and Peking provide differing propaganda interpretations of the anti-Marcos demonstrations in the Philippines.

Peking sees "a gigantic wave of demonstrations" directed against "U.S. imperialism and its Philippine agents." The "Philippine authorities" are said to be acting under American orders to persecute the people. But the people, Peking assures its listeners, "will certainly break everything shackling them and advance rapidly toward liberation."

Moscow differentiates between current demonstrations and those of a few weeks ago. Where previously student unrest had been "definitely" anti-American, Moscow declares, now it is directed against the Marcos government. Citing the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Moscow explains that the shift can be ascribed to CIA takeover of student organizations and a planned effort to turn the youth against the government. The CIA, it is said, wants the "too independent" Marcos removed from power and replaced by a more pliable regime.

Earlier Moscow articles accused the CIA of interfering in the Philippine elections to prevent a Marcos victory, and the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW charge of CIA infiltration into youth groups was aired in a 16 December 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA article. A 28 January IZVESTIYA article reviewed Marcos' program for the Philippines, noting his intention to reconsider "inequitable" agreements with the United States and his desire to develop relations with socialist countries. IZVESTIYA concluded that Marcos' program "to a certain degree" reflected the desire of the people to rid themselves of American control.

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WARSAW PACT

MOSCOW DENIES TIGHTENING PACT INTEGRATION; CEAUSESCU DEFIANT

An article in the 5 February RED STAR dismisses as a "canard" alleged Western insinuations that an article in that paper some two weeks earlier, by Shtemenko, had spelled out radical changes in the direction of tightening up the integration of the Pact joint forces since the March 1969 Budapest Pact summit meeting. Also on the 5th, Ceausescu assured a Bucharest audience that the Romanian armed forces would be commanded by no one but the Romanians themselves. Both these developments occurred as Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was winding up a four-day visit to Czechoslovakia--preceded and followed by visits to the GDR and Poland, respectively.

SHTEMENKO In the 24 January RED STAR, Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff
ARTICLE Shtemenko had followed up a reference to the "very important decisions" taken at Budapest with the statement that the Pact member states "now possess not only first-class national armies" but "have created mighty joint armed forces," imbued with Leninist "socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism." In Moscow's most explicit terms on this score since the start of the seven-year feud with the Romanians, he went on to say that "allocated to them from the national armies, by the decisions of their governments, are formations and units and also control and rear organs." Further strengthening the implication of recent innovations, Shtemenko added that the joint forces "now include ground forces, air and naval forces, and also air defense forces," with the socialist community's security guarded by "the nuclear missile might of the Soviet Union's armed forces."

Repeatedly mentioning "allocated" troops, he stressed that while their "daily" training is planned by the national commands, their "joint operations"--exercises and maneuvers--are carried out "according to the plans of the joint command." Reasserting the "great importance" of "further improving the mechanism" of the Pact, Shtemenko noted, as Soviet propaganda had done before, that the Budapest decision on establishing a "committee of defense ministers" had already been implemented.

LEONTYEV The briefer article by Col. A. Leontyev in the 5 February
ARTICLE RED STAR, entitled "The Story of a 'Canard,'" is vitriolic in rejecting alleged Western insinuations that the newly integrated Pact forces are to be used not only within but also "beyond" the socialist camp. Leontyev describes the "canard" as designed by NATO circles to throw a scare into NATO dissidents, to bring France back into the fold and to "take Canada and other partners in hand."

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Taking umbrage at such efforts to "besmirch the Soviet Union" and not it at odds with the other Pact members, Leontyev denies that Shtemenko's article had said the combined armed forces were formed during the Budapest conference. "Everybody knows," he says, that these forces were formed "after the signing of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955." He adds that this is not merely "a slight error" by Western news commentators and military experts, but a calculated implication that the combined forces are to be used for a new episode like "the events in Czechoslovakia," for "invading the European socialist countries."

SPEECH BY In apparent response to Shtemenko's article, Romania's
CEAUSESCU Ceausescu registered new defiance of Soviet pressures in
 a Bucharest speech to basic cadres of the Romanian armed
forces, also on the 5th. AGERPRES summarized the speech at length, and
SCINTEIA published it in full on the 6th. The speech came the day after
the 22d anniversary of the still unrenewed 20-year Soviet-Romanian friend-
ship treaty--observed in pro forma fashion by Moscow and Bucharest--and
three days after the appearance of an article in the February LUPTA DE
CLASA vigorously defending Romania's right to "economic and political
autonomy."*

While duly noting that "in a possible war Romania will not fight alone" and that "we are members of the Warsaw Treaty," Ceausescu stressed repeatedly--as he had done in the past more specifically with regard to economic integration in CEMA--that the Romanians would carry out "the spirit of the Budapest agreements" by cooperating not only with the other Pact members but with "the armies of all the socialist countries." He thus seemed in effect to rule out any use of his country's forces against China, Albania, or Yugoslavia and at the same time to convey a low-key reminder that Romania has socialist friends outside the Pact.

To long applause, according to SCINTEIA, Ceausescu went on to declare that "the sole leader of our armed forces is the party, the government, the supreme national command," and "only they can give orders to our army; only these orders can be carried out in the Socialist Republic of Romania!" He coupled an acknowledgment of the "obligations" to take part in joint training with the Pact allies, in accordance with proletarian internationalism, with an assertion that "our army has everything it needs to always fulfill its duties to the people" as well as to "our allies and friends in the fraternal socialist countries." The Romanian army, he declared, "will always be at its post," and "if the need arises it will perform its duty to the full."

* Discussed in the 4 February issue of the TRENDS.

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