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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

14 JAN 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

14 January 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 2)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JANUARY 1970

<u>Moscow (3401 items)</u>			<u>Peking (3698 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(5%)	4%	Domestic Issues	(42%)*	47%
Agnew Asian Tour	(0.5%)	3%	Year-End Review of		16%
Polish-Soviet	(0.1%)	3%	People's Struggles		
Diplomatic			[Middle East		5%]
Relations			[India		5%]
Anniversary			[Malaysia		3%]
Middle East	(2%)	3%	[Indonesia		2%]
Cosmonaut Belyayev's	(--)	2%	Joint New Year's	(25%)	7%
Death			Editorial		
			U.S.-Japanese	(2%)	4%
			Collusion		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* Excludes items on Chinese people's support of the joint New Year's editorial.

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## VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

## INTRODUCTION

At the 49th session of the Paris talks on 8 January PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi devoted the bulk of his prepared statement to the Vietnamization policy; the VNA account observes that Thi rejected the Nixon Administration's contention that this policy is the "correct" way for the United States to get out of the war "regardless of what happens on the negotiation front." DRV deputy delegation head Ha Van Lau, according to VNA, said that since the Nixon Administration had been unable to reach its goal of negotiating from strength, it has emphasized Vietnamization and regarded the search for a negotiated settlement as secondary. Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged that Ambassador Habib revived the proposal for restricted sessions--first advanced by Ambassador Lodge at the 40th session on 30 October--and that the communist delegates denounced the proposal in their rebuttal statements.

Moscow continues its criticism of the Vietnamization policy and alleged U.S. stalling at the Paris talks. Unlike Hanoi and Front media, TASS reports that the U.S. delegation at Paris again proposed "restricted talks" and that the DRV spokesman at the post-session press briefing denounced the proposal. On 12 January a domestic service broadcast briefly notes the announcement that the Army 1st Infantry Division is to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, calling the move a "meaningless symbol."

Peking's NCNA on 7 January summarizes the 31 December "special" PLAF command communique rounding up 1969 communist "victories." The summary includes the statistics on alleged allied casualties and notes the criticism of Vietnamization and the call for continued fighting until victory. Peking's only other current substantive attention to Vietnam comes in a 13 January NCNA summary of a PEOPLE'S DAILY article, attributed to Fan Ti, which discusses the advice given President Nixon by "the British nonentity, Robert Thompson." The article says the President in his 15 December TV address had quoted from Thompson's report to the White House the statement that the United States is now in a "winning position," but it claims that Thompson had merely rehashed "old strategies" developed under Kennedy and Johnson.

Vietnam propaganda on military action in the South focuses particularly on the northern provinces, with VNA on the 13th summarizing a NHAN DAN article which hails a "new victory" on 5 January in Quang Nam Province. The PLAF reportedly "annihilated" 400 U.S. Marines in this action at Cam Doi. The article also cites a series of attacks from 3 to 6 January

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in the highlands and central Trung Bo region. The spate of reviews of communist "victories" during 1969 continues with additional articles in the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN attributed to "Truc Cuien" (hand-to-hand combat). Liberation Radio from 11 through 13 January broadcasts a three-installment article on Vietnamization by "Cuu Long" (Mekong).

Hanoi propaganda on DRV internal affairs includes reports of various recent meetings which heard speeches by Politburo members: Truong Chinh spoke at a meeting of correspondents of the weekly THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG (YOUNG PIONEERS) on the occasion of its 15th anniversary; Pham Van Dong addressed a meeting of the 4th Congress of Representatives of the Vietnam National Union of Students; and Le Thanh Nghi spoke on food and consumer goods production at a meeting of the Haiphong People's Municipal Council and City Administrative Committee.

### PARIS TALKS: RESTRICTED SESSIONS, "VIETNAMIZATION" POLICY

**SILENCE ON U.S. PROPOSAL** The Vietnamese communist accounts of the 49th session of the Paris talks on 8 January fail to acknowledge that Ambassador Habib, in a supplementary statement after his formal presentation, repeated the proposal for restricted sessions originally made by Ambassador Lodge in his formal statement at the 30 October session.\* Suggesting that the next session on 15 January be a restricted one, Ambassador Habib proposed that the number of advisers be limited--he suggested that there be three, that each spokesman could raise any subject, and that an agreed statement be issued to the press.

In noting that both Ha Van Lau and Din Ba Thi spoke in rebuttal, the VNA account says simply that they "severely criticized and refuted the absurd demands of the U.S. and puppets' representatives. They stressed that the United States must bear full responsibility for the prolongation of the war in South Vietnam and the deadlock of the Paris conference." There is thus no acknowledgment that they denounced the restricted-session proposal.

**ALLIED SPEECHES** The VNA account of the session acknowledges some of the broad themes of GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong's formal statement when it says he "repeated the slanderous charge that the North committed aggression against the South and that North Vietnam is unwilling to stop the war and unwilling to negotiate. He claimed that

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\* The VNA account of the 30 October session took note of the Lodge proposal in reporting the communist side's rejection of it. See the TRENDS of 5 November 1969, pages 6-7.

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the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration is a legal representative and that in the past year it had shown goodwill and a serious attitude at the Paris conference." VNA, of course, ignores such details of these broad charges as Phong's assertion that 80 percent of the communists operating in South Vietnam are sent by Hanoi and his statement that "the communists' scheme to take advantage of the Paris meetings to embark on so-called diplomatic offensive" is shown in Resolution 9.\* VNA also ignores Phong's appeal for a discussion of secondary matters in order to "create a relaxed atmosphere and to generate mutual confidence."

The VNA account of Ambassador Habib's statement is characteristic of the standard cursory treatment when it notes that "the acting head of the U.S. delegation again tried to justify the U.S. crime of aggression and cover its maneuver to prolong the war and downgrade the Paris conference." VNA adds that "at the same time, he deliberately eluded the two basic questions in the 10-point overall solution of the NFL and PRG, namely the total and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. troops and troops of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam, and the setting up of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam." VNA thus ignores Habib's reference to specific allied proposals and his discussion of his attempts to obtain clarification from the communist side on such things as the relationship of points two and three in the NFLSV 10-point proposal on the withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops.

DINH BA THI ON PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi, again substituting for the  
VIETNAMIZATION reportedly ailing Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh,\*\* devoted the bulk of his formal statement to attacking military, political, and economic aspects of Vietnamization. He repeated the contention that the ARVN is not capable of taking over from U.S. Forces, and he claimed in this regard that during 1969 400,000 South Vietnamese government personnel were put out of action and that, "according to

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\* This was the third successive session at which the GVN delegate referred to COSVN Resolution 9, the document captured in July which presents a general assessment of the situation in the South and sets out broad guidelines.

\*\* When a U.S. reporter at the PRG press briefing after the session asked whether Mme. Binh was better since she was known to have made a public appearance, the PRG spokesman merely repeated that she had the flu. As usual, neither DRV nor Liberation Front media carry the accounts of any of the post session press briefings by the four delegations.

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reports from Saigon," 180,000 deserted. He alleged that in areas where ARVN units have assumed combat responsibility, they were so heavily attacked--at Bu Prang, for example--that the Americans had to come to their assistance. As a result, he said, U.S. forces continued to engage in combat and their casualties increased. Thi cited and took issue with official U.S. figures on casualties--78,292, a decrease of 35 percent as compared to 1968--and repeated without attribution the claims in the "special" PLAF command communique that 235,000 Americans were put out of action during 1969, a 5,000-man increase over 1968. Much of the detail of Thi's statement, including the figures on American casualties, do not appear in the VNA account.\*

Concerning the political aspect of Vietnamization, Thi routinely described the United States as attempting to "prettify" the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem 'administration.'" In quoting Saigon press characterizations of the government as "corrupt," Thi recalled--though this is not reported by VNA--that President Nixon on the other hand had "extolled" Thieu as one of the four or five "eminent statesmen in Asia." VNA notes Thi's standard description of the accelerated pacification operations as "terrorizing, massacring" and committing other "crimes." But VNA does not report his statement that they "strike directly, forcibly concentrate and tightly control the population, allegedly to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure," and that they then "produce phoney statistics about the so-called control of the Saigon administration over South Vietnam."

Thi called the strong economy which the Vietnamization plan seeks to build a "sheer illusion" and similarly questioned how this "beggar" economy, based entirely on the war and American aid, can become strong. He saw the GVN's economy at present as stagnating and experiencing serious inflation that has caused a difficult life for the people living under its "temporary" control. VNA reports his concluding appeal to the United States to "respond seriously to our logical and reasonable proposal and engage in genuine negotiations so as to settle the South Vietnam problem promptly instead of pursuing the illusion of winning a military victory and a position of strength through the erroneous way of Vietnamizing the war."

HA VAN LAU ON U.S. POLICY      The VNA account of DRV Ambassador Ha Van Lau's statement notes his denunciation of the U.S. policy of "negotiating from strength" and says he recalled previous statements made by President Nixon and Secretary Laird in this regard. VNA reports Lau's reference to President Nixon's order

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\* Liberation Radio departed from what has been its standard practice and did not broadcast a full text of the PRG delegate's formal statement at the session. The account is generally identical with that of VNA, although with some more detail on Vietnamization.

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on "maximum military pressure" against the "liberated" areas of South Vietnam. It also notes his recitation of other stock war escalation charges--that the number of battalion-size or larger-size sweeps had increased as compared to the number under the Johnson Administration, and that there had been increases in the number of air attacks sorties and the use of toxic chemical spraying.

VNA reports Lau's denunciation of the Nixon Administration's opposition to the proposals made by the DRV and PRG delegation at the talks and of Washington's "clinging" to its positions on mutual troop withdrawal and maintenance of the GVN. VNA's account does not, however, give the full flavor of Lau's remarks dealing with the U.S. attitude and position. It does not report his characterization of "all" proposals of the Nixon Administration on the Vietnam problem--whether in the President's 14 May eight-point program or in proposals made by the Saigon government as an embodiment of the United States' "obdurate and impudent position" regarding the "two crucial questions of a political settlement," the issues of a U.S. troop withdrawal and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

VNA does not acknowledge Lau's reference to early U.S. proposals on such specific questions as the restoration of the DMZ and the prisoners-of-war issue. And it similarly fails to report Lau's comment that Habib at the previous session put forward "nothing but the so-called question of prisoners of war." Consistent with Hanoi's silence on the issue, Lau did not mention that the United States at that time released a list of missing U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia and again asked Hanoi for a list of U.S. prisoners in the DRV.

VNA notes that Lau concluded his remarks by pledging to "continue to denounce the dark schemes of the Nixon Administration" and to continue the "just struggle of the Vietnamese" if the United States refuses to engage in serious negotiations.

### MOSCOW ON PARIS TALKS, TROOP WITHDRAWAL, MCCARTHY TOUR

RESTRICTED TALKS      The 9 June TASS report of the press briefing following the Paris session on the 8th reports that the U.S. delegation proposed holding "restricted" sessions and that DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le denounced the proposal as another proof that the United States is trying to "drag out" and "sabotage" the talks. On the 12th the Moscow domestic service briefly attributes to the New York TIMES a report on American efforts to "pressure" the DRV and PRG delegation at Paris by insisting on "limited" talks and the abolition of post-session press conferences. Thus far, Moscow has offered no comment of its own.

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When Ambassador Lodge first proposed "restricted talks" at the 30 October Paris session, TASS duly reported the remarks at the session and the post-session briefing, and a 1 November IZVESTIYA article scored the proposal as a "maneuver" to conceal aggression and to prevent any progress at the Paris talks.

**TROOP WITHDRAWAL** A 12 January TASS report of Secretary Laird's TV interview the previous day ignores his comments on troop withdrawal, stressing instead that he tried to "hush up" ROK "atrocities" in South Vietnam. On the same day, however, a domestic service broadcast does report the announcement by the U.S. Command that the Army's 1st Infantry Division is to be withdrawn. The report calls the move a "meaningless symbol" considering the "snail's pace" at which troops are being withdrawn.

**SEN. MCCARTHY IN USSR, PARIS** Soviet media carry brief items on Senator McCarthy's Moscow visit, but available propaganda has not mentioned his visit to the DRV Embassy to inquire about the fate of U.S. prisoners. The only mentions of the substance of any of his talks with Soviet officials were in a TASS report, which said he discussed "Soviet-American relations, including economic ties," with the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the United States, and in a domestic service report that he was informed about reconstruction in Moscow during a visit to the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet. There are cursory reports of his meetings with Supreme Soviet leaders on 7 and 8 January, his visit to the Foreign Trade Ministry on the 8th, and his talks with Kosygin on the 11th.

On 12 January the Moscow domestic service briefly reports that McCarthy saw Mme. Binh in Paris for talks on "ways toward a political solution" of the Vietnam problem; and on the 14th TASS reports the communique on Xuan Thuy's talks with McCarthy, noting that Thuy denounced the Vietnamization policy, expressed support for the NFLSV's 10-point program, and highly assessed the effort of the antiwar forces in the United States which demand a speedy and complete withdrawal of U.S. troops.

#### CONTINUING COMMENT ON VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TOUR

**HANOI AND THE FRONT** Vietnamese propaganda continues to criticize Vice President Agnew's Asian trip, highlighting anti-U.S. demonstrations which greeted him. Both Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 10th mention the demonstrations in the Philippines, Nepal, and Afghanistan, also citing protests made by Americans stationed in several countries he visited.

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Quoting the Vice President as saying in Saigon on 1 January that the Vietnamization policy "is correct and being successfully implemented," Hanoi radio on the 10th claims that the communists' 1969 "victories" have shown that Vietnamization has "failed." The broadcast further claims that while Agnew praised the GIs, in fact they are "getting more and more fed up" with the war and the antiwar movement is spreading among them, causing "worry to the Washington rulers."

Agnew's trip to Saigon, Hanoi says, "reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Asia in order to tranquilize the puppets" who were afraid the Americans would abandon them under the new Asian policy. Liberation Radio echoes this line; the broadcast further says that Asians cannot be fooled into fighting Asians and that President Marcos of the Philippines was finally "forced" by the people to withdraw the Filipino troops from Vietnam. It concludes that the "failure" of Agnew's trip is a "result of the great and comprehensive failure of the Americans in South Vietnam."

MOSCOW Moscow continues to assert that Vice President Agnew is trying, during his Asian tour, to "sell" the President's "Guam doctrine" to reluctant Asian states. A 7 January IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev\* says Agnew has been saying what President Nixon could not say--that the Guam doctrine does not essentially change the aggressive intentions of President Johnson's "Asian doctrine" which proclaimed a U.S. intention of establishing dominance in Asia through Asian regional groupings. Kudryavtsev notes that Agnew assured Philippine President Marcos that the United States intends to "maintain its positions" in the Pacific, emphasized in Thailand that there would be no changes in U.S. obligations to Thailand and Southeast Asia, and assured Chiang Kai-shek that the United States would fulfill its obligations to its allies. Kudryavtsev cites the Washington EVENING STAR for the conclusion that the United States seems to be trying to apply a policy of "Vietnamization on a global scale." Thus, says Kudryavtsev, the United States is trying to quiet U.S. public opinion with talk of Vietnamization and troop withdrawal while seeking to use Asian reactionary regimes to counter the Asian national liberation movement.

### NFLSV/PRG TOURING DELEGATIONS IN INDIA, AFRICA

The joint NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien, which had been in India for a "friendship visit" since 13 December, departed on 8 January. According to a "press communique" carried by LPA on the

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\* Kudryavtsev also says that Asian apprehension over American policy in Asia includes concern over U.S. "flirting" with Peking. See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

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10th, the group toured India as the guest of the All-India Peace Council and the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, and Tien had "cordial talks" with Prime Minister Gandhi, External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, and Foreign Secretary Kaul. India has not recognized the PRG and the only mention of the subject in available communist propaganda is in a 10 January IZVESTIYA article on the visit; IZVESTIYA says that during the delegation's stay the Indian press "frequently" put forward demands for the recognition of the PRG and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the DRV.

LPA on 8 January reports that an NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Le Quang Chanh visited Zambia--which also has not recognized the PRG--from 27 December to 5 January. Chanh's group had previously visited Tanzania after touring Iraq, South Yemen, and the Sudan.

### DRV DIRECTIVE ON TET CELEBRATIONS

Hanoi radio on 9 January reports that the DRV Premier "recently" issued a directive on the celebrations of the "Canh Thant" Lunar New Year Festival, Tet. The directive calls for "joyful" celebrations but also says that it must be a Tet "of resistance for national salvation and socialist construction." As in previous years, the instructions call on the population "to practice thrift, maintain vigilance, and be ready to plunge into work and production with a new, stirring revolutionary spirit."

The broadcast notes that the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers has granted one-and-a-half days' leave to cadres, workers, and civil servants--the afternoon of New Year's Eve, 5 February, and the first day of the first lunar month, 6 February. It adds that workers will also be off Saturday, 7 February, but will work in compensation on Sunday, 8 February. (In 1969, after the bombing halt of the DRV, Tet was celebrated in the North for two days; in 1968, the year of the Tet offensive, available propaganda gives no indication of time off for celebrations; and in 1967, comment notes that in "some areas where work was unfinished," only half a day was given for celebrations.)

### POLITBURO MEMBERS' SPEECHES AT DRV MEETINGS

TRUONG CHINH VNA on 8 January reports that Truong Chinh, Politburo member and Chairman of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, had addressed a gathering of correspondents of the weekly THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG (YOUNG PIONEERS) on the occasion of its 15th anniversary. On the same day Hanoi radio in its domestic service also reports the meeting and carries the full text of Chinh's remarks, in which he stressed the duty to "make all-out efforts" to educate

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young people "to correctly comply with the five teachings"\* of President Ho. Noting that a small number of students have been slow and undisciplined learners, Chinh blames such "responsible organs" as families, schools, and society in general for not coordinating closely to educate them.

Saying that THIEU NIEN TIEN PHONG must be a "propagandist, an educator, and an organizer" of teenagers and children, he explains that currently the core of the paper's tasks consists of educating youths about ethics. Among other things, he says, the paper must advise them "to help the organs responsible for maintaining security and order in struggling against these bad elements, and to be vigilant against the hooligans and counterrevolutionaries, . . . ."

PHAM VAN DONG        On 10 January, VNA reports that Politburo member Premier Pham Van Dong recently visited the 4th Congress of Representatives of the Vietnam National Union of Students and "had cordial conversations with the participants." Hanoi radio on the 9th broadcasts Dong's remarks at the meeting, which it says was held on 6 and 7 January. Dong recommends to the students that they "endeavor in study and training to become men and women both Red and expert as President Ho Chi Minh wanted." He goes on to urge the students to seek the best methods to further their study, since building socialism requires "many able and skilled workers" and since a contingent of scientists and technical cadres must be trained and fostered.

LE THANH NGHI        Hanoi radio on 10 January reports that on the 5th the Haiphong People's Municipal Council and City Administrative Committee held a conference at which Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi spoke. Discussing the main points "in the trends and tasks of the 1970 State Plan," Nghi discoursed on Haiphong's responsibility in food and consumer goods production for 1970. He reportedly also dealt with the production emulation drive to overfulfill the 1970 State Plan which was launched on 31 December in Hanoi.

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\* The five teachings of President Ho to children are: to love the fatherland and people, study well and work well, be united and observe good discipline, observe hygiene, and be modest, honest, and courageous.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW SHARPENS ATTACK ON CHINESE; PEKING ISSUES PROTEST

Stung by recent Chinese propaganda and resentful toward renewed Sino-U.S. contacts, Moscow has lifted its restraints on polemics to deliver a sharp attack centered on the Chinese war preparations campaign. In a widely disseminated TASS report dated 9 January and in other comments, Moscow has charged that the Maoist regime is fostering a "military psychosis" in an effort to overcome internal strife and to purge elements conciliatory toward the Soviets. At the same time, Moscow has conveyed its displeasure over recent contacts between the CPR and the United States leading to the agreement to renew the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw this month. The triangular relationship also figures in a CPR protest charging that the Soviets have coordinated with the United States in promoting a two-Chinas plot.

On the same day as the TASS report, Peking unofficially gave its version of the deadlocked Sino-Soviet talks in response to Western news reports from Moscow portraying the Chinese as taking a hostile stance at the talks. Again using the Hong Kong paper TA KUNG PAO as a channel for leaking their views on the talks, the Chinese claim that the deadlock is the result of the Soviet side's refusal to honor an agreement allegedly reached by Premiers Kosygin and Chou En-lai in September calling for military disengagement along the border. The TA KUNG PAO report, citing "well-informed circles," complains that the Soviets have not "put any restraint" on their armed forces, but it does not charge that there have been incidents along the border. The report seems designed to shift the burden of blame from the Chinese for the evident lack of progress in the talks and to reassert the priority Peking has placed on the need for military disengagement. Appearing in an "extra" edition one day after the CPR-U.S. agreement to resume the Warsaw talks, the report may also have been timed to put added pressure on the Soviets.\*

Moscow has used a favorite device of its own--remarks to correspondents by Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin--to announce that the Peking talks are continuing and to indicate Moscow's interest in keeping them

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\* Previously Peking implied a link between the Sino-Soviet and the Warsaw talks. In NCNA's international service in English on 14 December, a report on the departure from Peking that day of chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov was immediately followed by a belated report on the 11 December Warsaw meeting of the CPR charge d'affaires and the U.S. ambassador.

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alive. TASS on 13 January quoted Zamyatin as saying the talks "are continuing and it is yet early to sum up their results." Soviet comment on Chinese war preparations and anti-Soviet propaganda has not spelled out any implications for the talks, though the 9 January TASS report took note of an NCNA report describing propagandists operating "close to the Soviet borders" who have been explaining Mao's directives on war preparedness.

MOSCOW ON CPR MILITARISM      The 9 January TASS report on Chinese war preparations--carried in the central press and widely broadcast--represents the sharpest Soviet polemical attack since the moratorium on criticism of China was imposed in the wake of Kosygin's meeting with Chou in September. It also contains the first direct attack on Mao during this period. Denouncing the Chinese war preparedness campaign as an effort to promote "chauvinist sentiments and military psychosis," TASS says Peking's purpose is to overcome disunity in China and to consolidate the ranks of the "Maoists." The report reacts sharply to recent Chinese propaganda attacks, assailing Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial--which denounced Brezhnev directly--as containing "particularly vicious anti-Soviet attacks." Evinced growing Soviet impatience, TASS charges that Chinese propaganda portraying a Soviet threat ("absurd concoctions" that have been rehashed "for several years already") has recently been presented "more insistently than ever."

In referring to the "Maoists"--while avoiding the once-standard formula "Mao and his group," a code-term implying a faction without legitimate authority--the TASS report probes possible dissension in Peking's higher councils. TASS goes so far as to revive mention of Chinese communists who allegedly favor good relations with the Soviet Union but who have suffered reprisals for their attitude. According to the report, the Maoists have evoked the specter of a Soviet threat as a pretext for refusing to reinstate these communists in the CCP. TASS singles out a Chinese commentary on two opposed views on war, carried in the domestic service and PEOPLE'S DAILY on 24 December, as part of the campaign "glorifying militarism and chauvinism in the spirit of Mao's ideas." That commentary had assailed what it described as the revisionist view that there is a reasonable group within the enemy camp. As TASS notes, the commentary approvingly cited Chiang Ching, a figure generally associated with radical elements that might be expected to insist on an intransigent line toward the Soviets.

The TASS attack is followed up on successive days by articles in IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA charging that Peking's behavior has harmed the communist cause. A Yakovlev article in the 10 January IZVESTIYA

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morning edition, citing Peking as an example of the damage caused by "the rupture of proletarian internationalism," charges that "the atmosphere of war hysteria" being created in China plays into the hands of anticommunist propaganda. A similar theme is developed in PRAVDA's 11 January International review by Kolesnichenko, who denounces "the great-power, adventurist, anti-Soviet course" pursued by Peking for inflicting great damage on the communist movement. Kolesnichenko describes the Chinese war preparations as being "obviously provocative in nature" and refers to "another wave of anti-Soviet hysteria" in the CPR.

While significantly intensifying its polemical pressure, Moscow has also sustained its indirect attacks on Maoist doctrine in broadcasts beamed to China. In the regular Mandarin program for the PLA, a broadcast on 10 January argues in behalf of peaceful coexistence while rebuking those who call for a "revolutionary war, which is allegedly to eliminate a global thermonuclear war"--an allusion to a principal slogan in the Chinese war preparedness campaign. Dismissing views of unnamed theoreticians concerning "people's war" against a nuclear-armed enemy and "defensive warfare" designed to entice the enemy into an unfavorable position, the commentary attributes these views to a need to cover up the economic and military weaknesses of "those countries which advocate such a theory and their lack of a genuine military theory."

Moscow uses its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress as an irritant to Peking by informing the Chinese people of the CPR's recent dealings with Yugoslavia. Citing a report by a TANYUG correspondent in Peking, a Mandarin broadcast on the 12th reports that a Yugoslav freighter entered the port of Shanghai and was unloaded at an "unprecedented" speed. The broadcast plays up the hospitable reception accorded this ship's first visit to Shanghai.

SOVIET-CPR-U.S. TRIANGLE      Moscow has displayed its resentment and suspicion toward renewed Sino-U.S. contacts, characterized as Washington's "flirting" with Peking in order to advance U.S. interests. According to TASS on 8 January, the weekly LIFE ABROAD carried articles on this alleged flirtation from the foreign press together with a comment by I. Kravchenko denouncing "the perfidious attempts by militant circles" in the United States "to complicate relations" between Moscow and Peking. Soviet comment on Vice President Agnew's Asian tour has also played on this theme, as in the observation by IZVESTIYA commentator Kudryavtsev (in the 8 January morning edition) that the U.S. aim is to exploit Chinese dissidence in the interest of Washington's new Asian policy.

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The agreement reached by the United States and the CPR to renew the Warsaw ambassadorial talks has been reported without comment by Moscow. The Soviet press did, however, carry reports on the agreement in the same issues which published the TASS report on Chinese war preparations, with IZVESTIYA juxtaposing the reports and PRAVDA and RED STAR printing them on the same page. The timing of the TASS report suggests that Sino-U.S. developments are a factor in Moscow's intensified polemics.

Peking has also given vent to its suspicions in the triangular relationship, charging that Soviet media's coverage of Vice President Agnew's visit to Taiwan provided support for an alleged U.S. plot to create two Chinas. A CPR protest to the Soviet Union, dated 9 January and released on the 11th, strains to cite evidence from Soviet coverage of the visit indicating that Moscow regards Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan as a country. Taking the occasion to denounce the "Soviet revisionist social imperialists" for being hostile to the Chinese people, the protest claims that Moscow is mounting a "new anti-China campaign." This protest may have been provoked by snide observations in Soviet media that Peking had not reacted to the Vice President's affirmations of support for Chiang.

#### ULAN BATOR: MPR NOT A PAWN IN SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

An article in the Mongolian paper UNEN, carried on 9 January by TASS and PRAVDA, betrays sensitivity to the MPR's delicate position in the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Setting out to "expose the slanderous fabrications" contained in a UPI report which aimed at "undermining Mongolia's international authority," the UNEN article declares that even though "fraternal international assistance was rendered by Soviet Russia" the Mongolian people themselves, under the leadership of the party, gained their freedom and independence in 1921. UNEN insists that "no outside force proclaimed our country's independence" as alleged by UPI. Denying a statement in the UPI report that the existing treaty with the Soviet Union is "a treaty for rendering military aid," the paper says that on the contrary "it represents an historic document which is strengthening and deepening the ties of fraternal friendship between our countries and is promoting close cooperation in all spheres of the economy and culture."

With respect to alleged UPI statements that "when Mao Tse-tung and his communist supporters came to power in China many considered that Mongolia would again become a part of China" and that "Mongolia's location predetermined its fate to be a pawn in the struggle between Russia and Red China," UNEN charges that the UPI correspondent "failed to conceal the fact that he was one of those 'many people' who hoped Mongolia would again become part of China." Noting that Mongolia does border "on two great countries," the UNEN article states

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unequivocally that "throughout their history the Mongolian people have never played the role of a 'pawn' being moved from one place to another by others" and asserts that "these fantasies" are nothing more than "the audibly expressed thoughts of those who aspire to shape the destinies of other peoples."

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## MIDDLE EAST

## USSR CONTINUES TO CRITICIZE U.S. MIDEAST PROPOSALS

Soviet propagandists continue to assail the U.S. proposals for a Middle East settlement as Israel-oriented and as diverging from the November 1967 Security Council resolution, which is pressed as the "only acceptable basis" for resolving the conflict. At the same time, Moscow displays some sensitivity to Western press assessments that it is to the Soviet Union's advantage to prolong the conflict, as well as to speculation that there had been some measure of Soviet approval of the U.S. proposals and that Moscow has now changed its position with regard to the "Rhodes formula" on indirect Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moscow argues that "procedural questions" such as the form of any negotiations should be set aside in favor of working out the "essence of concrete principles" for implementing the Security Council resolution.

Comment tends to sidestep the question of official French involvement in the affair of the Israeli gunboats taken from Cherbourg despite the French embargo on arms to participants in the 1967 war; nor does Moscow address itself to Paris' intentions in connection with French arms deliveries to the Arab countries. Moscow pictures France as under heavy pressure from the United States and Israel to give up the Mirage talks with Libya, and Israel is said to seek "confrontations" between France and the other three powers in order to "cause disarray among the countries which want to see a settlement."

**U.S. PROPOSALS** A critique of the U.S. proposals by Primakov in the 14 January PRAVDA, as reported by TASS, seems to follow the lines of the 23 December Soviet response to the United States as described in the U.S. press on 13 January. Primakov charges the American press with trying to prove that "there had supposedly been some changes" in the U.S. position on the Middle East question and with trying to find additional means of pressure against the Arabs. Complaining of "impudent falsifications" by American "propaganda," Primakov cites an article by Joseph Alsop who "alleged in the Washington POST that the American proposals on the Middle East conflict had been tentatively approved" by the Soviet Union. Avoiding an outright denial, Primakov says that the "latest strategem of U.S. diplomacy" was prompted by increasing dissatisfaction with American policy in all Arab countries. He assesses the American plan as shifting from attempts to arrive at a "concerted formula" among the four powers for implementation of the November resolution, designed to facilitate the mission of U Thant's envoy, Jarring, to "a purely formal resumption of this mission."

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Primakov accuses the United States of "even changing its position" on some points in a pro-Israeli direction, with a view to reaching understanding "mainly on those issues which are advantageous for Israel." He charges "certain U.S. quarters" with seeking to wreck the possibility of agreement "not on neutral wordings but on the essence of concrete principles" of implementing the Security Council resolution. Suggesting that Moscow may seek to pursue the Middle East question in the four-power rather than bilateral consultations, TASS notes that Primakov in conclusion referred to both the Big Four and bilateral discussions and urged "continuation of the efforts of the Big Four powers" to find the best ways of practical implementation of all the resolution's provisions.

Reacting defensively to the idea that Soviet interests would be better served by prolonging the Middle East conflict, Kudryavtsev declares in the 11 January IZVESTIYA that behind Washington's proposals lay a desire to spread the notion that "prolongation of the war was supposedly in the interests of the Soviet Union, which allegedly is using it to 'advance its influence' in the Near East," as well as a desire "to accuse the Soviet Union of everything and thereby attempt to weaken its growing authority among the Arab countries and peoples."

Kudryavtsev accuses the United States of "patently deviating" from the Security Council resolution, whose "prime condition" is unconditional Israeli withdrawal. He ticks off complaints about the proposals regarding the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Sharm ash-Shaykh, and Jerusalem, concluding that if one follows Secretary Rogers, "only bits and pieces" of the resolution remain. He derides the legality of Israel's territorial claims, pointing out that Israel's borders prior to 5 June 1967 "do not correspond with those defined by the UN decisions of 1947," when the state of Israel was created; "the Arab countries could have claims against Israel, if they were guided by the justice which Israel and Washington are hypocritically shouting about." (The 1947 partition boundaries were described by PRAVDA's Belyayev, in a May 1969 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article, as the only Israeli boundaries that could be "legally recognized.")

Noting that the American proposals are addressed to the UAR and Jordan separately, "generally excluding Syria," Kudryavtsev maintains that the proposals aim, as does Israel, at achieving direct negotiations with each Arab country separately to compel them to capitulate. Some Soviet comment in late December had described the U.S. plan as consisting of three separate proposals--for the UAR, Jordan, and Syria.

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RHODES FORMULA A remark by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, at his press conference reported by TASS on 13 January, rejects Israeli interpretations of the Rhodes formula on Israeli-Arab negotiations as being "direct talks," but--like the few prior propaganda references to the formula--is careful not to rule out such negotiations altogether. Zamyatin, TASS says, denied that the Soviet Union had changed its position on the Middle East and accused Alsop of misinterpreting the Soviet position regarding the "so-called Rhodes formula."

TASS explains that this formula appeared in 1949 "during the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire agreement," the text of which "was agreed on with the mediation of UN representatives." But the "actual meaning now read into this formula," TASS says, is shown by Israeli contentions that the Rhodes talks "had allegedly been 'direct' talks." Zamyatin declared that the Soviet Union had never recognized such an interpretation. TASS adds that "after the 'Israeli explanations,' the United States is again bringing forth as one of the main questions the so-called 'Rhodes formula'"; by talking about the form of negotiations, the United States and Israel want to supplant the "main issue--the need to agree on the main principles" of a Middle East settlement on the basis of the November resolution.

PRAVDA's Belyayev rejects the Rhodes formula along the same lines. In the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable program on 11 December, he explains that the formula is unacceptable to the Arabs, "particularly since the Israelis have said that direct talks were supposed to have taken place" on Rhodes in 1949. Thus he appears to leave open the possibility, much as Zamyatin does, that such talks might be considered if the Israeli interpretation were changed. Belyayev goes on to repeat the long-standing Soviet contention that direct talks under conditions of Israeli occupation would constitute Arab capitulation.

In an ambiguous passage in his 11 January IZVESTIYA article, Kudryavtsev seems to object to the Rhodes formula on the same grounds as he did in a 17 December article in LIFE ABROAD, charging in both instances that the United States is trying in veiled form to force through the Israeli idea of direct negotiations with the Arab countries. In IZVESTIYA, he complains of the emphasis in the U.S. plan on "the procedure of the talks the United States has proposed" on normalization of the situation. Stating that the Rhodes formula was chosen as a "disguise" for Israeli demands, he says "the falseness" of this formula is striking because the Jarring mission "has borne no results primarily owing to the fault of American diplomacy." In late October, in the wake of the commotion created by reports--and Cairo denials--of UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's acceptance of the Rhodes formula, Kudryavtsev had been more categorical in rejecting the formula. He had argued in a broadcast in English to

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the United Kingdom that "accepting the Rhodes formula, even with Gunnar Jarring as mediator, would signify entering into direct negotiations with Israel before Israel cleared out of the occupied territories." He criticized the British press for "hypocritically calling these talks indirect, since the delegations were in different rooms at the time and came together in one room only to sign the agreement."

MILITARY OPERATIONS        The Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA is apparently the first reflection of concern in Soviet propaganda over the recent Israeli military exploits in attacking sensitive UAR targets. Kudryavtsev declares that the Israeli militarists' actions are becoming "ever more insolent and dangerous in view of their possible consequences." One can ascertain not only the extension of military actions, he says, but also "the preparation for spreading them to remote regions" of the Arab countries.

TASS regularly and briefly reports Arab military operations and Israeli "armed provocations," citing Arab military spokesmen's statements. Reporting the Israeli operation on the night of 26-27 December against what Cairo radio called "warning posts north of Ras Gharib and az-Zafaranah," TASS mentioned only the latter area; it was from Ras Gharib that the Israelis, as they acknowledged on 3 January, brought back a Soviet radar installation. Citing a UAR armed forces spokesman on the 7 and 13 January attacks on UAR military installations near Cairo, TASS in each instance said only that the Israeli planes were intercepted by the Egyptian air force and were compelled to retreat.

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## NIGERIA

## MOSCOW SEEKS TO EXPLOIT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VICTORY

Moscow reacts to the Biafran surrender with comment underscoring an image of the Soviet Union as a champion of African unity, contrasting Soviet support of a legitimate government against secessionist rebels with Western "interference" represented by aid to Biafra. Authoritative comment comes from Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, who remarked at his 13 January press conference, in reply to a question about the Soviet position on aid, that genuine humanitarian aid "should be rendered through the Federal Government at its request." Accordingly, as quoted by TASS, Zamyatin declared that the USSR "has given and will continue to give its support and material aid" to Lagos and that "so-called 'aid' to the rebels through various charity organizations" is "nothing but interference in Nigeria's internal affairs."

An article by Korovikov in PRAVDA on the same day, reviewed by TASS, embroiders the theme that the war has taught Nigeria "who are its friends and who are its enemies." Repeating past Soviet charges that Western oil monopolies played a role in instigating the conflict, the article seeks to blame the tragic consequences of the war on efforts "by the imperialist powers to fan up conflicts and to supply arms and give political support to the separatists." Moscow has on several past occasions acknowledged Soviet "material" aid to Lagos, as in Zamyatin's current remarks, but has never admitted specifically to being an arms supplier.

Noting that the Western press is "clamoring" for aid missions to be sent to Nigeria, the PRAVDA article says this indicates that "the Western powers have not abandoned their attempts to interfere in Nigeria's internal affairs." And an article by Khokhlov in IZVESTIYA on the same day says the country's "progressive forces" must now "take firmer steps to strengthen unity and to rebuff Western blackmail" and "to prevent imperialist forces from interfering in Nigeria's internal affairs." Neither article, to judge from the TASS accounts, specifically mentions U.S. offers to aid the war victims; in keeping with customary practice, the attack is focused broadly on the "imperialist" West.

Just as Khokhlov in IZVESTIYA welcomes the Nigerian Government victory with "profound satisfaction" and declares that the USSR has "always been in favor of a sovereign and united Nigeria," so Radio Moscow tells African listeners that Nigeria's "friends" are happy to see a tragic period ending and that the USSR has always stood for Nigerian unity, territorial integrity, and peace.

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It was on grounds of support for national unity that Moscow came down unequivocally on the side of the Federal Government when the fighting started in mid-1967, using propaganda support of Lagos as part of the Soviet effort to establish a political presence in the area. At the same time, as if to keep its options open, Moscow avoided directly attacking the Ibos, generally depicting them as pawns victimized by the Western "imperialists" and oil monopolies. As manifestations of world sympathy for the plight of the starving Biafrans and censure of arms suppliers increased, Soviet propagandists sought to play down the Soviet role and to concentrate almost entirely on the Western powers' alleged culpability. The volume of comment and reportage on Nigeria declined and has been very sparse even in broadcasts to Africa for more than a year.

Now, in the current Soviet press articles as well as in news coverage five times the previous norm in broadcasts to Africa, Moscow seizes an opportunity to make political capital of Soviet support for the winning side, reemphasizing its backing of Lagos in a conflict instigated and prolonged by the "imperialists and colonialists." Wide publicity is given a report that General Gowon has expressed thanks to Ambassador Romanov for Soviet support.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## SECRETARY LAIRD'S REMARKS SCORED BY ZAMYATIN, PROPAGANDISTS

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin touched briefly on the recently concluded Helsinki phase of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at his 13 January press conference, commenting that their results were "positively assessed" in the USSR. At the same time, according to the TASS report on the press conference, Zamyatin observed that Secretary Laird's 7 January statement on expanding the construction of the Safeguard ABM system "confirms the existence in the United States of forces actively resisting a limitation of the strategic arms race and trying to create obstacles for talks on that matter" and that Laird "frightens Americans by a Soviet menace he has himself invented." The TASS account does not include Zamyatin's observation, reported in the Western press, that the Soviet Union is confident that the next round of talks opening in Vienna in April "will be in the same spirit that marked Helsinki."

Zamyatin's comments follow a spate of propaganda critical of Laird's remarks on the U.S. arms budget and the expanding of the Safeguard system. A RED STAR article on 9 January, reporting on plans to expand Safeguard, quoted the New York TIMES for the observation that such a step "might prove excessively provocative with respect to the Soviet Union at a time when certain results have been achieved at the Soviet-American preliminary talks in Helsinki." RED STAR alluded to "officials" in Washington who are expressing fear that the Pentagon's plans "could exert a negative influence on the forthcoming Soviet-American talks" in Vienna. The military paper's reference to the possible impact on SALT is now echoed in a 13 January IZVESTIYA article criticizing Laird's remarks; IZVESTIYA says only that the plans for new weapons systems have "caused alarm among the American public, which is legitimately worried by the new wave of the Pentagon's military aspirations."

Over Radio Moscow, a foreign-language commentary by Vavilov on the 8th said recent remarks by the Secretary on the "alleged Soviet threat" have been taken up by "militarist circles in the United States." Noting that the Helsinki phase of SALT has been met with "satisfaction" throughout the world and that the talks will resume in Vienna in April, Vavilov stated that circles connected with the "military-industrial complex" in the United States "are doing everything they can to prevent anything being done to limit the arms race."

Continuing to report U.S. domestic opposition to development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), TASS on 9 January said Senator Proxmire indicated in a recent speech that MIRV testing "means a further buildup of the U.S. nuclear potential and creates serious obstacles for the talks on strategic arms limitation."

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## EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

## SOVIET SPOKESMAN VIEWS U.S. PARTICIPATION FAVORABLY

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin, at a 13 January press conference "devoted to questions of preparing and convening a conference on problems of European security," states that Moscow has informed Washington "of its favorable attitude to the participation of the United States in an all-European conference"--an attitude which, he adds, is shared by the other socialist countries. This is Moscow's first direct public statement that U.S. participation is acceptable, in contrast to long-standing Soviet ambivalence on the question in the past. In December 1966 and July 1968, for example, Kosygin had said U.S. participation was a matter "to be decided by the conference itself." More recently, the 1 December 1969 Soviet-Danish communique and the 22 December Soviet-Luxembourg communique referred to the participation of "all interested countries." Two days prior to Zamyatin's declaration, a participant in a domestic service commentators' roundtable show had remarked that the United States, "a non-European country, claims the right to participate in the European conference."\*

Zamyatin's press conference otherwise broke no new ground on the question of a European security conference. A statement read by him--carried in full by TASS four hours ahead of the TASS report of his remarks on U.S. participation--stresses the favorable response to the proposal for a conference and its timeliness. The statement endorses the agenda items contained in the 31 October Prague declaration of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers--the creation of security in Europe and renunciation of force and the widening of commercial and other ties between European states--and assails opponents of the conference who would delay it or overburden the agenda "with such questions as it would be unable to decide." While the statement cites no example of such questions, propaganda at the time of the NATO Council's Brussels meeting in early December had complained of efforts to place balanced force reduction and the German question on the conference agenda. Western news sources report that Zamyatin, in answer to a question, stated that the European security conference should not discuss the Berlin problem, but this exchange is not included in the TASS account of the question-and-answer session.

The statement read by Zamyatin at the press conference routinely attacks those "people" at the Brussels meeting who would prefer to switch the work of the forthcoming conference to talks between NATO and the Warsaw

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\* See the FBIS SURVEY of 4 December 1969, pages 2-3, for a recent discussion of Soviet propaganda treatment of the issue of U.S. participation.

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Pact. Such an approach, the statement says, would allow no role for European neutrals.

The timing of the Zamyatin press conference may relate in part to the reported opening in Moscow the next day of a secret meeting of European communist parties to discuss "the anti-imperialist struggle" and European security. AFP reports this development on the 14th, citing "well-informed sources" in Moscow.

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## USSR AND SPAIN

## SPANISH CP OPPOSES EXPANDED SOVIET-SPANISH RELATIONS

While Moscow propaganda on Spain continues to dwell routinely on labor unrest and opposition to the presence of U.S. bases, ignoring Western press speculation about moves toward a thaw in Soviet-Spanish relations, Spanish CP Secretary General Santiago Carrillo appeared to lend substance to the Western speculation in an interview over the party's clandestine Radio Espana Independiente on 5 January. In the wake of a meeting--reported by Western sources--between the Spanish foreign minister and senior Soviet officials at the Moscow airport,\* Carrillo expounded on his party's opposition to a rapprochement. Referring to a Madrid newspaper editorial which saw Moscow and its Warsaw Pact partners moving toward expanded ties with Spain, he said his party had "always" opposed "political, consular, or diplomatic relations" between Spain and the socialist countries and added--in an evident allusion to Poland, Romania, and Hungary, which have established consular ties with Spain--that such relations "will not be any advantage to those who have established them." With Franco "nearing his end," Carrillo stated, the party would have preferred that the socialist countries continue to shun "a regime imposed with the help of Hitler and Mussolini" so that "the prestige" of these countries might be preserved.

FRICTIONS BETWEEN  
SPANISH CP & CPSU

Frictions between Moscow and the Spanish CP appear to have been exacerbated by the Spanish party's intransigent stand on the Czechoslovak question. In October the party's executive committee reacted to the sanctions imposed on Dubcek and Smrkovsky with a statement charging that the actions against the Czechoslovak reformist leaders contravened "the conclusions of the 20th CPSU Congress" and marked a return to "methods justly condemned by the international communist movement."

Radio Espana Independiente now suggests that Moscow may be collaborating in the splitting efforts of two pro-Soviet dissidents who were dropped from Spanish party leadership positions in July. On 13 December the clandestine radio broadcast a purported letter sent to the party executive committee by "the Committee of the Spanish Communist Party [in exile] in the Soviet Union" protesting the activities of the two dissidents, who it alleged were trying to "discredit" the policies of

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\* Confirmed by the Spanish foreign minister to have taken place 26 December, according to a 12 January AFP report.

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the party leadership by disseminating "biased propaganda" to party militants. This propaganda, the letter charged, "is reprinted, distributed, and recorded on tapes, and signatures are collected and attached to letters demanding the measures adopted against these two men be cancelled." Indicating that the two dissidents enjoyed support from elements of the Spanish party residing in the USSR who were receiving and disseminating their propaganda materials, the letter alleged that "the dividing and splitting activities" of the dissidents were "clearly expressed in the attitude recently adopted by groups of comrades closely connected with these men." It complained that this divisive activity "makes it difficult for the Committee of the Spanish Communist Party in the Soviet Union to fulfill its tasks."

In the course of his 5 January interview Carrillo alluded to the two dissidents, stating that while all Spanish communists are in favor of maintaining "the best relations of friendship with the CPSU," they also feel that "just as pro-China fractions were not tolerated, so others which tried to favor any other socialist countries could not be tolerated either."

**TIRANA COMMENT** A 13 January Tirana domestic broadcast seizes on the reports of a meeting between the Spanish foreign minister and Soviet officials as exposing the "demagogic" nature of "claims" by the "Soviet revisionist clique" that it "allegedly defends the cause of socialism." Moves toward a Moscow-Madrid rapprochement stem not from any reversal of the Franco regime's policy of "suppression and massacre of the Spanish people," the broadcast says, but rather from an affinity between Franco's policy and Moscow's. The Soviet flirtation with Spain is called part and parcel of a policy of cooperation with "the most reactionary and bloody regimes of the world within the framework of the general U.S.-Soviet collaboration to divide their spheres of influence and suppress the peoples' liberation movement."

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND

## WARSAW MEDIA GIVE CERNIK VISIT LAVISH TREATMENT

Polish media's full and enthusiastic treatment of Czechoslovak Premier Cernik's 8-10 January "friendship" visit to Warsaw exceeds the publicity usually accorded a third-ranking guest from a bloc country and contrasts with Moscow's treatment of the holdover figure from the discredited Dubcek regime when he visited the Soviet Union with Husak and Svoboda last October: the Soviet press carried pictures and biographies of the latter two but not of Cernik, and Kosygin pointedly refrained from mentioning the Czechoslovak visitors by name in his toast at an embassy reception. Cernik was again in the Soviet Union on 3-4 December for the meeting of top party and government leaders of the socialist states and stayed on for what Moscow and Prague media were to describe, upon his return home on the 13th, as a "rest" at Kosygin's invitation.

That Cernik has now acquired some renewed acceptability, at least in Poland, is suggested by Warsaw media's comment on his January visit, which included a "cordial and friendly" meeting with Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz on the first day. Summing up the talks after Cernik's departure, TRYBUNA LUDU on 12 January hails "the full convergence of views on all problems discussed" and stresses that "these were important and fruitful talks which produced advantageous results both for Poland and for the cause of strengthening the unity of the socialist community." The military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI the same day, in an article titled "A New Level of Cooperation," says the visit served "the most vital national interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia." The lengthy 10 January communique on the Cernik-Cyrankiewicz talks records full agreement on the whole gamut of bilateral, bloc, and international topics, characterizing the atmosphere of the talks as one of "frankness and mutual confidence."

While neither the Polish press comment nor the communique alludes directly to Czechoslovakia's past troubles with the Warsaw Five, the two principals gave this subject an orthodox airing in their public utterances. At a 9 January meeting at the Zeran Automobile Factory, Cyrankiewicz asserted in notably hardline terms that a victory of "the antisocialist forces" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 would have meant "weakening the solidarity" of the socialist states "at a defined sector in the southwest, with all its consequences for the future . . ." Speaking on the same platform, Cernik was more direct than before in recalling at length how the "counterrevolutionary" forces "were shattered in 1968." His most explicit praise for Husak's leadership came in a Polish radio and television interview, also on

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the 9th, in which he noted that "since April 1969, when the new party leadership began its activity, the development has been completely normal, and favorable internal and external conditions have been created."

Prague television carried a routine interview with Cernik on his arrival back home on the 10th, in contrast to the total ignoring of the premier by Czechoslovak media in their airport interviews on the return of the CSSR party-government delegation from Moscow last October.

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