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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

6 OCTOBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 40)

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010035-6

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 SEPTEMBER -- 3 OCTOBER 1971

<u>Moscow (3367 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1477 items)</u>		
Indochina	(7%)	9%	Domestic Issues	(32%)	32%
[TASS Statement on	(1%)	4%]	National Day	(--)	27%
U.S. Bombing of DRV			Indochina	(29%)	17%
[Podgorny in DRV	(--)	3%]	[Li Hsien-nien	(5%)	9%]
Yemen Premier in USSR	(--)	5%	Economic Delega-		
Prime Minister Gandhi	(1%)	5%	tion in DRV		
in USSR			[Bombing of DRV	(10%)	3%]
Podgorny Stopover in	(0.1%)	4%	PRC Seat in UN	(9%)	6%
India					
China	(4%)	4%			
UK Spy Charges Against	(1%)	4%			
USSR					
Brezhnev in Yugoslavia	(20%)	4%			
Brezhnev in Bulgaria	(0.3%)	4%			
Brezhnev in Hungary	(1%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi's observance of the 1 October PRC National Day followed the standard pattern with the usual congratulatory message, speeches, and editorial comment. However, strains in Sino-DRV relations seem reflected in some of Hanoi's anniversary propaganda, just as they had been mirrored in its propaganda on the 24-28 September visit of the Li Hsien-nien economic delegation. Both Pham Van Dong's speech and the anniversary message are more restrained than they were last year in thanking the Chinese and characterizing the Chinese revolutionary struggle. The DRV congratulatory message uses the term "proletarian internationalism"--after Hanoi had studiously avoided it during Li Hsien-nien's visit--but there is continued evidence that the DRV remains less willing than China to describe their bilateral relations as based on this concept.

Propaganda surrounding Soviet President Podgorny's official visit in Hanoi stresses Soviet aid and solidarity between the two countries. And Podgorny at a banquet on the 3d pointedly said that the CPSU and the VWP share a common ideology which they defend against both revisionism and dogmatism. Hanoi avoids openly polemical statements, but it does repeatedly describe Soviet-DRV relations as being based on proletarian internationalism. First Secretary Le Duan, at the meeting on the 4th, pledged that the Vietnamese "will exert all their energy" to strengthen relations with the USSR, China, and other socialist countries in order "to help restore and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The reiteration of this stand seems particularly noteworthy against the background of Hanoi's polemical charges in July and August that the United States (through its overtures to Peking) was attempting to split the socialist countries.

Hanoi and Front media pursue standard propaganda themes in their reaction to the 3 October GVN presidential election. The voting is dismissed as a "farce" in a statement by a PRG spokesman and in press and radio comment, which reaffirms communist determination to bring about President Thieu's overthrow and maintains that the election has only made his position more isolated.

DRV PROPAGANDA ON PRC ANNIVERSARY IS STANDARD BUT RESTRAINED

Hanoi observed PRC National Day with a "grand meeting" sponsored by mass organizations on 29 September, a banquet at the Chinese embassy on the 30th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on 1 October. In a departure

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from the practice of previous years, DRV speeches and the editorial marking the PRC anniversary all mention Soviet as well as Chinese aid. Similar atypical references to Soviet aid were interjected in propaganda on the visit of the Li Hsien-nien delegation which signed the Sino-DRV aid agreement.* The references square with Hanoi's general effort to assume a scrupulously nonpartisan stance on the eve of Soviet President Podgorny's arrival in Hanoi.

Pham Van Dong's expression of thanks to the Chinese in his speech at the banquet this year was more reserved than his comments last year, when he voiced "profound gratitude" for China's "heartfelt support and great and valuable assistance." His only reference to Chinese aid this year was in a passage declaring that the Vietnamese have relied mainly on their own strength but have also "strived to win the sympathy and the great and precious support and assistance of the PRC, the Soviet Union, and the other fraternal socialist countries as well as of the whole of progressive mankind." He also referred this year to Vietnamese "profound gratitude" for the Chinese people's "militant solidarity."

The annual DRV message of greetings to the PRC--as usual addressed to Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai and signed by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong--is somewhat more subdued than last year's message. It does credit the Chinese with achievements in "the struggle against U.S.-led imperialism and colonialism and neocolonialism and for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism." But the 1970 message was much more ebullient in its declaration that China has been "holding aloft the banner of opposition to imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism" and that it "has given powerful support to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people and nations and has made tremendous contributions to the struggle in the whole world for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism."

The reference to proletarian internationalism in the message differs from last year's--a noteworthy difference against the recent background of Hanoi's implications that China was departing from this principle and the DRV's failure to respond

* See the 29 September TRENDS, pages 1-6, for a discussion of the Li Hsien-nien trip.

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in kind to Li Hsien-nien's use of the term during his visit to Hanoi. This year's message maintains that the people of Vietnam and China have built up "an ardent love [as translated by VNA] among 'comrades and brothers' on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." But it drops the declaration in the message last year that mutual friendship between the two peoples had been "unceasingly consolidated and developed" on this basis.

Despite this change, there seems no lack of warmth in the message when it refers to the "ardent love" (tinh thắm thiết) of "'comrades and brothers.'" This appears to be a paraphrase of a line in a Ho Chi Minh poem: "profound is the friendship between Vietnam and China, who are both comrades and brothers." Peking's versions of the message and Hanoi's own Chinese-language broadcast of the greeting modify the phrase to conform more closely with the Ho quotation, referring to "profound friendship" instead of "ardent love." The reason for the appearance of the less usual term "love" in the message as transmitted by VNA and in Hanoi's domestic service is not clear.

The DRV's current sensitivity regarding the concept of proletarian internationalism was also indicated by Hanoi radio's failure to include some remarks at the 29 September "grand meeting" by one Nguyen Van Huyen, a vice president of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, which were reported by NCNA. According to NCNA, Huyen said that the Vietnamese "are determined to do their utmost to nurture the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between our two peoples based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and have it consolidated and developed with each passing day." Elsewhere in his speech Nguyen Van Huyen hailed the friendship of the two peoples since they "came under the leadership of the proletarian parties," but these remarks too were reported only by Peking.

PODGORNY VISIT PROVIDES PEG FOR STRESS ON USSR-DRV SOLIDARITY

Soviet President Podgorny was given a top-level, warm greeting upon his arrival in Hanoi on 3 October, comparable to that accorded Kosygin in February 1965 and Chou En-lai last March. The entire VWP Politburo with the exception of Le Duc Tho and the long-absent Pham Hung met him at the airport, and most of

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the Politburo members also attended the banquet that evening and the Hanoi rally the next day.

In addition to the banquet and rally, Podgorny's activities so far have included talks with Ton Duc Thang on the 3d and with most of the members of the Politburo on the 4th and 5th. Moscow has repeatedly described the talks as being marked by "complete mutual understanding" and "unanimity," while Hanoi has avoided these characterizations.*

TASS described Podgorny's talks with Thang as having taken place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship, solidarity, and complete mutual understanding," while VNA said they were characterized by "fraternal friendship and militant solidarity." The talks on the 4th, according to VNA, were "permeated with brotherly friendship and militant solidarity." TASS' brief report on the 4th did not characterize the talks, but on the 5th, reporting their "completion," TASS said they were held in an atmosphere "of brotherhood characteristic of the relations between the CPSU and the VWP" and that they "reaffirmed full unanimity and mutual understanding of the sides on all problems under discussion." VNA's brief report on the 5th merely said that the talks "concluded successfully." In his 4 October rally speech, according to VNA's text, Podgorny said again that "complete mutual understanding" was manifested on "all questions brought up" and that "good decisions have been reached." Le Duan did not however, mention the talks in his speech on the same occasion.

SOVIET AID Both the composition of the Soviet delegation and the remarks made by Podgorny suggest that Soviet aid has been a major topic of discussion. In addition to Politburo member Mazurov, Party Secretary Katushev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, the delegation includes Vice Premier Novikov, who customarily signs the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreements, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Skachkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense Gen. Sokolov, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Grishin.

* When Le Duan met with Brezhnev on 9 May 1971, after attending the CPSU Congress and spending several weeks in the USSR, Moscow said that talks had taken place in an atmosphere of "complete unanimity," a term Hanoi avoided.

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At the 4 October Hanoi rally, Podgorny said that aid was discussed in the talks and added that "we take into consideration the fact that the war is continuing and that Vietnam needs arms, ammunition, and various military materials." He also stressed that the further development of "economic, trade, scientific, and technical ties" was being discussed. Routine Moscow comment on the visit reviews Soviet aid in the kind of detail that has become common in recent Moscow propaganda. The current comment includes assertions that more than 150 industrial, agricultural, and other projects have been built in the DRV with Soviet assistance and that more than 3,000 Vietnamese trainees and 4,000 students have received education in the USSR, with about 10,000 Vietnamese now studying and undergoing training in the Soviet Union.

Hanoi spokesmen have repeatedly expressed gratitude for Soviet aid and support, and a 3 October NHAN DAN editorial says Podgorny's visit shows the Soviet Union's determination to "increase its support and assistance to the Vietnamese people."

Le Duan at the rally was typically effusive in saying that the Vietnamese people "will forever engrave in their hearts the great, valuable, and effective support" rendered them by the party, government, and people of the Soviet Union. He said nothing specifically about military aid but mentioned Soviet specialists "in great numbers" and scientists who are training Vietnamese scientific and technical workers. He went on to express "heartfelt" sympathy for recent Soviet flood relief, thus paralleling the expression of thanks for Chinese flood relief during Li Hsien-nien's visit.

Podgorny in his rally speech on the 4th made a remark which could be construed as a slap at the Chinese stand on modern warfare when he said: "You know better than anyone else that the modern arms and modern war materials in the skillful hands of the heroic combatants of the VPA, of the Vietnamese patriots, play an important role in delivering thunder blows at the aggressors." Peking and Hanoi both profess commitment to the theory that men are more important than weapons, but Hanoi has on occasion been more willing than Peking to acknowledge the significant role of modern weapons. Their different approaches were reflected in propaganda during the Lam Son 719 operation earlier this year: A 21 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, for example, hailed alleged communist successes in Laos as proof that "modern warfare still relies on bravery and

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political consciousness" and described battles in which the "patriots" used "bayonets" to wipe out "whole battalions and regiments" which were "armed to the teeth." By contrast, Hanoi comment acknowledged the communist use of tanks and other modern weapons and held that the Lam Son 719 engagement demonstrated the importance of organizing logistics and technological support.

USSR-DRV In his 3 October banquet speech, Podgorny made
RELATIONS a reference to Soviet-DRV party relations which
 seems particularly pointed against the background
of Hanoi's implications--in its polemics during July and
August--that China was departing from a proletarian internationalist
path. Expressing satisfaction with the strengthening relations
between the CPSU and the VWP, Podgorny said:

We have a common ideological banner, Marxism-Leninism,
the purity of which we have upheld and will continue to
uphold from any attacks and revisionist or dogmatic
distortions. We are invariably loyal to the Leninist
principle of proletarian internationalism of which Ho
Chi Minh, the great patriot and internationalist, was
a convinced advocate and champion.*

Speaking at the Hanoi rally on the 4th, Podgorny said that "to support unconditionally the Vietnamese people's cause is the direct internationalist duty of all the revolutionary forces of our time. There is every reason to say that the word Vietnam today sounds like an appeal for solidarity and unity."

Vietnamese speakers repeatedly characterized Soviet-DRV relations as being based on "proletarian internationalism," a description they had been notably reluctant to use regarding Sino-DRV relations during the Li Hsien-nien visit. And according to VNA, one of the slogans decorating the city was: "Long live the unity and friendship among the socialist countries on the

* In a general passage in his rally speech on the 4th expressing Soviet willingness to strengthen friendship and cooperation with Asian countries, Podgorny reaffirmed Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress call for normalized relations with Peking "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism"--positions which the Soviets maintain the Chinese leadership has abandoned. See the USSR-PRC section of this TRENDS for a discussion of Soviet comment on China in connection with PRC National Day.

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basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!"
Ton Duc Thang made a similar toast at the 3 October banquet and called Soviet assistance to the DRV "a graphic manifestation of proletarian internationalism."

Le Duan paid his usual glowing tribute to Lenin and the Soviet revolution and declared that the peoples of Vietnam and the Soviet Union "have long been closely bound together by profound proletarian internationalist feelings." It was after he interjected expressions of thanks for aid from China* as well as the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" that he went on to revive the pledge to work for socialist unity:

The Vietnam Workers Party and the Vietnamese people will exert all their energy to consolidate and strengthen their militant solidarity and their relations of fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries so as to help restore and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

This is the first high-level DRV pledge to attempt to "restore" and strengthen socialist unity in the period since the 15 July announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking, which elicited the vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic from Hanoi. During the July-August period, along with the charges that the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at splitting the socialist countries, Hanoi did refer to its belief in and efforts toward socialist unity. But the last previous declaration comparable to Le Duan's was in the 19 June 1971 DRV-Romanian communique at the conclusion of Ceausescu's visit. Le Duan's assertion now is in contrast to Hanoi media's silence on socialist unity during the Japanese CP delegation's visit to Hanoi last month.**

* Ton Duc Thang also mentioned Chinese as well as Soviet aid. This accords with Hanoi's gratuitous references to Soviet aid during the Li Hsien-nien visit. Le Duan in speeches in Moscow has also mentioned Chinese as well as Soviet aid--at the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971, the Lenin Centenary in April 1970, and the 23d CPSU Congress in March 1966.

** See the 22 September TRENDS, pages 11-14.

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Presumably, while the DRV is willing to make such a statement in the presence of the Soviets, it did not wish to associate itself in such a statement with the openly anti-Chinese Japanese CP delegation.

POLITICAL Le Duan in his speech at the rally voiced the
SETTLEMENT standard sentiment that the PRG's seven-point
 proposal, "which has the complete support of the
DRV," is "the most appropriate way" for the United States to
get out of the war and that "the U.S. Government must give a
positive response to this logical, reasonable proposal." He
did not go into the details of the proposal, saying only that
U.S. troops must be withdrawn and that there must be "respect"
for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.
He concluded routinely that the United States must bear full
responsibility for the lack of progress at the Paris talks.

In his banquet speech on the 3d, Podgorny, while avoiding any
mention of President Nixon, said that the "American ruling circles"
are stalling and undermining the Paris talks, resorting to
"different political maneuvers" and refusing to accept the PRG's
seven-point proposal.* He characterized the PRG initiative as
"constructive," said that it opens up realistic prospects, and
declared that the Soviet Union regards it as a good basis for a
political settlement. In the rally speech the next day, Podgorny
again briefly praised the seven-point initiative as well as the
"constructive proposals" of the DRV.

* Moscow had endorsed the 1 July PRG proposal in a PRAVDA editorial on 5 July--the day after PEOPLE'S DAILY'S editorial endorsement. It was subsequently endorsed in a statement by the Soviet trade union council on 13 July.

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TASS STATEMENT BELATEDLY SCORES U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV

The belated issuance on 1 October of the TASS statement denouncing the U.S. bombings of the DRV was apparently designed to place Moscow officially on record in support of the DRV before Podgorny's arrival in Hanoi. Moscow's failure to issue an official statement earlier on the 21 September bombings had been made the more conspicuous by the issuance of PRC and DPRK Foreign Ministry statements and of official statements by Sihanouk's RGNU and the NLHS. Moscow had promptly denounced the 21 November 1970 raids with a TASS statement on the 23d, but had scored the 21-22 March 1971 strikes only in routine comment.

The tardiness of the current statement is obscured by its denunciation of U.S. raids on DRV territory "toward the end of September." It mentions that the bombings on the 21st caused many casualties and much destruction, but it adds that U.S. planes "repeatedly invaded DRV airspace" in "subsequent days." The statement notes that President Nixon "personally approved" the raids, and it once again denigrates U.S. arguments that they were made as "protective reaction" and that the United States had the "right" to make them. Asserting that neither "barbarous bombings" nor "political maneuvers and diplomatic intrigues" can break the will of the Vietnamese people, TASS says that the Vietnamese people, "relying on the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries," will give a strong rebuff to the aggressor. It reaffirms that the Soviet people condemn the bombings and that the USSR will continue its assistance and support to the Vietnamese people.

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HEAVY AIR STRIKES SCORED IN DRV COMMUNIQUE, LE DUAN SPEECH

Hanoi media continue to pick up foreign reports of "worldwide condemnation" of the intensive 21 September U.S. air strikes against the North. And on 2 October the DRV War Crimes Commission issued a special communique which repeated earlier allegations regarding civilian casualties and destruction caused by the strikes.

First Secretary Le Duan, in his speech at the 4 October meeting welcoming Podgorny, denounced the U.S. strikes by "a great number of aircraft" against "many areas" in language largely identical to that of the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement. Thus, he called the action "an extremely serious act of war which blatantly violates" the U.S. bombing halt and "an impudent challenge to the peace- and justice-loving nations in the world." He went on to warn that Vietnam is an independent state, that DRV territory is inviolable--language that was not used in the foreign ministry statement but that did appear in supporting comment at the time. Le Duan did not specify that the heavy strikes were on 21 September, referring instead to the attacks "in the last days of September"--a phrase similar to that contained in the belated 1 October TASS statement and perhaps used for that reason.

The last available Hanoi comment on the strikes came in a brief VNA review of a 30 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article. According to VNA, it complained that following the strikes on the 21st, U.S. aircraft continued "to reconnoiter and strafe various places in North Vietnam in defiance of worldwide condemnation." VNA also says the article denounced the dispatch of the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise "to the South China Sea close to Vietnam from the Indian Ocean."

At the Paris session on the 30th, DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy--filling in for Xuan Thuy, who reportedly had influenza--echoed earlier comment on the air strikes when he rejected "the absurd and arrogant" explanations by the Nixon Administration such as "protective reaction" and "defense of U.S. soldiers' security." Although PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi--again substituting for PRG Foreign Minister and delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who is currently on home leave--also scored the 21 September strikes, the VNA account did not report his remarks.

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FOREIGN MINISTRY Hanoi radio on 5 October publicized the
SPOKESMAN'S PROTEST latest of the continuing statements by the
 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. This one
"severely condemned" U.S. strikes against North Vietnam from
26 September to 3 October. (Following the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on 22 September protesting the large-scale raids the
previous day, a spokesman's protest on 27 September had scored
U.S. strikes from 22 to 25 September.) The current protest
charges that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap
village and that U.S. artillery "south of the DMZ and naval
gunfire" attacked Vinh Son and Vinh Phu villages from 26 September
to 3 October. It says that "all these villages are located
17 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone." The statement
also claims that U.S. aircraft strafed a number of villages in
Quang Binh Province from 26 to 28 September and on 2 October.

HANOI, FRONT HAIL "VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIAN BORDER AREA

Communist media have given moderate attention to recent heavy fighting along Highway 22 in the South Vietnamese province of Tay Ninh and along Highway 7 in the Krek area of Cambodia. Hanoi comment was highlighted by articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 2 October which praised alleged communist victories in Tay Ninh, in particular lauding a 20 September attack on the ARVN's Trang Lon base. Hanoi claimed that the PLAF completely destroyed the base and annihilated more than 600 troops, and the army paper asserted that the destruction of the base pierced "Saigon's northwest defense line" and cut off ARVN elements in Cambodia from their rear.

According to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the Trang Lon "victory" was followed by "a series of victories" along a 50-kilometer stretch of Highway 22. It maintained routinely that feats in Tay Ninh, along with "recent and repeated victories" in the Krek area and elsewhere in Cambodia, have "lowered the fighting morale of the U.S.-puppets and will lead them from defeat to defeat." An LPA commentary on the 4th similarly praised alleged achievements in Tay Ninh and "well-coordinated" attacks launched in the border area by the "Cambodian People's Liberation Army."

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PRG, HANOI ASSAIL THIEU ELECTION, PLEDGE INCREASED STRUGGLE

The PRG officially denounced the 3 October GVN presidential election in a statement by a government spokesman on the 5th charging that the election was a "farce" which was "rigged" through the use of "brutal, repressive measures and brazen, fraudulent methods." Dismissing Thieu's administration as a "bellicose and rotten ruling group" of "traitors" which is "fostered and commanded by the United States," the statement reiterated the communist position that, so long as U.S. troops remain in Vietnam and Thieu is in power, the South Vietnamese cannot exercise their right to self-determination. Pledging continued struggle, the statement routinely predicted that the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine will fail and "the traitorous ruling clique headed by Nguyen Van Thieu will certainly be toppled." The election was also condemned in a statement by the PRG delegation spokesman in Paris, released at a 4 October press conference.

DRV First Secretary Le Duan, speaking at the 4 October meeting welcoming Podgorny, also dismissed the election as a "farce" and went on--in the manner of other communist comment in recent months--to speculate on the possibility of a coup in Saigon. Le Duan warned: "Let Nixon and his like be reminded that even though the United States had staged a similar farce to make Ngo Dinh Diem win with 'over 90 percent of the votes,' Diem could not hide his face of a traitor and finally took the punishment he deserved."

A 5 October NHAN DAN article on the elections commented in this same vein, predicting that the election would plunge Thieu's administration "deeper into a crisis of disintegration" and that opposition factions would have even more reason to oppose him. The article speculated that Thieu will "try to punish Ky" for his recent attacks and then observed that "Ky will certainly not let himself be subdued easily, nor will many other persons and organs that have firearms." It added, in line with Le Duan's remark, that a tense situation will prevail and "a collapse of the Diem-Nhu type" may happen to Thieu.

Prior to the election, a call for a broad struggle against Thieu and the United States was voiced in a letter from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, dated the 27th and broadcast on the 29th. The letter enjoined "compatriots," as an "immediate objective" of this struggle, to "resolutely oppose the fraudulent, deceitful election farce." Front media subsequently publicized a 28 September letter from Vietnam Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao and a statement by Alliance Vice Chairman Thich Don Hau which also advocated continued struggle and opposition to the presidential election.

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DRV ASSEMBLY DELEGATION CONCLUDES TOUR OF USSR, EAST EUROPE

On 28 September VNA announced the return to Hanoi that day of the DRV National Assembly delegation led by Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan after a tour which included "friendship visits" to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the USSR. The delegation, which left home on 18 August, made stopovers in Peking and Moscow before arriving in Warsaw on 23 August. It again stopped in Peking from 25 to 28 September en route to Hanoi from Moscow.

Publicity for the tour, which began at the time of Hanoi's shrill polemical attacks directed at the PRC, has been in the same low key as that for a similar Hoan delegation visit last year to Bulgaria, East Germany, Albania, and Hungary.* Thus, according to VNA on 30 September, the delegation reported on its tour to a meeting of the National Assembly Standing Committee convened on the 29th. Following last year's pattern, the tour was described as having contributed to the strengthening of friendship and solidarity between the Vietnamese people and the peoples of fraternal countries "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." Since this is a standard formulation its presence here is notable only because of Hanoi's implication--following the 15 July announcement of the President's planned trip to Peking--that China was departing from a proletarian internationalist path.**

PEKING Consistent with the PRC's general effort to
STOPOVERS reassure the DRV during the past two months,
 Peking media reflected the warm welcome given the
Hoan delegation during both its 18-22 August and 25-28 September
stopovers in Peking.*** According to NCNA's report, at a banquet

* Last year's tour is reviewed in the TRENDS of 26 August 1970, pages 14-19.

** Li Hsien-nien's direct overtures--during the conclusion of the aid agreement in Hanoi--in assuring the DRV that the PRC is committed to a policy based on proletarian internationalism brought no response from Hanoi. See the TRENDS of 29 September 1971, pages 1-6. Hanoi's treatment of the concept in its propaganda on the 1 October PRC National Day is discussed above.

*** See the TRENDS of 25 August 1971, pages 8-9, for a report of the delegation's initial stopover in Peking.

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hosted by Chiu Hui-tso and Kuo Mo-jo on 26 September, the two sides toasted the "constant strengthening and development of their great friendship and militant unity" and reaffirmed that they would always "unite, fight side by side, and win victory together" in the struggle against the "common enemy, U.S. imperialism." NCNA described the banquet as having been held in a "warm atmosphere of friendship." (NCNA somewhat more effusively had described a banquet during the first stopover on 19 August as being "permeated with an atmosphere of revolutionary friendship between the people of China and Vietnam 'who are both comrades and brothers.'" Chou En-lai, as reported by NCNA, received the delegation on both occasions for "very cordial and friendly conversations." VNA's brief reports noted only that Chou "warmly received" the delegation and gave no substance of the banquet speeches.

MOSCOW VISIT Hanoi and Moscow media on 24 August had briefly noted that on its 22-23 August stopover in the Soviet capital, the delegation was met at the airport and hosted at a banquet by Central Committee member and Chairman of the Soviet of the Union Shitikov. (The Moscow stopover last year had also been handled at a low level; the delegation was hosted by Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group Spiridonov and went sightseeing in the capital.)

During the subsequent 13 to 24 September "official friendship visit," the delegation toured Volgograd, Kazan and Kishinev, held talks with Supreme Soviet officials, was greeted at a Moscow meeting of "representatives of the capital's working people" on the 22d, and had talks with Podgorny on the 24th. As reported by TASS and Moscow radio--including its Mandarin-language service--Podgorny and Hoan had a "heartfelt, friendly conversation" during which Podgorny promised continued Soviet aid and support and Hoan expressed "profound gratitude." According to a Hanoi radio Vietnamese-language broadcast on the 26th, Podgorny also stressed that the coming visit of a Soviet Party-Government delegation to the DRV would contribute to the strengthening of Soviet-DRV friendship and unity.

The remarks at the Moscow public meeting by Vice Premier and Chairman of the Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society Kalashnikov are not carried textually by available Soviet or DRV media. VNA reports that in addition to referring to the USSR's policy of "all-sided aid" to the Vietnamese, he noted Soviet support for the DRV's "correct stand" and the PRG's seven-point initiative.

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Reports in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA highlight his remarks on aid with no reference to a political settlement. A Moscow radio version in Vietnamese quotes him as elaborating on Soviet aid, but does not mention a political settlement, although other radio versions, including Mandarin- and English-language broadcasts, report him as referring to Soviet support for a peaceful settlement as well as to aid.

VISITS TO EAST EUROPE The publicity of the Hoan delegation's visits to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania largely consisted of reportage of activities, which included receptions in each country by party first secretaries and officials of legislative bodies. There were standard references to support and aid by the hosts and expressions of gratitude by Hoan.

TASS on 30 August briefly reported the delegation's arrival in Prague and a TASS-attributed report in PRAVDA on 24 August reported the arrival in Warsaw, but there is no known Moscow acknowledgment of the group's visit in Romania. On the other hand, the only NCNA report of the delegation's activities in Eastern Europe was a 14 September report describing the visit to Romania.

Limited propaganda on the visits was generally devoid of polemical overtones. However, the Czech organ RUDE PRAVO, in an 8 September comment on the Hoan visit attributed to CTK, echoed some of Hanoi's earlier anti-Chinese polemic. It said that "no one but the DRV Government and the PRG has the right to make decisions concerning the destiny of the Vietnamese people. The Paris peace conference, and possibly Hanoi, are the only two places where American representatives can hold responsible and binding negotiations. 'The keys to peace in Vietnam certainly do not lie outside Vietnam and out of the reach of its legitimate representatives.'"

Prague's CTK on 2 September and the labor organ PRACE had reported that Hoang Van Hoan, at a meeting with Czechoslovak CP Secretary General Husak, interjected a reference to the Soviet Union in expressing appreciation for socialist aid. RUDE PRAVO, however, like VNA and NHAN DAN, quoted Hoan as thanking "the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia."

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CHINA

LOW-KEYED NATIONAL DAY WITHOUT TOP LEADER TURNOUT OR EDITORIAL

For the first time since 1949, there was no National Day parade reviewed by Mao and other major PRC leaders from the Tienanmen rostrum. Officials had told foreign reporters earlier that the parade had been canceled, although there was no prior announcement in the public media. The top official present at National Day activities was Chou En-lai; but Chou did not deliver his usual speech on the eve of National Day, with the traditional state banquet being replaced by a Foreign Ministry reception. This and three other receptions for foreign visitors on 30 September and 1 October, plus a walkthrough at the Summer Palace grounds, were the only formal celebrations. In attendance at one or the other of these affairs were Politburo members Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, Yeh Chien-ying (senior PLA leader currently in public view) and Tung Pi-wu.

The ceremonial changes are in line with regime pronouncements favoring frugal celebrations--and in keeping also with the unexpectedly low-keyed observance of the CCP's 50th anniversary last summer, on 1 July. No doubt more crucial to the nature of the celebrations, however, is the fact that elimination of the final obligatory appearance this year for Politburo members in good standing effectively screens off any sure knowledge of Politburo changes.

In yet another, and even less explicable, break with tradition, there was no editorial hailing the anniversary. There had been joint RED FLAG - PEOPLE'S DAILY - LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorials since 1967, and before that separate editorials in the central journals. The National Day period also offered further opportunities for downplaying the adulation of Mao, with the PEOPLE'S DAILY omitting its usual frontpage picture of Mao or of Mao and Lin. References to Lin seem fewer than normal, but perhaps no less than would accord with the somewhat fewer references to Mao. The 50 color photos of Mao, and Mao with Lin--reported by NCNA on 12 September as ready for distribution throughout the country but never again mentioned in central media--were hailed in rally reports from Szechwan and Shantung but nowhere else (they had been referred to previously in Fukien and Kwangsi broadcasts also).

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PROVINCIAL RALLIES in seven provinces, among those reporting so far, were attended by provincial chiefs.

(Data is based solely on local broadcasts; NCNA did not release its customary detailed account telling who was present where.) In Liaoning Politburo member and Military Region commander Chen Hsi-lien spoke to Korean visitors. Hsu Shih-yu, the other Politburo member who commands a military region, did not show up in his Nanking base; a 22 September Anhwei broadcast had referred to Hsu's deputy Liao Jung-piao as "head of the PLA Nanking units," raising the possibility that Hsu has been purged or perhaps transferred to replace one of three military chiefs on the Politburo--Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, and Li Tso-peng--who have now been out of public view for nearly a month. Hsu, however, has not appeared publicly since June.

CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL PROPAGANDA CONTINUES MUCH AS USUAL

The daily propaganda in official media continues to provide scant help in suggesting policy issues that might have led to the current anomalies in Peking. That portion of the propaganda which is issue-oriented reveals no notable shifts in such areas as cultural and economic affairs; but the continuing flow of such propaganda does suggest that the leadership could easily have agreed on a series of bland pronouncements for a National Day editorial had it chosen to do so. Release of a 2 October article by the writing group of the Ministry of Commerce makes it less likely that agricultural policy is at issue, because the article simply reiterated the theme that the peasants' living conditions must be improved as output rises. The article did perhaps hint that some cadres and peasants are unhappy at the continual accumulation of surpluses; there was unusual attention to the need for surpluses, including the explanation that "in case enemies of a foreign country invade us and a war breaks out, grain reserves will be available everywhere."

A HEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial of 26 September may reflect some of the current tensions in the course of rhetoric which seems aimed at Chen Po-ta and the former Heilungkiang chief Pan Fu-sheng. Noting that the struggle in Heilungkiang "has been extremely fierce and acute," the editorial states that under the leadership of Mao and the Central Committee those undermining the cultural revolution in Heilungkiang had been repudiated and the "opportunist line that was 'left' in form but right in essence" had been destroyed.

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The continuing nature of the struggle in Heilungkiang is emphasized by the editorial's insistence that even "after the founding of the new provincial CCP committee" the left opportunist line "has brought damage to our cause" and must be wiped out. One tactic with which the enemy is credited--as is usual in this type of propaganda--is trying to split revolutionary ranks, in this case "the unity between the army and people and between the army and government." The editorial calls for closely following Mao's strategic plan, and may be indicating a larger area than Heilungkiang in placing an injunction against "independent kingdoms" in the context of disunity between the army and the people and government.

AIRPLANE CRASH IN MONGOLIA IS IGNORED IN PRC MEDIA

PRC media have not referred to the crash of a PRC airplane in Mongolia on the night of 12 September, which was reported by Mongolia's MONTSAME agency and by TASS on 30 September. These accounts indicated that the plane was a jet belonging to the PRC airforce, that the Mongolians had issued a formal protest, and that the Chinese had been allowed to send observers to view the wreck. Chinese spokesmen in Peking confirmed the crash to Western newsmen, but said it was a civilian flight. There have been no media indications that the crash was connected to the various anomalies in PRC behavior since then.

HAILE SELASSIE GREETED BY CHOU, PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL

NCNA on 6 October reported the arrival of Haile Selassie in Peking after a short stop in Canton. He was greeted at the airport by Chou En-lai and at the guesthouse by Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu. The only other Politburo members reported in attendance were Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying, both of whom have been making frequent public appearances. At his Canton stop Haile Selassie was greeted by almost all the top local leaders. The three heads of state who visited Peking previously during the past year were each received by Mao at some point in their visit.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the visit followed standard forms, praising the Ethiopians for their valiant stand against fascist invaders in the 1930's and for supporting the PRC in restoring "her legitimate rights" in the United Nations. As highlights of past friendly relations, the editorial mentions contacts at the 1955 Bandung Conference and the 1964 visit by Chou En-lai.

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USSR - PRC

MOSCOW COUPLES APPEAL FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH NEW POLEMICS

Moscow has again used the PRC's 1 October national day to call for normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations, but in contrast to its behavior last year it has coupled this call with new polemical attacks designed to discredit the Chinese leadership among the Chinese people and in the world communist movement.

The call for better relations came, as it did last year, in a message sent impersonally from the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers to "the president of the PRC"* and leading governmental organs, as well as in signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. But where both articles last year had shied away from attacks on Maoism, reflecting a calmer period in Sino-Soviet relations and perhaps higher hopes for the Peking border talks, both this year attack Maoist policies and the one in PRAVDA portrays the Peking leadership as aggressive, divisive, and anti-Soviet.

The IZVESTIYA article takes a more conciliatory tack than the one in PRAVDA, avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese leadership. Against the background of President Nixon's impending visit to China and the prospect of improved U.S.-PRC relations, a defensive insistence in the article on Moscow's "tireless" efforts to normalize relations with Peking seems calculated to justify the USSR's China policy for domestic and foreign communist audiences and to underscore the idea that the full burden of responsibility for the present state of relations rests with Peking. The softer tone of the article as compared with the one in PRAVDA is in keeping with IZVESTIYA's role as government organ, against the backdrop of the ongoing state negotiations with the PRC on the border question. IZVESTIYA, but not PRAVDA, refers to these negotiations, as was the case

* Last year's message was similarly addressed to "the president of the PRC," an office which has not been filled since Liu Shao-chi was purged in late 1966 during the cultural revolution.

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last year; and it was IZVESTIYA, but not PRAVDA, which last year called for the settlement of disputed questions through "talks and consultations."

PRAVDA's attack on the Peking leadership fits generally with the pattern of the continuing, concerted Soviet bloc polemical charges keyed by the I. Aleksandrov article in the party organ on 4 September. It also accords with a new blast at the Chinese leadership by CPSU ideologue Suslov at a party conference on Marxism-Leninism.

In keeping with this pattern, Moscow chose the eve of the PRC's national day to publicize a report, credited to the Mongolian news agency, that a Chinese air force jet, after violating Mongolia's airspace, crashed in Mongolian territory on the night of 12-13 September. The Soviet news agency also, on 1 October, picked up a Tokyo report that Liu Shao-chi had defected to the Soviet Union, ridiculing it as "fantasy" but underscoring the portrayal of PRC leadership instability by publicizing it while in effect dissociating the USSR from involvement in the Liu Shao-chi affair.

OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, GREETINGS MESSAGE Despite the polemical cast of the comment, the Soviet Union was represented at the same level at Chinese national day functions as it was last year. TASS briefly reported that Deputy Ministers Nikolay Rodionov and Nikolay Smelyakov, Engineer Colonel-General Komarovskiy, "and others" attended the PRC embassy reception in Moscow. Last year Soviet media reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Rodionov attended the reception but did not report who else was present. NCNA noted that Ilichev and Lubin, "the head and deputy head of the Soviet Government delegation to the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet border question," attended a foreign ministry reception in Peking. Following its customary practice, NCNA mentioned the Soviet guests at the tail end of a long list of participants at the festivities; last year, Ilichev and his then deputy Gankovskiy were similarly listed last among hundreds who watched the national day parade from the reviewing stand.

The Soviet message, frontpaged in PRAVDA on 1 October, follows a theme of Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress speech in calling for normalization of state relations with Peking, but it adjusts to the present Soviet polemical line by dropping a call in last year's message for united efforts against "the forces of war": Where last year's message urged that the

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Soviet and Chinese peoples unify their efforts in the struggle with "the forces of imperialism, reaction, and war," the current one merely calls for unified efforts to struggle against "international imperialism and reaction." The change accords with PRAVDA's portrayal of the Chinese as part of the aggressive, anti-Soviet forces: Where last year's comment on the occasion had sought to shift the blame to the West for seeking "to poison the atmosphere" and to exploit tensions between the USSR and China, this year's PRAVDA article--in tune with comment generally over the past month--depicts the Chinese leadership and their policies as themselves constituting a danger to world peace and sustains a cautious line toward the West.

VIKTOROV The PRAVDA article, by Viktorov, charges that
IN PRAVDA the Chinese leaders have "set the task of prepar-
 ing for war" as the PRC's main goal and "stress
in every possible way that a threat from the north hangs
over the country." Viktorov adds that "anti-Sovietism--the
poisonous weapon of the enemies of socialism--has now been pro-
claimed the Peking leaders' long-term policy." In a possible
allusion to Peking's invitation to President Nixon and its
diplomatic maneuvering in the Balkans, Viktorov says the
Chinese leaders have also "initiated hostile activity against
world socialism and the international communist movement," add-
ing that "the Marxist-Leninist parties are aware of all the
danger of the Chinese leadership's course and are dealing a
resolute rebuff to its hegemonist and chauvinist pretensions."

Underscoring the benefits accruing from friendship with
Moscow, Viktorov goes on to explain that history has demon-
strated that the PRC's successful development could be assured
only when it sought to strengthen its "cooperation and friend-
ship with the Soviet Union." He reaffirms Moscow's desire
for normalized relations with Peking while in effect charging
that the present Chinese leadership is not acting in the
best interests of its people by practicing anti-Sovietism.
The implication is that a change in the present leadership,
"whose voice is now heard in unison with that of the Kuomintang
reactionaries," would open the door to restoration of good
relations with Moscow, with attendant benefits to the Chinese
people.

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PAVLOV IN The IZVESTIYA article, by Pavlov, credits Moscow's
IZVESTIYA "tireless" diplomatic efforts with having
 prevented a further exacerbation of Sino-Soviet
relations despite continuing Chinese efforts to fan anti-
Soviet sentiments and to foment divisions in the world com-
munist movement--the later themes being left to PRAVDA to
develop more fully. Asserting that the Soviet Union has
been a model of "restraint and self-control" in the face of
PRC efforts "to distort Marxism-Leninism and to drive a
wedge in the ranks of the fighters against imperialism,"
Pavlov emphasizes the point that "the Soviet Union has done
its utmost to strive to normalize relations with the PRC."
It was "thanks to the Soviet Union's tireless efforts," he
adds, that "success has been achieved in halting the process
of progressive deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations."
Reaching for documentation of this "success," Pavlov notes
that ambassadors were exchanged, that there has been some
increase in trade, and that the border talks "are continuing."*
He adds without elaboration that Moscow has "also made other
principled and constructive proposals which correspond to
the national interests of both peoples and the adoption of
which would promote a change for the better in Soviet-Chinese
relations."

The Pavlov article repeats the stock formulation that pointedly
expresses the Soviet party's respect only for "the Chinese
people." While avoiding attacks on the leadership, it
assails Chinese propaganda and policies, playing some of the
Viktorov PRAVDA article's themes in lower key when it remarks
that "one cannot fail to see that the anti-Soviet line in Chinese
propaganda and policy continues to conflict with the cause
of socialism and the Chinese people themselves." Pavlov
says this is indicated by "fresh attempts to fan anti-Soviet
sentiment among the population." He adds that "as before,
Peking is making flagrant attacks on the CPSU and the

* Where this year's PRAVDA article does not mention the
border talks at all, both the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles
last year had made the point that the talks resulted from
Soviet initiatives and were "continuing." The IZVESTIYA article
had indicated that some progress was being made, reporting for
the first time in Soviet media that the Chinese had agreed
to assign an ambassador to Moscow.

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Soviet Union ..., which by no means facilitates an improvement in relations between the two countries."

Pointing to the "unwavering" policy toward the PRC defined at the 24th CPSU Congress, Pavlov reaffirms its principles as "cohesion of the socialist countries on a Marxist-Leninist basis" (the principle Moscow charges the Chinese leadership with discarding), defense of the national interests of the Soviet State, and normalization of relations with Peking. Maintaining that this "just and positive" position "meets with the understanding and approval of the socialist countries," Pavlov invokes as evidence the "high assessment of the USSR's peace-loving foreign policy" at the 1969 Moscow international communist conference.

SUSLOV The harsher line expressed in PRAVDA was predictably taken by party ideologue Suslov in an address to a conference at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism on 29 September. According to TASS, Suslov condemned "the anti-Soviet line of the present Chinese leaders" as "a great danger to the cause of socialism and rejected "the slanderous inventions concerning the policy of the CPSU that are circulated by Peking." He added "at the same time," TASS said, that "we have always striven and are prepared now to contribute in every way toward reestablishing and developing good neighborly relations and friendship between the Soviet Union and the PRC."

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SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

DELEGATION OF DIETMEN'S LEAGUE SIGNS JOINT STATEMENT

Judging by the contents of a joint communique issued on 2 October by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the Japanese Dietmen's League for Promoting the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan and the Taiwan straits area is no longer a major roadblock to the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. U.S. military presence on Taiwan was listed as one of the five major issues preventing improvement of relations between the two countries in a joint statement issued in July between the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the Komeito Party, Japan's second largest opposition party. In the latest communique, the issue of U.S. military presence in the Far East is mentioned only in the context of a joint call for the "two superpowers" to "withdraw their troops stationed in foreign countries and dismantle their military bases abroad."

Aside from the one omission, the communique essentially repeats the remaining four points contained in the July Komeito communique as the "basic principles for the restoration of Japan-China diplomatic relations." It denounces the "absurdity" of "'two China's, 'one China, one Taiwan,'" argues that Taiwan is China's internal affair, calls for abrogation of the "illegal and invalid" 1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty and declares that the "lawful rights of the PRC in all organs of the UN" must be restored and that the "representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" must be expelled. The Japanese side expressed its determination to work through the Diet to "urge the Japanese Government to accept these principles" and begin negotiations with the PRC "to end the state of war between Japan and China, restore diplomatic relations and conclude a peace treaty."

In an apparent effort to assist the League's drive to pass an antigovernment resolution on the question of restoration of relations with China, Peking appears to have made a tactical decision to soften its line on "Japanese militarism." The Chinese side noted with unusual confidence that the Japanese people "will absolutely not allow Japanese militarism to take the road of aggression again." It also noted that since "it is the Japanese people who determine the destiny of Japan" they will "certainly realize their aspirations to establish an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral and prosperous new Japan."

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Since the Nixon-Sato talks in 1969, Peking's propaganda line on Japan has fully exploited the theme of an irrevocable revival of militarism in Japan under the influence of "Marxist laws." Some softening of this line was reflected recently in an 18 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the 40th anniversary of the "Manchurian Incident"; the United States was portrayed as chiefly responsible for leading Japan down the military road and confidence was expressed that "farsighted people in Japanese economic and political circles" would successfully counter the influence of a "handful of pro-U.S. monopoly capitalists" and guide Japan down the path of "independence, peace and neutrality."

The communique contains specific blasts at Sato's China policy. The Japanese side expressed its "deep regrets" that the "Sato cabinet, in disregard of opposition by public opinion," has acted as a cosponsor of the draft resolutions for dual UN membership for Taiwan and the PRC. The Chinese side condemned the Sato Government for "stubbornly pursuing the policy of following the United States and of hostility toward China" and predicted that "it will surely meet with irretrievable defeat."

The communique was signed by Wang Kuo-chuan, head of the China-Japan Friendship Association, and Aiichiro Fujiyama, senior LDP Diet member and leader of the delegation, which was composed of Diet members from the ruling LDP as well as opposition members from the Komeito, Socialist and Democratic Socialist Parties. Kuo Mo-jo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and honorary president of the China-Japan Friendship Association, attended the signing ceremony. Chou En-lai met with the delegation once during its 17 September-4 October visit.

JCP REACTION KYODO on 4 October reported that JCP Chairman Kenji Miyamoto characterized the League delegation's visit to Peking as "kowtow diplomacy" in a 3 October speech at the Japan Press Club. Miyamoto also charged that the League committed a "grave error" by transgressing "its suprapartisan position" to side with China in an "united anti-U.S. and USSR front." Reflecting sensitivity to the failure of his party to participate in the delegation, Miyamoto asserted that the JCP was maintaining "splendid isolation" from other Japanese opposition parties in the "race to approach China."

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USSR - INDIA

GANDHI VISIT CEMENTS PRO-INDIAN SOVIET STANCE ON EAST BENGAL

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 27-29 September state visit to the USSR, six weeks after the ratification of the 9 August Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation, has moved Moscow's public position on the East Bengal crisis toward closer alignment with Delhi's. It has also produced a significantly increased level of Soviet propaganda attention to the burdens imposed on India by the continuing flow of refugees from East Pakistan, coupled with critical comment and reportage on alleged activities of the Pakistani authorities contributing to the exodus and violating the "human rights" of the East Pakistanis. Soviet mass meetings on the East Pakistan situation, resulting in appeals for an end to "reprisals" and "atrocities," were reported by TASS for the first time on 5 October and are continuing.

The joint statement issued at the close of Mrs. Gandhi's visit on the 29th, Moscow's publicity for the visit, and remarks by the Soviet leaders register in general a further consolidation of Soviet-Indian relations. Mrs. Gandhi had talks with all three of the top Soviet leaders, and the joint statement announces a decision to set up an intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

On the question of East Pakistan, while Moscow continues to press for a political solution--the substance and mechanics largely unspecified--it has now laid the blame for the crisis squarely at the door of Pakistani President Yahya Khan. In the harshest terms yet used by a Soviet leader, Kosygin declared in a luncheon speech on 28 September that "it is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities" which led to the "wholesale flight" of over eight million people from East Pakistan. The exodus, he said, "can only be explained by unbearable living conditions created for them there." Kosygin called on President Yahya Khan--by name--to take "the most effective steps for the liquidation of the hotbed of tension that has emerged."

The Soviet leadership has also endorsed the legitimacy of India's concern with events in East Pakistan, in effect gainsaying Pakistan's claim that India is meddling in a purely internal affair. In remarks keyed to the refugee flight, Kosygin declared

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on the 28th that "the task is to prevent aggravation of the relations between India and Pakistan," adding that "we distinctly perceive the intricacy of the questions that emerged as a result of these events in the relations between India and Pakistan." More directly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko asserted in his UNGA address on the 28th that the East Pakistan crisis is "not simply an internal question" and declared that "one cannot but admit that India has grounds for displaying uneasiness in connection with the turn that events have taken in East Pakistan."

THE JOINT STATEMENT "The grave situation which has arisen on the Indian subcontinent as a result of the recent events in East Bengal" is the principal issue dealt with in the joint statement of the 29th, as publicized in full by TASS in English. The use of the term "East Bengal" throughout the TASS English text, as in the text disseminated by India, is a departure from consistent Soviet practice--an evident concession handled with kid gloves by the Soviets and not generally reflected in Soviet propaganda. Notably, in an abbreviated version transmitted by TASS in Russian, in the text published in PRAVDA, and even in the versions broadcast by Radio Moscow in Hindi as well as in Urdu, Punjabi, and Bengali, the term "East Pakistan" is consistently substituted for "East Bengal." Kosygin, as well as Soviet comment and reportage, consistently used "East Pakistan."

The joint statement broaches the events in East Pakistan with an acknowledgment of the burdens imposed on India by the more than nine million refugees who have fled from the eastern region of Pakistan, mentioning India's "humane approach" to the problem. These passages preface a statement that the Soviet side "took into account" the Indian prime minister's statement that India is "fully determined to take all necessary measures" to stop the flow of refugees and to ensure that those refugees who are already in India "return to their homeland without delay." Clearly not prepared to concur in such an open-ended statement of intent, the Soviet side merely "reaffirmed its position regarding the problem of refugees and other questions" relating to the situation "as laid down in" Podgorny's 2 April letter to Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The letter had in fact made no reference to the refugee problem, which had not at the time assumed major proportions, but had merely called for adoption of "the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and repressions against the population in East Pakistan" and for recourse to "methods of a peaceful settlement."

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Calling again for "urgent measures" to achieve "a political solution," the statement now stipulates that such a solution must show regard for--in the words of the TASS English text-- "the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal as well as for the speediest and safe return of the refugees to their homeland in conditions safeguarding their honor and dignity." While this falls short of what Mrs. Gandhi may have sought by way of an explicit call for President Yahya Khan to deal directly with the elected Awami League leaders in East Bengal, it amounts to the strongest Soviet demand yet made on the Pakistani Government. The last Soviet-Indian joint statement, issued on 12 August at the close of Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi, had simply called for "a political solution" and "the creation of conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes," without elaboration.

The formula used in the 12 August statement had remained the Soviet position, as registered in authoritative pronouncements, until Podgorny on 14 September--during the visit of the King of Afghanistan--foreshadowed the current demand that the "wishes" and "inalienable rights and lawful interests" of the people of East Pakistan be respected. Podgorny called for a political settlement "taking account of the legitimate interests of [East Pakistan's] population" and the creation "of secure conditions" for the return of the refugees.

Kosygin picked up Podgorny's line on the 28th, during Mrs. Gandhi's visit, when he called for "an early political settlement in East Pakistan which would consider the legitimate interests of its population, would safeguard its normal development and eliminate the threat of further aggravation of Pakistani-Indian tensions." It is "necessary above all," Kosygin said, "to offer the refugees an opportunity to return home, to give them a full guarantee on the part of the Pakistani authorities that they will not be persecuted and will have an opportunity to live and work peacefully in East Pakistan." On 1 October at a luncheon in Delhi, Podgorny called for "a just political settlement with due consideration for the lawful rights and interests of the peoples of this region."

CALLS FOR END TO REPRISALS Since 30 September, TASS has carried daily reports of statements by Soviet organizations--peace committees, trade unions, factory and office workers, journalists, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies--urging the Pakistani

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authorities to "end mass reprisals against the population of East Pakistan," to cease the "mockery of justice over Mujibur Rahman"--described as a "legitimately elected leader of the Pakistani people, fighter for civil rights and freedom"--and to bring about a political solution "taking into account the will, rights, and aspirations of the people of East Pakistan" and enabling the refugees to return from India.

A particularly strong statement came from the Soviet Peace Committee, which declared that the Pakistani Government's actions "cannot be described otherwise than a violation of the lawful human rights of the population of East Pakistan and disregard of the clearly expressed will of the Pakistani people." And the Soviet Red Cross expressed "wrathful indignation" at "the continuing reprisals and the gross violations of the human rights declaration and universally recognized standards of human morality." On 5 October TASS reported statements in the same vein by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. TASS has carried previous statements on the situation from the WFTU, but there had been no publicity for statements by Soviet organizations before the 30th.

Mass meetings throughout the Soviet Union, first publicized by TASS on 5 October, are said to be adopting statements and resolutions demanding an end to "wholesale reprisals in East Pakistan" and cessation of "the disgraceful trial" of Awami League leader Mujibur.

Citing Indian press sources and other unspecified "reports," TASS dispatches from Delhi on 30 September and 4 October portrayed "India's great role in alleviation of the sufferings of those who fell victim to the events in East Pakistan" and went on to describe those events in terms of "unending repressions by the West Pakistani Army against the citizens of East Pakistan," "deliberate physical extermination" of the youth and intelligentsia, "atrocities," "terror," "barbarity," "lawlessness," and "oppression." The dispatch on the 30th cited "reports" that "special detachments in East Pakistan are destroying foodstuffs, burning down dwellings, and abusing in every way the civil population." With reference to "data cited by Indian and international press," the 4 October dispatch claimed there was "no doubt that fear of reprisals is the most important factor preventing the earliest return home

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of the refugees, and there is abundant proof that reprisals are really taking place." TASS added that the very fact of the presence of over nine million refugees in India was "irrefutable proof of brutal treatment by the East Pakistani authorities of the people of that province."

Soviet media had given little attention to the events in Pakistan in the weeks prior to Mrs. Gandhi's visit. There were occasional reports on developments relating to Mujibur Rahman, and Moscow sporadically reported--in carefully neutral fashion--the persistence of tensions on the Indian-Pakistani border. Soviet reports had taken note of the refugee problem and the burden it imposed on India, but had not emphasized it.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR IGNORES SUBSTANCE OF ROGERS, EBAN SPEECHES ON SETTLEMENT

A continuing low volume of Moscow propaganda on the Middle East situation draws on stock themes in pressing for a peaceful settlement on the basis of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution and in indicting Israel--as supported by its "patrons" in Washington--as the opponent of an accord. At the elite level, Premier Kosygin at a 30 September dinner speech honoring the visiting Yemeni Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad urged unity of action of all forces in the Middle East struggling against "imperialist aggression." He pledged support to the just cause of the Arab peoples and their efforts aimed at restoring "their flouted rights, at insuring a just political settlement in the Near East, and at defending the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine."

At this writing, Moscow has not acknowledged the substance of Secretary Rogers' remarks in his 4 October UNGA address in which he called for an interim Suez Canal agreement. The TASS report of the speech noted only that Rogers "placed himself, in fact, in the position of Tel Aviv's defender, calling on the Arab countries to give up their demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the foreign territories occupied by them."

On 28 September, a TASS report of ARE Foreign Minister Riad's remarks on television that day said he expressed puzzlement over the fact that the United States, which is "trying to pose as an 'impartial international mediator' in the efforts to solve the question of opening the Suez Canal, has been ignoring" the ARE Government for over two months. Riad went on, TASS said, to observe that neither Rogers nor Assistant Secretary Sisco has raised the question of opening the canal with Cairo. The TASS report of Riad's remarks after his meeting with Rogers on the 30th did not mention the canal issue, instead noting only that Riad told journalists that the Jarring plan of last February constitutes the "best plan" for a Middle East settlement. At the same time, the account continued, Riad "held the door open for any new possibility that will lead to peace."

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In the pattern of its handling of the Rogers speech, Moscow media have ignored the substance of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's 30 September address to the General Assembly on a Middle East settlement in which he proposed an interim Suez agreement. A brief TASS dispatch on the 3d on the ARE's rejection of Eban's proposals said merely that Eban has "again shown that Israel continues to oppose all efforts of the United Nations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Israeli ruling circles are exerting every effort to legalize their bossing on the seized Arab lands." And a domestic service broadcast on 4 October observed that Eban in the General Assembly "loudly stated" that Israel is seeking ways for a peaceful settlement, at the same time making "an intolerable attack on the Arab states and on the decisions of the General Assembly itself." Against this background, the broadcast concluded, "one is not amazed" by reports that Eban has raised new demands for the delivery of Phantom aircraft to Israel from the United States.

Other propaganda echoes the complaint that Israel is stepping up its pressure for delivery of additional aircraft from the United States. And an Arab-language broadcast on 3 October, citing Cairo's AL-AKHBAR, said that "a large number of American military experts and technicians" arrived in Tel Aviv in recent weeks and was immediately granted Israeli nationality. According to the broadcast, the Americans joined the Israeli army where they will serve in rocket and air force units and will be used in servicing military electronic equipment.

Further documenting their charge that Israel is bent on blocking a peace accord in the Middle East, propagandists have seized on the Israeli cabinet's rejection of the 25 September Security Council resolution urging Tel Aviv to discontinue its actions aimed at annexing Jerusalem. A domestic service commentary on 28 September, for example, called the decision "impudent" and assailed Tel Aviv's efforts since June 1967 to carry out "the so-called Israelization of Jerusalem." On the same day, a RED STAR article said that the cabinet's decision is fresh evidence that the Israeli rulers "are in fact prepared for any extreme measures in order to hang on to the occupied territories."

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EASTERN EUROPE

BORBA WELCOMES THAW IN BUDAPEST COMMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA

The semiofficial Yugoslav BORBA on 1 October expressed gratification at the cordial tone of a 25 September article in the Hungarian Government organ MAGYAR HIRLAP, contrasting it with comment during August in which Budapest had served Moscow as leading proxy spokesman in warning the Balkan communist mavericks against receptivity to Chinese overtures.

The MAGYAR HIRLAP article used the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations for a prompt shifting of gears in the wake of Brezhnev's fence-mending visit to Belgrade. It appeared on the day the Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement was released and on the first day of Brezhnev's 25-26 September stopover in Budapest, presumably to fill in the Hungarian leadership on the substance of his talks with Tito and on the new ground rules for relations with Yugoslavia.

The BORBA commentary, signed by Zoran Mandzuka, is entitled "A Good Road" in response to the title of MAGYAR HIRLAP's article, "A Rich Content." It welcomes the contrast between the tone of the Hungarian article and that of the same paper's article on "a previous occasion"--a clear allusion to the 13 August article in which MAGYAR HIRLAP had warned Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia against any attempt to form an "anti-Soviet axis" in the Balkans under Peking's aegis. "As is known to our readers," BORBA recalls, MAGYAR HIRLAP "on that occasion made a surprising and willful statement dealing with the Balkan situation in an unacceptable manner and even with a tone of warning."

BORBA comments approvingly that the new Hungarian article, while noting that periods in the past **had been marked by "misunderstanding,"** said it could "now" be noted with satisfaction that the two countries are linked by "the common aims of building socialism and the even development of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations." It also cites the Hungarian paper's conclusion that the two countries have built "a rich content" into their relations and that those relations "have never represented a mere formal act."

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On its own authority, BORBA goes on to expound the thesis that "methods" of building socialism are the affair of the individual countries, in harmony with the passage in the new Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement granting that "the methods of constructing socialism . . . are a matter for the peoples and working classes in individual countries and need not contradict each other." BORBA recalls that Hungarian Premier Fock, on a visit to Belgrade last year, had noted that existing differences between the two countries concerned only "the methods of solving essentially similar problems." The Yugoslav paper further underscores the "good direction" of relations between the two countries which, "while striving for the same aims, have chosen different methods."

MAGYAR HIRLAP's 25 September article, cordial but relatively restrained, stated that relations with Belgrade were developing on the basis of "mutual respect and understanding." BORBA goes beyond this to declare that "both sides" have stressed that their relations are also based on respect for "full sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries in practice" and on "full equality."

Publicizing a further gesture of rapprochement, TANJUG on the 30th reported that a notably high-level Yugoslav party figure--Stane Dolanc, member of the LCY Presidium's Executive Bureau--had paid a visit that day to "the first world hunting exposition" in Budapest, which included a large Yugoslav exhibit.

KADAR SPEECH Possibly to keep a rein on the new cordiality, MTI on the 2d, the day after the appearance of the BORBA commentary, released further details of a 29 September speech by Kadar in Tolna County in southern Hungary. Where recorded excerpts of the speech carried in the Budapest domestic service on the 30th included only a brief passage devoted to Hungary's loyalty to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and CEMA in its dealings with capitalist countries, the MTI summary adds gratuitous remarks by the MSZMP leader which could be read as an admonition to those socialist countries which failed to follow a consistently pro-Soviet line, aimed chiefly at the Romanians but in part also at Yugoslavia. In such dealings, MTI reports Kadar as having said, "socialist Hungary does not 'wobble' this way and that," and "in international life more respect is given to one of whom it is known where he stands," just as in everyday life "cooperation is impossible with the sort of person who keeps changing his mind and position all the time." Also in the MTI report, but not in the 30 September recorded excerpts, is

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Kadar's remark that as a measure of Budapest's solidarity with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, "just recently we had a friendly and comradely exchange of opinions in Budapest with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev," a type of consultation which "advances our united struggle for our common goals and interests."

HUNGARY & ROMANIA In another development evidently flowing from the Soviet-Yugoslav accommodation, Romanian and Hungarian media on 2 October publicized a meeting that day in Bucharest between visiting NEPSZABADSAG Chief Editor Istvan Sarlos and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, RCP Secretary and member of the party Executive Committee and Permanent Presidium--foremost spokesman for the RCP's independent policy in relations with the other ruling communist parties. The meeting, also attended by SCINTEIA Chief Editor Alexandru Ionescu, was characterized by both Budapest and Bucharest as "cordial and comradely."

Niculescu-Mizil had authored a 9 July SCINTEIA article directly attacking remarks by Hungarian party Politburo member and Secretary Komocsin, in a 24 June Hungarian National Assembly speech, which transparently criticized Ceausescu's trip to Peking and conveyed overtones of a threat to disrupt the political situation in Romania by voicing concern over the status of "socialism" among the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA STRESS UNITY, LOYALTY TO MOSCOW

A lengthy communique on the 1-2 October visit to Warsaw of a Czechoslovak party-government delegation led by CPCZ General Secretary Husak and Premier Strougal, and including arch-conservative figures Vasil Bilak and Vaclav Hula, presses the cause of Soviet bloc unity and orthodoxy and calls for consistent opposition to "splitting tendencies" as well as "any anti-Soviet tendencies." The document praises "the results of the recent negotiations between the leading representatives of the Soviet Union and other European countries," specifying only last year's Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and ignoring the Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement.

A large segment of the communique is devoted to economic integration under CEMA. Underscoring continuity in Polish-Czechoslovak coordination, the document recalls with satisfaction the visits of Polish leaders Gierak and Jaroszewicz to Prague in January and of Premier Strougal to Warsaw in August.

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TASS, reporting briefly on the communique, says the two sides discussed bilateral and international topics with "full unanimity." The Soviet news agency adds that they stressed the importance of friendship and cooperation with "fraternal socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union."

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FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MOSCOW: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MUNICH DAMAGES ALREADY APPORTIONED

A Moscow radio commentary on the eve of the 33d anniversary of the signing of the Munich agreement suggested that the FRG need not concern itself with the "legal responsibility" for damages inflicted on Czechoslovakia as a result of the Munich agreement if it recognizes the agreement as invalid ab initio. The commentary by Aleksandr Galkin, broadcast only to German audiences on 28 September and repeated in German on the 29th, coincided with the windup of the third session of the Prague-Bonn exploratory talks on the normalization of relations, held 27-28 September in the Czechoslovak capital.

The Moscow commentary reflected the amendment of the official Czechoslovak position apparently worked out at the 2 August Crimea meeting of bloc leaders. The communique on the meeting for the first time modified Prague's hitherto consistent demand for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio "and all the consequences arising therefrom" by dropping the final phrase. Although Czechoslovak elite and official statements since then have consistently registered this change, two Czechoslovak press articles following the exploratory talks restored the dropped phrase to the formula and generally took a hardened line. Thus the Moscow commentary may have been symptomatic of Soviet pressure on reluctant elements in the Czechoslovak regime to move ahead more vigorously in the talks with Bonn, as well as to reassure the West Germans.

A hardened line was expressed in both the Slovak and Czech party organs. The Slovak PRAVDA said on 29 September that "the socialist countries unconditionally support" Czechoslovakia's demand that the Munich agreement be recognized by Bonn as invalid ab initio, along with "acts" ensuing from it. Similarly, in citing Foreign Minister Marko's expressed hope in his UNGA speech on the 30th that "the present developments in Europe will favorably influence . . . negotiations with the FRG" and that Czechoslovakia is "sincerely interested in the successful conclusion" of the negotiations, a RUDE PRAVO commentator on 4 October added editorially that this success will depend "primarily on the FRG attitude toward nonvalidity of the Munich diktat ab initio with all the consequences arising

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therefrom." In reporting Marko's speech on the 30th, CTK had noted that he spoke of nonvalidity ab initio of the "diktat," with no address to the question of ensuing "consequences."

At the top official level, West German recognition of the invalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio--with the former final phrase duly absent--was demanded in the 3 October joint communique on the Warsaw visit of a Czechoslovak delegation led by Husak and Strougal. It was also demanded by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in his UNGA speech on the 28th. Noting in the course of his discussion of European developments the recently signed four-power agreement "on questions relating to West Berlin," the inner-German phase of the Berlin negotiations, and the expectation that the Moscow and Warsaw treaties will be ratified "in the near future," Gromyko said the normalization of Czechoslovak-FRG relations is "next on the list."

SOVIET EFFORT TO REASSURE THE FRG The Galkin commentary over Radio Moscow set out to debunk arguments that make Bonn hesitant to recognize the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio along with all the consequences arising from it--a move that would raise a myriad of legal and technical questions concerning such issues as the validity of German civil acts and citizenship in the Sudetenland between September 1938 and March 1939, when Hitler occupied Bohemia and Moravia, as well as possible Czechoslovak war damage reparations claims and, in turn, Sudeten German compensation claims.

Pointing to "ambivalence" in the West German "official position" on the Munich issue, Galkin remarked that Bonn "is said" to recognize the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement "for the present" while rejecting Prague's "just demands" for recognition of the accord ab initio, adducing "juridical reasons" for the latter. It is asserted in Bonn, Galkin continued, that the Munich agreement "is perfectly legal because it was concluded by the legitimate heads of government," while "unofficially" it is argued that "to declare that the Munich agreement was devoid of all legality from its inception would be to provide the juridical justification for instituting proceedings against those persons who were responsible for those measures." Concluding that "this whole line of argument is totally untenable," Galkin directly discounted "references to possible legal consequences if the Munich agreement is declared invalid ab initio." In fact, he said, "the legal responsibility for the damage inflicted on the Czechoslovak republic during the

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occupation has long since been apportioned by international accords on war criminals and by Czechoslovak laws which provide punishment for collaborationism."

The Moscow commentary may possibly have been contrived to lay public groundwork for a more "pragmatic" approach in the coming November session of the Prague-Bonn talks. According to the West German DPA on the 29th, FRG Government spokesman Ahlers announced that FRG negotiator Frank had told the federal cabinet the most recent talks in Prague had passed from the stage of exchanging basic thoughts to "a more pragmatic" search for a mutually acceptable formula regarding the Munich agreement, and that this approach would be pursued in November. A spate of authoritative Soviet press articles in the wake of the 16-18 September Brandt-Brezhnev meeting in the Crimea had been marked by warm praise for the "realism" of Brandt's Ostpolitik.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

DEMICHEV SWITCHES FORMULATIONS ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES

Reporting on 29 September to a high-level conference on the 24th party congress and questions of theory, P.N. Demichev, Central Committee Secretary for ideology, referred to the need to "preserve the preferential growth of subdivision I of public production as a whole" (PRAVDA, 30 September). "Subdivision I" in this formulation, which has long been utilized in economic literature, includes not only heavy industry but also significant categories of construction, transportation and agricultural production. The formulation is apparently designed to replace the traditional obeisance to the "preferential development of heavy industry," which has become increasingly nonsensical in recent years as the growth rates for industrial consumer goods (Group B) drew even with and surpassed the rates for heavy industry (Group A).

Demichiev appears to be the first Soviet leader to use the "subdivision I" formulation. Recently the leaders have for the most part avoided use of the term "preferential" and have used vaguer terms, describing heavy industry as the "foundation" of economic expansion (Podgorny, Kirilenko and Kapitonov in their May-June 1971 election speeches) or "basis of bases" (Shcherbitskiy in his June 1971 speech). Shelepin alone among the top leaders spoke of "retaining preferential development of heavy industry" in his 1971 election speech. Brezhnev has not recently repeated his June 1966 statement that "the unchanging principle of our economic policy was and remains preferential development of heavy industry"

The decision to accelerate Group B at a faster rate than Group A in the draft 1971-1975 plan obviously necessitated doctrinal adjustment designed to allay fears among party propagandists that Lenin's law of the preferential development of the means of production was being ignored. By reverting to the broader Marxist concept of "subdivision I" Demichev has squared the new policy with Lenin's law.

In their numerous 1971 speeches Brezhnev and other leaders had passed up the opportunity to use the broader formulation, leaving the propagandists in some confusion. Demichev's reformulation of economic policy, coupled with Suslov's condemnation of a "purely consumer" approach to raising welfare in his speech at this same conference, should reassure propagandists that Soviet policy remains oriented to traditional goals.

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

GROMYKO WARNING AGAINST "COMBINATIONS OF STATES"

For the eighth year running, the fullest version of Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech before the United Nations General Assembly appears in the central press, with TASS and Radio Moscow carrying excerpts and summaries. But a key passage in this year's address, which appears in a TASS excerpt of Gromyko's remarks on China as well as in the TASS summary of the 28 September speech, is not included in the press versions.

According to the TASS excerpt, Gromyko followed his remarks on U.S.-PRC relations and Chinese representation in the United Nations with the observation that in the past there have been "combinations" of states directed against others which have caused international tension and sometimes even wars. Ultimately, Gromyko added, these have "always backfired against their initiators and participants." He concluded that "the generation that witnessed such combinations is still among the living." Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA--which carried the longest versions of the address--ignored this passage, moving from the foreign minister's remarks on Chinese representation in the United Nations to his remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Gromyko's warning against the creation of "combinations" of states against others appears to go beyond earlier authoritative Moscow comment on President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the PRC, although the I. Aleksandrov article in the 4 September PRAVDA approached this formulation in asking rhetorically if a "deal against socialism" was being prepared behind the scenes in Peking and Washington. The exclusion of the "combinations" warning from the central press versions of the speech accords with Moscow's current cautious, restrained treatment of Sino-U.S. relations. PRAVDA's article on the PRC's 1 October national day this year contains no reference to Sino-U.S. relations. And the TASS account of Secretary Rogers' 4 October UNGA speech mentions none of his comments on U.S. relations with Peking or on the China representation issue.

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