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4 June 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : JSTPS Study on Recovery Assumptions for the Soviet Union

1. "Centralized control" and "party control" are not synonymous, although they are treated throughout the paper as if they were. The two concepts should be kept separate. "Centralized control" refers to the top level at which decisions are made. "Party control" refers to the institution that sets goals at any level. As they are here described, Case 1 and Case 2 are all but indistinguishable. Separation of the concepts of "centralization" (attractive to the military) and "party control" (not so attractive) would allow for a sharper definition of "military" goals. The military are here simply assumed to be more party-minded than the party itself, an assumption that should be very carefully examined.

2. It is not clear whether this blurring is deliberate in Case 3. The description is ambiguous, and the organizations listed in Table A-1 compound the ambiguity. Are we positing a real shift in the decision-making locus at the primary (major?) regional level from party organizations to the legislature, skipping the ministerial structure entirely? If so, this should be expressed more explicitly. It should be noted that there is no tradition of legislative control to fall back on in any of the republics, and that republic Supreme Soviets--like the USSR's--are very large organizations. They would be quite unwieldy decision-making bodies, as indeed would the republic party Central Committees.

3. Also, while we sympathize with the drafters' preference for Case 3, some effort should be made to check the drift in language from invidious (Case 1) to positive (Case 3). For example, in Table A-V, Case 1: "The party pyramid dominates and infiltrates the government pyramid." Case 3, describing the same situation at the Republic level: "Republic parties incorporate interest groups, united to preserve the Republic." Or in Table A-VI: Case 1: "Morale is maintained by 'bread AND CIRCUSES'; cultural extras do get attention." Case 3: "Schools, libraries, museums, etc., foster Republic nationalism." No Bread?

JCS review(s) completed.

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Some detailed comments follow:

Table A-1: Level 3. Republics have Politburos. These are far more likely loci for decision-making on regional matters than the 200-member republic Central Committees whose members, like those on the CPSU level, have other day-to-day jobs. In the large republics, the next levels downward are krays and oblasts whose party organizations have buros and committees. They seem to have been skipped entirely, but they are--and presumably would be--very important organizations. In the RSFSR, for example, they are the next level in the party structure below "the Kremlin", and they are both numerous and powerful. Below them in all republics come the city party committees with their buros. "Executive Committees" and "City Executive Committees" are not party organizations and should not be in the Party column. They belong in that double-headed hydra "Government". "Councils of Workers Deputies Enterprises" sound like something in Yugoslavia. A garble, perhaps?

Table A-IV: In the economic section, the term "link" is inappropriate. Perhaps the drafters had agro-industrial complexes in mind, although this seems somewhat sophisticated for an immediate post-strike recovery period. "Link" (zveno) is a system of organizing labor on a farm--any farm. It is roughly comparable to the share-cropping system in this country. Kolkhozy and sovkhozy refer to the organizational ownership of given farms. The Soviet military now have their own sovkhozy. Perhaps this would give some leads as to the future for the militarized Case 2? Also, there appears to be a contradiction in the Economic, item 5, Case 2 which suggests that the military would encourage the spread of industry "associations" and management via "optimal control". "Associations" are essentially decentralizing instruments. The military have been posited as preferring centralization.

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