



Directorate of Intelligence

2

~~Top Secret~~

103



FMC/CB

25X1

Afghanistan Situation Report



25X1

20 March 1984

~~Top Secret~~

NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX

20 March 1984

04A

25X1

Page Denied

TOP SECRET

25X1



AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT


CONTENTS

DESERTIONS AND MUTINIES INCREASE

Widespread mutinies and desertions in the Kabul area followed the extension of service there from three to four years. 

1

25X1




25X1

IN BRIEF

2

PERSPECTIVES


PAKISTAN AND THE REFUGEES

Afghan refugees have not become a heavy economic liability for Pakistan, but in some circumstances serious problems between them and Pakistanis could grow, causing Islamabad to seek an accommodation with Kabul and Moscow. 

4


25X1

AFGHANISTAN: CHANGING INSURGENT DYNAMICS

Studies of a number of tribal insurrections suggest that the Afghan resistance is now in transition to a modern nontribal insurgency that will be more difficult for the Soviets to defeat. 

9

25X1

This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to 

25X1

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1




800084 1-84

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX

25X1


TOP SECRET





25X1

DESERTIONS AND MUTINIES INCREASE 

25X1

The Afghan Government extended mandatory service for soldiers stationed in Kabul from three to four years on 8 March, causing widespread desertions and mutinies, according to US Embassy sources. The next day half of the military posts near Kabul airport were unoccupied. 


 about 120 Afghan soldiers from the 8th Division destroyed two military posts before joining insurgent forces in the Paghman area, west of Kabul. 

25X1


25X1

Comment:

25X1

The regime presumably increased the term of service because its recent conscription campaigns have failed. The change is likely to affect most Afghan troops because soldiers are usually assigned to Kabul at some point in their enlistments. It will also increase the number of civilians, particularly men, fleeing Afghanistan. News of the desertions in Kabul may encourage troops in other Afghan units to mutiny or desert. 

25X1



25X1

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX




25X1

TOP SECRET




25X1

IN BRIEF



25X1



25X1

-- Soviet Ambassador Tabayev indicated [redacted] that the upcoming Cordovez visit is unlikely to lead to progress in the UN negotiations. [redacted] Babrak Karmal "unyielding" on the Afghan regime's position. [redacted]

25X1

25X1
25X1



25X1

Chinese aid to the resistance would continue despite Soviet

**20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX**

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~



25X1

efforts to repair Sino-Soviet relations in other areas.




25X1

25X1



**20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX**

25X1



25X1

PERSPECTIVES

PAKISTAN AND THE REFUGEES



25X1



25X1

Afghan refugees in Pakistan have not become a heavy economic or political liability for Islamabad. Frictions between them and Pakistanis could grow, however, and lead to serious problems for Islamabad in some circumstances. A sharp increase in tensions between Pakistanis and the refugees would erode political stability in Pakistan and perhaps cause Islamabad to seek an accommodation on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan with Kabul and Moscow.



25X1

The Refugees

Pakistani Government registration figures indicate that about 2.8 million Afghans are in Pakistan. The US Embassy, however, believes that multiple registrations, the registration of nonexistent dependents, and the return of some registered refugees to Afghanistan have inflated this figure. Based on reports of discrepancies between registrations and numbers actually in some refugee camps, the embassy believes that between 1.75 and 1.9 million Afghans are in Pakistani refugee camps.



25X1

New refugees continue to arrive in Pakistan but, the rate is now 2,000 to 3,000 a month compared to 100,000 or more a month a few years ago. Heavy fighting near the border can still bring a surge--170,000 in the last four months of 1983--but we believe most of these refugees return home when military operations die down.



25X1

25X1

25X1

Most of the predominately Pushtun refugees reside in areas of Pakistan where cultural differences with the local population are minimal. About three-fourths are in the North-West Frontier Province near the Afghan border, and most of the remainder are in Baluchistan, primarily in Pushtun areas. Less than 2 percent are in Punjab and Sind Provinces. Islamabad plans to transfer about 300,000 refugees to camps in western Punjab, but less than 100,000 had moved by early February.



25X1

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX


25X1



TOP SECRET





25X1

According to the Pakistani press, refugees are barred from buying real estate or engaging in business activities that would lead to permanent residence, but other economic activity is permitted. Most live in camps near the Afghan border by choice. Refugees are free to live in any part of Pakistan, although Islamabad has put restrictions on the movement of large groups. Some refugee groups that migrated seasonally from one part of Afghanistan to another have tried to follow the same pattern in Pakistan. 


25X1

Economic Factors

Some Pakistanis claim that the refugees are taking jobs from local Pakistanis, forcing up rents and food prices, and living better than Pakistanis on largess from Islamabad. We believe that these claims are exaggerated and that the economic burden for Pakistan has not been excessive.  the direct cost to Pakistan of supporting the refugees is about \$180 million a year, or some 2.5 percent of the budget. The movement of food and other refugee supplies costs Pakistan about \$75 million. Other expenses include salaries of about 6,000 Pakistanis involved with refugee issues, education for some 70,000 refugee students, and support for 85 health units. When dealing with the United States and international relief agencies, we believe there is a tendency for Islamabad to pad its expenses. 

25X1

25X1

Even if the Pakistani cost figures are accurate, however, they do not reflect the indirect benefits Pakistan receives from the relief effort. The US Embassy estimates that between 110,000 and 150,000 tons of donated food--a quarter to a third of the total supplied by international organizations--is reexported by the refugees to Afghanistan or sold in Pakistan. We believe that the proceeds from these sales generally remain in Pakistan. Pakistani businessmen, such as tent manufacturers and millers, have had lucrative contracts with relief organizations, and other Pakistanis are employed by these groups. The UN refugee organization estimates that it will spend about \$60 million in Pakistan in the coming year, including \$7 million to help defray the Pakistani Government's administrative expenses. 

25X1


Some Pakistanis probably have lost jobs to refugees, but US officials report that most refugees have filled vacancies caused by the migration

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX


25X1




TOP SECRET



25X1


of Pakistani workers to the Gulf or are doing work done historically by migrant Afghan tribesmen. Because the refugees apparently receive more than enough food from international donors, and because prices have risen in parts of Pakistan where the refugee presence is negligible, we believe that there is little connection between the refugee influx and inflation. Nonetheless, US officials report that pressures generated by the refugees have had some impact on rents, at least in Quetta and Peshawar. 

25X1

The 70,000 Afghans being educated by Pakistan constitute only a small percentage of the over a million Afghan refugee children in the country. Moreover, less than one percent of Pakistan's medical personnel are assigned to refugee health centers. Pakistanis who lack adequate health care or whose children cannot go to school, however, are likely to believe that they suffer from the diversion of resources to the refugees. 

25X1

Law and Order

US officials report that many Pakistanis believe the refugees have been a primary cause of growing crime and disorder in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. The evidence is contradictory. Refugees have committed some murders and robberies, and fighting between rival insurgent groups has occasionally broken out in Pakistan. 


25X1

 however, the crime rate in the province has not increased since the refugees began arriving.  a whispering campaign has linked refugees to every unsolved crime. 

25X1

25X1

25X1

Violence has increased in Kurram Agency where there have been serious clashes between rival Shia and Sunni Pakistani tribes. Their dispute is centuries old, but we believe that the arrival of enough Afghan Sunnis to double the agency's population has contributed significantly to sectarian tensions. In the Khyber Agency, on the other hand, an increase in violence has been sparked by government efforts to eliminate heroin production and appears unrelated to the refugees. 

25X1

Future Problems

We do not expect tensions between refugees and Pakistanis to become a serious problem. There were more violent incidents and protests against

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX


25X1



TOP SECRET



25X1

the refugees in 1983 than in previous years, but the number was still small, and we know of only about a dozen serious incidents. 


25X1

In some circumstances, however, government and popular attitudes toward the refugees could change markedly and the situation could deteriorate.

-- If there were a significant decline in jobs for Pakistanis in the Gulf, competition between returning workers and refugees could become severe enough to lead to violence.

-- If foreign assistance declined, Islamabad would have to assume more of the relief effort and cut back on other Pakistani programs, or reduce support for the refugees. The latter option might cause a violent reaction in the camps and greater refugee pressure on local economies.

-- If Soviet military pressure drove hundreds of thousands of additional Afghans into Pakistan, facilities in areas where most refugees now live would be overburdened, lowering living standards and increasing tensions. If the government tried to move the refugees to other areas, it would meet resistance both from Afghans unwilling to leave the border areas and from Pakistanis in non-Pushtun areas.

-- If the refugee stay is prolonged, overgrazing by refugee herds and the felling of trees for firewood could cause an economic decline that would increase antirefugee sentiment. As the refugees come to see themselves as permanent residents, competition for political power could also become a problem. Baluch tribesmen, for example, fear that Pushtun refugees will join the large number of Pakistani Pushtuns in Baluchistan Province and seize political control. 

25X1

If the refugees become a serious economic burden or if tensions between refugees and Pakistanis cause serious civil disorders, we believe Islamabad would be more amenable to an arrangement with Kabul and Moscow that facilitated the return of the refugees and ended Pakistani support for the resistance. Should many of the refugees nevertheless remain in

20 March 1984
NESAM 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX




25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

Pakistan, as we believe likely, the task of integrating them into Pakistani society would be difficult, and Islamabad might be saddled with a permanent refugee community. 

25X1



**20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX**

25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

AFGHANISTAN: CHANGING INSURGENT DYNAMICS



25X1



25X1

The failure of the Soviets or their Afghan allies to quell the resistance movement that began in 1978 has allowed time for the beginning of a more modern and durable insurgency. Studies of a number of tribal insurrections during this century suggest that Afghanistan's tribal and ethnic groups were vulnerable to a quick defeat because of traditional leadership problems, feuds, and economic hardships. The Soviets and the regime were unable to defeat the mujahedin because they committed too few resources to the fray, however, and now they will have to undertake the arduous task of building a body of supporters who can regain control of key rural areas. Their success in this endeavor is not inevitable. In the years ahead they will face better organized and better trained insurgents who will be more aware of the need for a coherent political organization.

25X1

A Rising of the Tribes

The war in Afghanistan has undergone major changes since the initial uprising against the Marxist regime in 1978.

-- The rebellion at first was a tribal insurgency*, a mass uprising of various tribal and ethnic groups led by political and religious leaders who used traditional methods and institutions to mobilize the rural population.



25X1

*The term "tribal insurgency" is used here only as an identifying term. Most of the Afghan insurgents cannot be called "tribal." Many are linked by ethnic origin yet have lived in a religious-feudal structure one evolutionary step above tribalism. The severe, mountainous terrain was the dominant factor leading to the development of the numerous Afghan groups and continues to inhibit the formation of a regional identity.

25X1

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX


25X1





25X1

-- As is usually the case in tribal insurgencies, the rebellion was initially very successful. The local leaders quickly gained control of much of the rural area where the regime's security forces and administrative structures were rapidly eliminated.

-- Government forces had neither sufficient discipline nor training to fight more than a few bands at a time. Conscripted soldiers displayed low morale and growing reluctance to fight their own Muslim countrymen on behalf of a Communist regime. By late 1979 resistance forces were poised to capture major urban areas. 


25X1

A New Phase: Soviet Intervention

The Soviet invasion and the coup d'etat in Kabul led to a new phase in the insurgency.

-- As a result of more vigorous government and Soviet ground operations and frequent air strikes, some communities suffered considerable damage, and local institutions came under severe pressures.

-- Faced with persistent retaliation--especially airstrikes--and economic hardships, hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled to Pakistan or Iran.

-- Some leaders responded to these pressures with informal accommodations and laissez-faire policies with the Communist forces. 

25X1

A considerable number of tribesmen are determined to continue the fight, but they have trouble mounting a coherent threat to the regime.

-- Weaknesses in local leadership make it difficult to create a cohesive force or pursue sustained objectives.

-- Manpower usually cannot be spared from economic activities for long periods; some groups fear heavy casualties that would make it even more difficult to sustain agricultural production.

20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX


25X1



TOP SECRET





25X1

-- Rivalries among tribes, clans, and religious and political factions result in bloody bickering and hinder effective military coordination between groups. 

25X1

The Soviets and their Afghan allies, however, have failed to take advantage of these basic weaknesses. 

25X1

 punitive actions by modern military forces and the limitations of tribal societies normally cause a steep decline in insurgent control after the initial success. In Afghanistan, the Soviets and the Kabul regime simply had too few troops and supporters to return to the countryside and begin measures to win public support. 

25X1

25X1

Towards a More Lethal Insurgency

It now appears that the Afghan insurgents, under military pressures from the Soviet Union, are going through a transitional phase.


-- The destruction of local institutions in areas of intense military pressure has resulted, in some cases, in the development of more modern rural insurgencies with nontribal organizational features.

-- In other areas, such as the Panjsher Valley, local leaders seem to have acceded to Westernized commanders who have demonstrated military leadership. 

25X1

We believe, based on studies of previous insurgencies, that the transition phase may last several years.

-- As long as some local groups maintain their traditional organizations and leaders, they may come to some accommodations with the Soviet-supported regime if the latter can develop a more flexible political approach along with a more effective army.

-- A large number of local groups have been so severely defeated or their economic bases so shattered that their traditional institutions no longer exist and accommodation is almost impossible. -- Tribesmen from this category form the bulk of the rural refugees in Pakistan and Iran. 

25X1


20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX

25X1





25X1


-- Tribesmen who have elected to remain in Afghanistan and resist the government, however, are likely over time to become part of larger groups with more modern organizational structure. Overcoming longstanding ethnic rivalries will be difficult, but Masood's success in forging alliances in the northeast suggests that the task is not impossible. 

25X1

Looking Ahead--Elusive Soviet Success

We believe that as nontribal, nonlocal insurgent organizations develop, the Soviets will find it more difficult either to reach an accommodation with individual insurgent groups or to destroy them. A key factor will be the effectiveness of the "new" insurgents in creating disciplined and coherent organizations.

-- As the transition progresses, other key elements will be the ability of new groups to retain and gain local sympathizers and committed supporters and to mobilize public opinion in opposition to government programs and tactics.

-- Key points for the government will be its ability to build responsive local political organizations, to avoid self-defeating punitive expeditions against rural populations, and to develop better motivated armed forces from new and younger recruits. 

25X1


20 March 1984
NESA M 84-10121CX
SOVA M 84-10042CX

25X1



Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret