




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Afghanistan Situation Report



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
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

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4

December ended without a major incident in Kabul but with security deteriorating in other key cities; the Soviets showed concern over casualties, equipment losses, and morale problems.



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
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


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IN BRIEF



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--  regime officials attempted to recruit 2,000 to 3,000 Waziri tribesmen from the southeastern border area to serve as militiamen in Kabul. Tribal elders

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
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refused to send their people as far as Kabul to fight and [redacted] they were only seeking arms and money from the regime, with no intention of acceding to regime requests. [redacted]

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-- [redacted] a senior Parchami in the Kabul City government complained [redacted] of compulsory Soviet indoctrination courses, of Soviet advisers' patronizing and humiliating behavior, and of Soviet disregard for the safety of Afghan soldiers during clashes with insurgents. [redacted]



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PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER



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The Soviets celebrated the end of the fourth year of their invasion of Afghanistan by allowing the government to stage a 20,000-strong demonstration protesting the US "invasion" of Grenada. The fourth year ended in December without a major incident in Kabul; with security deteriorating in other key cities; with the Soviets concerned about casualties, equipment losses, and morale problems, and again discussing changes in tactics; with winter weather hampering Soviet and Afghan Government operations; with little hope for progress in the UN talks; and with no end to the Afghan resistance in sight. The fifth year begins with the resistance at its strongest since the invasion but still unable to cause serious and sustained trouble for the Soviets and Afghan regime.

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The Resistance

The Afghan resistance was unable to pull off its anticipated spectacular antigovernment incident in Kabul to mark the fourth anniversary of the invasion. The US Embassy reported that insurgent plans were frustrated by enhanced security measures in Kabul that included a larger number of government troops on patrol, more Soviet soldiers at key intersections, and round-the-clock helicopter patrols over the city on 27 December. Nonetheless, the Embassy observed that there were more shooting and explosions in and around Kabul in late December than in recent weeks, although there was no significant damage or Soviet and government casualties.

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The insurgents' inability to mount sustained attacks in Kabul in December is indicative of the Soviets' emphasis on maintaining the pretense of security, stability, and popular support in the Afghan capital. The Soviets organized two guided tours of Kabul for Western supporters to show how happy the Afghans are under the new regime. We believe the Soviets recognize that a deterioration of security in Afghanistan's capital requiring significantly and visibly enhanced security measures would give the resistance greater international publicity and credibility and more foreign support, and would increase the pressure on Moscow to negotiate a political settlement.

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
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1 Security in other major cities worsened in December, however. US Embassy sources reported that resistance activity in Jalalabad increased greatly, including a daylight attack on KHAD headquarters. In Qandahar, the insurgents denied the government meaningful control of the city; attacked an Afghan corps headquarters causing heavy regime casualties; and even established a judicial system that, according to one source of the Embassy, was recognized by the city's mayor. Insurgent pressure on key towns in Paktia Province also continued in December.

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The resistance maintained pressure on Soviet and Afghan supply lines throughout the month:

4 -- There were frequent attacks on convoys in eastern Afghanistan, particularly in the Salang Pass, according to Embassy sources.

3 -- The insurgents captured a government outpost at Torkham, which is a major transit point for Afghan Government exports.

5 -- Government garrisons in Paktia remained dependent on air transport for resupply because of insurgent attacks on supply lines.



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The Panjsher Truce



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3 A US Embassy source alleged that the Soviets had increased their forces in the Salang Pass to counter expected attacks from Panjsher guerrillas subordinate to Masood.

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A source of the US Embassy reports that the Soviets are willing

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1 to pay Masood as much as 20 to 30 million Afghanis for an explicit extension of the Panjsher truce. [redacted]

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Soviet and Afghan Operations

8 The Soviets and Afghan Army conducted fewer major operations in
7 December because of bad weather and increased concern about security in
9 the cities. Following the completion of the Guldara Valley offensive in
6 early December, Soviet and Afghan troops launched major operations in
10 Lowgar, Kapisa, and Parvan Provinces, around Ghazni and Jalalabad, and
in the Herat area. [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe poor weather conditions will prevent the
Soviets from launching many major offensives until spring. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Afghan Army continued
its intensive campaign to conscript soldiers for forces that are
5 [redacted] undermanned and plagued by a high rate of desertion.

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[redacted] the regime has begun drafting women for civil service so that more
men would be freed for military service. [redacted]

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
Soviets Assess Performance

6 17 [redacted] commissions led by the Chief of
the General Staff's Operations Directorate and the First Deputy Chief of
the Political Directorate were in Afghanistan in mid-December to review
the readiness and morale of Soviet units and the abilities of their

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
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
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We believe there will be little improvement in morale and the Soviets' combat performance in Afghanistan unless Moscow authorizes a significant troop increase and new tactics allowing greater initiative to tactical commanders. The Soviets have too few troops to control the countryside or even to adequately protect supply lines. Soviet operations are also too rigid and predictable to inflict a decisive defeat on the insurgents. In our judgment, the Soviets are unlikely to substantially increase the number of troops in Afghanistan because of the internal and international political repercussions.



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


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The UN Talks

The Pakistani Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador that UN special representative Cordovez was scheduled to resume his diplomatic efforts in late March 1984 on the basis of an agreed memorandum of understanding that clears the way for substantive discussions on a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawals and international guarantees. The UN memorandum is now acceptable to Pakistan because it no longer requires direct negotiations or a signed final agreement between Kabul and Islamabad. 

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13,14

UN diplomats remain pessimistic about the prospects for the Cordovez shuttle, however, and may decide to cancel his mission. The US Mission at the UN reports that Cordovez and his aides believe that neither the USSR nor the US is genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement and allow the UN efforts to continue principally for appearances. 

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