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4 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, DDO/NE  25X1

FROM:  25X1  
 Chief, DDI/NESA/PAB

SUBJECT: Supplemental Material for Congressional Briefing  
 on Afghanistan-Pakistan  25X1

Per your request, attached are contingency answers for selected questions likely to be asked by Congressman Long at the forthcoming briefing. The first set of answers includes a brief analysis of the Indo-Pak military balance and relevant maps and tables. Also attached are talking points that generally describe the roots of Pakistan's position at the UN-sponsored negotiations on Afghanistan.

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Attachments

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## CONTINGENCY ANSWERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS

## A. Deployment of Pakistani Forces

1. Although most Pakistani ground forces are garrisoned closer to India than Afghanistan, this reflects the history, topography, and infrastructure of the country and the nature of the Indian threat and not a benign attitude by Islamabad toward the Soviets. Fourteen of Pakistan's 18 divisions are located to defend against India:

- India is Pakistan's historical adversary and the two countries have conflicting claims in the Kashmir.
- Many Pakistani officials believe that India wishes to see Pakistan dismembered into weak, ethnically-based states.
- India's forces opposite Pakistan are larger and better equipped than those of Pakistan. ---
- Pakistan has no strategic depth opposite India. Most of its principal cities (including Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi) and major lines of communication are within 100 kilometers of the Indian border. A major breakthrough by Indian forces would immediately threaten Pakistan's most important political, cultural, and economic assets. Consequently, Pakistan's military strategy emphasizes a forward defense, which requires that the bulk of its forces be deployed opposite India.
- The transportation and logistic infrastructure of the country is more developed in the east and can better support large military forces than the less developed west.

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2. The four Pakistani divisions located opposite Afghanistan (two in the North-West Frontier Province and two in Baluchistan) are supplemented by approximately 50,000 men in the paramilitary Frontier Corps.

- Pakistan has considerable strategic depth in the west and has adopted a strategy of defense-in-depth opposite Afghanistan. The deployment of its Army in the west supports this strategy, in which Pakistan would have time to move reinforcements from east to west before Afghan or Soviet forces could threaten vital Pakistani assets.
- The Frontier Corps defend the border and are only lightly armed, but they have good knowledge of the country and we assess their ability to harass and slow Afghan or Soviet forces to be good.
- The rugged terrain in much of Pakistan's west is not

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conducive to a rapid advance by armored forces and we believe it would cause Afghan or Soviet forces operational and logistical difficulties.

3. Even with Pakistan's arms modernization, we assess that India's military superiority over Pakistan will grow through the 1980s:

- Since 1980, India has purchased more than \$6.1 billion of Soviet arms and \$2.7 billion of West European arms, including modern tanks, fighter aircraft, and naval vessels. 25X1
- Deliveries of these weapons will continue through the 1980s and will exceed by far the arms for which Pakistan expects delivery.
- Pakistan's armed forces have serious command-and-control, training, and logistics deficiencies, which limit their effectiveness, even with the acquisition of new weapons. 25X1

#### B. F-16 Deployment

- [redacted] all of Pakistan's F-16s will be based at Sargodha Airbase, which is roughly in the center of the country. The six F-16s so far delivered are at Sargodha. The F-16s at Sargodha could easily respond to military threats in either the east or west. 25X1

#### C. Refugee Burden on Pakistan

1. The some 2.8 million Afghan refugees in western Pakistan are becoming an increasing economic burden on Islamabad:


- The Pakistan Government estimates its 1982-1983 assistance costs for the refugees was \$555 million from its own coffers, a sizeable burden for a country with serious economic problems. International relief organizations have supplied an additional \$250 million. 25X1
- The Afghan refugees--the largest refugee population in the world--compete with the local Pakistani population for jobs and scarce grazing, water, and land rights, and the incidence of violence between the two groups has increased in the last year.
- The Pakistan Government has also given aid to the local inhabitants commensurate with that given to the refugees in areas where resentment towards the refugees is particularly high.

2. The Afghan refugees are also becoming an increasing threat to Pakistan's political stability:

- ( [ ] )
- The refugees have been involved in recent disturbances in the volatile tribal areas along the Afghanistan border.
  - Pakistani officials believe that even minor disturbances between the refugees and the local population, or between rival refugee groups, could provoke increasingly frequent and serious incidents.

# Pakistan and India: Disposition of Major Ground Units

- |                  |               |                             |
|------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Pakistani</b> | <b>Indian</b> |                             |
|                  |               | Corps headquarters          |
|                  |               | Armored division            |
|                  |               | Infantry division           |
|                  |               | Mountain division           |
|                  |               | Independent armored brigade |



PAKISTAN		INDIA	
450,000		Manpower	990,000
Type-59 (China) 750		Tanks	Vijayanta (India) 1,200
M47 (USA) 275			T-54/T-55 (Soviet Union) 500
Total 1,025			T-72 200
	385	Armored vehicles <sup>a</sup>	
	1,125	Field artillery <sup>b</sup>	1,000

<sup>a</sup> Armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles

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Figure 1  
Pakistan and India: Major Airfields




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**Figure 3:  
Pakistan and India: Current and Projected  
Military Forces**


Note change in scale

India  
Pakistan  
Combat Aircraft<sup>a</sup>




	1 Jan 83	1 Jan 88
<b>India</b>		
MIG 23	60	100
Jaguar	45	100
MIG 21	300	350
MIG 27		100
Mirage		40
Others	265	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>735</b>	<b>740</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>		
F-16	6	40
Mirage III/V	75	100
F-6	150	80
Canberra	10	
A-5		60
<b>Total</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>280</b>

Tanks<sup>b</sup>



	1 Jan 83	1 Jan 88
<b>India</b>		
T-72	150	600
T-55	900	700
Vishayanta	1,200	1,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,250</b>	<b>2,800</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>		
M-48A5	180	300
Type	750	1,000
M-47	150	
AMX-30		100
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,080</b>	<b>1,400</b>

Combat Maneuver Brigades



	1 Jan 83	1 Jan 88
<b>India</b>		
Armored	10	12
Mechanized	2	6
Infantry	102	105
<b>Total</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>		
Armored	8	10
Infantry	64	68
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>78</b>

<sup>a</sup> Does not include combat-capable trainees and aircraft in reserve storage.

<sup>b</sup> Does not include tanks in reserve storage.



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Talking Points

THE AFGHANISTAN TALKS: Pakistan's Objectives

The UN sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain international support for its position on Afghanistan, but we doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue in ways that would damage US interests.

- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the approximately 2.8 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw their troops. Islamabad might accept the retention of a token Soviet force in Kabul, but it will insist that all other Soviet forces leave.
- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak regime or deal directly with it. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the refugees have returned to Afghanistan. It will also press Kabul to accept Pakistan's version of the long-disputed border between the two countries.
- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan and meddle in Pakistan's restless borderlands. Further, an active insurgency is crucial to Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

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The insurgency and the UN talks enable Islamabad to maintain high levels of support for its position on Afghanistan in the UN, the Islamic Conference, and the Non-aligned Movement. This support strengthens Pakistan's position at any future bargaining table, mitigates Soviet pressures, and reassures influential domestic constituencies in Pakistan that want Islamabad to show more flexibility.

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- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow to reassure the Soviets that Islamabad has not closed off all its options in dealing with them. Islamabad will avoid a break with Moscow because it worries that the West will in time forget about Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as part of a larger East-West settlement. Of more immediate concern, we judge, is the possibility of greater exposure to Soviet pressure if the US-Pakistan relationship breaks down over Pakistan's nuclear program.

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- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and concern in the Army that the Afghan refugees will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political settlement.

Zia and his advisers will have to balance these pressures with the strong support their Afghanistan policy receives from conservative religious parties and well-armed Afghan insurgents at home and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China and the US.

- Pakistan would find it more difficult to maintain its strong stand on Afghanistan if relations with the US broke down or Beijing appeared ready to trade Afghanistan for a settlement on the Sino-Soviet border. So far, however, the Sino-Soviet talks have produced meager results and China's support for Pakistan has remained firm. The US connection has begun to produce for Pakistan--as the arrival of the first six F-16s attest--although Islamabad will be watching to see if aid for Pakistan passes Congress this spring. 25X1
- Some Pakistani officials advocate a more flexible position on Afghanistan so Islamabad can better confront Pakistan's real enemy, India. Growing Indian military pressure could strengthen this view, although for now Zia has succeeded in reducing tensions with India by engaging New Delhi in a dialogue on a nonaggression treaty. India-Pakistan relations remain unstable, however, and Islamabad is increasingly concerned about an Indian pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities.

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