Central Intelligence Agency



#### DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

#### 1 August 1983

China:	Reorganization	of	Security	Organs	25 <b>X</b> 1
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## Summary

At last month's National People's Congress Premier Zhao Ziyang made public the creation of a new security organ, the Ministry of State Security. The new ministry, headed by security professional Ling Yun, is part of a package of reforms intended to tighten control over security and intelligence bureaucracies, professionalize the security apparatus, and crack down on lax internal security procedures and foreign espionage. The moves were prompted by increasing Chinese concern over crime, espionage, numerous recent hijack attempts, and several 25X1 defections. We helieve the reorganization is also intended to increase Deng Xiaoping's control over the security apparatus and prevent it from assuming too much influence over policy.

The reorganizaton apparently leaves China with four major intelligence and security bodies—the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Armed Police (a revival of a pre-Cultural Revolution unit), and the Discipline Inspection Committee of the party. The Ministry of Justice will continue to oversee the courts and assume control of the prison system.

The Institutional Lineup

The Ministry of State Security was formed from parts of the Ministry of Public Security and the Investigation Department of

This memorandum was prepared by the Domestic Policy Branch of the China Division of the Office of East Asian Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Branch

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	icly announced responsibilities are to combat sion by foreign powers, prevent sabotage, and hreats to security.
included a broad ran been cut back. The	Public Security's functions, which formerly ge of security and intelligence duties, have MPS is now in charge of combatting general-
headed by Liu Fuzhi, cadre. The Ministry	crime and maintaining public order. It is who like Ling Yun is a longtime security of Justice will supervise the court system ver the prison system, formerly overseen by
The People's Ar	med Police Force is composed of personnel e internal security troops of the People's
Liberation Army, som firefighters, and so	e border defense troops, municipal me regular PLA garrison troops. Though the ot allude to it, an organization with the
same name and simila until its duties and PLA. The People's A	r functions existed in the 1950s and 1960s, many of its personnel were assigned to the rmed Police will now handle guard duty at overnment buildings and sites such as the
flag in Tiananmen Sq will also be used to bordersresponsibil	uare, and probably party headquarters. It control smuggling, patrol coasts and ities shared with the militaryfight fires,
includes prevention the litany in offici	urbances, and solve crimes. Its charter also of espionage and sabotage, a standard part of al Chinese statements on security. We
at sensitive install Chinese media, it re	ionage duties will be confined to guard duty ations. According to statements in the ports to the Ministry of Public Security,
structures as well.	eem to have ties to the regional PLA command
numbered among secur its responsibilities	cipline Inspection Committee is not usually ity organization by the Chinese, but some of fall into that area. It has authority to sh corruption, abuse of office, and political
misconduct by party	cadre. It has been heavily involved in the c crimes and also in the campaign against
Reasons for the Reor	ganization

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prevent the new secu over policy. Before	Beijing also intends rity organs from gaini and during the Cultur internal security wor	ng too much influence al Revolution, some to	25X1 25X1
factional infighting powers among several	which they used as wea . By dividing securit ministries, the leade all such a possibility	pons in disputes and y and intelligence rship has indicated i	
to Cultural Revoluti security responsibil	the People's Armed Polon events. After the ites, local units of t ghting between faction	Army assumed internal he PLA frequently	ng


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ultimately the Army was used to bring the Red Guards' activities to a halt. We believe the new force is intended to prevent the PLA from playing such a role by removing its internal security functions. This new force also advances streamlining of the PLA, a major reform goal, by reducing the number of people on active military duty.	25X1
Tighter Control	
The division of responsibilities and appointment of new leadership will probably improve both the performance and political reliability of the security apparatus. We believe it will have less impact on China's intelligence-gathering activities than on internal securitywhich in our view is of much greater concern to the leadership. Certainly the reorganization measures focused, as far as we can tell. on internal security, not on foreign intelligence.	25X1
The People's Armed Police, however, may be a less effective force than the leadership hopes. The PAP was created essentially by separating PLA security personnel from the Army and redesignating them as PAP	25X1 25X1
The Ministry of State Security, though powerful, does not seem to us to be a "Chinese KGB" despite the similarity in name. It lacks the KGB's sweeping authority in matters of internal security and does not command a large body of troops as the Soviet organization does.	25X1
The restructuring and the accompanying campaign stressing security concerns are likely to have a chilling effect domestically.	25X1
between Chinese and foreigners, already tight, will be even more closely watched. We expect that Chinese officials will be more guarded in their conversations with foreigners, official and unofficial. It will probably be increasingly difficult to gather certain information for business and trade purposes from Chinese fearful of giving away too much economic information and being	25X1
charged under China's vague and inclusive espionage laws.	25X1



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