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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

17 March 1983

China and the Asian Development Bank

Summary

China's recent decision to request membership in the Asian

Development Bankand to demand Taiwan's expulsioninjects another note of contention into US-China relations. Beijing appears in no mood to compromise. Indeed, by publicly scoring the US stand on the issue, the Chinese seem intent on pressing the United States and other ADB members to demonstrate their	
adherence to a one China policy.	25X1
Taiwan will not withdraw from the bank voluntarily. It has even indicated it is willing to remain a member if Beijing joins—the first time Taipei has acceded, even in principle, to dual membership in any international political or finanacial institution. If that ploy fails, Taiwan is likely to invoke the Taiwan Relations Act increasingly to induce the United States to support its position against China.	25X1
Japan and other bank members, meanwhile, are temporizing. Although they have told Beijing they will support China's bid for ADB membership, we believe they hope the United States will devise a means for Taiwan to remain in the bank. If Beijing rejects a reasonable US compromise proposal, we believe some bank	

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members	might	reduce	or	drop	their	support	for	Beijing's
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Background

The ADB was established in 1966 to provide financial and technical assistance to the developing countries of the Asian and Pacific region. Korea, Pakistan, and the ASEAN countries have been the bank's major borrowers. There are now 31 regional and 14 non-Asian member states (see annex). The bank is set up like the World Bank to provide both hard and soft loans. A subsidary, the Asian Development Fund (ADF), for example, provides 40-year loans to the region's poorest countries with a service charge of only 1 percent. The bank's ordinary loans are currently offered at an 11 percent interest rate. As of 31 December 1982 the bank's authorized capital was \$8 billion while the fund had \$3.6 billion in cumulative resources. Since its founding the bank has provided \$8 billion in hard loans and \$3.5 billion in soft The US contribution to the bank last year was \$134 million.

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Taiwan is a founding member of the bank and last borrowed from it in 1971. In fact, it currently owes the bank only \$42 million and last year contributed \$2 million to the ADF. Unlike its previous membership in the UN and the World Bank, Taipei's membership, capital share, vote, and loans at the ADB are based generally on Taiwan's economy and population, rather than all of China's.

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Why China Wants to Join

Beijing initially sought ADB membership to gain access to additional international financing and to remove Taiwan from the bank. We believe it thought it could simply replace Taiwan as it had in the World Bank. When it became clear by January, however, that Taiwan would fight to retain its seat and that other ADB members were not in favor of Taiwan's expulsion, the matter took on increased political importance for Beijing. Indeed, we believe the Chinese now view their quest for membership primarily as a way of forcing the United States and other key ADB members to demonstrate their commitment to a one-China policy. To win support and allay concern that China could become a drain on the bank's resources, Beijing has begun to reassure some bank members that it will take the ADB's limited assets into account in applying for loans.

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China's inability to obtain adequate World Bank assistance influenced its original decision to join the ADB. Beijing joined the World Bank in 1980, too late to take advantage of the last replenishment of the bank's soft loan subsidiary--the International Development Association (IDA). As a result, it has obtained only \$460 million in World Bank loans so far.

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China's growing rivalry with India for intern development loans also played a pabroke a gentleme with the ADB not to seek ADB funds.	ational n's agreement 25X1
To avoid the problems it encountered at the W Beijing decided to apply for ADB membership before approved its next general capital increase for the period. As a result, China began sounding out ADB fall and on the basis of a generally favorable reaformal demarches to bank members in November. In the United States and Japan expressed only qualifichina's positioni.e., refused to support explicidemand for Taiwan's ousterand Taiwan began to casupport, Beijing demanded Taiwan's expulsion as a for China's joining the bank.	the bank 1983-87 members last ction made January, when ed support for tly China's mpaign for precondition 25X1
In early February, Chinese officials told Sect that they were disappointed with the United States issuing a clear unequiviocal statement of support membership and Taiwan's explusion. On 8 March Chiand for the first time publicly criticized the Uniposition as being inconsistent with the Sino-US could be used the US of "laying obstacles" to China's accused the US of "laying obstacles" to China's accused the US of "laying obstacles" to China's accused days later, a Foreign Ministry official used with US embassy officials on another topic to undefinitely of the undefinitely of the US position.	for not for China's na went further ted States of ss spokesman lmission.
In late February, China formally notified the plans to join the bank and requested the bank take action to terminate Taiwan's membership. Chinese indicated that they would like to begin consultate bank, but have suggested that the ADB initiate the ADB's president indicated that he would have to see of the bank's board of directors. The board is so informally with its general counsel on 22 March to issue before possibly taking up the request at its in early May.	e immediate officials have ions with the is move. The eek the guidance cheduled to meet o discuss the
Taiwan's Gamble The ADB is the only remaining international political organization of which Taiwan is a member	financial or 25X1
Taiwan has raised no objections to Chin ADB, presumably banking on a Chinese refusal to a membership. At the same time, Taipei is trying t support, arguing that the Taiwan Relations Act precognition of Beijing from being used as a basis Taiwan from any international organization.	a joining the ccept joint or enlist US ecludes US
Thus far, officials in Taiwan have refused t	o entertain

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other compromise solutions, such as changing its name in the ADB

to "China, Taipei," as it did in order to remain a member of the International Olympics Committee. In late January, following an emergency Taiwan cabinet meeting, Taiwan officials also told US representatives in Taipei that Taiwan would not accept unofficial association with the bank.	25 X 1
Regional Reactions	
Japan and most other ADB members have told Beijing that they will support China's request for admission, despite their concern that China could become a drain on the bank's resources.	25X1
Most bank members appear to be hoping the United States will be able to devise a compromise that would allow Taiwan to remain in the bank.	25X1
Japan, which is the ADB's leading contributor, faces an especially uncomfortable dilemma. In our opinion, Tokyo does not want to damage its recently improved relations with Beijing, which soured briefly last year during the textbook controversy. But neither does it want to anger Taiwan, with which Japan has lucrative trading ties, or upset the pro-Taiwan lobby in the Diet.	25X1
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Korea, Australia, and Canada also have expressed their support for China's membership in the bank to Beijing but they would like to see Taiwan continue to play a role if that can be arranged. Korea has assured Taiwan of its support but added it will not lobby other ADB members on Taiwan's behalf. Like Japan, Australia has avoided taking a position on Taiwan's expulsion. Canada has suggested that it might work out a joint approach with the United States to handle China's admission.	25X1
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Is Compromise Possible?

The current atmosphere in US-China and US-Taiwan relations makes the working out of any compromise more difficult than in the past. Beijing is convinced that the United States is only paying lip-service to a one China policy, while Taipei is more confident of US support than it has been in years. Having turned the ADB issue into yet another test of US policy, therefore, the Chinese are unlikely to agree quickly to a compromise, if at all. Nor will Taiwan easily accede to a downgrading of its

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status in the bankthe only way we can see for both to belong to	
the ADB.	25X
Still, a compromise may be possible. The Chinese have	ч
stressed that their main concern is that the ADBand especially	
the United Statesacknowledge that Beijing represents China.	
Hence, they will almost certainly demand, at a minimum, that	
Taipei lose its official voting status. Beijing might then be	
more amenable to Taiwan's continued participation in the bank in	
a noncountry status, similiar to Hong Kong. Although Taiwan has	
publicly rejected such a solution, it has hinted	25X1
it might agree to an arrangement similiar to the one that	
permitted Taiwan to remain in the IOC as "China, Taipei."	25X

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ADB Subscriptions and Voting Power by Country

REGIONAL

Country	Subscribe <u>Shares</u>	ed	Percent of Total Voting Power
Afghanistan Australia Bangladesh Bhutan Burma Cambodia China, Republic of Cook Islands Fiji Hong Kong India	1,195 49,937 8,812 110 4,700 875 9,400 23 587 4,708 54,637		0.578 6.024 1.429 0.457 0.969 0.542 1.494 0.447 0.510 0.969 6.549
Indonesia Japan Kiribati Korea, Republic of Laos Malaysia Maldives Nepal New Zealand Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines Singapore Solomon Islands Sri Lanka Thailand Tongo Vanuatu Viet Nam Western Samoa	47,000 117,500 35 43,475 246 23,500 35 1,269 13,254 18,800 810 20,562 2,937 58 5,005 11,750 35 58 6,038 58		5.696 13.573 0.448 5.302 0.472 3.070 0.448 0.586 1.926 2.545 0.535 2.742 0.773 0.451 1.003 1.757 0.448 0.451 1.119 0.451
TOTAL REGIONAL	447,401		63.764
NON-REGIONAL United States Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France	117,500 2,937 2,937 45,143 2,937 1,175 14,687		13.573 0.773 0.773 5.488 0.773 0.576 2.085
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Country	Subscribed Shares	Percent of Total Voting Power
Germany, Fed. Rep. of Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom	37,334 11,750 6,462 2,937 1,175 4,037 17,625	4.615 1.757 1.166 0.773 0.576 0.895 2.413
TOTAL NON-REGIONAL	268,636	36. 236
TOTAL	716,037	100.000

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