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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Attached is the response to
Dr. Brzezinski's request for an
assessment of the Dutch report on
Pakistan.

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Chief, Southwest Asia
Analytic Center

Date 5 November 1980

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[Redacted]

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5 November 1980

MEMORANDUM

DUTCH REPORT THAT PAKISTAN
IS WAVERING ON AFGHANISTAN [Redacted]

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There is no evidence to support the contention in the Dutch report that the Pakistanis are in the process of switching their position on Afghanistan and that they have worked out a limited understanding to this end with the Soviets. [Redacted]

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Pakistan has made an attempt over the last few weeks to obtain an Islamic Conference draft resolution on Afghanistan that would receive wide support in the UN General Assembly and has urged moderation of the implementation proposals in the resolution with this objective in mind. Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, who has been at the UN, also apparently harbored hopes that the Soviets might respond favorably to a comparatively moderate resolution and perhaps show a willingness to negotiate, but there is no evidence he had any Soviet encouragement in this regard.

[Redacted]

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Publicly, the Soviets and Pakistanis show no evidence of changing their positions toward each other. In the last week, Zia has twice spoken out against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At a public reception in Peshawar this week Zia

This memorandum has been prepared by the Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center [Redacted]

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[redacted]

spoke at length about recent violations of Pakistani airspace and said there was no question of a shift of policy on Afghanistan because it was based on "principles that could not be compromised." And on 4 November Izvestia carried an article attacking Pakistan for its continuing unwillingness to enter direct negotiations with Babrak's regime. Izvestia said such a course ran counter to the national interests of the people of Pakistan, was fraught with adverse consequences for that country, politically, morally, and materially, and was aggravating relations not only with Afghanistan but also with other neighboring states. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The Dutch report, however, does reflect the increasing concern among Pakistani leaders--including President Zia--that Pakistan is becoming isolated on Afghanistan as the world pays less attention to the issue and as it becomes clearer that it will not be possible to oust the Soviets. There has been evidence for some time that several Pakistani leaders, including Agha Shahi, have advocated keeping a dialogue open with the Soviets in order to reduce pressure from Moscow and we believe President Zia would be willing to pursue indications of Soviet flexibility. [redacted]

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At some point Pakistan may have serious discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan. So far, however, the Soviets have shown no flexibility on Afghanistan, continuing to insist on Pakistani recognition of the Babrak government and on the end of aid to the insurgents, conditions which the Pakistanis show no signs yet of compromising on. [redacted]

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In short, current Pakistani policy appears to be one of continuing support for the Afghan insurgency, but to remain alert for signs of Soviet flexibility. [redacted]

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ACTION: NONE INFO: NESA, ODPS-S, OPA/RO, RAD/RAF, SDA-2,
SOA1-E (), WEN/NL, WES/SA, FILE, RF, ODPN-N, PPB/FESA, CR/E, EUR-3,
FR, IAD/CAS-3, IAD/PE, NE-4, NIC/AG, NIO/NE, NIO/WE, DGCR-2 (21/W)

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INFO RUFHKK/ALL NATO CAPITALS
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0454
RUSBUD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0246
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0206
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0091
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8459
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0797
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2837
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 07639

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/04/00 (BENNETT, W.TAPLEY, JR.) DR-P
TAGS: NATO, PEPR, AF, NL, PK
SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: NETHERLANDS REPORT ON SHIFT IN
PAKISTANI POSITION

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. AT POLADS NOV. 4 NETHERLANDS REP CIRCULATED REPORT (TEXT PARA 4) FROM DUTCH EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD SUGGESTING THAT PAKISTAN WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SWITCHING ITS POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SOME FORM OF DIALOGUE WITH THE KARMAL REGIME, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE BROADER SUPPORT FOR A UN RESOLUTION. NETHERLANDS REPORT IS

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CONCERNED, INTER ALIA, THAT PAKISTAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO "SELL OUT" THE AFGHANI RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ACCEPT THE FACT ACCOMPLI OF SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY READILY-AVAILABLE WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S CURRENT STANCE--BEYOND THE QUESTION OF THE UN RESOLUTION--THAT WE MIGHT SHARE WITH ALLIES HERE.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF NETHERLANDS REPORT:

RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

1. IN THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IN ISLAMABAD THE IMPRESSION PREVAILS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN AN OPERATION OF SWITCHING ITS POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THE BASIS FOR A DEAL WAS ARRANGED DURING THE CONVERSATIONS OF THE PAKISTANI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MR AGA SHAHI WITH THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN NEW YORK. IN ESSENCE THE AGREEMENT WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RESPECT THE INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN (FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST?) AND WOULD CEASE TO EXERCISE PRESSURE ON IT IN EXCHANGE FOR ACCEPTANCE BY ISLAMABAD OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN REGIME AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS ON THE WAYS AND MEANS TO SETTLE THE BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

2. IN ITS EXTERNAL POLICY THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AS WELL AS TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT THE RECENT CONSULTATIONS OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN NEW YORK (RESULTING IN THE ADDITION OF GUINEA AND TUNISIA TO THE MEDIATION COMMITTEE OF THREE) HAD RESULTED IN A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT SOME KIND OF DIALOGUE WITH BABRAK KARMAL, CUM SUIS WITHOUT PRIOR CONDITIONS, HAD BECOME UNAVOIDABLE FOR PAKISTAN.

3. THIS WOULD OPEN THE ROAD TO BREAK THE IMPASSE, FOR

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EXAMPLE IN THE FORM OF A UN RESOLUTION WHICH COULD BE SUBSCRIBED TO BY THE ISLAMIC STATES AND THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITH PRO-SOVIET LEANING AND POSSIBLY EVEN AVOID DIRECT SOVIET OPPOSITION. AS FAR AS THE CONTENT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, NO HARD INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, BUT DRAFTING WORK IN THE UN ON A RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN IS CONTINUING.

4. ON THE ONE HAND FOR REASONS EXPLAINED ABOVE, THE RESOLUTION CANNOT BE "VERY STIFF" WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND THE TEXT CAN ALSO NOT BE SO "WEAK" AS TO FORCE THE HARD-LINERS AMONG THE ISLAMIC AND NNA STATES TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE TEXT.

5. IN ORDER TO PREVENT THIS, THE RUMORS IN ISLAMABAD HAVE IT THAT PRESIDENT ZIA HAD CONSULTED PRESIDENT CARTER, MRS. THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THEM NOT TO STRESS THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST WEST RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO THE SAME RUMORS, HE HAD STRONGLY REQUESTED THEM TO SHOW CONSIDERATION FOR THE PRIMARY PAKISTANI INTEREST TO ARRIVE AT A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS (TO BE READ IN THIS CASE THE SOVIET INSTALLED REGIME IN KABUL), AT SOME POINT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

6. THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIET TACTIC OF "CARROT", THAT IS THE PROMISE NOT TO FOSTER SEPARATIST

TENDENCIES IN PASTUNISTAN, BALUCHISTAN AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY, THEREBY RESPECTING PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND "STICK" MEANING THE SWITCH FROM POLITICAL TO DIRECT MILITARY PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE THE RECENT HELICOPTER GUNSHIP RAIDS ON AFGHANI REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE PAKISTAN BORDER AREA, HAS SUCCEEDED IN MAKING PAKISTAN "WEAK IN THE KNEES".

7. ACCORDINGLY PAKISTAN'S REGIME WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE READY TO ACCEPT KABUL'S PROPOSALS OF MAY 14 LAST, IN PART OR IN WHOLE AS AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT.

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8. IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT FOR THE PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES THE RETURN OF THE NEARLY ONE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMETLAND IS NOT THE LAST, BUT RATHER THE FIRST PRIORITY. THE RUSSIANS ARE AWARE OF THIS AND EXPLOIT IT FOR ALL THAT IT IS WORTH KNOWING WELL THAT TIME WORKS TO THEIR BENEFIT.

9. THE QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE SCENARIO WHICH WOULD INDICATE THE "SELL-OUT" OF THE AFGHANI RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY AND THE DECREASE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES CAN, IN TIME, BE FOISTED ON THE FOREIGN SYMPATHIZERS WITH THE AFGHANI CAUSE. PROVIDED THAT THE OPERATION IS HANDLED WITH CARE AND SUFFICIENT TIME IS TAKEN TO COMPLETE IT, ISLAMABAD SEEMS TO FEEL THAT IT MAY WELL SUCCEED. ESPECIALLY IF KABUL WOULD BE PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE IN FINDING ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR LONG OUTSTANDING PAKISTANI-AFGHANI DIFFERENCES MOST NOTABLY THE RECOGNITION OF THE DURAND LINE.

10. ANOTHER FACT WORKING IN FAVOUR OF THE ABOVE SCENARIO BENEFITTING SOVIET INTERESTS, IS THE IRANI-IRAQI WAR WHICH NOW OVERSHADOWS THE AFGHAN CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION. THIS CAN BE USED BY THE PAKISTANIS TO SOFTEN THEIR INITIALLY INFLEXIBLE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND ADOPT A POSTURE OF ACQUIESCENCE WITH THE "FAIT ACCOMPLI". COMPROMISES ARE ALWAYS ACHIEVED IN THE SHADOW OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTSIDE THE LIME-LIGHT.

11. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE PAKISTANIS IN SWITCHING THEIR ATTITUDE IS THEIR BELIEF THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS CONTAINS ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE PAKISTANI SECURITY. IF DETENTE WOULD FAIL AND A NEW PERIOD OF EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION WOULD EMERGE, AFTER AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN IS DIRECTLY IN LINE TO BE THE NEXT VICTIM OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. PAKISTAN'S PRESIDENT ZIA REALIZES THIS ONLY TOO WELL, CONSIDERING HIS STATEMENT IN BONN THAT A POSSIBLE INTERVENTION OF THE RUSSIANS IN POLAND IN FACT WOULD NOT BE VERY MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHAT HAS ALREADY OCCURED IN AFGHANISTAN.

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12. THE PROBLEM FOR PAKISTAN IN THE PERSPECTIVE FROM ISLAMABAD IS, HOWEVER, THAT SEEN FROM WASHINGTON, LONDON AND BONN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN ARE FAR AWAY BUT SEEN FROM ISLAMABAD THE RUSSIANS STAND AT THE KHYBERPASS, THEREFORE, PAKISTAN IS READY TO MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD SITUATION. END TEXT. BENNETT

END OF MESSAGE

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