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# Soviet and East European Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs



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A Research Paper

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December 1983

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# Soviet and East European Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by the Communist  
Activities Branch, Office of Global Issues. It was  
coordinated with the Department of State and the  
Defense Intelligence Agency.

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directed to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch,  
International Security Issues Division, OGI, on

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**Soviet and East European  
Military Transfers to  
Non-Communist LDCs**

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**Summary**

*Information available  
as of 1 November 1983  
was used in this report.*

After nearly three decades, arms transfers remain the Soviet Union's primary and most effective means of gaining entry and extending its influence in the Third World. As a result of the rapid growth and commercialization of its military sales program in recent years, Moscow's earnings from arms transfers now surpass all other Soviet commercial ties with the non-Communist less developed countries (LDCs)—accounting for about 15 percent of total annual hard currency earnings.

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The USSR concluded just over \$9 billion worth of new military agreements with non-Communist LDC governments in 1982—up sharply from the year before—as Kremlin leaders took steps to recoup lost momentum and prestige in the Middle East and to strengthen military ties with New Delhi. As part of these initiatives, Moscow displayed an increased willingness to extend concessionary credit terms on new purchases and to provide preferred clients with a wider selection of some of its most up-to-date weapons systems. Iraq, Syria, and India were the main beneficiaries, accounting for nearly 90 percent of all Soviet arms accords signed in 1982. Relatively smaller, but significant, new Soviet arms commitments also were extended to Angola, Mozambique, Kuwait, Peru, and Nicaragua.

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Preliminary results for 1983 indicate that the value of new Soviet arms agreements will fall well below recent annual levels and are likely to total only some \$3-5 billion, with India, Angola, and possibly Libya the principal customers. The drop appears to result from the need of major buyers to absorb large outstanding equipment orders and from financial constraints faced by some of Moscow's oil-exporting clients:

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East European military agreements in 1982 fell back from the record set in 1981, but still managed to top the \$1 billion mark for the second consecutive year. The Iran-Iraq war again was the major factor, with some Eastern Bloc suppliers handling orders from both combatants.

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Warsaw Pact deliveries of weapons, related material, and services remained heavy in 1982 and are estimated to be worth at least \$7.7 billion. Following previous patterns, deliveries were concentrated in the Middle East. Syria and Iraq, which restocked depleted inventories of air and ground equipment, accounted for nearly half of all Warsaw Pact deliveries. Military shipments to Angola, Mozambique, India, and Nicaragua also showed large increases from the year before.

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[redacted]

The provision of more sophisticated weapons to LDC armed forces has led to an increased need for Soviet Bloc training and servicing. In 1982 a record 20,000 Soviet and East European military specialists were stationed in the non-Communist Third World—twice the number abroad just five years before. The 1983 figure for Soviet military presence abroad will be even higher as a result of the dispatch of several thousand additional air-defense-related technicians to Syria. [redacted]

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The precarious situations that threaten wider conflict in the Middle East are likely to provide Moscow greater latitudes of action in the coming months. This, along with the promise of new major arms deals with key Soviet clients and the introduction of new Soviet weapons into Third World inventories during 1983, signals continued success for Moscow's enduring military transfer program. [redacted]

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#### **Explanation of Terms**

*This annual report is based on data from a variety of sources, including unclassified publications. It recounts Warsaw Pact military transfers to non-Communist less developed countries. The term military transfers includes both the sale and grant of military equipment and related services, such as advisory support, training, and construction of military facilities. Military transfers encompass signed agreements, commitments, or accords which constitute a formal declaration of intent. The terms deliveries and shipments are used to indicate the actual movement of foreign military goods and services to the recipient country.* [redacted]

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*The data on military transfers reflect the latest information available and supersede data in our previous publications. Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Soviet trade prices that are usually quoted in rubles and converted into US dollars at current rates.* [redacted]

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*The non-Communist less developed countries referred to in this report include all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; all countries of East Asia except Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and the Communist states of Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam; Malta, Portugal, and Spain in Europe; all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and all countries in the Middle East and South Asia except Israel.*


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[redacted]

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**Figure 1**  
**Soviet and East European Military**  
**Agreements and Deliveries, 1955-82\***




\* Data for 1980-82 may understate actual deliveries by as much as two billion because of increased Soviet efforts to conceal military cargo shipments.

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**Figure 2**  
**Soviet and East European Military**  
**Deliveries, 1955-82**

Percent



Total: \$63.8 Billion

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## Soviet and East European Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs

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### Perspective

For nearly three decades the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have pressed to gain influence in non-Communist Third World countries through military assistance programs.<sup>1</sup> While experiencing some reverses, such as in Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, the permanence and resolve of the Kremlin's "penetration" strategy cannot be disputed. Indeed, the growing instability and armed conflict in the Third World since the early 1970s have provided not only fertile ground for new Soviet successes (Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua) but the opportunity to earn needed hard currency from LDC purchases of arms and related services.

Moscow found early on that arms transfers were the most direct and fastest route to influence in the LDCs. Newly independent Third World states often could obtain economic aid from the West but not the military assistance that many clamored for most. Offering a wide assortment of weaponry, along with rapid delivery, training, and generous repayment terms, the USSR soon parlayed its initial arms deals with Afghanistan and Egypt into a \$500 million a year program. The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts spurred rapid growth in Soviet military transfers and, together with the sharp rise in international oil prices, led Moscow to concentrate on Middle Eastern clients. By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had become the world's second-largest supplier of military equipment. The soaring demand for new and better armaments by oil-rich nations in the Middle East and others with access to Arab wealth and Soviet willingness to make available many modern weapons on short notice set the stage for full-scale competition with Western arms suppliers. Moscow temporarily overtook the United States as the leading arms provider to the Third World in 1980-81, concluding agreements worth more than \$20 billion, or about a half again as much as the United States.

**Table 1**  
**USSR: Military Agreements With LDCs**

Billion US \$

1970-72 (annual average)	1.5
1973	2.9
1974	5.7
1975	3.2
1976	6.1
1977	9.6
1978	2.5
1979	8.4
1980	14.2
1981	6.4
1982	9.1
1983 *	3.0-5.0

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\* Estimated.

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The escalation of OPEC petroleum prices beginning in 1973 coincided with a rapid rise in Soviet military equipment prices, as Moscow capitalized on the new-found Arab wealth. To boost its increasingly commercially oriented arms sales campaign, the USSR added more and larger carriers to its merchant fleet and in 1975-76 began a construction program that would triple the size of its principal arms export facility in the Black Sea. The results have been impressive: the volume and value of Soviet arms deliveries more than doubled in 1978-82, compared with the previous five-year period. During this period almost three-fourths of the arms delivered—valued at \$23 billion—went to hard currency Middle East customers.

**Soviet Military Agreements: The Recent Record**  
Soviet arms agreements climbed to \$9.1 billion in 1982, 40 percent higher than the year before and well above the average for 1973-81 (table 1). Agreements

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remained heavily concentrated among a few prominent clients—Iraq, Syria, and India—who accounted for nearly 90 percent of the new orders. Accords with Libya, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Angola, and Peru accounted for most of the remainder. For 1983, Soviet arms commitments to non-Communist LDCs are expected to drop back to \$3-5 billion, as major Middle Eastern buyers pause to absorb large military orders placed in 1980-82. A large new arms pledge to Angola and ongoing negotiations with India, Libya, and Ethiopia for additional modern weapons are likely to generate the bulk of Moscow's 1983 arms agreements.

**Moscow Adjusts Program.** Moscow adjusted its military transfer practices in 1982 both to bolster its flagging influence in the Middle East and to accommodate the worsening economic climate and increased competition from Western arms suppliers. The greater willingness to offer more of its advanced weaponry at more concessionary terms and with some debt rescheduling were prominent features of agreements negotiated in 1982. In fact, over the last two years more new Soviet modern weapon systems have been promised or sold to LDC clients than in any period since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (table 2). Moscow's greater willingness to make available for export more equipment from its current family of modern weapons reflects the realization that arms offerings had to be upgraded to meet LDC demands for more advanced systems—even at the risk of compromising military technology information. Although not conclusive, there is evidence suggesting that the large recent-year sales of late-model MIG fighters and armored vehicles to cash-paying Middle Eastern customers have caused some delays in promised exports to Eastern Bloc allies.


The military resupply accords signed with Iraq and Syria in 1982 underscored Moscow's desire not only to recoup lost influence and prestige but, in the case of Iraq, to prevent further erosion of its arms market to France and other Western suppliers. The softer repayment terms and inclusion of newer model tanks, more sophisticated fighter aircraft, and air defense missile systems contained in the latest Iraqi and Syrian agreements represent a change of course for Moscow in dealing with its major Arab clients.

**Table 2**  
**Advanced Soviet Weapons Systems**  
**Recently Offered or Sold to LDCs**

Country	Weapon Systems
Angola	SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system
India	Kresta-class guided missile cruisers
	SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems
	AT-5 anti-tank missile system
	MIG-27, -29, -32 fighters
	AN-32 transport aircraft
	Helix ASW helicopters
	T-72 tanks (improved models)
Iraq	MIG-27 fighters
	SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system
	MI-17 helicopters
	Improved armor (T-72s, BMPs)
	Improved radar and communications
Kuwait	SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system
Libya	SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system
	MIG-27 fighters
	Haze ASW helicopters
	Improved armored vehicles
	Improved electronic equipment
Syria	SA-5 and SA-8 anti-aircraft missile systems
	SS-21 surface-to-surface tactical missile systems
	MIG-27 fighters
	M-17 helicopters
	Haze ASW helicopters
	Improved armor, radar, and communications

New agreements with India last year showed yet another advance in Soviet arms export policy—the licensed sale of military production technology heretofore not available to countries outside the Warsaw Pact. About a third of the \$3 billion in new Soviet-Indian agreements last year will cover licenses to produce MIG-27 aircraft in India. Although a follow-on to the MIG-21 production program in India, the MIG-27 represents a significant advance in Soviet

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technology transfer to a non-Communist country, both in terms of hardware sophistication and fabrication techniques. India will become the only other country to produce this swing-wing, high-performance ground attack aircraft.

The granting of softer financial arrangements to Iraq, India, and Syria last year marked a shift, if not a reversal, in the USSR's commercial arms sales policy instituted in the mid-1970s. Following OPEC's initial

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petroleum price hikes in 1973/74, Moscow progressively instituted sharp increases in the prices charged for its weapons and military services and furthermore demanded repayment in hard currency from all but a very few select clients. This was particularly the case for arms transfers to the radical Middle Eastern oil-producing states and those countries receiving Arab financial assistance. Most of Syria's agreements with the Soviet Union, for example, have been funded from Baghdad Pact contributions. [redacted]

The apparent return to a more concessional policy on arms sales not only underlines the political importance Moscow places on the program, but demonstrates how quickly the program can be adjusted to accommodate Soviet foreign policy initiatives and changing economic conditions. The improved sales terms awarded to Iraq and India almost certainly were prompted in large part by those countries' recent efforts to lessen their dependence on the USSR for military support. Iraqi purchases of Western military equipment since the start of its war against Iran now amount to over \$12 billion—about four times the purchases of Soviet equipment—and includes much more advanced weaponry than that previously supplied by Moscow. The Soviet response of offering comparable equipment at cheaper prices and at better terms to key recipients illustrates Moscow's resolve to maintain a competitive edge in arms sales and also thwart Western inroads into strategically important markets. [redacted]

**Arms Deliveries Also Surge.** The volume of Soviet military deliveries increased dramatically in 1982 and remained at peak levels through the first six months of 1983, spurred largely by record backlogs and heavy resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. The estimated value of Soviet military deliveries in 1982, based on observed shipments, amounted to just over \$6 billion (table 3). Increased efforts to conceal Soviet unloadings, including more nighttime deliveries, denied a full accounting of transfers, especially to Iraq and Syria. As a result, we believe the value of Soviet deliveries may be understated perhaps by as much as \$1-2 billion, or one-third of the total. [redacted]

Syria and Iraq accounted for almost one-half of all ground weapons, aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles delivered by the USSR over the past 18 months.

**Table 3**  
**USSR: Estimated Value of Military Deliveries to Major Clients, 1982**

Million US \$

<b>Total</b>	<b>6,080</b>
Algeria	840
India	965
Iraq	840 *
Libya	685
Syria	1,800 *
Other	950

\* Values based on partial delivery information.

Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua also experienced sharp increases in Soviet military deliveries. Increased threats from South Africa led Moscow to bolster the defenses of its southern African patrons with record shipments to Angola that included the country's first guided-missile patrol boats and T-62 medium tanks, as well as two more squadrons of MIG-21 fighters. Capabilities have been bolstered more recently by the arrival of MI-24 helicopter gunships and SA-8 mobile air defense missile systems, which presumably will be manned by Cuban personnel. Moreover, to better protect Mozambique's southern flank, Moscow introduced several types of ground equipment, including new armored personnel carriers, tanks, and tracked bridging equipment. [redacted]

Soviet-sponsored deliveries to Nicaragua jumped from \$6 million in 1981 to \$50 million last year in response to intensified rebel activities. Following previous patterns, Soviet merchant ships delivered only military support items, such as trucks, with lethal Soviet hardware routed to Nicaraguan ports via Algerian and Bulgarian arms carriers. Major items received in 1982 included additional T-55 tanks, Managua's first BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, and mobile radio intercept stations to locate guerrilla

**Table 4**  
**Eastern Europe: Arms Agreements With LDCs**

Million US \$

	Annual Average 1970-77	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Jan-Jun 1983
<b>Total</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>746</b>	<b>827</b>	<b>2,399</b>	<b>1,222</b>	<b>521</b>
Bulgaria	11	160	2	162	247	126	222
Czechoslovakia	189	82	420	94	385	268	80
East Germany	18	100	10	209	68	319	97
Hungary	46	39	29	78	347	141	45
Poland	52	111	100	130	512	93	7
Romania	21	26	185	154	840	275	70

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communications sites.<sup>2</sup> Cuba and East Germany provided anti-aircraft guns and transport vehicles, respectively, from their own stocks. The pace of overall military deliveries quickened in the first half of 1983, with the USSR supplying AN-26 transport aircraft, MI-8 helicopters, and military trucks for the Nicaraguan Army's anti-insurgent campaign.

Cuba reportedly doubled the size of its military/security contingent during the early part of 1983.

**A Profitable Program.** The financial returns derived from military transfers surpass those from all other Soviet commercial relations with Third World countries. Hard currency returns from military sales during 1980-82 are estimated to have been about \$7-8 billion per year, or about 15 percent of Moscow's total hard currency earnings. These new totals are larger than earlier estimates because of new findings that indicate earnings from follow-on sales, support packages, military construction projects, and technical services are much higher than earlier thought. The huge backlog of orders for Soviet weaponry, together with increased demand for costly new hardware and military technical services, ensure steady if not growing income from arms transfers.

#### Eastern Europe: Augmenting the Soviet Arms Program

East European military transfers add an important dimension to the USSR's arms export program, generally complementing Soviet shipments of more sophisticated fighter aircraft, naval combatants, and surface-to-air missiles, by supplying large quantities of older model ground weapons and combat/trainer aircraft. The Eastern Bloc countries also serve as key sources of military training and provide technical services as well.

Although the value of new agreements was down from the 1981 peak, East European suppliers enjoyed another good year in 1982 by capitalizing on the continuing heavy demands generated by the Iran-Iraq war (table 4). About one-half of the \$1.2 billion in new East European arms accords in 1982 were divided between the two combatants, with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland accepting orders from both sides. Since the fighting erupted in September 1980, East European countries have garnered more than \$2 billion in arms contracts from Iran and Iraq. With no prospect in the near term for a decrease in the fighting between Iran and Iraq, East European suppliers should be able to sustain their relatively high levels of arms sales.

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**Table 5**  
**Eastern Europe: Military Deliveries**  
**to Regions and Major Recipients**

Million US \$

	Annual Average 1970-77	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 Jan-Jun
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>641</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>1,242</b>	<b>1,622</b>	<b>677</b>
Middle East/North Africa	167	413	509	465	1,132	1,520	636
Algeria	0	25	25	25	25	0	3
Egypt	22	4	10	10	NEGL	0	24
Iran	NEGL	1	0	0	4	60	2
Iraq	44	95	74	126	609	822	106
Libya	44	184	155	101	355	314	427
North Yemen	NEGL	2	100	NA	80	91	1
Syria	52	99	145	181	56	158	40
Other	5	3	0	22	3	75	33
Asia	21	0	46	25	31	22	18
India	17	0	45	25	29	16	9
Other	4	0	1	NA	2	6	9
Latin America	NEGL	0	0	3	6	26	22
Nicaragua	0	0	0	3	0	26	22
Other	NEGL	0	0	0	6	0	0
Sub-Saharan Africa	21	138	86	62	73	54	1
Angola	10	52	25	4	25	21	1
Ethiopia	4	41	25	7	5	0	0
Mozambique	1	22	19	29	2	10	0
Tanzania	1	18	14	10	10	10	0
Other	5	5	3	12	31	13	0

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East European arms deliveries reached a record \$1.6 billion in 1982, \$380 million higher than in 1981 (table 5). Iraq alone received materiel worth more than \$800 million, mostly expendable items, such as artillery ammunition, small arms, and spare parts. Preliminary data for the first six months of 1983 suggest that Libya was the largest recipient of East European military equipment, some of which was likely earmarked for Libyan-backed rebels in Chad.

**Military Technical Services: Higher Level of Support**  
 Technical services continue to be a key element of Warsaw Pact military programs. Paralleling the upswing in arms transfers, some 20,000 Warsaw Pact—along with 38,000 to 45,000 Cuban—military

personnel were posted to 34 LDCs in 1982 (table 6). This level was increased in 1983 by the addition of several thousand Soviet personnel in Syria.

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Most of the 25-percent increase in the Soviet overseas presence during 1982 was directed to Middle Eastern clients:

- Moscow sent about 500 more technicians and soldiers to Syria, primarily to man the new SA-5 missile installations. This augmentation raised Soviet military presence to about 3,500—the largest Soviet military advisory group in the non-Communist Third World community. Early this year, Moscow dispatched another 3,500 military personnel, mostly for air defense activities.

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**Table 6**  
**Military Technicians in LDCs, 1982**

*Number of persons*

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
<b>Total <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>57,780-64,980</b>	<b>17,450</b>	<b>2,630</b>	<b>37,700-44,900</b>
Middle East-North Africa	11,800	10,435 <sup>b</sup>	1,365	NA
Sub-Saharan Africa	41,385-48,585	4,440	1,250	35,695-42,895
Latin America	2,245	225	15	2,005
South Asia	2,350	2,350	NA	0

<sup>a</sup> Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

<sup>b</sup> In early 1983 an estimated 3,500 additional Soviet technicians were dispatched to Syria in conjunction with the new SA-5 missile installations.

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- The Soviet presence in Iraq doubled to 1,000 following the full-scale resumption of military deliveries last summer.
- Another 500 Soviets went to North Yemen, raising the number there to 1,200—a threefold increase since 1981.

nearly half of total shipments, while transfers to Libya, India, Ethiopia, and Angola also should show higher totals for 1983. Current deliveries continue to be characterized by high proportions of late-model, sophisticated weaponry for these high profile clients.

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Large Soviet contingents also continued to provide advice, technical support, and instruction in Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Angola, and Ethiopia.

While arms deliveries should remain strong, the level of new Soviet military commitments over the next few years will be governed largely by political dynamics in the Middle East and by the procurement cycles of Moscow's major arms recipients. As indicated earlier, Soviet arms agreements for 1983 will probably show a steep decline from the \$9.1 billion recorded in 1982.

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#### Looking Ahead

Arms transfer initiatives taken since the beginning of 1982 to bolster Moscow's position with key LDC allies seem to be continuing in 1983. A prime example of the Kremlin's increased willingness to provide top-of-the-line weaponry was spotlighted in October with the delivery of the Soviet's latest tactical missile system—the SS-21—to Syria.

Angola has been the only recipient of major new Soviet arms pledges thus far. Libya and India are negotiating major purchases, but the discussions will likely extend into 1984 before any agreements are signed. Given the frequency of African and Middle Eastern LDC military trade delegation visits to Moscow and East European capitals during 1983, we expect a number of modest follow-on arms accords will almost certainly result.

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We expect Soviet arms deliveries to hit a new high in 1983 and remain heavy through 1985—driven largely by the record order backlogs built up over the past several years. Iraq and Syria continue to account for

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In Central America, Soviet Bloc and Cuban efforts will remain focused on strengthening Nicaraguan military capabilities. Although no new arms agreements were reported during the first half of 1983, outstanding military commitments, the continued shuttling of Nicaraguan military delegations to Havana and Moscow, and embarrassment over Grenada suggest that additional military support will be forthcoming.

Stepped-up military actions by the anti-Sandinista forces punctuated by the first air strikes of the conflict have triggered public statements by Managua that it will seek to acquire combat aircraft to protect its airspace. Such announcements have been anticipated for some time, given the improvements to

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Nicaraguan airfields and the training of Nicaraguan pilots in Cuba and Eastern Europe since 1979. Because of their fears of further provoking the United States, Havana and Moscow probably would accede to such a request but only if they felt the regime were in imminent danger of collapse. [REDACTED]

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Over the longer term, we believe the changes in Soviet arms transfers policies seen recently have positioned the Soviet Union to better react to new opportunities to supply military hardware and technical services to Third World requesters. The recent export of more sophisticated Soviet weapons on attractive terms should mute longstanding LDC complaints about receiving outmoded Soviet equipment. In addition, the further expansion of Nikolayev South—the main Soviet arms export terminal in the Black Sea—will improve Moscow's capability to deliver larger volumes of heavy weapons and equipment on short notice. These and other refinements, including high-level personnel changes in its foreign-assistance apparatus, underline the continued priority the Kremlin places on arms transfers as a viable instrument of foreign policy. [REDACTED]

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East European arms suppliers should also be able to capitalize on their recent successes in the coming years. Aggressive marketing tactics, along with attractive prices and quick turnaround on orders have contributed to a reputation of being a reliable alternative source of equipment and technical expertise. [REDACTED]

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## Appendix A

Warsaw Pact Military Transfer Programs  
in 1982: A Regional Analysis

Table A-1

Million US \$

Middle East-North Africa: Soviet Bloc  
Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and  
Military Presence During 1982

	Total <sup>a</sup>		USSR		Eastern Europe		Soviet and East European Military Presence <sup>b</sup>
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,839</b>	<b>5,971</b>	<b>5,706</b>	<b>4,451</b>	<b>1,133</b>	<b>1,520</b>	<b>11,800</b>
Algeria	3	840	0	840	3	0	1,515
Cyprus	NA	NA	0	0	NA	0	0
Egypt	0	12	0	12	0	0	0
Greece	75	75	0	0	75	75	0
Iran	218	160	11	100	207	60	250
Iraq	3,388	1,660	3,003	838	385	822	1,100
Jordan	1	85	1	85	0	0	35
Kuwait	258	NA	258	NA	NA	0	0
Lebanon	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
Libya	748	998	386	684	362	314	2,800
Morocco	40	0	Negl	0	40	0	0
North Yemen	58	130	35	39	23	91	1,200
South Yemen	NA	53	0	53	NA	NA	1,100
Syria	2,048	1,958	2,012	1,800	36	158	3,800

<sup>a</sup> Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.

<sup>b</sup> Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more.

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### The Middle East-North Africa: The Major Soviet Target

The Middle East continued to be the focus of Soviet Bloc military transfers in 1982, accounting for two-thirds of all new arms accords (table A-1). The stalemated war in the Persian Gulf and the crisis in Lebanon last year presented opportunities for Moscow and its allies not only to recoup prestige and influence lost over the last three years but also to play a more active role in regional affairs. New Warsaw Pact arms agreements with Middle Eastern countries

reached a near-record \$6.8 billion and promised an array of weapon systems never before sent to LDCs:

- Iraq was promised at least \$3 billion worth of updated armaments, including MIG-27 ground attack aircraft, more advanced air defense equipment, and late model T-72 tanks.

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- Syria received an additional \$2 billion in military equipment credits to replenish and upgrade its inventories depleted during the Lebanon debacle, replacements to include the first Soviet export of MIG-23 Flogger G interceptors, SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, and MI-17 helicopters.
- Libya purchased \$750 million in military equipment, despite some problems over past-due payments.
- Kuwait signed its second deal with Moscow, worth \$260 million, after a hiatus of five years. [redacted]

East European arms suppliers enjoyed another profitable year in the Middle East, even though orders were only half the 1981 record of \$2.4 billion. Iran and Iraq again were the major buyers, with a combined total of almost \$600 million in new contracts, mostly for high expenditure items such as munitions, small arms, spares, and transport vehicles. East Germany's \$200 million agreement to supply military spare parts and support equipment to Iran was the largest single transaction. Elsewhere, Libya authorized Czechoslovakia to proceed with construction of a \$200 million tank repair facility, and the new socialist government in Greece signed its first military accord with a Communist state—Romania—in seven years.

The volume of Soviet and East European arms deliveries to the region reached new highs in 1982, spurred by heavy resupply efforts to Iraq and Syria. Algeria received near-record shipments of Soviet equipment, the result of the \$3 billion purchase agreement signed in 1980. [redacted]

Soviet military transfers to the Middle East proceeded apace in 1983. Indeed, based on deliveries monitored through June, arms and related equipment transfers for the year should top last year's total. Overall arms commitments to the region, however, may drop in value. Ongoing negotiations with Libya over another multibillion-dollar purchase may be finalized this year if Colonel Qadhafi shows some restraint in support of the Chadian rebels. Improved Soviet relations with Syria and Iraq could tempt Moscow to expand its military commitments in the face of the growing threats against both regimes. Even so, it is

doubtful that 1983 Soviet arms pledges will come close to matching the emergency relief seen the year before. [redacted]

#### Country Highlights

**Algeria.** Algeria signed no new arms accords in 1982 with Moscow, underscoring its determination to diversify its arms sources and reduce its dependence on the USSR for military equipment. The absence of new accords may also reflect Algerian concern with the disappointing performance of Soviet MIG fighters and SAM batteries in the Lebanese war. Nevertheless, some \$840 million in deliveries were received under the \$3 billion 1980 accord. First-time deliveries to Algeria in 1982 included:

- SA-8 mobile surface-to-air missile batteries.
- SA-3 missile batteries that will improve medium-altitude air defense capabilities.
- 152-mm self-propelled guns.
- MIG-23 Flogger B fighters equipped with a better engine, avionics, and armaments than the stripped-down model normally exported to LDCs.

**Iran.** While Tehran has come to depend on the supply of Soviet-type weaponry from North Korea and radical Arab countries, Moscow continues to maintain a significant but low-keyed arms supply relationship with Iran. We believe that some \$100 million worth of spare parts, munitions, and ordnance were shipped overland from the USSR last year. A new \$11 million contract for additional Soviet equipment was signed in November 1982. [redacted]

Cut off from its traditional sources of major weapons by an embargo, Iran experienced more success last year with alternate suppliers—North Korea, Libya, Syria, and several East European countries—in filling its essential war needs:

- *East Germany* agreed to supply \$200 million worth of nonlethal equipment.
- *North Korea* signed \$65 million worth of new military contracts and shipped \$360 million in arms to Iran, including T-62 tanks, BM-10 rocket launchers, artillery pieces and mortars, and large quantities of AT-3 antitank and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.

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- *Libya and Syria* both increased their support last year, providing Soviet-model tanks, artillery, infantry weapons, and other equipment worth over \$350 million. [redacted]

**Iraq.** The estimated \$3 billion in new Iraqi military agreements with the USSR in 1982 represented a substantial paring down of a \$10 billion wish list submitted to Moscow earlier in the year. Following several exchanges of high-level delegations, Moscow agreed in April to sell an estimated \$2 billion worth of advanced MIGs, new air defense systems and ground equipment. After the Iranian summer offensive, Baghdad requested additional military assistance; the USSR eventually agreed in December to supply another \$1 billion in arms, including MIG-27 ground attack aircraft and large numbers of advanced model T-72 tanks. The latest accord also included an easing of payment terms, underscoring the shift in Moscow's military transfer program from the hard commercial terms of past years. Eastern Europe supplemented Soviet support with \$385 million worth of new military agreements, including 25 used MIG-21s from Poland [redacted]

The Warsaw Pact accounted for the majority of war-related deliveries to Iraq last year, even though shipments from Western countries continued to mount. The lifting of the Soviet embargo caused Soviet arms transfers to triple in volume in 1982. More than 100 Soviet merchant ships deposited more than 150,000 metric tons of military cargo at Kuwaiti and Jordanian ports for transit to Iraq. [redacted]

[redacted] a minimum value of \$840 million, with the actual amount believed to be much higher. Soviet deliveries included Iraq's initial receipt of MIG-25s, some 65 other fighter aircraft, and more than 200 T-72 tanks. Deliveries from Eastern Europe climbed to a record \$820 million as a result of orders placed in 1981. Equipment delivered by the East Europeans consisted largely of older, less sophisticated weapons and transport vehicles. [redacted]

**Libya.** Libyan difficulties in meeting its repayment obligations to the Soviet Union apparently were not serious enough to damage the mutually beneficial

arms relationship. Moscow sold \$385 million worth of military equipment to Libya in 1982, raising total agreements signed since the 1973 Middle East war to more than \$15 billion. Pending large new agreements together with a \$7 billion backlog of undelivered orders, ensures large-scale deliveries of Soviet weapons well into the middle of the decade. Much of the equipment is intended to upgrade Libya's already overstocked arsenal, but some is also earmarked for Third World dissident groups and governments friendly to Libya. The \$685 million in Soviet deliveries in 1982 included Libya's first SA-8 surface-to-air missile systems. [redacted]

Large purchases of Soviet equipment continue to be supplemented with contracts from Eastern Europe. In 1982 Libya placed \$360 million in new orders with East European countries, some of which was designated to further implement ambitious Libyan plans for a domestic military production capability. (A \$650 million deal with Yugoslavia for an explosives factory is not included in the total. [redacted])

**Syria.** Moscow eased the considerable strain in USSR-Syrian relations caused by its limited arms support during Israel's drive into Lebanon by rapidly replenishing Syrian equipment losses and significantly upgrading Syrian defenses with better quality Soviet weapons. The new defense pact, worth at least \$2 billion, provides for the introduction of:

- The USSR's most advanced version of its MIG-23 interceptor (Flogger G), making Syria the first LDC to receive this fighter. 25X1
- The first SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems outside the Soviet Union (construction for the sites at Dumayr and Homs began in December 1982; the facilities are to be manned by Soviet technicians). 25X1
- MI-17 helicopters (advanced version of the MI-8 with more speed and a larger payload) to provide heliborne support to commando operations. 25X1
- Additional SA-8 and SA-9 surface-to-air missile batteries. 25X1
- More sophisticated command and control systems and electronic countermeasure equipment to jam Israeli radar. [redacted] 25X1

Moscow more than doubled its military advisory presence in 1982 to about 3,800 and further underscored its increased support of the Assad regime with a greater show of Soviet naval units off the Syrian and Lebanese coasts. Late in the year, the USSR reportedly agreed to ease terms for the arms ordered in the aftermath of the fighting with Israel by deferring payments until 1984 or beyond. [redacted]

continuation of Kuwait's policy to appear relatively independent of any one superpower for arms, rather than an attempt to reduce its reliance on Western sources. According to the US Embassy in Kuwait, Kuwaiti military officers opposed the SA-8 purchase. Western arms continue to flow into the country at the rate of \$100 million or more annually and remain the bulwark of Kuwait's defenses. [redacted]

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Soviet efforts to mend fences showed signs of success by yearend. Syrian officials changed the tone of their public comments, putting Soviet-Syrian relations on a more positive note. [redacted]

In anticipation of the delivery of the new SA-8 system, Moscow also received approval to train Kuwaiti air defense personnel in the USSR. Kuwait apparently also agreed to permit a small contingent of Soviet military technicians to enter the country to instruct Kuwaiti units on the SA-8 system. Until now, Kuwait has relied on Soviet-trained Arab allies, such as Iraq, for technical assistance. [redacted]

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[redacted] The USSR, meanwhile, refused to sign a more explicit mutual defense pact with Syria for fear of being drawn into a military confrontation with Israel or the United States. [redacted]

**Morocco.** The Polisario's use of advanced Soviet equipment against Moroccan forces and Moscow's heavy military support to Algeria and Libya kept political relations with the USSR cool. Relations with East European countries, however, showed improvement with the signing of a \$40 million military agreement with Romania—Rabat's largest arms accord with a Communist country. The pact, an outgrowth of a close relationship that has developed over the past 20 years, calls for delivery of 122-mm rocket launchers, ZPU-2 antiaircraft guns, grenade launchers, and 7.62-mm machineguns. [redacted]

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New East European arms accords with Damascus consisted of a \$36 million contract with Bulgaria for military support materials and a small contract with Czechoslovakia for military trucks. Prague delivered \$130 million in arms ordered under contracts concluded in the late 1970s, including L-39 trainer aircraft, BMP armored vehicles, and a large number of support vehicles. [redacted]

**North Yemen.** North Yemen's dependence on Soviet military equipment continued to deepen as the USSR agreed to provide Sana \$35 million in additional military assistance early in 1982. The accord calls for MI-8 helicopters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that additional SU-22 fighters and Sana's first T-72 tanks may also be included. Although down in volume from the year before, Soviet arms deliveries in 1982 substantially upgraded South Yemen's military capabilities with the receipt of its first Osa-II missile attack craft, Yevgenya-class minesweepers, and 50 new BMP infantry combat vehicles. Sana obtained another deferment of its arms payments to the Soviet Union last year, complementing the rollover granted in 1981 [redacted]

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**Jordan.** Moscow followed up its 1981 arms breakthrough in Jordan with prompt delivery of most of the air defense equipment ordered and the deputation of the first Soviet military technicians to Jordan. [redacted]

[redacted] We expect King Hussein to continue to fend off Soviet offers to expand military supply relations. Follow-on orders to supplement the SA-8 purchase are expected, but these are likely to remain small. [redacted]

**Kuwait.** Kuwaiti relations with the USSR were bolstered by a \$260 million arms deal in 1982—the first in five years. The March agreement, which calls for the introduction of the SA-8 air defense missile system and additional heavy artillery, is viewed as a

East European countries continued to supplement Soviet agreements with new accords:

- \$10 million from *Czechoslovakia* for four L-39 jet trainers.
- \$12 million from *East Germany* for vehicles and unidentified materials.
- \$1 million from *Romania* for uniforms.

Poland and East Germany were responsible for most of the \$90 million of East European arms shipped to North Yemen in 1982.

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*South Yemen.* No new military agreements were concluded with Moscow, and Soviet arms deliveries dropped to their lowest level in five years (\$53 million) as shipments under earlier arms orders wound down. US Embassy reporting indicates that both the economic and military debts owed to the USSR (estimated at \$1 to \$1.5 billion) were deferred by Moscow for another five years.

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Table A-2

Million US \$

## Asia: Soviet Bloc

## Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded and Military Presence During 1982

	Total <sup>a</sup>		USSR		Eastern Europe		Soviet and East European Military Presence <sup>b</sup>
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,162</b>	<b>1,142</b>	<b>3,131</b>	<b>1,120</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>2,350</b>
Afghanistan	175	160	169	154	6	6	2,000 <sup>c</sup>
Bangladesh	8	0	8	0	0	0	0
India	2,979	982	2,954	966	25	16	350
Pakistan	NEGL	0	0	0	NEGL	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.

<sup>b</sup> Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more.

<sup>c</sup> Number directly associated with the Afghan armed forces.

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## South Asia: Deepening Soviet Involvement in India

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The USSR committed \$3.1 billion in new military support to South Asian countries in 1982, nearly 95 percent of which was earmarked for across-the-board upgrading of the Indian defense establishment (table A-2). Moscow again emphasized its special relationship with New Dehli by offering to provide some of its most sophisticated conventional weapons and by agreeing to provide advanced weapons production technology to improve India's growing domestic armaments industry. [redacted]

Soviet-Afghan troop operations against the rebels located around the capital. [redacted]

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Along with the infusion of new and better aircraft, the USSR is investing heavily in improving Afghanistan's military infrastructure. Soviet building projects earmarked for the Afghans include several NCO and officer training schools, new barracks, a military vehicle repair shop, and a large medical treatment center. [redacted]

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## Country Highlights

**Afghanistan.** Despite some slippage in 1982, the USSR moved forward with its plan to expand and upgrade the Afghan defense establishment. The Afghan Air Force continues to receive the most attention. In 1982 the USSR transferred 14 SU-22 fighter-bombers and 15 MI-8 helicopters to the Afghan Government. Only a few of these aircraft represented replacements for battle losses. Moscow also agreed last year to supply the Afghan Air Force with two squadrons of MI-24/25 helicopter gunships, which reportedly will be used to support combined

More evidence of East European military cooperation surfaced last year. For the first time, Hungary was noted as a supplier of military equipment, although no details were available on the types of goods being supplied. Bulgaria delivered substantial amounts of quartermaster goods, and Czechoslovakia reportedly accepted 100 Afghan officers and enlisted personnel for instruction in the repair of tanks and heavy equipment. [redacted]

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Figure 5. Soviet Military Delegation to New Delhi

Wide World ©

Indian Defense Minister Venkataraman welcomes his Soviet counterpart General Ustinov and Admiral Gorshkov to New Delhi in March 1982. Minister of Defense Ustinov headed, a 140-man Soviet military trade delegation—the largest and most prestigious to visit a non-Bloc country. [redacted]

**India.** Apparently alarmed over India's recent arms diversification efforts with Western suppliers, Moscow took unprecedented steps in 1982 to revitalize its military-assistance relationship. In March, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov visited New Delhi as head of the largest and highest ranking Soviet military delegation ever sent to a non-Communist country. According to the Indian press, the delegation of 83 members (including the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff) offered to sell the Indians some of Moscow's most advanced weapon systems at concessional prices and terms. Moreover, the Soviet arms proposals included advanced military production technology and licenses to produce a range of Soviet hardware in India—Moscow's first substantial offer to export sophisticated military technology outside the Warsaw Pact. [redacted]

[redacted]

Follow-on discussions resulted in the signing of a series of new arms accords worth an estimated \$3 billion. Each of the three Indian armed services will benefit over the next five years:

- The Navy will add at least nine surface combatants and four F-class submarines over the next five years to its Indian Ocean fleet.

- The Army will receive hundreds of "improved" versions of T-72 tanks and BMP armored fighting vehicles (and probably production technology for both).
- The Air Force will receive several hundred domestically produced MIG-27 ground attack fighters, the latter the result of a licensing agreement. [redacted]

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India's equipment orders this year raised the value of Soviet arms accords signed since Prime Minister Gandhi's return to power in 1980 to almost \$6 billion, 50 percent more than the value recorded over the previous two decades. In contrast, highly publicized purchases from Western suppliers during the same period have amounted to just over \$2 billion. The commitments already made by Moscow since 1980, coupled with large, new agreements we expect to be signed over the next few years, will effectively ensure the continued dominance of the USSR in India's military modernization and expansion program. By playing Moscow against its Western competitors, New Delhi has garnered not only modern weapons and production technology from both the Soviets and the West but also substantial price and financing concessions. [redacted]

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**Table A-3**  
**Latin America: Soviet Bloc and Cuban**  
**Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded**  
**and Military Presence during 1982**

Million US \$

	Total <sup>a</sup>		USSR		Eastern Europe		Cuba		Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military Presence <sup>b</sup>
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	
<b>Total</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2,240 (2,005)</b>
Argentina	NA	0	0	0	NA	0	0	0	0
Grenada	NEGL	NEGL	0	0	0	0	NEGL	NEGL	5 (5)
Nicaragua	61	86	35	50	24	26	2	10	2,090 (2,000)
Peru	106	90	106	90	0	0	0	0	150
Suriname	NA	NEGL	0	0	0	0	NA	NA	NA

<sup>a</sup> Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates.

<sup>b</sup> Presence figures are rounded to the nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military personnel included in the total.

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### The Caribbean and Central America: Expanded Commitments

Soviet Bloc efforts to support radical regimes in the Caribbean and Central America led to some \$60 million in new regional military agreements in 1982, backstopping the \$105 million in accords signed the previous year (table A-3). Nicaragua accounted for virtually all these accords, pushing arms deliveries to a record level last year (\$50 million worth) and expanding foreign advisory and technical support. Although small by contrast, Cuban assistance to Grenada—highlighted by a new arms delivery and further progress on military-related construction—kept Havana's close relationship with that leftist government intact until the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop in October 1983. Suriname, a country Castro had unsuccessfully courted in the past, received its first Communist-supplied materiel in 1982—small arms and ammunition. [redacted]

### Country Highlights

**Grenada.** Cuba continued to support the leftist regime with arms and construction assistance until its demise in October 1983. Just prior to the downfall, Havana delivered:

- At least five armored personnel carriers.
- Sixty to 100 army trucks.
- Field artillery.
- Small arms and ammunition. [redacted]

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Cuba also stepped up the pace of construction at Point Salines International Airport scheduled for completion in 1983. Although ostensibly a commercial facility, it also could accommodate jet fighters and military

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transport aircraft. Cuba also neared completion on a large military camp at Calivigny, for use by the Cubans to train Grenadian troops. In contrast, the USSR maintained its low profile, providing only a small police training program [redacted]

and other facilities. [redacted]

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**Nicaragua.** In the face of the increased threat to the Sandinista regime, Cuba and the Soviet Bloc pledged additional military support in 1982, including agreements for arms and the dispatch of additional military personnel to Nicaragua. Valued at about \$60 million, these accords reflect:

- Soviet commitments (an estimated \$35 million) for tanks, other ground force weapons, and MI-8 helicopters.
- East German accords (\$25 million) for trucks and other nonlethal materiel.

Despite Managua's past denials that it plans to acquire combat aircraft, airfield construction in Nicaragua and pilot training in Cuba and Eastern Europe suggest that fighter planes eventually will be based in Nicaragua. At least six airfields are being constructed or improved to handle jet fighters, and the first Nicaraguan pilots sent to Bulgaria in mid-1980 have completed basic training. [redacted]

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[redacted] Nicaraguan-owned MIG-21s are now based in Cuba. The recent aerial strikes against Nicaraguan targets by antigovernment rebels may provide Managua and its Soviet-Cuban supporters with the justification to speed up delivery of combat aircraft. [redacted]

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**Suriname.** Suriname's new Foreign Minister broadened relations with Cuba in 1982 as part of his often-stated policy to reorient the country away from total dependence on the West. As a result, Suriname received small arms from Cuba—the first such delivery from a Communist country—and sent at least 10 of its military officers to train in Cuba. [redacted]

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The value of military deliveries from Soviet Bloc and Cuban sources spiraled to an estimated \$85 million in 1982. Key deliveries included:

- A dozen BM-21 rocket launchers (Nicaragua's first) provided by the USSR via Algeria in April.

- About 25 additional T-55 tanks from the USSR, doubling the size of the armor inventory.
- Two AN-26 transport aircraft, purchased under a December 1981 agreement to help establish a transport capability, arrived in Cuba in late November but were not transshipped to Nicaragua until early 1983. [redacted]

**South America—Limited Gains for Moscow**

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The USSR's longstanding efforts to expand military supply relationships in South America again met with little success in 1982. Soviet efforts to exploit the Falklands-induced rift between Argentina and some major Western suppliers by offering to sell Buenos Aires military equipment were unsuccessful. Peru remained the Soviets' only arms client on the southern continent, signing new agreements last year worth more than \$105 million. [redacted]

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Nicaragua remains highly dependent on foreign technicians and advisers. The Cubans, whose military presence rose to as many as 2,000 during 1982, train Nicaraguan troops, advise Nicaraguan officers in counterinsurgency operations, and construct airfields

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**Country Highlights**

**Argentina.** The USSR attempted to capitalize on the Falklands conflict to add Argentina to its list of arms clients. Despite repeated offers, however, Buenos Aires refused to buy Soviet weapons for political and technical reasons. East European suppliers fared little better: only Romania has signed a military accord with Argentina, and that was a minor agreement concluded in January 1982 for artillery tubes.

[REDACTED]

**Peru.** The USSR's role as an aircraft supplier to Peru and its involvement in the maintenance of Soviet-supplied armaments remained the basic bond between the two countries in 1982. Moscow won another \$105 million in contracts for MI-8 helicopters, land armaments, some munitions, spare parts, and technical support. Arms deliveries in 1982—which included additional SU-22 fighter/trainers and MI-8 helicopters—were worth about \$90 million, pushing total Soviet military shipments to Peru since 1975 to more than \$1.1 billion. Lima, nonetheless, has persistently resisted Soviet efforts to gain influence through military assistance by emphasizing the commercial nature of the relationship and limiting the presence and activities of Soviet advisers. Moscow's desire to maintain its position in Peru was reflected in its willingness in mid-1983 to refinance Lima's military debt.

[REDACTED]

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**Table A-4**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet Bloc and Cuban**  
**Military Agreements and Deliveries Concluded**  
**and Military Presence During 1982**

Million US \$

	Total <sup>a</sup>		USSR		Eastern Europe		Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military Presence <sup>b</sup>	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries		
<b>Total</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>366</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>41,340- 48,540</b>	<b>(35,695- 42,895)</b>
Angola	119	201	100	180	19	21	26,700- 31,700	(25,000- 30,000)
Benin	NA	0	0	0	NA	0	60	(20)
Botswana	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	0	5	
Burundi	0	3	0	3	0	0	30	
Cameroon	NA	NA	0	0	NA	NA	0	
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	(NA)
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	810	(700) <sup>c</sup>
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	(NA)
Ethiopia	10	110	10	110	0	0	11,300- 13,300	(9,000- 11,000)
Guinea	19	0	19	0	0	0	65	(15)
Guinea Bissau	NA	9	0	9	NA	NA	115	(50)
Madagascar	0	0	0	0	0	0	160	(NA)
Mali	1	1	1	1	0	0	150	
Mozambique	12	70	2	60	10	10	1,600- 1,800	(800- 1,000)
Nigeria	6	0	6	0	0	0	10	
Sao Tome/Principe	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	(50)
Seychelles	0	1	0	1	0	0	10	(50)
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	(10)
Sudan	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	
Tanzania	0	12	0	2	0	10	120	
Zambia	NA	13	0	0	NA	13	110	

<sup>a</sup> Presence figures are rounded to nearest five and represent the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. The figures in parentheses refer to the number of Cuban military personnel included in the total.

<sup>b</sup> Most of the Cubans are located in Cabinda and support the Cuban military forces in Angola.

<sup>c</sup> We believe a new large military agreement was concluded in 1982, however, details are not yet known.



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**Sub-Saharan Africa:**  
**Focus on Established Clients**

Although Warsaw Pact military agreements with Sub-Saharan clients identified in 1982 totaled only \$170 million—less than 10 percent of the value of 1981 accords—we believe actual commitments were much greater because of new, but undefined, Soviet

arms agreements with Angola and Mozambique (table A-4). Moscow's military assistance relationships in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be focused on a

narrow range of countries notable for their strategic locations and radical politics. Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Guinea accounted for virtually all observed military accords concluded last year.

[redacted]

Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1982 amounted to \$420 million, down considerably from the levels of the late 1970s. Reduced transfers to Ethiopia—Moscow's largest regional client—accounted for much of the decline. In southern Africa, the growing threat from UNITA guerrillas and South Africa sent arms deliveries to Angola and Mozambique sharply higher. Cuba sent more troops to Angola for the same reason. The Cuban augmentation, coupled with more East European arrivals, raised the regional presence of Warsaw Pact and Cuban troops, technicians, and advisers to at least 41,000 personnel.

[redacted]

Despite Moscow's dominant position in the Sub-Saharan arms market, the Soviets failed to obtain more strategic concessions. Congo, Guinea, and Madagascar continue to withhold access to naval and air facilities that Moscow desires for reconnaissance activities. Ethiopia, although allowing the USSR limited use of a Soviet-built facility on Dahlak Island, again refused Soviet requests for full control over the island.

[redacted]

**Country Highlights**

**Angola.** Military setbacks and heavy government casualties stemming from more aggressive actions by UNITA guerrillas and South African troops precipitated sharp increases in Soviet and Cuban support to Angola last year. Moscow delivered a record \$180 million worth of identified military equipment in 1982, more than twice the level of recent years. This increase largely reflects the arrival of more advanced, higher cost weapons, including Angola's first Osa-II missile attack craft, T-62 tanks, and BMP armored reconnaissance vehicles, as well as two more squadrons of MIG-21 fighters and various early warning radar stations. Additional T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and hundreds of military transport vehicles rounded out Soviet equipment

deliveries for the year. Cuba delivered its first weapons to Angola in five years, including tanks and artillery, to replace some of the losses sustained by Cuban forces in skirmishes with UNITA insurgents. Havana also raised the number of Cuban troops to an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 to stiffen southern defenses and man some advanced equipment provided by the USSR.

[redacted]

**Ethiopia.** Ethiopia's nearly \$2 billion in backlogged military orders from the USSR was largely responsible for the lack of new agreements. Only one accord with Moscow—a \$10 million deal for 300 military trucks—was signed in 1982. Moreover, the estimated \$110 million in new Soviet equipment deliveries, which included tanks, APCs, artillery, heavy transport vehicles, and additional coast patrol craft, marked a six-year low.

[redacted]

Mutual concessions by Ethiopia and the USSR during Chairman Mengistu's October 1982 visit to Moscow appear to have strengthened the bonds between the two countries and paved the way for additional assistance. In return for Mengistu's agreement to move forward with the establishment of an Ethiopian Communist party, the USSR promised further relief of Ethiopia's large military debt (estimated at \$2-3 billion) and pledged additional arms. Specific agreements apparently were not concluded. The Ethiopian leadership has become increasingly concerned about the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigre.

[redacted]

**Guinea.** Moscow continued to provide the bulk of Guinea's military equipment in 1982, signing a \$20 million agreement for improved versions of the MIG-21 fighter and pilot training. Elements in Guinea's military would like to shift some purchases to Western suppliers, but financial and political constraints preclude such a move.

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**Mozambique.** Mozambican's expanding ties with Western powers apparently did not adversely affect its relationships with Communist countries in 1982. Although some Mozambican officials questioned the wisdom of relying on Communist countries for military equipment and services, these reservations have not yet become serious enough to damage the ties forged during Frelimo's long liberation struggle. Moscow and Maputo concluded a large, new arms accord in the first half of 1982. Although no information on the size and scope of the agreement is available, subsequent deliveries of light armored vehicles and bridging equipment suggest that it is tailored to help the Mozambican armed forces cope with the South African-supported insurgents. Hungary also concluded a \$10 million military accord last year, bringing identified alltime military agreements with Warsaw Pact countries to \$440 million. [redacted]

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**Zambia.** The good will generated by Moscow's sale of \$250 million worth of military equipment in the mid-1970s is being eroded by Lusaka's difficulty in meeting scheduled payments. The USSR has accepted cobalt in partial settlement, but Zambia was still in arrears at yearend. No new military agreements were signed with the USSR in 1982, and no new equipment arrived. [redacted]

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## Appendix B

Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With  
LDCs: Agreements Concluded and  
Equipment Delivered, 1955-82 <sup>a</sup>

Million US \$

	Agreements Concluded		Equipment Delivered			Agreements Concluded		Equipment Delivered	
	USSR	Eastern Europe	USSR	Eastern Europe		USSR	Eastern Europe	USSR	Eastern Europe
<b>Total</b>	<b>78,477</b>	<b>9,357</b>	<b>56,820</b>	<b>7,018</b>					
<b>Africa-Sub-Saharan</b>	<b>7,475</b>	<b>686</b>	<b>5,463</b>	<b>607</b>					
Angola <sup>b</sup>	782	222	774	204					
Benin	183	1	183	1					
Botswana	7	0	7	0					
Burundi	38	2	17	1					
Cameroon	NEGL	NA	NEGL	NEGL					
Cape Verde	65	0	58	0					
Central African Republic	8	0	3	0					
Chad	7	0	7	0					
Congo	126	4	74	4					
Equatorial Guinea	25	0	21	0					
Ethiopia	3,942	109	2,252	109					
Gabon	0	NA	0	0					
Gambia	NEGL	0	NEGL	0					
Ghana	10	14	10	12					
Guinea	189	4	97	4					
Guinea Bissau	42	1	36	1					
Kenya	NEGL	0	NEGL	0					
Liberia	0	0	0	0					
Madagascar	110	5	98	5					
Mali	161	0	132	0					
Mozambique	318	123	290	93					
Nigeria	214	22	186	19					
Rwanda	0	0	0	0					
Sao Tome and Principe	2	0	2	0					
Senegal	0	NA	0	NA					
Seychelles	8	0	8	0					
Sierra Leone	2	NEGL	2	NEGL					
Somalia	402	16	402	16					
Sudan	100	18	100	11					
Tanzania	340	93	337	75					
Togo	0	0	0	0					
Uganda	144	11	123	11					
Zaire	0	NEGL	0	NEGL					
Zambia	251	41	244	41					
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0					
<b>Asia-East</b>	<b>890</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>884</b>	<b>223</b>					
Burma	NEGL	1	NEGL	1					
Indonesia	878	217	872	217					
Kampuchea <sup>c</sup>	12	2	12	2					
Philippines	0	1	0	1					
South Korea	0	2	0	2					
Thailand	0	0	0	0					
<b>Asia-South</b>	<b>12,937</b>	<b>439</b>	<b>7,032</b>	<b>376</b>					
Afghanistan <sup>d</sup>	2,887	90	1,271	42					
Bangladesh	75	NEGL	67	NEGL					
India	9,912	314	5,631	299					
Maldiv Islands	NEGL	0	NEGL	0					
Nepal	2	0	2	0					
Pakistan	48	35	48	35					
Sri Lanka	13	0	13	0					
<b>Europe</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>					
Spain	28	0	0	0					
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>1,535</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>1,185</b>	<b>11</b>					
Argentina	0	NA	0	0					
Colombia	1	7	1	7					
Grenada	1	0	1	0					
Honduras	0	NEGL	0	NEGL					
Nicaragua	137	31	56	3					
Peru	1,396	1	1,127	1					

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**Soviet Bloc Military Agreements With  
LDCs: Agreements Concluded and  
Equipment Delivered, 1955-82<sup>a</sup> (continued)**

Million US \$

	Agreements Concluded		Equipment Delivered			Agreements Concluded		Equipment Delivered	
	USSR	Eastern Europe	USSR	Eastern Europe		USSR	Eastern Europe	USSR	Eastern Europe
<b>Middle East/ North Africa</b>	<b>55,612</b>	<b>7,969</b>	<b>42,256</b>	<b>5,801</b>	Libya <sup>f</sup>	15,129	2,449	8,107	1,463
Algeria	4,945	108	4,115	105	Mauritania	0	4	0	4
Cyprus <sup>e</sup>	18	34	18	4	Morocco	74	73	43	33
Egypt	4,141	929	4,141	510	North Yemen	982	329	897	310
Greece	1	84	1	84	Oman	0	0	0	0
Iran	1,955	260	1,820	67	South Yemen	1,157	24	1,089	24
Iraq	12,890	2,621	9,452	2,146	Syria	13,766	1,040	12,417	1,039
Jordan	226	0	85	0	Tunisia	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	309	NA	52	0	Turkey	7	0	7	0
Lebanon	12	12	12	10	United Arab Emirates	0	2	0	2

<sup>a</sup> Values of military agreements and deliveries are based on Communist donor export prices and are adjusted for changes in the dollar value of the currencies denominated in foreign trade transactions. In cases where actual values are not known, Soviet export prices of similar equipment are used as surrogates. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes \$151 million worth of Soviet commitments and \$1 million worth of Romanian commitments to Angola made before independence in November 1975. The USSR recommitted \$59 million of the original amount in March 1976 when the Neto regime assumed power.

<sup>c</sup> Aid transactions prior to formation of the Communist government in 1975.

<sup>d</sup> Excludes Soviet equipment transfers used exclusively by Soviet troops.

<sup>e</sup> Outstanding orders for most equipment were canceled when the program became inactive.

<sup>f</sup> Of the East European delivery total of \$1,463 million, \$68 million was delivered on Soviet account under the Soviet-Libyan arms accord of 1974.



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