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18 April 1983

Operational Support for Future Unconventional Warfare

From an operations perspective, there are serious impediments to establishing underground networks in peacetime for contingency usage in time of war. While not necessarily overwhelming, these problems do suggest caution in making preparations for irregular warfare contingent on progress in this area. Specifically:

- Operations personnel are charged with establishing professional, high level unilateral penetrations in denied areas. This task consumes currently available resources.
 - The recruitment of clandestine underground "networks" is inherently insecure and highly susceptible to host country penetration - particularly in sophisticated counterintelligence environments such as Eastern Europe.
 - While the risk to life of indigenous collaborators is worth it in wartime, this point is more debatable in peacetime unless the operation is of demonstrable high value.
 - Inherently insecure operations tend to heighten concerns of the host governments about our operations, with resultant impact on the security of other agents.
-
- Political backing in the USG for such activity, some of which will be compromised, comes and goes. Operators have found that willingness to sustain a political repercussion to compromised activity by one policy group is rapidly disavowed by succeeding policymakers actually faced with the event. Among other things, careers suffer.
 - Recruitment of this type of agent network sends an extremely militant message to the target government, and we must be certain that war preparation is that desired message.
 - From the basic operator's point of view, the career pay off is not high. There is little intelligence flow of value.

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The above negative considerations can, of course, be overcome by high level sustained policy decisions. Short of that, however, the following is immediately possible:

- Tasking of current unilateral agents for identification of nodes of opposition and related data.
- Relevant operational personality target studies short of actual recruitment. Some recruitment activity with these operations in mind.
- Related propaganda operations designed to intensify opposition thinking in the target country.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Sent to:

Steven Bosworth, Director Policy Planning -State
Norman Bailey, Staff Asst., NSC Staff
Andrew Marshall, Dir. Net Assessment, DOD
Richard N. Perle, Asst. Sec. (ISA) DOD

15 April 1983

Date

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SUBJECT: Insurgency: Significant Trends in the Last Decade

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to highlight an obvious but insufficiently noted shift in the political nature of insurgencies worldwide. Most insurgencies a decade ago were leftist or at least anti-Western due to intense nationalism. They were generally backed by the Soviets or their representative, and were victorious. This situation no longer pertains.

2. Specifically:

-- In 1973, 10 politically significant insurgencies were underway (see chart). Nine were anti-Western in political content, of which seven were victorious in at least the short run. The one anti-leftist insurgency lost.

-- In 1983, there are 12 politically significant insurgencies extant. Six are anti-leftist in political content, of which the outcome of five remains in dispute and one has been largely suppressed. There are also six anti-Western insurgencies of which the outcome of three remains in dispute and three have been largely suppressed.

-- Four of the now ongoing anti-leftist insurgencies are against leftist regimes resulting from successful 1973 insurgencies. Soviet "victories" have not been turned into "defeats" but they have become costly.

-- In at least two anti-leftist insurgencies, the Soviets probably believe there is US support.

3. This situation must affect Soviet judgments on support to insurgencies, probably as follows:

-- "Peoples Revolutionary War," formerly a leftist preserve, has become a two-edged sword.

-- Direct intervention, as in Afghanistan, does not guarantee success.

-- Leftist insurgencies are no longer cheap instruments by which to project influence. Initial victories in such wars may be ephemeral, and increasingly costly.

-- Increasing Western, and particularly US support, to anti-leftist insurgencies is a disturbing trend, and must be considered a real possibility.

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-- Support by a leftist state to insurgencies in neighboring countries may now trigger a retaliation internally in the supporting state. This possibility gives any operational planner pause.

4. In short, we have moved away from a situation in which insurgency was a leftist monopoly. In part this is simply because there are more established leftist governments, in part because of more aggressive Western tactics, and in part because of activist regional policies of certain conservative regimes (i.e. South Africa). For reasons outlined in paragraph 3, a case can be made that the overall trend is desirable from the US perspective.

Attachment:
Chart

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Att. to NIC 2689-83

POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT INSURGENCIES

Admittedly this chart oversimplifies the complex local issues at stake in these conflicts by putting them in solely east-west terms, but is used for illustrative purposes.

1973

			<u>Winner</u>
Nicaragua	Anti-Western Guerrillas	Anti-Leftist Regime	Guerrillas
Angola	" "	" "	"
Mozambique	" "	" "	"
Vietnam	" "	" "	"
Cambodia	" "	" "	"
Laos	" "	" "	"
Zimbabwe	" "	" "	"
Oman	" "	" "	Regime
PLO/Israel	" "	" "	"
Iraq/Kurds	Anti-Leftist Guerrillas	Anti-Western Regime	"

1983

			<u>Winner</u>
*Nicaragua	Anti-Leftist Guerrillas	Anti-Western Regime	?
*Angola	" "	" "	?
*Mozambique	" "	" "	?
*Afghanistan	" "	" "	?
*Kampuchea	" "	" "	Regime
*Ethiopia/Eritrea	" "	" "	?
El Salvador	Anti-Western Guerrillas	Anti-Leftist Regime	?
Guatemala	" "	" "	?
Namibia	" "	" "	?
North Yemen	" "	" "	Regime
Western Sahara	" "	" "	"
PLO/Israel	" "	" "	"

*Leftist takeover in 1970s

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