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Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age

MICHAEL NOVAK

Although in recent times, as in earlier times, there has been a tendency to use the expression "the Church" to mean chiefly its ordained leaders, the clergy, the Church in fact consists of the entire people of God, including those laymen and laywomen who participate in "the saving mission of the Church." As the Second Vatican Council puts it:

Every layman should openly reveal to [his pastors] his needs and desires with that freedom and confidence which befits a son of God and a brother in Christ. An individual layman, by reason of the knowledge, competence, or outstanding ability which he may enjoy, is permitted and sometimes even obliged to express his opinion on things which concern the good of the Church. When occasions arise, let this be done through the agencies set up by the Church for this purpose. Let it always be done in truth, in courage, and in prudence, with reverence and charity toward those who by reason of their sacred office represent the person of Christ. [*Lumen Genitum*, #37.]

In recent years, many laymen, laywomen, and clergy have awaited the early drafts of a pastoral letter from the U.S. bishops on morality in nuclear matters. Both the first and second drafts that have appeared have awakened many questions. Rather than merely react to flawed portions of the two early drafts—with which many bishops are not yet satisfied—it seemed wiser to attempt a constructive statement of our own reasoned moral views. The task is immensely difficult. No more than our bishops do we expect complete unanimity. Emulating their example, we are moved

by our responsibilities to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to our vocations as Christians in the world. We hope that this constructive act will be useful to our bishops, and we make it public in accord with their express desire that the complex issues involved be treated to extensive and reasoned debate.

For nearly the whole of our adult lifetimes, since the first use of atomic power, and since the passing of its secrets into the hands of the USSR, we have all of us lived under the shadow of new and terrible weapons. Descriptions of the horrible devastation that might be wrought upon the entire world through these weapons have been set before the public not only in scientific testimony but also in popular novels and movies. For more than thirty years, a primary moral imperative placed upon governments and peoples has been to assure that these weapons shall never be unjustly used.

The technology upon which these weapons are based is sufficiently simple that its secrets have now become dispersed throughout the world. Knowledge is good in itself; so is human liberty; we can scarcely wish that these secrets had never been learned. Moreover, it is virtually impossible that, once discovered, they can

be wholly repressed or permanently banished from this earth. The moral imperative that they never be unjustly used, therefore, will retain its full force for the foreseeable future.

Yet it must immediately be observed that such weapons have two quite different uses. The most obvious use is through their explosion in warfare. The more subtle use is through intimidation, since powers that possess them exercise over others that do not a threat beside which conventional armed forces pale. While the use of nuclear weapons in the first sense is

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most to be guarded against, use in the second sense also constitutes a grave danger to justice, liberty, and peace. The moral imperative mentioned above applies to both uses.

More than once in our lifetime, superior nuclear force has obliged weaker nations either to surrender (Japan) or to abandon projects in which they were engaged (the USSR in Cuba) or otherwise to moderate their intentions and actions. The possession of nuclear weapons seems also to have moderated actions that might in other times have led to confrontation by force of conventional arms. In this sense, while nuclear weapons constitute a grave threat to justice, liberty, and peace, their possession has also had pacific effects.

From biblical times, the human race has often been warned that God might will or permit its destruction. When Cain slew Abel, he prefigured the possibility of a threat to all the progeny of Adam and Eve, including himself, for by the same passion he might have slain not only his brother but also his parents and finally himself. In the story of Noah, the Bible instructs us in an image of the destruction of the whole world by flood, and warns us of God's threat to destroy all the world by fire. Sodom, Gomorrah, and other cities were utterly destroyed in vivid warning, as was the Temple of Jerusalem. To live under threat of flood, fire, glacier, plague, pestilence, war, and destruction is not novel for an imagination attuned to biblical history. The destruction of Carthage, the leveling of the glories of Greece and Rome, and the coming night of barbarism inspired St. Augustine to oppose secular millenarianism and a false sense of ca-

tastrophe as he penned *The City of God*. The ruin of civilization is not a theme new to our time, nor is the theme of the destruction of all things living. Since Jewish and Christian conscience has long been steeled by contemplation of the fragility of this world and the overpowering sovereignty of God, our generation should not separate itself too dramatically from all others. The prophecies in the Book of Revelation exceed even the horrors of the twentieth century.

In fulfilling the moral imperative to prevent unjust uses of nuclear weapons, therefore, Christian citizens must exercise clear and sustained thought. Any flight of reason into panic must be quietly resisted, and every flight into illusion curbed. Both for good and for ill, the "mobilization of the masses" has frequently characterized life in this century. Neither slogans nor cold fear is a suitable substitute for prudent judgment. Questions of this magnitude cannot be left to experts, governmental or ecclesiastical, but must be prayerfully and lucidly reflected upon by all citizens. Only a broadly supported, carefully reasoned public policy, sustained over decades, meets the imperative laid upon all of us. Strong majorities must grasp and nourish such a policy.

For this reason, we Catholic citizens welcome the effort of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States, and the bishops of various Conferences in Europe and elsewhere, to draft pastoral letters on nuclear arms. The bishops have a right and a duty to express the truth of the Gospels entrusted to them and to restate the Catholic tradition for our time. On these matters, they, and only they, in their vocation as teachers, have full authority with respect to the Gospels and the Catholic faith.

According to the teaching of Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, there are three spheres of Gospel teaching in human life.* The first concerns the life of the spirit, human life in the light of eternity. The sec-

*See Maritain, "The Structure of Action," *Integral Humanism*, trans. Joseph W. Evans (Scribner's, 1968). Addressing the Society of Jesus on February 27, 1982, John Paul II said: "As I said on 2 July 1980 in Rio de Janeiro, priestly service, 'if it is really to be faithful to itself, is essentially and *par excellence* spiritual. This must be even more emphasized in our times against the many tendencies to secularize the priest's work by reducing it to a purely philanthropic function. He is not a medical doctor, a social worker, a politician, or a trade unionist. In certain cases, no doubt, the priest can help, but in a supplementary fashion—as in the past priests have done so with remarkable success. Today, however, these services are admirably rendered by other members of society, whilst our service is always more precisely and specifically spiritual.'" In his letter of March 25, 1982 to the entire Society of Jesus, Father Dezza applied the prescriptions of the Holy Father, while speaking of the recommendations presented by Pope Paul VI: "The second recommendation was not to confuse roles proper to priests with those proper to lay people. In the economic, social, and political fields, the role of the priest is to educate toward justice and social commitment, and to encourage lay people to carry out their duties fully without replacing them in these. The priest's role is to indicate Christian principles concerning economic, social, and political life; to denounce injustices, to exhort people to work with the improvement or reform of institutions, to 'expound the social doctrine of the Church, not so much to

ond concerns those areas of the social order on which the Gospels and Catholic teaching directly impinge and in which they are necessarily enmeshed—such areas as are addressed in the social encyclicals of the popes, for example. The third concerns the area of worldly interpretation of social reality and fact, tactical and strategic judgment oriented to results in the concrete world of history, choice among various permissible means, practical detail, and, in general, questions of prudential judgment.

While in all three spheres every member of the Church may have important witness to contribute, there is an ordinary differentiation of functions and


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authority. In the first of these spheres, the teaching of the bishops is clear and supreme when in conformity with that of the Holy Father and the whole college of bishops. In the second, the teaching of the bishops and popes is necessary and fruitful, although more engaged with matters fraught with ambiguity and danger of error. In the third, the focus of Catholic teaching normally passes from the hands of the bishops and popes to the concrete moral reasoning of individual Catholics responsible for fulfilling their vo-

find solutions for concrete social and political problems, which is the task of lay people, but to help them reflect on the principles which should guide the search for such solutions."

cations in the world. This is because in the world of contingency and action, Church leaders cannot summarize all concrete possibilities, but must enunciate religious ideals and moral principles and demand that lay people apply them to concrete situations prudently and prayerfully. In this third sphere, the God of the Last Judgment will not be satisfied by a claim that a Christian followed the general authority of his bishop or of anyone else; each will be judged by what he or she did in the light of his or her own concrete moral reasoning in particular cases. From such personal responsibility, there will be no escape in the encompassing light of Judgment.

It is in this third sphere that we associate ourselves in the task of Christian moral reasoning, reflecting on the realities of nuclear weapons in our time. We are conscious of the presence of God. It is His judgment we fear. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Proverbs 9:10). Being faithful to the teachings of the Gospel and of the Catholic tradition, including the recent teachings of the Second Vatican Council, the popes, and the bishops, we propose to deal as clearly and as conscientiously as we can with the prudential matters of the third sphere. We speak for no others but ourselves. The matters with which we wrestle are, in the nature of the case, full of ambiguity, complex in their chains of reasoning, dependent upon difficult judgments of fact at every step. Other Christians of good will are certain to make quite different judgments at any of ten or twelve places in the argument. So it always is in complex judgments of fact. We are certain only that we have tried to be faithful to biblical realism: both to the Gospels and the Catholic tradition, and to a realistic assessment of matters of fact and rational principle. We welcome argument, since it is by argument that we have arrived where we are, and by argument that we hope to learn. Among ourselves, we also have differences. Nonetheless, we have found it possible to offer what follows as a public and moral policy, which we as Catholics support.



Peace in the world today: Catholic Perspectives

The Catholic tradition on war and peace is long and complex: it reaches from the Old Testament and the beginning of the New, from the slaughter of the innocents at the birth of Christ to the baptism of the Roman centurion, from the practice of the early Church to recent statements by Pope John Paul II. Its development cannot be sketched in a straight line. It seldom gives a simple answer to complex questions. It speaks through many voices. It has produced multiple forms of religious witness.

We rely upon *The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World* and on *The Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity* of Vatican II (Walter M. Abbott, SJ, ed., *The Documents of Vatican II*, America Press, 1966) as the most authoritative recent statements on the question of nuclear weapons and on the role of the laity. We note that *The Pastoral Constitution* carefully differentiated in its own teaching between those elements "of permanent value" and others of "only a transitory one." It said that future "interpreters must bear in mind . . . the changeable circumstances which the subject matter, by its very nature, involves." In this spirit, we are mindful of the indispensable, central role of accurate discrimination and sound prudential judgment.

We note also that Vatican II did not speak of nuclear weapons as such, but of "scientific weapons." We understand this more general concept to be essential, since developments in rocketry, computers, and explosives since 1945 have given even "conventional" weapons awesome destructive power at great distances and with amazing accuracy. Because of their power, many of the novel "conventional" weapons seem to fall under the same moral strictures as do nuclear weapons, in terms of proportionality and discrimination in targeting. Indeed, the larger "conventional" weapons now exceed in their destructive power the smaller nuclear weapons. If one cannot distinguish between such weapons on the scale of sheer physical power, nonetheless the divide between conventional and nuclear explosives is a critical boundary.

The *Pastoral Constitution* bids us to read the "signs of the times." We note three vital factors in particu-

lar. The first is recorded in the *Pastoral Constitution* itself: "Insofar as men are sinful, the threat of war hangs over them, and hang over them it will until the return of Christ. . . . In spite of the fact that recent wars have wrought physical and moral havoc on our world, conflicts still produce their devastating effect day by day somewhere in the world." The second comes from that constitution's definition of peace: "This peace cannot be obtained on earth unless personal values are safeguarded and men freely and trustingly share with one another the riches of their inner spirits and their talents." This is not the peace of totalitarianism. It is the peace of liberty and justice. The third vital factor is that considerations of the need to avoid nuclear war "compel us to undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude." It is a moral imperative to deter not only nuclear war but all war. Yet the very act of nuclear deterrence has its own novel characteristics, involving new ways of thinking about intention, threat, use,

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means and ends, and lesser evils. "An entirely new attitude" is indeed required on some of these matters.

At the center of the Catholic teaching on war and peace is, first, the sovereignty of God and, second, the dignity of the human person. The perennial sinfulness of human beings makes the threat of war perennial; their longing to be true to the image of God within them makes perennial the longing for peace. Directly to take innocent human life is a prerogative

only of the sovereign God, the Author of life. To defend the dignity of human life is both the motive force of peace and the just cause of war. When an unjust aggressor injures human dignity, to stand aside is a form of complicity and collusion. To resist an unjust aggressor with proportionate means is demanded by justice. Thus, human dignity is the cause both of just peace and of just war. As there are wars that are unjust, so also there is peace that is unjust.

It is sometimes held that there are on these questions plural traditions in the Catholic Church, one addressed to Catholics and another addressed to the pluralistic public, one evangelical and the other based on natural law, one committed to pacifism and the other committed to the tradition of just-war reasoning. But there is not one teaching for initiates, another for the uninitiated; not one teaching for the perfect, another for the imperfect. In the matter of celibacy and marriage there may be two vocations in the Church, yet one vision of a common faith. So in matters of war and peace there is more than one vocation, yet one common teaching about justice in war and in peace. One common set of precepts, many different counsels; one life of charity, many different vocations: this is our vision.

P *Peace and the Kingdom*

Although God has always promised His people peace and rest, the paradoxical nature of these promises is ever-present in the Bible. "Not as the world gives do I give peace," Jesus says (John 14:27). Again: "I have come to bring not peace but the sword" (Matthew 10:34). And, admonishing Peter in Gethsemane, Jesus says: "Put your sword back into its place; for all those who take up the sword shall perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and He will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then should the Scriptures be fulfilled, that it must be so?" (Matthew 26:52-54).

In the Old Testament, God is often portrayed as One Who leads His people into battle, Whose power helps them to prevail, Who avenges wrongs done to them by their enemies. Paradoxically, Gideon says, "God is peace," and the blessing of the Lord on Israel includes this, that "the Lord lift up His countenance and give you peace" (Numbers 6:23-27). Ezekiel speaks for Yahweh: "I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant with them . . ." (Ezekiel 37:26). Yet as sin persists, so does war. False prophets "heal the wound of the

people lightly" (Jeremiah 6:14). Peace would have come, had people not persisted in sin: "O! that you had hearkened to my commandments! Then your peace would have been like a river, and your right-

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eousness like the waves of the sea" (Isaiah 48:18). Only in the time of full righteousness and no more sin shall the people "bend their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isaiah 2:4).

Although Jesus comes as the Prince of Peace, inaugurating a kingdom of peace, He was a man of sorrows, bloodily slain on the cross. He called His disciples to share in self-sacrifice. His vision of this world was no vision of the easy triumph of justice and light. On the contrary, the vision of Jesus is a divisive force in history, dividing even families, a two-edged sword that "pierces to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and marrow, and discerns the thoughts and intentions of the heart" (Hebrews 4:12). It will divide believer from infidel. It will trouble individuals, like the rich young man (Matthew 19:16-26), and in time divide the nations. In this world Jesus does not promise peace. When Jesus speaks of peace, it is not as the absence of war between nations, or as an end to persecution, or as a cessation of injustice, or as an end to terror and lies, but, rather, as a form of knowing and being in union with God (John 17:3), a "peace which the world cannot give" (John 14:27). It is worth noting that no one in the New Testament thinks of telling the Roman centurions to give up their military careers—neither Jesus (Matthew 8:5-13), nor John the Baptist (Luke 3:14), nor St. Paul (Acts 22:25).

In being condemned to a cruel death (Galatians 3:13), Jesus did not defend Himself against unjust treatment and assaults upon His human dignity. He followed here not His will, but His Father's, offering a redemptive sacrifice for all. His gentleness under torment, His nonviolence, and His forgiveness of His killers have led some to choose, in imitation of Him, nonviolence as a way of life, both in their persons and in public policy. We recognize this choice, but believe it to be a misreading both of the Scriptures

and of virtually the entire Catholic tradition. We sharply distinguish between pacifism as a personal commitment, implicating only a person who is not a public figure responsible for the lives of others, and pacifism as a public policy, compromising many who are not pacifists and endangering the very possibility of pacifism itself. It is not justice if the human race as a whole or in part is heaped with indignities, spat upon, publicly humiliated, and destroyed, as Jesus was. It is not moral to permit the human race so to endure the injustice of the passion and death of Christ. Many serious arguments against pacifism as a Christian vocation have been offered throughout Christian history. Closest to our own time, the arguments of Reinhold Niebuhr and C. S. Lewis may be cited. While following closely the paradoxical language of the Scriptures and the Catholic tradition, and choosing against pacifism for ourselves, however, we honor the liberty of others to choose differently, and, in particular, the calling of the clergy not to take up arms.

Kingdom and History

With Pope John Paul II we hold:

Christian optimism based on the glorious cross of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is no excuse for self-deception. For Christians, peace on earth is always a challenge because of the presence of sin in man's heart.

Although Christians put all their best energies into preventing war or stopping it, they do not deceive themselves about their ability to cause peace to triumph, nor about the effect of their efforts to this end. They therefore concern themselves with all human initiatives in favor of peace and very often take part in them. But they regard them with realism and humility. One could almost say that they relativize them in two senses: they relate them both to the self-deception of humanity and to God's saving plan. ["World Day of Peace Message," 1982.]

History is open; therefore, one must always say that peace is possible. On the other hand, we heed Pope John Paul II, who observes, in that same message, "that in this world a totally and permanently peaceful human society is unfortunately a utopia, and that ideologies that hold up that prospect as easily attainable are based on hopes that cannot be realized, whatever the reason behind them."

History is full of ambiguities, contingencies, and complex patterns of fact. No two people perceive world affairs in identical fashion. Interpretations even of the simplest events radically diverge. In this re-

spect, we cherish the wisdom of the *Pastoral Constitution*:

Very often their Christian vision will suggest a certain solution in some given situation. Yet it happens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that some of the faithful, with no less sincerity, will see the problem quite differently. Now if one or other of the proposed solutions is too easily associated with the message of the Gospel, they ought to remember that in those cases no one is permitted to identify the authority of the Church exclusively with his own opinion. Let them, then, try to guide each other by sincere dialogue in a spirit of mutual charity and with anxious interest above all in the common good.

Moral Choices for the Kingdom

From some of the early Christians through Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King Jr., some Christians—joining others like Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, and Norman Thomas—have held that any use of military force is immoral. Yet we observe that military and police power has been necessary from time immemorial to preserve civilized societies—and pacifists themselves—against unjust aggression and brutal violation of rights. As a set of practical methods, non-violent techniques have pre-eminence for nonpacifists as well as for pacifists. They are, after all, the stuff of diplomacy and statecraft, within which adversaries observe civil discourse and amenities of many sorts. Although a full discussion of these issues would take us too far afield, we observe that there are important distinctions to be made between force and violence, between nonviolence and pacifism, and between the power and the authority of the state. For example, nonpacifists prefer nonviolence to violence, respect for legitimate authority to naked state power, and legitimate uses of force to violent acts. Deterrence itself is a form of nonviolence, a legitimate use of force, based upon legitimate authority.

While some Christian communities, such as the Mennonites, the Quakers, and the Church of the Brethren, make the refusal of military service an obligation for their members, the Catholic Church has not done so—indeed, has afforded many arguments, biblical, theological, moral, and political, against pacifism. In this world of sin and threat of war, for every pacifist who refuses to take up arms, some other citizen, who would also prefer to live in peace, must take his place. Nonetheless, in the full liberty of an open church, nonviolent witness through a conscientious refusal of military service has been honored in the Catholic tradition. Recognizing this liberty of

conscience, we nonetheless argue against the pacifist option, as did C. S. Lewis in *The Weight of Glory*:

Only liberal societies tolerate pacifists. In the liberal society, the number of pacifists will either be large enough to cripple the state as a belligerent, or not. If not, you have done nothing. If it is large enough, then you have handed over the state which does tolerate pacifists to its totalitarian neighbor who does not. Pacifism of this kind is taking the straight road to a world in which there will be no pacifists.

Thus widespread pacifism in churches and universities during the 1930s helped convince Hitler and the Japanese that the West lacked the resolve to defend itself, and encouraged them to launch World War II.

The pacifist refuses to restrain with proportionate force an aggressor who is injuring the innocent. By contrast, St. Augustine understood the command of love to demand a just defense of the innocent. This is because St. Augustine understood that the world of history is in part evil, and that action to restrain evil is an essential component of justice. While some Christians stress the fact that the "New Kingdom" has already come with Jesus, others, like Augustine, stress the continuing power of sin and the complex texture of social ambiguity. War, for example, may arise from human sinfulness, but it may also afford a tragic remedy for sin in political society. (It was in this spirit that we observed, above, that the possession of nuclear weapons has had both threatening and moderating effects during the past 25 years.) Moreover, if love demands the defense of others (such that a

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failure to defend them can be a sin), both love and justice also command self-defense. Peace is sometimes unjust; war is sometimes morally imperative. In clarifying such paradoxes, the traditional just-war teaching has stood the tests of time. Many who claim to reject it do, nonetheless, invoke its criteria; as, for example, in judging nuclear weapons immoral (for lack of proportionality and discrimination), in defending wars of liberation like those against Somoza and the Shah, and in opposing the U.S. presence in South Vietnam.

The essence of just-war theory lies in the convic-

tion that wars are wrong and to be avoided, except under quite stringently defined conditions. These are seven in number: 1) Only a *competent authority* may declare a war for the common good and in the interests of the public order. 2) It must be inspired by a *just cause*: such as to defend against aggression, to protect innocent life and human rights from real and certain injury, and to resist tyranny. 3) A *right intention* must guide the purpose, means, conduct, and aims of war in the light of the "just cause." Violence may be chosen only 4) *as a last resort*, when all peaceful methods of negotiation have failed, and 5) with *probability of success*—so that irrational resort to force is not mandated in the name of justice. The nature of the war itself must manifest 6) *proportionality*: the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred must not constitute a greater evil than the evil to be avoided. 7) *Just means* that are *both discriminate and proportional* must be employed. This means that: a) *discrimination* between combatants and civilians, while not easy to observe under modern conditions, must be maintained in every act of war; b) the *proportionality* of each act of war derives from its indirect, collateral, and long-term effects. It will be noted that common-sense criticisms of wars and the conduct of wars usually fall under one of these headings.

There are some gaps in just-war theory today, since new conditions have raised new questions. Among these may be mentioned the following: a) Does any band of idealists or cynics that takes up arms in the name of a "just cause" constitute a competent authority to launch a just war? b) Under what circumstances, if any, are acts of terrorism (that is, violent acts directed at persons, property, or public order), for whatever motives, whether revolutionary or absurdist or other, justified? c) Considering the current literature of instruction in the conduct of guerrilla warfare, the training of terrorists, and the techniques of espionage and subversion, what light can be shed by just-war theory on existing practices in widespread underground wars? d) According to just-war theory, is a "cold war" of espionage and counter-espionage to be preferred to a "hot war" of conventional conflict, as a means of self-defense; and, if so, according to what standards of behavior? e) Under the "paradoxes of deterrence" (to be discussed below), does the traditional teaching on "intention" have to be refined and stated more precisely? f) If it may be concluded that a particular totalitarian regime is evil in a special way—as was the case with National Socialism under Adolf Hitler, at least from the time of the death camps in 1941—do other nations acquire moral responsibilities, in the name of justice, for what happens *within* those regimes? What responsibility have citizens of one nation to be keepers of the human rights of those of another? These are only a few of the unanswered questions of our day.

25



Because of the unparalleled power of nuclear weapons, it is easy to be deflected from reasoned discourse. When one has listened to eminent scientists and physicians detail the horrors of the worst imaginable case of nuclear destruction, one is driven to recall the lessons of Christian faith about the precariousness of all human life, the approaching end of history, the perennial wickedness and obduracy of the human race, and the total sovereignty of God. Nuclear weapons have changed our world but have not altered the fundamentals of the Jewish-Christian vision. In the biblical era, only about fifty million human beings, widely separated from each other, lived on earth. Under ancient conditions of communications, those who lived in a particular village, town, region, or country believed they knew "the whole world," and did not know they inhabited a tiny planet spinning in space. For them, the destruction of their whole world could descend in one violent sacking, pillaging, and leveling—as, more than once, the heads of infants in Israel were dashed against stones; and as Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw fell to Mongol invaders in horrors still not forgotten. Images of horrible plague and destruction often arose in medieval times. Not even our fears are as novel as we think. This is the context in which Pope John Paul II said at Hiroshima: "In the past it was pos-

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sible to destroy a village, a town, a region, even a country. Now it is the whole planet that has come under threat." Today, nuclear weapons add new di-

mensions of scale and time, through prolonged radioactivity. These new possibilities make two questions most insistent: Can nuclear war be prevented? If so, which strategies and tactics, and which principles of human behavior, are most likely to succeed in preventing it? The first question involves a principle: We must seek to prevent nuclear war. The second, while also involving principles, is ultimately a question for prudential judgment.

The New Moment

There is a widespread, well-organized, and well-financed "peace movement" in several free countries today, particularly in those about to make decisions for their future defense against superior nuclear forces now arrayed against them: West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. (France is militarily independent of NATO and has its own deterrent; its "peace movement" is far less visible.) There is also a well-organized "peace movement" in many cities in the United States. Some have found the public discussion here and abroad "unprecedented in its scope and depth." Democratic societies entrust such matters to public discussion; that is one reason they are worth defending. Democracy itself depends upon the civility, reasonableness, and wisdom of the discussion.

Political peace has always been precarious, and statesmen imply fragility when they use such phrases as "the balance of power." An overall balance of power, always shifting, does not *guarantee* peace. Yet experience has shown that the capacity to retaliate in kind has prevented some weapons systems from being used, even when peace is breached—e.g., chemical weapons in World War II. But deterrence has never been wisely thought of as a "safe and stable"

system, except by comparison with other proposed alternatives. Today a spiritual sea change does threaten deterrence. Since 1945, the 400 million citizens of the NATO countries have enjoyed liberty and prosperity unparalleled in human history. Changes in material conditions also unleashed new possibilities for spiritual fulfillment. This great transformation in

**As Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown
said, 'When we
build, they build.
When we stop
building, they build'**

life has been sudden and profound. Children can scarcely know the almost wholly different conditions under which their parents entered upon life during the Depression and wartime. The horrors and deprivations of forty years ago are unknown to a majority of those now living. Consequently, unrealistic and utopian expectations find fertile soil. Deterrence is sometimes judged against ideals, not against recent history. There is a danger that history may once again repeat itself, not only in Europe but elsewhere. Preserving peace and defending justice are political tasks; and politics, while always ambiguous and imperfect, is the instrument of natural law for the protection of the weak and the innocent. Constitutional law, democratic procedures, and political processes are far from perfect, but they are noble in their dependence upon civil discourse, persuasion, and realistic judgment about the less than perfect.

To be sure, it is tragic that so much treasure has had to be spent on arms since 1945. The postwar world might have been different. Moreover, if one compares the crude atomic bomb of 1945 and its primitive delivery system with the weaponry to be found 37 years later in the arsenals of the U.S. and the USSR, one sees that the "arms race" means not only treasure spent but conditions transformed. This is true even though the total money spent on nuclear weapons and their technology has been a very small fraction of U.S. economic resources. Expenditures on the research and production of nuclear weapons by the United States since 1945 have been estimated to be less than \$400 billion, about \$12 billion per year. In fiscal year 1983, U.S. expenditures on nuclear weapons constitute 9 per cent of the military budget, 2.9 per cent of the entire federal budget, and about 0.6 per cent of GNP. Compared to conventional arms, nuclear arms are vastly less expensive.

Under the terms of the treaties ending World War II, the United States has chiefly been charged with the defense, not simply of its own interests, but of Western Europe and Japan, as well. After the war, all Western nations virtually disarmed. Even in the face of a massive Soviet build-up since 1965—the most massive in peacetime history—the defense budget in 1981 for Western nations was, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London: for Belgium, 3.3 per cent of GNP; Britain, 5.4; Canada, 1.7; Denmark, 2.5; France, 4.1; Germany, 4.3; Greece, 5.7; Italy, 2.5; Japan, 0.9; Luxembourg, 1.2; Netherlands, 3.4; Norway, 3.3; Portugal, 3.8; Spain, 1.9; Turkey, 4.5; U.S., 6.1. (It is estimated that the Soviet Union spends, for its armed forces alone, not counting the military KGB, between 11 and 12 per cent. The Soviet GNP is lower than that of the U.S.; but costs, not least in salaries to military and military industries, are much lower in the Soviet Union.) These considerations suggest two conclusions. First, the percentage of national resources spent on arms by the Western allies is low. Second, the percentage of national resources spent on nuclear arms is, in the case of the U.S., ten times as low. Thus when, in 1976, the Holy See condemned the arms race as a danger, an act of aggression against the poor, and a folly that does not provide the security it promises, the Holy See could not reasonably be interpreted as asking the Western allies to spend much less than they are spending. The reason for poverty in the world is not adequate defense. Furthermore, efforts to supplant reliance on nuclear weaponry with reliance on conventional weaponry are bound to raise military costs dramatically, since conventional weapons are far more expensive.

While we cannot speak for the "arms race" of Third World countries or in the Soviet Union, we do note that the percentage of world gross economic product being spent on arms has declined during every year since 1967. According to *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, in 1978, the last year for which figures are available, the world spent 5.4 per cent of its gross economic product on arms, down from 6.7 per cent a decade earlier. In 1978 this amounted to \$480 billion. Since virtually all nations of the world are welfare states to some degree or another, it must be noted that government expenditures alone for health and welfare, not counting expenditures by private citizens on their own behalf, amounted to several times the level of military expenditures. In the United States, for example, the portion of the *federal* budget spent on health and welfare programs of various sorts during 1982 was 51 per cent, and on defense programs, 26 per cent. This does not include human services provided by state and local governments and by private agencies of every sort. Since the United States bears the free world's heaviest defense burden, comparisons of percentages of human-services ex-

penditures to military expenditures in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and other nations are even more favorable. In the free nations, moneys from all sources spent on health, education, welfare, and other human services exceed moneys spent on weapons by a factor of about twenty to one.

It is, nonetheless, true that lower spending on defense would be advantageous to all. Since government spending that creates deficits has implications for inflation and unemployment, every reduction in pressure on government budgets may have salutary effects throughout the economy. For many reasons, we favor the minimum amount of defense spending consistent with moral obligations to defend the innocent with just means. We recognize that moral means may be more costly than less moral means, as conventional deterrence may be more costly than nuclear deterrence, but we accept this as the price of moral behavior.

To say no to nuclear war is both a necessary and a complex task, especially since saying no doesn't make it so. It is also a task full of paradox, and demands new ways of thinking. It is a task demanding perseverance from one generation to another. It is a task exquisitely dependent upon cool-headedness and the force of reason, a task made difficult by outbursts of passion, accusation, flagrant hyperbole, and misleading assertion. In denouncing the relations between the United States and the USSR for being based upon a balance of nuclear power, some critics fail to imagine the consequences of losing a war to a tyrannical power. Some also fail to imagine the consequences of attempting a balance of conventional power. First, the history of modern Europe is not reassuring about balances of conventional power. Second, world leaders do not seem by their behavior to fear conventional wars—of which there have been more than 67 since World War II—as they fear nuclear conflict. Third, at present the conven-

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tional military arms of the Soviet Union sufficiently outnumber those of Western Europe to create an imbalance whose rectification would require immediate, sustained, and heavy military expenditures by Western nations. A political leader seeking to solicit those expenditures from voters might not be successful, and might not win support from the churches, the universities, and the press. In short, an alternative to the nuclear balance is easier to talk about than to realize. Further, it is one-sided to speak of "psychological damage" done to ordinary people, especially the young, by the nuclear balance without comparing it to the "psychological damage" that would be caused by heavier taxes and conscription for conventional forces, on the one hand, and by intimidation under "Finlandization," on the other. Appeasement, too, causes "psychological damage." It is also extreme to contrast the "billions readily spent for destructive instruments"—\$17 billion were spent in the U.S. in 1982 on strategic forces—with "pitched battles" being waged in the U.S. Congress over "a fraction of this amount for the homeless, the hungry, and the helpless." Moneys allocated by Congress for housing assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, and other forms of welfare vastly exceed moneys allocated for nuclear arms. Although one might wish that cuts in spending on nuclear weapons would go to the homeless, the hungry, and the helpless, the second draft of the Pastoral Letter of the U.S. Catholic Bishops (November 1982) prudently observes: "Rejection of some forms of nuclear deterrence might therefore require a willingness to pay higher costs to develop conventional forces. Leaders and peoples of other nations might also have to accept higher costs for their own defense if the United States Government were to withdraw any threat to use nuclear weapons first." Saying no to nuclear weapons might, therefore, impose a greater burden on the poor than they now bear.

Religious Leadership and Public Debate

Religious leaders who wish to influence public policy by influencing public opinion owe a special debt to democratic states, and incur an obligation to defend them against those who would destroy them. "Rulers must be supported and enlightened by a public opinion that encourages them or, where necessary, expresses disapproval," Pope John Paul II says, thus preferring societies in which the public may express disapproval of their leaders. Is it just to defend such societies with nuclear weapons? Some would "build a barrier against the concept of nuclear war." But a

parchment barrier will not prevent nuclear war. As even God's commandments have frequently been disobeyed, so also a nuclear war may be waged by sinful men. Since this possibility cannot be excluded, it does not seem wrong for the potential victims of nuclear war to give some thought to surviving it. Is it a necessary assumption that any one use of any one type of nuclear weapon will result almost at once in the explosion of every nuclear weapon? History is full of surprises and sudden turns. What seems most probable often does not occur. Prudent leaders must, therefore, consider other possible eventualities.

It is possible that one step into nuclear warfare will escalate outside human control to total expenditure of every nuclear weapon. But this is not the only possibility. Moral reflection requires the moralist to face other eventualities. Today, these possibilities are shaped by two great concrete realities: the actual nature of the Soviet Union and the actual nature of the United States and other Western democracies. The problem of saying no to nuclear war is not abstract; it is concretely directed most of all to Moscow, to Washington, and to the European capitals. Actual decisions about existing and forthcoming nuclear weapons are made by real persons in specific political and geographical locations. Moral thinking about nuclear war must be concrete, as well as abstract.

The Concrete Moral Context

In deciding ethical questions in political matters it is wise procedure to seek first a clear grasp of realities, interests, and powers. This attained, one then wisely asks: "What ought we to do?" and appeals to all one's resources of vision and principle. Virtually all arguments about the prevention of nuclear war hinge on judgments concerning the nature of the Soviet Union and its nuclear forces. In 1968, the U.S. had a larger number of nuclear warheads, a greater total throw-weight, and a larger and more varied number of delivery systems than did the Soviet Union. In an effort to promote arms control, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara froze the strategic bomber fleet at 600 aircraft, froze the number of land-based missiles at 1,054, and froze the maximum number of nuclear submarines at 41. By 1982 the total throw-weight of U.S. nuclear arsenals had been reduced by more than one-half, and warheads have been reduced in number and size. Emphasis has been placed upon smaller, more accurate warheads, in order to meet the just-war criteria of proportionality and discrimination, and in order to avoid entrapment in a strategy

of Mutual Assured Destruction. (We ourselves judge that this shift away from MAD is morally correct despite the fact that MAD affords conceptual simplicity and lower costs.) Since 1968, no new delivery system for U.S. land-based missiles has been built, no new bomber has been built, and both the ICBM missiles (1,052) and the B-52s (315) are entering obsolescence.

Since 1968, by contrast, the Soviets have developed the number, power, variety, and accuracy of their delivery systems and warheads. As Carter's Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, said: "When we build, they

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build. When we stop building, they build." The U.S. did try a freeze, for 14 years. The trend lines of Soviet forces kept mounting, while those of U.S. forces either fell or rose more slowly and have now become subject to public pressure for a total freeze. The Soviets have developed a strategic triad, with nuclear weapons on aircraft and in submarines. Their land-based missiles outnumber ours by a third, and are larger, more modern, and more powerful.* Although some critics of U.S. policy fear that the U.S. may by 1990 develop a first-strike capability against Soviet land-based missiles—an intention denied by U.S. officials—the Soviets already possess such a capability.† Their land-based missiles are sufficient in number and power to deliver at least two warheads on each of the 1,052 American silos, while still retaining a large number of warheads and delivery systems for a second strike. If it is wrong for the

*The Soviet ICBM force currently numbers 1,398 missiles, compared to 1,052 for the U.S., and possesses greater aggregate throw-weight than the U.S. missile force. The latest-generation Soviet warheads are more accurate than their American counterparts, and the smallest Soviet MIRVed warheads are twice as large as the largest U.S. MIRVed warheads. See the Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1982-83*, pp. 112-113; and the Committee on the Present Danger's *Has America Become Number 2?* p. 16.

†Admiral Thomas Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1979: "With respect to essential equivalence it is my view that without any question the Soviets will have a first-strike capability over the next few years. If that is not a loss of essential equivalence, I do not know what is." *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms and Protocol Thereto*. Hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 1, p. 177.

U.S. to have a first-strike capability, it would seem to be wrong to acquiesce in the Soviets' having one.

Some citizens are inclined to stress the possibilities of negotiation, agreement, neighborly coexistence, and perhaps even ultimate friendship with the Soviets. Pointing out that now-friendly nations like Germany and Japan were not long ago our foes, they correctly say that in world affairs there are no permanent enemies. They believe that taking risks, taking first steps, and launching initiatives will draw the Soviet leaders into amicable, or at least non-hostile, relations. Since the days of Lenin, the Soviets have frequently supported "peace offensives." Surely, some citizens conclude, peace is better than war, agreement better than conflict, amity better than struggle.

Much depends on how cynical Soviet leaders are. If their purpose is the eventual destruction of democratic societies, feigned friendship may suit them now. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union intends to become a nation like other nations, committed to living and letting live, respectful mutuality may be possible. Among these and other possibilities, how should we judge the purposes and character of the leadership of the Soviet Union? That is the factual question on which subsequent ethical judgment turns. Naïveté in this judgment, on the one hand, or excessive cynicism, on the other, would undercut moral correctness in later judgments. For it is not moral to place trust in a liar, nor is it moral, from erroneous hardness of heart, to withhold trust. Judgment about the Soviet leaders must therefore be carefully developed, beginning with their own view of themselves and their strategies for war. This is another instance of the crucial role played by prudence.

In assessing the purposes and character of the Soviet leaders, it is crucial to observe three facts. First, the number of relevant decision-makers is very small (14 in the Politburo), and their means of attaining power and of holding power are far from regular, systematic, open, and under public control. Much jockeying goes on; there have been many murders, executions, disappearances, and obliterations from the historical record ("nonpersons") among them. Second, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, which legitimates their role in history, their authority, and their morality, operates as a check upon their behavior. Even for those who do not believe this ideology in their hearts, ideological deviation may swiftly become a source of vulnerability to their positions and their lives. Third, the culture of centuries of Russian experience, including xenophobia and a sense of inferiority, affects their understanding of the role of the Russian people in history. Observers properly debate what comparative weights to assign to each of these three characteristics: organizational struggle; the ideology of Marxism-Leninism; and Russian experience and culture. All three factors bear on the Soviet

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sense of security and historical destiny. All three must be soberly considered. Whether one entertains prospects of friendship or coexistence or struggle with such leaders is much affected by such assessment. How one weighs the moral value of Soviet words and deeds is also affected by one's judgment about their cultural world. Words spoken and deeds done have full significance only in such contexts. How to interpret their significance within one's own context is a quite different matter.

The record of arms-control negotiations during the past hundred years has been, for the most part, a record of deception on the part of the cynically ambitious and self-deception on the part of those who thought peace might be bought cheap.* The record

Marxist-Leninist ideology rejects 'bourgeois formalism,' including promises and signed agreements

of other nations' negotiations with the Soviet Union on nonaggression and noninterference pacts, and treaties on chemical and biological warfare and the like, has always demanded unusual amounts of vigilance against betrayal. Marxist-Leninist ideology rejects "bourgeois formalism," including promises and signed

*After chronicling the various unsuccessful efforts at arms control in this century, the historian Barbara Tuchman says: "I have engaged in this long and dreary survey in order to show that control of war in the form of disarmament or limitation of arms has been a fruitless effort." Part of the reason why this is the case is suggested by Salvador de Madariaga, chairman of the League of Nations Disarmament Commission and Disarmament Conference, who observed in his memoirs in 1973, as quoted by Mrs. Tuchman: "The trouble with disarmament was (and still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end. . . . Nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter." *New York Times Magazine*, April 18, 1982.

See also Theodore Draper, "How Not to Think about Nuclear War," *The New York Review of Books*, July 15, 1982: "Once different weapons and even different weapons systems must be evaluated and balanced off against each other, negotiations inevitably degenerate into endlessly futile haggling sessions, brought to a close only by agreement on a crazy quilt of trade-offs and loopholes. Negotiations of this sort become more important for the mere consolation that the deadly antagonists are negotiating than for anything the negotiations may bring forth. . . . short of abolishing all nuclear weapons forever, . . . deterrence is all we have."

agreements; Soviet practice in observing treaties, while sometimes good, is selective. Furthermore, to demand on-the-ground verifiability of Soviet arms is to demand a sweeping change within the structure of Soviet society. Despite all this, negotiations are both necessary and useful. But signed agreements by Soviet leaders cannot be prudently understood as deterrents to any course of action Soviet leaders choose to take when they choose to take it. Parchment barriers have seldom restrained players of Realpolitik.

In 1968, Defense Secretary McNamara judged that U.S. strategic forces were both superior to Soviet forces and at a point of sufficiency for the deterrence of any possible Soviet attack. For this reason, he instituted the freeze mentioned above. Secretary McNamara's judgment was that the Soviets would build up their forces until they reached parity. By 1972, with the signing of SALT I, leaders on both sides claimed that parity had been reached. Since 1974, the Soviets have added two new generations of delivery systems and warheads, with others in development. This includes strategic missiles of unprecedented size and throw-weight, and large, swift missiles for the European theater, as well.† In a sense, the nuclear initiative has passed into Soviet hands.

As for the United States, military budgets in constant 1972 dollars remained relatively level from 1962 to 1982, and expenditures for nuclear weapons as a percentage of the military budget and in constant 1972 dollars have also remained remarkably level.‡ From 1968 until 1976, virtually every presidential campaign and many congressional campaigns were conducted on the pledge to cut military spending. As

†Modernization of the Soviet ICBM force has focused on the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missiles; during the last decade, more than half of Soviet silos have been rebuilt to house these weapons. See Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 54. Of particular concern is the giant SS-18, which carries a payload large enough and is accurate enough to threaten U.S. ICBMs in their silos. The SS-18, of which 308 have been deployed, dwarfs the proposed MX: it is 120 feet high, 10 feet in diameter, has a throw-weight of 16,000 pounds, and can carry up to 10 warheads. By comparison, the MX is 72 feet high, about 8 feet in diameter, has a throw-weight of about 8,000 pounds, and can carry 6 to 10 warheads. The SS-17 and SS-19 are comparable in these respects to the MX. See *The Military Balance 1982-83*, p. 113 and Michael B. Donley, ed., *The SALT Handbook* (The Heritage Foundation, 1979), pp. 62, 75. The Committee on the Present Danger notes that "in only the last five years, the number of deployed Soviet IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile] warheads targeted on NATO—Europe and Asia—has more than doubled." *Has America Become No. 2?* p. 21. The principal threat is the Soviet SS-20: "The SS-20, with three MIRVs per missile and significant improvements in survivability, mobility, responsiveness, and accuracy, is a far more capable weapon than the older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. . . . [it] can cover the entire European theater and provide significant coverage of other areas." Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1983*, p. 27.

‡Charles Mohr, "Drop in U.S. Arms Spurs Debate on Military Policy," *New York Times*, October 24, 1982. For spending on nuclear forces as a percentage of the military budget for 1962-1982, see Kevin N. Lewis, *The Economics of SALT Revisited* (Rand Corp., 1979), p. 10, and Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983*, p. A-1.

a proportion of GNP, military spending went from 9 per cent in 1960 to 5 per cent in 1980. As a proportion of the federal budget, military spending during the same period went from 44 per cent to 23 per cent. Beginning under President Carter, and continuing under President Reagan, the military budget

**Were the Soviet Union
a benign nation,
the need for deterrence
would by now have
much diminished
or disappeared**

(in actual outlays) has now been slated to rise, in real terms, at 7 per cent per year, reaching about 6.3 per cent of GNP and 32.4 per cent of the projected federal budget for 1984. Unlike other nations, the United States is charged not solely with its own defense but with that of Western Europe and Japan. It is estimated that the maintenance of 303,000 troops in Europe costs the defense budget \$133 billion yearly, compared to the expenditure (in 1981) of \$16.7 billion on all nuclear forces together.* U.S. strategic bombers, under the McNamara freeze, have been reduced from 600 to 315. The number of land-based ICBMs remains at 1,052. The number of nuclear submarines remains at 31, of which only half are on station at any one time. Military hardware inexorably becomes obsolete and less reliable with age. Even without expanding capacity, the replacement of weapons systems every ten or fifteen years is required. Such hardware, therefore, has a time factor: a preponderance (almost two-thirds) of U.S. delivery systems are more than ten years old, while a preponderance (more than two-thirds) of Soviet delivery systems are less than six years old.† Technology, of course, does not stand still, so new generations of weapons have new potential. For U.S. forces, such changes have

*For the number of U.S. military personnel in NATO, see *Defense/81*, Special Almanac Issue (September 1981): 22. The cost of the U.S. commitment to NATO is given in the remarks of Senator Ted Stevens on the continuing appropriations legislation for fiscal year 1983. See the *Congressional Record*, December 16, 1982, 149, pt. 3: S-15138. The budget figure for nuclear forces includes both those over which the Department of Defense has jurisdiction and those which the Department of Energy supervises, and covers all personnel, operation and maintenance, and warhead procurement costs, strategic as well as tactical/theater.

†See *The Military Balance 1982-83*, pp. 112-113, 140; and *Soviet Military Power*, pp. 55-56. The data supplied by these sources indicate that about 62 per cent of U.S. strategic warheads are on systems with an initial operational capability prior to 1972, whereas 70 per cent of Soviet strategic warheads are on systems initially deployed since 1977.

been generally in the direction of smaller warheads and greater accuracy.

U.S. military strategy is defensive in configuration. This fact is clearest in conventional weaponry. Neither U.S. nor NATO forces are equipped for offensive use, not in numbers of tanks, nor in numbers of fighters, bombers, or support vehicles. No attempt has been made to match Soviet forces on the Western front, tank for tank, artillery piece for artillery piece, aircraft for aircraft. To equalize the numbers of NATO forces with those of Soviet forces in Europe would require raising the number of NATO fighter planes and interceptors from 3,100 to the 8,600 of the Warsaw Pact forces. To equalize tanks would require raising the northern NATO number of 10,500 to the Warsaw Pact number of 27,300. The Soviet all-ocean navy now numbers 2,429 ships, the U.S. Navy 514.‡ But the task of equalizing all forces is not necessary for two reasons. First, the NATO configuration is defensive, the Soviet offensive. Second, U.S. forces are believed still to hold a technological edge, which, however, has diminished over the years.

It has long been recognized that democracies are inferior to dictatorships in their capacity to mobilize armies during peacetime. Free voters are reluctant to bear expenses not widely seen to be essential; they discern many social needs of greater moment and value. Free economies seem to thrive on production for peace rather than for military purposes, as the Japanese, West German, and other economies demonstrate. The ideology of the West does not require the destruction of socialism, but the ideology of Marxism-Leninism does teach a law of history according to which socialism must replace capitalism. A part of this law is encapsulated in the "Brezhnev Doctrine" that nations, once socialist, may never be permitted to return to an earlier stage in history. Such cultural and political discrepancies are also part of the present reality.

The Imperative of Deterrence

It is not necessary to decide the argument whether Soviet forces, nuclear and conventional, are now su-

‡*The Military Balance 1982-83*, pp. 132-33. For figures on the U.S. Navy see *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983*, p. III-20. For the Soviet navy, see *Soviet Military Power*, p. 40. Both sets of figures include attack submarines, major surface combat vessels, and minor surface combatants (corvettes, patrol craft, minesweepers, amphibious ships, and support craft). The U.S. figure as given in the *Report to Congress* does not include ballistic-missile submarines; the Soviet figure does. Adding this figure (31) to the U.S. count gives 545 ships.

rior to U.S. forces, whether in Europe or worldwide. Forces superior in number are not necessarily superior in other respects. More important for forces committed to defense is the simpler question of sufficiency for deterrence of aggression. Superiority is not essential. Sufficiency is. Moreover, sufficiency to deter aggression is a moral imperative of the right to self-defense and the duty to defend the innocent from unjust aggression. This includes the defense of good citizens living under totalitarian regimes who, as Solzhenitsyn reminds us, would be left by our failure without any hope whatever.

This is the concrete context within which the moral standing of doctrines of deterrence arises. The overriding moral imperative is to deter the use of nuclear weapons, both their explosive use and their political use to intimidate the free. To fulfill this imperative, prolonged social sacrifices and resoluteness of public will are indispensable. To weaken this will is immoral, since a public unwilling to make these sacrifices fails in its moral duty. That duty is purely defensive.

Some hold that it is not enough to deter aggression. One must also attempt to bring about changes in the potential aggressor, especially by appeals to self-interest in avoiding mutual destruction, by negotiations, by cultural exchanges, by trade, and, in a word, by peaceful and friendly pursuits. With these arguments we are in full accord, when and insofar as the potential aggressor shows himself by deeds to be a mutual partner. Adolf Hitler, however, both betrayed and was betrayed by Josef Stalin. Not all states seek relations of mutuality. In affairs of state, Aristotle once observed, one must be satisfied with a tincture of virtue. Reinhold Niebuhr in *Moral Man and Immoral Society* showed with several reasons why this is so. Just conduct can, however, be morally demanded of states, and exacted by the force of arms.

An adequate morality of conduct between states, therefore, must take account of the various moral conducts of different states, including outlaw states whose only moral law is their own aggrandizement. Such states have appeared, and do appear, in history. Knowledge about how such states act is pivotal.

In this context, moral clarity in a nuclear age raises exceedingly difficult questions. A major complexity is this. The deployment of Soviet nuclear arms on the borders of the West has political uses far beyond material considerations like potential physical destruction; this point has been well stressed by German Catholics. Since nuclear weapons have a political as well as an explosive use, deterrence of both uses demands a sufficiency of threat. The only known path to this sufficiency is a corresponding threat of destruction to a potential aggressor's industrial base or else to its war-making capacity. The first alternative is called "countervalue," the second "counterforce." The moral problem posed by countervalue strategies is that they hold noncombatants in urban areas hostage.

The moral problem posed by counterforce strategies is that they awaken possibilities of a hair-trigger response to perceived threats. The countervalue strategies require much less accuracy, fewer warheads and delivery systems, and much less expenditure. The counterforce strategies require far greater technological sophistication, numbers, precision, and prior intelligence. It must be said that both strategies make

To abandon deterrence is to neglect the duty to defend the innocent, to preserve the Constitution and the Republic

one sad, except by comparison with the only current alternative. That alternative is to fail in the duty of defending the innocent, by having no deterrent at all. Such a dilemma, like the Fall, ought not to have existed, but when it does exist, actions to prevent evil are not bad but good. On its face, it would seem that countervalue strategies are less to be approved, by the just-war criteria of lack of proportionality and indiscriminate taking of innocent life. Countervalue strategies give rise to the terror of Mutual Assured Destruction. On the other hand, some support them because they seem to afford less risk of miscalculation and cost less money. Furthermore, some regimes are such that they do not shrink from using Western principles to confound Western strategies, deliberately emplacing offensive weaponry amidst civilian targets.

It is clear that the complexities of nuclear deterrence change the meaning of "intention" and "threat" as these words are usually used in moral discourse. Those who intend to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by maintaining a system of deterrence in readiness for use do *intend* to use such weapons, but only in order *not* to use them, and do *threaten* to use them, but only in order to *deter* their use. That this is not mere rationalization is shown by the fact that several generations of nuclear-weapons systems have become obsolete and been retired, without ever having been used. These are considered to be successful and moral systems. In the same way, deterrence is judged to be successful insofar as nuclear war does not occur.

That a human system like deterrence is not infallible, is not foolproof, and does not convey full safety and security, goes without saying. In the world of contingent matters of fact, no system is. That one

might devoutly wish for some other alternative also goes without saying. Contemplation of the horror of a breakdown in deterrence, through either the outbreak of nuclear hostilities or the intimidation of innocent peoples, leads some to seek a way out of this dilemma by putting the best possible face upon the enemy to be deterred. But this is to deny the premise from which the dilemma arises in the first place. Were the Soviet Union a benign nation, even a nation like Japan and Germany, a nation like others, the need for deterrence would by now have much diminished or disappeared. The U.S. has no deterrent in place against any other power. The reality of the Soviet Union is the linchpin of the dilemma.

But the moral dilemma remains. No choice before U.S. leaders is wholly satisfactory. To abandon deterrence is to neglect the duty to defend the innocent, to preserve the Constitution and the Republic, and to keep safe the very idea of political liberty. No President by his oath of office can so act, nor can a moral people.

We must, then, confront anew the moral hazards of deterrence. The fundamental moral principle here is to make the moral choice that occasions the fewest evil consequences. To abandon deterrence occasions the greatest evil, for it entails endangering that liberty which is more precious than life itself. Free societies are an indispensable social condition of free moral life and the preservation of human rights. That is why for the signers of the Declaration of Independence (and for millions before and since) liberty is worth the pledge of life, fortune, and sacred honor. If one chooses deterrence, one does so as the choice of a lesser evil. Insofar as deterrence succeeds, no evil is committed and the worst evils—whether of destruction in nuclear war or of abandoning the duty to preserve liberty—are avoided. It is the fundamental moral intention of those who embrace deterrence that it should succeed in preventing these

worse evils. Those who say that deterrence may fail are, of course, correct. But they do not, and cannot, show that the abandonment of deterrence will succeed either in preventing nuclear devastation or in preserving liberty. Their claim to a superior morality is, therefore, flawed in a fundamental respect.

An example may illustrate this. Had Japan had the capacity in 1945 to strike Sacramento and Portland as Hiroshima and Nagasaki were struck, one may doubt that President Truman would have ordered the flight of the *Enola Gay*. In that case, a bloody amphibious assault on the Japanese mainland might have had to ensue, with far greater devastation and loss of life than actually occurred. Two points arise from this illustration. Without justifying the decision of President Truman, the first highlights the uses of deterrence from the point of view of the Japanese. The second highlights the awful destructive force even of modern conventional warfare. It was perhaps for this reason that the Second Vatican Council spoke of "modern scientific weapons" rather than explicitly of nuclear weapons.

Some find the moral flaw in deterrence in the choice of an evil means to attain a good end, calling this "consequentialism." They admit that the end of preventing nuclear war is good. But they hold it evil actually to intend to use any deterrent force lacking proportionality and moral discrimination in order to attain this end. This formulation contains, we judge, two flaws. First, the appropriate moral principle is

not the relation of means to ends but the choice of a moral act that prevents greater evil. Clearly, it is a more moral choice and occasions less evil to hold a deterrent intention than it is to allow nuclear attack. Second, the nature of the intention in deterrence is different from intention in ordinary moral action. There is a paradox in its nature, such that the word "intention" is clearly used equivocally.

It is true that on entering the arena of public policy and pruden-

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
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tial judgment, moral actors are bound primarily by the ethic of consequences rather than by the ethic of intentions ("The road to hell is paved with good intentions"). Further, existing alternatives in a world of sin often present policy-makers with no alternative that is purely good, and oblige moral actors to choose the course that occasions the least evils. Nonetheless, the quality of moral intentions deserves moral scrutiny. Alas, the word "intention" (like "threat") has many meanings. Since many moral issues cluster here, some detail is necessary.

In the carrying of a firearm, a) a policeman, b) a burglar, and c) a murderer have each of them different intentions with respect to using the firearm. The policeman intends deterrence but no actual use unless governed by justice and the disciplines of his profession; the burglar intends only a threatening and conditioned use outside justice; the murderer intends not a conditional but a willful use. These three are only a few of the many senses of "intention" and "threat." The intention in deterrence, for example, is analogous to case a), not to b), and certainly not to c). In nuclear matters, we would further distinguish between a fundamental, secondary, and architectonic intention. Each of these must also be treated in turn.

The fundamental moral intention in nuclear deterrence is never to have to use the deterrent force. That this is in fact so is shown by the honorable discharge of military officers, after their term of duty expires, who have succeeded in their fundamental intention. Besides this fundamental intention, however, deterrence requires by its nature a secondary intention. For the physical, material weapon is by itself no deterrent without the engagement of intellect and will on the part of the entire public that called it into being. It is also no deterrent if it fails to meet and to halt the will, intellect, and social organization of the particular opposing regime. A people that would be judged inca-

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pable of willing to use the deterrent would tempt an adversary to call its bluff. Thus, a secondary intention cannot be separated from deterrence. Without that secondary intention, distinct from the fundamental intention, a deterrent is no longer a deterrent but only an inert weapon backed up by a public lie.

As a counter to this, some might argue that the Soviet Union could never be sure whether a weapon held in readiness were backed by the secondary intention to use it. Given Soviet ideology about the perfidy of capitalist powers, however, Soviet leaders would be obliged to assume the worst. Arguing the casuistry of truth-telling may indeed permit leaders of one nation to allow the leaders of another, who have no title to know the truth, to be self-deceived. But probes and tests of real intentions cannot be ruled out. In nuclear matters, such uncertainty willfully created would seem to constitute immoral behavior.

The word intention has yet a third sense, beyond the two subjective intentions we have so far discussed. The Catholic moral tradition holds that human acts have objective intentionality apart from subjective dispositions. In order to construct and to maintain a nuclear deterrent force, a democratic society must generate a complex, highly rational, socially organized, objective intentionality. Citizens through their representatives vote funds for it; research and production are organized; elaborate systems of communication and command are maintained. The architectonic of objective political intention suffuses the entire process. This already is a sustained intention of a crucial sort. To be sure, many individuals must also be committed to their tasks to infuse this objective intentionality with appropriate subjective dispositions. The latter are indispensable. But a society that possesses a deterrent also has an organized objective intention. In the case of the United States, individuals add to this objective in-

tion subjective intentions which are both fundamental—that the deterrent succeed in never being used—and secondary—that the deterrent be held in readiness for use. The proposition that a nation may possess a deterrent but may not intend to use it is fulfilled by the fundamental intention but not by the objective intention and the secondary intention. To condemn the latter is to frustrate the former and to invite a host of greater evils.

Moral clarity in a nuclear age re-

quires that governments not willfully allow certain kinds of miscalculation to arise in the minds of other governments. While not every capability or intention or option needs to be—or should be—revealed, a basic and clear set of understandings is necessary. This requirement rules out bellicose threats as it rules out mere bluff. Public statements about nuclear policy must, therefore, be unambiguous and reasoned, restrained and understated. Leaders have sometimes erred in this

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matter. Communications between adversaries should be swift, clear, unthreatening, and unambiguous, especially during times of stress. The record of the last 37 years shows that this is difficult but possible.

A dilemma arises when some say that counter-value strategies are immoral in substance but prefer-

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able on grounds of economy and sufficiency; and that counterforce strategies, more moral in substance, are immoral because more dangerous. A similar dilemma arises when some say that making nuclear weapons smaller and more precise, so as to approximate the force of larger conventional weapons, thus reducing the moral problem of proportionality and discrimination, makes the use of nuclear weapons more thinkable and so should be avoided. If the use of both sorts of nuclear weapons is to be deterred, total reliance on one alone is likely to enlarge the options and temptations of an aggressor.

Similarly, some critics condemn the attainment by the U.S. of a first-strike capability, while ignoring the fact that the Soviets already have, or very shortly will have, this capacity with respect to U.S. land-based delivery systems. By first-strike capability is meant the capacity to destroy the opponent's delivery systems before they can be called into use. This the United States does not have, and has no plans to attain. The one hundred MX missiles requested by President Reagan cannot possibly wipe out all Soviet land-based missiles. Since two warheads on each silo are believed to be required, the 1,398 Soviet land-based delivery systems cannot be threatened by the MX, for it would be suicide to strike some without destroying all. Meanwhile, the existing 1,052 American silos are vulnerable to the multiple warheads of a fraction of the Soviet missile force. Since U.S. B-52s are not likely to penetrate Soviet defenses, a first strike by the Soviets may leave only submarine-launched missiles under U.S. command. To launch these would guarantee a second strike on U.S. cities. Given these capacities, the Soviets could, even without a first strike, hold U.S. forces immobilized and in checkmate, freeing Soviet conventional forces from restraint. Nuclear weapons do not have to be fired in order to exact surrender.

The reasons why the United States maintains a strategic triad—land-based, airborne, and submarine-borne delivery systems—are two: first, to reduce the temptation of a simple first strike; and, second, to prevent the President of the United States from facing only a single option, the command to destroy Soviet cities. Such an option would be suicidal for American cities. No President can be fairly placed in that position.

In short, given the nature of the USSR's leadership, its ideology, and its political culture, and recognizing the configuration of its nuclear forces, we see no completely satisfactory position: neither abandonment of the deterrent, nor a deterrent strategy based upon counterforce, nor a deterrent based upon counter-value. Among these, we judge the best of the ambiguous but morally good options to reside in a combination of counterforce and counter-value deterrence. We uphold the fundamental intention of deterrence that no nuclear weapon ever be used. We uphold the secondary intention of being ready to use the deterrent within the narrowest feasible limits, as indispensable to making deterrence work. We reject the policy of national bluff that permits possession but does not permit its essential secondary intention. We discern no other way to defend the Constitution of the United States, to protect its institutions of liberty, and to prevent the most awful aggression against innocent peoples here and elsewhere. It would hardly be better for us if some other people bore this burden, but in any case there is none that can lift it from us. In due course, the Soviet Union may learn to prefer ways of peace abroad and ways of liberty at home—in which case, peace among nations may be possible. For this we labor and pray.

Conventional War and Nuclear War

· Even should the specter of nuclear war be lifted at last from the human race, we recognize the horrors of modern conventional warfare. The power and terrible accuracy of rocket-driven conventional arms, launched at great distances, became visible during the last days of World War II. These horrors have been magnified since, as exhibited in the Falkland Islands and elsewhere. In World War I, 15 million civilians died. In World War II, 51 million civilians died. In some 67 conventional wars since that time, millions of other civilians have died. It cannot be thought that an end to nuclear deterrence will necessarily usher in an era without war. Insofar as war springs from evil in the human heart, insofar as that evil is

ineradicable except by the grace of God, and insofar as human beings can, and do, resist God's grace, we do not expect that war will ever be wholly eliminated from human history. Nonetheless, the dream of a world without war abides. Institutions of liberties and rights, peaceful competition and cooperative labors,

We do not consider the present situation of nuclear deterrence ideal; we consider it a moral choice involving the lesser evil

and the conversion of every human heart are devoutly to be labored for. They cannot be said to have yet been attained. Like Christ, we see ahead the cross: Not our will, but Thine be done.

Distinguished strategists have argued that an end to nuclear deterrence raises the probability of conventional war on the part of the Soviet Union. This is because of the great superiority of the Soviets' conventional forces, wherever they should choose to mass them, on the central German plain or on the northern borders of the Middle East. (See the analysis by Edward N. Luttwak, "How to Think about Nuclear War," *Commentary*, August 1982.) However this may be, we hold it to be a good worth sacrificing for to raise the capabilities of NATO forces in Europe and the Middle East to a level sufficient to deter any Soviet temptation to aggression. The editors of *The Economist* have worked out a study of the as-yet-unmet requirements of such sufficiency. They hold that this goal is costly, but attainable ("Without the Bomb," July 31, 1982). Economically, at least, it is feasible; whether political will for the sacrifices entailed is available is questionable. Still, the present

weakness of NATO on the German plain now makes recurrence to defense with tactical nuclear weapons a necessary part of NATO strategy. To supplant this reliance on tactical nuclear weapons with a sufficient conventional deterrent seems to us both morally good and morally required. Even so, prudence dictates that the nuclear deterrent be held in reserve. Certainly, it will have to be so until the current imbalance in conventional forces is redressed. We urge speedy and generous cooperation to this end, even though welfare states naturally prefer to evade heavier expenditures except for social programs.

It has not been sufficiently recognized, in the U.S. and in Europe, that the people of the United States have made themselves hostage to an outbreak of war in Europe. Should such a war arise, and should a terrified Europe demand that tactical nuclear weapons be called into play (when, for example, Soviet troops had made a breakthrough across half of Germany), further nuclear escalation could not be ruled out, in which the Soviets would threaten the United States with nuclear destruction. To protect themselves from this possibility, the people of the United States might someday seek disengagement from the European theater. But this step, too, would have fateful consequences not only for Europe and the United States but for mankind. In this context, the cry of "no first use" of tactical or other nuclear weapons has for some much appeal. Heeding such a cry, the United States might at first save itself. It would not be likely to have done so for long. Until an adequate conventional deterrent is in place in Europe, we hold a pledge of "no first use" to be divisive and destabilizing. Perhaps most clearly among our differences, this conviction differentiates our judgment from that of the Bishops' second draft. Since NATO forces are not designed for offensive use, the question arises only in the case of Soviet aggression. Deterrence of that aggression is the first moral imperative. When NATO conventional forces are able to present a sufficient deterrent without recourse to nuclear weapons, such a pledge would be in effect whether stated or not.

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We do not consider the present situation of nuclear deterrence ideal; we consider it a moral choice involving the lesser evil. When we look to the future, we see both creative possibilities and even greater dangers. The greatest danger is spiritual. Democratic peoples find protracted danger and sacrifice more onerous by far than do the leaders of totalitarian states. The latter benefit by military mobilization; the former find it a threat to democracy itself. Again, successful deterrence buries the evidence that brought it into play to begin with, and a free people must take up the argument ever anew. Thus, hope for peace nourishes illusions in a democratic people, eternal vigilance being the price of liberty most difficult to pay. That is why today broad popular discussion, argument, and consensus are indispensable to the preservation of liberty. The military strategy of the United States and its allies depends upon popular understanding and popular support.

In this respect, every citizen might well wish that our lives were not burdened, as they are, by sacri-

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fices for defense. Many cannot help wishing that nuclear dangers might simply vanish. Indeed, much time and energy is well spent trying to imagine prudent steps to diminish the present danger.

Many citizens have hoped that a mutually verifiable nuclear freeze by both the U.S. and the USSR would offer surcease. We judge that the hope that the Soviets will consent to on-site verification is re-

mote. We recognize that verification by technical means such as satellite observation and electronic monitoring is subject to deception and disinformation. Moreover, there are four reasons for believing that a freeze now would be destabilizing. First, the Soviet nuclear force already holds two destabilizing advantages: its first-strike capacity concerning the U.S. land-based Minutemen, and its targeting of European capitals with SS-20s. Similarly, the trend lines of new Soviet weapons development are up, whereas the process of strengthening U.S. and NATO deterrent forces is appropriately democratic and slow. Second, a freeze at present levels would not at all diminish the present danger; it would freeze it in place. This danger includes the rapidly approaching obsolescence of U.S. delivery systems and the relative youth of Soviet systems. Third, we note that a "verifiable" freeze—including a freeze on nuclear research and development (which can go on inside buildings anywhere)—would require a massive regimen of verification beyond anything remotely sustainable at present. Finally, Soviet officials have begun offering schemes of reduction, below levels envisioned in a mere freeze. For these reasons, we judge that a negotiated freeze may well be inferior to negotiated reductions, and thus cannot be insisted on by moralists. Such concrete judgments must finally be resolved democratically, by duly constituted governments amid reasoned public debate, in which good people disagree.

Since the Soviets have several forms of superiority at present—not necessarily in every respect, but in some important ones—it is obviously difficult for Soviet leaders to surrender advantages they have amassed through great sacrifices on the part of their people. On the other hand, Soviet leaders have reason to fear the greater inventiveness of free societies. If American and NATO resolve were now to falter, Soviet leaders would be likely to continue their present successful strategy. If, on the contrary, they must face the fact that the U.S. and NATO are determined to maintain deterrence through new inventions, they may conclude that they must alter their course. The linchpin of preventing war is Soviet will.

Soviet intentions, strategies, weapons development and procurement follow from Soviet will. At the present moment, we judge that negotiations for reductions in both strategic and theater nuclear weapons coincide with real interests on both sides. Such negotiations, however fragile and risky, as history shows, have a reasonable prospect of success, provided that the Soviets perceive greater risks in the determination of Western nations to rectify the current imbalance. Such an opportunity must be pursued, despite the sorry record of arms negotiations in the past. Caution is required, since negotiations for the sake of negotiations may occasion greater evils. Criteria distinguishing moral from less than moral negotiations are required. Many of our current difficulties arise out of judgments made by American negotiators in the past. The current emphasis on large offensive land-based missiles, for example, and on offensive rather than defensive weapons, arose from past negotiations. Nonetheless, a change in Soviet will—through negotiations, if possible—is to be pursued with determination.

The question of defensive weapons raises further technological possibilities in the future. It is not our role to recommend particular weapons systems, but it is important to recall that technology does not stand still and that the future is not determined. Future developments in satellite detection systems, matched with satellite laser weapons, could enable defenders to destroy ballistic weapons shortly after take-off. Ballistic missiles would, therefore, be rendered obsolete. Some experts hold that current laser technology affords just such a defensive possibility; others believe this is not feasible at all. In any case, this is a non-

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nuclear defense. As a deterrent system, it does not rely on counterforce or countervalue but on non-nuclear defensive instruments. Not only does its moral character seem to be superior, but its implementation would seem to remove the threat of land-based missile systems. While it is not our role here to pass judgment for or against this or other particular systems, we do wish to note that the present situation may one day be lifted from the human race. The human race is neither static nor foredoomed.

For most of its history, the human race did not live under nuclear threat; there is nothing inevitable or necessary about the continuance of that threat. Efforts to remove it must be sound, prudent, and wise, lest they result in a deterioration of the present situation into something even worse. But eventually to lift such a threat is surely within the reach of sustained moral efforts. It is the vocation of Christians and Jews not only to reflect on the world but to change it, bringing it closer to the outlines of the Kingdom promised in both the Old and the New Testaments. It is the vocation of American citizens, civilian and military, called by the Seal of the United States to evoke *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, a new order of liberty and justice for all, to extend the boundaries of liberty and justice by peaceful means, through the consent of the governed. Although not without failures and flaws, the United States' foreign and military policy since World War II has had as its purpose to defend and to extend such liberties, on which alone true peace can rest. We cherish the hope that even our adversaries will one day experience liberty for all their peoples, and join with us in the cooperative task of bringing all peoples on earth to a fuller measure of human development, in peace, liberty, and justice for all mankind, fulfilling thereby the will of God on earth. It is in seeking to follow His will that we have, to the best of our ability, formulated these arguments for the respectful consideration of our fellow Catholics, our fellow citizens, and all persons of good will throughout the world. May God favor this purpose. Though His ways be dark, His constancy abides forever. □

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