

BISHOPS AND OTHER STRATEGISTS ON BOMBING INNOCENTS

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Strategists in Western foreign policy establishments — and strategists in the antinuclear counterestablishments here and in Protestant Europe — have received a message from 23 Catholic Bishops. But what is the message in their draft pastoral letter on nuclear war?

It seems quite unequivocal on one crucial point that should be obvious to nonCatholics and Catholics alike: "Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets." Though that message only restates an exemplary part of Vatican II two decades earlier, it is far from commonplace. Nonetheless informed realists in foreign policy establishments as well as genuine pacifists should oppose aiming to kill innocent bystanders with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons. We have urgent political and military as well as moral grounds for improving our ability to answer an attack on Western military forces with less unintended killing, not to mention deliberate mass slaughter.

The Bishops' reaffirmation of Vatican II seemed to counter a perverse dogma that after the Cuban Missile Crisis increasingly came to be used by Western foreign policy establishments eager to spend less on defense: that the West should rely for deterring the Soviets on the ability to answer a nuclear military attack by assuring the deliberate destruction of tens or even hundreds of millions of Soviet civilians; and that the United States should also, for the supposed

sake of "stability," give up any defense of its own civilians and any attack on military targets in order to assure the Soviets that they could, in response, destroy a comparable number of American civilians. The long humanist as well as the religious tradition on just war stresses especially the need to avoid attacks on "open," that is undefended cities. The new doctrine exactly reversed this; it calls both for leaving cities undefended and threatening to annihilate them. John Newhouse succinctly stated this dogma, to which he was sympathetic, in the "frosty apothegm:" "Offense is defense, defense is offense. Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad." The late Donald Brennan, a strong, long-term advocate of arms control was not sympathetic. He noted that the acronym for Mutual Assured Destruction—"MAD"—adequately describes that Orwellian dogma.

Having observed long ago that not even Ghengis Khan had adopted a policy of avoiding military targets to focus on destroying noncombatants, I was grateful, on a first look at this issue in the pastoral letter, to find the Bishops on the side of the angels. Unfortunately, a closer reading suggested that they are also on the other side. For, while they sometimes suggest that we cannot threaten to destroy civilians, they say too that we may continue to maintain nuclear weapons — and so implicitly threaten their use as a deterrent — while moving towards permanent verifiable nuclear and general disarmament; yet we cannot meanwhile plan to be able to fight a nuclear war even in response to a nuclear attack.

Before that distant millennial day when all the world disarms totally, verifiably and irrevocably—at least in nuclear arms—if we cannot plan deliberately to attack noncombatants, as the letter says, what alternative is there to deter nuclear attack or coercion?

Plainly only to be able to aim at the combatants attacking us, or at their equipment, facilities, or direct sources of combat supply. That, however, is what is meant by planning to be able to fight a nuclear war — which the letter rejects.

Perhaps the Bishops can work this out in their final draft. But a close reading of their text, their prior writings and the writing of some of their associates suggests that this is unlikely. For their struggle with conscience has led them to make only more explicit the widespread confusions and pious evasions of many secular strategists —including many scientists, editors, senators, business leaders and former government officials. Take John Cardinal Krol and Father Brian Hehir, a key associate who has been staff advisor to the ad hoc committee drafting the pastoral letter. Cardinal Krol repeated in a sermon at the White House in 1979 what he and his associates had been suggesting in recent years—that it is all right for the United States implicitly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, but "at the point of such decisions, ...political and military authorities are responsible to a higher set of values" and so "must reject the actual use of such weapons, whatever the consequences." The consequences, it is plain, may include surrender.

As Father Hehir elaborates this tortured view: A). We cannot even plan to get an ability to attack combatants. B). We can maintain an ability to attack noncombatants while waiting for nuclear disarmament, and C). We can use that ability implicitly (though not explicitly) to threaten retaliation against noncombatants. D). Indeed to deter nuclear attack, we must convince other nations that our

"determination to use nuclear weapons is beyond question," E). That means a deliberate and difficult deception for we cannot really mean to use nuclear weapons or declare our intent to use them even in reply to a nuclear attack. And, F). We cannot actually use them, that is to say, we cannot retaliate at all.

Precisely how this volubly revealed deception is to fool allies and adversaries "beyond question" has not itself been revealed. (Perhaps future sermons at the White House would have to be classified.) If the final letter could transmit that revelation, it would fortify a good many strategists in our foreign affairs establishment who want fervently to believe that we can deter an adversary solely by threatening the nuclear extermination of his cities while making quite clear to the entire world that we would never actually use nuclear weapons at all. In sending that message to Western elites the draft letter only relays, amplifies, and broadcasts an extreme that many among our elite have themselves been signaling for years. The troubling obscurity of the draft letter reflects their ambivalence and absurdities. Some of the draft, for example, derives from the same apocalyptic and millennial MAD bombers who believe that defense is offense and that killing people is good and killing weapons bad. On many matters of technical, military, and political fact the Bishops derive their views not from sacred authority but from a much more limited and doubtful range of secular strategists than they realize.

The many Catholic dissenters from these dubious lay views might, as Michael Novak suggests, fear being barred from sacraments if sacred authority is invoked to sustain secular dogmas. But given their moral prestige, the Bishops' strategic views may weigh heavily with non-

Catholics as well, and may serve to reinforce the impassioned pacifist and neutralist movements that have been growing in Europe and in the United States, and the establishment strategies which helped to generate these protest movements.

For the Bishops do pass lightly over or further confound many controversial and muddled questions of fact and policy: In a world where so many intense, deep and sometimes mutually reinforcing antagonisms divide regional as well as superpowers, are there serious early prospects for negotiating the complete, verifiable and permanent elimination of nuclear or nonnuclear arms? If antagonists don't agree, should we disarm unilaterally? If we keep nuclear arms, how should we use them to deter their use against us or an ally? Might an adversary in some plausible circumstance make a nuclear attack on an element (perhaps a nonnuclear element) of our military power or that of an ally to whom we have issued a nuclear guarantee? Might such an enemy nuclear attack (for example, one generated in the course of allied nonnuclear resistance to a conventional invasion of NATO's center or of a critical country on NATO's Northern or Southern flank) have substantial military effect yet restrict side effects enough to leave us, and possibly our ally, a very large stake in avoiding "mutual mass slaughter?" Could some militarily useful Western response to such a restricted nuclear attack destroy substantially fewer innocent bystanders than a direct attack on population centers? Would any Western discriminate response to a restricted nuclear attack--even one in an isolated area on a flank--inevitably (or more likely than not, or just possibly, or with some intermediate probability) lead to the destruction of humanity, or "something little better?" Or at

least to an unprecedented catastrophe? Would it be less or more likely than a direct attack on population to lead to unrestricted attacks on populations? Can we deter a restricted nuclear attack better by threatening an "unlimited" and frankly suicidal and, therefore, improbable attack on the aggressor's cities or, by a limited but much more probable response suited to the circumstance?

The Bishops' authorities evade or confound almost all of these questions. The Bishops sometimes seem only to be saying that the extent of direct collateral harm done by a particular restricted attack is uncertain, quite apart from the possibilities of "escalation." At other times they are quite certain that restricted attacks will lead to an entirely unrestricted war. And they then suggest that the chance is "so infinitesimal" that any Western nuclear response to a restricted attack would end short of ending humanity itself, that we might better threaten directly to bring on the apocalypse. The Bishops cite experts as authority for their judgment that any use whatever of nuclear weapons would lead to unlimited destruction with an overwhelming probability. And some of their experts do seem to say just that. But some they cite appear only to say that we cannot be quite sure (that is, the probability is not quite equal to one) that any use of nuclear weapons would stay limited. Distinctions between a probability not quite equal to one and a probability that is not quite zero may be quite important if we are to avoid making reckless nuclear threats. Yet two successive paragraphs in a recent article by Messrs. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara and Smith, which the Bishops cite, assert each of a wide range of such differing possibilities without distinction. Most of the authorities relied on by the Bishops are themselves not very discriminating about

which point they are trying to assert or prove.

Some important components of conventional military power vulnerable to nuclear attack are close to population centers. Others, however, may be very far from them, for example, naval forces at sea, or satellites in orbits hundred or even hundreds of thousands of miles above the earth, that may be expected to perform many tasks during a nonnuclear war such as reconnaissance, surveillance, navigation, guidance and communications. These are more vulnerable to nuclear than nonnuclear attack. If we have no way of discouraging a limited nuclear attack except by extracting a promise from an adversary that he will not attack, or by threatening that we will respond to such isolated attacks with a suicidal retaliation on Soviet cities, an adversary might, in the course of a conventional war, chance a small but effective nuclear attack against such isolated military targets. Such an attack would do incomparably less damage to civilians in the West than any of the "limited" attacks discussed by the Bishops' authorities. Is it really so evident that a similarly restricted Western nuclear response to such a nuclear attack would be nearly certain to escalate to the end of humanity? Wouldn't a restricted response doing minimal damage to civilians on either side be much less likely to escalate than a direct attack on cities? And wouldn't the ability to respond in a proportionate way be a better deterrent to an adversary's crossing the gap between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons? The Bishops' lay experts tend to see the Soviets as mirror images of themselves, but sometimes diabolize them. They act as if the Soviets would not continue during a war to have the strongest possible incentives to keep escalation within bounds; and as

if the Soviets would love every killing of a Western bystander exactly as much as the West values his or her survival; as if their interest were in annihilating rather than dominating Western society.

In fact, calculations cited by the Bishops' authorities hardly probe the issue as to whether an adversary might find occasion to use nuclear weapons that would destroy important components of a military force discriminately, leaving us a very large stake in making either a discriminate response or no response at all. The calculations published in 1979 by the Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] in response to an inquiry by supporters of MAD on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, deal with hypothetical "small" and supposedly "limited" attacks. However, OTA's "limitations" were not seriously designed to test the feasibility, now or in the future, of destroying military targets and not population. One of their "limited" cases involves direct attacks on the populations of Detroit and Leningrad. And OTA's most "limited" Soviet attack directed 100 one-megaton nuclear warheads at oil refineries, including some inside of Philadelphia and Los Angeles, in order "to inflict as much economic damage as possible" and "without any effort to maximize or minimize human casualties." (emphasis added) No one should be surprised that such a "limited" attack might kill about five million bystanders; or that a similar attack on Soviet oil refineries might kill 840,000—a result which the influential English military historian, Michael Howard, describes as "little better" than a genocidal nuclear exchange killing up to 160 million in each country. But such analyses dodge all the serious issues as to whether an adversary might, in the course of a nonnuclear war, use some nuclear weapons with substantial military effect and yet leave us and our allies with a large stake in

avoiding mutual mass slaughter; and as to whether we should have no response to such an attack except bringing on the mass slaughter or surrendering; and no better way of deterring it than promising one or the other or even, like the Bishops' strategists, both of these two incompatible, bad alternatives. Yet the problem of deterring nuclear coercion or attack on an ally will persist.

Despite lip service at Geneva and the United Nations, hardly anyone seriously expects that each and every one of the six or seven or eight nations that have made nuclear explosives will destroy all their nuclear arms irretrievably and verifiably in a future near enough to govern our present actions. (The uncertainty as to the number of present nuclear powers suggests some of the difficulty we would have in getting actionable evidence that all of the existing nuclear powers had destroyed all of their weapons.) Nor are all prospective nuclear powers likely to surrender the possibilities of making the bomb. Moreover, the harm that these weapons can do is so great that merely reducing them to the numbers talked of by "minimum deterrers," who would use the remainder to threaten the mass slaughter of populations, would not remove, and might increase the probability of an enormous catastrophe. And it would not prevent the potent use of threats of mass slaughter for coercing those who have disarmed. Coercion, moreover, will be a persistent problem. John Paul II has observed that "a totally and permanently peaceful human society is unfortunately a Utopia;" that "pacifist declarations" frequently cloak plans for "aggression, domination and manipulation of others" and could "lead straight to the false peace of totalitarian regimes." (The Pope has known that false peace personally).

It has been obvious since the 1950s that the West needs to rely less on nuclear weapons and much more on improving conventional defenses; to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons; to continue to make nuclear weapons more secure against seizure, unauthorized or mistaken use, safer from "accidental" detonation, and less vulnerable to attack. The Soviet Union has its own reasons, as have we, for undertaking such measures unilaterally, with or without formal agreements or even "understandings." (Formal agreements on these matters, in fact, have frequently defeated their overt purpose. Agreements, for example, that were supposed to encourage exclusively peaceful uses and research on nuclear energy, have spread plutonium useable in explosives.) Moreover, the West has many excellent reasons for reducing the numbers and destructiveness of our nuclear weapons quite apart from any agreement. The number of megatons or indiscriminate destructiveness of the American stockpile was four times higher in 1960 than in 1980. The number of weapons was one-third higher in 1967. The failure of Westerners who make a fetish of bilateral agreements to observe the unilateral decline in destructiveness and numbers in either the strategic or tactical American stockpiles shows, at the very least, a certain lack of seriousness. In any case, the U.S. can reduce further and drastically the numbers and destructiveness of its nuclear stockpile by exploiting the improved accuracies possible today. Improved accuracies make feasible greater discrimination as well as effectiveness and more extensive replacement of nuclear with nonnuclear weapons.

My own research and that of others has for many years pointed to the need for a much higher priority on improving our ability to hit what we aim at and only what we aim at. That would mean, in

particular, that effective nonnuclear weapons could drastically reduce the West's reliance on nuclear force. Moreover, for years now, technology's thrust, as in the electronics revolution, has been increasingly to provide us with just such intelligent discriminating choices between using nonnuclear or nuclear weapons, and between killing innocent bystanders with nuclear weapons or attacking means of aggression and domination. The danger of Soviet aggression is more likely to be lessened by a Western ability to threaten the military means of domination than bystanders. First they value their military power, on the evidence, more than the lives of bystanders. Second, Western nonsuicidal threats against legitimate military targets are more credible than threats to bring about the indiscriminate destruction of civil society on both sides. The latter have a negligible likelihood of being carried out, and therefore are not reliable means of dissuasion. No deep moral dilemma or fundamental paradox forces us to threaten the nuclear destruction of civilians in order to prevent nuclear or nonnuclear war. Only some widely prevalent but shallow evasions and self-befuddlements. The Bishops are clear about rejecting the actual use of nuclear weapons to kill innocents. About threats to kill innocents, they are much less clear. Their obscurity mirrors a vital and uneasy area of darkness in establishment views.

II

Precisely because many of the Bishops' views on these matters do not come from on high but are shared by many in the establishment and also in the antinuclear and pacifist movements that shake the establishment, it is worth looking at several of their arguments more

closely in the context of the evolution of defense policy, and of the changing technologies of discrimination and control as distinct from those for releasing destructive nuclear energy; and in the context of a sequence of earlier writings on nuclear deterrence and the humane traditions of "just war." Arguments of the antinuclear movements proceed not much more irrationally than many in the establishment from some of the same premises about the inevitable dependence of deterrence on threats deliberately to kill innocents. Establishment bluffs about bringing on the nuclear apocalypse helped generate the rise of the unilateral nuclear disarmers; and continuing reliance on such bluffs helps to disarm the establishment from answering the unilateral disarmers. The arguments of both undermine deterrence.

Many recent accounts of the evolution of defense policy in the nuclear age rewrite history to lend an aura of inevitability to the extreme view that we can reliably deter a nuclear attack in any plausible circumstance by threats solely to kill innocents on both sides, threats which we would and should clearly never carry out. Advocates of that dangerous self-labelled bluff, like some revisionist historians and, most recently a senior editor of the New Republic claimed that this extreme has been the essential base of Western defense policy since Hiroshima. It wasn't at the beginning. Nor was it the meaning of the second-strike theory of deterrence that originated near the start of the 1950s. Neither the immediate views after Hiroshima nor the second-strike theory held that we had to choose between deterring and preparing to fight if deterrence failed. Americans who oppose unilateral disarmament have never split into a "war party" as distinct from a "party of deterrence."

But the evolution of doctrines and policies of deterrence, or fighting in case deterrence fails, needs to be seen in relation to the evolution of nuclear weapons and of our understanding of them. The least destructive fission bomb—the scientists associated with its development assumed immediately after Hiroshima—would affect so large an area and the number of such bombs would always be so scarce that they were suited only to attacks on large population centers rather than military forces or war plants directly supporting them. Therefore the standard description—weapons of "mass destruction" or "mass slaughter." And, since the atomic scientists did not believe that atomic deterrence would be at all stable, they therefore believed that the probability of a totally destructive nuclear war was so great and so imminent that nothing less than world government soon and total disarmament ~~seen~~ would permit our survival. It was—in a slogan common in 1945 to which Jonathan Schell might now subscribe—"One World or None."

By the time it had become clear that we were not about to get one world, and that fission weapons could be used effectively and in adequate numbers against military targets, the Atomic Scientists Movement had come to the view that they should be used only against military targets. By that time, fusion weapons were in prospect and many of the same scientists assumed, as they had at first about the A-Bomb, that the H-Bomb was suited only to destroy population centers and, at that, offered a net advantage over A-Bombs only against a few of the largest population centers. Therefore, they opposed fusion weapons and advocated a vast expansion of the fission bomb stockpile to be used in fighting a ground war in Europe, in anti-submarine warfare, in continental defense and against enemy bomber bases.

In 1952, thoughtful analysts of the implications of thermonuclear weapons, like the economist Charles Hitch, found that—contrary to many claims—H-Bombs were indeed much more effective than A-bombs against military targets and war-supporting industry; but, like the atomic scientists, he was concerned that they raised the gravest problems of unintended collateral damage to noncombatants: to reduce civilian casualties one should give priority to targets outside cities and warn urban populations to evacuate. Like the physicists, Hitch's study considered mainly very large (25 megaton) H-bombs delivered with great inaccuracy, that is, with half the bombs missing by a radius of at least a half mile and generally by well over a mile. Other writers on the H-Bomb at the time, like Bernard Brodie, an international relations theorist who had once thought A-bombs were suited only to attack whole cities, sometimes agreed with Hitch that H-bombs made restraint essential and that war objectives had to be limited as well; at other times talked of them as "city busters;" and at still other times, talked about their tactical advantage for use in Europe where they could destroy so large an area as to frustrate dispersion and concealment of ground forces.

Yet, whether one considered H-bombs or A-bombs, the trend in Alliance policy—if only to manage domestic economic and political problems—was to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons and to neglect the unintended harm they would do. Churchill, who justified British nuclear weapons in part because they would be able to destroy military targets of special interest to Britain, was so impressed by the destructive side effects of the H-Bomb soon to be acquired by both Britain and the U.S., that he talked vividly and hopefully of safety

becoming the sturdy child of "terror." The Republicans, coming to power at the end of an unpopular and costly nonnuclear war in Korea, talked of nuclear weapons as simply "modern weapons" which furnished a "bigger bang for a buck." They talked of massive retaliation against lesser threats; and the NATO Military Committee in 1957 formally adopted a strategy of threatening a "full" nuclear response even to a local incursion into NATO territory so long as it persisted.

Inevitably, uneasiness about the credibility or sturdiness as well as the morality of a balance based on threats of such massive destruction, however unintentional, led many sober critics to propose more limited applications of nuclear force, and especially the use of small nuclear weapons on the battlefield. But it soon became clear that tactical nuclear weapons used on the battlefield in the center of West Europe also might have their drawbacks as a replacement for adequate conventional force. The Carte Blanche exercise in 1955 indicated that the side effects of their early introduction might kill nearly two million West Germans and wound many others. Chancellor Adenauer therefore resisted an increased reliance on nuclear weapons and changed his mind only at the end of 1956, when it became clear that a conventional buildup in West Germany would be drastically constrained by domestic political problems in getting 18-month terms for Army conscripts. After that, the Germans and other West Europeans came to favor relying on nuclear weapons as a cheap substitute for conventional force more than any American president since 1961.

Operational plans, however, have always differed from the rhetoric of indiscriminate threats. Certainly NATO has never planned to avoid military targets in order deliberately to kill innocents at long or short range. NATO plans have always included various restraints on the

size of weapons used against military targets in Eastern as well as Western Europe. Nonetheless the problem of unintended harm to noncombatants on both sides remained and always cast some doubt about the sturdiness of deterrence and especially about Western will to respond to limited or isolated nuclear attacks against the military forces of an ally. (Where that ally is a country on the Northern or Southern flanks of Europe, the doubt is most obvious; yet these "flank countries" are at present more endangered and more critical for the alliance than ever.) Doubts have increased especially about the effectiveness of massive nuclear threats as a substitute for conventional force.

Another line of research that was pursued intensively in classified form, beginning in 1951, disclosed a different but even more urgent range of problems about the sturdiness of nuclear deterrence. This research, which generated the second strike theory of deterrence, looked at the vulnerabilities of all the essential elements of strategic nuclear forces under nuclear attack, and the problems these entailed for maintaining a convincing deterrent. These problems had been badly neglected in part because the original belief after World War II that nuclear weapons could be used effectively only against cities, predisposed political and military leaders, as well as scientists, to neglect the possibility that our own nuclear force might come under attack; also because doctrines of strategic bombing during and before World War II had stressed as the main function of strategic forces their ability to destroy the centers of war supporting industry and not the military forces themselves.

As a result the force we had planned for the mid and late 1950s

was much more vulnerable than is generally realized even today. A strategic force, however powerful when left undisturbed to do its work, cannot deter an attack which it is unable itself to survive; and the studies showed that we needed to protect not only the vehicles but all the complex elements of an effective response, including in particular a responsible command and control. Moreover, preserving responsible command and control required operating in peacetime in ways that avoid a large risk of lethal "accidents" or even more lethal mistakes in response to false alarms. It excludes, for example, launching ICBMs on warning or, to use a present euphemism, "launching under attack".

Popularizations of the second-strike theory and some academic recent accounts distort history to make it seem essential to threaten innocents in order to deter. They frequently identify a second strike with attacks on civilians. In its origins the second-strike theory assumed no such identity. The study that generated the distinction and that first specified requirements for a second strike, the Rand Base Study, in which I was engaged between 1951 and 1953 with Fred Hoffman, Harry Rowen and Robert Lutz, made explicit that it would not deal with how to choose targets, but rather how to choose a protected mode of basing and operating a strategic force that would be best and invariant for any of several target systems. It looked at several target sets typical of the time: a quite limited number of key war plants supporting combat, at military targets whose destruction might retard the advance of ground forces in Europe, and those that might blunt a continuing enemy strategic attack. It did so in order to show in all cases how best to reduce the vulnerability of our own strategic forces. The study saved 9 billion 1953 dollars, illustrating that one

does not have to aim to destroy cities only or to destroy cities at all, to avoid "exponential" increases in defense spending, as one implausible rationalization for bombing innocents has it. Its authors became increasingly clear in further studies, that to have only the alternative of indiscriminate attack on civilians would seriously compromise the credibility that there would be any response at all. The two lines of research, one on targeting and reducing collateral damage and the other on protecting the strategic force converged. It had become apparent that to have a persuasive deterrent, we had not only to be able to protect command and control, but also to have some alternatives which a responsible political leader would be willing to command.

That raised again the problem of unintended collateral damage. The recognition at the end of 1953 that fusion warheads might be made small enough to be carried in ballistic missiles by the 1960s, might have seemed to hold out the prospect for reducing collateral damage somewhat. For these first ballistic missile warheads were expected to be substantially smaller than the gravity bombs carried in aircraft. (Later Navy SLBM warheads were about the same size as some early A-bombs, 40 kilotons. Even the first SLBM and ICBM warheads were about a half megaton, much smaller than the H-bombs contemplated in the initial debate.) Actually, however, the prospect of the ballistic missile worsened expectations about collateral damage because the first generation of missiles was expected to be much more inaccurate than aircraft. The median miss distance then expected for the first ballistic missiles was anywhere from two to five miles. A five mile median radius of inaccuracy meant that half the bombs would strike

outside of an 80 square mile area!

But inaccuracy is a more basic determinant of unintended damage than the explosive yield of individual bombs. It is the lack of technology that is smart enough rather than the availability of large brute force single weapons, that is at the root of the problem of collateral damage. One can make up for incompetence in aiming by filling an enormous area of uncertainty either with a few large yield nuclear weapons or, as the British did in World War II, with a very large number of small, nonnuclear bombs. When the British discovered early in World War II that only a third of the bomber crews that thought they had bombed the target were within 80 square miles of it, they resorted to huge raids involving thousands of bombers with the results that became visible in Hamburg and in Dresden. David Irving's estimate of the dead in Dresden came to 135,000. Much more than the official estimates of the Hiroshima dead. A single American nonnuclear raid on Tokyo in March 1945 destroyed an area over three times that destroyed by the Hiroshima bomb (15.8 compared to 4.7 square miles) and nearly nine times that destroyed by the Nagasaki bomb (1.8 square miles). The average area destroyed in 93 nonnuclear attacks against Japanese cities amounted to the same as that in Nagasaki.

During the post-war period the prospects for reducing collateral damage seemed at their worst in the late 1950s, when the average explosive yield of a bomb was at its peak and when anticipated missile inaccuracies were at their maximum. Some of the most familiar and perverse current views on nuclear deterrence, including those that have influenced the Bishops' draft letter, were formed at that time. Since then, the prospects of hitting only what one is aiming at have

changed by several orders of magnitude. That implies improvements in effectiveness against small, hard, fixed targets that are in some ways more revolutionary than the transition from nonnuclear to fission explosives or even fusion weapons. The fission and fusion revolutions blasted themselves, so to speak, into public awareness. Revolutionary improvements in our ability to focus destruction on targets alone have proceeded quietly and attracted less public notice and understanding. However, a tenfold improvement in accuracy is roughly equal in effectiveness to a thousandfold increase in the explosive energy released by a weapon. Improving accuracy by a factor of one hundred improves blast effectiveness against a small, hard, military target about as much as multiplying the energy released a million times. The fission bomb at Hiroshima released about 1,000 times more energy and a ten megaton fusion bomb can release a million times more energy than a ten ton nonnuclear "block buster." A one hundredfold improvement in accuracy roughly equals in effectiveness a millionfold increase in the release of destructive energy to enable the blast destruction of a small fixed target.

However, while the improvement in effectiveness may be the same, there is an essential difference in how these two technologies achieve that improvement. When one improves effectiveness in destroying targets by releasing more destructive energy, there is a corresponding increase in collateral damage. When one improves the ability to destroy a target by increasing one's accuracy, there is a corresponding decrease in collateral damage.

Improvements in guidance using midcourse adjustments have already reduced cruise missile inaccuracies to 200 feet from the 12,000-30,000 feet average misses expected for ballistic missiles in the late 1950s. That improvement by a factor of 60 to 150 makes feasible radical reductions in collateral damage. Even more important, terminal guidance systems in development now that can be deployed in the late 1980s could further reduce inaccuracies at extended ranges by another order of magnitude. That would permit a nonnuclear weapon to replace nuclear bombs in a wide variety of missions with an essentially equal probability of destroying a fixed military target. It would drastically raise the threshold beyond which one would have to resort to nuclear weapons in order to be effective. It would mean a much smaller likelihood of "escalation" and incomparably smaller side effects.

The destruction of targets on land which could substantially affect the outcome of a conventional conflict, has side effects which may trouble us more even in relatively isolated land areas than the destruction of important naval forces at sea or key satellites deep in space. Yet the situation has altered greatly here too. Most such land targets are less resistant to attack than ICBM silos. But attacking them effectively with the huge inaccuracies expected in the late 1950s would have meant filling an enormous area of uncertainty with destruction. That might typically have subjected an area of 1000 sq. miles or so to unintended lethal effects. A current cruise missile with midcourse guidance and a small nuclear warhead, could be

equally effective against a military target while confining lethal damage to about one square mile. Most important, improvements in terminal guidance in the next few years can enable a cruise missile with a suitable nonnuclear warhead to destroy the military target and reduce the area of fatal collateral damage to about one-thousandth of a square mile.

It is important to emphasize that these advances in our ability to reduce collateral damage and increase the effectiveness of nonnuclear weapons do not blur the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear force. On the contrary, that remains vital. But these revolutionary changes make it much more feasible to avoid crossing the divide between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. They give us choices.

Discussions of the morality of bombing and deterrence today often proceed as if, as one eminent physicist suggests, "the technical realities" foreclose choice; as if "the mutual hostage relation" were not at all a "consequence of policy and therefore.....subject to change," but, a matter of physics — permanently determined by the technology for releasing nuclear energy. Yet the evolution since the 1950s of technologies other than the release of nuclear energy have altered the possibilities of discrimination and will not excuse us from the responsibility for preparing to keep violence from mounting without bound.

III

With a few exceptions even the best of the discussions of the moral and prudential considerations in threatening to bomb innocents

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have been mired in technology of the late 1950's and specifically in the technology of nuclear brute force. I can illustrate this by referring to the evolution of NATO policy, to the development of technologies of destruction and discrimination, and to a sequence of five substantial writers on deterrence and just war between the end of the 1950s and the present time: in temporal order, Robert W. Tucker, Alain Enthoven, Paul Ramsey, Michael Walzer and William V. O'Brien.

Tucker and the Nuclear Policy and Technology of the 1950s

Tucker, in his book, The Just War, observed that the policy of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s had demonstrated "at least a striking verbal insensitivity" to the consequences of the actual defensive use of nuclear force. Indeed "the more extreme versions" were "obsessed" with the idea that the deterrent threat would never have to be carried out and therefore regarded "the effectiveness of deterrence as directly proportionate" to its horrors. If one accepts this extreme then one must acknowledge that "in the nuclear age...there are virtually no substantive restraints which need to be observed by those waging a defensive war." But Tucker himself seemed to lean toward the extreme, since he thought no restraints would be effective.

Indiscriminateness, he suggests, is a "necessity" that inheres in technology." He rejected the position taken by the World Council of Churches in 1958, that the "all-out" use of nuclear weapons should never be resorted to. As Paul Ramsey later observed, Tucker agreed with the pacifists that statecraft in the nuclear age necessarily involves using evil nuclear means—a threat of destruction that would inevitably exterminate civilians. He parted company with the pacifists

because Approved For Release 2008/01/15 : CIA-RDP85T00153R000100040040-3
would rather abandon morality. His concluding paragraph argues,
"There is something patently absurd in the complaint that a threat of
extermination, even when restricted to preventing one's own
annihilation, signifies a moral decline for which there is no
explanation other than that men have deliberately chosen to abandon
any sense of restraint. If men presently show less restraint in
threatening their adversaries, it is largely because they are less
secure than in an earlier age." But during the 1950s, dissatisfaction
grew with the political and military implications that indiscriminate
destruction and massive retaliation inhered in technology.

Enthoven and Ramsey on the McNamara Doctrine of the First Two
Years Alain Enthoven's defense of the continuing validity and
relevance of the traditional Christian doctrine of just war was made
at Loyola University in Chicago in February 1963. He wrote in the
context of the defense policy characteristic of the first two Kennedy
years, and expressed the view that was then dominant in the
administration and its advisors. The new policy embodied the two
converging lines of research on the protection of the strategic force
and its targeting. It put into effect many of the criticisms of
massive retaliation that cumulated during the 1950s. It stressed the
importance of a second strike capability, including a responsible
command and control system with its vulnerabilities reduced, for
example, by the use of airborne command posts. But it also called for
a conventional buildup to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and
considered the use of nuclear force itself only with discrimination
and restraint in the service of political ends.

Enthoven starts with the assumption that military force is not

about to disappear as an instrument of policy. Both non-nuclear and nuclear force, neither of which could substitute for the other, would have to be used in limited ways, if we were to deter aggression, or frustrate it should it occur. He explicitly rejects the 'realist' and pacifist views of deterrence which assume in common the incompatibility of morality and statecraft in the nuclear age. On Enthoven's view, they are compatible. We do not have to choose one or the other. The realists would eliminate moral restraints because they believe them impossible. The pacifists think that the impossibility of restraint in nuclear war proves what they have believed all along, that the only moral course is to disarm totally, even if unilaterally, and thus bring about an unshakeable peace.

Enthoven distinguished his view also from the obsessive extreme which Tucker seems to have had in mind. It is known sometimes by the euphemisms "Minimum Deterrence" or "Deterrence Only." He notes that this view, which had begun to take hold after Sputnik, resembled that of the pacifists in its belief that a stable and lasting peace was feasible in the short term. But "Deterrence Only" would base stability on threats to respond to a military attack on our strategic force by deliberately bombing enemy civilians. The core of this newer view, as he might have noted, was therefore an antithesis both of pacifist non-violence and of the Christian and other ethical traditions of humane warfare. In one sense the new dogma seemed to return to the immediate post-war view about the nuclear bombing of cities. But the typical view after Hiroshima held that either side's nuclear stockpile would be intrinsically so small in number and the individual bombs so destructive that they could be effective only

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against attack only cities. An aggressor could effectively retaliate only against the aggressor's cities. "Deterrence Only," on the other hand, accepted the fact that strategic forces could bomb military forces, but held that we should respond to such an attack only by bombing cities, and that we should leave our own cities undefended. It was remarkable not only for its extreme departure from Christian ethics, but also because it represented a 180 degree turn by many of its main proponents, who, for nearly a decade before they adopted this dogma, had proposed using nuclear weapons only against military targets—in continental defense against invading bombers, against ground forces in Europe, and against combat ships at sea: and who had recommended immense deep shelter programs for civil defense. Deterrence Only was an extreme minority view at the time of Enthoven's writing. After the Cuban missile crisis, it became an established ideology. In the current debate defenders of deterrence as diverse as the conservative Walter Berns and the liberal Leon Wieseltier seem to assume uncritically that "deterrence" by definition means a threat deliberately to exterminate innocents.

It was in a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan in June 1962 that Robert McNamara had announced in public that in the event of a nuclear war growing out of a major attack on NATO, the United States' principal military objective would be to destroy enemy military forces, not his civilian population. The part about restricting, so far as feasible, the use of strategic forces to military rather than civilian targets, was embedded in statements stressing that American military force was designed only to discourage aggression, not to change the status quo and never to initiate a war; that the United

States was reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in general and wanted to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons.

Despite these cautions, his speech produced an extraordinarily negative response from conservatives as well as liberals both here and abroad, and from keepers of the traditional morality of just war. Mr. McNamara's blunt style can hardly explain it. Rather, a certain ambivalence, if not affection, for nuclear terror, had become nearly universal. Franz Josef Strauss, who was then West German Defense Minister, made clear that he continued to believe that deterrence depended on threatening the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons at the battle line, to be followed quickly by massive strategic retaliation mainly against cities. Senator Russell and Senator Smith, Democratic and Republican stalwarts respectively on the Senate Armed Services Committee, denounced McNamara's statement. The scientists and engineers, who had only recently, in the aftermath of Sputnik, turned to relying on threats to bomb cities and away from advocating the use of nuclear weapons against military forces and from massive continental defense and deep shelter programs, now pronounced any attempt to attack military forces or to defend cities to be "destabilizing." With a rancor suggesting a bad conscience, they said that the very modest Kennedy fallout shelter program and that the new official focus on military targets rather than massive retaliation might influence American leaders to initiate preventive nuclear war. This, though members of the administration had abundantly stated the very opposite and had explicitly recognized that any nuclear war would be an "unprecedented catastrophe."

It is plainly silly to suppose that American political leaders

would be eager to unleash such an unprecedented catastrophe simply because it might not be total. The reaction was all the more striking since neither these critics nor anyone else had ever suggested that the much more costly programs the critics had been backing a few years earlier (for nearly leak-proof air defenses, a thick ballistic missile defense of population as well as strategic forces, extensive deep shelters for civilians, and the limitation of nuclear weapons to legitimate military targets), would induce American leaders to undertake preventive war. All in all, the venomous response, including that of the media, was shallow, partisan and, not infrequently, in bad faith. Such venom unfortunately continues to poison the current debate. It takes a great deal of civic courage for a leader to sustain that burden and, in the detente that started after the missile crisis, the administration did not. Nonetheless the last six Secretaries of Defense have found it essential both to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and to return to the subject of the limited and selective use of long as well as short range nuclear forces against military targets. Much of Paul Ramsey's work on just war is related to such a policy.

Ramsey's answer to Tucker states that the conduct of a nuclear war need not—and, if it is to be moral, cannot— "violate the moral immunity of noncombatants from direct attack." If any harm is done at the very least it should not be intended. He implies, moreover, that the conduct of nuclear war should involve a serious effort to minimize such unintended damage. If he had been more aware of the possibilities implicit in the electronic revolution, he might have added that research and development needs to aim at improving the ability to discriminate. He insists that attacks should not only

attempt to discriminate but that the unintended damage should be proportionate to any good that can come out of the war.

In a chapter on "The Limits of Nuclear War," Ramsey considers what actions in a nuclear war are "undo-able," even if they are "thinkable." He notes that McNamara's announcement at Ann Arbor that the main objective in responding to an attack on the alliance should be to destroy the enemy's forces, not his civilian population, had occasioned hardly a single Amen on either side of the Atlantic. Only stereotyped objections from defense establishments here and abroad and the same from publications like the Christian Century which one normally thinks of as the keepers of such a civilized rule. Ramsey proceeds with a brilliant support of such limitation and with a sympathetic but penetrating critique of Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, who favored limiting nuclear war, but included under those limits selective exchanges of attacks on cities, and held that it might be rational to threaten such attacks even if it was irrational to execute them. Limited attacks on military installations and forces are both thinkable and do-able, according to Ramsey; but a direct attack on innocent civilians to achieve some other goal, even a good goal like deterrence, is wrong. Like art a political action, (or doing), has consequences beyond itself, but, as Aristotle pointed out, an action is also right or wrong in itself. Attacking innocent civilians is wrong even to accomplish something else. Ramsey rejected the use of threats of even limited city exchanges.

Enthoven criticized such threats on the grounds that they would also not be believed:

The trouble with trying to exploit 'the rationality of irrationality,' as theorists of bargaining and

conflict call this, is that it simply is not a viable policy in the long run for a democracy, especially a democracy with allies...Moreover, threats to blow ourselves up along with the aggressor are not likely to be credible. Rather, the most credible kind of threat is the threat that we will do what in the event will be most in our interest to do. In the case of piecemeal nonnuclear aggression, that will be to apply conventional forces."

According to Michael Walzer, who believes that to deter one must threaten to kill innocents, Ramsey relies on unintended "collateral civilian damage from counterforce warfare in its maximum form' to deter potential aggressors." Walzer takes this as a justification of unintended collateral damage: fortunate, because it makes possible deterrence. But Ramsey was not, as Walzer suggests, referring in that context to deterrence of the initial outbreak of an aggression. He was explicitly talking of the possibility that, during the actual conduct of a war waged against military targets on both sides, both sides may avoid attacking cities and also avoid a "maximum" "counterforce" attack—in order to prevent the collateral damage that would ensue from attacking even military targets that are closely co-located with population centers. That is a very different point from saying that to deter the initial attack one must rely on a threat to kill civilians—intentionally or unintentionally. Nor does selectivity in attacks on military targets during a war mean threatening civilians, but rather the opposite.

One difficulty in getting the evolution straight of both official doctrines and official operational policy on nuclear weapons is that operational policies and formal statements of doctrine have often diverged and the statements of doctrine have often been designed for political combat within domestic bureaucracies rather than potential

combat with the Soviets. While McNamara, after the Missile Crisis, sometimes talked of Mutual Assured Destruction as if it were a seriously operational policy, it never was. He never abandoned the objective of limiting harm to American civilians and never abandoned the intention to use strategic nuclear forces against Soviet military targets. Even as a declaratory doctrine, he did not in general state it in the unqualified and brutal Orwellian form of the aphorism "killing weapons is bad, killing people is good." When he first talked about a capability for assured destruction of 20-25% of the Soviet population, he was thinking of deterring the Joint Chiefs of Staff from asking for higher budgets rather than the Soviets from attacking the U.S. It was his way, if not the best way, of winning a budget battle and putting a lower ceiling on the size of our strategic forces. He stressed that, while we would have the capability for destroying Soviet population—and he expected that capacity to deter the Soviets—we would actually use our strategic forces against military targets. In short, the original official form of the MAD doctrine which he introduced can best be described by the acronym "MADCAP" rather than "MAD." Mr McNamara said we would use a MAD CAPABILITY for deterrence without any serious intention actually to assure the destruction of enemy civilians.

The Bishops' strategists, who believe that one can deter even if one is plainly committed never to use nuclear weapons, first, second, or ever, would maintain a capability but never use nuclear weapons at all. Mr. McNamara, when he changed from the doctrine of his first two years to talk of capabilities for mutual assured destruction, said he would maintain the capability to kill Russian civilians but would actually use nuclear weapons against military targets. That's rather

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different. Nonetheless it was a long step on the way the present
absurdities and evasions of the moral and prudential problems of
discouraging an attack on the U.S. or one of its allies.

Mad Nuclear Threats to Deter Nonnuclear Attack Michael Walzer
has very perceptive things to say about the use of terror by
guerrillas to provoke counterterror against innocents. But when it
comes to nuclear weapons, he accepts the essential stereotypes of the
MAD rather than the MADCAP version of the use of threats of terror
against innocents to deter attack. He doesn't question the
technical determinism of the nuclear technologists that limiting harm
to civilians on either side is impossible. He advances comfortably
the familiar paradox about "the monstrous immorality that our policy
contemplates" but thinks it inevitable. "The unavoidable truth is
that all of these policies rest ultimately on immoral threats." Like
Tucker, Walzer is unwilling to give up immoral threats because he
thinks they are necessary for deterrence. Here he rests on the
baseless judgment that the only thing that will deter Soviet
aggression is the prospect that Russian bystanders will be killed.

To reject that view one need not assume that the Soviets' values
are the same as our own, nor that they are simply monsters who are
indifferent or even like to see citizens killed. We need only
observe that the Soviets value military power and the means of
domination at least as much and possibly more than the lives of
Russian civilians. This is surely evidenced by a long history
documented by careful scholars like Adam Ulam, Robert Conquest,
Nikolai Tolstoy and many others, in which the Soviets have sacrificed
civilian lives for the sake of Soviet power. Their collectivization

program in the 1920s gained the control of the peasants at the expense of slaughtering some 12-15 million of them. (Stalin told Churchill that the great bulk of 10 million kulaks had to be wiped out or transferred to Siberia.) The Soviet government sharply increased grain exports during the famine year of 1933, when 5 million Ukrainian peasants were dying. If Robert Conquest, is right the Great Purge of the late 1930s killed several million more Soviet citizens. If Nikolai Tolstoy is right, Stalin and the NKVD were responsible for more than half of the 20-30 million deaths suffered by the Soviets during World War II. Soviet refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War doomed many additional Russian as well as German prisoners.

Whatever else one may say of these actions, they do not suggest that Soviet leaders value the life of Russian citizens above political and military power. If the West responds to Soviet military attack by destroying military targets, it would affect something that the Soviet leaders appear to cherish more than the lives of Russian citizens; and the prospects of such a Western response would be the best deterrent to their initiating war. Moreover continued attacks during a war on elements of their military power and means of domination would appear to be the best way to bring the war to a rapid close. There is no prudential reason to rely on even the unintended damage done to civilians by military attack for deterrence. Discrimination remains an important goal during the war—and an important capability to achieve in advance of the war, both for deterring the war and bringing it to an end.

But Walzer believes that "counterpopulation deterrence" is

basic. He also believes that it is perfectly effective. It "rules out" (i.e., makes so unlikely as to be negligible) any sort of nuclear war between the great powers; even though the Soviets know we believe that nuclear attacks on populations would be suicidal, our threat would be sure to deter them. And, typical of his time, he was also quite comfortable about the effectiveness of counterpopulation deterrence for forestalling a conventional invasion. His complacency here parallels that expressed in various British and American magisterial writings of the late 1960s and 1970s. He quotes with approval a passage from Bernard Brodie: "The spectacle of a large Soviet Field army crashing across the line into western Europe in the hope and expectation that nuclear weapons would not be used against it—thereby putting itself and the USSR totally at risk while leaving the choice of weapons to us—would seem to be hardly worth a second thought..." One may surmise that if Brodie were alive he would be having second thoughts today. Many who wrote that way in the late 1960s and 1970s are less comfortable today, in particular about threatening mutual annihilation as a way of deterring nonnuclear attack on Western Europe.

McGeorge Bundy illustrates the change in the American establishment. He had chided Henry Kissinger for expressing very public doubts on that subject at Brussels in 1979. "American strategy for the protection of West Europe," he was satisfied, was "so far, a classic case of doctrinal confusion and pragmatic success." The two words "so far" suggested some misgivings. I cautioned at the time that it would be a great mistake to attribute the pragmatic success to the doctrinal confusion; and Mr. Bundy did not disagree. The protest movements in Europe were already visible for one thing; for another,

there were the Soviets, and they may not be confused just because we are. We cannot count on a Mutual Assured Confusion. In any case Mr. Bundy, less confident about MAD threats to deter conventional has joined Robert McNamara, George Kennan and Gerard Smith in proposing that we exchange pledges with the Soviets that neither would be the first to use nuclear weapons. The four stress the No-First-Use pledge much more than any serious and extensive program to improve the size or quality of NATO conventional forces, so that NATO could depend less on nuclear threats to overcome Soviet advantages in the use of nonnuclear force. These advantages have to do not only with the massive and increasing size and quality of the Soviet force, but with their geographical position. Japan and Korea as well as all our European allies are within immediate range of Soviet, but far from the center of American conventional power.

Indeed, it seems that the four have not really abandoned the use of an implicit threat of the first use of nuclear weapons to make up for our conventional disadvantage. For while the four may really mean the Western pledge literally, they rely on the Soviets not actually trusting us to live up to our pledge and so continuing to keep their ground forces dispersed and less effective for conventional attack and defense. In short, the policy they advocate resembles the pastoral letter in explicitly and intentionally abandoning a nuclear threat, while implicitly continuing to rely on it. In their case, the threat is implicit in NATO's continued capability to use nuclear weapons first. If their policy led each side to believe the other's pledge, the Soviets would be more likely to concentrate their conventional force effectively—and safely since we would mean our

pledge. On the other hand, if we risked concentrating our defenses at the point of attack, that would not be safe since NATO has no way of enforcing such a Soviet pledge. It seems likely that the four would want NATO to continue to be wary of Soviet first use. In sum, it does not appear that the policy of exchanging unenforceable pledges about the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe reduces the doctrinal confusion that has been troubling NATO even on the subject of the nuclear deterrence of conventional attack. It has only alarmed West European leaders who continue to place excessive reliance on nuclear weapons.

Many have observed that the four are rather perfunctory about a program to improve NATO conventional forces—in size or quality or method of deployment or strategy—a program that might make them more capable of defeating a Soviet conventional attack without resorting to nuclear weapons. (The pastoral letter is even more halfhearted on the subject of replacing nuclear with nonnuclear weapons. "We do not in any way want to contribute to a notion of 'making the world safe for conventional war', which introduces its own horrors." It warns that an "upward spiral even in conventional arms may lead to war.")

I do not doubt the earnestness of the authors' desire for a more than nominal decrease in NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. In the case of Robert McNamara, I can testify that his interest in improving NATO's conventional capability goes back at least twentytwo years. I was his representative on the Acheson Committee which drafted the National Security Council decision formally to end the U.S. policy of massive retaliation in the spring of 1961. That decision called for a substantial raising of the nuclear threshold; preparations of a capability to make a substantial conventional fight able to defeat all

but a very massive nonnuclear attack; and the use of nuclear weapons only if our increased conventional force did not suffice. But as the stormy reaction to the McNamara doctrines of his first two years indicated, NATO's policy of early first use did not evidence any convincing willingness actually to use nuclear weapons quickly, but rather evidenced NATO's reluctance to spend the resources needed for an adequate conventional defense. Moreover, though Mr. McNamara was skeptical about the utility of battlefield nuclear weapons, he did not resist increasing the number of tactical nuclear weapons to 7,000 in order to quiet the stormy reaction. When six years after the Acheson Report the Europeans did agree to "flexible response" it was a rather grudging compromise—agreeing on the need for improved conventional forces but insisting that the main defense would be nuclear. That tended to undercut the seriousness with which they or we attended to the problem of improving NATO's ability to defend itself against conventional attack without resorting to the early use of nuclear weapons.

From the beginning of the 1960s to about the late 1970s, all the major Allies, including the U.S., while prattling about an arms race, cut their defense budgets in half, in percent of GNP, while the Soviets steadily increased their spending in real terms for conventional general purpose forces as well as for theatre and long-range nuclear forces. Though NATO continued to rely on U.S. strategic forces to respond even to a conventional attack, if it were overwhelming, our strategic spending in constant dollars was three times as high at the beginning of the 1960s as in 1976. The corresponding figure for the Soviets was three times as high at the

end of the 1970s as ours. Even more telling is our record on the military investment needed to improve the quality and size of our general purpose forces if we were to offset the Soviets' geostrategic and other advantages for nonnuclear attack. U.S. investment in research and development, procurement and military construction for general purpose forces was about the same in 1966 as the Soviets. In 1981 their investment was more than one third higher than ours. And since investment, unlike maintenance and operations, has a cumulative effect on a longer run future, their greater efforts in the intervening years will continue to have a substantial effect. As a result NATO found itself continuing to rely on the early and first use of nuclear weapons while the correlation of forces was changing so as to make that less convincing than ever before.

It may be that the apocalyptic antinuclear movement in West Europe, if it has served any useful function at all, has done so by making responsible West Europeans more conscious of the recklessness of depending on apocalyptic nuclear threats to meet nonnuclear attacks. And given the economic problems that European governments face, key Western leaders are forced to think not merely of multiplying brute numbers but also of exploiting the new intelligent technologies to increase the effectiveness of the resources used. Such an effort has been hampered up to now by a kind of Luddite and moralist resistance to qualitative improvement and by a particular antipathy to technologies that improve the possibility of discrimination and choice.

Moralists who have chosen to emphasize the shallow paradoxes associated with deterrence by immoral threats against population have been at their worst when they have opposed any attempts to improve the

capability to attack targets precisely and discriminately. While they have thought of themselves as aiming their policy at nuclear weapons, they have done collateral damage to non-nuclear weapons. They have slowed the development of technologies which can free us from the loose and wishful paradoxes involved in trying to save the peace with threats to terrorize our own as well as adversary civilians.

There are some parallels here in the events leading up to the massive nonnuclear raids on German and Japanese cities in World War II. British scientists, when the menace of Hitler overcame their natural distaste for arms research, formed a Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defense which backed Watson Watts' development of radar for the defense of Britain. Their distaste was not quite overcome enough for them to support as energetically the Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Offense, whose work was quite desultory. The lag in developing radar for navigation and bombing, however, did not prevent the bombing of German targets. It only assured that the raids would be more destructive of German civilians. Much of the responsibility lies with the Royal Air Force failure to exercise the necessary diligence to improve their accuracy in between the wars. Marshall Trenchard, relying on the untypical experience of strategic bombing in clear weather against undefended targets in Iraq as part of Imperial Defense, thought British bombing accuracy was excellent. In 1928 he argued, "What is illegitimate, as being contrary to the dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole purpose of terrorizing the civilian population." Citing the draft code of rules for Air War drawn up at the Hague in 1922-23, he held that air attacks were legitimate--"provided all reasonable care

is taken to confine the scope of the bombing to the military objective..." But it is doubtful that he exercised reasonable care before the outbreak of war to improve bombing accuracies. Trenchard's opposite numbers in the British Army and Navy had expressed their doubts that the state of accuracy in 1928 would permit either the effectiveness or the discrimination that Trenchard claimed. During World War II when he found how poor its accuracy was, Trenchard advised that if the Bomber Command missed the intended targets they would still kill Germans and so do good work.

The evolution of declaratory doctrine for the American defense of Europe beginning in the 1950s started with the belief that we could simply substitute tactical nuclear weapons and especially strategic nuclear weapons for the conventional fire power which our NATO allies were reluctant to supply to meet a conventional invasion. It went through a phase in which many of those who were concerned about the extensive destruction worked by nuclear weapons entertained exaggerated hopes for limiting the destruction done in the course of the large scale use of tactical nuclear weapons on European battlefields; and for using active and civil defense on a massive scale to limit the damage done by a large raid on U.S. cities to quite small amounts. When these hopes were disappointed those who had entertained them adopted the view that unlimited destruction was a good thing or at least that the threat of unlimited destruction was nearly sure to deter even a conventional invasion. In the last year or two, we are seeing signs of a renewed serious interest in improving NATO'S ability to meet a conventional invasion in Europe on its own terms. Manfred Woerner, the current Minister of Defense in the Federal Republic has set forth a program which is designed not only to

discourage Soviet nonnuclear invasion, but to do it responsibly in a way that will also put to rest the antinuclear movement that has been growing in West Germany. He would exploit the advanced technologies that are coming to be available for that purpose.

Woerner's view stands in great contrast to that of his predecessor who held that even a nonnuclear war in Europe would be "the end of Europe," and that it was essential that tactical nuclear weapons be used quickly but only as a link to "the intercontinental exchange,"-- which would be "the end of the world." But anyone who relies on such threats to deter a conventional attack is likely to threaten up to the last minute and then, when it became clear that the Soviets did not believe that NATO leaders would consciously bring on the end of Europe and then the end of the world, rush to reassure the Soviets that they did not really mean to execute the "threat." Such a policy, Herman Kahn labelled accurately, "preemptive surrender." It differs from the policy advocated by the Greens in the antinuclear movement. They would make their accommodation with the Soviets now in time of peace, well in advance of a potential Soviet attack. The brilliant French political scientist, Pierre Hassner, characterizes the difference between the leaders of the antinuclear movement and some leading figures in the West European establishment who rely on suicidal threats as essentially the difference between "preventive surrender" and "preemptive surrender".

Deterring Nuclear Attack on an Ally Messrs. Bundy, McNamara, et al, have lost their faith in suicidal threats as a way of deterring a conventional invasion. They continue to believe in the necessity and

adequacy of such threats to deter nuclear attacks. However, a hope that an adversary can be safely deterred by our threat to blow him up along with ourselves, (and any claim that an adversary can be stably deterred by a capability which we make plain we would never actually use if deterrence failed) is as clearly absurd in connection with the deterrence of a nuclear attack on an ally and not just a nonnuclear attack. Consider, for example, a strategically placed ally like Norway with an American nuclear guarantee and no nuclear weapons of its own. How would a capability for destroying Soviet civilians, along with American civilians and possibly the civilization of Europe itself, discourage the Soviet use of nuclear weapons against military targets in the course of an attack aimed at seizing the sparsely populated but strategic northernmost counties of Norway? No one—no Norwegian, no American leader, and no Soviet leader—seriously would expect us actually to respond to such an attack by consciously initiating the killing of one hundred million or so innocent Soviet civilians and a corresponding number of Americans and/or West Europeans. That is one reason why holders of the MAD dogma explicitly exclude the actual use of such a capability. But a capability which plainly will never be used to initiate a chain of events we believed would lead to the end of civilization will terrify an adversary no more than a capability that would destroy half, or a tenth or a millionth the number of civilians or no civilians at all. The only way weapons can inspire concern is by the likelihood that they will be used. The residual fear that the West may deliberately blow up the world tends to terrify some in our own elites much more than the Soviets who chatter much less on this subject.

The Incoherence of "Deterrence Only" Even for Deterring Nuclear

Attack on Oneself". Dogmas of "minimum deterrence" and "deterrence only" had their origins in the late 1950s in the writings of General Pierre Gallois. Gallois believed that nuclear weapons spelled the end of alliance: no nuclear guarantee to a nonnuclear ally was credible since no nation would commit suicide for another. His version of minimum deterrence formed the center of his rationalization for the spread of nuclear weapons to any nation, even very small ones that wanted protection from nuclear attack or coercion. Initial American variants of the minimum deterrence doctrine in 1958 cited some of Gallois' principal arguments and the calculations he designed in order to prove the necessity for targeting cities rather than opposing military forces; and in some cases the 1958 American writings on minimum deterrence recommended the distribution of nuclear submarine launched ballistic missiles to NATO allies to replace the American guarantee. However the incoherence of the deterrence only view is thorough and applies to deterring attack on oneself. If it is true that no nation will commit suicide for another it seems quite as clear that it cannot commit suicide in order to assure its own survival. Suicidal threats are in general not a reliable means of dissuasion.

Yet the absolute separation of threat from any possibility of execution has been common in establishments abroad as well as here, even among those who would maintain the alliance. An associate director of that pillar of the European establishment, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), talked in much the way Father Hehir does. Father Hehir holds that nuclear weapons exist "to be not used. They are destined to threaten, never to

strike." Ian Smart, then of the IISS, has said that "nuclear weapons are exclusively destined to deter" and suggests that it is only certain misguided American hawks who view them "as reasonable and effective" for fighting. But the absolute dichotomy between deterring and fighting is not tenable.

William O'Brien's writings since his 1981 book on The Conduct of Just and Limited War are especially blunt about the insanity of the deception that labels itself a deception as does any doctrine of "Deterrence Only." The Jesuit Father Winters has an enthusiastic explication of the pastoral letter which parallels Father Hehir: the letter opts "with notable casuistic ingenuity for possession of the strategic arsenal along with renunciation of the intention to employ it." O'Brien responds that, "given the centrality of credibility to deterrence... this proposition is insane. What is needed is not casuistic ingenuity, but a serious commitment to face the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence without recourse to escapist diversions." He hopes, as should we all, that the final letter will not advance that proposition.

O'Brien's 1981 book, while a painstakingly honest and informed inquiry into the circumstances in which war is justified and into its discriminate and proportionate conduct in a wide range of historical conflicts, is somewhat less incisive on the subject of MAD. He gives a little credence to the possibility that at least a onesided abandonment of the threat against innocents might be destabilizing, and, though he is aware of the possibilities, he appears to underestimate the actual progress in technologies that give us a significant choice between destroying military targets and destroying innocents. However, he is right on the mark in his answer to the

Deterrence Only version of the pastoral letter proposed by Father Winters and Father Hehir.

Father Hehir is aware of but troubled by the fact that some nuclear weapons are less destructive than some nonnuclear ones. He argues on the basis of "psychological criteria" that we may continue to threaten to use nuclear weapons but should ban their actual use because he wants to solidify in our minds the dangers of crossing the gap between nonnuclear and nuclear weapons. He wants to set up a psychological barrier against our ever actually using them. Unfortunately, he is less concerned to set up a psychological barrier for the use of nuclear weapons by our adversaries. Assuring them that we would never actually use nuclear weapons, even in response to a nuclear attack, cancels the deterrent and, for them, opens up a psychological expressway.

One can see why "casuistry," which once meant dealing with cases of conscience and the resolution of questions of right or wrong in conduct, acquired a bad name and came to refer to the trivial and false application of moral principles to make things seem like their opposite. It is striking that the upholders of what might be called the Doctrine of No-Use--First-Or-Second-Or-Ever seem unaware that an adversary might be concerned not only about the magnitude of the harm we threaten but about the likelihood that we will actually inflict it.

However, it is a familiar fact of everyday life that we consider implicitly in our behavior not only the size of the assorted catastrophes we might conceivably face when we get up each morning but also their likelihood. Blizzards in August might find us peculiarly unequipped to survive them. So might the prospect of intense heat and

sunstroke in December. Neither bothers us much, nor leads us to wear furs in summer and carry parasols in winter. We enter rooms unconcerned that the molecules in the air filling the room may not continue to move at random in accordance with the Kinetic Theory of Gases, and that they will not suddenly all wheel and head for a corner leaving us to suffocate.

Even when we face adversaries and not merely environmental dangers, we have a way of arraying threats according to the probability that they will actually be carried out and not only in terms of the damage they would do if they were carried out. When a threatener can execute a terrible threat to us with little harm to himself, we worry more than when he would suffer at least as much as we would. Moreover, when a threatener, who expects to destroy himself and his allies along with the aggressor, says that he has no intention whatsoever and, in fact, would regard it as immoral to execute his threat because it would end civilization, this can only be extremely reassuring to a potential aggressor. It is an invitation rather than a deterrent. Somehow it does not occur to those who hope to deter by a suicidal but empty threat (which they loudly proclaim they will never execute) that they may be doing the very opposite of deterring. Their policy is—to use that dread catchword—"destabilizing." Nonetheless, in advancing this doctrine of No-Use—First-or-Second-or-Ever, the Catholic thinkers are only expanding and making more obvious some of the confusions of secular strategists.

Many analyses in the early 1960s related the actual use of our strategic forces to the problem of limiting harm done to ourselves and our allies in case deterrence fails; and related deterrence of the initiation of war exclusively to the harm that we could do to an

adversary if we responded. They tended to treat these two objectives as quite independent. That was, in fact, the mode of discussion in Robert McNamara's Annual Posture Statements after the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the separation is extremely artificial. It misconstrues the problem of deterring. It is very hard to convince an adversary that the action he wants to undertake will be excessively risky if we convince him, at the same time, that we are most unlikely to respond for fear of the unlimited harm we would bring on ourselves; and especially if we take steps to assure that we will be annihilated. Much of the discussion after McNamara left the office of Secretary of Defense completed the absurdity by making it a matter of explicit statement that we have no intention of actually fighting a nuclear war at all, i.e., of actually using nuclear weapons, that we only mean to threaten. Unfortunately, the Principle of Deterrence and the Principle of No-Use—First-Second-or-Ever mutually annihilate each other.

Declaring that one does not really mean to use nuclear weapons, if deterrence fails, is one way of stilling uneasiness about using a threat to kill innocents in order to deter. Another standard way of softening guilt is to say that the West should continue to use such an immoral implicit threat only if it is making serious progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. That, however, does not lie solely within the West's power. It depends on others who have or may acquire nuclear weapons, and in particular it depends on the disposition of the deeply suspicious hostile leadership of the Soviet Union. For a brief time in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, some Western leaders talked fervently about world government and the need to sacrifice national sovereignties to assure world peace. Prime

Minister Attlee invoked "an act of faith" by the United States, the United Kingdom and other nations, and "a new valuation of what are called national interests." Secretary Stimson "spoke continuously about a way to use nuclear energy for other things 'than killing people'" and of "the changed relation of man to his universe." It is easy to understand and sympathize with their initial emotional reaction to the enormous destruction released at Hiroshima and to feel their disappointment as Russian behavior made evident that such hopes were Utopian. But 37 years later, the utopian hopes expressed by Jonathan Schell and others are more obviously groundless. Since then, the Soviet leadership has made clear many times that Western versions of utopia differ from their own. They see the independence of Western democracies side by side with their own system, as a permanent danger to the maintenance of their system, not to say its expansion. There is little evidence that any feasible arrangement would lead them to surrender so powerful an instrument of coercion or defense. That after all was indicated in their rejection of the Baruch Acheson Lilienthal plan, and the contrast of their private view with that of Western leadership is illustrated by the accounts of such reliable witnesses as Milovan Djilas. Stalin exhibited none of the anguish that was sincerely felt by Western leaders and none of their hopes for a world authority governing Communist and non-Communist nations side by side. "He spoke of the A-Bomb 'That is a powerful thing, pow-er-ful!' His expression was full of admiration..."

Nor have Soviet leaders since Stalin shown any lesser awareness of the value of nuclear weapons as an implicit or explicit means of intimidation in a hostile world they do not dominate. Their value is only enhanced by the contrasting Western scruples on the same subject.

If Western political as well as religious leaders take Western possession of nuclear weapons as justified only if there is progress towards agreement with the Russians to eliminate them altogether, this places in Soviet hands the decision as to whether the West will continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Not all differences are negotiable. Pretending that they are in this case suggests a willingness to disarm unilaterally—either because the Soviets have prevented an agreement or because they have consented only to an agreement under which their disarmament would be purely nominal and the West's disarmament would be real. The Utopians in West Germany's Party of the Greens look forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their immediate withdrawal from Eastern and Western Europe. They are not noted for their realism. However, they have rejected the zero option for intermediate nuclear forces in Europe as "unrealistic," even though it would seem to be a rather substantial step on the way to their goal. Petra Kelly and Manon Maren-Griesbach, two of their principal leaders, explain that the zero option is unrealistic because the Russians would never agree to it. It is therefore "not [even] an honest step towards arms reduction." But the inconsistency of the Greens and their willingness to see the West accommodate to an unaltered Soviet position does not differ substantially from many in the West who express great concern that the American government has not been able to convince the Soviets that we are sincere.

Here again, Paul Ramsey understood very well what was involved in the Western tendency to take negotiation and, in fact, agreement with adversaries as an absolute essential. He questions the

"omnicompetence of negotiation" and observes about some statements in Pacem in Terris to the effect that there can be hope in negotiations only if these proceed "from inner conviction" that, if such statements mean that "the way to conduct negotiations is not to permit them to fail" then the adoption of that way of negotiating by any single nation would mean "its premature surrender...It takes two to negotiate in any such fashion."

The view of the present Reagan administration on this subject is, at best, mixed and sometimes seems to lack conviction. The President has said "it takes two to tango." But when the New York Times editorialist, who apparently thinks the impulse for social dancing is universal, said "So Tango!" and when the American Catholic Bishops proposed arms control instead of new weapons, the administration has tended mainly to justify its intermediate nuclear force programs and its strategic programs as the best way to get an agreement with the Soviets. Implicitly, the administration, then, seems to agree that there is no escape from the holocaust except by agreeing with the Soviets. But this particular apocalyptic view, like others, has no basis in fact.

We should pursue arms agreements but recognize that utopian hopes for total nuclear disarmament cannot excuse a Western failure to defend its independence soberly without using reckless threats. The phrase "arms control" is loaded with wishful and mistaken prejudices that have shaped American and European policy on arms negotiations beginning in 1963. It suggests that without arms agreements our spending on defense inevitably will rise exponentially and uncontrollably; and that with arms agreements Soviet arms efforts will diminish. The experience since the Cuban missile crisis illustrates

the opposite.

A serious effort to negotiate agreements with the Soviets might enable us to achieve our objectives at lower levels of armaments than might otherwise be possible. Being serious about arms agreements, however, is not the same as being desperate. Even without agreements the West is quite capable of deterring war and defending its independence against a formidable and persistently hostile adversary committed, as the Soviets have been, to changing the nuclear and non-nuclear 'correlation of forces,' in their favor. The contrary view is deeply pessimistic and, ultimately irresponsible, leading easily to treaties and "understandings" which only worsen the situation of the West.

For a serious pursuit of arms negotiation by the West cannot be simply sincere but wishful. It calls for a sober and thoughtful assessment of how any arrangements contemplated in an agreement are actually likely to affect the West's long-term objectives of security and independence, and its intermediate objective of redressing the balance which worsened during the period of detente. These are not merely technical matters. The actual results of arms negotiations have, in the past, contrasted sharply with our expectations and desires. The negotiations of the last two decades started with Western expectations that the agreements achieved would reduce arms spending on both sides without any change in the balance. We assumed that the Soviets, like ourselves, had, as a principal objective, the desire to reduce the percentage of their resources devoted to arms spending and that they would choose "arms control" rather than arms competition. The record plainly shows that Western assumptions were

wishful. The Soviets pursued arms agreements as a method of limiting Western spending—which did decline as a proportion of GNP by nearly half in the period after the Missile Crisis—while they, themselves, steadily increased their spending and did succeed in changing the balance. Now the West has the problem of catching up and that is especially hard to negotiate.

Serious negotiations today must recognize the limits to what can be accomplished by negotiation. We and the Soviets share an interest in avoiding a mutually suicidal nuclear war, an interest which each of us will pursue whether or not we reach genuine agreement in various understandings and formal treaties. But the Soviets also have interests in expanding their influence and control and, in the process, destabilizing the West, if necessary by the use of external force rather than simply by the manipulation of internal dissention. Arms agreements might temper but are unlikely to eliminate this reality. In particular, there seems scant basis to hope for major economies in our security effort through negotiated limits or reductions.

Experience suggests that when the Soviets agree to close off one path of effort, they quickly redirect their resources to augment other projects posing differing but no lesser dangers. On the other hand, many of the ostensible goals of arms agreements such as reducing the danger of nuclear war, are best achieved through measures which we can and should implement unilaterally. Our current efforts to design and deploy nuclear weapons which are more accident proof and more secure against theft or unauthorized use are a good example. Measures to improve the safety, security and invulnerability of nuclear weapons can be implemented by both sides individually because they make sense

for each side independently of formal treaties or elaborate verification measures. These need not mean a net increase in the numbers or destructiveness of nuclear weapons in our stockpile. The United States has already greatly reduced both the megatonnage and the numbers of its nuclear weapons. It recently removed 1000 weapons from Europe and has said that, if in accordance with NATO's decision in 1979, it installs 572 intermediate range nuclear missiles, it would withdraw an equal number of warheads. If we increase precision further, we can drastically further reduce the number and destructiveness of our nuclear weapons. That can improve the effectiveness of nonnuclear weapons so that they may increasingly replace nuclear brute force. And it would improve our ability to avoid the unintended bombing of innocents with nuclear or nonnuclear warheads. It would enlarge rather than foreclose our freedom to choose.

But many strategists in our foreign policy establishment would prefer to foreclose choice. The orthodox view expressed by editors of our magazines that deal with foreign policy, liberal senators, scientists and many former government officials holds that any use of nuclear weapons by us will almost surely end in a catastrophe leaving almost everybody dead or worse than dead; yet that we should have no alternative other than to threaten the bombing of cities; and that we should therefore make clear to our adversaries and allies that we will never actually fight a nuclear war. Anyone who holds that to be right and orthodox will want to believe that he has no other choice. If he cannot say, like Flip Wilson, "The Devil made me do it," he can introduce the deus ex machine of technology: Nuclear Technology makes

me do it. He is likely to be outraged by any heretic who dares suggest we might have choices.

The grand inquisitors on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had Kenneth Adelman on the rack recently. They probed to find some trace of a doubt in him on the question as to whether we should try for a capability to limit nuclear destruction. Dostoyevsky would have been fascinated. His Grand Inquisitor, a venerable jesuit who had had Christ seized on the streets of Seville, argued with the savior that his mistake was not to recognize that men cannot bear the burden of free choice. That's a point on which many in our establishment have selfconsciously impaled themselves.