

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 2

N.I.A. 1

4 February 1946

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

The President's letter of 22 January 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority, specified the general functions of the Central Intelligence Group but left many questions of policies and procedures for decision by the Authority.

It is considered desirable, not only to resolve some of the matters which the President left for your decision, but also to establish at the outset certain policies which will insure that the Central Intelligence Group performs its functions in an efficient and effective manner. The enclosed Directive is designed to accomplish both purposes.

It is recommended that the members of the National Intelligence Authority approve and sign the enclosed Directive.

MORI/CDF (Electronic) Pages 38
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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

N.I.A. DIRECTIVE NO. 1

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Pursuant to the letter from the President, dated 22 January 1946, designating the undersigned as the National Intelligence Authority, you are hereby directed to perform your mission, as Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with the following policies and procedures:

1. The Central Intelligence Group shall be considered, organized and operated as a cooperative interdepartmental activity, with adequate and equitable participation by the State, War and Navy Departments and, as recommended by you and approved by us, other Federal departments and agencies. The Army Air Forces will be represented on a basis similar to that of the Army and the Navy.

2. The Central Intelligence Group will furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security.

3. The composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board will be flexible and will depend, in each instance, upon the subject matter under consideration. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, WDGS, the Chief of Naval Intelligence and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (or their representatives) will be permanent members. You will

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invite the head (or his representative) of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the national security to sit as a member on all matters within the province of his agency.

All recommendations, prior to submission to this Authority, will be referred to the Board for concurrence or comment. Any recommendation which you and the Intelligence Advisory Board approve unanimously and have the existing authority to execute may be put into effect without ~~prior reference to~~ *action by* this Authority. If any member of the Board does not concur, you will submit to this Authority the basis for his non-concurrence at the same time that you submit your recommendation.

4. Recommendations approved by this Authority will, where applicable, govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for ensuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments.

5. You will submit to this Authority as soon as practicable a proposal for the organization of the Central Intelligence Group and an estimate of the personnel and funds required from each department by this Group for the balance of this fiscal year and for the next fiscal year. Each year thereafter prior to the preparation of departmental budgets, you will submit a similar estimate for the following fiscal year. As approved by this Authority and ~~made available~~ *within the limits of available appropriations,* by existing and future appropriations, the necessary funds and positions will be earmarked by *available to you* each department for requisition by you. Personnel will be procured by arrangement between you and the *department through the appropriate* member of the Intelligence Advisory Board, ~~but~~ *Y* you may determine the qualifications *of personnel* ~~required~~ and the adequacy of individual candidates. Personnel assigned to you will be under your operational and administrative control, subject only to necessary personnel procedures in each department.

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6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilize all available intelligence in producing strategic and national policy intelligence. All intelligence reports prepared by the Central Intelligence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participating intelligence agency.

7. As required in the performance of your authorized mission, there will be made available to you or your authorized representatives all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of our respective departments, ~~including necessary information as to policies, plans, actions, capabilities and intentions of the United States with reference to foreign countries.~~ Arrangements to carry this out will be made with members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Conversely, all facilities of the Central Intelligence Group and all intelligence prepared by it will be made available to us and, through arrangements agreed between you and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, subject to any authorized restrictions, to our respective departments.

8. The operations of the intelligence agencies of our departments will be open to inspection by you or your authorized representatives in connection with your planning functions, under arrangements agreed to between you and the respective members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

9. You are authorized to request of other Federal departments and agencies any information or assistance required by you in the performance of your authorized mission.

10. You will be responsible for furnishing, from the personnel of the Central Intelligence Group, a Secretariat for this Authority, with the functions of preparing agenda, reviewing

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and circulating papers for consideration, attending all meetings, keeping and publishing minutes, initiating and reviewing the implementation of decisions, and performing other necessary secretarial services.

Secretary of State

Secretary of War

Secretary of the Navy

Personal Representative
of the President

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N.I.A. 2

5 February 1946

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

Reference: N.I.A. 1

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of January 22, 1946, requires the assignment of necessary personnel and facilities from the Departments of State, War and the Navy in order to form a Central Intelligence Group.

2. An initial personnel authorization and an outline of organization should now be approved so that the Group may be activated and proceed with the pressing problems now confronting the National Intelligence Authority. The problems requiring earliest attention are:

a. The production of daily and weekly summaries of the ~~most~~ ^{developments in the field of} significant intelligence and operational ^{events} information related to national security and foreign ~~policy~~ ^{events} for the use of the President, the members of the National Intelligence Authority, and certain additional limited distribution.

b. Conducting a survey of existing facilities for collecting foreign intelligence information, with a view to determining how these facilities may be better coordinated and improved.

3. The proposed organization is set forth in the enclosed directive which has been prepared for your approval. It provides the necessary tentative charter and sufficient personnel to activate the organization and begin operating.

4. It is recommended that the members of the National Intelligence Authority approve and sign the enclosed directive.

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E N C L O S U R E

D R A F T

N.I.A. DIRECTIVE NO. 2

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

(Tentative)

- References: A. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, establishing the National Intelligence Authority.
B. N.I.A. Directive Number 1.

1. Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating the undersigned as the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group is hereby constituted and will be activated this date by the Director of Central Intelligence. In accordance with personnel authorizations approved by this Authority, the Departments of State, War, and the Navy will assign personnel to the Central Intelligence Group, and make reliefs and replacements, upon the Director's requisition. The approved initial personnel authorization is enclosed (Appendix "A").

2. The initial authorization provides the minimum personnel necessary for the tasks of organizing, surveying pressing problems, and meeting initial requirements. As soon as practicable the Director will submit his recommendations for augmentation of the Group.

3. Initial principal offices and sub-divisions shall be as shown on the chart (Appendix "B"), with functions as follows:

a. Director of Central Intelligence - Responsible for all operations of the Central Intelligence Group in accordance with the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and Directives of the National Intelligence Authority. He will make the assignments of all personnel in the Group. At the appropriate time, he will select an Assistant Director from

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each of the four personnel contingents (State, Army, Navy, Air), one of whom he may designate as his Deputy.

b. Administrative Section - This Section will perform all necessary administrative and security functions of the Group, and will provide the Secretariat for the National Intelligence Authority.

c. Central Reports Staff - This Staff will assist the Director in accomplishing the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and in accomplishing appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.

d. Central Planning Staff - This Staff will assist the Director in planning for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security, and in preparing recommendations regarding the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

e. Central Intelligence Services - The Central Intelligence Services shall be such operating agencies as may hereafter be established upon approval of this Authority under the provisions of paragraph 3c of the President's Directive of 22 January.

4. Initial Tasks. The Director of Central Intelligence will give first priority to the following tasks:

a. Production of daily and weekly summaries of the most significant intelligence and operational information related to the national security and to foreign policy for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in Appendix "C".

b. Conducting a survey of existing facilities for collection of foreign intelligence information, and submission of appropriate recommendations.

Secretary of State

Secretary of War

Secretary of the Navy

Personal Representative
of the President

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	State	War	Navy
<u>Central Reports Staff</u>			
Col., Capt., P-8 (Assigned)	1	2 (1 Air)	1
Col., Capt., P-8 (Detailed)	1	2 (1 Air)	1
P-7	3	2	
Lt. Cmdr., P-6	6	6 (3 Air)	5
Major, Lt. Cmdr., P-5	7		1
P-4			1
P-3		1 Lt.	1
P-2		2	2
CAF-7			1
CAF-5		2	1
CAF-4		11	5
TOTAL (less Detailed)	17	26	18
<u>Central Planning Staff</u>			
Col., Capt., P-8 or 7, CAF-15 or 14	3	6 (3 Air)	3
Lt. Col., Cmdr., P-6, CAF-13	3	6 (3 Air)	3
CAF-5	4	8	4
TOTAL	10	20	10
<u>Administrative Section</u>			
Col., Capt., CAF-14	1	2 (1 Air)	1
Lt. Col.-Capt, Cmdr. Lt. CAF-12 to 10	7	7	7
CAF-7	2	8	2
CAF-6	0	2	0
CAF-5	2	2	2
CAF-4	2	2	2
CAF-3	2	10	1
TOTAL	16	33	15
TOTAL (less Detailed)	43	79	43


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APPENDIX "B"

INITIAL ORGANIZATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP



Appendix "B"

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APPENDIX "C"

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF C.I.G. TOP SECRET
PERIODIC SUMMARIES

The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief
Chief of Staff of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, WDGS
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-5
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Research and Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2

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CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 5N.I.A. 327 March 1946NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITYPOLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The Executive Order of 20 September 1945, referring to functions of the Office of Strategic Services which were transferred to the War Department, stated: "The Secretary of War shall, whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest, discontinue and wind up all affairs relating thereto." At a meeting of intelligence representatives held in the War Department on 8 February, it was generally agreed that an authoritative group should promptly make a study to determine which functions and facilities of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) should be preserved for permanent peacetime purposes after the liquidation of SSU. It was further agreed that prompt decisions should be reached as to which preserved functions should be operated by C.I.G., and which by departments or existing agencies.

2. The Central Intelligence Group is preparing a separate action for the purpose of initiating a comprehensive survey of existing facilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information. However, that survey will necessarily be a long-range matter, whereas the disposition of SSU raises urgent questions which should be decided immediately. Therefore, an interdepartmental committee was formed to survey the Strategic Services Unit and make recommendations as to its immediate disposition.

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3. Based on the recommendations contained in the report of this interdepartmental committee, the enclosed draft directives were prepared as a means of implementing those recommendations.

4. The enclosed directives have been unanimously agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a member for the consideration of this matter.

5. It is therefore recommended that:

a. The National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure A; and

b. Concurrently, the Secretary of War approve and issue the draft directive in Enclosure B.

6. Arrangements for a meeting of the National Intelligence Authority, at which the above recommendations may be considered, will be made by subsequent communication.

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ENCLOSURE A

D R A F T

N.I.A. DIRECTIVE NO. _____

POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

References: A. The Executive Order of 20 September 1945, subject: "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions"

B. C.I.G. Directive No. 1

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the letter from the President dated 22 January 1946 which designated this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating the Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) are announced;

1. The national interest demands that the complete liquidation of SSU shall not be accomplished until it is determined which of its functions and activities are required for the permanent Federal foreign intelligence program, and should therefore be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group or other agencies in order that its useful assets may not be lost. Such determination and transfers shall be made and the liquidation of the remainder of SSU shall be completed as promptly as possible and prior to 1 July 1947. The Director of Central Intelligence shall issue the necessary directives to effect the liquidation. He will make recommendations to this Authority as to the Intelligence activities permanently required in the peace-time effort.

2. During the period of liquidation the SSU should be administered and operated so as to service, to the extent

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Enclosure A

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practicable, the intelligence agencies subject to our coordination. The Director of Central Intelligence shall issue the necessary directives to the Director of SSU required to accomplish this mission. In addition, the Director of SSU will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, any facilities and services of SSU which may be useful in the performance of an authorized function of the Central Intelligence Group.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for determining which funds, personnel and facilities of SSU are required for the performance of an authorized function of the Central Intelligence Group. Such funds, personnel and facilities of SSU will then be transferred to an appropriate War Department unit. The Director of Central Intelligence will be responsible for making the necessary administrative arrangements and for issuing the necessary directives to the Director of SSU.

4. The War Department will take the necessary budgetary action to carry out this program.

5. The war department shall retain the right to determine what portion of War Department funds, personnel and facilities can be made available to SSU by the War Department.

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Enclosure A

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ENCLOSURE B

D R A F T

PROPOSED DIRECTIVE FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO THE
DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

Effective immediately, you are directed to continue the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) as ordered in paragraph 3 of the Executive Order dated 20 September 1945, subject: "Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions". The liquidation will be completed not later than 30 June 1947.

The liquidation of SSU will be coordinated with the development of the permanent peace-time intelligence program. You will carry out the liquidation in accordance with instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative. The Director or his representative will deal directly with you. He will have such staff as he requires working with SSU.

During the period of liquidation you will administer and operate the SSU so as to service ^{within your capabilities} the intelligence agencies subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority in accordance with directives provided by the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative. In addition, you will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, any facilities and services ^{within your capabilities} of SSU which may be useful in the performance of an authorized function of the Central Intelligence Group.

Previous War Department instructions relating to this problem are amended accordingly.

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Enclosure B

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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N.I.A. 4

29 June 1946

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Class. Changed to:	TS (S) C
Next Review Date:	
Auth:	HR 78-3
Date:	29 Aug 71

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- References:
- a. President's letter of 22 January 1946
 - b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1
 - c. N.I.A. Directive No. 2

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

1. The President's letter of 22 January 1946, directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority, contained, in paragraph 3 thereof, a general description of the functions envisaged for the Director of Central Intelligence. N.I.A. Directive No. 1, containing the basic policies and procedures governing the Central Intelligence Group, further clarified the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly as regards his relationship with the National Intelligence Authority and the Intelligence Advisory Board. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 contained an initial personnel authorization for the Central Intelligence Group, providing only the minimum necessary for the tasks of organizing, surveying pressing problems, and meeting initial requirements. N.I.A. Directive No. 2 also instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to submit his recommendations for augmentation of the Central Intelligence Group as soon as practicable. Pursuant to those instructions, this report proposes a redefinition of the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence which will give him the necessary authority to augment the Central Intelligence Group so that he may effectively perform his assigned missions.

2. A draft N.I.A. directive, redefining the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, is contained in Enclosure "A". Discussion of the provisions of this draft directive is contained in Enclosure "B".

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3. The former Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, has concurred in the recommendations contained herein. This report also has the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case.

4. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A".

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ENCLOSURE "A"

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946 designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to ensure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence are hereby redefined as follows, subject to the provisions of said letter:

1. Paragraph 3 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946 defined the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence as follows:

"3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.

"b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the Intelligence agencies of your departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

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"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."

2. In performing the functions specified in paragraph 3-a of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized to undertake such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently performed or are not being adequately performed. Based upon these determinations, the Director of Central Intelligence may centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.

3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3-b of the President's letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to act as the agent of this Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed.

4. Pursuant to paragraph 3-c of the President's letter, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby directed to perform the following services of common concern which this Authority has determined can be more efficiently accomplished centrally:

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a. Conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.

b. Conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security.

5. To the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities, as determined by the respective Departments, the State, War and Navy Departments will make available to the Director of Central Intelligence, upon his request, the funds, personnel, facilities and other assistance required for the performance of the functions authorized herein. At the earliest practicable date, the Director of Central Intelligence will submit for approval by this Authority any supplemental budget required to perform the functions authorized herein, in addition to the appropriations which can be made available for this purpose by the State, War and Navy Departments.

6. Where the performance of functions authorized herein requires the liquidation, transfer or integration of funds, personnel or facilities for existing activities of the State, War and Navy Departments, the liquidation, transfer or integration will be accomplished at the earliest practicable date as agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and the official responsible for such activities so as to involve a minimum of interruption in the performance of these functions.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ENCLOSURE "B"DISCUSSION

Discussion by paragraphs of the provisions of the draft directive in Enclosure "A" follows:

Paragraph 2: Paragraph 3-a of the President's letter makes the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence relating to the national security, making full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments. This means that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the accuracy, adequacy and timeliness of intelligence required for the national security. To discharge his vital responsibilities, the Director of Central Intelligence should not be required to rely solely upon evaluated intelligence from the various Departments. He should have the authority to undertake within the Central Intelligence Group such research and analysis as may be necessary to determine what functions in the fields of national security intelligence are not being presently or adequately performed. He should also be authorized to centralize such research and analysis activities as may, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, be more efficiently or effectively accomplished centrally.

Paragraph 3: Paragraph 3-b of the President's letter charges the Director of Central Intelligence with planning for the coordination of intelligence activities related to the national security and recommending over-all policies and objectives to the National Intelligence Authority. No provision is made in the President's letter for an agent of the National Intelligence Authority who will be responsible for

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coordinating intelligence activities related to the national security so as to ensure that policies are properly implemented and objectives are successfully accomplished. Such coordination is essential to the effective execution of the national intelligence program and can be accomplished most efficiently only when the coordinating and supervisory responsibility is centered in one appropriate person. It is therefore recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be specifically charged with this responsibility.

Paragraph 4-a: It is considered that the conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security can be more efficiently accomplished centrally by the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:

A. Conduct of this type of operation by the executive departments would almost certainly embarrass these departments in the conduct of their official overt activities.

B. Such operations must be centrally controlled to ensure that they serve the national interest rather than the interests of any single department or agency, and that they do not conflict with overt intelligence activities.

C. Since such operations require maximum security they should be performed by a single closely controlled central agency.

D. The danger of competition and confusion between agents of different agencies necessitates the use of a single agency. Moreover, the interdependency and inter-relationship between geographical areas and foreign countries makes it imperative that there be one agency with world coverage. This does not, of course, preclude

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the use of specialized departmental personnel under rigid central control as mutually agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence and authorized departmental officials.

E. The difficult and specialized administrative problems involved in such operations make a single central agency more efficient and economical.

Paragraph 4-b: It is recommended that the conduct of all Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers required for the collection of intelligence information related to the national security be centrally operated under the Director of Central Intelligence for the following reasons:

A. The present organization carrying on this function under War Department direction should be liquidated because its reports are circulated too generally and its personnel have not been adequately screened for security.

B. This function is of value to the State, War, Navy and other Government departments. It should therefore be centrally directed to serve the needs of all these departments.

C. The Department of State appears to have the greatest interest, but the War Department is the only agency which has included funds for this function in its 1947 budget. The Department of State, however, has stated that it is not practicable for that Department to assume responsibility for this operation. The War Department considers that under no circumstances should it engage on a continuing basis in this predominantly nonmilitary intelligence function. The same viewpoint applies to the Navy Department. It therefore appears that this function is a service of common concern which can be accomplished more efficiently centrally.

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Paragraph 5: The primary source of funds, personnel and facilities required by the Director of Central Intelligence to discharge the functions proposed in this report should be those which can be made available by the State, War and Navy Departments. Since, however, some of these functions have not been performed by any department, or have not been performed on the adequate scale now contemplated, the Director of Central Intelligence should be authorized to submit for N.I.A. approval any supplemental budget required pursuant to this directive.

Paragraph 6: This paragraph is intended to ensure that the transition of any activities from departmental to central direction of operations is accomplished with a minimum of interruption in the performance of those functions.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

8 July 1946

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Reference: N.I.A. 4

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Class. Changed to: TS (S) C	25X1
Next Review Date:	
Auth: NA 70-3	
Date: 29 Aug 91	

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The Secretaries of State, War and the Navy have approved Enclosure "A" to N.I.A. 4 without change.

2. Admiral Leahy objected to the use of the word "agent" in paragraph 3 of that Enclosure because its legal connotation might imply unwarranted freedom of the Director of Central Intelligence to act for the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence concurred that the possibility of such an interpretation of that paragraph was undesirable, and explained that it was intended only to authorize him to act for the Authority in ensuring that its policies and objectives are properly implemented and executed. It was therefore agreed that this paragraph should be re-worded to make it clear that the Authority is not relinquishing its supervision and control, and to protect from unauthorized interference the rights of departmental intelligence agencies to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence.

3. Enclosure "A" to N.I.A. 4 is therefore being circulated as N.I.A. Directive No. ⁵ #, with editorial revision of paragraph 3 thereof to read as follows:

"3. In addition to the functions specified in paragraph 3-b of the President's letter and in accordance with paragraph 4 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this

Paragraph 3, line 2, corrected to read: "N.I.A. Directive No. 5...." in accordance with verbal information received from Secretary, N.I.A., 10 July. *A. E. Chittam*

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Authority in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed."

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.I.A.

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N.I.A. 5

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1 July 1946

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PROVISION FOR COORDINATING THE ACQUISITION
OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. It has been suggested by the Librarian of Congress that an Inter-departmental Committee on the acquisition of Foreign Publications, such as that which existed during the war, should be established on a permanent basis. The Department of State supports the principle embodied in this suggestion.

2. The matter was laid before the Director by letter of Mr. Alfred McCormack, dated 4 March 1946.

3. After consideration of all evidence assembled in the case, the Director of Central Intelligence concludes that:-

a. The continuation, on a permanent basis, of an inter-departmental committee to coordinate the acquisition of foreign publications for the use of government agencies is necessary in the interest of economy and efficiency.

b. The materials collected as a result of the committee's activities will contain much information needed for the production of intelligence related to the national security. Therefore, the N.I.A. should assume responsibility in the matter.

c. The organization of the committee on a permanent basis should be arranged for by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Department of State should administer the committee and continue to furnish the Secretariat. Since the committee will deal largely with matters of library



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techniques, the Librarian of Congress would be an appropriate chairman; and he has, in fact, expressed his willingness to accept such position.

Discussion upon which these conclusions are based is continued in Enclosure "B".

4. The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive has been prepared to provide the means for carrying out the recommendations based upon the above conclusions. It has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which included the Librarian of Congress and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case.

5. It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in Enclosure "A".

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

PROVISION FOR COORDINATING THE
ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

Paragraph 1 of the letter from the President, dated 22 January 1946, designated this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating the Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. Since the mass of foreign publications required by the various Federal agencies, as references useful in the conduct of their business, contains matter of value as intelligence information related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to the acquisition of foreign publications, are announced:

1. A permanent Inter-departmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications is hereby established as a subordinate agency of the National Intelligence Authority. The Department of State will administer the committee and furnish the Secretariat therefor.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the Librarian of Congress to accept the Chairmanship of the Committee and will send invitations for membership on the Committee to representatives of all Federal agencies interested in the acquisition of foreign publications for the conduct of their business.

3. The Committee will have duties and responsibilities as follows:

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a. To coordinate cooperative acquisition as between and among the several departments and agencies. The scope of this coordination shall include the establishment of agreed policies and procedures for the maintenance of comprehensive collections of library materials, in appropriate locations, the rapid interchange and loan of such materials, and the distribution of bibliographical information. These coordinating responsibilities are distinct from and therefore will not interfere with the usual responsibilities of individual agencies for the maintenance of working collections of library materials necessary to the transaction of their business.

b. To originate recommendations to the several departments and agencies concerning the development of their libraries within a framework of over-all Federal acquisitions, such recommendations to be designed to make available to this Government, with minimum duplication, all foreign library materials necessary to the conduct of the public business.

c. To originate recommendations to the Department of State on matters of broad policy connected with the procurement of foreign library materials through the Foreign Service, in so far as they pertain to servicing the acquisitions needs of the Federal Establishment as a whole.

d. To review requisitions on the State Department procurement facilities whenever it is necessary to determine whether said requisitions are consistent with the Committee's comprehensive acquisitions program.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence will designate a representative to act with the Committee as the Vice-Chairman and to be responsible for ensuring that the Committee's activities make adequate provision for the securing of intelligence information related to the national security.

ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

1. Immediately prior to and during the war, the Coordinator of Information and later the Office of Strategic Services furnished the Secretariat of an Interdepartmental Committee on the Acquisition of Foreign Publications. That Secretariat was taken over, under proper authority, by the State Department, as a part of the Research and Analysis Branch of O.S.S., and still functions under the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.

2. The primary concern of such parts of this existing and continuing Committee as are within the departments whose heads constitute the N.I.A. is foreign publications having possible intelligence information value in connection with the intelligence mission concerned with the national security.

3. Other Federal agencies, not primarily concerned with intelligence bearing on the national security, are also interested in the acquisition of foreign publications. Some twenty-one (21) Federal agencies have shown an interest in the matter and manifested that interest by sending representatives to meetings held in the office of the Librarian of Congress on 7 September and 25 October 1945. These meetings considered the coordination of the procurement effort, but had neither formal authority nor power to act.

4. The procurement of desired foreign publications for the interested agencies is accomplished in large measure by the State Department through its missions abroad. Payment for publications is made to State by the agency for which publications are procured.

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5. Certain Foreign Service Officers (eleven at last report) are about to go out to the most important foreign publishing centers with the sole duty of organizing the acquisition service and preparing bibliographical indices of available publications.

6. The Librarian of Congress, Dr. Luther H. Evans, feels that the problem of coordinating the Acquisition of Foreign Publications is a technical library matter. The Director of Central Intelligence concurs substantially in that view, although important matters of policy are also involved.

7. Dr. Evans submitted to the Secretary of State, on 26 October 1945, an outline of the coordinating committee which he feels can govern properly the acquisition of foreign publications. The results of Dr. Evans' study are incorporated in the recommendations made herewith.

8. The interest of N.I.A. in the problem is due to its continuing responsibility for coordinating the collection of intelligence information bearing upon the national security, and the fact that some of the publications acquired will have value in that connection. Therefore, this is an undertaking which can be most efficiently initiated and organized by N.I.A. action.

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13 August 1946

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY
DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board

Foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities constitute a paramount field of intelligence related to the national security. As such, the National Intelligence Authority is responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating Federal foreign intelligence activities in this field.

To date, the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the office of Major General Leslie R. Groves, the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, has been the agency performing functions of collecting and evaluating intelligence related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities. This Branch has operated under the personal direction of General Groves, who is in turn responsible, by Presidential directive, to the Secretary of War.

The newly created Atomic Energy Commission will be concerned with the entire field of atomic energy in the United States, including commercial as well as military aspects. The Commission will, upon Presidential directive, take over the responsibilities of the Manhattan Engineer District. It is considered appropriate at this time that the National Intelligence Authority should authorize and direct the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the

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correlation, evaluation and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. To accomplish this function, the personnel and working files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by General Groves should be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group.

The enclosed draft N.I.A. Directive is designed to carry out the conclusions contained in the above paragraph. This Directive has been unanimously concurred in by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, which in this case included the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District.

It is recommended that the National Intelligence Authority approve the draft directive in the Enclosure.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY
DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES

Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for planning, developing, and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to Federal intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security are announced:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized and directed to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to N.I.A. coordination of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security, and to accomplish the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorized to arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Government to utilize their collection facilities in this field.

2. To accomplish the function assigned in paragraph 1, the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District have authorized the transfer to the Central Intelligence Group of the personnel and working files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, effective at the earliest practicable date.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The enclosed report, SWCC 304/1, has been forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence.

2. The recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the enclosed report are being prepared and will be submitted for consideration by the National Intelligence Authority after review by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

[Redacted Signature]

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Acting Secretary, N.I.A.



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SWNCC 304/1

10 December 1946

Pages 3 - 28, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Reference: SWNCC 304

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a report by the ad hoc Committee in response to the above reference, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. Copies of this report have been forwarded to the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority will be circulated to the Committee upon receipt thereof from the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority.

H. W. MOSELEY
W. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

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E N C L O S U R E

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To review World War II efforts in Psychological Warfare, to study and report on the future status of psychological warfare, and recommend:

a. A peacetime organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-for-mobilization status;

b. A wartime psychological warfare organization; both organizations to be assigned such directives as will insure effective planning, coordination and implementation, particularly with respect to the integration of national psychological warfare with military plans.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. Psychological Warfare is defined as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:

- a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
- b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;
- c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

3. For further Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, see Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. Psychological Warfare is an essential factor in the achievement of national aims and military objectives in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

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b. The State Department has primary interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the foreign policy of the United States.

c. The armed services have a vital interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the national security and the conduct of military operations of the United States.

d. The National Intelligence Authority has an interest in the intelligence and certain other aspects of psychological warfare.

e. There is need for the immediate establishment of a committee with full-time representation from appropriate governmental agencies to serve as an agency charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and studies for employment in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President.

f. Appropriate agencies of the government should be required to assist in wartime implementation of approved psychological warfare plans.

g. The implementation of psychological warfare plans and directives during wartime in an actual or projected military theater of operations should be an active responsibility of the Theater Commander concerned.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that the SWNCC:

a. Approve Appendix "A" (a charter for the agency proposed in paragraph 4 e), subject to the concurrence of the National Intelligence Authority and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Thereafter, transmit this report to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, for guidance and appropriate measures of implementation.

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c. Obtain the comments or concurrence of the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when and as appropriate, in connection with psychological warfare plans developed by the Subcommittee provided for in Appendix "A" before acting on them.

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Enclosure

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APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

CHARTER

SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (P.W.C.)

ORGANIZATION

1. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (P.W.C.) is hereby established as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), charged with preparation of policies, plans, and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise.

2. Psychological Warfare is defined as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives:

- a. To assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight;
- b. To sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy;
- c. To improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

MEMBERSHIP

3. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare will consist of
- a. Two officials of the State Department, one of whom will serve as chairman.
 - b. Two officials of the Central Intelligence Group.
 - c. One officer of the War Department.
 - d. One officer of the Navy Department.

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Appendix "A"

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4. The members of the P.W.C. will, insofar as practicable, be assigned no other duties.

5. Alternate members shall be designated to act for members in absentia.

6. The P.W.C. will be provided by SWNCC with a permanent Secretariat.

7. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare shall be responsible for the:

a. Preparation of national plans and implementing directives relating to the employment of psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President), and for transmission of subject plans to SWNCC.

b. Preparation of plans for orderly and effective organizational transition of the P.W.C. from peacetime to wartime status, and for transmission of these plans to SWNCC.

c. Coordination of implementation of approved plans and directives as specified in a, preceding, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. Guidance and supply of necessary information, including implementing requirements therefor, concerning national psychological warfare plans to appropriate policy offices of the State, War and Navy Departments and to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to authorized coordinating agencies of other Departments of the Government of the United States.

PROCEDURE

8. The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Maintain close liaison with the appropriate policy offices of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and with authorized coordinating agencies of other Departments of the Government of the United States.

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c. Utilize the services of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) for necessary intelligence in the preparation of plans, studies, and reports.

d. Under authority of this charter, request the presence at committee meetings, as consultants, of representatives from the policy and functional offices of the State, War, or Navy Departments, and the Central Intelligence Group.

e. If unable to reach agreement on policies, plans, or directives, report promptly to SWNCC.

9. Plans and directives specified in paragraph 7 a above, which are to be implemented in actual or projected military areas, theaters or commands, will, following their approval, be transmitted by rapid communication to the military commanders concerned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only. Responsibility for implementation of such plans and directives will be that of the commanders concerned, solely.

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Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The United States organization for psychological warfare in World War II was affected by the following developments:

a. 11 July 1941. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was established by Presidential Order to collect, analyze, and correlate information and data bearing on national security, to make such data available to the President and such other officials as determined by the President, and to perform related activities. COI commenced operations on the premise that this agency would not only coordinate all incoming information, but also information flowing from the United States to the rest of the world. The Foreign Information Service was organized as a separate branch of COI, was situated in New York City, and was charged with the responsibility of coordinating international broadcasting from this country.

b. 30 July 1941. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) was created by Executive Order. This office was an outgrowth of the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, created by the Council of National Defense on 16 August 1940. CIAA was assigned broad functions as coordination center of commercial and cultural relations with other American republics, and was responsible for furthering commercial and economic well-being in the Western Hemisphere.

c. 30 July 1941. The Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) was established (originally as the Economic Defense Board) by Executive Order for the purpose of developing and coordinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense. (Eventually BEW was consolidated into the Foreign Economic Administration.)

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d. 26 October 1941. The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was created by Executive Order for the purpose of facilitating dissemination of factual information to the citizens of this country on the progress of defense efforts and on the defense policy and activities of the government.

e. 3 March 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created (in JCS 12) the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) which was envisaged as the ultimate authority over both foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations. (This committee's functions later were absorbed by other agencies.)

f. 13 June 1942. The Office of War Information (OWI) was established by Executive Order of the President for the purpose of coordinating into one agency war information functions of the government---foreign and domestic. The Executive Order brought the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) into the new agency, and abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), exclusive of the Foreign Information Service which was transferred to OWI.

g. 13 June 1942. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was established by Military Order under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of collecting and analyzing such strategic information as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations in planning and in conducting special operations not assigned to other government agencies.

h. 22 February 1943. The Director of OSS sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum enclosing the first "overall strategic plan for United States psychological warfare." This memorandum became JCS 230 dated 1 March 1943. (Certain provisions of the memorandum having to do with the functions of OSS were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 155/11/D on 27 October 1943.)

i. 2 March 1943. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the first basic plan for psychological warfare prepared by OSS. (Basic Plan for Psychological Warfare in Italy, contained in JCS 139/2.)

j. 10 March 1943. The President issued the following clarifying order with respect to the responsibilities of OWI and OSS:

"The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans through the planning agencies of the War and Navy Departments, and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of the foreign propaganda program which are to be executed in a theater of military operations will be subject to the control of the theater commander. The authority, functions, and duties of the Office of War Information shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere, exclusive of the United States and Canada.

"The military order of June 13, 1942, establishing the Office of Strategic Services, is hereby modified to the extent necessary to make this order effective."

k. 17 March 1943. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized liaison officers for the War and Navy Departments with duties as follows:

To sit as members of the Overseas Planning Group of OWI.

To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the JCS and to furnish the Overseas Planning Group of the Office of War Information with as much of JCS plans as authorized by Joint Security Control (an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and as necessary to insure correlation between military and propaganda plans.

To transmit requests from JCS to OWI relative to propaganda activities desired for the purpose of furthering military operations.

To present to the JCS all propaganda plans which required their approval.

S E C R E T

1. 27 October 1943. In JCS 155/11/D, Joint Security Control was charged with direction of the timing of the strategic service measures initiated from the United States by the OSS.

m. 4 December 1944. In JCS 1178/1, Joint Security Control was directed to bring to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison officers with OWI such JCS papers as were likely to be of interest to OWI.

2. The foregoing directives, in their successive steps, formulated the government's policy with respect to information and foreign propaganda, and established organizations designed to provide for coordinated planning and implementation of foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations. With respect to information, various governmental agencies operated to inform the United States public of our progress in the war. These agencies were subject to voluntary censorship and to cable and postal censorship. With regard to foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations, governmental organizations operated to overcome the enemy's will to fight and to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy. In addition, there was an attempt, divided between information and propaganda agencies, to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

3. Foreign propaganda and foreign secret (subversive) operations were directed so as to discredit the enemy's government and leaders, to stimulate divisions between dissident enemy persons and groups, to persuade the enemy military and enemy civilian population of the hopelessness of their situation, and to meet the enemy propaganda with counter-propaganda. These tasks were accomplished by "white" propaganda and "black" measures. In general, "white" propaganda was overt---issued from reputable, known U.S. official or other sources, or from countries known to be friendly to the United States, and implemented by radio,

leaflets, pamphlets, and sonic means. "Black" measures were covert---apparently conducted by forces friendly to the enemy or by subversive forces within enemy territory, and implemented by radio "freedom" stations, false rumors, false leaflets or documents, fifth column activities, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and support of underground resistance groups.

4. Directives outlined in paragraph 1 above eventually resulted in the following procedure (also shown on chart, Annex "A") within the organizations dealing with phases of psychological warfare:

a. "White". The Director of the Office of War Information (OWI), in planning and executing the federal program of overseas propaganda, had an Overseas Planning Board, on which were represented OWI, the State Department, and liaison officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CIAA and the British Political Warfare Commission were represented by observers, for purposes of information and coordination. This board, following the general structure of an overall plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared a weekly Central Directive for overseas propaganda which was cleared through agencies of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These directives (and other supporting ones) were transmitted to OWI offices and to major psychological warfare agencies in military commands abroad as the established U.S. government propaganda policy. In London, a combined directive was worked out by U.S. and British foreign propaganda agencies to govern all combined European Theater propaganda operations.

b. "Black". The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had a Planning Group, on which were represented OSS, the State Department, and the War and Navy Departments. An Advisory Committee served with the OSS Planning Group to consider matters affecting the respective agencies represented on the committee. Representatives on

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the Advisory Committee were from the Office of Economic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Treasury Department or other appropriate agencies. The Planning Group, following the general directives flowing from an overall plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared frequent directives for overseas operations, the timing of which was under the direction of a Joint Chiefs of Staff agency, Joint Security Control. These directives were communicated to OSS agencies overseas as the established U.S. policy for secret operations.

c. Coordination between OSS and OWI was on a basis of informal cooperation. Approval of OSS and OWI plans for military theaters of operation or projected operations was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In military theaters, coordination was conducted through the normal military command channels.

d. The Army and Navy conducted psychological warfare operations, partially through OSS and OWI agencies, and partially through their own organizations. Agencies for psychological warfare operations were developed in all theaters of operations, usually on the basis of a special staff section of the theater commander's staff, which maintained close liaison with the intelligence section. In addition, field operating teams for front-line combat psychological warfare were employed by the armed services. OWI and OSS personnel in military theaters were nominally integrated into the military organization, which assumed responsibility for their logistical support.

e. The CIAA operated semi-independently, with "information" measures designed to improve economic and commercial interests between the United States and the countries of Central and South America.

5. The following problems with respect to psychological warfare existed at the end of World War II:

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a. Coordination of OSS "black" and OWI "white" plans and operations at the Washington level remained on a basis of informal cooperation, which did not always result in coordination.

b. The national psychological organization was such that there was duplication of effort, competition for available supplies of personnel, slow and limited coordination and integration into the major military, political and economic programs of the government.

c. Directives overseas were subject to delays in transmission which often negated their use.

d. Military theater commanders received psychological warfare directives from OSS or OWI.

DISCUSSION

6. Examination has been conducted by the ad hoc Committee of World War II C.C.S, J.C.S., and J.P.S. papers; executive and other orders of the President; reports from military commanders and their staffs; and personnel with experience in World War II psychological warfare activities. It was noted during the examination that all major nations participating in World War II made use of psychological warfare at various stages and in varied techniques, and that in numerous instances psychological warfare contributed toward strategic and tactical victories. Detailed appraisal of psychological warfare results and future application of techniques will require further and continuous study, including as source material the comprehensive World War II history on the subject which is now under preparation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. Delays in the organization for and in the application of psychological warfare during World War II resulted in large part from different interpretations of terminology. The meanings of "psychological warfare," "information," "propaganda," "white," and "black" measures apparently were not sufficiently

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definitive to permit clear presentation or prompt approval of plans and implementing measures. The following definitions are therefore presented as a basis for present discussion, conclusions, and recommendations:

a. Psychological warfare. The planned use, during time of war, or threat of war, of all measures exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims, with the following objectives: to assist in overcoming an enemy's will to fight; to sustain the morale of friendly groups in countries occupied by the enemy; and to improve the morale of friendly countries and the attitudes of neutral countries toward the United States.

b. Information. Dissemination of complete factual information on subjects of interest in order to promote the functioning of man's reason.

c. Propaganda. Dissemination of information on subjects of interest, prepared with the intent of persuading, and of dominating man's reason. The information is normally factual, but not necessarily complete.

d. "White" propaganda. Overt propaganda, issued from reputable, known U.S. official or other sources, or from countries known to be friendly to the U.S. "White" propaganda may be implemented by press, radio, leaflets, pamphlets, and voice.

e. "Black" measures. Covert measures, apparently conducted by forces friendly to the enemy or by subversive forces within enemy territory. These may be implemented by radio "freedom" stations, false rumors, false leaflets and documents, fifth column activities, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and support of underground resistance groups.

8. United States psychological warfare has a history of improvisation, without central leadership, control or integration with other methods of attaining national objectives.

S E C R E T

Initial U.S. psychological warfare efforts in World War II suffered because there was no organization prior to the onset of shooting war for coordinated advance planning, training of personnel, or perfection of techniques.

9. In analyzing factors bearing on the formation of such an organization, the following have been taken into account:

a. The four instruments for making national policy effective in the international field consist of: (1) diplomacy (negotiation and bargaining among governmental representatives); (2) economic bargaining and pressure; (3) the threat or employment of armed force; and (4) information and propaganda. For maximum effect, information and propaganda must be applied with action in the other three fields. Maximum effectiveness in the management of foreign relations can only be achieved if all four foregoing instruments are used in a planned and coordinated fashion. It is necessary for those in charge of planning, coordination and execution to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the various techniques offered by all four elements. In time of war, the use of these elements is determined by the war situation and they become instruments of warfare.

b. Three phases in international relations apply with respect to United States foreign policy:

(1) Time of peace with varying degrees of international tension.

During this phase the major U.S. emphasis is on the basis of information; i. e., the explanation and justification of United States foreign policy, a description of America's peaceful pursuits, her natural resources, her industrial and agricultural organization and potentialities, and her scientific and cultural activities and achievements.

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(2) Time of international crisis but juridical peace.

This phase appears if and when international relations between the United States and other powers develop to the point where strong political, economic and military pressure may be required to effectuate American foreign policy. It is generally signaled by an act of the President, or of the Congress, or both, or the announcement of a policy to take immediate military action in defense of U.S. nationals against possible foreign aggression. The major emphasis shifts from a purely informational and cultural program to greater reliance upon measures designed to influence a foreign state to act in conformity with the requirements of our foreign policy (which measures usually are designated as "political warfare.")

(3) Time of War.

This phase is characterized by employment of all psychological warfare activities (including political and economic), involving channels and media for dissemination of psychological warfare as adjuncts to military operations or projected operations.

c. The existing peacetime organizations within the governmental structure which are charged with information responsibilities and which might be integrated, at least in part, into a wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. Personnel in the foregoing organizations who have experience in psychological warfare and who might be assigned to positions within the wartime organization.

10. In the development of an organization for wartime preparedness in psychological warfare, the following factors are considered fundamental:

a. The State Department has primary interest in the foreign policy aspects.

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b. The armed services have a vital interest in psychological warfare policy determination which affects the national security and the conduct of military operations of the United States.

c. Other appropriate agencies of the government should be required to assist in planning and implementation of psychological warfare.

d. Coordination of "white" and "black" psychological warfare is a necessity in any national effort.

e. Procedure finally developed during World War II in the planning and implementing of psychological warfare should be used initially as a basis for future wartime organization and procedure, with such minor administrative modifications as appeared desirable at the close of the war.

11. Recommendation is made that a subcommittee of SWNCC be created as:

a. A peacetime agency charged with the responsibility for planning all necessary measures, including firm plans for wartime organization, that will place psychological warfare in readiness for wartime implementation.

b. An agency which, in the absence of any other agency, can be utilized for coordinating implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise.

c. An agency which may either continue as the plans and policy nucleus of a wartime organization or may serve to lend continuous, planned effort to psychological warfare during the transition to a wartime organization of different structure.

12. Membership of the peacetime subcommittee for psychological warfare is recommended on a basis of those governmental agencies having primary or vital interest in the subject, namely, representation from the State, War, and Navy Departments, and the Central Intelligence Group. The latter agency is included in

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order that the committee can be supplied with evaluated intelligence concerning target nations and nationals, and in addition, because the Central Intelligence Group appears to be the one existing agency of the government fitted to implement "black" psychological warfare measures.

13. The following tasks are visualized for a peacetime psychological warfare committee:

a. Establishment of definitions, responsibilities and functions for "white" and "black" psychological warfare.

b. Plans to be prepared for use in time of war.

(1) "Strategic" psychological warfare plans, to be directed at potential enemy, enemy-occupied, neutral and friendly nations.

(2) "Tactical", or combat, psychological warfare plans, to be directed against armed forces of potential enemies.

(3) Counter-propaganda plans, determined from an analysis of peacetime and wartime propaganda of potential enemies.

(4) Consolidation of plans for areas occupied by U.S. forces.

(5) Plans for information control activities for occupied, hostile areas.

Plans noted in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), preceding, should be formulated for periods when the United States is on the defensive, when a stalemate exists, and when the U.S. is on the offensive. In addition, such plans should make provision for coordination with similar efforts of possible allies. It is considered that plans should be concentrated against the major vulnerable target of a potential enemy and that plans for subsidiary vulnerable targets should be integrated with plans against the key target.

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c. Personnel.

(1) Selection on an inter-departmental basis of personnel for wartime assignment.

(2) Formulation of training and familiarization courses.

In the selection and enrollment of personnel, provisions should be made for waiving physical or age restrictions in the cases of those skilled or trained in psychological warfare. In addition, it is considered necessary to examine the integration into the military organization of such personnel as may be assigned to military theaters of operation. In this latter problem, cognizance should be taken of World War II experience, in which this proved to be a continuing source of difficulty. Between military and civilian personnel serving in the field, problems of pay differentials, standards of responsibility, discipline and privileges were such as to lead those military commands who experienced these difficulties to recommend integration of civilian personnel into the military chain of command. This procedure, it was pointed out, was successful in several branches of the services which required speedy mobilization of technicians in large numbers, some of whom were draft-exempt for physical or other reasons. In planning for recruitment of psychological warfare personnel, it has been suggested that qualified volunteers and draft-exempt individuals be permitted to enlist specifically for psychological warfare, with assured rating as non-commissioned officers, or in the case of qualified personnel, as officers.

d. Techniques.

(1) Study of World War II techniques, including distribution of leaflets by aircraft; distribution of leaflets by guns; operation of radio stations, fixed and mobile; and use of loud speakers in tactical situations.

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(2) Development of new techniques applicable to possible new types of warfare.

(3) Organization and operations of psychological warfare combat teams, and other psychological warfare operating agencies, including recommendations for changes in organization and materiel.

e. Communications. Provision for rapid and secure communications between Washington and overseas operating centers.

Lack of rapid transmission during World War II often resulted in receipt of psychological warfare directives after events had overtaken their contents. Provision of rapid and secure communications to remedy this situation is considered of such importance that a separate radio channel or high priority classification for psychological warfare communications is indicated.

f. Intelligence.

Development of an intelligence procedure to insure that intelligence research at home and overseas is made available in time and sufficiency so that sound psychological warfare plans and operational decisions can be made.

g. Wartime Organization. The ad hoc Committee is of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a complete blueprint of a wartime psychological warfare organization. If its recommendations for the peacetime organization are adopted, it would be a function of the peacetime subcommittee to work on the problem of a wartime organization at length and in detail. The ad hoc Committee has indicated the framework and basis for a wartime organization in its recommendations for the peacetime organization (Appendix "A"). Any change in the composition or functions of this organization to conform to possible future changes in the structure of governmental departments or agencies should be based on the principles of: integration with political policy and action, and with military plans and operations, both on the

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policy and operating levels; and coordination of "white" and "black" psychological warfare measures. Discussions by the ad hoc Committee developed the following factors for consideration by the peacetime subcommittee recommended in Appendix "A":

(1) Washington Organization and Procedure. Chart of proposed wartime organization and procedure for Washington Headquarters is attached (Annex "B"). This visualizes:

A Director of Psychological Warfare and policy committee (Central Psychological Warfare Committee) with either the Director or policy committee responsible to the President or to a National Security Council, if established. The ad hoc Committee favors the C.P.W.C. as the agency directly responsible to the President (or National Security Council) with the Director acting as executive of the C.P.W.C., similar to the organization for the National Intelligence Authority.

Membership in the C.P.W.C. from the State, War and Navy Departments and the Central Intelligence Group.

An advisory group from other governmental agencies concerned (for example, Treasury and other economic agencies).

The Central Psychological Warfare Committee to formulate long-term "white" and "black" psychological warfare plans and policies, insuring necessary integration with long-term political and military plans.

Final approval of the foregoing plans and policies to be the prerogative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thereafter, a "white" subcommittee and "black" subcommittee to draft regular directives based within the framework of the long-term plans and taking account of the developments of military campaigns, or political policies, and of foreseeable events requiring special handling.

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These directives to be approved by a Joint Chiefs of Staff agency in order to insure that they assist in and not interfere with current military operations.

Directives to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to military theater commanders, and by the State Department to its missions and to the Federal agencies concerned.

Provisions to be made to capitalize in a controlled, directed and rapid manner on sudden military or political developments which had not been foreseen either as to scope, effect, or timing.

(2) Military Theater Organization. Chart of a proposed wartime organization for military theaters is attached (Annex "C"), based on developments in the major U.S. military theaters of World War II. Experience in these theaters demonstrated that while psychological warfare originally had been assigned to various staff sections for development and implementation, the diversity of the operations were such that effective use of psychological warfare as an auxiliary operational weapon required that responsibilities for psychological warfare be established in a separate staff section.

h. Fiscal problems in connection with a peacetime and wartime psychological warfare organization.

i. Coordination between psychological warfare and other agencies. One of the major problems in wartime psychological warfare is the necessity of developing a policy that will provide, so far as practicable, continuous coordination in the story of the war told to enemy, neutral, and home populations. Since overseas operations are a part of the major national and military and political operation, release of information concerning overseas operations requires facilities for a constant balance with psychological warfare. A policy to establish such a balance involves

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close coordination between psychological warfare, security and censorship agencies, together with facilities for briefing overseas press and radio representatives and control of their current communications outside the theaters.

14. Recommendation is made that in view of the scope of exploratory and definitive work confronting a peacetime psychological warfare committee, members on this committee should be assigned, insofar as practicable, no other duties, and should be provided with a permanent secretariat.

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
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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES

WORLD WAR II




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PROPOSED FLOW PROCEDURE

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICIES, PLANS & DIRECTIVES




* Representatives of other governmental agencies having Psychological Warfare interests.

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THEATER PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION



*1 Provides liaison with other Divisions, Allies, and Civilian Administrations.

*2 Provides direction and management of.

*3 Provides and manages labor necessary for physical preparation of materials, loading shells, bombs, etc.

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N.I.A. 7/1

15 April 1947

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Reference: N.I.A. 7

Memorandum by the Secretary

1. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board acting for the National Intelligence Authority, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, have unanimously concurred in the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

[Redacted Signature]

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Acting Secretary, N.I.A.



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Subject: Psychological Warfare

Reference: Memorandum, subject as above, File SWN-4964,
dated 11 December 1946.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board acting for the National Intelligence Authority concur in the provisions of SWNCC 304/1, from an intelligence aspect, subject to the following amendments:

a. Paragraph 7 e, page 16:

"e. 'Black' measures. Covert measures apparently conducted by forces apparently friendly to the enemy. . ."

b. Paragraph 12, 4th line, page 20:


Add word "peacetime" before word "agency."

c. Paragraph 13, page 25, add new paragraph:

"i. Coordination with appropriate SWNCC and JCS agencies of policies concerning deception materials to be used in psychological warfare operations in order to insure harmony of objectives of psychological warfare plans with other plans."

2. It is understood that the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has recommended through military channels that the membership of the proposed Central Psychological Warfare Committee be increased to include an Air Force member. The National Intelligence Authority interposes no objection to this increase.

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Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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