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IAC-D-101/3  
14 March 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E   A D V I S O R Y   C O M M I T T E E

Intelligence Requirements on U. S. Citizens

Held in Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries

1. Attached is the joint report of the State Prisoner Officer and the Defense Prisoner Officer prepared in response to IAC request for clarification of requirements (IAC-D-101/2, para. 4). See also IAC-D-101 and 101/1.

2. This will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for discussion.

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Secretary

State Dept., JCS reviews  
completed

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March 2, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Recommendations for Improving Collection  
of Intelligence on Americans Held in  
Communist Countries

Nature of the Problem

1. The United States Government and the American people traditionally have felt deep concern at the unjust detention of American citizens in foreign countries. The Government is obligated to take every possible step to procure the release of such citizens. The imprisonment of Americans in Communist countries presents a new and unusual problem in this field because of the exceptional difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence.

2. In negotiating for release of prisoners held or believed held by Communist countries, it has become increasingly apparent that improved intelligence is an essential base for effective action to recover personnel. The Communists have demonstrated again and again that unless the United States can identify the subject of negotiation and provide evidence that he is being held by the Communists, there is little chance of effecting his release.

3. The intelligence available to support these recovery activities has usually been collected as a by-product of other intelligence. The material provided the negotiators has been compiled by persons outside the intelligence community who have little appreciation of the task of negotiating face to face with the Communists.

4. Most intelligence reports have been lacking in detail and specificity. General lack of emphasis on this problem has resulted in reporting of isolated bits of information which have not been correlated with existing intelligence. The reports reflect the shortage of background information in the hands of the field collectors.

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5. While there are indications of failure to cross-disseminate the reports available to all interested agencies, these problems of communication are rapidly being eliminated by improved liaison within the Government and by concentrated effort on the part of State and Defense Department personnel. However, there are certain areas that could benefit by further examination.

Examples of Particular Problems

6. In the negotiations being conducted in Geneva with the Chinese Communists by Ambassador Johnson, he has been severely handicapped in demanding an accounting for 450 American servicemen missing from the Korean war because the records on these men are inadequate. He has been unable to cite specific, convincing facts in individual cases to demonstrate that the Communists should have knowledge of the fate of these persons. One important reason for the inadequacy of the information is the fact that neither the original collectors of the intelligence nor the persons who compiled the records for use in Geneva were properly instructed as to the type of intelligence to be collected and the use to which it was to be put.

7. Many agencies are currently engaged in interrogating German prisoners returning from Soviet prison camps. The interrogators are handicapped in exploiting this excellent source of intelligence on Americans held in the USSR because they lack proper guidance and background material on missing persons.

Recommendations

8. It is recommended that arrangements be made in the intelligence community:

(a) to determine which agencies of the United States Government, both within and outside of the intelligence community, are capable of contributing substantially to the collection of intelligence of Americans believed held in Communist countries;

(b) to ensure that all available intelligence resources are utilized to locate and identify United States nationals held in Communist prisons and to collect and disseminate pertinent

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information to the Department of State in the cases of United States civilians, the Department of Defense in the cases of United States military personnel, or to both these departments when it is not known whether the individual is civilian or military;

(c) to provide for the establishment of an interviewing guide containing instructions for the collection of this type of intelligence, with a supplement containing photographs, vital statistics, and pertinent biographical material about personnel possibly held, and history of their disappearance or capture. This collection guide and supplement should be reproduced in legible and compact form and made available to all field collection agencies. The guide supplement should enable more pointed and accurate reporting from the field and facilitate feedback from time to time of intelligence available within the Washington area to field agencies. In addition the guide supplement would provide essential background material for use in negotiation;

(d) to ensure that effective procedures exist within the intelligence community for evaluating and collating information collected to insure the accomplishment of b) and c) above. (Without proper evaluation in the past, information pertaining to personnel not readily identified was not made available to the appropriate agencies.)

/s/ Ralph N. Clough  
Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs  
Department of State Prisoner Officer

/s/ James L. Monroe  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF,  
Department of Defense Prisoner Officer

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**MINUTES: IAC AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETINGS ON INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT  
ON US CITIZENS HELD IN SINO-SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES  
(4 May 1956 and 9 May 1956)**

**MEMBERS ATTENDING:**

Department of Defense	Lt Col James Monroe, Chairman
Department of State	Mr. George A. Pope
Central Intelligence Agency	[Redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Mr. M. W. Kuhrtz (4 May only)
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS	Capt C. H. White (4 May only)
Department of the Army	Lt Col M. J. Hagood (Acting Secy)
Department of the Navy	Cdr O. O. Liebechner
Department of the Air Force	Maj O. H. Michelson (acting)

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**OTHER REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT:**

**STATE:** Mr. A. C. Donaldson, Director, Office of Special Consular Services, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

Mr. George Haselton, DD, SCS/SCA

Miss Nina Glover, Specialist, SCS/SCA

Mr. R. N. Clough, POW Officer & DD, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. J. P. Nagoski, Chief, International Relations Branch, CA/TE

Mr. W. A. Crawford, DD, Office of Eastern European Affairs

**NAVY:** Maj A. E. James, OACoFS, G-2 HQ USMC

Capt J. A. Weatherspoon, HQ USMC

CWO E. H. Karr, HQ USMC

1. The minutes of the 20 April meeting were read by the acting secretary for that meeting (Mr. Nagoski, Department of State), and approved by the committee, with a change in the last line each of paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c) to read "American civilians detained in Communist countries," and "Americans detained in Communist countries," respectively.

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2. In the course of presentations and discussion, the committee considered the point raised in the first meeting (as stated in para 3(a) of the minutes of that meeting). The committee agreed not to broaden the scope of its study, at this time, to cover the acquisition and processing of information on all Americans in Communist countries. The committee did, however, agree to inclusion of individuals detained through denial of exit visas and other means as well as those held as prisoners.

3. During the remainder of both meetings the committee heard and discussed reports from members, on policies and procedures within their respective agencies for collection, production and dissemination of intelligence identifying and/or locating Americans believed to be detained in Communist countries, as basis for intelligence support of repatriation action.

a. Through reports from three offices within Department of State, by Mr. Haggaki, Mr. Crawford and Miss Glover, the following points on State policy and procedures were brought out in the first meeting and further clarified in the second meeting.

(1) The problem is simpler with respect to individuals detained in Communist China than with those detained in Eastern European Countries and the USSR, because of the short period of time the problem with respect to China has existed, the closeness of contact that prevailed between Americans in China, and the small residual number now being detained in this area. Collection and evaluation of information on detained personnel, and recommendation of repatriation action supported by accurate, timely intelligence can therefore be produced at operational (desk) level, in addition to other duties, without formal, centralized organization for this purpose within CA/EE Bureau, or assistance outside the Bureau in the form of a specific collection plan and centralized collation, evaluation and "feed-back" elsewhere within the Department.

(2) In the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, a card file system has been established to simplify collation of information of long standing complexity with respect to this area. Information on detained personnel is routinely received, collated, evaluated and recorded at the operational (desk or branch) level, and reports obviously of interest to other offices, within or outside the Department of State, are disseminated to them. Responsibility for developing intelligence support of repatriation action on individuals detained in the Eastern European satellites and the USSR, however, is shared with several other bureaus and offices within the Department. Intelligence support with respect to this area could possibly be improved either by centralized responsibility for collection, production and dissemination within this one bureau, or elsewhere within the Department with respect to all Communist countries.

(3) With respect to the intelligence support problem, the Office of Special Consular Services, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, is both a source and a channel for information of interest to area desks and branches within Department of State, and to other offices within Department of Defense, the FBI and other agencies. It is not, however, currently charged with or organized for centralized development of the intelligence support on detained personnel required within the Department on civilian or military personnel.

(4) The Department of State Prisoner Officer is basically Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. His responsibilities relating to prisoners are limited to those held in Communist China.

(5) The intelligence component of the Department of State is not charged with or organized to perform the centralized function of developing intelligence research support in this field, but maintains intelligence collection liaison thereon with CIA, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force and other source or user agencies as called upon.

b. The representative of the Joint Intelligence Group (JCS), Capt White, reported that, although the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, had expressed a specific interest and concern in this problem, the Joint Staff is a policy, plans and guidance organization, and neither a collector, producer or user of the intelligence required in support of repatriation operations.

c. The Army representative (OACSI), Lt Col Hagood, reported as follows:

(1) Under the Missing Persons Act and the National Defense Act, Army policy, directives, and organization provide adequately for development of information to support casualty status determination, and security requirements with respect to disappearance, detention or defection of Army military and civilian personnel. Within the Army, two types of Interrogation Guides are designed also to foster collection of the type of data which would be useful in producing intelligence support for repatriation of detained US nationals.

(2) No office within the OACSI or the Army, however, is charged with or organized for centralized collection, production, dissemination, liaison and "feed-back" to field-collection media, with respect to this aspect of intelligence. Such estimates on individuals, or collations on groups of detained personnel as are currently produced, are either incidental to established casualty or security determination objectives, or else in response to occasional, one-time, spot requirements placed on the Army Headquarters.

d. The Navy representative (ONI), Commander Liebchner, reported that although there is a limited flow of information bearing on detained Navy personnel there is no established requirement or procedure for processing such information except in support of casualty determinations. Two alphabetical files on missing personnel are maintained, however, for other than casualty information purposes, one for future reference in security determinations and the other for future reference in connection with possible identification, location and repatriation of personnel missing in connection with Korean operations. Representatives of HQ Marine Corps, Maj James and Capt Weatherspoon, added to the Navy report that except in support of casualty determinations the Marine Corps is dependent on ONI for finished intelligence.

e. The Air Force representative (AFGIN) Maj Michelson, reported an active collection effort, through Air Intelligence Service Squadrons in the Far East and Europe, and similar policy, organization and procedure for casualty and security determination objectives to those reported by the Army. Currently the development of identification and location of detained Air Force personnel

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as basis for repatriation action is considered by AFOIN to be a personnel action rather than an intelligence function. As a result, although field organizations are processing information available, on local initiative, there is in the Air Force, as in Army and Navy, no centralized organization and procedure for collection, production and generation of new intelligence requirements to support repatriation action.

2. The FBI representative, Mr. Kuhrtz, was not present 9 May 1956 to make a report. The FBI, however, is not a primary source or user in this field, except with respect to data in support of security conclusions.

3. The CIA representative, [redacted] reported and reiterated that basically the machinery to collect, produce, and make available better intelligence in this field, already exists. What is required is activating the machinery by spelling out requirements, and keeping the machinery operating through some agreed means for centralized coordination. 25X1

4. The Chairman summarized the analysis of the committee in two points and one recommendation.

a. Five (5) major agencies (State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force) are concerned with identification and location information or intelligence on detained US nationals for three reasons, security conclusions, casualty determination, and recovery or repatriation action, but there is inadequate centralized or coordinated activity to meet the problem, particularly with respect to recovery or repatriation.

b. The Department of Defense can, on an ad hoc basis, provide a focal point for support of repatriation action on specific military individuals or groups, and has designated a POW Officer (Lt Col Monroe) for this purpose. The Department of Defense is not the appropriate level or agency, however, to collate or coordinate the intelligence support required for effective repatriation of other military personnel or other detained US nationals.

c. Recommended that an editorial sub-committee, consisting of Lt Col Haggood (Army) and [redacted] (CIA), assisted by the State and Defense Prisoner Officers (Mr. Clough and Lt Col Monroe) draft a report and recommendations to the SAC, for presentation to all members of the ad hoc Committee at its next meeting. 25X1

5. The recommendation of the Chairman was approved by the Committee, which adjourned pending notice of availability of a draft report and recommendations.

6. The next meeting of the Committee is tentatively scheduled for 101400 July, Room 1033, Tempo Building, "M."

[redacted]

Acting Secretary 25X1