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✓ IAC-D-129

Proposed Draft DCID 1/5: Terms of Reference, Watch Committee of the USIB (20 Aug 1958)


IAC-D-130 **Agreed Procedures for U. S. Participation in
NATO Standing Group Intelligence Estimate
(28 Aug 1958)**

IAC-D-131 **Analysis of Bloc Radio and Press Propaganda
(5 Sept 1958) (Limited Distribution)**



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
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IAC-D-132
10 September 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Exploitation of Soviet Long-Range Missile Test Activities

We have been requested to place the attached memorandum, which has been approved by the Critical Collection Problems Committee, on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 16 September. At that time Mr. Amory will also make a brief oral presentation on this matter from background material presently being prepared by various members of the CCPC.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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5 September 1958

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Analysis of Bloc Radio Broadcasts, Newspapers, and Periodicals.

Reference: IAC-M-356, 12 August 1958, Item 2b; IAC-M-357 19 August, Item 1.

Materials Available

1. Radio Broadcasts. These are monitored, translated, and a generous selection printed and disseminated in the FBIS Daily Report. Coverage of Radio Moscow and Radio Peiping is described as "virtually exhaustive"; of Soviet and Chinese Communist regional radio broadcasts, and of East European and Far East Satellite stations, as "selective". The Daily Report is voluminous. Spot items of special interest are rapidly made available by teletype to interested recipients by the FBIS.

2. Newspapers and Periodicals. There is "virtually exhaustive" coverage of the output of TASS and of the New China News Agency. Considerable numbers of Soviet and European Satellite newspapers and periodicals are available; for example the State Department research people receive 39 Soviet newspapers, 97 Soviet journals, 42 Eastern European newspapers, and 127 Eastern European journals. The supply of Chinese Communist printed materials is still comparatively scanty: out of some 800 newspapers

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published in Communist China in 1957 only about 70 were available in Hong Kong on a fairly regular basis, and the FDD reported in July 1957 a list of 18 which it exploited. We are still considerably dependent on radio rebroadcasts of Chinese Communist press materials.

Methods of Analysis

3. It is convenient to distinguish three ways of using these materials:

(a) Ordinary reading by intelligence analysts. This is a rather cavalier designation for what is certainly the principal method of extracting intelligence from these materials. Needless to say, many intelligence analysts spend a good deal of their time in studying, clipping, and filing the contents of newspapers, journals, and the FBIS Daily Report. It is worth remarking, as an example of the esteem in which these materials are held, that IRA's Division of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe considers them to be its most important single source of information.

(b) Research projects - into some particular problem or subject as treated in Bloc radio, newspaper or other published materials,

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past and present. All intelligence analysts do a good deal of this in the course of their work, and indeed the significance of any Bloc utterance can seldom be evaluated properly except in relation to previous Bloc utterances. But there are also various research projects of large scale, such as some of those done by the Rand Corporation or by Russian Research Centers at universities, or by individual scholars. Extensive projects are peculiarly suited to be carried out under the auspices of universities, or by such organizations as Rand.

(c) "Content analysis". This phrase is here loosely used to mean the systematic analysis of radio, newspaper and journalistic materials, day by day, as a full-time and specialized job. More narrowly, "content analysis", or "propaganda analysis", involves the application of special analytical techniques to propaganda and policy materials, by persons who have special training in the study of communications.

Content analysis is conducted at present only by the Radio Propaganda Branch of FBID, where about 15 professionals currently work at the job. This Branch reports its findings in various

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special papers, and regularly in two periodicals - a three-page weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, and a more detailed bi-weekly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS.

General Remarks

4. There would probably be no dissent to the proposition that analysis of the contents of radio broadcasts, newspapers and journals from the Bloc is one of the most vital aspects of intelligence work. It is of peculiar importance in connection with Chinese Communist affairs and Sino-Soviet relations, where other evidences are exceedingly scanty. In the cursory collection of data for this memorandum there appeared a strong, though not wholly unanimous, opinion that a more extensive acquisition and exploitation of Chinese Communist printed materials would be highly profitable to the total intelligence effort.

5. The principal other suggestion that came up in the course of preparing this memorandum appears to be more controversial. This was that a substantially greater effort be allocated to "content analysis" -- not necessarily to content analysis only in its narrowest sense, but rather to the technically skilled study of Bloc propaganda materials by persons whose full-time job this was. In short, that there be an increase

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in the kind of work presently carried on by the Radio Propaganda Branch of FBID. There are strong proponents of this course, and there are others who contend that analysis of propaganda materials is best carried on as a part of the work of regional intelligence specialists, who devote themselves not in the exploitation of one source of information, but rather to the affairs of the country or region whence the information comes.

6. Should the IAC desire to pursue this subject further, it is recommended that the Chairman designate some qualified person to form a small committee, investigate the matter more thoroughly than has been done for this memorandum, and submit recommendations for action.

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IAC-D-130
28 August 1958

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Agreed Procedures for U. S. Participation in NATO

Standing Group Intelligence Estimate

The attached documents setting forth the "Agreed Procedures" for U. S. participation in the NATO Standing Group Intelligence Estimate are forwarded for information.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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TAB A
IAC-D-130

23 August 1958

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Honorable Donald A. Quarles
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Don:

Thank you for your letter of 15 August, transmitting the "Agreed Procedures" for U. S. participation in the NATO Standing Group Intelligence Estimate.

I have approved the statement of understanding and it is returned herewith.

Sincerely,

/s/

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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TAB B
IAC-D-130

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

15 August 1958

Dear Allen:

Attached is a statement of "Agreed Procedures" under which, with the assistance of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, you would support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the execution of their responsibility in regard to the Standing Group Intelligence Estimate. This paper was developed under the guidelines reached at our meeting of 7 March 1958. I am satisfied that it follows those guidelines, and will serve a useful purpose, not only in solving the instant problem of U. S. support to the Standing Group, but also in providing a precedent under which the Intelligence Advisory Committee can advise and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they deem it appropriate, in the execution of their military responsibilities pertaining to their intelligence relationships with the military authorities of other countries. Accordingly I have signed the statement of understanding and am sending it to you for your signature, if you agree with the procedures as set forth.

Upon receipt of your acceptance of the inclosure as the basis for your support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in respect to the Standing Group Estimate, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, as the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will proceed with implementation of that document. As the first step, you may expect a request for comment on draft terms of reference.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

DONALD A. QUARLES
Deputy

Honorable Allen Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

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TAB C
IAC-D-130

AGREED PROCEDURES FOR U. S. PARTICIPATION IN
NATO STANDING GROUP INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

In the preparation of the subject estimate, it is agreed that the following principles and procedures shall govern the relationships between the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)* on the other:

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for prescribing the scope, format and outline of the estimate and for establishing appropriate deadlines for its completion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to final determination of these items.

2. The first draft of the U. S. Position Paper will be prepared by the Joint Staff and shall be reviewed and modified as appropriate by a working group including representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence, of the Department of State, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the military departments. Applicable National Intelligence Estimates, supplemented by contributions from interested agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, shall form the basis for this draft. The draft will then be coordinated with U. S. intelligence agencies in the manner employed for National Intelligence Estimates.

3. The coordinated draft shall be acted upon by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The Estimate as accepted by the IAC shall be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; upon approval by them it shall become the U. S. Position Paper for the guidance of the U. S. representative on such Standing Group body as is designated to prepare the Estimate. Any disagreement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with substantive content of the IAC approved Estimate shall be resolved by direct discussion between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* It is understood that the U. S. Intelligence Board will be substituted herein when it replaces the IAC.

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4. The U. S. representative shall be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He shall be assisted by appropriate representatives of the intelligence agencies concerned. The Director of Central Intelligence may designate an individual to advise and assist the U. S. representative in the work of the latter on the Steering Committee.

5. The draft Standing Group Intelligence Estimate, when completed, shall be transmitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Comments and recommendations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will then be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consideration of comments and recommendations of the IAC and the U. S. representative, Standing Group, NATO, shall take the appropriate further action.

APPROVED:

/s/

Deputy Secretary of Defense

/s/

Director of Central Intelligence

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IAC-D-129
20 August 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Proposed Draft DCID 1/5: Terms of Reference,

Watch Committee of the USIB

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Director, National Indications Center (Tab A) concerning a proposed revision of the terms of reference of the Watch Committee which has been prepared in the light of the new draft NSCID 1. We are also forwarding a draft DCID 1/5 designed to make the necessary changes in and supersede the existing DCID 1/2 of 11 May 1954. In general, changes are indicated by underscoring while the old language appears in parentheses.

2. This proposed DCID 1/5 will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for approval.



JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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TAB A
IAC-D-129
20 August 1958

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25 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Revisions in DCID 1/2

1. An examination of DCID 1/2 has been made and it is the opinion of General Cabell, Chairman of the Watch Committee, and of other members of the Watch Committee, who were consulted on the matter, that no change seems to be required in the language of this directive -- except that when the USIB comes into existence, its name should be substituted for the IAC wherever it occurs, and wherever the term Indications Center appears, National Indications Center should be substituted.

2. This directive has been an ideal charter to work under and four years after its issuance, it still provides adequate room for growth and flexibility.

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

Director

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TAB B
IAC-D-129

20 August 1958

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. (1/2) 1/5

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE (IAC) USIB
(11 May 1954; SECRET)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (6)4e, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 10, a, (1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the (IAC) USIB are hereby established:

Preamble

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action* in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the (IAC) USIB agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions.

A. Name

Watch Committee of the(IAC) USIB

B. Mission

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.

C. Functions

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for the levying upon (IAC) USIB members, and the requesting from other U. S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance warning and for recommending the collection priorities of these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the (IAC) USIB agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against

* Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support of military strategy.

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1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,

2 U.S. allies or their forces,

3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the United States.

3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the (IAC) USIB and other appropriate recipients. In the event of an impending critical situation, (IAC) USIB principals will be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph (6) Ae, NSCID No. 1, will apply.

4. To make recommendations to the (IAC), USIB, or member agencies thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating (IAC) USIB estimative functions.

D. Composition and Organization

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each (IAC) USIB member organization, one of whom will be designated by the DCI, after consultation with the (IAC), USIB, as Chairman for a specified period. The Committee will be supported by (an) the National Indications Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.

2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

E. Duties and Responsibilities

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.

2. Arrange through the (IAC) USIB or the appropriate member thereof for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of (IAC) USIB field intelligence activities confer with the (IAC) USIB and the Watch Committee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelligence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

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3. Arrange with the (IAC) USIB agencies for a systematic screening of all information and intelligence received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the National Indications Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition to the action called for in paragraph (6) of NSCID No. 1) ; an agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.
4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their respective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent information and intelligence is being made available to the National Indications Center.
5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence received from all (IAC) USIB agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission.
6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indication in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.
7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular and special meetings.
8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.
9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch Committee reports.
10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission.
11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically the current and cumulative indications.
12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if desirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assisting effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its mission.
13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the (IAC) USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

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**IAC-D-128
8 August 1958**

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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

[redacted] Intelligence Conference

We are forwarding for information the attached letter from
the [redacted] regarding an intelligence conference
to be held in [redacted] this fall, together with a proposed program
for the conference. Mr. Dulles may discuss this matter informally
at an early IAC meeting.

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JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

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31 July 1958
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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

**SUBJECT : Bureau of the Budget Tabulation of Foreign Positive
Strategic Intelligence Cost Estimates**

Attached is a copy of a letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to Mr. Dulles enclosing a tabulation of this year's foreign, positive, strategic intelligence cost estimates together with comparative summary data for fiscal years 1956 and 1957. As you recall, it was agreed at the IAC meeting on 29 July that a copy of these tabulations should be circulated to each IAC member, and that a working group chaired by the CIA Comptroller should review these data and make recommendations to the IAC with respect to standardizing criteria for the development and presentation of such intelligence cost estimates.

We are distributing one copy of this material to each IAC member on an "Eyes Only" basis. In addition, the CIA Comptroller proposes to make one copy available to each member of the working group.



**JOHN HEIRES
Secretary**

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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

JUN 23 1958

My dear Mr. Dulles:

Enclosed are six copies of this year's foreign, positive, strategic intelligence cost estimates together with comparative summary data for fiscal years 1956 and 1957. The tabulations have been prepared by the Bureau of the Budget for its own use and for use by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities on the basis of estimates submitted by the several departments and agencies engaged in intelligence activities.

Because of the detailed information on covert collection included in the estimates, the Bureau is not distributing copies directly to the individual contributors. Rather, we are again taking the liberty of sending multiple copies to you as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee with the request that you make whatever distribution you deem appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

Maurice H. Stans
Director

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosures

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1. This is the fifth in a series of annual reports prepared by the Bureau of the Budget on estimated foreign, positive, strategic intelligence efforts. Like earlier reports it is subject to a rather wide margin of possible error because the existing budget and accounting structure of the agencies does not permit easy identification of all intelligence activities. The tables represent estimates which cut across a large number of separate appropriations and the data cannot be related directly to actual accounting figures. The precise margin of error, which is most significant in Department of Defense estimates, cannot be determined but it is probably at least 25%, meaning that the real cost of intelligence activity may amount to as much as \$1 billion.
2. Included in this report are summary tables for the past three years which are intended to give some indication of trends in the total intelligence program. During these three years, there has been very little change in the format of the reports and the criteria which served as their base.
3. As is evident, roughly three-fourths of total intelligence costs are borne by the Department of Defense. The non-Defense agencies appear to have achieved a degree of consistency in interpreting the criteria issued by the Bureau of the Budget and their reports over the past three years evidence a high degree of stability. For the Defense agencies, however, quite the contrary is true; here we find large differences in the various reporting categories from year to year, explained presumably on the basis of varying interpretations of the reporting criteria. It is hoped that prior to the call for estimates for FY 1959 more specific guidelines can be agreed upon, so that the consumer in subsequent years will have a greater assurance that each of the service estimates are based on common understandings.
4. For this year's report Army cost and manpower estimates were based on submissions from the various continental armies, operating agencies, and overseas commands, using actual cost data and obligations where available. Navy estimates were based on known commitments for the first half of FY 1958 and then doubling these commitments. They were drawn up entirely in Washington without inquiry from the field. Air Force estimates on the other hand are largely a compilation of field agency submissions which were based on the latest financial plans of the contributors.
5. The Department of the Army has spread the cost of additions to capital equipment into categories 1 through 4, whereas the other services reported these items net of additions to capital equipment.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: First Comparative Evaluation of U. S. -Soviet Capabilities in Selected Weapons Systems

1. The President has now approved an evaluation of air defense radar developments and capabilities as the first to be undertaken under the aegis of the new Comparative Evaluations Group created by the NSC. In general each evaluation is to be completed within three months.

2. The President has also approved the following procedure:

"3 c. The Chairman of the Group should designate one individual to be responsible for each of the studies to be undertaken. (In general, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, should be responsible for (1) collecting and evaluating all available information concerning Soviet capabilities in the particular area selected for study, and (2) designating the foreign intelligence expert or experts most capable in such field. In general, the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, should be responsible for collection of all necessary information concerning U. S. capabilities in the particular area selected for study. Where appropriate, he should call in for consultation other individuals having special competence in the area under study.)"

3. It is my intention to designate the best qualified individuals in the intelligence community, regardless of agency affiliation, to carry out the intelligence portions of the evaluations. For the first study, I propose to designate Lt. General Earl W. Barnes, USAF (Ret.) who has served with WSEG. He would be assisted by a small

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24 July 1958
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group of senior specialists drawn from the intelligence agencies with primary competence in this field.

4. I suggest that we discuss this subject briefly at the IAC meeting on Tuesday 29 July.

/s/
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

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