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\*Army and State Dept. reviews completed\*

300032

S E C R E T

*Returned*  
*25 MAR 92*

14 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief, Historical Review Section, CRB/IP&CRD

SUBJECT:

Follow-Up Coordination of Documents from DCI Record Files, Box 3, Job 85S00362R [92-1]

1. Attached are two additional documents which O/DCI/IRO has asked us to coordinate also with you. Our primary coordination package for DO from this box (eleven documents) was sent to you on 14 January. O/DCI/IRO agrees with our determination for these two, subject to your concurrence. (Please note that [Redacted] name was released in the [Redacted] on 18 pages, and in this specific role-- secretary, IAC--on, e.g., page 9 of Volume III.)

2. Please indicate your concurrence or disagreement on the HRP Cover Sheet.

[Redacted]

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM ATTACHMENTS

S E C R E T

25X1A

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**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET  
IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

SPITZBERGEN

The attached memorandum has been received from General Bolling recommending that an Intelligence Estimate be initiated on "The Prospect of Increased Soviet Activity in the Spitzbergen Area."

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

TOP SECRET  
IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

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300033

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IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence  
Washington 25, D. C.

G2-I

14 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Spitzbergen

1. It is recommended that an Intelligence Estimate be initiated on, "The Prospect of Increased Soviet Activity in the Spitzbergen Area."

2. Reference is made to a memorandum from this office dated 6 November 1950, subject:



25X1

12 February 1951) was made available to interested agencies, and indicated that there was no unusual or widespread Soviet activity in the area.

3. The following, however, are significant factors bearing on the possibility of the U.S.S.R. taking action in the Spitzbergen area in the near future:

a. The strategic location of Spitzbergen, in view of its possible use, either by the U.S.S.R. or the Western Powers, as an air base.

b. The establishment of U.S. security detachment in Iceland.

c. The proposed establishment of other U.S. air bases.

d. The reported Russian activity in the Coles Bay, Spitzbergen, area to prepare for handling of ocean-going ships.

e. Increased activity reported at Bohemanneset, Spitzbergen - a potential Russian airfield site.

f. The possible use of glaciers as landing grounds.

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IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

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IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

g. Suspected overland exploration by the Russians between Coles Bay, Spitzbergen and Billefjord, Spitzbergen in the winter of 1949/50.

h. Russian fishing activity off the coast of Western Spitzbergen in July 1950.

s/ A. R. BOLLING

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IAC-D-5/3  
16 May 1951

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CIA 36107

TOP SECRET  
IAC-D-5  
24 November 1950

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
General Staff, United States Army  
Washington 25, D.C.

G2-PC 904.3

6 Nov 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT:

25X1

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 16 November 1949, dealing with U.S. strategic and intelligence requirements in Spitzbergen, and to Tab "A" attached hereto which reviews the situation in Spitzbergen and the action taken by the State Department subsequent to the circulation of reference memorandum. Tab "A" represents all information available to this office on what action has been taken to date in regard to intelligence on Spitzbergen.

It seems that the whole project has been in a state of deferment following the dispatch of a telegram by the State Department to the United States Ambassador in London (see paragraph 10 of Tab "A").

It is my belief that the strategic importance of Spitzbergen is of sufficient importance to warrant further action. I, therefore, recommend that the subject of Spitzbergen be brought up for discussion by IAC at an early date.

/s/ A. R. Bolling

A. R. BOLLING  
Major General, GSC  
A. C. of S., G-2

1 Incl.  
Tab "A"

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IAC-D-5  
24 November 1950

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IAC-D-3  
13 November 1950

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

YUGOSLAVIA

1. The attached draft terms of reference for a National Estimate on Yugoslavia is a revision of the paper earlier distributed in IAC-D-1/1, as revised by the working staffs and by the IAC. It is issued in this form for ready reference.

2. IAC-D-1/1 should be destroyed since it was not properly numbered. A separate paper on terms of reference for Iran will be distributed at this same time.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-3  
13 November

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SECRET  
IAC-D-3  
13 November 1950

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

YUGOSLAVIA

The Problem:

To estimate the current situation in Yugoslavia and its effect on the world balance of power.

Scope:

This estimate is designed to indicate the importance of the survival of the Tito regime, both from the point of view of the US and of the USSR; to estimate the stability of Tito regime and to analyze current Yugoslav economic difficulties in terms of their effect on this stability, to analyze current Yugoslav economic difficulties in terms of their internal effects, the degree to which they increase Cominform capabilities for the overthrow of Tito, and the extent to which US aid might be successful in maintaining the regime in power.

Suggested Outline:

- I. Importance of non-Stalinist Yugoslavia to the West
  - A. Degree and Dependability of Yugoslav Western orientation
    1. International
    2. Internal
  - B. Military importance
  - C. Salient in Soviet ideological front
  - D. Base for political warfare in Balkans
- II. Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia
- III. Military Situation of Yugoslavia
  - A. Military strength

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13 November 1950

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13 November 1950

- B. Ability to withstand satellite attack
  - C. Ability to withstand Soviet attack
- IV. Stability of the Tito regime under the impact of the current economic crisis.
- A. What are the Tito regime's internal difficulties (considered without regard to Cominform exploitation or Western aid)?
    - 1. Was disaffection with the Tito government widespread or serious before the drought?
    - 2. To what extent has it increased?
    - 3. Is this discontent generally expressed in terms of the Communist nature of the regime? Its oppressive and dictatorial nature? Its policy of opposition to the Cominform? The desire on the part of Yugoslav groups for return of a former regime?
    - 4. Apart from aid or intervention, would Tito have the necessary strength to control popular discontent during the period of economic stress?
  - B. What are the prospects for attempts on the part of the Cominform to exploit the current situation for changing the alignment of the Tito regime or overthrowing it?
    - 1. What possibilities are there for an accommodation between the Tito regime and the Cominform?
    - 2. To what extent are the Yugoslav people--or any influential group in Yugoslavia--susceptible to Cominform propaganda claims? for example, that economic conditions would be better if Yugoslavia return to the Soviet fold? that Tito is doomed in any case and, therefore, prudence would dictate individual opposition to Tito? that Tito is selling Yugoslavia out to Western Capitalist-Imperialists?
    - 3. Is Tito so weakened that Cominform-directed guerrilla activities or other forms of subversive or quasi-military activity would promise success?

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13 November 1950

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13 November 1950

4. Is the current situation in Yugoslavia sufficiently unstable to encourage direct military action by the USSR? or by the Soviet Satellites bordering on Yugoslavia?
- C. What US aid would be required to maintain the Tito regime?
1. What is the scope and character of US economic aid needed to tide the Tito government over until Yugoslav economic conditions improve?
  2. Given relief from drought conditions in 1951, how long is it likely to be before Yugoslavia will cease to need US aid?
  3. To what extent can US aid be exploited for:
    - a. procuring intelligence?
    - b. developing a base for covert anti-Soviet operations?
    - c. weakening any Yugoslav tendencies toward accommodation with the Cominform?
    - d. improving long-term US relations with Yugoslavia?

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IAC-D-3

13 November 1950

**SECRET**

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IAC-D-4  
14 November 1950

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

IRAN

1. The attached draft terms of reference for a National Estimate on Iran is a revision of the paper earlier distributed in IAC-D-1/1, as revised by the working staffs and by the IAC. It is issued in this form for ready reference.

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JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-4  
14 November 1950

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IAC-D-4

14 November 1950

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

IRAN

The Problem:

To estimate the current position of Iran in the world balance of power.

Scope:

This estimate is designed to answer the following broad questions relating to the current position of Iran --

What is the strategic importance of IRAN to the US and its allies? to the USSR?

What are the scope and character of possible Soviet measures designed to gain influence or control over Iran?

What are the prospects for Iranian resistance to those Soviet measures?

What deficiencies essential to the maintenance of the stability and security of Iran must be met by the US and its allies?

*Continued U.N. program?*

Suggested Outline:

I. The Basic Factors Underlying Iran's Position.

*Basic weaknesses of Iran's position*

A. Soviet Pressure.

1. Open political, economic, and military pressure.
2. Subversive activities and covert penetration.

B. Iranian Reaction.

1. Internal reforms.
2. Aid from the West.

C. US Program in Iran.

1. Character and purpose.

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IAC-D-4

14 November 1950

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
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TAC-D-4

14 November 1950

- 2. Results to date.
- 3. Prospects.



II. Current Situation in Iran.

- A. Internal.
- B. Foreign Relations.

III. Effect on US Security Interests <sup>in Iran</sup> of:

A. On the Assumption of a continuation of "Cold War":

- 1. Current Alignment of Iran.
- 2. Alignment with the USSR as result of political or subversive pressures.

*economic (recent trade agreement)*

B. On the Assumption of an Outbreak of Hostilities:

- 1. Allied or aligned with US.
- 2. Neutral.
- 3. Allied or aligned with USSR.

IV. Probable Position and International Alignment of Iran through 1951.

A. On the Assumption of a Continuation of "Cold War":

- 1. In event legitimate Iranian government retains control of country, US continues programmed aid, and USSR takes no direct military action against Iran.
- 2. In event Soviet-supported elements gain control of:
  - a. Limited areas in Iran.
  - b. Central government.

B. On the Assumption of an Outbreak of Hostilities:

- 1. Direct Soviet military action against Iran, presumably under Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921,

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TAC-D-4

14 November 1950

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- without general war --
- a. In event of Western direct military aid to Iran.
  - b. In absence of Western military aid to Iran.
2. Direct Soviet military action against Iran as part of general war --
- a. In event of Western direct military aid to Iran.
  - b. In event Western military aid to Iran limited to air operations.
  - c. In absence of Western direct military aid to Iran.

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IAC-D-4

14 November 1950

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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1 February 1952

REGULATION OF TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS  
IN THE UNITED STATES

At the request of the Department of State the attached proposal for regulation of travel of Soviet officials in the United States is circulated for the consideration and concurrence of the IAC. It will be considered at the meeting on February 7.

JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

REGULATION OF TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS  
IN THE UNITED STATES

1. On January 15 the Soviet Government greatly increased its previous travel restrictions on American officials in the USSR. The history and nature of these restrictions, which have existed since 1941, are described in TAB A.

2. The Department of State considers that the time has now come to regulate the travel of Soviet officials in the United States not on a security basis but solely on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment accorded to official representatives of each government by the receiving state. The suggested method of application of this regulation is set forth in a draft note to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, which forms TAB B of this memorandum. Our regulation will apply only to Soviet official personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, to Soviet newspaper correspondents whose place of work is Washington and to Soviet personnel of Amtorg in New York.

3. Although the proposed regulation of the travel of Soviet personnel in the United States is less onerous than the restrictions applied to American officials in the USSR, the Department has drafted the proposed note with the purpose of maintaining a flexible position which would enable us to forbid a proposed journey by a Soviet official, if such were thought expedient in the light of Soviet restrictive practices on our official personnel in Moscow. Ambassador-designate Kennan has approved this proposed procedure and has expressed the desire to be given the authority, if the occasion arises after his arrival in the Soviet Union, to inform Soviet authorities that a relaxation in Soviet travel restrictions will be met by a relaxation in the regulation of travel placed by this Government on Soviet official personnel in Washington.

4. The Department has informed the United States Deputy on the NATO Council of Deputies in London of this proposed action and has instructed him to inform his colleagues of the measure being contemplated. He has been instructed to say that while a final United States Government position has not yet been reached, we would like to obtain from the other Deputies an expression of the views of their governments whether they intend to regulate the travel of Soviet official personnel in their respective countries. However, our final action will not be dependent upon any discussion or decision by the NATO Council of Deputies.

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1 February 1952

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Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

5. Secretary Acheson has approved of the procedure for regulating the travel of Soviet official personnel in the United States as outlined above. It is desired, however, to have the comments of other interested government agencies and their concurrence in the action finally taken.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS PLACED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
ON AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN THE USSR

1. Travel restrictions were first placed upon American officials as well as other foreign representatives in the USSR by a circular note from the Soviet Foreign Office to foreign missions in Moscow dated May 16, 1941. The Soviet note declared travel to certain points and localities prohibited and established a procedure under which travel on the territory of the USSR by members of foreign embassies, legations and consulates may take place "only on condition that such persons previously inform appropriate organs of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Peoples Commissariat for Defense and Peoples Commissariat for Navy with regard to trips planned, indicating itinerary, points of stopover and length of travel so that such trips may be registered by above-mentioned organs."

2. On June 7, 1941 the United States imposed retaliatory restrictions which required Soviet officials in this country to secure permits for travel more than 100 miles outside of Washington, (and 50 miles outside of New York and San Francisco). These retaliatory restrictions were withdrawn shortly after the German attack on the USSR.

3. The Soviet regulations were not officially withdrawn although application of the provisions was relaxed for a short time at the end of the war. By 1947 it had become evident that the Soviet authorities were actively hindering the movements of official American personnel outside of Moscow. In the summer of 1948 the hindrances were extended to automobile travel only a short distance from Moscow.

4. On September 30, 1948, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the American Embassy and other foreign missions at Moscow that the 1941 restrictions were still in effect and added a new and greatly expanded list of localities closed to travel by members of the staffs of foreign missions. Under the 1948 procedure, however, foreign officials were required to give the Soviet Foreign Office (military personnel - the Foreign Liaison Section of the Ministry of Armed Forces) 48 hours advance notice of their intention to travel more than 50 kilometers outside of Moscow. Beyond this 50 kilometer zone travel was permitted only by public carrier except to three points of historic interest near the city. Even within this 50 kilometer perimeter certain areas were forbidden for travel, with the result that automobile travel to the 50 kilometer limit was possible on only four highways.

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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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Security Information

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1 February 1952

5. In general, the border areas, the Central Asian Republics, the Caucasus region with the exception of Tiflis, the Baltic States, and the Western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia, including the capital cities of Kiev and Minsk were placed within the zones prohibited to foreign officials. Although most of the Siberian area was left technically "free", in practice it was greatly restricted owing to the fact that the important cities are forbidden areas and therefore there are no facilities available for foreign visitors.

6. On January 15, 1952, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prohibited 22 additional cities of the USSR to foreigners and reduced the zone around Moscow from 50 to 40 kilometers from the center of the city. In addition, several more districts within the 40 kilometer limit were placed on the prohibited list, thus reducing to a great extent the number of places to which foreign officials may travel in the USSR or in the Moscow area. It is noteworthy that the great majority of the new prohibited localities are those which American and other foreign officials have visited most frequently since 1948.

7. At present about 80 percent of Soviet territory is closed to American officials. In addition to the forbidden zones, the Soviet Government denies access to other technically "free" areas by exercising administrative control over the limited facilities for travelers and by prohibiting access to large urban centers which are necessary transit points to reach surrounding areas. Thus by its latest move of adding 22 cities to the prohibited list, the Soviet Government has been able to close to American and foreign officials a large proportion of the localities to which they have traveled in recent years. In practice, all of the USSR is now closed to foreign officials except a small portion of European Russia and of the Caucasus region, including Tiflis.

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CONFIDENTIAL

IAC-D-2/1

1 February 1952

TAB B

CONFIDENTIAL  
Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

1. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to invite the Ambassador's attention to note No. 46/PR of January 15, 1952, note No. 1130/PR of September 30, 1948, and the note verbale dated May 16 1941, addressed to the United States Embassy at Moscow by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the effect of which has been to restrict the travel in the Soviet Union of American diplomatic and consular officers, as well as of the other members of the staff of the American Embassy at Moscow.

2. In view of the restrictions which have been placed upon the travel of American diplomatic and consular representatives and employees in the Soviet Union, the Government of the United States, on the basis of reciprocity, is constrained to regulate the travel of Soviet personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, Soviet representatives of the official Soviet news agency, Tass, or Soviet representatives of other publicity media who are assigned for duty in Washington and Soviet official personnel assigned to Amtorg in New York. Effective immediately Soviet official personnel of the Embassy in Washington, Tass representatives and others who are Soviet citizens assigned for newspaper work in Washington are required not to travel to any point more than 25 miles distant from the center of Washington without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance. Soviet official personnel assigned to Amtorg shall not travel to any point more than 25 miles distant from the center of New York City without previous official notification at least 48 hours in advance.

3. In the case of Soviet civilian officials, the notification should be addressed to the Department of State, and in the case of Soviet military personnel to the Department of Defense. Notification should contain the name of each traveler, complete and detailed information concerning his projected travel, including itinerary, points of stopover, and duration of journey.

4. The United States Government observes that by reason of the action of the Soviet Government in restricting the travel of United States official personnel in the USSR, it is compelled on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment of official representatives similarly to regulate Soviet official personnel. At the same time the United States Government states it is prepared to re-examine the question of travel regulations in the light of the treatment accorded United States official representatives in the Soviet Union.

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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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1 February 1952

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS PLACED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
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2. On June 7, 1941 the United States imposed retaliatory restrictions which required Soviet officials in this country to secure permits for travel more than 100 miles outside of Washington, (and 50 miles outside of New York and San Francisco). These retaliatory restrictions were withdrawn shortly after the German attack on the USSR.

3. The Soviet regulations were not officially withdrawn although application of the provisions was relaxed for a short time at the end of the war. By 1947 it had become evident that the Soviet authorities were actively hindering the movements of official American personnel outside of Moscow. In the summer of 1948 the hindrances were extended to automobile travel only a short distance from Moscow.

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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

5. Secretary Acheson has approved of the procedure for regulating the travel of Soviet official personnel in the United States as outlined above. It is desired, however, to have the comments of other interested government agencies and their concurrence in the action finally taken.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952



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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

5. In general, the border areas, the Central Asian Republics, the Caucasus region with the exception of Tiflis, the Baltic States, and the Western areas of the Ukraine and Belorussia, including the capital cities of Kiev and Minsk were placed within the zones prohibited to foreign officials. Although most of the Siberian area was left technically "free", in practice it was greatly restricted owing to the fact that the important cities are forbidden areas and therefore there are no facilities available for foreign visitors.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

CONFIDENTIAL  
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IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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Security Information

IAC-D-2/1

1 February 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

1 February 1952

REGULATION OF TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS  
IN THE UNITED STATES

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JAMES Q. REBER  
Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

CONFIDENTIAL

IAC-D-2/1

1 February 1952

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CONFIDENTIAL  
Security Information  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

REGULATION OF TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS  
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1. On January 15 the Soviet Government greatly increased its previous travel restrictions on American officials in the USSR. The history and nature of these restrictions, which have existed since 1941, are described in TAB A.

2. The Department of State considers that the time has now come to regulate the travel of Soviet officials in the United States not on a security basis but solely on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment accorded to official representatives of each government by the receiving state. The suggested method of application of this regulation is set forth in a draft note to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, which forms TAB B of this memorandum. Our regulation will apply only to Soviet official personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, to Soviet newspaper correspondents whose place of work is Washington and to Soviet personnel of Amtorg in New York.

3. Although the proposed regulation of the travel of Soviet personnel in the United States is less onerous than the restrictions applied to American officials in the USSR, the Department has drafted the proposed note with the purpose of maintaining a flexible position which would enable us to forbid a proposed journey by a Soviet official, if such were thought expedient in the light of Soviet restrictive practices on our official personnel in Moscow. Ambassador-designate Kennan has approved this proposed procedure and has expressed the desire to be given the authority, if the occasion arises after his arrival in the Soviet Union, to inform Soviet authorities that a relaxation in Soviet travel restrictions will be met by a relaxation in the regulation of travel placed by this Government on Soviet official personnel in Washington.

4. The Department has informed the United States Deputy on the NATO Council of Deputies in London of this proposed action and has instructed him to inform his colleagues of the measure being contemplated. He has been instructed to say that while a final United States Government position has not yet been reached, we would like to obtain from the other Deputies an expression of the views of their governments whether they intend to regulate the travel of Soviet official personnel in their respective countries. However, our final action will not be dependent upon any discussion or decision by the NATO Council of Deputies.

CONFIDENTIAL  
IAC-D-2/1  
1 February 1952

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