



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~



# **El Salvador: Guerrilla Capabilities and Prospects Over the Next Two Years**



25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

~~Top Secret~~

ALA 84-10104C

October 1984

Copy

131

25X1

**Page Denied**



Directorate of Intelligence

Top Secret



25X1

# El Salvador: Guerrilla Capabilities and Prospects Over the Next Two Years



25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Major contributions were made by [redacted] the Analytic Support Group; [redacted] Office of Central Reference; and [redacted] Office of Global Issues. Basic data on guerrilla performance, force structure, and arms flows were provided by the Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) in the Department of Defense. This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA, on [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



Top Secret

ALA 84-10104C

October 1984

25X1

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

**El Salvador: Guerrilla Capabilities and Prospects Over the Next Two Years**



25X1

**Key Judgments**

*Information available as of 21 September 1984 was used in this report.*

The election of the Duarte government and the increasing aggressiveness of the Salvadoran military have put the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) on the defensive, but we believe the insurgents will continue to pose a serious challenge to the government for the next two years at least. The guerrillas remain strong enough to regain the initiative for short periods. Nonetheless, we believe declining popular support, internal factionalism, and shortages of ammunition and other basic supplies will prevent them from carrying out a sustained offensive against the government or shifting the military balance decisively in their favor in the next two years. This assessment assumes continued US support for the Salvadoran Government, at least at present levels.

We believe the guerrillas' planned fall offensive—if it occurs—is unlikely to alter the military balance. A statistical analysis of guerrilla-initiated actions since 1981 shows that military activity has not increased since mid-1982, but that the proportion of guerrilla incidents involving civilian targets has grown considerably in recent years. This suggests that serious problems within the insurgent movement are inhibiting military progress and forcing the guerrillas to prey increasingly on the civilian population.

the guerrillas perceive that such problems preclude them from launching a general offensive with any realistic expectation of overthrowing the government.

25X1

25X1

they hope instead to mount at least a few "spectacular" attacks on important military and economic targets in order to erode Salvadoran military morale and US public support for the Reagan administration's policy in El Salvador.

25X1

Some of the more serious problems confronting the guerrillas are:

- Shortages of food, medicine, and clothing, which have hurt morale and spurred many recent recruits to defect. Such shortages have led to a dramatic increase in robberies and kidnappings this year, and they could tightly constrain efforts to increase force levels.
- The FMLN's inability to broaden popular support, which has impaired guerrilla performance and undercut the FMLN's potential. Even in areas dominated by the major factions, the FMLN has failed to provide goods, services, and security to potential supporters. Moreover, forced recruitment, constant harassment, and the expropriation of foodstuffs and other basic necessities have alienated much of the population.



Top Secret

ALA 84-10104C

October 1984



25X1

25X1

25X1



Top Secret



- Fundamental differences in ideology and policy as well as personal rivalries, which continue to plague the alliance despite some progress toward better coordination of guerrilla military operations.
- The FMLN's vulnerability to reductions in foreign assistance, which has been underscored by several developments during the past year.   Nicaragua and Cuba have considered—but not yet implemented—cuts in their assistance and that other foreign countries and some humanitarian organizations have reduced their funding and political support. Although the guerrillas probably can come close to maintaining current arms inventories by capturing weapons from the Salvadoran military, we believe they will continue to depend on external suppliers for most of their ammunition, communications support, and substantial amounts of food and other supplies.

25X1

25X1

Despite these constraints, guerrilla combat effectiveness is high, communications are sophisticated, and the FMLN's ability to collect and disseminate intelligence on the armed forces is excellent. The FMLN has kept 9,000 to 11,000 guerrillas and militia in the field for over three years, during which time the number of well-armed, well-trained, and combat-experienced fighters has climbed steadily to between 6,000 and 8,000.   despite harsh living conditions, the bulk of the insurgents continue to exhibit great tenacity and an abiding commitment to the guerrilla struggle.

25X1

25X1

Taking these factors into account, we believe the FMLN will continue to pose a substantial military threat to the Duarte government, although it probably will experience some degradation in its overall capabilities during the next two years. We judge the most likely guerrilla scenario will see total force strength dropping by 1,000 to 3,000, and greater emphasis placed on urban operations and terrorism. Insurgent activity probably will increase in western El Salvador, if only to relieve pressure on FMLN forces and supply corridors elsewhere in the country.

Top Secret



25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

Even if guerrilla degradation is more rapid than we presently foresee and circumstances strongly favor government initiatives, we doubt that insurgent force levels would drop by more than half in the next two years. Several thousand insurgents have now spent a minimum of two years in the field and seem likely to persist even under extremely adverse circumstances. Havana and Managua might decide to reduce aid but probably could provide enough assistance to sustain at least 6,000 experienced combatants. We believe such a hard core of well-armed, combat-experienced guerrillas operating mostly from traditional strongholds along the Honduran border would continue to pose major problems for the government. Insurgent base areas in the west and, to a lesser extent, in southeastern El Salvador would be far more vulnerable to government operations.

Should trends unexpectedly favor the guerrillas during the next two years, we judge that logistic constraints and their small popular base would still prevent the FMLN from achieving a final military victory. The guerrillas probably could field a few thousand more combatants, but they would be confronting a Salvadoran military that would be over three times their size and more than their match if equipped at present levels. The guerrillas most likely would expand operations in urban areas and western El Salvador, while consolidating their position in the east. Cuba and Nicaragua probably would accelerate assistance under these circumstances in an effort to help the FMLN cement its gains.

The guerrillas will watch the US election closely and probably reassess their strategy in late 1984. Whether they decide to emphasize a two-pronged negotiate-and-fight strategy or opt primarily for a military approach will depend largely on their reading of the next administration's willingness to make concessions.



25X1



**Top Secret**



25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Scope Note	ix
Introduction	1
Shifting Guerrilla Strategy	1
Force Development and Capabilities	3
Key Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities	4
Basic Needs	4
Popular Support	4
Factionalism	7
Foreign Assistance	9
The Performance Record	11
Projecting Near-Term Capabilities	14
Most Likely Outcome	15
Substantial Guerrilla Decline	16
The Guerrillas Regain Momentum	16
Guerrilla Intentions and Implications for the United States	17
A Fall Offensive	17
Insurgent Strategy Beyond the US Election	18

**Appendixes**

A.	The FMLN's Five and One-Half Factions	21
B.	Factionalism: A Chronic Problem	25
C.	FMLN Force Capabilities	29
D.	Guerrilla Weapons Inventory	35
E.	External Assistance: The Cuba-Nicaragua Pipeline	37
F.	Methodology for Tracking Guerrilla Performance	43

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Top Secret**



25X1

**Scope Note**


This assessment examines current guerrilla strengths and weaknesses and the likely course of insurgent activity and strategy over the next year or two. The paper does not systematically compare the performance of the guerrillas against the Salvadoran military, although it identifies tensions within, and between, the Salvadoran Government and the military as a key factor in projecting guerrilla prospects.



25X1



**Top Secret**



25X1


25X1



Top Secret

25X1

Figure 1  
Guerrilla Operating Areas



703235 10-84

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

x

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

### El Salvador: Guerrilla Capabilities and Prospects Over the Next Two Years



25X1

#### Introduction

Since the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was founded in 1980, the tactical initiative in the guerrilla war has shifted periodically from one side to the other. During the past year, however, problems within guerrilla ranks and the improved performance of the Salvadoran military have kept the guerrillas on the defensive.

FMLN leaders have had difficulty developing a cohesive, long-term strategy and coping with declining popular support, internal factionalism, and supply shortages. Nevertheless, the FMLN remains a formidable foe, and its top leaders recognize the need to launch another offensive to restore military credibility. This paper examines current insurgent capabilities, explores to what extent and under what conditions the military balance could shift in the next two years, and assesses the implications for the United States.

The Salvadoran military's success in foiling guerrilla efforts to disrupt the 1982 election, however, deflated insurgent morale and prospects. Apparently recognizing that Salvadoran military capabilities were improving and that popular support was insufficient to achieve a quick victory, the FMLN opted for a war of attrition—emphasizing attacks on the nation's economic fabric while seeking simultaneously to negotiate a power-sharing agreement. During this third phase, relatively low levels of US aid and political infighting at senior levels in the Salvadoran military and government worked to the guerrillas' advantage, and a stalemate resulted.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The fourth phase of guerrilla operations began with a major offensive in the fall of 1983. It was marked by increasingly larger and better coordinated operations by both sides. The FMLN attacked key strategic targets and large military units, such as the light infantry hunter battalions. This strategy brought the guerrillas two spectacular successes when on 30 December 1983 they destroyed a major bridge and overran a large military garrison.

25X1

25X1

#### Shifting Guerrilla Strategy

The guerrillas have adopted four different approaches to the war, depending on their capabilities at the time and their expectations of success. From 1979 to 1981, the guerrillas conducted mostly isolated, uncoordinated attacks involving small numbers of fighters. At the same time, they worked to build a military organization and develop broad popular support, especially in the labor movement, the universities, and urban centers. This phase, which was aimed at inciting a Nicaragua-style insurrection, culminated in the unsuccessful "final offensive" in January 1981.

Insurgent hopes to build on these victories and regain momentum, however, were dashed in March and May of this year when the Salvadoran military kept the guerrillas from seriously disrupting the elections, enabling over 80 percent of the Salvadoran electorate to go to the polls.

25X1

25X1

the guerrillas were unable to agree on a basic strategy for the elections campaign, and that they now are in search of a new strategic plan. Meanwhile, most insurgent leaders continue to stress the importance of concentrating their forces to attack key economic and military targets in order to undermine military morale and press the Duarte government to negotiate. Some also want to concentrate more heavily on the earlier strategy of establishing front groups among labor, students, and the masses, and promoting urban terrorism.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The second phase, which lasted until the March 1982 assembly election, took the war to the countryside. The number of people involved in guerrilla attack units grew from tens to often hundreds, and coordinated tactical planning became the rule.

many guerrilla leaders believed that by expanding the war in this way they could achieve sufficient momentum to shift the military and political balance decisively in their favor.

25X1

25X1



Top Secret



25X1

25X1


Top Secret

25X1

**Figure 2**  
**Components of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)**

**Force Strengths**

Total, September 1984=9,000-11,000

**Faction****Main Operating Areas<sup>a</sup>****Remarks**

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Eastern Front	Most active militarily; operates relatively independently of other factions.
Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)	Northern, Central, and Paracentral Fronts	Dominant group until top leaders murdered in early 1983.
Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)	Central and Paracentral Fronts	Military arm of Communist Party; forces becoming increasingly integrated into FPL.
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)	Central and Paracentral Fronts	Least doctrinaire; also cooperating more closely with FPL.
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)	Paracentral and Eastern Fronts	Least influential; emphasis on urban operations.
Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR)	San Salvador	Small urban terrorist group that split from FPL in late 1983; not a recognized FMLN faction.

<sup>a</sup> The five factions that comprise the FMLN are organized into five geographic fronts (see Figure 1).

303705 (C00410) 10-84

25X1

A guerrilla document captured in June 1984 typifies the recurrent themes in FMLN documents and communications and provides insight into how the insurgents view their capabilities and the task ahead. The document—a September 1983 report of a plenary session of the Revolutionary Council of the FPL (figure 2)—details the goals and objectives that reflect the four basic pillars of guerrilla strategy:<sup>1</sup>

- **Intensification of the armed struggle.** Guerrilla forces need to be increased and strengthened, their areas of operations expanded, and the level of conflict raised.

<sup>1</sup> An overview of each faction of the FMLN, including its historical roots, political orientation, military structure, and leadership is presented in appendix A.

- **Unity.** Coordination and cooperation among the five military factions must be improved, and the creation of a single Marxist-Leninist party with its own political front organization is a key task.
- **Development of Popular Support.** A broad social base must be developed, organized, and consolidated, focusing special attention on the “worker-farmer alliance” and the labor sector.
- **Diplomatic/Political Initiatives.** Ties to Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union should be strengthened, while diplomacy and propaganda should be used to break down the ranks of the enemy and discredit the US and Salvadoran Governments; negotiations and dialogue must be encouraged as a means of achieving power and reducing the chances of armed US intervention.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret


2

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Figure 3  
El Salvador: Guerrilla Force Levels,  
1978 to 1984



303706 (C00409) 9-84

**Force Development and Capabilities**

The total number of guerrilla and militia forces grew from about 2,000 in 1978 to some 10,000 in 1982 (figure 3).<sup>2</sup> Since then, force levels have remained fairly constant, totaling from 9,000 to 11,000 insurgents. However, the proportion of this force that is well-armed, well-trained, and combat-experienced has increased markedly. This rise is attributable mostly to the fuller integration of militia forces into combat units and the acquisition through capture and sustained infiltration in 1982 and 1983 of enough modern weapons—mostly automatic rifles—to arm all combatants.

[Redacted]

We estimate that the FMLN has impressed as many as 3,000

<sup>2</sup> Appendix B deals with factionalism among and within the guerrilla forces, and a detailed discussion of guerrilla capabilities and recent trends in force development appears in appendix C.

people—mostly youths—into their ranks in 1984, but that at least an equivalent number have defected, been captured, or died in combat.

[Redacted]

We believe that large numbers of insurgents also have deserted but not turned themselves over to Salvadoran authorities.

[Redacted]

During the past five years, the FMLN has developed a highly mobile and well-ordered force structure.

Despite harsh living conditions,

[Redacted]

most guerrillas continue to demonstrate great tenacity and an abiding commitment to the guerrilla struggle. Although there are occasional reports of poor treatment by unit commanders, guerrilla leaders in the field generally fight alongside and command the respect of their forces.

[Redacted]

We judge the combat effectiveness of the guerrilla forces to be high. Tactical war-fighting doctrine appears sound and the flexibility and mobility of battlefield units allow them to be deployed efficiently. Increased Salvadoran military patrolling and sweep activity have kept the guerrillas off balance throughout much of this year, but the guerrillas still dictate the terms and pace of most tactical encounters and are able to avoid major engagements except at times and places of their choosing.

The guerrillas are well-armed with a variety of mostly Western-manufactured light-infantry and crew-served weapons.<sup>3</sup>

[Redacted]

about 70 percent of the FARN's 500 to 600 combatants in the Guazapa Front had M-16 rifles. Although the guerrillas have captured over 5,000 weapons since March 1982, the availability of weapons appears to differ among and within the FMLN factions,

[Redacted]

<sup>3</sup> A list of weapons known to be in the guerrilla arms inventory appears in appendix D.

[Redacted]

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The lack of antiaircraft weapons also is a major problem, but in recent months captured guerrillas have said that the FMLN would soon deploy SA-7 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to El Salvador.

**Basic Needs**

The lack of funds and basic necessities—such as medicine, food, shoes, and clothing—has posed serious problems for the guerrillas. The FMLN depends on local farmers and villagers as well as foreign sources including Nicaragua and Cuba for the bulk of these supplies. The insurgents cannot grow enough crops to feed their combatants, and much of what is smuggled across the Honduran border consists of food and other basic necessities. The insurgents often establish roadblocks on major highways to extort money, shoes, clothing, medicine, and food—sometimes taking only half of what is available and justifying their action as a “war tax.” Moreover, thefts from stores and pharmacies have increased sharply during the past year. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted] the lack of food and medicine has badly hurt morale in some guerrilla units and is becoming a growing concern for their leaders. Several deserters have said such problems would have caused many more guerrillas to defect if they had known the Salvadoran military would not mistreat them or that reprisals would not be taken against their families. It is questionable, however, whether such conditions have had a major impact on established guerrilla ranks; so far the bulk of those who have deserted were forcibly recruited and spent little time with the guerrillas.

25X1

Comments by numerous captured guerrillas and defectors in recent months establish that at least the major FMLN factions have developed fairly extensive training programs. Guerrillas continue to be sent to Nicaragua, Cuba, and other friendly countries for extensive training, and instruction is given in El Salvador at schools accommodating as many as 300 students. Within El Salvador, course length varies from three days to several months and subject matter ranges from basic literacy to instruction in artillery and demolition techniques. [Redacted]

**Popular Support**

Most observers and the guerrillas themselves—according to captured documents—believe that low popular support for the insurgents is a critical problem.<sup>4</sup> Embassy officials in San Salvador estimate that a political party representing the FMLN or acting as its front in a national election would attract only 5 to 10 percent of the vote. Several recent public opinion polls support the Embassy’s assessment. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Key Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities**

Although the guerrillas have developed an imposing military capability over the past five years, their success to date and their prospects for further gains have been impaired by their lack of unity and their inability to develop a broad base of popular support. The FMLN’s continuing dependence on Nicaragua and Cuba for ammunition, supplies, and other assistance is another potential vulnerability, especially in the wake of signs that began to appear in late 1983 that Nicaragua and Cuba might reduce future assistance. [Redacted]

In a nationwide poll of 2,000 Salvadorans conducted in May and June of 1983, 68 percent of the respondents said that most Salvadorans think the Army had

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

“many sympathizers” and only 9 percent that the guerrillas had “many sympathizers.” When asked which group—the Army or the guerrillas—had been gaining sympathizers in recent months, 65 percent cited the Army and only 7 percent the guerrillas. In a similar poll conducted in September and October of 1983, 77 percent of the respondents said the Salvadoran people supported the Army in the war against the guerrillas; 14 percent said that Salvadorans do not care for either side; and 7 percent did not answer, presumably because most were guerrilla supporters.

The unpopularity of the guerrillas can be traced in part to the FMLN’s inability to provide security and offer viable alternative economic and social services, as well as to the government’s progress in implementing social programs and its growing commitment to democracy. More important, forced recruitment, attacks on farm cooperatives, constant guerrilla harassment, and the expropriation of foodstuffs and other basic necessities have hurt the guerrillas’ image and alienated much of the population.

In a guerrilla document captured in March, a People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) commander noted that townspeople failed to respond to calls to join the revolution and complained openly that the insurgents were harming their lives, jobs, and property. Moreover, the document characterizes campesinos in areas under ERP “control” as too politically naive to understand how an FMLN victory would justify the deprivations they must suffer.

This problem was vividly illustrated in mid-1984 when according to US Embassy officials and press reports as many as 6,000 refugees fled northern Morazan, in some instances over guerrilla-mined roads, and crossed into Honduras. They sought help in returning to parts of El Salvador under government control and resisted resettlement in UNHCR refugee camps in Honduras where the inhabitants generally are believed to be sympathetic to the FMLN and

<sup>5</sup> The poll was sponsored by the Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party and approved by the Salvadoran Government. It was based on interviews conducted with 1,500 people in six departments designated as “nonconflict areas” and 500 people living in the capital cities of the remaining eight departments designated as “conflict areas.”

*The Church Speaks Out*

*The Catholic hierarchy—which over the past three years has judiciously balanced its criticism of abuses by the left and the right—has become increasingly outspoken in its condemnation of the guerrillas’ forced recruitment drive and sabotage activities. In one of the more eloquent appeals made by senior Church officials in mid-1984, Bishop Rosa Chavez pleaded in his homily of 1 July for the return of hundreds of youths who remained in guerrilla encampments against their will, noting in particular the case of a boy who could go blind if he did not receive proper treatment for an eye disease.*

*The Bishop also said that, no matter how the guerrillas justified their acts of sabotage, “it is the people who suffer when the guerrillas down the electric pylons; it is the people who suffer when the guerrillas dynamite telephone installations, . . . kidnap, demand their famous war tax, or devote themselves to burning vehicles as they did recently. If they continue along that path, as they increase in military strength, the weaker they will be politically and will have even less space in the heart of the people. Therefore, I ask myself in whose favor are they really fighting?”*

*The guerrillas, in a response broadcast on Radio Venceremos, labeled the Bishop a “reactionary and partial” man “who wants to sit at the table of both the rich and the poor, and that is not possible.”*

where some guerrilla reprisals have taken place. The refugees said they fled primarily to escape forced recruitment into guerrilla ranks, but they also complained of growing insurgent demands and the confiscation of village food supplies. An FMLN propaganda campaign urging peasants to remain on their land and not leave their native villages apparently had little effect.

Popular support for the guerrillas has been eroded by other FMLN practices, such as the use of roadblocks to collect war taxes, obtaining protection money from

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

Top Secret



25X1

**Figure 4**  
**El Salvador: Municipalities Where Voting Did Not**  
**Take Place on May 6, 1984**



25X1



25X1



703236 10-84

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

25X1

commercial farmers and sugar mill owners, and recent attacks on farm cooperatives. The kidnaping of civilians, including the Defense Minister's brother in June, appears to be on the rise again despite public statements by the FMLN that it would not attack the relatives of foes. Moreover, the sharp increase in forced recruitment, including many schoolchildren, probably has done serious and lasting damage to the guerrilla cause.

The government's National Plan to rebuild San Vicente and Usulután—two agriculturally important departments—and to win "the hearts and minds of the people" has had mixed success. According to the US Embassy officials, many civilians appear enthusiastic to take up arms to protect their villages once the guerrillas are driven away, but chronic weapons shortages and the Army's inability to provide adequate support often have forced them to remain neutral, if only to survive. Less than 15 percent of local civilian security personnel now carry rifles. A new government civil defense program should help, but weapons shortages are constraining this effort as well.

25X1

25X1

National elections in March 1982 and the spring of 1984 have helped build popular support for the government. Despite insurgent appeals to boycott the "imperialist farce," the turnout in both elections exceeded 80 percent, and guerrilla efforts to sabotage the elections generally proved counterproductive. In San Miguel Department—a traditional guerrilla stronghold in eastern El Salvador—the turnout in the May runoff balloting was 15 percent higher than in the March election despite guerrilla attacks in the interim that were designed to inhibit the voting.

**Factionalism**

Fundamental differences in policy and strategy and personal rivalries have beset the FMLN from the start and continue to impede its political and military effectiveness.<sup>6</sup> Differences among the five factions center on the most fundamental issue: the purpose and conduct of the armed struggle. The FPL faction, for example, has consistently advocated a strategy of "prolonged popular war" that emphasizes the gradual development of popular support and a prolonged war of attrition. The ERP and the FARN, on the other hand, generally adhere to the line that frequent armed attacks will incite the masses to overthrow the government.

25X1

25X1

Voting patterns in the 1984 elections, however, demonstrate the insurgents' impact in more isolated rural areas. On 6 May, the government did not conduct balloting in 53 out of 261 municipalities; most of these towns were in longstanding guerrilla strongholds in Chalatenango, Morazan, San Miguel, and La Union Departments (figure 4). Nonetheless, the fact that 20 percent of the municipalities did not vote is potentially misleading because most of the areas where little voting occurred are mountainous and sparsely populated. In Morazan and Chalatenango Departments—where 36 municipalities did not vote

Differences over negotiating strategy also are common and criticism of other factions frequently is reported within the guerrilla ranks.

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

More-over, in 10 locations voters were allowed to cast ballots in other towns not under guerrilla control.

the ERP and its leader, Joaquin Villalobos, often are faulted by other guerrilla commanders for being ruthless, opportunistic, and bellicose. The FPL is criticized by other guerrilla factions as too ideological, and the FARN as too willing to negotiate and too nationalistic. Some FMLN leaders also are reported to have dismissed the PRTC as no more than terrorists and the FAL as lackeys of Moscow and Havana.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The agrarian reform program, launched in March 1980, also has hurt the guerrillas and helped improve the government's image. Approximately 22 percent of the country's farmland has been handed over to private farmers and members of cooperatives, and so far about 570,000 Salvadorans—including family members—have benefited. Nevertheless, recent interviews with refugees from all 14 departments reveal that few were aware of specific details of the land reform program, suggesting that a more effective communications effort might gain the government increased support.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

[Large redacted block]

25X6

Antagonisms have emerged within most guerrilla factions as well. [Redacted] during the past year serious tensions have developed between the rank and file and the senior leadership of both the PRTC and the FARN. Evidence of a far more serious rift within FPL ranks surfaced publicly in April 1983 when deputy commander Melida Anaya Montes, known as "Ana Maria," was murdered by followers of top commander Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who then allegedly committed suicide. Carpio's successor, Leonel Gonzalez, has since moved the FPL toward increased military coordination and political cooperation with other factions and has adopted a more flexible attitude on negotiations. This led several of Carpio's hardline supporters in late 1983 to form a splinter group—the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR)—which has conducted a number of sabotage and terrorist acts, mostly in San Salvador. [Redacted]

[Redacted block]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Since last year, some progress has been made, although the ERP continues to operate relatively independently. Major strides in coordinating tactical military operations have been made by the FPL and the FAL. Their success in conducting more joint operations in northern and western El Salvador has allowed them to mass forces for larger operations against important strategic targets such as the Fourth Brigade headquarters in Chalatenango Department. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted block]

**Top Secret**


[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

25X1



25X1

**Arms and Ammunition.** The insurgents remain heavily dependent on Havana and Managua for ammunition and other supplies.

25X1



25X1

[redacted] we estimate that roughly three-fourths of guerrilla ammunition needs and substantial amounts of basic necessities are met by external supply. Between May 1982 and June 1983, it appears that the FMLN infiltrated about as many arms as it captured, but since then [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Foreign Assistance**


Although Cuba, Nicaragua, and other foreign supporters continue to provide arms, ammunition, training, funds, and other assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas, during the past year their relations with the FMLN have been affected by concerns over a potential increased US role in the region.<sup>7</sup> [redacted]

[redacted] the guerrillas have infiltrated far fewer weapons than they have captured (table 1).<sup>9</sup> [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1




We believe the substantial drop in the flow of infiltrated weapons since mid-1983 reflects both a reduced insurgent need for additional weapons following a substantial influx of arms in 1982 and 1983 as well as guerrilla success in capturing over 5,000 individual and crew-served weapons from the Salvadoran military mostly during those same years. [redacted]

25X1


25X1

25X1



25X1

<sup>7</sup> Additional information on Nicaraguan, Cuban, and other foreign assistance efforts; guerrilla arms acquisitions and losses; and infiltration routes appear in appendix E. [redacted]



25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

**Training.** Nicaragua and Cuba continue to play a major role in training Salvadoran insurgents, despite the presence of numerous training facilities in El Salvador.

[Redacted]

**Advisers.** [Redacted] as was the case during the Sandinista insurrection—individuals and small units from every Central American country, Mexico, North and South America, Cuba, and the Caribbean have served as combatants and support personnel with the guerrillas in El Salvador at one time or another during the past four years.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Financing.** Although information on guerrilla financing is sketchy, we believe the FMLN obtains much of its funding from foreign countries and humanitarian organizations. In recent months,

[Redacted] a steady decrease in financial assistance received from West European sources and international organizations.

[Redacted] European donors have cited the insurgents' use of funds earmarked for humanitarian purposes to purchase arms and the misappropriation of sizable amounts of money by individual FMLN members as reasons for reducing aid. As a result,

[Redacted] FMLN finances have suffered badly.

West Europeans also have served with the guerrillas in medical and other capacities. Such involvement was dramatically underscored in June when a Spanish doctor was killed in a firefight near a refugee camp in Honduras. The doctor had worked as a volunteer in a Honduran refugee camp for a few months before joining the guerrillas in June 1983. During the past year, unconfirmed reports of foreigners also serving as

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

instructors, squad leaders, and even camp commanders have appeared in Salvadoran debriefings of captured guerrillas and defectors.

**The Performance Record**

An analysis of guerrilla-initiated actions from January 1981 through June 1984 illuminates several basic trends in guerrilla strategy and capabilities. The overall level of insurgent activity peaked in early 1982 at the time of the national election. Since then it has remained fairly steady at a reduced level, reflecting both the guerrillas' underlying strengths and weaknesses. Guerrilla actions against civilian targets have increased, but the number of attacks against military targets has not—suggesting that insurgent unity and supply shortages as well as more aggressive Army tactics continue to inhibit military progress.

We have sought to measure basic guerrilla military behavior by counting the number of attacks the guerrillas have launched against stationary targets each week since January 1981. Common targets include military facilities and guardposts, towns, bridges, and public buildings—especially utilities. The data, compiled by the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) in the Department of Defense, show that the number of military attacks escalated dramatically during the 1982 election campaign but since has fallen to a lower level (figure 5, Military Attacks).<sup>10</sup> Almost 80 attacks were registered in the week before the March 1982 election, but the highest number reported in any given week during the spring 1984 elections was 20. The number of guerrilla ambushes—defined as attacks against moving targets—shows a similar pattern, with a major surge in early 1982 and a lower level of activity since then (figure 5, Ambush Incidents).

Some observers have attributed the lack of an appreciable upward trend in military attacks and ambushes since 1982 to an FMLN decision to conduct fewer small-scale actions and create larger military units to attack important military and strategic targets. We believe the guerrillas hoped—unrealistically, as it

<sup>10</sup> Details on the data base, definitions, and methodology used in preparing these graphs appear in appendix F.

turned out—that such a strategy would undermine the morale of the Salvadoran military and the population as a whole. Since January 1982, however, the number of major military attacks—involving company-sized guerrilla units consisting of 120 or more combatants—has never exceeded eight in one week, and the average number of major military attacks, as distinct from total military actions, for the first half of 1984 is lower than that in 1983 (figure 5, Major Military Attacks). Some of this decline may reflect frictions and supply problems within guerrilla ranks, but most of it probably is due to the Salvadoran military's growing ability to take the war to the insurgents, especially in eastern El Salvador. By frequently sweeping traditional base areas and supply corridors, the military has kept the guerrillas off balance and made it increasingly difficult for them to gather the supplies and forces needed to launch major attacks.

Evidence of a change in guerrilla strategy is suggested by a comparison of the number of insurgent actions aimed at civilian targets with actions directed at military targets (figure 6). In 1981, the number of incidents involving civilian targets—such as robberies, kidnappings, assassinations, sabotage, and road blocks—roughly equaled that involving military targets. Beginning in 1982, however, the number of incidents against civilians soared. During the March 1982 election campaign two-thirds of all incidents were against civilians and even higher civilian rates prevailed during the March 1984 election campaign.

The trend in kidnappings and robberies is even more striking (figure 5, Kidnaping and Robbery Incidents). The dramatic increase in kidnappings in 1984 reflects growing guerrilla reliance on forced recruitment as well as efforts to obtain ransom and impress farmers and villagers to transport guerrilla supplies and casualties. The number of robberies—mostly involving the theft of clothes, shoes, and medicine from local stores and pharmacies—has also surged, indicating that guerrilla supply problems are becoming increasingly severe.

Top Secret



25X1


Top Secret

25X1


**Figure 5**  
**El Salvador: Guerrilla-Initiated Incidents,**  
**January 1981 to July 1984**

Number of incidents per week

**Military Attacks**



**Ambush Incidents**



[Redacted]

303708 10-84

25X1


Top Secret

25X1


Figure 5 (continued)

Number of incidents per week


Major Military Attacks



Kidnaping Incidents



Robbery Incidents



<sup>a</sup> No data available for 1981.

303708 (C00413) 10-84


**Top Secret**

25X1

**Figure 6**  
**El Salvador: Guerrilla Actions Against Military and Civilian Targets, January 1981 to July 1984**

Number of incidents per quarter

■ Military    □ Civilian




303713 10-84

**Figure 7**  
**El Salvador: Guerrilla Assassination Incidents, January 1981 to July 1984**

Number of incidents per quarter

40



303714 10-84

The data on guerrilla killings for political purposes also appear to reflect basic shifts in insurgent strategy (figure 7). In the first quarter of 1982, 31 incidents were recorded involving the murder of national legislators, mayors, military officers, and other security force personnel. At that time the guerrillas still were emphasizing urban warfare, and the resurgence of killings of prominent individuals in early 1984 suggests a possible return to this strategy. The small number of such murders in the intervening period might also reflect the government's success in uprooting much of the FMLN's urban apparatus as well as the elimination of thousands of leftist sympathizers and potential assassins by rightwing death squads.

[Redacted]

**Projecting Near-Term Capabilities**

In assessing insurgent capabilities and prospects over the next year or two, four major variables stand out: popular support, external assistance, guerrilla unity, and the performance of the Salvadoran military and government:

- Popular support will continue to be critical because it directly affects the FMLN's ability to recruit and retain combatants, provision its forces, and bring pressure on the government.

**Top Secret**

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

- Foreign assistance levels will determine whether the guerrillas have enough ammunition, sufficient weapons to equip additional forces, and a political and propaganda apparatus that portrays the guerrillas in the best light at home and abroad.
- How the insurgents deal with factionalism in their ranks will affect their ability to coordinate military operations and formulate an attractive political program as well as a coherent, long-term military strategy.
- The guerrillas' prospects will continue to turn on whether the Salvadoran Government and military avoid political infighting, control death squad activity, and keep their attention focused on winning the war.

**Most Likely Outcome**

Taking the guerrillas' current overall strengths and weaknesses into account, we believe insurgent force strength is likely to drop by 1,000 to 3,000 over the next two years, especially if the Duarte government implements an effective amnesty program. Most defections probably will come from the ranks of those recently recruited.

We judge desertions will continue largely because insurgent leaders can offer few inducements to their fighters.

FMLN commanders increasingly are threatening to take reprisals against the guerrillas and their families if they desert.

We judge, nonetheless, that the guerrillas' overall force capabilities are unlikely to diminish significantly. The FMLN probably will be able to capture or infiltrate all of the arms it needs, and more sophisticated weapons, such as SA-7 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, may be introduced shortly. If this system proves effective against El Salvador's small Air Force, the government's ability to redeploy forces, reinforce units, and evacuate wounded will be seriously impaired. The FMLN would continue to depend on

foreign suppliers for ammunition and basic necessities, but, even with attrition of some forces, shortages of such supplies probably would affect the pace more than the intensity of the fighting.

The FMLN will continue, in our view, to operate from all of its traditional base areas, maintaining its strongest presence along the Honduran border. emphasis on urban operations and terrorism will be renewed and that military activity might pick up in western El Salvador, if only to relieve pressure on guerrilla forces and supply corridors elsewhere in the country. To the extent that government sweeps and interdiction efforts complicate resupply efforts, the guerrillas will have to give more attention to conserving resources. FMLN leaders probably will become more selective in choosing targets to attack and more cautious in mapping out basic strategy.

Ideological differences and rivalries are likely to continue hampering interfactional cooperation. Although the FAL and the FPL—and to a lesser extent the FARN and the PRTC—are moving toward more integrated military operations, the ERP probably will continue as in the past to operate relatively independently of the other factions. Efforts by the Duarte government to engage the FMLN in a dialogue or to entice some of its members into the legitimate political process probably would exacerbate internal frictions and further complicate efforts to improve tactical coordination.

Considering their growing concerns, guerrilla leaders probably will increasingly emphasize the need to strengthen popular support, but their prospects for much success are dim largely because they are working from such a small base of supporters. The insurgents might make significant inroads in some labor unions and peasant organizations, however, especially if the Duarte administration adopts more confrontational tactics in response to growing labor demands.

Top Secret

25X1



Top Secret

25X1

**Substantial Guerrilla Decline**

Even if circumstances are substantially worse for the guerrillas and defections jump significantly, we believe insurgent force strengths would not drop below 6,000 in the next two years. Substantial defections could occur if the insurgents were unable to launch a credible fall offensive and it became increasingly apparent that the FMLN no longer was capable of winning the war. Additional guerrillas also might be tempted to leave if a new and better publicized amnesty program was coupled with the development of a legitimate left willing and able to participate in municipal and legislative elections scheduled in 1985 or to prepare for such elections in 1988. Those who chose to reenter legitimate political life probably would become major targets of the extreme right or left, just as those who were associated with the reformist government in 1979 were targets of far right violence.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Nonetheless, we doubt that any top FMLN leaders would defect. A hard core of well-armed, combat-experienced insurgents also would remain, determined to continue the struggle over the foreseeable future. About 6,000 insurgents now have been in the field for two years or more, and they seem likely to persist even under extremely adverse circumstances.

With such reduced force levels, we believe the FMLN might lose some of its traditional base areas but would retain a dominant position in strongholds along the Honduran border. Base areas in western El Salvador and in the Guazapa region might be more vulnerable, especially if large numbers of guerrillas from the less doctrinaire FAL or FARN defected. Guerrilla strongholds in southeastern El Salvador also might come under increased pressure, particularly if the Salvadoran military intensified efforts to interdict seaborne infiltration across the Gulf of Fonseca.

More aggressive operations by the Salvadoran military would make insurgent base areas throughout the country less secure, thereby complicating guerrilla supply efforts. The need for weapons and basic necessities might pose less of a problem than at present because fewer guerrillas would have to be armed, fed, and clothed. Nevertheless, the guerrillas would be operating out of sparsely populated areas, making it more difficult for them to acquire goods and supplies locally.

Top Secret

If the guerrillas saw their situation steadily deteriorating, some leaders—particularly those within the ERP—might be tempted to push a “go-for-broke” strategy or try to establish a liberated zone in the east. Such a strategy would give the movement a temporary psychological boost and help restore insurgent credibility at home and abroad. The military risk, however, would be severe as the preponderance of their forces could be lost in the fighting. A more likely guerrilla response would be to place even greater emphasis on urban terrorism, particularly assassination efforts aimed at senior Salvadoran officials and US personnel.

A more fruitful strategy for the guerrillas would be to continue the war at a reduced pace while attempting over a period of years to rebuild a popular and political base, resolve internal unity problems, and restore their standing in the international community. In such circumstances, Havana and Managua might moderate their assistance until the guerrillas completed their retrenchment and could seriously challenge the government.

**The Guerrillas Regain Momentum**

Should trends unexpectedly favor the guerrillas and they begin to work together more closely, we believe the FMLN still would be unlikely to add more than 2,000 combatants to its ranks in the next two years. The FMLN would need more time to develop a substantial popular base, and a major force expansion would add to logistic problems. Although the guerrillas probably have, or could acquire, enough weapons to arm several thousand additional fighters, they would have to rely increasingly on infiltration or robbery and extortion to obtain additional ammunition and supplies. As a result, popular support would be further eroded, making recruitment even more difficult.

We believe a resurgent guerrilla force would first seek to consolidate its position in eastern El Salvador. Because the guerrillas already are well-entrenched in parts of Usulután, San Miguel, and Morazan Departments, further consolidation in the east would allow

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

the FMLN to secure several of its primary infiltration routes. The guerrillas might be able to close portions of the Pan American Highway. This not only would facilitate infiltration efforts but deal a major psychological and economic blow to the Salvadoran Government—much in the same way Angolan rebels have ravaged the Luanda regime by shutting down the Benguela Railroad." [Redacted]

Guerrilla activity in urban areas and western parts of the country would grow in our view, affecting even the most western Departments. [Redacted]

[Redacted] insurgent strategy would be to spread the government forces out, draw them away from the east, and demonstrate that the guerrilla struggle is a nationwide effort. Base areas and more extensive resupply corridors probably would be developed in western Chalatenango and Santa Ana Departments to support such operations as well as new infiltration routes along the western coast of El Salvador. We believe the guerrillas would try to infiltrate a growing proportion of arms and equipment by sea and air because of the relative slowness of overland deliveries. [Redacted]

Despite what would be their growing strength, we believe many guerrilla leaders would remain reluctant to declare a liberated zone. Such a declaration would give the guerrillas a propaganda boost, but they would be taking a major military risk by consolidating their forces and requiring them to defend territory. Moreover, a liberated zone would be feasible only in northeastern El Salvador where the ERP is dominant, and the leaders of most other factions would want to avoid any action that tended to increase the ERP's standing within the alliance. [Redacted]

If the FMLN regained momentum, we judge its foreign supporters almost certainly would try to accelerate shipments of arms and equipment and establish new supply routes in an effort to consolidate insurgent advances and propel the FMLN toward a final victory. Even then, the guerrillas probably would not emerge victorious over the Duarte government in the

" The Benguela Railroad, which bisects Angola, had great economic and symbolic importance in that it was an integral part of the regional transportation system and a key foreign exchange earner for the Luanda government. [Redacted]

next year or two largely because they would be working from a relatively small popular base. Moreover, as in the past, internal frictions most likely would persist or intensify with any improvement in guerrilla prospects. Under these circumstances, we doubt a guerrilla force with as many as 13,000 combatants could overwhelm a Salvadoran military more than three times its size. The FMLN would be able to achieve power only in the event that the political system collapsed and the Salvadoran military fell into disarray. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Guerrilla Intentions and Implications for the United States**

**A Fall Offensive**

25X1

[Redacted] since early this year the guerrillas have been preparing a major offensive for the summer or fall of 1984 to restore their military credibility and to undercut the Reagan administration's electoral prospects in November. The Cubans appear to have been especially active in urging and planning this strategy, but [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] some guerrilla leaders may have resisted a summer campaign because of shortages of supplies and trained manpower. Guerrilla leaders, [Redacted] also were concerned that a major offensive would give the US Government an excuse to intervene directly or the justification it needed to convince the US Congress to approve a large military and economic assistance program for El Salvador. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

If President Reagan is reelected, the FMLN probably will continue to pursue a two-track policy, maintaining military pressure on the Salvadoran Government while seeking to engage the Duarte government in a dialogue—primarily as a ploy to gain time in order to rebuild popular support, develop stronger ties to labor and peasant organizations, and strengthen their military position.<sup>12</sup> We believe FMLN leaders would consider their chances of winning a total military victory to be minimal but would seek to ensure that they would be in a position to seize power in the event that serious conflicts within the Salvadoran Government or military threatened a collapse. [Redacted]

25X1

The FMLN, in our view, can and will intensify military activity in the next month or so, most likely by mounting swift, intensive operations against highly visible, strategic targets such as dams, bridges, airfields, oil refineries, port complexes, or departmental capitals. At the same time, we believe efforts to harass transport routes, impede the harvest, and increase urban terrorism will continue. Nonetheless, we judge that the guerrillas are incapable of sustaining a nationwide offensive that could substantially alter the military balance. The Salvadoran military's continued sweeps, especially east of the Lempa River, have disrupted the guerrillas' resupply activity this summer and, [Redacted] probably will continue to hamper guerrilla operations. Moreover, [Redacted]

We judge that FMLN leaders would view continuing US military and economic assistance to El Salvador as a key obstacle to their winning the war. As a result, they would be likely to give at least as much attention to undercutting US public and Congressional support for the Duarte government. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the guerrillas still lack the strategic vision necessary to formulate a general plan and the coordinating mechanisms needed to implement it at the tactical level. [Redacted]

Should President Reagan lose the election, we believe the FMLN would pursue the negotiating track much more vigorously, while preparing to step up military activity after the new administration is in place. We judge the FMLN would push hard to engage the new administration and the Salvadoran Government in serious negotiations in the hope this would open the door to a power-sharing arrangement. Moreover, insurgent leaders almost certainly would expect the

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1.

**Insurgent Strategy Beyond the US Election**

Guerrilla strategy over the next year or two will be influenced strongly by the outcome of the US Presidential election in November. [Redacted] many guerrilla leaders would interpret a Reagan administration victory as a prelude to a US invasion of El Salvador.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Top Secret


[Redacted]

25X1


Top Secret




25X1

initiation of talks to enhance their credibility internationally, complicate Washington's relations with the Salvadoran Government, and create serious problems for Duarte in his dealings with the military and conservative business sectors. 


25X1

FMLN leaders probably would not increase the fighting in late 1984; in our view, out of fear this might provoke the outgoing administration to escalate US involvement in the struggle. Nevertheless, we judge the military struggle would receive greater emphasis if it appeared the new administration in Washington was unwilling to make meaningful concessions on the negotiating front. By stepping up the fighting, the guerrillas would hope to demonstrate the costs and futility of continuing US support to the Duarte government. Moreover, from the guerrillas' perspective, increased military activity would generate more pressure for negotiations and help prepare the way for an eventual military victory. 

25X1

Regardless of who wins the US election, guerrilla prospects are likely to continue to wax and wane in tandem with the capability of the Salvadoran Government and military. When the Salvadoran military has lost the initiative in the past and political infighting has broken out among senior officers, the guerrillas traditionally have responded by holding back to see who would come out on top and how the military and political balance would be affected. The guerrillas also may have refrained from escalating the fighting because they believed this would inspire the military to put aside its differences and focus on the war. 

25X1

When the military has gone on the offensive, the guerrillas usually have tried to meet the challenge, striking back in order to show their foreign supporters and the Salvadoran armed forces that they cannot be easily vanquished. Since January, however, the Salvadoran military has kept the guerrillas off balance throughout much of the country and disrupted their supply networks. If the military can maintain the tactical initiative, keep the insurgents on the move, and reduce the flow of infiltrated weapons, ammunitions, and supplies, we judge the FMLN's ability to rebound will be severely inhibited. 

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Appendix A**

**The FMLN's Five and One-Half Factions**

**The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)**

The ERP was founded in 1972 as an urban terrorist organization made up largely of radical Marxist students and some Christian socialists bent on violence. The ERP, led by Joaquin Villalobos, is the largest and most aggressive of the guerrilla groups and often functions in the role of military tactician for the alliance. [redacted]

The ERP is an opportunistic organization with shallow ideological roots. Although in 1977 it created the Salvadoran Revolutionary Party (PRS) and a front group, the Popular Leagues of 28 February (LP-28), the ERP has paid far less attention to political organization and propagandizing than the military aspects of the struggle. [redacted]

The ERP, with an estimated strength of 3,000 to 3,500 combatants, was the first guerrilla faction to establish large, conventional size units in an effort to regularize command and control and give the guerrillas a counterbalance to the government's immediate reaction battalions. [redacted]

[redacted]

Radio Venceremos, a clandestine radio station that usually transmits from northern Morazan Department, is operated by the ERP. [redacted]

**Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)**

The FPL was founded in 1970 when Salvador Cayetano Carpio broke with the Communist Party of El Salvador because, in his view, it did not give sufficient emphasis to the armed struggle. It began as an urban terrorist group and evolved into a predominantly rural guerrilla movement. [redacted]

Under Carpio's leadership, the FPL was the largest and most prestigious of the guerrilla groups. The military arm of the FPL is often referred to as the Popular Armed Forces of Liberation (FAPL). Its associated mass organization, the Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR), was founded in 1975. [redacted]

Following the death of Carpio and his deputy in the spring of 1983, a more conciliatory leadership took power. The FPL's new chief, Leonel Gonzalez, had spent much of his time at FPL headquarters in Nicaragua where he coordinated logistic, political, and military activities. His deputy, Dimas Rodriguez, previously commanded the FPL's northern front. [redacted]

Gonzalez and Rodriguez restructured the FAPL in order to improve combat capabilities and to facilitate coordination with other factions. As of July 1984 at least four infantry battalions had been formed, consisting of some 400 combatants and 100 support personnel each. These battalions comprise the Felipe Pena Mendoza Brigade which operates in the Central and Paracentral Fronts. [redacted]

[redacted]

The FPL broadcasts clandestinely over Radio Farabundo Marti, which usually is based in Las Vueltas, Chalatenango Department. [redacted]

**The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)**

The FARN and its party organization, the National Resistance (RN), were established in 1975 by a dissident group that split from the ERP after their leader, noted poet and former Communist Party

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1



25X6

25X1

member Roque Dalton, was murdered by ERP militants. The dissidents opposed the ERP's emphasis on terrorism and its failure to organize the masses. [Redacted]

25X1

In 1975 the FARN affiliated itself with the already existing United Popular Action Front (FAPU), which is now the FARN front organization. FAPU, which was created in 1974, was the second largest Marxist front organization at that time. [Redacted]

25X1

Ferman Cienfuegos became head of the FARN and the RN in September 1980 when his predecessor reportedly was killed in a plane crash in Panama. Some believe that his death also occurred under suspicious circumstances. Under Cienfuegos' direction, the FARN has gained the reputation in El Salvador and internationally as the least doctrinaire and most nationalistic of the five factions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The FARN, which now has an estimated 1,400 to 1,550 combatants, was the last of the factions to restructure its combat forces, creating at least two battalions or "columns" in 1983. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**The Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL)**

The FAL is the military arm of the Moscow-supported Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). The party was founded in 1930 and exerts substantial influence over its military counterpart. The Communist Party's front organization, the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), was founded in 1968, and the FAL was established in 1979 after the party decided to join the insurgency. [Redacted]

Shafik Handal has been general secretary of the party since the early 1970s and now helps direct the guerrilla movement. [Redacted]

Moscow and Havana would like to see Handal's faction dominate any future government established by the guerrillas. Much of the group's influence is due to continued Soviet and Cuban support. [Redacted]


Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1



The PRTC is the smallest, least influential faction in the FMLN and has claimed responsibility for many bombings and assassinations. It has close ties to the Cubans and the Nicaraguans. According to several defectors, Nicaraguans have served in leadership posts. [Redacted]

25X6

25X1


Military operations were conducted under the name of the PRTC until a separate military organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces for Popular Liberation (FARLP), was created following the March 1982 election. The PRTC's mass organization, the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP), was founded in 1979. [Redacted]

25X1

The PRTC's estimated 700 to 850 insurgents are organized into the mobile Luis Adalberto Diaz Detachment with three columns of about 115 combatants each, and 300 to 450 territorial and militia troops subordinate to commands in the Central and Paracentral Fronts and in the northern and southern portions of the Eastern Front. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1



[Redacted] We estimate that FAL forces now number between 1,160 and 1,325 insurgents. Their units have become increasingly integrated into the FPL's military structure. [Redacted]

25X1

**Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR)**

In a communique published in December 1983, the FPL announced that a splinter group had emerged in San Salvador calling itself the Salvador Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MOR). The communique said this group was pledged to follow the more dogmatic line of former FPL commander Carpio and noted that the FPL needed to espouse a less fanatical ideology. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

In late 1983, [Redacted] another renegade FPL group, the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CER), was conducting terrorist operations in San Salvador. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**The Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)**

The PRTC was founded as a regional party organization in Costa Rica and has branches in all Central American countries. The Salvadoran branch, headed by Roberto Roca, is the most active. [Redacted]

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] Former FPL commander  
Filomeno Ramirez appears to be in charge of the  
MOR. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

The MOR and the CER have been described as a  
group of about 100 dangerous, well-trained terrorists  
operating in San Salvador and, to a lesser extent, in  
Usulután, San Miguel, and Santa Ana. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

On several occasions the FPL has publicly disassociat-  
ed itself from the MOR and the CER, and only the  
PRTC among the other insurgent factions has shown  
any willingness to cooperate with the dissidents. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

In

25X1

view of its small size and internal problems, the  
FMLN leadership is not likely to recognize the MOR  
as a legitimate guerrilla faction. [Redacted]

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1



Top Secret

25X1

### Appendix B

#### Factionalism: A Chronic Problem

Common goals and personal backgrounds have helped to hold the guerrillas together, but at the same time serious rifts have always existed as a result of fundamental differences over policy and strategy and personal rivalries. Presently existing components of the movement date from the 1970s, as one group after another was formed by extreme leftists, many of whom originally were members of the Communist Party of El Salvador. In late 1980, owing largely to pressure from Havana and Moscow, the five groups united under the umbrella of the FMLN, but continued factionalism and a lack of coordination contributed significantly to the failure of the guerrilla's January 1981 "final offensive."

In the four years since the FMLN was created, it has had little success implementing directives intended to be binding on all member organizations. For example, two guerrilla factions were unprepared for the FMLN's "final offensive" in 1981, and the FPL did not participate in the general offensive that took place at the time of the March 1982 election.

[Redacted]

One of the many issues that has sparked debate within the movement has been the distribution of funds provided by international humanitarian agencies.

[Redacted]

Such antagonism has appeared within as well as between the guerrilla factions. In 1982, differences within the FPL over the conduct of the war and negotiating strategy provoked a major rift when some young FPL leaders and deputy commander Melida Anaya Montes—"Ana Maria"—began to press then top commander Salvador Cayetano Carpio to be more accommodating or to give way to younger, more flexible leaders. The dispute surfaced openly in April 1983 when Ana Maria was murdered by a group of Carpio's followers and Carpio then allegedly committed suicide.

[Redacted] Carpio ordered Ana Maria killed because she advocated greater unity within the FMLN and became more popular than he. [Redacted] when the top commanders were replaced by more conciliatory leaders several commanders in the FPL's Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CER) left the organization, taking with them all funds for the Northern Front. As a result, the Front was in disarray from August to November 1983.

[Redacted]

The FARN and the PRTC also have suffered from internal dissension. [Redacted] as late as August 1983 guerrilla members were complaining that many of their leaders, including Cienfuegos, were living in Nicaragua where they had

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

access to houses, cars, food, and liquor. Living conditions are harsh for guerrillas for all factions and such rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan-based leadership extends well beyond the FARN.

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

This spring, [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] urban units of the PRTC were showing a tendency to disobey orders from guerrilla leaders in Nicaragua. In May, a top PRTC leader was dispatched to El Salvador to reestablish discipline and to dissuade urban units from new killings, but they apparently ignored his instructions. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Despite such efforts, the guerrillas have been relatively inactive during much of this year. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the guerrillas' failure to disrupt the March and May elections largely reflected internal policy differences and an inability to agree on a coordinated military strategy. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

[Redacted]

25X1

**Page Denied**


Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied





### Appendix C


#### FMLN Force Capabilities

##### Force Size


As of mid-1984, the FMLN had developed an effective combat strength of some 9,000 to 11,000 armed insurgents, including its militia forces.<sup>13</sup> Of this number, we estimate that some 6,000 to 8,000 are well-armed, well-trained, and combat experienced. 

Senior Salvadoran military officials have said that the guerrillas were trying to build a total force of some 14,000 insurgents in preparation for a fall 1984 offensive, but we believe insurgent leaders have encountered major problems in meeting this target. Salvadoran authorities estimate that from March through July 1984 the guerrillas had impressed over 1,500 people, mostly youths in eastern portions of El Salvador; the total number of Salvadorans forcibly recruited in 1984 could well exceed 3,000. 




 substantial attrition of guerrilla ranks in 1984. In an interview last May, Army Chief of Staff Colonel Blandon said there had been 900 guerrilla desertions since December 1983, compared to only a few dozen in the previous six months. Between August 1983 and September 1984, some 175 guerrillas had responded to a government amnesty program offering a bounty of about \$250 for turning themselves in with their weapons. Other reasons cited by guerrillas for defecting include hunger, cold, lack of pay, and the belief



that what they were doing was wrong. Large numbers of guerrillas probably also have deserted without notifying Salvadoran authorities. 

25X1


In addition, guerrilla ranks have been depleted by combat losses, but we cannot obtain accurate figures on casualty rates. The Salvadoran military estimates that over 1,250 guerrillas were killed from 1 January to 20 August this year. These figures may be exaggerated because they count guerrilla sympathizers and other civilians killed in the crossfire. The guerrillas also are known to retrieve the bodies and weapons of many, if not most, of their comrades killed in action. Guerrilla losses due to inadequate medical care are high. For example, a 16-year-old guerrilla deserter who had been forcibly recruited early this year cited three incidents in one month where 10, 12, and 15 guerrillas wounded in firefights died because of a lack of medical care. 

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

25X1



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Training**

Nicaragua, Cuba, and other countries friendly to the FMLN continue to play an important role in training Salvadoran insurgents. [Redacted]

[Redacted] efforts to train guerrillas from all factions are continuing and possibly expanding in Nicaragua. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] a military camp under construction on the Cosiguina Peninsula in northwestern Nicaragua was used as a training camp for Salvadoran insurgents. [Redacted]

[Redacted] three anti-aircraft sites—possibly for SA-7 training—nearby protected by sawtooth trenching, firing ranges, an obstacle course, a baseball field, people in military formation, and at least 11 small barracks-type buildings. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Substantial training activity appears to be taking place in El Salvador. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] have revealed the presence of training camps accommodating as many as 300 guerrillas at various locations in northern San Miguel and Morazan, eastern Chalatenango, and southern Usulután Departments. The courses last from a few weeks to three months and usually include physical training, military instruction, and political indoctrination. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**Foreign Advisers**

25X1

Many of the foreigners who are working with the insurgents in El Salvador appear to be serving as doctors, nurses, or medics. During the past four years, however, foreigners also have served as combatants,

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

instructors, military advisers, and even as camp commanders or squad leaders, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

An ERP guerrilla who defected in March said that early this year 24 Cubans spent a month at an insurgent camp near Corinto, Morazan Department, where they provided instruction in the use of small arms and lectured on how the Cuban revolution applied to El Salvador. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] a camp near El Column, Chalatenango Department, that was under the command of a Cuban, "Commandante Guillermo." [Redacted]

[Redacted] two Cubans at a base camp near Los Mangos, Chalatenango; he said one of the Cubans was in charge of physical instruction and the other was a squad leader. Another [Redacted]

[Redacted] Cuban [Redacted] camp near San Augustin in Usulután Department. According to press reports, a kidnap victim from San Vicente said he encountered 12 Cuban weapons instructors at the insurgent camp where he was held captive for several days in July. [Redacted]

During the past year there have been occasional reports of Nicaraguans operating with the guerrillas in El Salvador as well. An ERP insurgent who deserted in August 1983 identified a Nicaraguan named Williams, also called "Negro," as a column commander for the elite BRAZ brigade and another Nicaraguan as a column commander and director of a military school. An ERP insurgent who defected in January 1984 also referred to a Nicaraguan called "Negro William" who he said had commanded a camp near La Corina in San Miguel Department. He added that a Cuban was in charge of political indoctrination at the camp. [Redacted]

**Funding**

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

We believe that most guerrilla funding comes from foreign donors such as international organizations and sympathetic governments. [Redacted]

25X1.1

25X1

[Redacted] funds also are obtained locally by robbing banks, kidnaping wealthy individuals for ransom, cattle rustling, or by setting up roadblocks to collect "war taxes." The FMLN publicly admitted that four men who tried to rob a bank in Soyapango—a suburb of San Salvador—in August were FAL members and that the attack was justified by the guerrillas' need for funds. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Basic Necessities**

The lack of medicine, food, shoes, and clothing appears as a growing complaint in guerrilla communications and interrogation reports, probably due in large part to more aggressive activities of the Salvadoran military in disrupting the insurgents' traditional base areas. Although some defectors describe the conditions under which they operate as difficult but manageable, others have spoken of desperation and low morale due to harsh living conditions in their camps. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

two other Honduran refugee camps in Colomoncagua and San Antonio. [Redacted] in early 1984 the ERP's BRAZ brigade obtained most of its food, medicine, and supplies from Colomoncagua.

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

The guerrillas appear to obtain most of their basic necessities from the populace either through donations or extortion. Robbery and roadblocks seems to be the most frequent means of expropriating goods; grocery stores and pharmacies are frequently broken into and buses and private vehicles are constantly stopped along major roads to extort money, shoes, clothing, and food. Because such actions undermine popular support for their cause, the guerrillas purchase food and clothing from local storekeepers when funds are available. [Redacted]

Insurgents in eastern El Salvador appear to be more dependent on nonguerrilla sources for their basic food requirements than their counterparts in western base areas. Although some peasant sympathizers provide food voluntarily to the guerrillas, an insurgent who deserted from the ERP in late 1983 said that in some parts of eastern El Salvador villagers were forced to cultivate corn, rice, and beans to supplement guerrilla food supplies. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the guerrillas were paying farmers in several departments to buy seeds and fertilizer with the understanding that half of the harvest would go to the insurgents. The FPL defector also said the guerrillas often require peasants to turn over half their crops to the guerrillas. [Redacted]

25X1

Substantial quantities of supplies also are smuggled into the country from Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. According to a guerrilla who guarded an FPL safehouse in Honduras and was captured in March 1984, food and medicine were brought to this house from Tegucigalpa twice a month and then smuggled across the border into Chalatenango Department. Other guerrilla defectors have reported regular deliveries of supplies to other parts of El Salvador from Honduras, using pack animals or trucks, and from Nicaragua using boats. [Redacted]

The guerrillas are known to have large plots of land under cultivation in the Guazapa area and in western Cabanas Department. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted] a "food production unit" growing corn, beans, and rice for guerrillas based in northern Morazan. Plots of land that have been identified near guerrilla base camps in eastern El Salvador during the past year, however, do not appear large enough to feed more than those living in the immediate vicinity. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

Moreover, there is growing evidence that refugee camps near the Salvadoran border in Honduras sometimes serve as supply bases for Salvadoran insurgent forces. In June the US defense attache in Tegucigalpa reported that Honduran military officers had discovered a guerrilla supply corridor from the UN-sponsored refugee camp at Mesa Grande to Chalatenango Department. Honduran military investigators have determined that sympathizers in that camp repaired equipment and clothing for the Salvadoran guerrillas, and that insurgents used the camp for rest and medical care. In mid-June, Honduran soldiers clashed with armed guerrillas who had left the camp to rob nearby houses. According to the Hondurans, such incidents were increasing. [Redacted]

The guerrillas seem to have developed no more than rudimentary medical facilities to support their combatants. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] medical personnel with no more than basic training accompany combat units in the field. Captured guerrillas and defectors also have reported the presence of clandestine "hospitals" in most guerrilla base areas, but we doubt such facilities are well equipped or well supplied. [Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted] the insurgents rely heavily on foreign doctors. [Redacted]

25X1

Salvadoran guerrillas in northern San Miguel and Morazan Departments reportedly have used at least

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1



Top Secret

25X1

## Appendix D

**Guerrilla Weapons Inventory**

<b>Light infantry weapons</b>	.357 MAG revolver
<b>Automatic rifles</b>	.45-caliber revolver
5.56-mm M-16 (including AR-15)	.25 caliber
5.56-mm GALIL	9-mm pistol
5.56-mm CAL assault	.32 caliber
7.62-mm FAL	<b>Crew-served weapons</b>
7.62-mm G-3	<b>Machineguns</b>
.30-caliber M-1 Garand	.50 caliber
.30-caliber Browning automatic (BAR)	.30 caliber
.30-caliber M-1 carbine	7.62-mm M-60
.30-caliber M-2 carbine	5.56-mm or 7.62-mm HK-21 light machinegun
<b>Other rifles</b>	<b>Grenade rocket launchers</b>
.22 caliber hunting rifle (30.06)	M-79 grenade launcher
Czechoslovak manufacture shotguns (12, 16, and 20 gauge)	M-72 (LAW—light antitank weapon)
<b>Submachineguns</b>	RPG-2 (rocket launcher)
9-mm H&K MP-5 (HK52)	RPG-7 (rocket launcher)
9-mm UZI	<b>Recoilless rifles</b>
9-mm Madsen	57 mm
.45-caliber M-3 (Grease Gun)	75 mm
.45-caliber Thompson	90 mm
9-mm Sterling (Police Carbine Mark 4) or 9x19-mm NATO L2A3	<b>Mortars</b>
<b>Pistols</b>	60 mm
.45-caliber automatic	81 mm
.22-caliber revolver	120 mm
.38-caliber special	<b>Air defense</b>
	SA-7 (unconfirmed)

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Appendix E**

25X1

**External Support: The Cuba-Nicaragua Pipeline**

25X1

Our ability to monitor and quantify arms shipments to El Salvador since late 1983 has been hampered

25X1

most reports available to us from defectors and captured insurgents have concerned deliveries prior to mid-1983.<sup>14</sup>

25X1

the insurgents remain heavily dependent on Cuba and Nicaragua for ammunition and supplies, although their need for small arms has diminished.

25X1

25X1

ammunition is the guerrillas' major priority this year.

25X1

25X1

25X1

the rebels, while continuing to infiltrate materiel from Nicaragua into El Salvador by air, land, and sea, had sufficient weapons to arm their combatants and were therefore primarily infiltrating munitions, spare parts, medicines, and clothing. Reinforcing the emphasis on ammunition,

25X1

25X1

few weapons were being sent to El Salvador because the guerrillas had sufficient arms and the Nicaraguans had a greater need for the weapons themselves—apparently a reference to the increasing military challenge directed against Managua by the anti-Sandinista insurgents.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Page Denied**

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

**Infiltration Routes**

[Redacted]

large pockets of disputed territory restricts Salvadoran and Honduran military activity in those areas.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] the insurgents cache weapons in refugee camps in Honduras and use these camps for resupply and other support activities.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Seaborne deliveries probably equal or exceed overland infiltration. About a dozen suspected infiltration points have been identified along the southeastern coast of El Salvador.

[Redacted] supplies generally leave Nicaragua on board large boats or canoes and are transferred to smaller crafts in the Gulf of Fonseca at night and ferried to the beaches where they are picked up by the guerrillas for later distribution.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Lesser amounts of materiel also continue to be paraded or delivered to a myriad of dirt airstrips that dot eastern El Salvador.

[Redacted] arms, ammunition, and other supplies were being flown into Honduras from Nicaragua and then transported into El Salvador. The aircraft used reportedly belong to the FPL and are regularly based in Nicaragua.

[Redacted] the FPL has decided that, if any problems are encountered with this mode of delivery, it would resort once again to bringing arms and ammunition into the country by sea.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

We estimate, [Redacted] that arms and supplies enter El Salvador through at least four infiltration corridors from Guatemala and at least nine routes from Honduras (figure 9). Most of the arms that are purchased on the international black market appear to be funneled through Guatemala. Overland shipments by truck, pack animal, or human porter through Honduras probably remain the most consistent method of resupply. Rugged terrain makes the Honduran frontier difficult to patrol, and the presence of a number of

The sophistication of the guerrillas' delivery system is complemented by their flexible distribution networks.

[Redacted]

We believe most internal transshipment points are located east of the Lempa River, where the insurgents are strongest and geographically nearest Nicaragua.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

[Redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Figure 9  
Arms Infiltration



703237 10-84

25X1

In May, the Salvadoran military discovered and destroyed 34 canoes, each more than 5 meters long, at the mouth of the Lempa River.

addition, the Salvadoran Army recently identified what it believes are several guerrilla warehouses and distribution centers in southern and southeastern El Salvador.

25X1

25X1

Recently captured documents also attest to the extensiveness of the distribution network as reflected in hand-drawn maps depicting insurgent-controlled logistics corridors in the coastal areas, 10 nearby airstrips, and the locations of Salvadoran military units.

columns of 30 to 300 men have been used to transport materials. In

25X1


25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



### Other Foreign Suppliers

other suppliers are active, including countries in the Soviet Bloc, the Middle East, and Vietnam. For instance, analysis of 7.62-mm ammunition captured in May strongly suggests Bulgarian manufacture, and similar ammunition recently was discovered in a guerrilla arms cache. Since late 1982, Bulgaria has shipped large quantities of military materiel to Nicaragua, some of which we believe may have been earmarked for delivery to the Salvadoran guerrillas or intended to replenish items the Sandinistas took from their own stocks and sent to the insurgents.



Regarding the Vietnamese connection, the US defense attache reports the Salvadoran Army recently

**Table 3**  
**El Salvador: Trace Information on**  
**M-16 Rifles in Guerrilla Hands <sup>a</sup>**

	M-16 Rifles (number)	As a Share of Total (percent)
<b>Total</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Probably delivered to Vietnam</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>80</b>
Originally sent to Vietnam by United States	202	44
Traced to US military units or depots in the 1960s with probable delivery to Vietnam	90	19
Produced by US manufacturers during the Vietnam era with probable delivery to Vietnam	80	17
<b>Probably delivered elsewhere</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>20</b>
Originally sent to El Salvador	68	15
Originally sent to the Somoza government in Nicaragua	9	2
Traced to other locations	14	3

<sup>a</sup> As of 26 July 1984, 471 M-16s had been captured from the insurgents and 264 had been identified from captured documents. Trace information is available for 463 of these M-16s, including 252 that were captured and 211 that were listed in documents. (S NF)

captured an 82-mm mortar sight with Vietnamese markings. Eighty percent of the traceable M-16 rifles that were captured from the insurgents or that are still in guerrilla hands, according to captured documents, probably were sent to Vietnam over a decade ago, according to the US Embassy (table 3). We believe most of the equipment furnished by Hanoi was delivered in the early 1980s.

Top Secret

25X1



### Appendix F

#### Methodology for Tracking Salvadoran Guerrilla Performance


The analysis of guerrilla performance is based on  data base of daily counts of guerrilla-initiated incidents from January 1981 to July 1984. The data base—developed by CAJIT in an effort to better understand insurgent activities, tactics, and strategies—currently contains over 11,000 incidents ranging from major attacks to minor civil disturbances.

For each incident, CAJIT recorded the following information:

- Incident type (table 4).
- Target type (table 5).
- Date.
- Place name.
- Coordinates.
- Guerrilla faction.
- Source, report number, and date of report.
- Comments, which include number of casualties.



#### Data Sources and Limitations



**Table 4**  
El Salvador: Incident Types in the Guerrilla Data Base

Code	Incident Type
AMB	Ambush
ARS	Arson
MUR	Assassination
ASL	Assault
ATK	Attack
BAR	Barricade
BMB	Bombing
CNT	Continuation
CON	Containment
DIV	Diversion
ENG	Engagement
EXE	Execution
FIR	Firefight/Confrontation
GDF	Groundfire
HAR	Harassment
HOS	Hostage
KID	Kidnaping
LOG	Logistics
OCC	Occupation
PRO	Propaganda
RAI	Raid
RAN	Ransom
REC	Recruitment
BLK	Roadblock
ROB	Robbery
SAB	Sabotage
STR	Strike
TAX	Taxation
THW	Thwarted attempt
VAN	Vandalism
GUR	Guerrillas killed
GOV	Government killed
CIV	Civilians killed
OTH	Other



25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1




**Top Secret**

25X1

**Table 5  
El Salvador: Target Types  
in the Guerrilla Data Base**

Code	Target Type
AGR	Agriculture
BRD	Bridge
BUS	Business
CIV	Civilian
CLO	Clothing
COM	Communications
CUL	Cultural
CAM	Dam
DIP	Diplomatic
DOC	Documents
ECO	Economic
EDU	Education
EQP	Equipment
FAC	Facility
FOD	Foodstuffs
FOR	Foreign
GOV	Government
INF	Infrastructure
LIV	Livestock
LOG	Logistics
MTL	Materiel
MED	Medical
MIL	Military
MON	Money
PAR	Paramilitary
PER	Personnel
PLC	Police
PET	Petroleum
POL	Political
POW	Power
RAL	Rail
RLG	Religious
RDW	Roadway
STR	Storage
STU	Student
TWN	Town
TRN	Transportation
WAT	Water
OTH	Other

25X1



**Primary and Secondary Incident Types and Target Types**

Each incident is classified by a primary and an optional secondary incident type. The 21 incident types often are paired such as roadblocks and robbery, bombings and sabotage, and attacks resulting in occupations (table 9).

25X1

CAJIT coded certain incident types under more than one name (table 7). Incident types were combined as follows:



25X1

- An attack and an assault.
- Engagements, firefights, and confrontations.
- Robbery and taxation.
- Barricade and containment.

25X1

For the purposes of our analysis, an incident was counted only when it appeared as a primary type.

25X1



**Top Secret**

25X1



Top Secret

25X1

**Table 7**  
**Definitions and Comments on Incident Types**

Incident Type	Definition/Comments
Attack	A forceful hostile action against a stationary government force (also called an assault).
Ambush	A military action against a moving governmental force.
Raid	A military action to obtain supplies for current needs.
Harassment	Military actions such as sniping, lobbing a small number of shells, or similar actions which seem intended to hamper governmental operations rather than to defeat them. Harassments also include the making of threats.
Groundfire	Guerrilla fire directed against aircraft.
Engagements	Unplanned, opportunistic-hostilities (also called confrontations and firefights).
Diversion	A military action to divert governmental forces from other activities.
Thwarted attempt	Sometimes used as a secondary incident type to identify unsuccessful incidents.
Occupation	Seizure of territory.
Barricade	The embargoing of an area (also called a containment).
Roadblock	The deliberate blockage of a road by any means. If the roadblock is part of a barricade, the incident is coded as a barricade.
Robbery	May also be reported as taxation, depending on the source.
Kidnaping	The forcible impressment of a person into guerrilla ranks or to perform services such as transporting guerrillas to another town.
Assassination	The deliberate killing of a politically prominent individual.
Vandalism	The disruption of offices, property, etc., without major destruction.
Execution	The deliberate killing of a nonprominent individual.
Sabotage	The destruction of facilities which support governmental military operations or the economy.
Bombing	The detonation of any kind of a bomb except a leaflet bomb. If the bombing occurs in an ambush, attack, or other combat category, it is coded in that category.
Arson	Self-explanatory.
Propaganda	Dissemination of information by means such as leaflets and briefings. Dramatic actions without verbal content are not considered propaganda.
Guerrilla recruitment	Self-explanatory.

Targets also are classified by 15 primary and 39 optional secondary target types with frequent combinations including military personnel, civilian personnel, civilian transportation, communications infrastructure, power infrastructure, and military facilities (table 10). Facilities and infrastructure are differentiated by size and importance. For example, destroying a telephone switch box is an attack on a facility, but destroying a powerline is an attack on the entire power network.

25X1

#### Analytic Methods

**Graphical.** The number of guerrilla incidents of a particular type fluctuated greatly on a daily and even a weekly basis. The graphs that appear in this assessment are drawn to reflect the broad trends and the short-term fluctuations.

25X1

The data points on the graphs represent the number of incidents per week. The weekly level of aggregation reveals the overall trends in the data, which can be submerged in daily variations. The smooth lines are five-week moving averages of the weekly data. A moving average is a technique for smoothing a curve. The value of the continuous curve at a particular week represents the average of five weeks of activity, centered about the given week.

25X1

When activity levels for two consecutive weeks were very close, the two data points were merged into a single point on the graph for ease of readability. Thus, a year on a graph may contain less than 52 points. In all analysis, of course, the full set of data were used.

25X1

The bar chart showing the number of assassinations (figure 7) reflects total incidents per quarter from January 1981 to July 1984. Figure 6, which compares guerrilla incidents involving civilian versus military targets, also is calculated on a quarterly basis. In order to construct this graph, the data first had to be partitioned into military- and civilian-related incidents. Any incident labeled as military or civilian in the primary or secondary target type was treated as such. This procedure classified roughly half of the incidents.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

**Table 8**  
**Classification of Incidents by**  
**Secondary Target Type**

Civilian
Agricultural
Bridge
Business
Communications
Cultural
Dam
Diplomatic
Economic
Educational
Foodstuffs
Foreign
Government
Infrastructure
Livestock
Logistics
Money
Petroleum
Political
Power
Rail
Roadway
Religious
Student
Town
Water
Military
Documents
Equipment
Materiel
Paramilitary
Police
Omitted
Clothing
Facilities
Medical
Other
Personnel
Storage

The remaining incidents were classified on the basis of their secondary target type (the more specific target type). Some types clearly indicate civilian targets (for example, agriculture, and cultural). Others, such as logistics, are more problematic. For these, the CAJIT coder's comments were examined to determine the overall impact of the category. A few categories could not be classified as either civilian or military. These 578 incidents were excluded from the graph. The classification of each secondary target type appears in table 8. [redacted]

25X1

**Statistical.** A trend analysis was performed on each incident type, with the objective of determining the presence or absence of a significant overall trend over the four-year period. No significant overall trend was found in a majority of the incident types. Even in those cases with a significant overall trend, the interpretation and practical significance of each result was clouded by the following factors:

- Offensives and elections prompted peaks of guerrilla activity. These significantly affected the overall trend, thus obscuring changes in the underlying baseline.
- The overall variability of the data, plus sharp changes in the level of the variability, weakened the meaningfulness of statistical trend assessments.
- A different trend is sometimes evident in different years, thus weakening the interpretability of the overall trend.

As a result, overall trend analyses of the incident data are not very meaningful. Each incident type should be examined on a year-to-year basis, taking into account the effects of significant events such as elections.

25X1

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

**Table 9**  
**El Salvador: Primary Versus**  
**Secondary Incident Type**

Incident Type	Secondary																			Total			
	AMB	ARS	ATK	BAR	BLK	BMB	DIV	ENG	EXE	GDF	HAR	KID	MUR	OCC	PRO	REC	ROB	SAB	THW		VAN	None	
Ambush		1		1	2	5		7		1	1		1				2		4			1,167	1,193
Arson			1			2		1			5	3		1			3	4	3	2		276	301
Assassination																			7			61	68
Attack	10	6		5		4	1	12		3	20		1	235	5		12	16	3			1,807	2,140
Barricade	1				1			1						1	1			2	1			8	16
Bombing		2									3					4	1	37	18			535	600
Diversion																		1					1
Engagement			2	1	1			76						1			1	2				1,037	1,121
Execution											2	3	1		1		2		36			484	529
Groundfire	2							1														28	31
Harassment	1	5	60		1	2				1		1			17	3	13					1,012	1,116
Kidnaping			2					1	18		3	10	1	1	1	6	1	1	4			523	572
Occupation	1	1		1	2			2	1						36	2	2	3	2			72	125
Other																						1	1
Propaganda			2		3	3		1			12	3		6		17	1	1				783	832
Raid			1																			36	37
Recruitment											1	1			2							9	13
Roadblock	2	19	1	15		1		13	1		18	6		6	24		358	16		11		241	732
Robbery		4	1			1			2		5	5			2	1	5		4	2		748	780
Sabotage		6	5	1	2	136		2			2			1	2		1		22	1		684	865
Vandalism											1						1					22	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9,534</b>	<b>11,097</b>	

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

**Table 10**  
**El Salvador: Primary Versus Secondary Target Type**

Target Type	Secondary																				None	Total
	AGR	BRD	BUS	CIV	CLO	COM	CUL	DAM	DIP	DOC	ECO	EDU	EQP	FAC	FOD	FOR	GOV	INF	LIV	LOG		
Business														1								1
Civilian						2								2							1	10
Communications																						1
Economic	18														1			1				24
Equipment	8		2				1														2	20
Facility	55		94	80		77	4		14		1	7					50	2		9		1,078
Government														1								1
Infrastructure	4	171	1	3		78		12						3						6		2,400
Logistics	8		1	1	16	6					2		8	8	89			3	129			1,186
Military										1				3						3		19
Other																						1
Personnel	48		13	2,055		3			3			9				6	13			9		5,742
Political																						1
Storage																						1
Transportation	28		16	334		2					3					3	7	10		2		611
None																						1
<b>Total</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>2,473</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>30</b>		

	MED	MIL	MON	MTL	OTH	PAR	PER	PET	PLC	POL	POW	RAL	RDW	RLG	STR	STU	TRN	TWN	WAT	None	Total	
Business																						1
Civilian							1														4	10
Communications																					1	1
Economic																	3				1	24
Equipment					1					6	2											20
Facility	9	408				51	2	17	27	13	123	4		4	14		6	1	1	5	1,078	
Government																						1
Infrastructure		1			2	1	9	3			632	12	70				220	1,146	24	2	2,400	
Logistics	23	3	573	31	28		2	2			1						152	1		99	1,186	
Military								12														19
Other																					1	1
Personnel	14	3,004				296				179	31	2		4		7	31			15	5,742	
Political				1																		1
Storage									1													1
Transportation	3	93					12	2	1			80	3						1	11	611	
None																						1
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>3,509</b>	<b>573</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>1,148</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>11,097</b>	

Top Secret

**Top Secret**



25X1

;

;

**Top Secret**