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Nicaragua: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction



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Erratum

Notice to recipients of Reference Aid: *Nicaragua: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction*, ALA 84-10088/CR 84-13330, [Redacted] September 1984. 25X1

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
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The graphic on page 2 has incorrect colors. The attached is correct. [Redacted]

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
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Figure 2
Cuban and Nicaraguan Party Flags




Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSN), 1927-34.³

"Red and black flags on many houses. As a Nicaraguan I am happy. That flag was the flag of Sandino. Fidel adopted the Sandino flag for the '26th of July' movement, and so it became the flag of the Cuban revolution." Ernesto Cardenal, In Cuba (1974).



Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement (M-26-7 or 26 Julio)




Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

³ Information courtesy of US Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.



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Nicaragua: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction



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This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
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**Nicaragua:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction**

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Summary

*Information available
as of 8 September 1984
was used in this report.*

Five years after the overthrow of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Nicaragua is ruled by the predominantly Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN has reneged on its original promises to establish a pluralist political and economic system and to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy—as long association with its principal foreign mentor, Fidel Castro, suggested it would. Nevertheless, in response to mounting domestic and foreign pressures, the FSLN has pledged to hold elections in November 1984 for president, vice president, and assembly.

The overwhelming popularity in Nicaragua originally accorded the FSLN-led coalition has eroded considerably. Most former allies have distanced themselves from the FSLN in varying degrees. Some groups—such as the Independent Liberal Party and the Popular Social Christian Party—while ostensibly supporting the regime, have decided to compete in the election as independent parties. Others, such as the Democratic Coordinator and the Superior Council of Private Enterprise, have become part of a large, unarmed, internal political opposition. Still others, most notably the Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, including a few former members of the FSLN, have taken up arms against it. Several opposition leaders have said that, in an electoral contest meeting internationally acceptable standards of fairness, the FSLN would win no more than 40 percent of the popular vote.

The FSLN's opponents, however, have been unable to take full advantage of the FSLN's shrinking base of support. The political parties constituting the legal opposition cooperate only with difficulty and are internally divided, mainly over the extent to which they should confront the FSLN directly. Their leaders are not particularly vigorous or adventuresome. Some of them, doubtful that they can overcome the FSLN's advantages in mass organization and propaganda and thus fearful of losing, may be looking for an excuse to boycott the elections or may be hoping that the regime will cancel them.

In comparison with the parties, other elements of the unarmed opposition—the private sector, independent unions, Catholic hierarchy and the feisty newspaper *La Prensa*—are better led and seem to us more determined to confront the regime. Yet, the prospect of an FSLN regime legitimized by an election is demoralizing for many in these sectors as well.

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The antiregime insurgents—the “contras”—have achieved significant strength and confidence. The Somozist ingredient within their ranks now represents no more than a tiny fraction of their total membership, and they have developed good relations with the population in rural areas where they operate. They have not yet achieved fully effective unification, although there has been movement in this direction. They depend heavily on outside support, and Sandinista control of densely populated western Nicaragua has limited expression of popular support for them.

We expect the existing array of forces along the political spectrum to remain essentially in place at least through the end of 1984. We do not expect the FSLN to acquire new political allies, nor is the center likely to develop bold, unified leadership. Given the weakness of many of the FSLN's internal adversaries and its ability to control the election process, FSLN victory seems a foregone conclusion. Claiming that the election has conferred on it a new aura of legitimacy, the FSLN probably will proceed with its increasing domination of Nicaraguan society.



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Nicaragua: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction

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Introduction

In July 1979 guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), with broad popular support, ousted the government of President Anastasio Somoza Debayle. As it came to power, the FSLN promised to establish a new society based on political pluralism, a mixed economy, and observance of human rights. Among the specific public commitments made by FSLN leaders to the Organization of American States shortly before Somoza's overthrow, and to the Nicaraguan people on their first day in power, was a pledge to hold free elections within a few months. The FSLN reneged on this pledge, although in October 1982 the Sandinistas proclaimed a six-point plan to institutionalize the revolution that included the promulgation of laws on political parties and elections. The interim legislature, the Council of State, enacted these laws in September 1983 and March 1984, respectively, thereby setting the stage for elections for president, vice president, and a 90-member assembly to be held in November 1984.

The scheduling of elections focuses new attention on the major political elements and dynamics in the Nicaraguan political spectrum. In our view, the steady erosion of the regime's legitimacy and its original promises has been the basic determinant in how these political actors have interacted since 1979 and how they approach the coming elections. As a result, elements once firmly supporting the FSLN now comprise uncertain allies, nonviolent opponents, and armed insurgents. This paper identifies the key individuals and groups, provides some background on them, and examines the ways they interact. Appendixes A through C offer capsule summaries on the key groups as well as a list of all known organizations presently or recently active.¹

¹ There is foldout table, *A Guide to Key Political Groups*, at the end of the paper that contains a list of the political organizations, with their abbreviation and orientation, discussed in the text.

From National Consensus to Partisan Rule

Somoza's fall represented something close to a national triumph. The victorious elements spanned the political spectrum from extreme left to center-right, including not only Sandinistas and three smaller Marxist splinter groups but conservatives, the private sector and labor unions, virtually the entire Catholic Church and most Protestant denominations, and even former Somocistas. This broad coalition, most observers agree, was supported by perhaps 90 percent of the Nicaraguan people.

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The principal segments of the anti-Somoza coalition included:

- The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), composed of three factions or "tendencies" (Popular Prolonged War, Proletarian, and Tercerista or Insurrectionist). Led by pro-Cuban Marxists, the tendencies had merged into a unified National Directorate only in March 1979, after prodding by Fidel Castro. The Sandinistas had mass support on the left in the form of the United People's Movement (MPU), but their links to non-Marxist sectors were forged by the Terceristas, the largest of the factions, whose own rank and file was generally social democratic, nationalist, and Christian. The Terceristas maintained covert control of *Los Doce* (The Twelve), a group of ostensibly apolitical professionals formed in 1977, with strong connections to other prominent Nicaraguans. 25X1
- The traditional conservative opposition to the Somoza-dominated Liberal Party. This opposition was linked mainly by a network of families, particularly the Chamorros, who controlled the independent newspaper *La Prensa*. Its preferred political party was the right-centrist Democratic Conservative Party (PCD). Its principal tie to other anti-Somoza elements was the Democratic Union of 25X1

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
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Figure 2
Cuban and Nicaraguan Party Flags



Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSN), 1927-34.³

"Red and black flags on many houses. As a Nicaraguan I am happy. That flag was the flag of Sandino. Fidel adopted the Sandino flag for the '26th of July' movement, and so it became the flag of the Cuban revolution." Ernesto Cardenal, In Cuba (1974).



Fidel Castro's 26th of July movement (M-26-7 or 26 Julio)



Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

³ Information courtesy of US Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

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Table 1
Los Doce (The Twelve)

Name	Position in November 1977	Current Role
Miguel D'Escoto Brockman	Maryknoll priest; publisher of Orbis Books, Maryknoll, NY	Maryknoll priest; Nicaraguan Foreign Minister
Fernando Cardenal Martinez	Jesuit priest; a leader of Revolutionary Christian Movement which, according to US Embassy Managua, had links with FSLN	Jesuit priest; Minister of Education
Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro	Corporation lawyer; exiled in Costa Rica	Finance Minister
Arturo Cruz Porras	Official with Inter-American Development Bank in Washington	Prominent antiregime exile leader after serving as a member of GRN Junta and then as Ambassador to the United States
Carlos Tunnerman Bernheim	Former university rector	Ambassador to the United States
Sergio Ramirez Mercado	Writer; Secretary General of the Higher Council of the Central American University; according to US Embassy Managua, a Marxist; in Costa Rica	Member GRN Junta
Emilio Baltodano Pallais	Businessman, active in human rights and Catholic Church issues, exiled in Costa Rica	Nicaraguan Comptroller General
Felipe Mantica Abaunza	Businessman active in Catholic Church and charitable causes; exiled in Costa Rica	Businessman
Ricardo Coronel Kautz	Large landowner; involved in agrarian cooperatives and cattle development projects to help poor farmers; exiled in Costa Rica	Vice Minister of Policy, Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA)
Ernesto Castillo Martinez	Lawyer; professor at the National Autonomous University; identified as a friend of Mantica family; an FSLN activist, probably in Costa Rica	Justice Minister
Casimiro Sotelo Rodriguez	Architect and businessman living in California; FSLN member	Ambassador to Canada
Carlos Gutierrez Sotelo	Dentist; FSLN member; living in Mexico	As of 1981, official in Foreign Ministry

Note: In November 1977, this group issued a manifesto—"the Document of Twelve"—asking for a national dialogue to seek peaceful solutions to the crisis in Nicaragua. In February 1978, the US Embassy in Managua judged them collectively "important as a link between the FSLN and the private sector."

Liberation (UDEL), headed first by the publisher of *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal. Chamorro's assassination in January 1978—widely attributed in Nicaragua to Somoza's son Anastasio—galvanized popular resistance to the dictator, thereby aiding significantly the Sandinistas' final offensive. More specifically, it made even the staunchest non-Marxists in the PCD and UDEL willing to collaborate with *Los Doce*, and thereby the FSLN, to overthrow Somoza.

- The private sector, organized mainly around the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). This group opposed what it perceived as Somoza's antibusiness policies, his efforts to accumulate wealth for himself, and curbs on political liberties. Following Chamorro's assassination, one of COSEP's leaders, manufacturer Alfonso Robelo Callejas, organized a political coalition of progressive businessmen and professional and labor leaders known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN). The MDN then joined UDEL and *Los Doce* to form the Broad Opposition Front (FAO).

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- The Catholic Church, led by Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. [redacted] by 1974 he was "firmly opposed to the regime" of Somoza [redacted] he helped the FSLN achieve power in at least three ways: as mediator in important confrontations between the FSLN and the regime, he achieved outcomes enhancing the FSLN's prestige; he withheld episcopal censure of church activists who became FSLN combatants; and in August 1978 he and other bishops publicly called upon Somoza to resign, implicitly justifying violence against him if he refused. Several Protestant organizations also opposed Somoza.
- Former members of Somoza's Liberal Party. The small Independent Liberal Party (PLI), which had broken away in the 1940s to protest Somoza family dominance, was joined by other liberals in the late 1970s. The left-of-center PLI became virtually a junior partner of the FSLN. [redacted]

To solidify this partnership, FSLN spokesmen repeatedly promised that the post-Somoza regime would respect political pluralism, provide guarantees for the private sector, and pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. Moreover, the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN) established in July 1979 by the FSLN and its allies as the interim government—pending national elections—reinforced earlier Sandinista pledges by decreeing that "all laws repressing the free manifestation and communication of thought and the freedom of information shall be abolished."
(c)

In addition to postponing elections, the FSLN since then has sought to evade its other commitments to pluralism. It has, for example:

- Seized nearly 90 percent of the media and heavily censored the rest.
- Stacked the Council of State and key ministries with FSLN loyalists.
- Turned the security forces and mass organizations into Cuban-style instruments of intimidation directed against political activists, church officials, and

Atlantic coast minorities (mainly non-Spanish-speaking Miskito, Sumu, and Rama Indians, English-speaking Creoles, black Caribs, and some Chinese).

- Circumvented normal judicial authority through special tribunals and held thousands of political prisoners.
- Undertaken public indoctrination to train Nicaraguan youth in Marxism.
- Built up its own labor groups through fraudulent elections, intimidation, and economic sanctions directed against competing labor organizations.
- Embarked on what we believe to be the slow strangulation of the private sector.²
- Applied political restrictions that, in the view of the Permanent Human Rights Commission of Nicaragua established in 1977 in Managua, are more severe than under Somoza. [redacted]

FSLN supporters claim that the Sandinistas would have kept their pledges were it not for the antiregime violence by Somocista elements dating almost from the time of Somoza's fall, although it seems to us likely that a movement closely linked from its inception with the Cubans would have attempted to establish a somewhat similar political system. In addition, evidence from FSLN documents indicates the intention of FSLN leaders to operate only temporarily behind a facade of democracy.³ [redacted]

³ For example, the April 1978 edition of the *FSLN Bulletin* insisted that the "vanguard Sandinista nucleus should . . . use Marxism-Leninism as an absolute and unquestionable guide . . . for the transformation of society." In January 1979, Tercerista leader Humberto Ortega, now Minister of Defense, wrote to a fellow leader that "what we plan is a broad democratic and popular government which, despite the participation of the bourgeoisie, is a means and not an end toward . . . socialism." The FSLN's design for achieving hegemony over all other political movements was formalized in a 36-page document presented by FSLN leaders to other members of the party in September 1979. [redacted]

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The FSLN's Cuban Connections

The FSLN leadership's association with Fidel Castro predates the formation of the party itself in 1961. A pro-Sandinista source recorded in 1981 that a "few months" after Castro's victory in 1959, a multinational guerrilla column was formed in the Honduran-Nicaraguan border area "with strong moral support from Che Guevara." The column was ambushed by local security forces and "several Nicaraguans and Cubans died." Carlos Fonseca Amador, later a co-founder of the FSLN with Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge, was seriously wounded in that battle. He recuperated in Cuba, and later moved his family to Havana, where they remained until Somoza's downfall. Fonseca died in combat against Somoza's National Guard in 1976. [redacted]

During the 1960s and 1970s, the FSLN continued to draw inspiration from the Castro regime. Borge, the only surviving co-founder of the FSLN, recalled that, during those years, "for us, Fidel was the resurrection of Sandino." Ernesto Cardenal, now Minister of Culture, visited Cuba in 1970 and 1971 and his published impressions (In Cuba, New York 1984) imply that the new Nicaragua, in order to fulfill Sandino's legacy, should look to Cuba as a model. He particularly praised Castro's 1961 literacy campaign, which combined teaching basic reading and writing skills with socialist political indoctrination. The Nicaraguan literacy campaign of 1980, administered by Ernesto's brother Fernando, followed the same pattern. [redacted]

For their part, the Cubans during this period not only cultivated potential Nicaraguan friends like Ernesto Cardenal, but also eagerly repeated FSLN statements indicating solidarity with Cuba and its Communist allies and hostility toward the United States. The Cubans also welcomed FSLN achievements. In 1974 and 1978, when the FSLN kidnaped members of the Somoza regime in order to free Sandinista prisoners and obtain money and publicity, the victorious guerrillas were flown to Cuba where Castro greeted them as heroes. [redacted]

As the prospects for the overthrow of Somoza brightened, Castro asserted his influence over the FSLN by persuading the leaders of three separate "tendencias" to unify in the FSLN National Directorate in return for further Cuban material assistance. Castro had already provided paramilitary training and safehaven for FSLN cadres. For the final Sandinista offensive, Cuba helped design the FSLN's military strategy, provided 500 tons of weaponry, trained and transported combatants, and even sent as many as 50 advisers to Nicaragua to accompany Sandinista units into the field. [redacted]

Since July 1979, the Cuban presence has expanded to virtually all Nicaraguan public institutions. [redacted] to the sizable corps of Cuban advisers stationed with the armed forces and the Interior Ministry, as well as the thousands of Nicaraguans sent to study in Cuba. Many key Nicaraguan institutions clearly follow Cuban precedents. [redacted]

Humberto Belli, a former Sandinista now living in exile, has stressed other aspects of the Cuban presence that may be less obvious to foreigners but grate on Nicaraguan nerves: the gratuitous insults to Nicaraguan religious sensibilities; the provision of Cuban economic assistance that includes the dispatch of Cuban construction workers to a country where serious unemployment exists in the construction industry; and above all the sense that the Cubans are an occupation force. After noting in a book published in 1983 that there appeared to be at least 8,000 Cubans in Nicaragua (current Intelligence Community estimates are even higher), Belli added that "8,000 Cubans is, for Nicaragua, what 800,000 would be for a country the size of the United States." [redacted]

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Table 2
Cuba-Nicaragua: Some Similar Institutions^a

Cuba		Nicaragua	
CDR	Comite de Defensa de la Revolucion (Committee for the Defense of the Revolution)	CDS	Comite de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defense Committee)
CPC	Consejo Provincial de Cultura (Provincial Council of Culture)	CPC	Centros Populares de Cultura (People's Cultural Centers)
CTC	Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions)	CST	Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (Sandinista Workers' Central)
DSE	Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security)	DGSE	Direccion General de la Seguridad del Estado (General Directorate of State Security)
DOE	Departamento de Operaciones Especiales (Department of Special Operations)	BOE	Buro de Operaciones Especiales (Bureau of Special Operations)
DIM	Direccion de Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelligence Directorate)	IM	Inteligencia Militar (Military Intelligence)
INRA	Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (National Institute for Agrarian Reform)	INRA	Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (National Institute for Agrarian Reform)
MICONS	Ministerio de la Construccion (Ministry of Construction)	MICONS	Ministerio de Construccion (Ministry of Construction)
MTT	Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (Territorial Troops Militia)	MPS	Milicias Populares Sandinistas (Sandinista People's Militias)
SMG	Servicio Militar General (General Military Service)	SMP	Servicio Militar Patriotico (Patriotic Military Service)

^a Nicaragua's intelligence and security organizations not only resemble their Cuban counterparts in name, structure, and functions, but also have numerous Cuban (and other bloc) advisers from counterpart organizations assigned to them. Ministries of construction are especially characteristic of the USSR and its allies—reflecting at least in part the Marxist emphasis on “constructing a new society”—and are infrequently found in non-Marxist regimes.

No other Hispanic country has *milicias*, which are effective Marxist instruments for mobilizing and controlling populations. Peru is the only other Latin American country with a *servicio militar* and a CDR network. INRA is obsolete in Cuba and Nicaragua, in each case having been absorbed by the relevant ministry dealing with agricultural affairs once it had completed nationalizing large farm properties.

Those Nicaraguans inclined to blame the FSLN for the “deficiencies of the present”—restrictions on political freedoms, a sagging economy, and even the civil turbulence—have grown considerably over the past five years. As discussed below, however, there is considerable disunity in sectors outside the FSLN. Even those certain of what they oppose are uncertain of what they favor or how to reach their political goals.

The Regime and Its Supporters

The FSLN

The Sandinistas directly or indirectly control all key public institutions in Nicaragua. The public record shows that FSLN members occupy two of the three

posts in the Junta and at least 10 of the 13 top commands in the armed forces. At least 40 of the 52 members comprising the Council of State openly support the Sandinistas. Several of the FSLN-dominated groups represented on the Council of State are mass organizations—for example, labor, women's and youth groups, and defense committees (CDS)—with considerable powers to surveil, control, and mobilize the general public; the CDS, for example, issue ration cards. Moreover, the regime's lowering of the voting age to 16 has enfranchised a large portion of the FSLN-dominated youth organization, JS-19J. With this concentration of power, the FSLN has the means to set and enforce public policy on major issues.

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The FSLN also controls much of the daily functioning of government. Only 16 of the 33 Cabinet members are known to belong to the FSLN, but they hold key portfolios such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, justice, planning, construction, culture, agriculture, education, and local government. Several other positions (such as the minister of finance and the comptroller) are managed by individuals considered by opposition leaders to have been co-opted by the FSLN. In addition, the Council of Government, which was installed in March 1981 to advise the Junta on economic and social policy and which seems to function as a rump Cabinet on nonsecurity issues, has an FSLN majority.⁴ [redacted]

The apparent exception to this pattern of FSLN dominance of public bodies—the Supreme Court—tends to prove the rule in practice. Only one of the seven members of the Supreme Court is known to be an FSLN member, and the Court occasionally has acted independently, notably in freeing groups of Atlantic coast minorities detained by Nicaraguan security forces. But the Supreme Court orders must be carried out by the FSLN-dominated Interior and Justice Ministries. All judges below the Supreme Court are appointed by the Junta—in effect, by FSLN majority vote. Moreover, although a system of popular courts set up in 1979 to handle “war crimes” of the Somoza period was disbanded in 1981, new tribunals aimed at perceived opponents of the FSLN were established in May 1983. In addition, the Supreme Court lacks the power to rule on the constitutionality of laws. [redacted]

The FSLN’s ability to work its will with the judiciary and other public institutions presupposes that it maintains internal unity. Decisionmaking within the FSLN centers in the nine-member National Directorate, the so-called comandantes, who—at least publicly—appear coequal. As long as these nine hold together, the FSLN can act decisively. We see little difference among them on fundamental ideology, though they seem to have personal rivalries. [redacted]

[redacted]

Although the commandantes are Marxists, the idea of a truly collective leadership deviates from the organizational practice of ruling Communist parties, which usually are led by a party Politburo with a First or General Secretary. We have had some indications that Nicaragua’s orthodox Communist allies hope this Nicaraguan variant will end. Conceivably the election of a Nicaraguan president could identify a first among equals within the FSLN. Junta members Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez are the FSLN nominees for president and vice president, respectively. [redacted]

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Next to the Directorate, the most important decision-making body within the FSLN is the 80-member Sandinista Assembly (Asamblea), the FSLN’s equivalent, in Communist terms, of a party Central Committee. Historical differences among the three FSLN “tendencies” seem more likely to reemerge here than in the Directorate. Some former Terceristas in the Asamblea may be dissatisfied with certain regime tactics—moves against the Catholic Church, suppression of dissent, and too close identification with Communist states—but, with the exception of Eden Pastora and a few others, we have not yet seen Tercerista defections, and we believe that the overwhelming majority of Asamblea members are committed Marxists. [redacted]

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Uneasy Allies

Among the groups that have been allied with the FSLN are three small political parties and several economic organizations represented on the Council of State. The parties include the Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and two parties of the democratic left—the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) and the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC). The most important economic organizations are two labor confederations, the Sandinista Workers Central (CST) and the Rural Workers Association (ATC), plus the Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (UNAG), formed by the Sandinistas after Somoza’s overthrow to represent new landowners created through agrarian redistribution. In recent months indications of dissatisfaction with FSLN policies have surfaced in all of these groups. [redacted]

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The Comandantes: Nicaragua's Decisionmakers

Formed in March 1979, the National Directorate of the FSLN that has ruled Nicaragua since the Sandinistas toppled the Somoza regime in July of that year, has remained remarkably unified. Because the Directorate's nine members led the insurrection that overthrew Somoza, they are known as comandantes de la revolucion (commanders of the revolution), the highest honorary rank in Nicaragua. The Directorate is the supreme decisionmaking body for the FSLN and the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN); comandantes hold key Cabinet posts, running the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Planning, and Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform. Daniel Ortega holds the post of coordinator of the GRN Junta, from which he communicates Directorate decisions to the government. [redacted]

We believe that the comandantes, as committed Marxists, view the world almost solely in political terms. Most of their decisions, therefore, are aimed at furthering the political power of the FSLN. For example, Nicaraguan officials have told Embassy officers that the FSLN/GRN has no long-term or coordinated economic planning procedures and that government economists have criticized the efficacy of some Directorate decisions. Economic managers have not participated in shaping land reform policy and have criticized the agrarian reform program, among others, as being manipulated to increase rural support for the FSLN at the expense of farm production. [redacted]

The closed political environment and consistent public display of unity make it difficult to assess how the decisionmaking process works. We believe the Directorate generally operates as a collegial body, making decisions based on consensus. US Embassy officials speculate that when disagreements emerge, there may be an informal reckoning of strength rather than a formal vote. In fast-breaking situations, the more powerful among the nine (Tomas Borge, Humberto Ortega, and Daniel Ortega, for example) tend to decide alone or with partial consultation. Because public unity is the cardinal rule of the Directorate, individual comandantes invariably do not dissent publicly from any decision after it is reached; instead, those linked with an unpopular decision tend to keep a low public profile temporarily. [redacted]

Several factors seem to influence decisionmaking in the Directorate. [redacted]

[redacted] there have been some ideological disagreements, if not on goals then on ways to achieve them. Certainly there have been abrupt modifications of decisions taken earlier—for example, on electoral procedures and censorship. Borge, Bayardo Arce, and Henry Ruiz seem to hold relatively hardline views on the direction of the revolution, advocating further militarization, greater control of the opposition, and a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist system. Victor Tirado, too, has recently shown a relatively firm commitment to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, at least publicly. In contrast, the Ortega brothers—supported by Carlos Nunez, Jaime Wheelock, and Luis Carrion—sometimes appear to take a more pragmatic approach, as if willing to temper some Marxist goals at home and abroad in order to ensure the viability of the regime. [redacted]

The US Embassy reports that since 1983 the Ortegas appear to have at least temporarily gained the upper hand among the comandantes. To that extent the ideological orientation of the regime may be less rigidly orthodox Marxist than it would be if the Borge line were dominant. These putative differences in ideology should not be overemphasized, however, [redacted]

[redacted] the regime at least partly contrived such differences for Western consumption. [redacted]

Friendships, rivalries, and individual responsibilities also influence decisionmaking in the Directorate. Borge's vanity and unpredictability, for example, have irritated other comandantes. Although Borge probably expects deference from his colleagues because of his seniority and experience—as the only surviving founder of the FSLN—the Ortegas apparently have not always granted it. Moreover, Embassy reporting indicates that Borge long wanted to be president, yet he did not become the FSLN's choice. Animosity also exists between Ruiz and Wheelock because the overlapping economic functions of their respective planning and agricultural ministries force them to compete for limited financial resources to accomplish their programs. [redacted]

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Until February 1984, the three parties were joined to the FSLN as part of a coalition, the Patriotic Front of the Revolution (FPR). At its February convention, however, the PLI announced its withdrawal from the coalition in order to compete separately in the elections; the other two quickly followed suit. In July the PLI and PSN nominated for president ex-Labor Minister Virgilio Godoy and Council of State member Domingo Sanchez Salgado, respectively. Two small obscure leftist parties—the Popular Action Movement—Marxist Leninist and the Communist Party of Nicaragua, the latter a breakaway from the PSN—also nominated candidates. In their published statements and private comments to US Embassy officials, the PLI, PPSC, and even the PSN have criticized the FSLN for curbing political dissent. In addition, the PLI and PPSC have called for more guarantees to the private sector and for a more nonaligned foreign policy; the PLI wants Nicaragua to improve its relations with its neighbors, while the PPSC advocates better relations with the United States. [redacted]

Whereas the PSN's decision to run separately from the FSLN may be of little consequence—its long-term goals for Nicaragua are nearly identical to those of the FSLN and its electoral support probably is small—the defections of the PLI and PPSC could prove costly. Politicians from parties on the center and center-right have estimated to US officials that in a reasonably fair election the two parties together might garner 20 percent of the vote, with the FSLN winning 40 percent and their own parties the remainder. Moreover, the PLI's alliance with the FSLN had conferred some international prestige on the regime, inasmuch as the PLI president is a respected vice president of the Liberal International, an alliance of liberal parties in several countries. The PPSC had drawn its support mainly from Catholic Church activists—the so-called Popular Church—whose “liberation theology” had led them to support leftist revolutionary causes. Part of the PPSC, calling itself the Authentic PPSC, has split off from the rest of the party and joined the unarmed opposition. [redacted]

Anti-FSLN grievances within economic organizations are less specific, but—because these organizations claim a combined membership of more than 275,000—the impact on the FSLN's popular support

is potentially greater. Much of the Sandinista Workers Central rank and file, according to the US Embassy, is more interested in bread-and-butter issues than in the Marxist goals conveyed by its leaders and the regime. As a result, a few member unions have switched their affiliation to other labor confederations. The opposite also has occurred, however, and some independent unions have been coerced by the regime into joining the CST. [redacted]

[redacted] many Rural Workers Association members would prefer their leaders to spend more time on improving rural conditions and less on urging their members and families to join the Sandinista militia or register for the draft. Discontent within the National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen seems to be prompted, according to the US Embassy, by its members' new status as landowners; they have developed a vested interest in safeguarding the private sector, and as a result some may be beginning to find more in common with the union's erstwhile rival in rural areas, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise. [redacted]

The Unarmed Opposition

Several major groups in Nicaragua that initially were allied with the FSLN now stand in unarmed opposition to it. They include several political parties, independent trade unions, the private sector, *La Prensa*, and the Catholic hierarchy. Most of these entities are represented in an umbrella group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (CDN). [redacted]

The major political weakness of the CDN is the lack of determination and disunity in the political parties. Although many opposition party leaders claim they could match the FSLN in a fair election, the US Embassy reports that privately these leaders express doubt that they could overcome the FSLN's advantages gained through five years of massive propaganda and control of the state apparatus and mass organizations—even if the campaign from now on were to be fair. Some of the parties, according to the US Embassy, may therefore be looking for an excuse to boycott the elections or may be hoping the regime

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Figure 3
Nicaragua: Major Elements in the Political Spectrum^a

	Regime and Its Perceived Supporters	Unarmed Opposition	Contras
Parties and Paramilitaries	FSLN PLI PPSC PSN Armed forces commanders	PSD PSC PPSCA ^b MLC PCD PCDN ^c	ARDE ^d MISURA FDN
Economic Interest Groups	ATC UNAG CST	COSEP CTN CUS	
Social Groups and Media	AMNLAE <i>Barricada</i> CDS <i>END</i> JS-19J UCA CEPAD	CEN <i>La Prensa</i>	

^a For discussion of these and other significant political organizations, see appendix A.

^b Reportedly has joined PSC.

^c Split with PCD because it decided not to compete in electoral campaign. Is probably much larger than remnant of PCD.

^d In July 1984 Eden Pastora and his followers withdrew from ARDE in protest against unification of ARDE with FDN.

[Redacted]

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will cancel them altogether. In July, the CDN nominated a former Junta member and Ambassador to the United States, Arturo Cruz, for president and Social Christian Party leader Adan Fletes for vice president, but the CDN has refused to register on the grounds that the existing electoral procedures are unfair. [Redacted]

Conservative Parties (PCD and PCDN)

The Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) is the descendant of Nicaragua's traditional conservative opposition to the Somoza-dominated Liberal Party. Under the present regime the PCD as a whole has been pro-United States, proprivate sector, and anti-Communist, and as of early 1984 the US Embassy considered it the largest and best organized opposition party. Its major weakness is a sharp internal split regarding its basic relation with the FSLN and participation in the elections. The leader of one

faction, Mario Rappaccioli, has been described by US Embassy officials as seeking to undo virtually all that the Sandinistas have done. Moreover, he repeatedly threatened to boycott the elections if he considered the regime's promised electoral freedoms for the party as unsatisfactory. Leaders of the second, and, in our judgment, much smaller faction, Clemente Guido, Enrique Sotelo, and Junta member Rafael Cordova Rivas, argued that the PCD should work with the government. In July 1984 this faction registered for the election using the name PCD. Rappaccioli's followers, using the name Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCDN), have aligned themselves with the CDN by refusing to participate in the campaign. [Redacted]

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Social Christian Party (PSC)

An active but minor player in the Nicaraguan political scene for the past two decades, the PSC probably commands more respect from abroad—and the FSLN—than any other party in the internal opposition. It has strong ties to the independent Nicaraguan Workers' Central, the Catholic hierarchy, and other Social Christian and Christian Democratic parties in Latin America and Western Europe. In March 1984 PSC leaders shifted from calling for dialogue among all sectors, including the contras, to talks between the FSLN and the unarmed democratic opposition. We believe this decision may have been designed to demonstrate the PSC's reasonableness vis-a-vis the regime. Nonetheless, the move undercut the party's allies in the CDN and differed from the position of the church hierarchy, who in April 1984 included the armed opponents in their proposal for dialogue. In addition, the PSC has been more eager than other opposition parties to participate in the campaign and appears to have been strengthened by defections from the PPSC in the form of the so-called Authentic PPSC. PSC leader Adan Fletes probably received the CDN's vice presidential nomination in order to ensure that the PSC would not openly differ with the other CDN members on the question of boycotting the election. [redacted]

Social Democratic Party (PSD)

Formed in 1979, the PSD identifies ideologically with European Social Democrats. The party last September joined the small Democratic Action Party of El Salvador and the Panamanian People's Action Party to form Central American Social Democracy, an organization designed to facilitate mutual support among these parties. US Embassy officials have described PSD leaders as being sometimes more aggressive than perceptive. For example, having been admitted to the Council of State in January 1984, the PSD soon withdrew to protest the electoral law then under discussion. This precipitous withdrawal not only deprived the PSD of further opportunity to shape the law but also diluted the protest because the move was not coordinated with the other opposition parties. [redacted]

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)

The Council is an umbrella group representing lower-middle to upper-class members of the private sector.

Next to the church, it is the largest, most representative, and best organized opposition group. The Council's energetic new leader, cotton grower Enrique Bolanos, probably is second in importance to Archbishop Obando y Bravo among the regime's opponents. COSEP cooperates with the opposition parties and has pledged material support to them in order to encourage unity during the electoral campaign. Ironically, however, the Council's demonstrated effectiveness has aroused the envious resentment of some party leaders. In addition, some Council members, according to the US Embassy, are becoming increasingly discouraged by the regime's growing control over the economy and continuing threats of confiscation. [redacted]

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Independent Labor

Nicaragua's only independent labor unions, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN) and the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), have considerable political potential, and some problems as well. Although we do not have reliable data on their membership, the two unions together probably are larger than all the political parties combined. Their leaders seem determined to stay politically active, despite considerable FSLN harassment. They also have sources of moral and some financial support; CTN receives assistance from the Latin American Workers Central, a Christian Democratic regional labor organization, while the Confederation has connections with the American Institute for Free Labor Development and other Western labor organizations. [redacted]

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On the debit side, the Nicaraguan Workers Central is hampered by an internal split, with one factional leader, Carlos Huembes, regularly accusing the other, Antonio Jarquin, of being an FSLN agent. The Confederation's main problems, according to its secretary general, Alvin Guthrie, are that it lacks money and reliable domestic allies. Guthrie wants the Confederation to participate actively in the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator alliance challenging the FSLN candidate in the elections, and he—unrealistically, in our view—favors trying to persuade the FSLN to meet with the CDN on an open agenda. [redacted]

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**The Catholic Church**

The mainstream Catholic Church, according to the US Embassy, is the strongest element in the unarmed opposition, and Archbishop Obando y Bravo the most popular leader. He and other members of the hierarchy were buoyed by the Pope's visit in March 1983 and seem more determined than ever to make the church a bulwark against the Sandinistas' institutionalization of Marxism. Moreover, the Vatican's decision to have Obando step down in September 1983 from president to vice president of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference (CEN)—at first considered by many observers as a Vatican concession to the Sandinistas—has made it more difficult for the regime and others to single him out for criticism. Now these critics must take on the entire CEN as it proclaims

what previously Obando alone would have said. Under its current president, Bishop Pablo Vega, the Conference has boldly asserted its opposition to conscription and called for the regime to negotiate even with its armed opponents. Enthusiastic attendance at official church functions—marked on one recent occasion by tens of thousands chanting “we are Christians, not Marxists”—suggests that the bishops' policies toward the regime reflect the aspirations of a large majority of practicing Catholics.

Nevertheless, the church is politically divided. Members of the so-called Popular Church, which draws most of its strength from religious orders, such as the

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Politically Divided Families

Familial relationships traditionally have played a prominent role in Nicaraguan politics. In the past, a group of families centered in the city of Granada and identified with the Conservative Party struggled for political dominance over a similar group concentrated in Leon who supported the Liberal Party. Among the leading Conservative Party families were the Chamorros, who founded the newspaper La Prensa in 1926 as a voice in opposition to the Liberal Party dominated by the Somoza family. [redacted]

The January 1978 assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, editor and publisher of La Prensa, by Somoza security forces proved to be a critical turning point in the movement to oust Somoza. On one level it united Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas against the dictator. On another level it brought together Marxists and non-Marxists, the latter led by families like the Chamorros and the Cardenals. The latter alliance became the source of subsequent political divisions within these families, who remained united in what they opposed—Somoza—but not in what they supported. [redacted]

Within the Chamorro family, Pedro Joaquin's brother, Xavier, became the new editor of La Prensa. Pedro's son Carlos Fernando began collaborating directly with Sandinista combatants even while retaining his normal journalistic duties. When La Prensa reopened after Somoza's fall—Somoza's forces had bombed it out of production earlier that year—Carlos Fernando decided to ally himself more directly with the new regime. He left the family enterprise altogether to become Deputy Minister of Culture and then editor of Barricada, the official FSLN newspaper. [redacted]

That departure set off further reverberations at La Prensa. Xavier resented the resistance of other family members to the new regime. He led a walkout of most of the top editors and reporters of La Prensa and formed El Nuevo Diario, a newspaper supporting the government. As a result, the widow of the assassinated Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, Violeta—who served as an early member of the Junta but became disillusioned with the regime—became head of the board of directors of La Prensa. Her son, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, became codirector of the newspaper. An academic specialist on international media has observed that all three dailies contain acrimonious charges and countercharges about their respective editorial stances. Moreover, two Chamorro cousins of these journalists, Edmundo Chamorro Rappaccioli and his brother Fernando, who fought with the Sandinistas against Somoza, are now prominent anti-Sandinista leaders with UDN-FARN. [redacted]

The Cardenals are related to the Chamorros. Like the Chamorros, they were largely conservative politically and today are divided in their loyalties. Two brothers, the priests Ernesto and Fernando, serve as government officials, and a relative, Vanesa Castro Cardenal, is director of the FSLN's Party Affairs Department and the wife of FSLN National Directorate member Jaime Wheelock. Businessman Jose "Chicano" Cardenal, however, helped found the anti-Sandinista FDN after becoming disillusioned with the FSLN. Lucia Cardenal de Salazar, the widow of a Nicaraguan businessman killed by Sandinista security agents in 1980 and the cousin of Ernesto and Fernando, is now a member of the FDN leadership. [redacted]

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Other families, also traditionally supporters of the Conservative Party, are divided politically. One member of the Cuadra family is a coeditor of La Prensa; another is Minister of Finance under the Sandinistas though not a Sandinista himself; a third is the Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the FSLN. One member of the Coronel family, Carlos Coronel Kautz, is a close adviser to anti-Sandinista leader Eden Pastora; his brothers, Manuel and Ricardo, hold vice ministerial posts in the Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform. The Castillo family also is divided: Mario is a close assistant to FSLN National Directorate member Humberto Ortega; his brother Ernesto is Minister of Justice and an FSLN member; their sister Maria Isabel, however, is married to a prominent businessman and staunchly opposes the Sandinista regime.

Some anti-Sandinista leaders are at odds politically despite family connections. Alfonso Callejas Deshon is a member of the FDN National Directorate and uncle of Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a founder of ARDE, which in the past has resisted formally allying itself with the FDN. Steadman Fagoth of MISURA is married to the sister of his political rival for the allegiance of the Atlantic Coast peoples, Brooklyn Rivera.

In theory some family relationships might eventually contribute to a political reconciliation. According to a December 1983 North American television documentary, for example, most of the Chamorros are socially friendly despite political differences. The history of most civil conflicts, however, suggests even a resolution of the political conflict would not quickly heal the bitter personal divisions within families.

Jesuits, and from foreign priests—both groups outside the direct control of the hierarchy—continue to support the Sandinistas even though the mainstream church no longer does. Some serve the regime in various official or semiofficial roles, thereby helping to preserve the regime's credibility in countries with large Catholic populations. The partnership of church activists with the Sandinistas was important in mobilizing popular support in Nicaragua against Somoza and in presenting the Sandinistas abroad as a movement dedicated to social justice and Christian values. For those reasons, the tentative signs that the commitment of some members of the Popular Church to the regime is weakening—for example, the dissolution of the proregime clerical association ACLEN last January—are equally important. In a book published in 1984, a generally pro-FSLN church activist estimated that no more than 25 percent or so of the Catholic clergy in Nicaragua remain "supportive of the revolution." The rest, he said, appeared to be "with the bishops."

La Prensa

Once the clearest voice of the anti-Somoza opposition, *La Prensa* now fulfills virtually the same role against the FSLN. It is a close ally of Obando y Bravo. Although the Chamorro family, who owned it, is now divided politically, its codirector and general manager—both Chamorros—are leaders in two major opposition parties. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro is with the Social Democratic Party; Jaime Chamorro is with the Democratic Conservative Party. We believe the newspaper now is subject to greater censorship but commands stronger international support than during the Somoza era. Overall, we believe that *La Prensa*, like the Episcopal Conference but unlike much of the rest of the unarmed opposition, relishes its confrontation with the FSLN and is generally optimistic about its prospects for survival.

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The Contras

Over the past three years, world media and other sources have identified at least 20 anti-Sandinista exile organizations, most of which claim to have some military capability. Nearly all have combined forces or withered away for lack of popular and material support. We believe only three "contra" organizations—with an estimated combined strength of about 15,000 insurgents—currently possess a recognizable political leadership and demonstrated capacity to conduct combat operations inside Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN); the combined forces of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE); and the MISURA Revolutionary Front. Together these organizations have achieved considerable popular following in the largely rural areas where they operate, although Sandinista control of western Nicaragua where most of the population is concentrated has greatly inhibited expressions of popular support for them in those districts. [redacted]

The FDN

Based in Honduras, the FDN is larger than the other two groups combined. It was formed in 1981 and at first had a heavily Somocista and National Guard cast. In 1982, however, its Directorate was reorganized to attract, successfully, additional prestigious individuals not identified with Somoza:

- Adolfo Calero, leader of the Democratic Conservative Party until he went into exile in 1982.
- Alfonso Callejas, who resigned as Vice President of Nicaragua in 1972 to protest Somoza's authoritarianism.
- Lucia Cardenal de Salazar, widow of Jorge Salazar, an anti-Somoza businessman killed in 1980 by Sandinista security agents because of his opposition to the regime.
- Indalecio Rodriguez, former leader of the Independent Liberal Party exiled in the 1960s for his opposition to Somoza [redacted]

Few of the FDN's key civilian personnel—who control the organization's political and military affairs—held positions in the Somoza government. Only one present Directorate member, Enrique Bermudez, was directly associated with Somoza. His position as Nicaraguan defense attache in Washington from 1976-79 generally insulated him from association

with human rights abuses during the civil war. He currently serves as Directorate liaison to the FDN general staff, whose five members served as National Guard officers. A few ex-guardsmen occupy key positions owing to their military qualifications, although we estimate that less than five percent of FDN combatants are former guardsmen, and this share is declining as new recruits are added. [redacted]

ARDE

Based in Costa Rica, ARDE was formed in September 1982, and is less rightist in orientation and has stronger anti-Somoza credentials than the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Its principal components, through June 1984, included:

- The Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), led by ex-Sandinista guerrilla commander Eden Pastora.
- The Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), led by Alfonso Robelo Callejas, one of the five members of the original junta that replaced Somoza in 1979.
- The Miskito, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Unity organization (MISURASATA), led by Brooklyn Rivera. MISURASATA was set up by the Sandinista regime in 1979 to represent the Atlantic Coast population but became anti-Sandinista in 1981 and a co-founder of ARDE in September 1982. The regime has created a new organization—with negligible popular support to date—to preserve the facade of loyalty from that quarter.
- The Christian Democratic Solidarity Front (FSDC), under Jose Davila, professing an ideology similar to that of most Christian Democratic parties in Central America.
- Nicaraguan Democratic Workers Solidarity (STDN), led by former labor leader Donald Castillo.
- The Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Forces (UDN-FARN) led by ex-Sandinista fighters Edmundo and Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli. UDN-FARN was one of the founders of ARDE and rejoined it in January 1984 after a brief alliance with FDN. [redacted]

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Figure 4
Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups



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ARDE has been beset with disputes over how far it should go in collaborating with the Nicaraguan Democratic Force without compromising its anti-Somoza legacy, and whether it can function effectively and supply its combatants without such cooperation. For several months the two principal Alliance leaders, Pastora and Robelo, differed significantly on these issues. Robelo was willing to commit the Alliance to a formal coalition with the two other major contra forces, but Pastora strongly objected. Pastora insisted that the Democratic Force must first oust Bermudez—which it is reluctant to do because of his military abilities—and demanded guarantees that ARDE's military requirements would be adequately met as a result of an alliance. Adding to Pastora's intransigence is his considerable ego; we believe that Pastora wants to lead a united insurgent force and, if the Sandinistas were overthrown, Nicaragua itself. In early July, Pastora announced that he and his supporters—constituting most of the southern-based insurgents—had withdrawn from ARDE to continue the struggle as the “true” ARDE. In early September, however, Pastora and Robelo agreed to collaborate on “parallel paths” against the regime. [redacted]

MISURA

Led by Steadman Fagoth, MISURA was originally part of the FDN, remained in regular contact with its military leadership, and, as of June 1984, was ready to join a unified insurgent coalition. MISURA's strength is drawn mainly from Indian refugees who fled to Honduras, but the organization claims to have over 1,500 combatants operating in eastern Nicaragua. MISURA's political goals are limited to securing greater autonomy for the native Indian and black communities in the Atlantic Coast; it has little capability or interest in asserting its presence in the Spanish-speaking areas of Nicaragua. Moreover, a personal rivalry between Fagoth and the chief of ARDE's MISURASATA organization Rivera limits the effectiveness of resistance to Sandinista rule in the Atlantic Coast area. [redacted]

In late August leaders of the three organizations (minus Pastora and his followers) formed the Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR). This action in itself does not portend any imminent threat to the regime, in our judgment. The contra effort is not that

strong. Moreover, all three groups must depend heavily on outside assistance, both material and moral. Nevertheless, the 1984 Easter appeal of the Nicaraguan bishops for the regime to negotiate with the insurgents provides one indication of popular sympathy for their cause. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe that, in the near term, most groups and individuals discussed in this paper will remain where they are on the political spectrum. We expect the FSLN leadership to continue to pay lipservice to democratic ideals while building a Marxist state, and to seek to control, intimidate, and discredit those groups that oppose it. In our view, considering the persistence of the armed anti-Sandinista movement and the increasing internal dissatisfaction with the regime—even among the revolutionary faithful—the FSLN leadership's perception of its security situation will continue to drive its actions. Individual policy moves are likely to be pragmatic, at least in the sense that the FSLN will seek to avoid a domestic or foreign crisis—for example, by allowing the opposition to have limited freedoms in the electoral campaign in order to give the elections a democratic facade for international consumption. In our opinion, although Sandinista leaders realize that opposition participation in the elections would lend greater credence to their claims of pluralism, the FSLN presently appears intent on holding elections with or without such participation, and then proceeding with its increasing domination of society. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Politically Significant Organizations

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
ACLEN	National Association of the Clergy Alvaro Arguello Hurtado, S. J.	A pro-Sandinista group representing the Popular Church on Council of State. In January 1984 Father Arguello withdrew from Council of State and ACLEN abolished itself; probably responding to pressure from Vatican and Nicaraguan bishops to disengage from politics. ACLEN members who take religious vows also belong to CONFER.
AMNLAE	Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women Glenda Monterrey Vasquez (secretary general)	A mass organization set up by the Sandinistas. Originally made up of urban middle-class women who had formed committees during civil war to protest disappearances; women who formed part of Sandinista fighting force and combat support groups joined later. Encourages women to participate in national affairs and to join the military. Propagandizes middle-class women. Has held discussions to redefine women's roles in Nicaragua, established a commission to rewrite law code on marriage, divorce, and property rights. Most important function is to serve as a control mechanism for the regime. All other significant women's organizations are outgrowths of AMNLAE.
ANDEN	Nicaraguan National Association of Educators Carlos Carrion Cruz (national coordinator, Natan Sevilla Gomez (secretary general)	One of the most active Sandinista organizations. Affiliate of the Sandinista labor union CST; 14,000 members involved from primary schools through universities. Not in an adversary role to that of Minister of Education; according to regime spokesmen, there "cannot exist contradictions" in the ministry "now that education serves the masses." ANDEN serves to control teachers' economic demands and to monitor their ideology.
ANS	Association of Sandinista Children Ana Morales	Apparently important only as a propaganda vehicle. Specializes in indoctrination through hero worship, with pilgrimages to the birthplaces of Sandino and Carlos Fonseca Amador. Many parents accuse ANS of weakening family authority and teaching Marxism.
ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance Alfonso Robelo Callejas Eden Pastora Gomez Brooklyn Rivera Bryan Jose Davila Membreno Donald Castillo Edmundo Chamorro Rappaccioli Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli	Coalition of anti-Sandinista groups formed in September 1982 by Pastora's Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), Robelo's MDN, and Rivera's MISURASATA. Later joined by Davila's Christian Democratic Solidarity Front, Castillo's Nicaraguan Democratic Workers' Solidarity, and Chamorro's UDN-FARN. Based in Costa Rica. Carries out guerrilla operations in southern Nicaragua. Represents itself as the voice of the revolution betrayed. Calls for freeing Nicaragua from Cuban, Soviet, and US influence. Also calls for free elections and a mixed economy. Pastora's ties to the Socialist International and his reluctance to see ARDE formally ally with the FDN underscore ARDE's political orientation as somewhat left of the two other significant contra groups. Pastora, Davila, and Castillo have withdrawn at least temporarily from ARDE to set up a "true" ARDE. Robelo's faction of ARDE is now united with the FDN and MISURA in the organization UNIR.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
Asamblea	Sandinista Assembly 80 FSLN members (for example, Director of State Security Lenin Cerna, Junta member Sergio Ramirez, Minister of Justice Ernesto Castillo, Foreign Minister D'Escoto, Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal, <i>Barricada</i> Director Carlos Chamorro)	A consultative body to the FSLN National Directorate that includes the top Sandinistas. Members hold important government, mass organization, media, and party positions. Has more power as a deliberative body than the more publicized Council of State. Meets at least once a year to approve FSLN policies. A forum where serious disagreements within the FSLN are likely to be settled.
ATC	Rural Workers Association Edgardo Garcia (secretary general)	FSLN organization of farm laborers. During revolution, grew out of groups of landless peasants organized in mid-1970s by church activists. Early activities included organizing of land invasions and protest marches. Groups fused in 1978 as ATC, which supported guerrillas and sabotaged Somoza's National Guard operations. Originated on the Pacific coast but now in all parts of country. Runs the Sandinista Agricultural Commune, which consists of some peasants and also "represents" the workers in the State Production Units—nationalized agricultural estates. Ministry of Labor credits the ATC with over 30,000 full members in about 500 unions in 1982; statistics may be inflated. Operates on state farms and private holdings. Competes with farmworkers' unions sponsored by non-Sandinista groups. Functions as a source of Sandinista indoctrination through its rural school of political formation. Organizes nonrural workers for coffee harvests. Possibly because of its traditional links with church activists, ATC has usually sent members to Western Europe and North America rather than to Cuba and the USSR. ATC not developing completely the way the FSLN desires; many members seek to defend own interests rather than FSLN cause.
<i>Barricada</i>	Carlos Chamorro Barrios (director)	The FSLN newspaper, known for its vivid support for regime. Chamorro had been a Sandinista activist during insurrection. When Junta set up special courts in 1979 to try Somocistas, <i>Barricada</i> ran photos of defendants under such headlines as "henchmen of the genocide." Praises state security successes and impugns motives of regime critics. When regime established a special tax to pay for militias, <i>Barricada</i> stressed opposition of private sector—implying that it was unpatriotic. In August 1982 participated in regime-staged public humiliation of Archbishop Obando y Bravo's assistant, Rev. Bismarck Carballo. Has continued to hew faithfully to FSLN line. Has published international monthly editions in English and Spanish since 1982.
CAUS	Center for Labor Action and Unity Allan Zambrana Salmeron (secretary general)	Extreme leftist union not under direct control of CST but linked to the Nicaraguan Communist Party (which is not pro-Moscow). Strong among textile workers. Organized a strike of 2,000 factory workers in Managua in 1980, demanding a 100-percent wage increase; this prompted FSLN leader Arce to declare that "these Communists" were in league with CIA. CAUS's continued instigation of labor agitation led to imprisonment of numerous CAUS officials in late 1981. Since their release in 1982, CAUS has been fairly quiet. As of 1982, had about 1,500 members in 14 affiliates.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
CDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator Luis Rivas Leiva (president)	Umbrella group comprising the unarmed internal opposition to the Sandinista regime. Organized in 1981. Includes PSC, PSD, MLC, CTN, CUS, COSEP, CONAPRO, Chamber of Commerce, CADIN, and UPANIC. Attempting to approach the November elections as a unified bloc.
CDS	Sandinista Defense Committees (or Committee) Leticia Herrera (secretary general)	A powerful instrument of social control in which authority flows from the FSLN directorate through the CDS structure to neighborhood committees. Modeled on the Cuban Committees for Defense of Revolution. Originally called Civil Defense Committees. Formed during the insurrection—in large part from church activist groups inspired by “liberation theology”—to mobilize popular support for Somoza’s overthrow and to aid Sandinista combatants by serving as an intelligence and recruiting network and source of logistic support. Also provided emergency aid to the populace immediately after the Sandinista victory. In 1982 the committees became responsible for local defense under the authority of the army high command. The chain of command is not clearly outlined; considerable overlap exists at the national and local level between the CDS, the militia, and other Sandinista organizations. Currently has authority to issue ration cards and licenses and report on activities of “counterrevolutionaries.” Supervises some local elections. Tasks also include first aid, firefighting, emergency evacuation, vice control, assisting in literacy campaigns, supplying loans and materials for housing.
CEN	Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega Mantilla (chairman or president) Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo (vice chairman or vice president)	Represents the authority of the nine Catholic bishops of Nicaragua. Prior to the fall of Somoza issued a declaration justifying revolution, and early in Sandinista rule cautiously approved regime’s policies, including “socialism.” Has since become increasingly antiregime. Until recent months, at least one bishop, Lopez Ardon of Esteli, was consistently pro-Sandinista. Speculation was that Vatican substituted Vega for Obando as chairman in September 1983 to reduce problems created by Obando’s confrontational style toward regime. However, under Vega CEN has asserted itself boldly, notably by continuing to oppose military conscription. In April 1984 all nine bishops issued a pastoral letter calling on the regime to open negotiations with the Nicaraguan insurgents.



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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
CEPAD	Evangelical Committee for Development Aid Gustavo Parajon Benjamin Cortes	Ecumenical but mainly Protestant organization generally supportive of regime. Established after 1972 earthquake by a Baptist doctor, Parajon, to aid earthquake victims and seek funds from congregations in Nicaragua and from international church agencies to fund longer-term development projects. Interest in human rights issues brought it into confrontation with Somoza and support for FSLN. Distributed food to needy after Somoza's overthrow, and organized propaganda support for regime in Nicaragua and abroad among Protestant denominations, similar to the efforts of Catholic organizations such as ACLEN, CONFER, and UCA to enlist Catholic support for the FSLN. There is some indication that CEPAD's loyalty, like that of some Catholic groups affiliated with the Popular Church, may be shifting away from the regime.
CGTI	Independent General Labor Confederation	A Communist union, organized during the Somoza era by the pro-Moscow Socialist Party of Nicaragua, which joined in a general strike after the 1978 assassination of <i>La Prensa</i> editor. The strike ended after violence and repression by National Guard, but the forces it unleashed contributed to success of Sandinistas. CGTI derives its strength mainly from the Managua Construction Workers Union. Because Socialist Party has been allied with FSLN in government, CGTI generally has supported Sandinistas but has resisted complete takeover by FSLN. Lagging construction industry, however, has hurt rank and file and led to some disagreement with regime policies. Once claimed 15,000 members; US Embassy now estimates less than 7,000.
COIP	People's Industrial Corporation Gilberto Guzman (director)	Established after Sandinistas took power to administer the properties abandoned by or seized from the Somoza family and their collaborators. Within a year controlled 109 industrial enterprises. Falls under Ministry of Industry, and its director also holds title of Vice Minister of Industry.
CONFER	Conference of Religious Orders or National Conference of Religious Rev. Jose Manuel Guijo (president)	CONFERS are found throughout Latin America and are composed of individuals, such as Jesuits, Dominicans, Capuchins, and other religious orders. CONFER has been an important part of the so-called Popular Church in Nicaragua. According to a 1982 internal Church survey of the Central American Church, CONFER was "confronting" the Bishops' Conferences, including the Nicaraguan CEN, with better organization and resources, and many CONFER leaders were judged to be "radicalized" or pro-Marxist. Some indication since 1982 that CONFER's political support for Sandinista regime has been weakening.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
COSEP	Superior Council of Private Enterprise Enrique Bolanos Gayer (president) William Baez Sacasa Enrique Dreyfus Morales	Private-sector umbrella organization established in 1972. Includes Nicaraguan Development Institute/Nicaraguan Development Foundation (INDE/FUNDE), Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries (CADIN), National Confederation of Professional Associations (CONAPRO), Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Construction, and Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers of Nicaragua (UPANIC). Has always been politicized. Strong supporter of 1979 revolution. Tried to work out accommodation with FSLN through mid-1980. Reluctantly took six seats assigned to it in Council of State but would have preferred an elected legislature. After security forces killed its vice president, Jorge Salazar, in November 1980, COSEP left Council of State. Since 1981 has become a voice for middle- and upper-income members of the opposition. Much of COSEP's leadership sees itself as representing the political and economic interests of individuals, not just of private property. Has tended to favor interests of big business, but recently has sought to broaden its membership and has established a chapter in nearly every town. Has encouraged political parties to form an alliance for November elections using promise of COSEP support as tool. Leaders believe that the key political issue is survival, not democracy, tempers short-term goals. Strategy is to not let any one leader become so visible that regime targets him as it did Salazar. Regime methods to attack COSEP include controlling pricing and marketing of goods and declaring meetings illegal; but COSEP retains some ability to affect regime decisions if only because the private sector remains critical to the country's economic health.
CPDH	Permanent Commission on Human Rights Marta Patricia Baltodano (coordinator)	Compiles information on deaths, disappearances, and treatment of political prisoners in Nicaragua. Began activities in 1977. Has a 15-member National Directorate with representatives from the church, business, and labor and political parties. Before 1980 was relatively free to investigate abuses. Then Sandinista regime initiated campaign against CPHD and formed its own organization, the National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. CPHD no longer allowed to enter jails or attend Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals. FSLN harasses members to prevent CPHD from investigating abuses and publishing its findings.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
CST	Sandinista Workers Central Lucio Jimenez Guzman (secretary general)	Started in 1977 as a clandestine Sandinista movement. By 1982, had enrolled 90,000 workers in over 500 member unions, according to probably inflated statistics of Ministry of Labor. Most are in Managua area. Not all members are pro-Sandinista. Has held political seminars to indoctrinate members in Sandinista ideology, mobilized "volunteers" to aid in harvests, and sent workers to Cuba and USSR for political indoctrination. In 1981 joined the Moscow-led World Federation of Trade Unions; has cooperation agreements with Soviet Central Council of Trade Unions. Not very active in seeking worker benefits because of FSLN orders. Practicing journalists supposedly are required to belong to CST affiliate, UPN; and teachers, to the counterpart AN-DEN. There is also a component for white-collar workers, UNE.
CTN	Nicaraguan Workers Central Carlos Huembes (secretary general—one faction) Antonio Jarquin Rodriguez (secretary general—dissident faction)	Outgrowth of Catholic Workers Youth from late 1950s. Became Autonomous Labor Movement of Nicaragua, then CTN. Has informal ties to PSC. Also affiliated with Latin American Workers Central (CLAT) and dependent on CLAT assistance. Joined general strike against Somoza after 1978 assassination of <i>La Prensa</i> publisher. Much of its strength from textile, food processing, and health sectors. Its farmworkers' affiliates have competed with Sandinista-run ATC for rural loyalties. Leaders claim that, during 1979-80, membership tripled to 65,000 workers in more than 100 unions. Leaders admit, however, that membership has since declined because of FSLN pressure. Moreover, internal dissension since 1982 has led to a factional split, with one faction participating in the CDN and the other abstaining.
CUS	Confederation for Labor Unification Alvin Guthrie Rivers (secretary general)	An affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT), backed by AIFLD. Has ties to the AFL-CIO. Played no significant role in overthrow of Somoza. Joined Broad Opposition Front in 1980 with CTN and political parties opposed to Sandinistas. In 1983 the Embassy credited the CUS with 10,000 members. Has about 35 affiliated unions in six regional federations, with wide-ranging skills. Provides vocational training. Organizationally strong but financially weak. State security harasses affiliated unions. Not affiliated with any political party but belongs to CDN. Leaders claim to be pressuring FSLN to hold dialogue with CDN. Significant that this large, independent union continues to exist under Sandinista rule.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
END	<i>El Nuevo Diario</i> (The New Daily) Xavier Chamorro Cardenal (director)	After assassination of <i>La Prensa</i> publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, his brother Xavier took over. Xavier quarreled with Pedro Joaquin's son and widow over support for the Sandinista regime, and the two removed him from his post in 1980. <i>La Prensa's</i> unionized journalists and printers shut facilities; Xavier, along with 80 percent of the newspaper's editorial and technical staff, established a competing daily, <i>END</i> . <i>END</i> supposedly is independent, but its editorial line is virtually indistinguishable from that of the FSLN daily, <i>Barri-cada</i> ; often is even more extreme. Nevertheless, <i>END</i> is subject to mild censorship.
FAO	Broad Opposition Front Alfonso Robelo Callejas	Of historical interest, but now obsolete. Formed in July 1978 in wake of assassination of <i>La Prensa</i> publisher, and in August called a general strike against Somoza regime. Composed of 16 organizations—including three labor unions, four factions of Conservative Party, two socialist parties, Independent Liberal Party, <i>Los Doce</i> (The Twelve, an exile group led by Father Miguel D'Escoto and writer Sergio Ramirez Mercado) and the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), led by Robelo. Forces in this anti-Somoza coalition clearly represented a majority of Nicaraguans. In September 1978 announced formation of a three-member provisional government (Ramirez, Robelo, and Rafael Cordova Rivas, head of UDEL). FAO split into hardliners and moderates in late 1978 over negotiations with Somoza. <i>Los Doce</i> withdrew from negotiations and essentially from FAO. Twenty political and union groups, most linked with FSLN, formed the United People's Movement (MPU), which later joined <i>Los Doce</i> to form the National Patriotic Front (FPN); linked to FSLN. Somoza imprisoned Robelo and several other leaders of FAO and MPU in 1979, thus solidifying opposition against him. In April 1980 Robelo resigned from the Junta to protest regime delays in scheduling elections and began to form a coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist parties under the old rubric FAO (included were PSD, PSC, PCD, and Robelo's MDN). Struggled to remain a loyal opposition until death of Jorge Salazar in 1980, when it withdrew from Council of State. FAO members have since joined the anti-Sandinista insurgents or the internal opposition.
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force Adolfo Calero Portocarrero (president and commander in chief) Enrique Bermudez Varela (military commander) Marco Zeledon Rosales Alfonso Callejas Deshon Lucia Cardenal de Salazar Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz	Largest anti-Sandinista insurgent group, formed in August 1981 and based in Honduras. Stated political objectives for Nicaragua include nonalignment in foreign affairs; free elections; establishment of freedom of press, religion, and association; respect for human rights; and expulsion of Cuban advisers. Politically somewhat to the right of ARDE. Now united with Robelo's portion of ARDE and with MISURA in the new alliance, UNIR.



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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
FETSALUD	Health Workers Federation Santos Lopez (secretary general)	Pro-Sandinista union, though leadership claims it is not controlled by the regime. Formed in 1963, expanded considerably after 1972 earthquake. Participated in 1978 general strike against Somoza, and staffed clandestine hospitals for anti-Somoza combatants. Has pressed for a coherent government policy on minimum wages and working conditions for health workers and improved public health standards. Leadership claims membership of more than 16,000 of Nicaragua's 20,000 health care workers.
FIN	Nicaraguan Internal Front Comdr. Julio Zelaya Rojas Capt. Misael Brenes Comdr. Alejandro Martinez Saenz Engineer Edwin Duarte Dr. Sergio Prado Comdr. Eduardo Sanchez Comdr. Rafael Mayorga Francis Mena Bonilla	Anti-Sandinista group that announced its formation in April 1984. Seeks to promote establishment of a democratic system, characterized by free, secret and periodic elections and "socioeconomic justice with respect for private enterprise." Pledged to struggle against Marxist-Leninist system of the FSLN. Not clear that this is much more than a paper organization.
FPR	Revolutionary Patriotic Front Leaders of FSLN, PLI, PSN, and PPSC	To counter the reconstitution of the FAO in 1980, the Sandinistas formed a progovernment front comprising the FSLN; the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), a remnant of anti-Somoza Liberals; the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), a Communist, pro-Soviet group; and the Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC), a leftist splinter from the PSC. All these parties held positions in government and were represented in Council of State. To date has exercised no authority independent of Sandinistas. In spring 1984 the three parties allied with FSLN announced they would run their own candidates in 1984 election. Status of FPR therefore unclear.
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front Nine-member directorate, with three members from each of the three tendencies	In 1959 a group of students opposed to Somoza organized the National Liberation Front. They instigated an uprising in Leon; many were killed, but some survivors went to Cuba to prepare for another effort against Somoza. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro encouraged the reformation of the group in 1961 as the FSLN under leadership of Carlos Fonseca Amador. Tried terrorism and guerrilla attacks but to little avail at first. Fonseca was arrested in 1969 on bank robbery charges; Sandinistas hijacked an airliner to gain his release. In 1974 the Sandinistas took several hostages, including mayor of Managua and Nicaraguan Ambassador to US; through the mediation of Archbishop Obando y Bravo the Sandinistas received \$5 million, 14 political prisoners, and a trip to Havana. FSLN began to stage effective raids around the country but did not gain a decisive edge until 1978 murder of <i>La Prensa</i> publisher. This galvanized anti-Somoza opposition into willingness to collaborate with FSLN.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
INDE/FUNDE	Nicaraguan Development Institute/Nicaraguan Development Foundation Enrique Bolanos Gayer (president) William Baez Sacasa (executive secretary)	Works with business (as INDE) and provides educational loans and credit to private sector (as FUNDE). Originated in 1963, became a prime mover in creation of COSEP in 1972. Active in recovery efforts after 1972 earthquake. In 1973 began to help small businessmen form cooperatives. Became an active opponent of Somoza in mid-1970s, and since July 1979 has increasingly opposed the Sandinista regime. Uses its cooperatives—which, it claims, have grown from 8,000 organizations before 1979 to more than 30,000 at present—to block FSLN efforts to smother the private sector.
INNICA	Nicaraguan Institute of the Atlantic Coast William Ramirez Solorzano (minister)	Established by the Sandinista regime to encourage the immigration of Spanish-speaking, pro-Sandinista campesinos to the Atlantic coast. Seeks to encourage economic development of region and to reinforce control of indigenous population.
JS-19J	19 July Sandinista Youth Carlos Carrion Cruz (national coordinator)	Formed out of the Sandinista-led Nicaraguan Revolutionary Youth, active in anti-Somoza insurgency. Designed as an organization of secondary school and university students; its purpose is indoctrination, to achieve unconditional support for the FSLN. Provided "volunteers" for coffee harvest and played a large part in the literacy campaign. In 1980 a JS-19J group sacked Robelo's MDN headquarters in Managua with no hindrance from police and later attacked other opposition party headquarters. Linked, along with other Sandinista mass organizations, to CDS. Provides intelligence to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and serves as conduits for mass mobilization and ad hoc recruitment as the regime requires. Has no support from non-Sandinista groups.
MDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Movement Alfonso Robelo Callejas	Originally an anti-Somoza organization from the private sector. Joined with 15 other groups in 1978 to form the FAO. Less inclined than other private-sector groups to accept concessions from Somoza and made an informal alliance with groups linked to FSLN by end of 1978. In April 1980, after Robelo resigned from the governing Junta, MDN joined PSD, PSC, and PCD to form a coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist parties, the reconstituted FAO. An MDN rally scheduled for November 1980 was banned by Borge on grounds it violated decree prohibiting political activity until 1984, and the Sandinista youth group JS-19J sacked MDN headquarters. Moreover, in March 1981 the Sandinista-controlled CDS blocked plans by the MDN to hold a political rally even though Ministry of Interior had given permission. Since then, MDN has strongly opposed the regime. In March 1982, Robelo left Nicaragua and in September 1982 founded ARDE with Eden Pastora.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
MISURA	MISURA Revolutionary Front (or Force) Steadman Fagoth Muller Wycliffe Diego Teofilo Archibald Roger Hermann	Contra group based in Honduras and operating mainly in northeastern Nicaragua. Originally composed of dissident members of MISURASATA. Renamed MISURA in May 1983. Claims to have about 2,800 armed combatants, recruited from native Indian tribes and English-speaking Creoles. Allied with FDN and Robelo's portion of ARDE in the new alliance, UNIR.
MISURASATA	Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Sandinista Unity	Sometimes called Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas and Sandinistas United. Based on Atlantic coast. Founded in 1979 by FSLN as a replacement for a Somoza-supported organization called ALPROMISA, whose leaders and representatives were mostly community lay pastors representing Miskito interests. MISURASATA was supposed to have broader ethnic representation, but excluded Creoles, Black Caribs, and Chinese. Granted a seat on the Council of State. Cooperated in regime-sponsored literacy campaign, but resisted regime efforts to encourage migration of Spanish-speaking (and pro-Sandinista) campesinos to Atlantic coast. Several prominent MISURASATA members have joined contras—either the MISURA Revolutionary Front or the MISURASATA group in ARDE.
MLC	Liberal Constitutionalist Party (or Constitutional Liberal Party) Mario Oviedo Reyes (secretary general)	A splinter group of Somoza's Liberal Party, which broke away in 1968. By 1981 had become generally critical of regime. Currently weak though it continues to be part of legal opposition.
MPS	Sandinista People's Militia	Founded in 1980 as an adjunct to the regular armed forces. Eden Pastora was the first commander. Effective as a means of regime control over the population. Emphasizes projects designed more for "keeping up the revolutionary spirit" than for creating an effective combat force. For example, after the US intervened in Grenada in October 1983, MPS personnel dug trenches in Managua which, according to our defense attaches there, were useless militarily; yet the campaign served to rally people symbolically "in the defense of the revolution."
MPU	United People's Movement Moises Hassan Morales	Mainly of historical interest. In 1978, 22 political, labor, and mass organizations on the left, most linked with FSLN, joined to form the MPU. The presence of <i>Los Doce</i> in the MPU and the FAO linked the Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas. In this way the Sandinistas broadened the base of opposition to Somoza. Hassan Morales was the MPU representative on the first governing Junta appointed in June 1979, a month before the FSLN victory. He is no longer a member. Many former MPU leaders are now anti-Sandinista, and [redacted] Hassan has fallen out of favor with the regime.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
PCD (and PCDN)	<p>Democratic Conservative Party (and Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua)</p> <p>Rafael Cordova Rivas (Junta member) Clemente Guido (pro-Cordova faction) Enrique Sotelo (pro-Cordova faction) Mario Rappaccioli (anti-Cordova faction) Myriam Arguello (anti-Cordova faction)</p>	<p>Center-rightist party now seriously divided. Traditional opponents of Somoza's Liberal Party but not strongly against him until murder of <i>La Prensa</i> publisher. In 1980 joined the coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist parties, the reconstituted FAO. Could have been the largest and most effective legal opposition party. Nevertheless, split into factions. Anti-Cordova faction has signed agreement with CDN to form an alliance in preparation for the November elections. Nevertheless, party leaders say they will not participate in electoral process without guaranteed freedoms. In July 1984 the pro-Cordova faction registered for the elections using the traditional name (PCD). The remainder of the original PCD, apparently by far the largest part, at least temporarily adopted the name PCN (or PCDN), became aligned with the CDN, and refused to participate in the elections.</p>
PLI	<p>Independent Liberal Party</p> <p>Virgilio Godoy Reyes (president)</p>	<p>A small but prestigious remnant of anti-Somoza Liberals, formed in 1944 under the leadership of Gen. Carlos Pasos, to protest Somoza's efforts to have Liberal Party endorse a proposed constitutional amendment to eliminate prohibition against reelection of president. Joined conservative-led legal opposition to Somoza in mid-1960s. After brief stay in the FAO, joined Sandinista-controlled FPN in 1979. In April 1980 joined FPR, formed by Sandinistas to counter the coalition of non-Marxist-Leninist parties, FAO. PLI members hold a few positions in government and PLI is represented on Council of State, but has little real authority. At its February convention the PLI withdrew from the FPR to run in the November elections. PLI leaders have expressed concern about government confiscations of private property and the party's inability to dissent from FSLN in the media.</p>
PPSC (and PPSCA)	<p>Popular Social Christian Party (and Authentic Popular Social Christian Party)</p> <p>Mauricio Diaz Davila (secretary general)</p>	<p>Non-Marxist, left-of-center offshoot of the PSC but influenced by Popular Church to seek "revolutionary change." Has close personal contacts with the CTN and some Catholic bishops. All party work is voluntary. In 1980, joined the FPR, a Sandinista-engineered coalition designed to counter the opposition FAO. In spring 1984 left FPR to run own candidates in November elections. In June 1984 a faction of the PPSC, calling itself the "Authentic" PPSC and headed by Armando Sanchez Vasquez, agreed to collaborate with the PSC; this PPSCA may have joined the PSC.</p>



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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)


Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
<i>La Prensa</i>	Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios (codirector) Pablo Antonio Cuadra Cardenal (codirector) Jaime Chamorro (general manager) Roberto Cardenal (chairman, editorial board)	Founded in 1926. Nicaragua's largest circulation daily and only independent newspaper. Strong defender of the press. A strong opponent of Somoza before it became the major voice of opposition to the FSLN. Several staff members were Sandinista leaders. On several occasions since the fall of Somoza, the regime has closed it briefly and currently censors every issue. Because censorship allows paper to blame errors on government, reporting has sometimes been sloppy and inaccurate. Cooperates with and is backed by COSEP and legal opposition forces. Usually manages to have its important censored items published elsewhere, especially in Costa Rica. Occasionally manages to conduct accurate public opinion polls showing popular support for Archbishop Obando y Bravo and popular opposition to regime.
PS	Sandinista Police Walter Ferreti Fonseca (national commander)	Organized after fall of Somoza for duty primarily in urban areas. PS and State Security elements were integrated into the military command structure of EPS, although they were to be administratively controlled by Ministry of Interior. In 1979-80, <i>Barricada</i> ran numerous stories on irregularities by lower-ranking police officers. In doing so, presumably the FSLN was trying to limit Panamanian influence in Nicaragua during the brief period when Panamanian National Guard advisers were assigned to PS and Panama was donating vehicles and equipment to the PS and training Sandinistas in Panama's Police Training Academy. When abuses become known, policemen responsible sometimes are executed. Members sometimes are tapped for such "volunteer" duties as road repair and harvesting. In 1980 Interior Minister Borge claimed that the PS eventually would reach 30,000 in strength. Of political significance mainly because Borge appears to consider PS part of his personal power base.
PSC	Social Christian Party Agustin Jarquin Anaya (president) Adan Fletes	Founded in the late 1950s and middle class in composition. Nicaraguan equivalent of the centrist Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador, but comparatively much weaker. Leaders claim a membership of 3,000. Prior to July 1979 often joined anti-Somoza coalition with Conservatives and Independent Liberals. In 1980 joined the reconstituted FAO. An affiliate of the World Union of Christian Democrats. Advocates social democracy system with political pluralism and a viable private sector—and a "national dialogue of reconciliation" to achieve those objectives. In March 1984, however, party leaders showed a willingness to exclude armed opponents of the regime from the dialogue.
PSD	Social Democratic Party Luis Rivas Leiva (secretary general)	A centrist group formed in 1979 by Conservative Party dissidents who identified with European Social Democrats. In 1980 joined FAO. In September 1983 joined parties from El Salvador (Democratic Action) and Panama (People's Action Party) to form the Central American Social Democracy. Joined Council of State in January 1984 but withdrew in March to protest Electoral Law.

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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
PSN	Nicaraguan Socialist Party Luis Sanchez Sancho (secretary general)	A Moscow-line Communist party. Moving force behind the CGTI, based largely on construction workers. Cooperated with FSLN during insurrection against Somoza. Joined the pro-Sandinista coalition FPR in mid-1980. Claims to agree with FSLN's stated goals but not with some means used to achieve them, such as censorship and restrictions on civil liberties. Some alleged differences between FSLN and PSN may be contrived although at other times it appears that PSN has differences with FSLN on tactics. Plans to run candidates independent of FSLN in November elections, but in effect votes for the PSN will augment the FSLN total.
UCA	Central American University Cesar Jerez, S. J. Alvaro Arguello, S. J. (director, Central American Historical Institute)	Headquartered in Managua. One of several Jesuit institutions founded in Latin America in 1960s. All at first were perceived by conservative elements in these countries to be less radical than state-run universities, but many became more radical due to recent church doctrines and the rise of "liberation theology" justifying Christian collaboration with Marxists. UCA in Managua has become a propaganda center on behalf of the Sandinista regime, particularly through its Central American Historical Institute, which spreads pro-Sandinista messages throughout the Catholic Church outside Nicaragua.
UDN-FARN	Nicaraguan Democratic Union—Revolutionary Armed Forces Edmundo Chamorro Rappaccioli Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli Jose Francisco Cardenal	Anti-Sandinista armed group composed mainly of disillusioned supporters of the revolution. Based in Costa Rica. Cardenal had been anti-Somoza since at least 1978. Cardenal became vice president of Council of State in 1980 but left Nicaragua soon afterward denouncing the regime as "Communist." In 1981 leaders announced that group was conducting forays from Honduras into the Nicaraguan department of Jinotega. Joined ARDE in September 1982, later joined FDN. By January 1984 had left FDN and rejoined ARDE.
UNAG	National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen Wilberto Lara Aguirre (president)	In April 1981 the Sandinista regime established a new organization of small- and medium-sized agricultural and livestock producers. As of late 1982, UNAG claimed to represent more than 75,000 members in more than 1,700 chapters. Has representatives on the Council of State. From the regime's standpoint, UNAG is supposed to work harmoniously with ATC, but there are indications that its policies often tilt toward the particular interests of its membership. Leaders claim they are as much a private-sector group as a government organization. Its political orientation is center-leftist and becoming more centrist. Is supposed to rival COSEP in rural areas, but some in COSEP—with reason—view them as potential allies.
UNE	National Union of Employees Antonio Sujo (secretary general)	A component of the Sandinista-controlled labor federation CST. Members are white-collar workers. Its existence demonstrates extent to which FSLN seeks to establish a foothold in all important sectors of economy and society.




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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Title and Leaders	Comments
UNIR	Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation Alfonso Robelo Callejas Adolfo Calero Portocarrero Wycliffe Diego	Formed in late August 1984 as an alliance of the FDN, Robelo's portion of ARDE, and MISURA. Robelo describes UNIR as the first step to achieve a "great alliance" that will lead to creation of "a government of national unity" in Nicaragua.
UPN	Union of Nicaraguan Journalists Juan Molina Palacios (secretary general)	Formed in 1978, operated underground until the fall of Somoza. An affiliate of the Sandinista-run CST. Under the regime's August 1979 press law, all practicing journalists in any medium are required to belong to it; in fact the regime has been unable to enforce this ruling rigidly and some journalists remain outside UPN.



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Appendix C

Nicaraguan Organizations

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
ACLEN ^a	Asociacion Nacional del Clero	National Association of the Clergy
ACM	Asociacion de Comerciantes Mayoristas	Wholesalers Association
ACOPROBAMA	Asociacion de Comerciantes de Productos Basicos de Managua	Association of Managua Merchants of Basic Goods
ADACH	Asociacion de Algodoneros de Chinandega	Association of Chinandega Cotton Growers
ADADO	Asociacion de Algodoneros de Oriente	Association of Eastern Cotton Growers
ADAL	Asociacion de Algodoneros de Leon	Association of Leon Cotton Growers
ADREN	Alianza Democratica Revolucionaria Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
AERONICA	Aerolineas Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Airlines
AFENIC	Asociacion de Ferreteros de Nicaragua	Association of Nicaraguan Hardware Dealers
AGROMECC	Empresa Nacional de Agromecomicacion	Agricultural Machinery Enterprise
AMANIC	Agencias Maritimas y Aduaneras de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Shipping and Customs Agencies
AMNLAE ^a	Asociacion de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza	Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women
AMPRONAC	Asociacion Nacional de Mujeres ante la Problema-tica Nacional	National Association of Women Concerned With the Nation's Problems
ANAP	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Administracion Publica	Nicaraguan Association of Public Administration
ANAPROFAR	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Propietarios de Farmacias	Nicaraguan Association of Pharmacy Owners
ANAPS	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Amistad con los Paises Socialistas	Nicaraguan Association of Friendship With Socialist Countries
ANAR	Asociacion de Arroceros de Nicaragua	Association of Nicaraguan Rice Growers
ANCS	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Comunidades Sumus	Nicaraguan Association of Sumu Communities
ANDEN	Asociacion Nacional de Educadores de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan National Association of Educators
ANDIPET	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Distribuidores de Productos de Petroleo	Nicaraguan Association of Petroleum Products Dealers
ANDIVA	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Automotrices	Nicaraguan Association of Motor Vehicle Dealers
ANIA	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Ingenieros y Arquitectos	Nicaraguan Association of Engineers and Architects
ANN	Agencia de Noticias Nueva Nicaragua	New Nicaraguan News Agency
ANPAF	Asociacion Nacional de Padres de Familia	National Association of Heads of Families
ANPP	Asamblea Nacional de Partidos Politicos	National Assembly of Political Parties
ANPROBA	Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Banano	National Association of Banana Producers
AÑPROSOR	Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Sorgo	National Association of Sorghum Producers
ANS ^a	Asociacion de Ninos Sandinistas Luis Alfonso Velasquez	Association of Sandinista Children



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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
ANTA	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Talleres Automotores	Nicaraguan Association of Auto Repair Shops
ANTC	Asociacion Nicaraguense de Transportistas de Carga	Nicaraguan Association of Cargo Carriers
ANUDE	Asamblea Nicaraguense de Unidad Democratica	Nicaraguan Assembly of Democratic Unity
APP	Area de Propiedad del Pueblo	People's Ownership Sector
ARDE ^a	Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Asamblea ^a	Asamblea Sandinista	Sandinista Assembly
ASCANIC	Asociacion de Caneros de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Association of Sugar Producers
ASTC	Asociacion Sandinista de Trabajadores de la Cultura	Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers
ATC ^a	Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo	Rural Workers Association
BANANIC	Empresa Nicaraguense del Banano	Nicaraguan Banana Enterprise
BANIC	Banco Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Bank
BCN	Banco Central de Nicaragua	Central Bank of Nicaragua
BND	Banco Nacional de Desarrollo	National Development Bank
CAAN	Confederacion de Asociaciones Algodoneras de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Cotton Associations Confederation
CADIN	Camara de Industrias de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries
CAM	Centro de Abastecimiento Medico	Medical Supplies Center
CAP	Comites de Accion Popular	People's Action Committees
CAUS ^a	Central de Accion y Unidad Sindical	Center for Labor Action and Unity
CAV	Centro Antonio Valdivieso	Antonio Valdivieso Center
CBS	Comite de Barrio Sandinista	Sandinista Neighborhood Committee
CC or (CNC)	Camara de la Construccion (or Camara Nicaraguense de la Construccion)	Chamber of Construction (or Nicaraguan Chamber of Construction)
CCC	Confederacion de Camara de Comercio	Chamber of Commerce Confederation
CCN	Compania Cervecera de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Brewery Company
CDDN	Comite de Defensa de la Democracia en Nicaragua	Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Nicaragua
CDI	Centro de Desarrollo Infantil	Child Development Center
CDN ^a	Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator
CDR	Comite Directivo Regional	Regional Directive Committee
CDS ^a	Comite de Defensa Sandinista	Sandinista Defense Committee
CDT	Comites de Defensa de los Trabajadores	Committees for the Defense of Workers
CEN ^a	Conferencia Episcopal Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference
CENIT	Centro Nicaraguense de Informacion Tecnologica	Nicaraguan Center for Technological Information
CEP	Centros de Educacion Popular	Popular Education Centers
CEPA	Centro de Educacion y Promocion Agraria or Comite Evangelico Pro Promocion Agraria	Agrarian Education and Promotion Center or Evangelical Committee for Agrarian Advancement
CEPA	Centro Experimental de Produccion Agropecuaria	Center for Agricultural-Livestock Experimental Production
CEPAD ^a	Comite Evangelico Pro Ayuda al Desarrollo	Evangelical Committee for Development Aid
CGTI ^a	Confederacion General del Trabajo Independiente	Independent General Labor Confederation
CLS	Comites de Lucha Sindical	Union Struggle Committees
CLT	Comite de Lucha de los Trabajadores	Workers Struggle Committees
CNA	Comite Nacional de Abastos	National Supply Committee

Note: Footnote at end of table.

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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
CNE	Comite Nacional de Emergencia	National Emergency Committee
CNEPCE	Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion, Programacion y Capacitacion Educativa	National Council of Educational Evaluation, Programming and Training
CNES	Consejo Nacional de Educacion Superior	National Council of Higher Education
CNI	Comision Nacional Intersindical	National Inter-Trade Union Commission
CNPP	Consejo Nacional de Partidos Politicos	National Council of Political Parties
CNPPA	Comite Nacional de la Pequena Produccion Agropecuaria	National Committee of Small Agricultural-Livestock Producers
CNSP	Comite Nicaraguense de Solidaridad con los Pueblos	Nicaraguan Committee of Solidarity With Peoples
CNTD	Confederacion Nacionalista de Trabajadores Democraticos	Nationalist Confederation of Democratic Workers
COES	Centro Obrero de Estudios Sociales	Worker Center for Social Studies
COIP ^a	Corporacion Industrial del Pueblo	People's Industrial Corporation
COMNOMET	Corporacion Nicaraguense de Minerales No Metalicos	Nicaraguan Corporation of Nonmetallic Minerals
CONAES	Colegio Nicaraguense de Administradores de Empresa	Nicaraguan College of Business Managers
CONAL	Comision Nacional de Algodon	National Commission for Cotton
CONAPRO	Confederacion Nacional de Asociaciones Profesionales	National Confederation of Professional Associations
CONARCA	Comision Nacional de Renovacion de Cafetales	National Committee for Renovating Coffee Farms
CONDEMINA	Corporacion Nicaraguense de Minas	Nicaraguan Corporation of Mines
CONFER ^a	Confederacion de los Religiosos	Confederation of Religious Orders
CONIBIR	Corporacion Nicaraguense de Bienes Raices	Nicaraguan Corporation of Real Estate
CONIPAZ	Comite Nicaraguense de la Paz	Nicaraguan Peace Committee
CORADEP	Corporacion de Radiodifusion del Pueblo	People's Radiobroadcasting Corporation
CORCOP	Corporacion Comercial del Pueblo	People's Commercial Corporation
CORFIN	Corporacion Financiera de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Financial Corporation
CORFOP	Corporacion Forestal del Pueblo	People's Forestry Products Corporation
COSEP ^a	Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada	Superior Council of Private Enterprise
CNPPDH	Comision Nacional de Promocion y Promovacion de Derechos Humanos	National Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
CPC	Centros Populares de Cultura	People's Cultural Centers
CPDH ^a	Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos	Permanent Commission on Human Rights
CSE	Consejo Superior Electoral	Supreme Electoral Council
CSN	Coordinadora Sindical Nacional	National Trade Union Coordinating Board
CST ^a	Central Sandinista de Trabajadores Jose Benito Escobar	Jose Benito Escobar Sandinista Workers Central
CSUCA	Consejo Superior Universitario Centroamericano	Higher Council of the Central American University
CTN ^a	Central de Trabajadores de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Workers Central
CUS ^a	Confederacion de Unificacion Sindicalista	Confederation for Labor Unification
CUUN	Centro Universitario de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua	University Center of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
DAST	Division Administrativa de Servicios de Transporte	Administrative Division of Transportation Services

Note: Footnote at end of table.

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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
DEPE	Division de Ejecucion de Proyectos Educativos	Division for the Implementation of Educational Projects
DEPEP	Departamento de Propaganda y Educacion Politica	Department of Propaganda and Political Education
DGA	Direccion General de Aduanas	General Directorate of Customs
DGSE	Direccion General de la Seguridad del Estado	General Directorate of State Security
DNI	Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones	National Department of Investigations
DORMA	Departamento de Organizacion y Masas	Department of Organization and the Masses
DRI	Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales	International Relations Department
EDUCA	Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana	Central American University Publishing House
EEBI	Escuela de Entrenamiento Basico de Infanteria	Infantry Basic Training School
ELN	Ejercito de Liberacion Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Liberation Army
EMPO	Equipos Modernos de Oficina	Modern Office Equipment
ENA	Empresa Nacional del Arroz	National Rice Enterprise
ENABAS	Empresa Nicaraguense de Alimentos Basicos	Nicaraguan Enterprise for Staple Foods
ENABUS	Empresa Nacional de Buses	National Bus Enterprise
ENAG	Escuela Nacional de Agricultura y Ganaderia	National School of Agriculture and Livestock
ENAL	Empresa Nicaraguense del Algodon	Nicaraguan Cotton Enterprise
ENALUF	Empresa Nacional de Luz y Fuerza	National Enterprise for Light and Power
ENAP	Empresa Nacional de Puertos	National Ports Enterprise
ENARA	Empresa Nacional Avicola de Reforma Agraria	National Poultry Enterprise
ENASAL	Empresa Nacional de la Sal	National Salt Enterprise
ENAZUCAR	Empresa Nicaraguense del Azucar	Nicaraguan Sugar Enterprise
ENCA	Empresa Nacional del Cafe	National Coffee Enterprise
ENCAFE	Empresa Nicaraguense del Cafe	Nicaraguan Coffee Enterprise
ENCAR	Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne	Nicaraguan Meat Enterprise
END ^a	<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	(The New Newspaper)
ENE	Escuela Nacional de Enfermeria	National School of Nursing
ENIA	Empresa Nicaraguense de Insumos Agropecuarios	Nicaraguan Enterprise for Agricultural-Livestock Inputs
ENICAB	Empresa Nicaraguense de Cabotaje	Nicaraguan Enterprise for Coastal Shipping
ENIMPORT	Empresa Nicaraguense de Importaciones	Nicaraguan Imports Enterprise
ENIPREX	Empresa Nicaraguense de Promocion de Exportaciones	Nicaraguan Export Promotion Enterprise
ENM	Empresa Nacional de Mataderos	National Slaughterhouse Enterprise
ENMAR	Empresa Nicaraguense del Marisco	Nicaraguan Seafood Enterprise
EPA	Ejercito Popular de Alfabetizacion	People's Literacy Army
EPS	Ejercito Popular Sandinista	Sandinista People's Army
ETSA	Empresa de Transportes y Servicios Aereos	Air Transportation and Service Enterprise
FAD	Fuerzas Armadas Democraticas	Democratic Armed Forces
FAGANIC	Federacion de Asociaciones Ganaderas de Nicaragua	Federation of Nicaraguan Cattlemen's Associations
FAO ^a	Frente Amplio de Oposicion	Broad Opposition Front
FAS	Fuerza Aerea Sandinista	Sandinista Air Force
FDN ^a	Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Democratic Force

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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
FECHANIC	Federacion de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito	Federation of Savings and Loan Cooperatives
FECONIC	Federacion de Cooperativas de Nicaragua	Federation of Nicaraguan Cooperatives
FED	Fondo Especial de Desarrollo	Special Development Fund
FENEC	Federacion Nacional de Educadores Catolicos	National Federation of Catholic Teachers
FER	Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario	Revolutionary Student Front
FESGAS	Fuerzas Especiales de Guerrillas Anticomunistas	Special Forces of Anti-Communist Guerrillas
FESOMENIC	Federacion de Sociedades Medicas de Nicaragua	Federation of Nicaraguan Medical Societies
FETSALUD ^a	Federacion de Trabajadores de la Salud	Health Workers Federation
FIN ^a	Frente Interno Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Internal Front
FINAPRI	Financiera de Preinversion	Preinvestment Financing Enterprise
FIR	Fondo Internacional de Reconstruccion	International Reconstruction Fund
FONDILAC	Fondo de Desarrollo de la Industria Lactea	Dairy Industry Development Fund
FPN	Frente Patriotico Nacional	National Patriotic Front
FPR ^a	Frente Patriotico Revolucionario	Revolutionary Patriotic Front
FRS	Frente Revolucionario Sandino	Sandinista Revolutionary Front
FSDC	Frente de Solidaridad Democratica Cristiana	Christian Democratic Solidarity Front
FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional	Sandinista National Liberation Front
FSM	Federacion Sindical de Managua	Trade Union Federation of Managua
FTM	Federacion de Trabajadores de Managua	Federation of Managua Workers
GPP	Guerra Popular Prolongada	Popular Prolonged War
GRN	Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional	Government of National Reconstruction
INAA	Instituto Nicaraguense de Acueductos Alcantarillados	Nicaraguan Institute of Aqueducts and Canals
INAP	Instituto Nicaraguense de Administracion Publica	Nicaraguan Public Administration Institute
INAPI	Instituto Nacional de Prevencion Contra Incendios	National Institute of Fire Prevention
INCINE	Instituto Nicaraguense del Cine	Nicaraguan Film Institute
IND	Instituto Nacional de Deportes	National Institute of Sports
INDE-FUNDE ^a	Instituto Nicaraguense de Desarrollo—Fundacion Nicaraguense de Desarrollo	Nicaraguan Development Institute/ Nicaraguan Development Foundation
INE	Instituto Nicaraguense de Energia	Nicaraguan Institute of Energy
INEC	Instituto Nicaraguense de Estadistica y Censos	Nicaraguan Institute of Statistics and Census
INETER	Instituto Nicaraguense de Estudios Territoriales	Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies
INFONAC	Instituto de Fomento Nacional	National Development Institute
INIES-CRIES	Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales—Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales	Economic and Social Research Institute—Regional Coordinating Board for Economic and Social Research
INISER	Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguros y Reaseguros	Nicaraguan Institute of Insurance and Reinsurance
INMINEH	Instituto Nicaraguense de Minas e Hidrocarburos	Nicaraguan Institute of Mines and Hydrocarbons
INNICA ^a	Instituto Nicaraguense de la Costa Atlantica	Nicaraguan Institute of the Atlantic Coast
INPESCA	Instituto Nicaraguense de la Pesca	Nicaraguan Institute of Fisheries
INPRHU	Instituto de Promocion Humana	Institute for Human Development
INRA	Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria	National Institute for Agrarian Reform

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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
INSSBI	Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguridad Social y Bienestar	Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security and Social Welfare
INTURISMO	Instituto Nicaraguense de Turismo y del Ambiente	Nicaraguan Tourism Institute
IRENA	Instituto Nicaraguense de Recursos Naturales y del Ambiente	Nicaraguan Institute of Natural Resources and Environment
ITESNIC	Instituto Tecnologico Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Technological Institute
JGRN	Junta del Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional	Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction
JLR	Junta Local de Reconstruccion	Local Reconstruction Board
JRM	Junta de Reconstruccion de Managua	Managua Reconstruction Board
JS-19J ^a	Juventud Sandinista 19 de Julio	19 July Sandinista Youth
JSN	Juventud Socialista Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Socialist Youth
M-3	Media Tercera	Third Path Movement
MAP	Movimiento de Accion Popular	Popular Action Movement
MCR	Movimiento Cristiano Revolucionario	Revolutionary Christian Movement
MDN ^a	Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Democratic Movement
MED	Ministerio de Educacion	Ministry of Education
MICE	Ministerio de Comercio del Exterior	Ministry of Foreign Trade
MICOIN	Ministerio de Comercio Interior	Ministry of Domestic Trade
MICONS	Ministerio de Construccion	Ministry of Construction
MIDINRA	Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria	Ministry of Agricultural-Livestock Development and Agrarian Reform
MIFIN	Ministerio de Finanzas	Ministry of Finance
MIND	Ministerio de Industria	Ministry of Industry
MININT (or MINT)	Ministerio del Interior	Ministry of the Interior
MINSA	Ministerio de Salud	Ministry of Health
MINVAH	Ministerio de la Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos	Ministry of Housing and Human Services
MIPLAN	Ministerio de Planificacion	Ministry of Planning
MISURA ^a	Fuerza Revolucionaria MISURA	MISURA Revolutionary Front (or Force)
MISURASATA ^a	Unidad Sandinista de Miskitos, Sumos y Ramas	Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Sandinista Unity
MITRAB	Ministerio de Trabajo	Ministry of Labor
MITRANS	Ministerio de Transporte	Ministry of Transportation
MLC ^a	Movimiento Liberal Constitucionalista	Liberal Constitutionalist Party
MOA	Milicias Obreras de la Alfabetizacion	Literacy Workers' Militias
MOC	Movimiento Obrero Cristiano de Nicaragua	Christian Worker Movement of Nicaragua
MORE	Movimiento Obrero Revolucionario	Revolutionary Workers' Movement
MPR	Movimiento Popular Revolucionario	Revolutionary People's Movement
MPS ^a	Milicias Populares Sandinistas	Sandinista People's Militias
MPU ^a	Movimiento Pueblo Unido	United People's Movement
MSPT	Movimientos Sindicales del Pueblo Trabajador	Trade Union Movement of the Working People
PAN	Programa Alimentario Nacional	National Food Program
PAR	Partido Accion Revolucionaria	Revolutionary Action Party
PC de N (or PCN)	Partido Comunista de Nicaragua	Communist Party of Nicaragua

Note: Footnote at end of table.

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Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
PC de N (or PCN)	Partido Comunista de Nicaragua	Communist Party of Nicaragua
PCD ^a (PCDN) ^a	Partido Conservador Democrata (Partido Conservador Democrata de Nicaragua)	Democratic Conservative Party (Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua)
PETRONIC	Empresa Nicaraguense del Petroleo	Nicaraguan Petroleum Enterprise
PGE	Proveduria General del Estado	State General Supplier
PIP	Programa de Inversiones Publicas	Public Investments Program
PLD	Partido Liberal Democratico	Democratic Liberal Party
PLI ^a	Partido Liberal Independiente	Independent Liberal Party
PLN	Partido Liberal Nacionalista	Nationalist Liberal Party
PMN	Partido de Movilizacion Nacional	National Mobilization Party
PODERI	Programa de Desarrollo Rural Integral	Integral Rural Development Program
PPSC ^a	Partido Popular Social Cristiano	Popular Social Christian Party
PPSCA ^a	Partido Popular Social Cristiano Autentico	Authentic Popular Social Christian Party
PRAI	Proyecto de Reconstruccion y Accion Inmediata	Reconstruction and Immediate Action Program
PROCANA	Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar	Sugarcane Producers Association
PRODECO	Programa de Promocion Educativa Comunal	Program for the Promotion of Community Education
PS ^a	Policia Sandinista	Sandinista Police
PSC ^a	Partido Social Cristiano	Social Christian Party
PSD ^a	Partido Social Democrata	Social Democratic Party
PSN ^a	Partido Socialista Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Socialist Party
RIDEN	Resistencia Interna Democratica Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Democratic Internal Resistance
RIN	Resistencia Interna Nacional	National Internal Resistance
SFN	Sistema Financiero Nacional	National Financial System
SIMOTUR	Sindicato de Motoristas del Transporte Urbano	Trade Union of Urban Transportation Drivers
SINACOI	Sistema Nacional Contra Incendios	National Fire Prevention System
SINAFORP	Sistema Nacional de Formacion Profesional	National System for Professional Training
SITRAICE	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Ceramica	Trade Union of Ceramic Industry Workers
SITRAIM	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Muebles	Trade Union of Furniture Industry Workers
SITRATEx	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Textil	Trade Union of Textile Industry Workers
SITRECO	Sindicato de Trabajadores de Empresas Comerciales	Trade Union of Commercial Enterprise Workers
SMMM	Sindicato de Mecanicos y Metalurgicos de Managua	Trade Union of Managua Mechanics and Metalworkers
SNEM	Servicio Nacional de Erradicacion de la Malaria	National Service for Malaria Eradication
SNPEP	Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y Educacion Politica	National Secretariat for Propaganda and Political Education
SNUS	Sistema Nacional Unico de Salud	Unitary National Health System
SSTV	Sistema Sandinista de Television	Sandinista Television System
STAI	Sindicato de Trabajadores Agroindustriales	Trade Union of Agro-Industrial Workers
STDN	Solidaridad de Trabajadores Democraticos	Nicaraguan Democratic Workers Solidarity
STIES	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Electromecanica y Similares	Trade Union of Electricians and Related Trades Workers
STIP	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Plastica	Trade Union of Plastic Industry Workers

Note: Footnote at end of table.

Nicaraguan Organizations (continued)

Acronym	Spanish Title	English
SUMAGRO	Empresa de Suministros Agroindustriales	Agro-Industrial Purchasing Agency
SUTRA	Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores	Sole Trade Union of Workers
TANIC	Tabacalera Nicaraguense, S. A.	Nicaraguan Tobacco Company, Inc.
TELCOR	Telecomunicaciones y Correos de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Telecommunications and Postal Services
TEPCE	Talleres de Evaluacion, Programacion y Capacitacion Educativa	Educational Evaluation, Programming and Training Workshops
TISA	Transportadora Internacional, S. A.	International Transport Company, Inc.
UACAS	Unidades de Abastecimiento para las Comunas Agricolas Sandinistas	Supply Units for the Sandinista Agricultural Communes
UCA ^a	Universidad Centroamericana	Central American University
UCN	Union de Campesinos Nicaraguenses	Nicaraguan Peasants' Union
UDEL	Union Democratica de Liberacion	Democratic Union of Liberation
UDN-FARN ^a	Union Democratica Nicaraguense-Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias	Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Forces
UJC	Union de Jovenes Comunistas	Union of Young Communists
UMV	Union de Mujeres de Vanguardia	Vanguard Women's Union
UNAG ^a	Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos	National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen
UNAN	Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua	National Autonomous University of Nicaragua
UNCAFENIC	Union Nacional de Cafecultores de Nicaragua	National Union of Nicaraguan Coffeegrowers
UNE ^a	Union Nacional de Empleados	National Union of Employees
UNIR ^a	Unidad Nicaraguense de Reconciliacion	Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation
UNO	Union Nacional Opositora	National Opposition Union
UPANIC	Union de Productores Agropecuarios de Nicaragua	Union of Agricultural and Livestock Producers of Nicaragua
UPE	Unidades de Produccion Estatal	State Production Units
UPES	Unidades de Produccion Estatal Sandinista	Sandinista State Production Units
UPN ^a	Union de Periodistas Nicaraguenses	Union of Nicaraguan Journalists
UPOLI	Universidad Politecnica de Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Polytechnical University
URN	Union Republicana Nicaraguense	Nicaraguan Republican Union
VIMEDA	Vice Ministerio de Educacion para Adultos	Vice Ministry of Adult Education

^a Discussed further in appendix A.



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A Guide to Key Political Groups

Acronym	Name	Political Orientation
ACLEN	National Association of the Clergy	Preregime; obsolete
ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance	Armed opposition
ATC	Rural Workers Association	Preregime
CDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator	Unarmed opposition
CDS	Sandinista Defense Committee(s)	Preregime
CEN	Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference	Unarmed opposition
COSEP	Superior Council of Private Enterprise	Unarmed opposition
CST	Sandinista Workers Central	Preregime
CTN	Nicaraguan Workers Central	Unarmed opposition
CUS	Confederation for Labor Unification	Unarmed opposition
FAD	Democratic Armed Forces	Armed opposition; obsolete
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force	Armed opposition
FPR	Revolutionary Patriotic Front	Preregime
FRS	Sandino Revolutionary Front	Armed opposition
FSDC	Christian Democratic Solidarity Front	Armed opposition
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front	Preregime
JGRN	Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction	Preregime
MDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Movement	Armed opposition
MISURA	Misura Revolutionary Front	Armed opposition
MISURASATA	Miskito, Sumo and Rama Sandinista Unity	Armed opposition
MPU	United People's Movement	Preregime
PCD	Democratic Conservative Party	Ostensibly part of unarmed opposition but willing to participate in elections
PCN (or PCDN)	Nicaraguan Conservative Party (or Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua)	Unarmed opposition
PLI	Independent Liberal Party	Ostensibly preregime
PPSC	Popular Social Christian Party	Ostensibly preregime
PSC	Social Christian Party	Unarmed opposition
PSD	Social Democratic Party	Unarmed opposition
PSN	Nicaraguan Socialist Party	Preregime
STDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Workers Solidarity	Armed opposition
UDN-FARN	Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Forces	Armed opposition
UNAG	National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen	Preregime
UNIR	Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation	Armed opposition umbrella group

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