



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~

25X1

# **The Israeli Presence in Black Africa**

25X1

**A Research Paper**

~~Secret~~

*ALA 84-10068  
July 1984*

*Copy* **408**

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**



25X1




# The Israeli Presence in Black Africa




25X1

**A Research Paper**

25X1

This assessment was prepared by   
of the Office of African and Latin American Analysis  
with a contribution from  of the  
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. 

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, Regional Issues Branch, Africa  
Division, ALA, 

25X1

25X1

**Secret**

*ALA 84-10068  
July 1984*

Secret

25X1

## The Israeli Presence in Black Africa

25X1

### Key Judgments

*Information available  
as of 10 July 1984  
was used in this report.*

Israel has been a pariah in Sub-Saharan Africa since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, but Tel Aviv has never ceased to consider the region an important arena in which it could promote trade and security assistance, recoup political influence, and ultimately ease its diplomatic isolation. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has long been among the principal champions of an active Israeli policy in Africa. This policy achieved a major breakthrough by the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Zaire two years ago. [redacted]

25X1

Although Liberia followed Kinshasa's lead by resuming relations last August, since then Israel's diplomatic momentum in black Africa has stalled. Israel's official presence is thus limited to long-established diplomatic ties with three states closely linked to South Africa—Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland—and to the recently reestablished relations with two countries closely associated with the United States: Zaire and Liberia. Tel Aviv has intensified its efforts for formal relations, particularly among pro-Western states in French-speaking West Africa, but we doubt that Israel will achieve significant success any time soon in its efforts to renew diplomatic links. Nonetheless, Tel Aviv has important informal economic and security ties with several African states, including Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Togo, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Botswana, and Ghana. [redacted]

25X1

A number of factors weigh against Israel's chances of strengthening or expanding full-scale diplomatic relations:

- Arab and Islamic pressures, especially important among African states with large Muslim populations and those that are dependent on the Arabs for oil or desire Arab economic assistance.
- African disapproval of Israeli policies in the Middle East, particularly Israeli occupation of Arab lands and opposition to a Palestinian homeland.
- African resentment of Israel's ties with South Africa because of Pretoria's systematic subordination of blacks.
- French resistance to the reestablishment of an Israeli diplomatic presence in Francophone Africa.
- Israel's economic problems, which limit Tel Aviv's ability to provide aid.

25X1

Several factors are working in Israel's favor, but, in our judgment, they are insufficient to persuade more than one or two other African states to resume or expand official relations:

Secret



25X1

- African disillusionment with unfulfilled Arab promises of economic assistance and with fear of Libyan interference.
- Fond memories of Israeli technical and security assistance up to 1973.
- The lure of potential international Jewish investment and trade.
- The informal ties that Israel has already established in several black African countries through trade, technical and security assistance, and political contacts.




25X1

In our judgment, Israel's diplomatic prospects are best in Ivory Coast and Togo. We believe that both would prefer to act as part of a larger group, however, rather than reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel individually.



25X1

Israel will continue to build upon its business and labor connections in Africa. Because of a persistent lack of economic assistance resources, the government will attempt to promote trade and private investment as alternatives to official aid.



25X1

We believe that Tel Aviv will continue to look to Washington to play a key role in helping to restore Israel's presence in black Africa. The Israelis, in our view, will ask US diplomatic missions to continue to serve as channels of communication for them in countries where the United States has good access to the head of state. Tel Aviv will also want Washington to elicit French and Egyptian support for Israeli efforts to reestablish diplomatic ties. In addition, the Israeli economic situation probably will continue to impel Tel Aviv to request US help in financing military and development projects it hopes to provide African states. Zaire in particular has suffered a large net loss of Arab aid by renewing diplomatic ties and will be looking to Israel to make good the difference through what Kinshasa views as Tel Aviv's influence in the United States.



25X1

Washington's close identification with Israel is likely to help US bilateral relations with pro-Western black African states who benefit from Israeli assistance, but US Embassy reporting indicates that this identification hinders relations with such states as Nigeria and Senegal where Islamic ties and anti-South African views both play major roles in foreign policy formulation. In such states as Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, where Tel Aviv's close ties with South Africa are probably the decisive factor in opposition to Israel, Washington's identification with Israel could also damage US bilateral relations.



25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Israeli Aims in Africa	1
Tel Aviv's Policy Apparatus for Africa	2
Factors Affecting Israeli Prospects	3
African-Arab Relations	3
Israel's Ties With South Africa	4
The French	5
Domestic Economic Constraints	6
Outlook	6
Implications for the United States	7
<b>Appendixes</b>	
A.    Israel in Africa: Country Surveys	9
B.    African Relations With Israel and the Arab States	20

Secret

25X1

### Israeli Presence in Black Africa



702562 7-84

25X1

Secret

Secret  
[Redacted]

25X1

**The Israeli Presence  
in Black Africa** [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

**Israeli Aims in Africa**

The proximity of the African Continent to Israel and the receptivity in the late 1950s and 1960s of the new nations of Africa to cooperation with Tel Aviv facilitated Israel's initial diplomatic activities in Africa. By the early 1970s, Israel had diplomatic relations with 33 black African states and thriving trade, aid, and advisory missions across the subcontinent. Because funds were limited, Israel made extensive use of the best resource it had to offer—skilled technicians, especially in agriculture. In return, Tel Aviv was able to count on black African support at the United Nations and within the Organization of African Unity (OAU), thus frustrating early Arab efforts to turn these institutions into anti-Israeli forums. [Redacted]

Ethiopia. In these and several other countries, private-sector contacts—business, cultural, and labor union—survived the trauma of the earlier state-to-state breaks. Drawing on these ties, Tel Aviv openly began to court selected African countries by the late 1970s, holding out the prospect of technical and security assistance in return for diplomatic recognition. Israeli policymakers assumed that Tel Aviv could exploit a residue of good will that was built up during the 1960s, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. [Redacted]

Israeli officials had hoped that Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 would prompt many black African leaders to consider resuming diplomatic ties, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. 25X1

Although Zaire restored formal relations within a month, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that summer forestalled any snowball effect. Embassy reporting indicates that the Israeli Foreign Ministry nevertheless continues to court various African states, drawing primarily on private-sector contacts to exploit opportunities on an ad hoc basis. [Redacted] 25X1

African support for Israel began to erode shortly before the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, partly because of the lure of Arab offers of oil at below-market prices and financial assistance. African sensitivity to Israel's growing ties with South Africa was also a factor, as was the desire of many emerging states for Arab diplomatic support in the struggle against white minority rule. Nine black African states severed formal relations with Israel just before the 1973 war. Twenty others followed suit during or as a result of the war. The OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution in late 1973 calling on member states to refrain from diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv until Israel withdrew from all of the Arab territories it occupied and until the issue of a Palestinian homeland was settled. The last to break relations, Mauritius, did so in 1976. The only states to retain diplomatic relations were Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi, all of whom had close ties to South Africa. [Redacted]

According to press reports, Tel Aviv views Africa as a promising market for manufactures that would ease its chronic balance-of-payments deficit. Israeli officials take pride in the simplified maintenance requirements of their relatively sophisticated but durable manufactured products. Although Tel Aviv cannot offer large amounts of financial aid, Israeli policymakers believe their country's technical expertise can contribute to the solution of such widespread African problems as low agricultural productivity, according to the US Embassy. [Redacted] 25X1

In mapping out its strategy for Africa, Israel distinguishes between those it regards as "important" states—Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia—because of size, strategic interest, potential trade 25X1

Rebuilding a network of relationships with Africa has been a central tenet of Israeli foreign policy since 1973. Links with a number of African states resumed gradually in the mid-1970s on a discreet, unofficial level, notably in Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and



Secret

importance, or influence with other black African states and the rest, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. Of the important states, Tel Aviv believes that diplomatic progress is most likely in the near term in Ivory Coast, while among the less important countries it sees good prospects in Togo, Cameroon, and possibly Ghana and Guinea. In these countries, Tel Aviv is holding out the prospect of international Jewish investment and offering technical and security assistance in exchange for beginning a process that will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Because the other, more important states have shown little interest in formal ties, the Embassy believes Israel is content for now simply to maintain quiet lines of communication. [redacted]

**Tel Aviv's Policy Apparatus for Africa**

The driving force behind Israel's policy toward Africa is Avi Primor, who heads the Foreign Ministry's Africa Division. We believe Primor has wide latitude in setting the strategy and tactics that support Israel's objectives in Africa. According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Primor enjoys the full confidence of his superiors, including the Foreign Ministry's Director General, David Kimche, who shares Primor's keen interest in developing the Israeli presence in black Africa. In an effort to promote formal diplomatic ties, Primor has visited a number of African capitals over the past year to suggest ways in which they might benefit from Israeli security and technical assistance, according to reports from US Embassies in the region. [redacted]

The Foreign Ministry's leading role in formulating and executing Tel Aviv's policies in Africa is a recent development. While he was Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon had taken the lead in Israeli activities in Africa, aggressively cultivating several Central African countries and dangling offers of security assistance to Zaire in return for the restoration of formal ties. Following Sharon's resignation as Defense Minister, Yitzhak Shamir—then Foreign Minister—reasserted the primacy of the Foreign Ministry over Tel Aviv's policies in Africa. We believe Shamir has remained actively involved in African policy since becoming Prime Minister last October. [redacted]

Foreign Ministry officials periodically have had to compete with colleagues in the Finance and Defense

Ministries for the limited economic and military resources that are critical to Israel's diplomatic efforts in Africa. Primor has told US Embassy officers that he has no economic assistance budget and that high-level officials have had to intervene personally to obtain even a limited amount of funding for one agricultural project in Zaire. Primor has a little more flexibility with respect to military assistance, but the Defense Ministry's own budgetary problems limit Israel's ability to offer sizable arms aid. We believe, however, that the Israeli services and the Foreign Ministry cooperate fully in efforts to train and develop the security services in several African countries. [redacted]

Outside the Horn of Africa, Israel maintains government-to-government contacts through the activities and travels of Israeli diplomats accredited to the five countries with which Tel Aviv has formal relations (Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zaire, and Liberia) or serving in Israeli Interests Sections in various European embassies in four other states (Ivory Coast, Togo, Ghana, and Kenya). The diplomat in charge of the Israeli Interests Section at the Belgian Embassy in Abidjan, for example, enjoys direct access to Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny with greater frequency than some accredited ambassadors, according to the US Embassy there. He also is responsible for Tel Aviv's dealings with the Governments of Upper Volta, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gabon. [redacted]

Israel considers its stake in the Horn of Africa to be so sensitive that it has assigned the task of handling its relations with Ethiopia to the Israeli intelligence community rather than the Foreign Ministry, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. The area is of major strategic importance to Israel because of the potential for Arab control of the Red Sea and Tel Aviv's need to ensure safe passage for its ships through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. [redacted]

Tel Aviv has long encouraged trade and investment by private Israeli businessmen as an alternative to official assistance. As a result, Israeli business interests are an active force in developing relations in Africa. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

Israeli businessmen often serve as informal representatives of the government, meeting regularly with political leaders and diplomats. The vast majority of Israelis living in Africa—including the 2,500 in Nigeria, 1,000 in the Ivory Coast, and several hundred in Kenya—are private Israeli businessmen, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. [redacted]

Israel's trade union federation, the Histadrut, has an important role in maintaining and developing extensive Israeli ties in more than 20 African countries. Its Afro-Asian Institute provides training for some 250 African labor leaders a year in such subjects as management, cooperative movements, and leadership. The Histadrut also owns several companies such as the large conglomerate, Koor Industries, and the construction firm, Solel Boneh, which operate with Tel Aviv's encouragement and support throughout much of Africa, according to press reports. [redacted]

#### **Factors Affecting Israeli Prospects**

Several factors work in Israel's favor in black Africa. These include Tel Aviv's record of effective and timely assistance over a period of years, early ties of friendship with several generations of African leaders, and the likelihood that some African states would be as pragmatic in seeking to restore relations as they were in breaking them earlier. The lure of potential international Jewish investment and trade is also strong. Finally, Israel can present itself as an ally and benefactor that is not a superpower and that is itself a small, recently created state. These clear-cut advantages are overshadowed, however, by the dominant influence of African-Arab relations. [redacted]

**African-Arab Relations.** Potentially the most important factor supporting Israel's diplomatic return to black Africa is general African disillusionment with unfulfilled promises of Arab aid, trade, and investment. Published trade and aid data indicate that Arab states and investors have not committed surplus oil revenues to African development projects at the level Africans had expected in return for their diplomatic break with Israel in 1973 and as compensation for the subsequent oil price spiral set off by the Arab oil embargo. As of 1983, Arab donors accounted for only 10 percent of total capital inflows to the region and ranked well below Western sources of official assistance, according to press reports. Moreover, Arab aid

tends to be concentrated in a few states with sizable Muslim populations—especially Somalia, Senegal, and Guinea—and is channeled mainly into such projects as the construction of mosques and Islamic schools. Trade prospects between Arab and black African states are poor because neither group produces substantial quantities of manufactured goods, processed commodities, or foodstuffs for the other's markets. [redacted]

Moreover, apart from Muslim influence in certain African states, there is little cultural, political, or economic basis for African-Arab solidarity. African memories of Arab slaving and military interventions south of the Sahara in past centuries have stood in the way of closer relations even in the postindependence era, according to a number of press reports and academic studies. More recently, the Libyans' enthusiastic support for Idi Amin in Uganda during the 1970s, Egyptian help for Somalia, Persian Gulf states' interference on behalf of Eritrean insurgents against Ethiopia, Libyan backing of Chadian rebels against the N'Djamena government, and the disarray in the OAU in the past five years have provoked public questions among African leaders as to the value of too close ties with the Arab states. In West and Central Africa, particularly, fears of Libyan subversion have enhanced the Israeli position as a supplier of internal security assistance, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

Still, Africans have not rushed to supplant Arab ties by turning to Israel. Disappointment aside, we believe that the need for Arab aid, however paltry, and the continuing hope of receiving concessional terms on oil purchases—long promised but rarely realized, according to oil industry reports—remain for many black African countries disincentives to reestablishing ties with Israel. Such hard-pressed states as Ghana and the Central African Republic continue to hope that the Saudis, Libyans, or other oil producers will sign long-term concessional agreements for oil, according to US Embassy reports. In particular, we believe West African countries with dismal economies find it difficult to turn away any potential donor even when

Secret

Secret

past promises have been largely unfulfilled. For drought-plagued Senegal, for example, Arab financing of two major dam projects is too important to jeopardize by moving closer to Israel, according to US Embassy sources. [redacted]

Fear of Arab economic reprisal is also a factor, in our judgment. Delegations from the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Saudis and Tunisians have gone to a number of African states to urge the case against expanding ties with Israel, according to press and US Embassy reports. The Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, which had provided Kinshasa with \$422.4 million in aid between 1974 and 1981, suspended its activities in Zaire. The Gulf Cooperation Council of Foreign and Economic Ministers,<sup>1</sup> which had supplied approximately \$2 billion in aid to black African countries, announced that it would sever all relations—including economic—with governments that resume ties with Israel. [redacted]

In our view, most African states will probably choose not to open up to Israel, citing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli military presence there, and the absence of progress toward resolving the Palestinian issue. We believe that for some African states, such as Niger and the Central African Republic, these reasons will be merely excuses; for others, such as Muslim-dominated Senegal, they are matters of deep conviction among intellectual, government, and political elites. [redacted]

**Israel's Ties With South Africa.** African leaders usually cite publicly Israel's relationship with South Africa as the principal reason for their unwillingness to renew diplomatic relations. Although Pretoria's recent rapprochement with Mozambique may remove some of the stigma in some quarters, we believe that Tel Aviv's political, economic, and military ties with Pretoria will continue to complicate Israel's campaign to rebuild a diplomatic presence in black Africa. [redacted]

The Israeli-South African relationship has deep historical roots dating back to South African support for the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and to Pretoria's

<sup>1</sup> The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. [redacted]

early recognition of Israel in 1948. The relationship rests in part on the countries' mutual identification as "pariah" states and on the influence of South Africa's Jewish community with its heavily Zionist leanings and extensive ties with Israel. Israeli President Herzog made a point during his visits to Kinshasa and Monrovia early this year publicly to justify Tel Aviv's ties with Pretoria in terms of Israel's obligation to protect the Jewish community in South Africa, which has about 120,000 members. [redacted]

Although relations cooled during the 1960s when Israel adopted an antiapartheid stance as part of its efforts to win black African allies, the rupture of Israeli relations with black Africa in the early 1970s apparently led Tel Aviv to conclude that it had little to lose from cultivating its relationship with Pretoria. Under Israeli governments since then—particularly that of Prime Minister Begin, who was once president of the Israeli-South African Friendship League—bilateral economic, scientific, and military links have grown considerably. [redacted]

For most black African leaders, Israel's economic relations with South Africa are a continuing provocation. South Africa is Israel's leading commercial partner in Africa. The \$245 million trade between them, according to Israeli statistics, is small in terms of each country's total trade, but we believe this figure is understated because it excludes diamonds and military equipment. South Africa provides Israel a market for high-grade chemicals, clothing, and sophisticated engineering products and is a major source of rough diamonds, ores, and metals for Israeli manufacturers. [redacted]

Black Africans tend to believe the worst about the Israeli-South African connection, according to Embassy and press assessments. They are convinced, for example, that scientific and military exchanges between Israel and South Africa include secret cooperation in nuclear technology for weapons programs in both countries. African suspicions have been fueled further in the past year by a rash of rumors and Soviet disinformation efforts linking South Africa, Zaire, the

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

United States, and Israel in alleged plots to destabilize southern Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. The Angolans, for example, are convinced that Israeli military advisers in Zaire are helping Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), according to press reports. [redacted]

In addition, Tel Aviv has been embarrassed by publicity involving its relations with some of the black "homelands" that South Africa has created in support of *apartheid*—Pretoria's policy of systematic separation of the races based on white supremacy. The homeland governments often distort the scope and significance of their dealings with Israel in their eagerness to exploit even the vaguest manifestation of legitimacy. Several homeland leaders have traveled to Israel on private visits that they have publicized as "official." [redacted]

Although Israeli representatives disavow official recognition of the homelands and reaffirm Tel Aviv's official abhorrence of *apartheid*, Israel is providing security assistance to at least one homeland. According to the US Embassy in Pretoria, Ciskei sent 24 pilot trainees to Israel last November, and private Israelis have tried to help Ciskei purchase six Mooney-type aircraft from the United States.<sup>2</sup> The Ciskei Armaments Corporation (Ciskor) was established last year with the assistance of Israel and West Germany, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. [redacted]

Private Israeli firms are also active in the industrial and agricultural development of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, according to US Embassy reporting from Pretoria. Ciskei President Sebe has also publicized Israeli investor interest in the homeland. This includes a \$1.6 million clothing factory, a joint venture involving two major Israeli companies. The Director of the Ciskei People's Development Bank claims to have received applications for 13 other Israeli investment projects totaling about \$6 million,

<sup>2</sup> According to Israeli press reports, Foreign Ministry Director General Kimche was particularly upset about the publicity given a visit to the Ciskei last October by a retired Israeli general who for years had been the military secretary to Prime Ministers Rabin and Begin. Ciskei's President, Lennox Sebe, told a news conference that a general, whom he did not identify by name, had come to evaluate the homeland's military and police intelligence systems. [redacted]

according to Embassy reports. The Israelis will play a major role in the operation of an educational television service in Bophuthatswana and also in commercial television to a lesser degree, according to US Embassy sources. [redacted]

Tel Aviv and Pretoria are both seeking to deemphasize the closeness of their relationship. US Embassy reports indicate South African officials are sympathetic to Israel's efforts to reestablish itself in black Africa because they would view Israel's return as an indicator of greater political pragmatism by the black African states. These officials see this as beneficial to South Africa in the long run by laying the groundwork for a similar growth of a South African presence in the region. [redacted]

**The French.** Kimche, Primor, and other key Israeli policymakers are concerned about what they perceive as an anti-Israel bias on the part of members of the French Foreign Ministry, diplomatic service, and French communities in Africa, according to the US Embassy in Paris. Some of them suspect that key French officials regard Tel Aviv's activities in Francophone Africa as part of a thinly disguised US effort to displace or weaken the French presence there, according to the Embassy. The Israelis see French influence working against them particularly in Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Togo. According to the Israeli officials cited above, French pressure on Tunisian President Bourguiba may have caused him to advise Ivorian leader Houphouet-Boigny against resuming relations with Israel. [redacted]

We believe that France is wary of any group that might supplant its influence in Africa. According to US Embassy sources in the French Foreign Ministry and presidency, Paris does not favor the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Francophone African states and Israel because French officials fear that such a move would cut off such states from Arab economic assistance and make them more dependent on France. Although our experience suggests that French commercial interests are hostile to any competitors in "their" African markets, the same French

Secret

Secret

officials insist that the French Government does not oppose the continuation of Israel's informal ties in Africa, particularly those involving trade and investment. Furthermore, they even claim to welcome Tel Aviv's low-profile assistance programs as a supplement to French aid because of the constraints on France's own budget. [redacted]

**Domestic Economic Constraints.** Israel's economic problems<sup>3</sup> have forced Tel Aviv to reduce its assistance budget for Africa, causing the Foreign Ministry to seek funding for its development programs from third parties. Officials have obtained supplemental aid from Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden for Israeli-directed projects and encouraged international Jewish businesses to invest in programs for which Israel can provide the expertise. The most that the Israelis can offer to black Africa is technical assistance, and in each case the programs are small, employing only a handful of technicians. Only Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Liberia, and Zaire have received official Israeli technical assistance over the past few years, according to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. [redacted]

The same economic constraints apply to military assistance. According to US Embassy reporting, Tel Aviv is embarrassed by its inability to furnish more than a token amount of the military assistance requested by Liberia and to fulfill its offer, quoted at various times as high as \$10-20 million, to equip Zaire's Kamanyola Division in Shaba Region. [redacted]

**Outlook**

In our judgment, Tel Aviv's official diplomatic relations with black Africa will remain stalemated for at least the next several years. We believe that fear of Libyan retaliation, pressure from the Arab League—particularly from the Saudis—or disapproval of Israeli military actions in the Middle East will continue to [redacted]

impel those African leaders who may be considering a renewal of relations to postpone action. [redacted]

25X1

Any further progress in restoring diplomatic relations with Israel would probably have to be based on some form of joint action by two or more African leaders. In the near term, there seems little chance that such a group initiative will materialize because we believe there are no compelling reasons to do so. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Moreover, we estimate that even the present modest degree of African sympathy and friendship for Israel will weaken as members of the older generation of African leaders who are sympathetic toward Israel—such as Houphouet and Eyadema—pass from the scene. Even the thus-far sturdy tie with Malawi is likely to be lost when President Banda dies. [redacted]

25X1

The Israeli economic situation will, in our view, compel Tel Aviv increasingly to seek third-party participation in development schemes involving its technical expertise. If successful, this will limit Tel Aviv's flexibility and reduce even further the effectiveness of the Israeli tactic of offering technical and military support in exchange for diplomatic relations. Previous experience in Liberia and Zaire indicates, however, that third-party support is difficult to attract and usually limited to small ventures. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Israeli commercial ties will probably also suffer from the worsening economic conditions in black Africa. Many African states are having to pare their imports because of shortages of foreign exchange brought on by an export slump and debt servicing needs. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

We believe Tel Aviv's links with South Africa will continue to complicate Israel's future in black Africa, particularly if their military and scientific exchanges receive publicity. Indeed, over the long run, Israel may have to choose between its substantial interests in South Africa and any hope of a diplomatic presence in black Africa. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Implications for the United States**

We expect that Israel will continue to request US diplomatic help in restoring its position in black Africa. As in the past, Tel Aviv will be likely to ask US diplomatic missions to serve as channels of communication in countries such as Cameroon, Botswana, and Togo where the United States has good access to the head of state. Tel Aviv will also ask the United States to encourage other states, such as France and Egypt, to support the establishment of diplomatic ties. Moreover, Israel will look to the United States to be active on its behalf among black African governments during the yearly ritual of Arab and radical Muslim challenges to Israeli credentials before the United Nations and other international organizations. [redacted]

On the other hand, the close identification between Washington and Tel Aviv will continue to hamper African-US relations in states like Nigeria and Senegal where Islamic ties and anti-South African views both play major roles in foreign policy formulation. In such states as Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, where Tel Aviv's close ties with South Africa are probably the decisive factor in opposition to Israel, Washington's identification with Israel is likely to damage US bilateral relations. [redacted]

25X1

According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel will continue to request US financial help for military and development projects it hopes to provide key African states, particularly Liberia and Zaire. Unless Israel is able to fulfill its commitments to Zaire and Liberia in the near future, those relationships will be increasingly stressful. Zaire in particular has suffered a large net loss of Arab aid by renewing diplomatic ties and will be looking to Israel to make good the difference through what Kinshasa views, according to US Embassy reporting, as Tel Aviv's influence in the United States. [redacted]

25X1

The close identification of Israel with the United States in the eyes of many black African leaders will have a positive effect on African-US relations where this identification is associated with welcome forms of bilateral assistance from either country. For some moderate states, Israel's strong connection with the United States is likely in itself to be an influential argument for establishing closer ties with Tel Aviv.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

## Appendix A

### Israel in Africa: Country Surveys<sup>4</sup>

#### Long-Established Diplomatic Ties

Only three black African states have maintained diplomatic links with Israel for the entire period since 1973—Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Each is far from the mainstream of black African politics. What they have in common, apart from their longstanding relationship with Israel, are close political or geographic ties with South Africa. [redacted]

**Malawi.** Malawi, the only black African state that maintains full diplomatic relations with South Africa, is Israel's most consistent supporter in black Africa. Lilongwe's stance reflects the powerful personal influence of President Banda, whose relationship with Tel Aviv goes back to Malawi's independence in 1964. Israel's interest in Malawi centers around the political value of diplomatic recognition but also includes small amounts of trade and aid. Because there is no significant public support for Israel in Malawi, we judge that Lilongwe's relationship with Israel is likely to change after Banda—who is in his eighties—dies or retires. [redacted]

**Swaziland.** Like Malawi, Swaziland has a close working relationship with Pretoria and has no diplomatic relations with any Marxist government except its neighbor, Mozambique. Israel has had relations with and a resident diplomatic mission in Mbabane since 1972; its Ambassador there is also accredited to Lesotho and responsible for informal Israeli relations with Botswana and for courting Mozambique. [redacted]

Tel Aviv provides a modest amount of technical training to the Swazis, and it has sold Mbabane two military transport aircraft. At least four Swazi pilots are training in Israel at Mbabane's expense, and the Israelis have also provided some aircraft maintenance instruction in Swaziland. In addition, several senior Swazi officials have visited Israel, including the present Prime Minister. [redacted]

<sup>4</sup> The appendix is based, for the most part, on information supplied by US Embassies in Africa. [redacted]

**Lesotho.** Israel's relations with Lesotho were initially an adjunct of Israel's close ties with Pretoria and a reflection of Maseru's anti-Communist, pro-Western orientation. During the past year, however, partly in response to the South African attack in December 1982 on alleged safehouses of the African National Congress in Maseru, Prime Minister Jonathan has sought to establish Lesotho's nonaligned credentials by opening diplomatic relations with China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. This move and the souring of Maseru's relationship with South Africa probably preclude any significant expansion of Lesotho's ties with Israel. Jonathan backed away from entertaining Israeli President Herzog during the latter's trip to Africa in January 1984 to avoid security problems and unwelcome publicity, according to US Embassy reporting from Maseru. [redacted]

Israel's principal importance to Lesotho is as a supplier of arms and ammunition, which Maseru purchases periodically on a cash-and-carry basis. The advantage to Maseru in this arrangement, apart from reasonable prices, is that Tel Aviv's close ties with Pretoria usually enable Israel to facilitate the shipment of such goods through South African territory. Because of the deterioration in Lesotho-South African relations since the 1982 attack, however, Pretoria has held up Israeli shipments of armored cars, land rovers, helicopter spares, and small arms, according to the US Embassy in Pretoria. [redacted]

#### Recently Formalized Relationships

Israel began to crack the diplomatic logjam in its relations with the rest of black Africa in 1982 as it prepared to end its military occupation of the Sinai. Tel Aviv assiduously cultivated Zaire and Liberia, which it regarded as among the most promising candidates for resuming relations because of their close ties with the United States and their need for

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

security assistance. According to the US Embassy sources in Tel Aviv, Israeli policymakers hoped that other black African leaders would follow suit once one or more sub-Saharan states took the lead. [redacted]

25X1

**Zaire.** Zaire became the first black African state to reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel in May 1982 because President Mobutu believed this would lead to increased levels of US aid as well as to Israeli assistance, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. At the time, members of the US Congress were calling for major cuts in US aid to Zaire because of human rights violations and corruption in the government. According to US Embassy reporting, the Israelis emphasized the alleged influence of "their" lobby on Capitol Hill as an important selling point in persuading Kinshasa of the advantages of reestablishing relations. Notwithstanding Tel Aviv's hints and Kinshasa's hopes, US aid to Zaire has grown only slightly, from \$31 million in 1982 to an estimated \$37.5 million in 1984. According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, Mobutu has been disappointed by the lack of US response. [redacted]

25X1

A desire for Israeli security assistance also played an important role in Mobutu's decision, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

The US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that Israeli economic assistance to Zaire is limited to technical advisers and that Tel Aviv provides no financial assistance. Israeli agricultural experts have been working at Mobutu's presidential experimental farms near Lubumbashi, Gbadolite, and Kinshasa since before the establishment of diplomatic relations. [redacted]

25X1

The resumption of ties with Israel damaged Zaire's relations with a number of Arab states and cost it valuable financial support. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates closed their embassies in Kinshasa and immediately cut their aid, which averaged more than \$30 million a year through 1981. The Arab states of North Africa generally reacted more cautiously. Only Libya broke relations; it also stepped up support for anti-Mobutu dissident groups in exile. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] According to the Embassy, he was influenced by concern for his own safety and by fears of internal instability and of incursions by dissidents or mercenaries from across Zaire's borders. He asked for substantial Israeli assistance both in training and materiel for his personal bodyguard and for the troops protecting Shaba Region, the principal source of Zaire's copper wealth. One of Mobutu's closest advisers is an Israeli, and he trusts the Israelis enough to place them in positions of influence with his palace guard. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Kinshasa is looking for ways to restore Arab ties with an eye toward regaining Arab aid. The Zairian Foreign Minister urged his Egyptian and Sudanese counterparts to put Kinshasa back in touch with the [redacted]

25X1

25X1

<sup>5</sup> An Israeli proposal to train a Chadian elite military force in Zaire has reached a dead end, according to US Embassy reporting. Funds have not been found for the program, and President Mobutu has not given it a clear endorsement. [redacted]

25X1



Arab Bank for Economic Development last November, according to US Embassy reporting. The US Embassy in Kinshasa assumes that Mobutu also discussed renewing relations with Saudi Arabia during his meeting last summer with Saudi tycoon Kashoggi and that he probably also asked Egyptian President Mubarak for help during Mubarak's visit to Zaire earlier this year. Mobutu publicly urged Tel Aviv to modify its policy toward the Palestinians during the visit of Israeli President Herzog to Zaire in January. [redacted]

The future of Zaire's relations with Israel could well hinge on Israel's ability to secure additional financial aid for Kinshasa. Israel has tried to persuade the United States, West Germany, and possibly other Western governments to provide financial support for its assistance programs in Zaire, but these efforts have failed thus far, according to US Embassy reporting. We believe that Mobutu will be watching US Congressional reaction to President Reagan's proposed assistance package of \$59 million for Kinshasa for fiscal year 1985 as a sign not only of the future direction of US policy but also of the value of Israeli support. [redacted]

**Liberia.** Liberia's renewal of relations with Israel in August 1983 and Head of State Doe's visit to Jerusalem in the same month—the first by an African head of state in over a decade—were the result of a combination of factors. According to the US Embassy in Monrovia, Doe was anxious to obtain Israeli technical and security assistance because of his fears of Libyan subversion; he also saw the move as a way of improving his image as an important actor in regional politics; and he believed that relations with Israel would provide a small counterbalance to the overwhelming presence of the United States in Liberia. [redacted]

Although Monrovia obviously expected the United States to react positively to the reestablishment of relations with Israel, the Embassy believes that this was not the prime motivating factor. Most Liberians saw the move as an assertion of their sovereignty and their ability to find assistance from sources other than the United States, according to the Embassy. At the same time, the Embassy acknowledges that Doe's

government would be pleased if the Jewish community in the United States were to respond positively to Monrovia's initiative and seek to invest in Liberia. We also believe that Doe would not react adversely if Tel Aviv were to support Liberia's pleas for greater US aid. [redacted]

25X1

Doe viewed President Herzog's state visit to Monrovia in January as a major diplomatic accomplishment, according to US Embassy sources, notwithstanding Israel's embarrassment over its inability to provide more than a token amount of the military assistance Doe has requested. Liberia had approached Tel Aviv with a long list of military equipment, but US Embassy reports from Tel Aviv indicate that the Israelis thus far have ducked most of the request, claiming they must first consult their American colleagues. The US Embassy believes, however, that the Israelis promised some ammunition to Liberia during Herzog's visit. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

US officials have suggested that Israel's greatest contribution could come in police training, a field that US law bars from US foreign assistance. Twelve Liberian police officers went to Israel in January for a month's training in riot control. The Israelis have also agreed to provide training for Liberia's elite presidential guard. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Israel has also provided some intelligence assistance to the Liberian Government, but the extent of this cooperation is not clear. According to the US Embassy, the Liberians have an exaggerated fear of Libyan interference in Liberia's internal affairs and believe that the Israelis can help them guard against subversive threats. [redacted]


25X1

Liberian officials are apparently pleased by recent Israeli interest in a number of private investment projects. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1



them to counter any potential Muslim political threat, particularly one that might be associated with Libyan activity. The newly founded Liberian-Israeli Friendship Organization aims to promote ties between the two countries. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Liberia's renewal of relations with Israel has had only slight effect on its relations with Arab states, from whom Monrovia had not received much aid even before 1973. Liberia is not directly dependent on Arab oil because it generally buys oil on the spot market through European brokers. No Arab states withdrew their missions, and Libya has done nothing to retaliate. Liberia feared for a time that the Arab states might boycott Liberian-flag vessels if Monrovia opened its Embassy in Jerusalem, but this pressure abated when Doe decided to locate the Embassy in Tel Aviv. [redacted]

25X1

Tel Aviv and Monrovia probably will continue to try to enlist US financial support for Israel's assistance program. The US response thus far has been limited to offers of equipment for the proposed Israeli-trained Executive Mansion Guard. We believe that Monrovia's requests will increase in urgency as the disparity grows between Liberia's needs and what Israel can afford. [redacted]

25X1

Monrovia is also looking to Israel for technical assistance, according to US Embassy reports. Several Israeli agricultural technicians are working at the Firestone plantation, and one or two Israelis work in the diamond business. The Liberians have requested aid in health care and are discussing with the Israelis the establishment of an ophthalmologic medical center. Finally, both the Governor of the National Bank of Liberia and the Finance Minister have visited Israel's Central Bank within the past year to obtain technical advice. [redacted]

**Countries of Major Interest to Israel**

Israel seeks to cultivate the friendship of a few particularly influential African states and to develop discreet contacts with them. Of the four discussed below, we believe that only Ivory Coast is a candidate for reestablishing relations any time soon. [redacted]

25X1

Despite this flurry of activity, most Israeli assistance projects in Liberia are still in the planning stage, and US Embassy sources have reported Israeli frustration over the lack of progress. The Israeli community in Liberia probably still numbers less than 25 people. [redacted]

25X1

*Ivory Coast.* Aged President Houphouet-Boigny is one of Israel's most enduring and best friends in Africa. His close ties go back before Ivorian independence to the 1950s, and he was one of the last African leaders to break relations in 1973. Houphouet has for years given Tel Aviv indications of his willingness to reestablish formal ties and, on several occasions, has led Israeli representatives to believe that only the timing of such a move remained to be decided. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Even so, Monrovia's restoration of ties with Tel Aviv has met with widespread approval within Liberia, according to US Embassy sources. The most politically active segments of the population are conservative Christians who are concerned about Qadhafi's activities in the region and the slow expansion of Islam in the interior. They believe that Israeli support will help

Secret

Because Houphouet is one of Francophone Africa's influential senior statesmen, the Israelis are eager to gain his active support for their diplomatic campaign in Africa. They believe that other pro-Western Francophone states would follow his lead if he would renew diplomatic relations. According to US Embassy reporting, Houphouet had planned to discuss the renewal of Israeli ties with other pro-Western African leaders—most likely the Presidents of Togo, Gabon, and Central African Republic—after the OAU summit, which had been tentatively scheduled for Conakry in May. The death of Guinean President Toure and the subsequent military coup in Guinea have made the timing and venue of the next summit uncertain, however, and reduced the likelihood of Houphouet taking an initiative to organize a concerted diplomatic move toward Tel Aviv. [redacted]

The Israeli Interests Section at the Belgian Embassy in Abidjan is staffed by a senior diplomat, Benad Avital, who has the title of Second Secretary. He has been joined recently by an assistant, according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. Avital travels freely in and out of the country and within Ivory Coast. Houphouet himself meets periodically with senior Israeli officials during his visits to Western Europe, according to US Embassy reporting. He held secret talks—later reported in the British press—with Shamir in Geneva in July 1983, for example, when Shamir was Foreign Minister. [redacted]

A number of well-established economic links exist between Israel and Ivory Coast. The Israeli community of about 1,000 is primarily involved in the construction industry and export-import firms, according to US Embassy reports from Abidjan. Many are former technical advisers who stayed on after 1973 to work on contract for the Ivorian Government or in private business. Israel does not now provide technical assistance to Ivory Coast, but Tel Aviv has raised the possibility of establishing a program if diplomatic relations are resumed, the US Embassy in Abidjan reports. [redacted]

Security considerations also play a part in Houphouet's interest in developing formal ties with Israel, according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. Although Tel Aviv is providing some limited security assistance to Abidjan, Houphouet probably would welcome more

Israeli aid. He is concerned about Libyan activities in neighboring Upper Volta and Ghana as well as elsewhere in the region, and we believe he would like to have a small counterbalance to the overwhelming French presence in Ivory Coast's security sector. [redacted]

25X1

There are already signs of increased interest in Ivory Coast among American investors that are at least partially attributable to Abidjan's links with Israel, according to the US Embassy in Abidjan. A group of Jewish-American businessmen planned an investment mission to Ivory Coast in late 1983, but the visit was canceled at the last minute. According to the Embassy, the visit apparently will be rescheduled this year. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Several factors complicate the Israeli effort to renew formal ties with Abidjan. First, Houphouet has close ties with the Arab-oriented states in Francophone Africa that have significant Muslim populations. Second, we believe he continues to be troubled by what he views as aggressive Israeli actions and policies in the Middle East. Third, Ivorian Foreign Minister Ake is opposed to reestablishing formal ties with Tel Aviv and favors a Third World foreign policy orientation, according to the US Embassy. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

On the other hand, Abidjan has been able to ignore the most blatant Arab pressures against its dealings with Israel because it is nearly self-sufficient in oil. Houphouet has paid a price, however, for steadfastly refusing to accept a boycott of Israeli firms as a condition of Arab aid: construction of the Soubre Dam, the country's largest investment project, has been postponed indefinitely because of a shortfall in Arab funding. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

As long as Houphouet is in power, Ivory Coast will remain one of Israel's best prospects for another diplomatic breakthrough. Houphouet's death or retirement would reduce Tel Aviv's chances in Abidjan, however, because a successor regime would probably wish to avoid controversial foreign policy ventures and concentrate on consolidating domestic support. [redacted]

**Nigeria.** Nigeria is of major interest to the Israelis because of its size, large market, and influence with other OAU states. As the region's principal oil producer and a prime mover behind the Economic Community of West African States, Lagos carries considerable weight among its neighbors. [redacted]

Nigeria has long been Israel's largest trading partner in black Africa, although Israeli businessmen are suffering because of Nigeria's economic crisis. In the past, Israel exported mainly chemicals, medicine, and agricultural products to Nigeria—totaling \$43.3 million in 1982—and provided technical expertise. [redacted]

An Israeli community of about 2,500 lives in the country. Most are businessmen primarily involved in trading and construction, many working on short-term contracts. Some companies are openly identified as Israeli, such as Solel Boneh or Dizengoff. Others, according to academic observers, are registered elsewhere—such as Reynolds Construction Company in the United States and Afro-Continental in Switzerland—but are staffed almost entirely by Israeli personnel. [redacted]

Israeli construction firms secured contracts worth \$1 billion in 1981. According to information gathered by the US Embassy in Lagos, most contracts have been undertaken in Nigeria's southern states—for houses in and around Lagos, buildings for the government's ministries and parastatals, and roads—but Solel Boneh has been awarded a substantial contract to work at Abuja, the site of the new federal capital in central Nigeria. [redacted]

Tel Aviv's strongest supporters in Nigeria have long been the predominantly Christian communities in the southern part of the country, according to published US academic studies. Pro-Israeli sentiment among them stems from personal ties that developed during

the 1960s between southern Nigerian leaders and Tel Aviv in reaction against the Pan-Islamic links that had developed between Nigerian Muslims and Egypt. Until late last year, the two southern-based Nigerian parties—the Unity Party of Nigeria of Obafemi Awolowo and the Nigerian People's Party of Nnamde Azikiwe—favored renewing diplomatic relations with Israel. Nigeria's new military government has banned these parties, however, and greatly reduced the influence of their leaders. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

According to US Embassy sources in Tel Aviv, Israeli officials believe, nonetheless, that the new military government may be more positively inclined toward Tel Aviv than its predecessor, even though it is also dominated by northern Muslims. The previous government had taken a consistently firm public stand against diplomatic relations because of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

We doubt that the military government will move closer to Israel, however, because it is trying to obtain loans from Saudi Arabia, to increase its official OPEC oil production quota, and to maintain support among the Muslim majority in northern Nigeria. The Nigerian Foreign Minister told the press in late January that it was not yet time to reestablish relations, particularly in light of Israel's trade and military exchanges with South Africa. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Members of the Israeli community in Nigeria themselves doubt the value of restoring diplomatic relations, according to US Embassy reporting. They fear that it would endanger them personally and their business prospects by putting them in the spotlight. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

**Kenya.** There is a long history of close Kenyan-Israeli ties, particularly during the presidency, 1964-78, of the late Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta's personal links with Tel Aviv dated back before independence, and in 1973 he severed formal relations with the greatest reluctance. Afterward, Kenyatta allowed Israeli diplomats to maintain an Interests Section at the Danish Embassy in Nairobi. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[redacted]  
[redacted] The durability of the Kenyan-Israeli connection was dramatized in 1976 by Tel Aviv's use of the Nairobi airport during the operation that rescued Israeli hostages from Entebbe, Uganda, and by a subsequent step-up of Israeli military assistance.  
[redacted]

We believe that Nairobi is satisfied for now with the extent of its informal ties with Israel. [redacted]  
[redacted]

Kenya's Israeli connection cooled considerably after President Moi came to power in 1978. During Moi's chairmanship of the OAU, the organization roundly condemned Israel for its policies in the Middle East. Moi has concentrated on expanding Kenya's ties with the Arab states. [redacted]

**Ethiopia.** Israel has had a long historical connection with Ethiopia, largely because of Tel Aviv's strategic interest in the Horn of Africa. The Israelis developed a close relationship with prerevolutionary Ethiopia under the late Emperor Haile Selassie during the 1960s when Tel Aviv played an influential role in training the Ethiopian Army, paramilitary police, and intelligence service. About 50 Israeli military-security advisers served in the country during the late 1960s, and Tel Aviv continued to maintain a small military advisory presence until 1977 despite the break in relations in 1973, according to US press reports. Officials of Haile Selassie's government said privately to a US Embassy source that the main reason for the diplomatic break was that Tel Aviv had not done enough to get the United States to provide more military assistance to Addis Ababa, although we believe that a need to ensure Arab neutrality in the event of hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia and a desire to persuade the Arabs to stop assisting Eritrean dissidents were also factors. [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Israel lost its most influential advocate in Kenya last summer when Moi forced Constitutional Affairs Minister Charles Njonjo out of his government for reasons unrelated to Njonjo's links with Tel Aviv.  
[redacted]

The Mengistu regime has been officially hostile to Tel Aviv for years, but it has not cut off contact with Israel. [redacted]

Kenya, nonetheless, is one of Israel's largest commercial partners in black Africa, and several hundred Israelis live there, almost all connected with private business. According to IMF figures, Israeli exports to Kenya in 1982 were over \$8 million, consisting principally of chemicals, construction and agricultural equipment, and medicine. El Al has continued its air service to Nairobi, including stopovers for weekly flights to South Africa. [redacted]

[redacted]


[redacted]

The Israelis do a modest business with Ethiopia in a variety of goods such as agricultural machinery and chemicals, soft drink bottles and blankets, communications equipment, and spare parts for the Ethiopian Army, according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa.

25X1  
25X1

Secret

Secret



**Togo.** Togo has maintained informal ties with Israel since breaking relations in 1973. An Israeli diplomat stationed in the Israeli Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Ghana is attached formally to the Belgian Embassy in Lome and has good access to Togolese officials. In addition, Maurice Assor, a Jewish businessman of Moroccan origin is one of President Eyadema's closest advisers on official and personal financial matters and, according to US Embassy sources, has been a valuable and sympathetic contact for Tel Aviv. [redacted]

25X1

Eyadema is a pragmatist who personally decides the government's foreign policy positions, but he has not made up his mind about restoring relations with Israel, according to the US Embassy in Lome. He is concerned about Libyan destabilization in the region and irritated that the moderate Arab states have done nothing to restrain Qadhafi, according to the US Embassy. He told US officials last October that he might join other pro-Western African leaders in a concerted action to renew ties with Tel Aviv. Like Houphouet, he would prefer to postpone discussion of renewed Israeli ties until after the next OAU summit. Lome is less vulnerable than many African states to Arab pressure because Togo has diversified its sources of imported oil. The US Embassy in Lome reports that a group of American Jewish investors interested in promoting Togo-Israeli relations plan to investigate investment possibilities in Togo and elsewhere in West Africa this year. [redacted]

25X1

Tel Aviv takes a special interest in the well-being of Ethiopia's 25,000-member indigenous Jewish community, the "Falashas," whom Addis Ababa largely ignores. Several thousand Falashas have emigrated to Israel illegally through Sudan and other neighboring states, according to US press reporting. [redacted]

25X1

The Mengistu regime's close links with the Soviets, who are adamantly opposed to Israeli influence in Ethiopia, make a rapprochement between Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa unlikely any time soon. At the same time, Ethiopia's anger over Arab support for Eritrean dissidents and the continuity of Addis Ababa's long-standing links with Tel Aviv are factors that could work in Israel's favor over the longer term. Even now, some senior Ethiopian officials are surreptitiously friendly to Israel, and most of the influential Amharic population is unabashedly friendly, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

25X1

**Other Targets**

Tel Aviv believes that if any influential English- or French-speaking black African states—such as Ivory Coast, Nigeria, or Kenya—could be persuaded to resume relations with Israel, others would follow. It has expended considerable effort over the past year in cultivating a number of smaller African countries with which it already had informal ties. [redacted]

25X1

On the negative side, we believe that Eyadema would be reluctant to close the door on Arab trade and economic assistance or to provoke Libya. Togo sells cotton worth almost \$5 million annually to Morocco and Tunisia and imports goods valued near \$9 million annually from Arab states; by contrast, Israeli trade with Togo is inconsequential. An Arab League delegation left Lome last November convinced that Togo would not renew relations with Israel until the OAU rescinds the resolution under which members agreed to boycott Israel, according to US Embassy sources. In our view, such a withdrawal is unlikely. Moreover, the US Embassy reports that Eyadema believes that Tel Aviv wrongfully pursues a policy of hegemony in the Middle East, and he personally supports Palestinian self-determination. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Secret

**Central African Republic.** With the overthrow of Emperor Bokassa in late 1979 and the installation of the David Dacko regime, the Israelis began to negotiate a renewal of their ties with Bangui, which had been severed in 1973. According to US Embassy sources, the two countries had tentatively agreed to exchange ambassadors, just before President Dacko was overthrown by General Kolingba in 1981. An Israeli delegation met with Kolingba a few weeks later, according to the US Embassy in Bangui, hoping to move ahead swiftly on reestablishing relations, but the new President demurred, pleading the insecurity of his position as a new head of state. Until recently, US Embassy reporting indicates a number of feelers put out by the Israelis have been met by consistent procrastination, although Kolingba has been willing to consider Tel Aviv's overtures in principle. [redacted]

We believe that Bangui's reluctance is based on apprehensions about Arab reactions to restored ties with Israel. Although Bangui is not dependent on the Arabs for oil—its main supplier is Gabon—the CAR is in dire economic straits and does not want to jeopardize Arab assistance. Moreover, we believe Bangui does not wish to give Libya any further pretext for stepping up subversion against the Kolingba government. [redacted]

Although US Embassy sources report Kolingba would like the Israelis to resume agricultural assistance and a youth training program and would welcome the establishment of a joint venture for the exploitation of diamonds in the CAR, the Israelis have tied these and other inducements—such as promises to attract private Jewish investment to the CAR—to a formal publicized announcement of renewed relations. We believe Kolingba, an extremely cautious and prudent person, has not found the incentives worth the risk. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Cameroon.** Since 1982, when a government dominated by Muslim northerners was replaced by one led by Christian southerners, Israel has targeted Cameroon for special attention, according to US Embassy reporting from Tel Aviv. Although President Biya's

position is delicate following a failed coup attempt in April by the then Muslim-dominated Presidential Guard, the same sources indicate that Israeli officials speculate that the abortive coup might sharpen Cameroonian interest in obtaining security assistance from Tel Aviv. In our view, however, Biya or any other non-Muslim Cameroonian will have to proceed cautiously in exploring closer ties with Israel to avoid sowing further unrest among northern Cameroonians already fearful of domination by Christians in the south. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Director General Kimche of the Israeli Foreign Ministry made a secret visit, later reported in the Israeli media, to Yaounde in March to discuss possible cooperation in security, agriculture, and construction. Biya expressed concern about the loyalty of Muslim tribes in the north and about a possible threat of Libyan incursions from Chad. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] News of the meeting was leaked to the Israeli press, and a scheduled visit by a Cameroonian delegation to Tel Aviv in April was canceled by Yaounde, which was embarrassed by the publicity. [redacted]

25X1

**Gabon.** Israel hopes that President Bongo would follow Ivorian President Houphouet's lead should the latter decide to reestablish ties with Tel Aviv, according to the US Embassy in Libreville, but we believe Bongo's negative view of Israel's military presence in Lebanon makes an early resumption of relations impossible. Bongo has also publicly criticized Israel's position on the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem, although he supports the Camp David accords. Moreover, we believe he does not want to give Libya any excuse to interfere in Gabon. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Bongo is interested, however, in expanding Israel's role in Gabon's economic development, according to US Embassy reporting. Gabonese-Israeli trade has increased over the past few years, and Bongo would be likely to welcome Israeli investment and agricultural development. Although Saudi Arabia and Morocco have provided financial support for the trans-Gabon

25X1

railroad and other development projects, Gabon is less vulnerable than most African states to Arab pressure because it is self-sufficient in oil production. [redacted]

**Botswana.** Tel Aviv's informal relations with Botswana are handled by the Israeli Ambassador in Swaziland. The previous Ambassador in Mbabane, Emmanuel Galbar, had visited Botswana every three or four months but, according to the US Embassy, generally had been unable to obtain appointments with senior officials until 1982 when Washington suggested that Tel Aviv might be able to supply rifles to the country's national police force. Botswana had first requested such weapons from the United States, but US regulations prevented it from meeting Gaborone's request. [redacted]

Gaborone reacted negatively to Galbar's rather ham-handed offer to exchange the rifles for normalizing relations, according to US Embassy reporting. Tel Aviv then backtracked and offered to give Gaborone the weapons with no strings attached. Galbar worked out the details with the help of the Israeli military attache in Pretoria. [redacted]

The deal led to an improved climate between Gaborone and Tel Aviv and made possible closer ties between Israel and the Botswana armed forces. Brigadier Ian Khama, the Deputy Commander of the Army and the son of Botswana's first president—the late Seretse Khama—visited Israel in November 1983.

[redacted]  
[redacted] The head of the Army, General Merafhe, is expected to visit Israel later this year, according to the US Embassy. Discussions have also been conducted about the possibility of the Botswana military receiving Israeli training in the use of mortars and commando tactics. [redacted]

According to US Embassy reporting from Gaborone, Tel Aviv has also offered scholarships to bring Botswanan students to Israel and has proposed programs for developing dry-land agriculture and irrigation techniques. The same sources report Israeli officials have also discussed assistance in desalinization, cloud seeding, and the extraction of mineral byproducts from mining. In addition, Tel Aviv is considering a request for construction of an eye clinic in Gaborone. [redacted]

Notwithstanding this burgeoning relationship, the US Embassy in Gaborone doubts that Botswana will normalize relations with Tel Aviv unless a number of other OAU members, including some key states such as Nigeria or Kenya, take the lead. Botswana's Minister of External Affairs, Archie Mogwe, is an outspoken opponent of closer ties with Israel. For the present, according to US Embassy sources, Botswana prefers to maintain some distance between itself and Israel in order to establish credibility in Third World forums, particularly as Israel is perceived by many African countries to be working hand in glove with South Africa in the region. [redacted]

**Ghana.** Israel's diplomatic prospects in Ghana have been poor since Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings took power in 1981 and immediately developed ties with Libya. Although Libyan-Ghanaian relations have deteriorated recently, we doubt that Accra will break relations or turn to Israel any time soon. Moreover, Accra's continuing hope of obtaining low-priced petroleum from Libya or other Arab states makes a renewal of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv unlikely. [redacted]

Nevertheless, longstanding informal links exist between Ghana and Israel. Tel Aviv has maintained an Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Accra since Ghana severed relations in 1973. Zim Israel Navigation Company, Ltd. (Zim Lines), a government-owned corporation, also has a representative in Accra, according to US Embassy reports. Zim Lines organized and supervised Ghana's shipping line, Black Star, from the time of the country's independence in 1957 until Accra broke diplomatic relations in 1973. Zim Lines was invited to renew its relationship with Black Star in 1981, but the Israelis turned down the offer, preferring to maintain the present level of operations in Ghana until diplomatic ties are renewed. Still, Israeli-flag vessels call in Ghana on an average of one each month. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



**Secret**

Other Israeli activity in Ghana includes investments by the firm of Dizengoff, which supplies communications equipment to the government, and by Tahal, which is engaged in water and road construction projects with World Bank financing. Ghana's depressed economy has caused a sharp reduction in Israeli commercial operations and in the numbers of Israeli nationals based in Accra. Nonetheless, Israel provides short-term training in agriculture, shipping, and port management. When the Nigerians expelled large numbers of Ghanaian citizens in 1983, Tel Aviv provided advice and liaison assistance to them at Ghana's request through the Zim Lines office in Lagos, according to the US Embassy there.

25X1

**Secret**

Secret

## Appendix B

### African Relations With Israel and the Arab States

	Diplomatic Relations With Israel	Exports to Israel	Imports From Israel
Botswana	Broke relations in November 1973. Deals informally through Israeli Ambassador in Swaziland.	None.	Negligible.
Burundi	Broke relations in May 1973.	None.	Negligible.
Central African Republic	Broke relations in October 1973.	Negligible.	Negligible.
Congo	Broke relations in December 1972.	Negligible.	Negligible.
Ethiopia	Broke relations in October 1973.	\$4 million in 1982, including agricultural products, engine parts.	\$4.1 million in 1982, including agricultural machinery, chemicals, manufactured goods, communications equipment, and spare parts for the Ethiopian Army.
Gabon	Broke relations in October 1973. The Israelis maintained an Interests Section in Libreville until 1982; they are now represented by the Israeli Interests Section at the Belgian Embassy in Abidjan.	\$10 million in 1982, chiefly wood and wood products.	\$0.8 million in 1982, principally glass, tools, and parts.
Ghana	Broke relations in October 1973. Israel maintains a one-man Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy in Accra.	\$0.3 million in 1982, principally cocoa cake.	\$0.6 million in 1982, including agricultural products, medicines, and parts.

Secret

Secret

Israeli Commercial Presence	Israeli Residents	Relations With Arab States
None.	Less than 10.	In 1982 Botswana received a total of \$6.2 million in aid disbursements from OPEC states. Only Libya has a diplomatic mission, but it exercises only modest influence. Saudis and Kuwaitis have given concessionary assistance for airport construction and a coal project.
None.	None.	Receiving development aid from Libya and negotiating for assistance from Algeria. The Abu Dhabi Fund, Kuwait, the Arab Development Bank, and the Saudis have provided modest levels of assistance.
None.	None.	As of December 1983, the OPEC Development Fund has provided \$6 million for road construction; Kuwait, \$5.7 million for roads; BADEA, \$3.4 million for cotton development and \$1.5 million for roads; Egypt, \$2 million for technical assistance; and Morocco, 1,012 scholarships yearly. Iraq promised an unknown amount of crude as balance-of-payments support, but none has been delivered. President Kolingba visited Khartoum and Cairo in May 1984 seeking further support.
None.	None.	PLO maintains an office in Brazzaville with full diplomatic privileges. Total debt to Arab sources in 1983: Arab Development Fund, \$280,000; Iraq, \$360,168; Libya, \$350,000; and OPEC Fund, \$80,000. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements for 1982, \$7.6 million; multilateral, \$4.8 million.
\$40 million soda ash mining and processing facility at planning stage.	One businessman and his non-resident assistant.	Addis Ababa is hostile to Egyptian military assistance to Somalia and to Sudanese and Saudi support for Eritrean insurgents, but trades with Arab neighbors. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements for 1982; \$0.1 million.
Unknown.	Unknown.	Gabon is a member of the Islamic League; and President Bongo, a convert to Islam. Gabon has received Saudi financing for the trans-Gabon railway. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements in 1982, \$0.7 million.
Zim Israel Navigation Company continues to maintain its own representative in Ghana. Israeli ships call regularly at Tema. Dizengoff West Africa, a trading company, and Motorola (Israel) working in communications, operating out of Accra. The Israeli construction firm TAHAL is engaged in water and road projects with World Bank financing.	Around 10.	The close Libyan connection has diminished because of Ghanaian disappointment with the level of Libyan assistance. OPEC bilateral aid disbursements in 1982 were \$6.5 million; multilateral, \$1.3 million.

Secret

**Secret****African Relations With Israel and the Arab States (continued)**

	Diplomatic Relations With Israel	Exports to Israel	Imports From Israel
Guinea	Broke relations in June 1967. Tel Aviv is now represented by the Israeli Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy in Abidjan.	Negligible.	\$1.1 million in 1982, including disinfectants and tires.
Ivory Coast	Broke relations in November 1973. Israel maintains an Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy in Abidjan.	\$7.1 million in 1982, principally coffee, cocoa, and forest products.	\$2.7 million in 1982, chiefly insecticides and refrigeration and air conditioning equipment.
Kenya	Broke relations in November 1973. Israel has an Interests Section in the Danish Embassy in Nairobi.	\$2.2 million in 1982, principally agricultural products.	\$8.5 million in 1982, chiefly agricultural equipment, fertilizers, medicines, chemicals, plastics, vehicles, and parts.
Lesotho	Diplomatic relations since independence in 1966. Israel is represented by its Ambassador to Swaziland.	None.	Negligible. Some purchases of small arms and ammunition.
Liberia	Broke relations in November 1973. Renewed diplomatic ties in August 1983.	Negligible.	\$0.1 million in 1982, chiefly agricultural and communications equipment and medicines.
Malawi	Maintained relations since independence in 1964.	Negligible.	\$1 million in 1982, chiefly fertilizers, glass products, and medicines.
Nigeria	Broke relations in October 1973.	Negligible.	\$43.3 million in 1982, principally food, animal feed, medicines, chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, asbestos, rubber and glass products, equipment, and parts.
Senegal	Broke relations in October 1973.	Negligible.	\$0.1 million in 1982, mostly food and machinery.
Sierra Leone	Broke relations in October 1973. Israelis now represented by an Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy, Abidjan.	Negligible.	Negligible.
Swaziland	A resident Israeli Ambassador since 1972 also accredited to Lesotho and keeps an eye on Botswana and Mozambique.	Negligible.	Negligible.
Tanzania	Broke relations in October 1973.	\$0.5 million in 1982, nuts, coffee, and spices.	\$4.3 million in 1982, chiefly agricultural products, medicines, and chemicals.
Togo	Broke relations in September 1973. Israel represented by Interests Section in Belgian Embassy, Abidjan.	Negligible.	\$0.1 million in 1982, chiefly manufactured goods and agricultural products.
Uganda	Broke relations in March 1972.	Negligible.	Negligible.

**Secret**

Israeli Commercial Presence	Israeli Residents	Relations With Arab States
None.	None.	The late President Sekou Toure was a leader of the Islamic Conference. Saudi Arabia recently completed one of the world's largest mosques in Guinea. In 1982 Guinea received \$4.2 million in bilateral aid disbursements from OPEC countries and \$1.8 million in multilateral disbursements.
No major holdings.	Around 1,000, most in construction and export/import firms in capital city region.	In 1982 Ivorian exports of forest products, coffee, and cocoa to Arab countries (primarily Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) totaled nearly \$55 million while Ivorian imports, mostly crude oil, from Arab states (primarily Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Libya) totaled \$213 million or 10 percent of total Ivorian imports.
Some construction contracts.	Several hundred.	OPEC bilateral aid disbursements for 1982 were about \$5.7 million; multilateral disbursements, \$8.5 million.
None.	Less than 10.	Kuwait is continuing some \$15 million support for Maseru's new international airport. Egypt is the only Arab state to maintain diplomatic relations.
No major holdings.	Less than 25.	Receives little Arab assistance; in 1982 OPEC countries disbursed \$1.5 million bilaterally and \$3.9 million multilaterally, mostly in concessional oil from Kuwait.
Malawi None.	Less than 15.	Negligible.
Major investments primarily in trading companies, engineering, and construction. Principal investors include Solel Boneh and Dizengoff.	About 2,500, mostly businessmen, technical and office personnel, and families concentrated in Lagos and Ibadan.	A member of OPEC and a major petroleum exporter. Saudis provided \$400 million loan last year. In 1982 over 80,000 Nigerians made a pilgrimage to Mecca.
Unknown.	Unknown.	Senegal is one of the major beneficiaries of Arab aid in black Africa. In 1982 Senegal received \$119 million in bilateral aid disbursements from OPEC countries, mainly to finance two major dams on the Senegal River.
Negligible.	Unknown.	In 1982 Sierra Leone received \$0.3 million in bilateral aid disbursements from the OPEC states and \$1.1 million in multilateral disbursements.
None.	Five families.	No Arab representation or investment.
None.	About 25.	Tanzania is a staunch supporter of the PLO and increasingly dependent on Libya and Algeria for oil. Over the past two years, Tanzania has made a major effort to strengthen ties with Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
None.	Less than 10.	During the 1980s Libya has invested \$3 million in Togo's fishing industry and built a mosque and cultural center. The Saudis have invested \$16 million in construction and agriculture. The Saudis supply about 26 percent of Togo's heavy fuel oil needs.
Unknown.	Unknown.	In 1982 the OPEC states provided \$1.4 million in bilateral aid and nearly \$5 million in multilateral aid.

---

**African Relations With Israel and the Arab States (continued)**

	Diplomatic Relations With Israel	Exports to Israel	Imports From Israel
Zaire	Broke relations in October 1973. Reestablished relations in May 1982.	Negligible.	\$3.2 million in 1982, principally agricultural products, communications equipment, and insulation.
Zambia	Broke relations in October 1973.	\$0.1 million in 1982, principally coffee.	\$4.7 million in 1982, principally farm machinery, chemicals, fabrics, glass, and parts.
Zimbabwe	Never established relations.	Negligible.	Negligible.

---

[Redacted]

25X1

Secret

---

Israeli Commercial Presence	Israeli Residents	Relations With Arab States
Negligible.	About 28 families.	Middle Eastern Arab states broke relations and cut off aid in 1982 when Zaire resumed diplomatic ties with Israel. Of the North African Arab countries, only Libya broke relations.
Negligible.	About 40.	In 1982 Zambia's largest sources of bilateral external assistance were the Saudi Arabia Fund for Development (\$49 million) and Iraq (\$48 million). Zambia is dependent on the Middle Eastern Arab states for oil.
Negligible.	About 100, of which a number are successful businessmen, lawyers, and doctors.	The government maintains close ties with the PLO. Zimbabwe buys nearly all its oil from Algeria and Persian Gulf Arab states. In 1982 OPEC states gave \$44 million aid bilaterally and \$10.1 million through multilateral organizations.

Secret

**Secret**

**Secret**