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
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# Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism



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An Intelligence Assessment



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EUR 84-10190  
September 1984

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# **Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office  
of European Analysis. It was coordinated with the  
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries  
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,  
Western Europe Division, EURA, [redacted]

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**Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism** [Redacted]

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**Key Judgments**

*Information available as of 1 September 1984 was used in this report.*

Despite a drastic reduction in the incidence of violence and the decimation of a number of clandestine terrorist groups under the three years of military rule that ended last November, we do not believe Turkey's effort to put an end to terrorism has succeeded:

- Turkish security forces continue to find and confiscate significant quantities of weapons and make arrests.
- In the last several months, there has been a recurrence of small-scale violence.
- Kurdish dissident raids in August resulted in several deaths and demonstrated that this problem remains alive. [Redacted]

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Foreign support for Turkish terrorism continues. The Turks see Damascus—an ideological and historical rival—as their main antagonist. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] We believe the Soviets also lend support to terrorist groups, but they have been extremely discreet, and there is limited evidence of their activities. In our view, they rely on intermediaries, such as the Bulgarians and Syrians, whose role is better documented. In addition, Arab and Iranian terrorist groups have begun targeting each other and Western targets in Turkey. [Redacted]

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Eliminating foreign support would not halt terrorism in Turkey. In our judgment, Turkish terrorism has its roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and sociological changes that have occurred over the last three decades. Until significant improvements can be achieved in dealing with the resulting problems—unemployment, inequitable land and income distribution, overtaxed urban facilities, and festering religious and ethnic tensions—terrorism will remain a threat. [Redacted]

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
We expect a gradual resurgence of violence, but we do not expect it to take on dimensions serious enough to threaten political stability over the next year or two. Despite the return to civilian rule in November 1983, martial law remains in force throughout most of the country. Moreover, Turkish security forces have been strengthened by improved training and financial resources. [Redacted]

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
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The strength of the resurgence will also depend on the willingness of civilian and military authorities—now represented by Prime Minister Ozal and President Evren—to work together. We believe the competing political and institutional interests of these two men will complicate their relationship and perhaps weaken the security services and the government's ability to contain terrorism. 

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Even a moderate upsurge in terrorism could threaten US facilities and personnel in the country. The United States is seen as the principal patron of the Turkish Government and United States servicemen could again become the target of terrorists. 

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
### Turkey: The Threat of Resurgent Terrorism



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#### Introduction

The transition from military to civilian rule over the past year has taken place quietly, and the national election which brought Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to power last November was relatively trouble free. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the threat posed by leftist—and to a lesser degree, rightist and Islamic—terrorist groups has not been eliminated.



Indeed, in our judgment, one motivation for the generals to step back was a belief that only a popularly elected, competent civilian regime would have any hope of implementing the social and economic programs necessary to eradicate the sources of extremism and violence. As such, the move is a gamble, and the outcome could be decisive for the immediate future of democracy in Turkey.

#### Terrorism: Roots and Responses

**Sources of Political Violence.** The inadequacies of governmental structures and underlying social tensions in Turkey gave rise to a growing wave of violence which started in the late 1950s and culminated in military interventions in 1960, 1971, and September 1980. The violence and terrorism have their roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and sociological changes that have occurred over the last three decades. While the strains resulting from economic change, population growth, internal migration, urbanization, and ethnic/religious changes are common in the Third World, they have been acute in Turkey:

- Turkey's population of 50 million is nearly double that of 30 years ago. It grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent between 1950 and 1975—one of the highest rates in the world.
- The urban population has grown even more rapidly than the population as a whole. In 1960, 25 percent of the population lived in cities; by 1980, the portion had risen to 50 percent. This has thrown together

diverse and sometimes antagonistic ethnic and religious groups in unfamiliar city neighborhoods with sometimes violent consequences. For example, the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, the scene of large-scale rioting in December 1978, had perhaps the highest rate of growth in Turkey during the 1970s.

- The current official unemployment rate of about 20 percent has dropped only slightly from levels in the 1970s. Underemployment has been variously estimated as high as 70 percent of the working population in the sprawling shantytowns surrounding cities such as Ankara and Izmir.
- Income distribution is badly skewed: two prominent Turkish scholars claimed in 1980 that 70 percent of the population was below the average income level.
- Rural workers account for half the working population but only 28 percent of the national income, and much of this is concentrated among a few individuals. Land distribution also has become less equitable over time.

Violence also has its roots in Turkey's serious minority problems. Most troublesome are the Kurds in the southeastern provinces, who are second only to ethnic Turks in supplying recruits to radical leftist groups. The estrangement of this community, which makes up 10 percent or more of the population, is due in large part to Turkish laws that prohibit Kurdish language, literature, and ethnic organizational activity; indeed, Turkish officials deny the existence of a Kurdish minority. The Alevi community, concentrated in eastern Turkey and comprising perhaps 15 percent of the population, is another significant minority. Alevis—ethnic Turks who practice a version of Islam that draws from both Sunni and Shia doctrine, as well as elements of shamanism and Christianity—are viewed with suspicion, intolerance, and open hostility by the Sunni majority. Violence has flared frequently between these groups.

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The complexity of the causes of violence is matched by the diversity of terrorist groups which sprung up in Turkey. A feature of terrorism in Turkey is the plethora of leftist organizations. More than 50 such groups were in existence before the 1980 coup, and there was no trace of a common organization. The fragmentation of these groups reflects their highly personalized leadership and undeveloped ideological ideas. Beyond fuzzy Marxist notions, they appear to have only a vague concept of the type of state they wish to establish, and an anarchistic bent which has prevented the development of a widespread base of support. Their fragmentation, small size, and tight cell structure, however, do afford these militant groups a defense against police operations. [redacted]

**Violence and Weak Government.** The emergence of social and economic problems coincided with and contributed to a period of weak government when a series of internally divided coalition governments proved unable to agree on the causes of or solutions to Turkey's problems. Parliamentary governments in Turkey have not measured up well to the challenges posed sporadically by political violence. When terrorist violence first emerged as a serious problem in the late 1950s, the political institutions left by Ataturk had already been discredited by corrupt and arbitrary rule. Added to this was a succession of weak and internally divided coalition governments, as no single party was able to win a parliamentary majority. [redacted]

Terrorism first took on significant dimensions under the conservative and authoritarian Menderes government, whose misrule led to a military coup by a cabal of reformist Army colonels in May 1960. Their temporary government produced a highly liberal constitution which opened the way to hitherto-repressed political and social forces. Radical political parties and interest groups began to organize openly. Trade unions were granted the right to strike, and labor unrest began to grow. In this atmosphere of ferment, political radicalism took hold in the student community. The major political parties—the social democratic Republican People's Party and the conservative Justice Party—were preoccupied with internal power struggles and unable to cooperate to reduce the influence of these dangerous new forces. [redacted]

The politicization of the universities and factories led to street demonstrations and violence during the late

1960s and early 1970s and the emergence of clandestine, radical groups. In 1971 the military hierarchy intervened again, bloodlessly deposing the conservative Demirel government. The government of technocrats that followed, and subsequent elected cabinets as well, proved weak and equally incapable of containing the unrest. Between the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, governments were debilitated by the switching of party allegiances by deputies and even cabinet ministers, the need to seek coalition partners among extremist groups, rampant corruption, and the lack of consistent economic and political decision making. Foreign developments, such as the 1973/74 oil price hikes and the 1974 Cyprus conflict, produced new economic difficulties and anti-Western emotions that contributed to the growth of radicalism. Dissatisfaction with the United States, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Middle East, and the rise of formidable leftist groups prompted the emergence in turn of Islamic and neofascist groups.<sup>1</sup> [redacted]

The first large-scale violence occurred in Kahramanmaraş in December 1978 between Sunnis and Alevis. The killing of more than 100 people there led the left-of-center Ecevit government to impose martial law in 13 provinces, including the major urban areas. Nevertheless, the situation deteriorated rapidly, partly because the major political parties were themselves riddled with extremists and unwilling to cooperate against terrorism. By 1980, up to 20 Turks were dying every day in terrorist attacks. The victims included a former premier, a deputy party chief, a trade union leader, the country's foremost journalist, and senior security officials. The military, concerned that the situation was fast approaching civil war, finally intervened on 12 September 1980 and imposed military rule. [redacted]

<sup>1</sup> While the emergence of the rightwing terrorist group, the "Grey Wolves" of Alpaslan Turkes, was a major destabilizing factor before the coup, Islamic-oriented extremist groups have not been potent compared to other Turkish militants or even Islamic fundamentalist organizations in neighboring countries. Most Turks—leftist and rightist extremists, as well as mainstream politicians—support the idea of a secular state despite otherwise intense political differences and interpretations of Kemalism. Turkey is an overwhelmingly Sunni nation, and the only significant religious minority, the Alevis, does not have the dynamic clergy associated with the Shias. The government historically has kept religious leaders of all persuasions under fairly tight rein. [redacted]

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**Table 1**  
**Turkish Violence, 1978-82<sup>a</sup>**

Types of Incidents	26 December 1978-12 September 1980	13 September 1980-11 September 1982
Armed assaults	9,090	737
Explosions	6,365	370
Riots	1,163	68
Robberies	3,014	1,491
Student demonstrations	2,532	60
Other demonstrations	3,836	860
Wounded	10,427	850
Security officials killed	164	72
Terrorists killed	146	215

<sup>a</sup> This table is a representative picture of the scope of violence in Turkey before and after the military takeover. The figures were compiled from government communiques.

[Redacted]

**Results of Military Rule.** Three years of military rule produced significant gains in the battle against terrorism. According to official claims and press reports, political killings dropped from 5,000 during the nine months before the coup in 1980 to 442 in the following year. Incidents of political violence were down from 33,000 to 5,673 during the same period. Security forces confiscated more than 0.5 million pistols and rifles, about 2.2 million rounds of ammunition, nearly 10,000 explosive devices, 21 rocket launchers, and one mortar during the first year of military rule alone (see table 1). [Redacted]

The number of suspect terrorists arrested is more difficult to calculate but definitely reached into the tens of thousands. Some Turkish newspapers have alleged that arrests of suspected terrorists and sympathizers since the initial imposition of martial law in 1978 may have been as high as 125,000, although many of these were subsequently released or acquitted. A senior official of Ozal's party told the press last spring that there are still 100,000 people in jail, including 20,000 people in military prisons.<sup>2</sup> [Redacted]

<sup>2</sup> A majority of these prisoners are described by the Turkish Government as leftists, followed by those of "uncertain persuasions," and, lastly, Kurds. Most of the Turks arrested were apprehended in the major urban areas. [Redacted]

In handing over power last year, the military tried to ensure it would retain the means to deal with any resurgence of terrorism. It kept the presidency in its own hands, in the person of Gen. Kenan Evren, the former Chairman of the National Security Council. The new constitution enhances the powers of the president, who now has wide authority to act in emergencies and can control the selection and discipline of civil servants. The military also imposed new laws restricting party and electoral activity, banning former party leaders from participation in politics for 10 years, imposing sanctions for references to past political quarrels, and setting stiff penalties for violations of limits on labor and religious activity. [Redacted]

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A cornerstone of the military's program to strengthen the hand of the government is the State of Emergency Law, which was passed by the NSC last October. It offers a mechanism for the government to deal with disorder without implementing martial law. The NSC also established new state security courts to deal with offenses against the "integrity" of the country. These courts are staffed by civilians but have military judges and prosecutors. They can try cases falling under the anti-Communist provisions of the civil code, as well as violations related to labor laws, illegal demonstrations and associations, and smuggling (see inset, "State of Emergency Law"). [Redacted]

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In practice, the new law has served as a vehicle for shifting administrative responsibility from military to civilian authorities. Of the 26 provinces without military rule, 11 have been placed under a state of emergency. Martial law was extended in June in the remaining 41 provinces. [Redacted]

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#### **Terrorism: Dead or Alive?**

Despite the military's crackdown on radical groups, and the current relative calm, practically all observers agree that violence has not been eliminated. [Redacted]

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**Domestic Groups.** The government claimed in 1983 that nearly half of the illegal groups active at the time of the coup were still in operation. Last August, in an unusual announcement regarding the status of clandestine organizations, the martial law command in

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**State of Emergency Law**

*The new State of Emergency Law gives the government power to issue laws by decree, detain suspects for extended periods, impose curfews, and ban public meetings or publications for a period of up to six months in the event of a disruption of public order or natural disaster. Parliament has the responsibility of approving the decision and of extending the emergency in four-month increments.*

*During normal circumstances, when neither martial law nor a state of emergency is in effect, public prosecutors and the police have enhanced powers to arrest and detain suspects and prosecute defendants. Legislation passed by the former National Security Council expanded or redefined the list of offenses listed in the criminal code. Even so, the effectiveness of the new civilian system will depend on the cohesiveness of the state apparatus and the government's ability to maintain a well-disciplined and competent judicial and police system.*

Ankara said that 25 groups had been practically eliminated but three groups were still engaged in violence and 17 others had increased their activities. The command also announced that almost 6,000 suspects were still at large (see table 2).

the most active and dangerous organizations appear to be the same ones that were notorious before the 1980 coup. According to their own manifestoes, all these groups aim to overthrow the constitutional order through violent means and to force the removal of US facilities from Turkey. Their tactics emphasize armed assaults and bombing raids on government officials and facilities, as well as on rightist opponents and leftist rivals.

Security sweeps on the part of the Turkish National Police (TNP) once again are turning up signs of terrorist activity. The TNP, for example, arrested two militants in Istanbul in February who possessed sizable amounts of dynamite and explosive devices.

[redacted] [redacted]

three people were killed and 64 injured in violent incidents during municipal elections. In late June, Turkish police discovered three incendiary devices in Istanbul, and in early July a bomb exploded in an Istanbul office building. In August, terrorists bombed an office of an American bank in Istanbul. Elsewhere, security forces earlier this year seized large quantities of arms in the Provinces of Erzurum, Agri, Kayseri, and Tokat.

**The Foreign Dimension.** In addition to the domestic wellsprings of terrorism, foreign terrorist activities on Turkish soil add to the challenges facing the new government. The war between Iran and Iraq and the upheaval in Lebanon have produced a spate of terrorism throughout the Middle East that occasionally spills over into Turkey.

[redacted]

Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered more headlines abroad, is a much less serious threat. Armenian-sponsored terrorism for the most part takes place outside Turkey and has not contributed significantly to political instability. In fact, we believe Armenian terrorism tends to unite Turks and reinforce government efforts to portray the problem of terrorism simply as a result of foreign subversion. Even so, attacks by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) have unnerved the Turkish foreign service, generated unfavorable publicity about Turkey, and further burdened the security services.

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**Table 2**  
**Turkey: Major Terrorist Groups <sup>a</sup>**

Group	Ideological Orientation	Leaders	Goals and Tactics	Status
Revolutionary Way (Dev Yol)	Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet; emphasis on a continuing revolution	Ibrahim Keceiler, Taner Akcam, Ali Baspinar, Akin Dirik, Nasuh Kitap, Nasuh Mitar, Oruzhan Muftuoqlu, Melih Pekdemir, Mehmet Yilmaz	Immediate establishment of a proletarian dictatorship; focuses on propaganda and demonstrations as well as armed assaults	Active
Revolutionary left (Dev Sol)	Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet	Ozden Bilgin, Celaledin Can, Faruk Erner, Pasha Guven, Sursun Karatas, Sinan Kukul, Huseyin Soqun, Mehmet Venlue, Mehmet Murat	Much the same as Dev Yol	Active
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda (MLAPU)	Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet	Kirkor Aluc, Tafun Bilgen, Hayrettin Can, Hasan Erciyas, Semsiz Ozkan, Suleyman Polat, Hasan Sensoy, Kerim Sonatilgan, Tamer Tabak	Same as groups above, but the MLAPU has been more professional than any other group in its political assassinations and success in attacking US servicemen	Active
Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front-Swift Ones (Acilciler faction—TPLP-F-A)	Marxist-Leninist and pro-Soviet; faction believes militants need not be well trained or well indoctrinated for participation in violent acts	Enngin Erkiner, Cemil Orkunoqlu, Hilal Orkunoqlu, Mirac Ural	Same as above, but with more emphasis on violence for its own sake	Active
"Partizan" Group; Turkish Communist Party (TKP/ML)	Uncertain, but probably anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese		Uncertain, but probably a "national democratic people's" revolution with emphasis on the rural dimension of popular revolt	Active
Turkish Communist Labor Party (TKLP)	Unknown			Active
Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front (TPLP-F)	Umbrella organization for several groups such as the "Swift Ones" and the MLAPU described above; pro-Soviet	Taner Akcam, Tayfun Bilgin, Gulden Cayan, Nalan Gurates, Mirac Ural	Proletarian revolution; well-established history of bombings and assassinations	Less active than other groups but highly dangerous
Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA)	Broadly aligned with Albanian Marxism and the ideas of Che Guevara; chief rival of the TPLP-F during the 1970s	Unknown	Popular revolution with an emphasis on the rural dimension	Inactive

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**Table 2****Turkey: Major Terrorist Groups<sup>a</sup> (continued)**

Group	Ideological Orientation	Leaders	Goals and Tactics	Status
Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union (TRCU or TIKB)	Marxist-Leninist; offshoot of TPLA	Hasam Acan—Central Committee		Active
Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Party (TWPLP)	Principal pro-Chinese revolutionary group	Doqu Perineck	Revolution based on rural peasants and workers	Inactive; not as involved in violence as its offshoots
Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army (TWPLA or TIKKO)	Offshoot of TWPLP; anti-Soviet and Maoist	Mertol (LNU) "Murat"	Same as above with greater emphasis on terrorism as a precursor to revolution	Active
Grey Wolves (Idealist Hearths)	Rightwing militant arm of the disbanded Nationalist Action Party; neofascist	Alpaslan Turkes, Omer Baqci, Ali Batman, Oral Celik, Hasan Taskin	Destruction of Communist groups; pan-Turanism, or unity of all Turks including those in neighboring countries; armed assaults on leftist militants	Self-imposed inactivity
Kurdish Liberation Army (KLA) or "Apocular"	Kurdish separatism containing both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements	Abdullah Ocalan	Unity of all Kurdish groups and formation of a people's dictatorship in an independent Kurdish state; undertakes propaganda and armed assaults	Unknown
Kurdish Democratic Party	Kurdish separatism	Unknown	Same as above	Unknown
KAWA	Same as above	Unknown	Same as above	Unknown
Kurdish Workers (or Labor) Party (KWP)	Same as above	Abusi	Same as above	Unknown
Rizgari	Marxist-Leninist	Kadir Boztimer	Same as above	Unknown

<sup>a</sup> The Turkish Government indicated a year ago that about half of these groups remain active in some fashion. The organizations listed represent either the most active and violent groups in existence today, or those which we believe have the potential of emerging again. [redacted]

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Foreign support of Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian militants is a serious concern for the Turkish Government. Damascus is one of the main culprits; [redacted]

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[redacted] Iran has been providing money and weapons to Islamic-oriented groups in Turkey. Both countries presumably hope to weaken Turkey's ties with the West, particularly with the United States and Israel, and support the growth of Marxist or Islamic groups. [redacted]

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We believe the Soviets also lend support to proscribed Kurdish and Turkish groups. Although there is limited information about Soviet activities in Turkey, Turkish officials are convinced that Moscow plays a substantial role in fostering leftist extremism.

[Redacted]

The general sparsity of information is attributable, we believe, to Soviet reliance on intermediaries to provide discreet assistance to Turkish militants. Bulgaria and Syria,

[Redacted]

They, in turn, probably rely on well-established smuggling networks and Kurdish infiltration routes across the southern border. In our view, however, these operations are not critical to the survival of leftist groups because Turkish militants appear to have sufficient indigenous resources at their disposal (see inset, "Soviet Perspectives on Turkish Terrorism").

The Kurdish problem is the one most susceptible to foreign manipulation, given the predominance of ethnic Kurds in southeastern Turkey and their cross-border ties with compatriots in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Reports earlier this year from [Redacted] a contact of the US Consul in Izmir indicate that Kurdish organizations have become more active. Army officers reportedly also have become more concerned of late about the Kurdish problem, especially because of Baghdad's decision earlier this year to grant limited autonomy for Iraq's Kurdish tribes along Turkey's southern frontier.

[Redacted]

According to press reports and government announcements, in mid-August Kurdish guerrillas launched raids in several towns in eastern Turkey. Several gendarme officers were killed or wounded.

**Soviet Perspectives on Turkish Terrorism**

*Soviet officials no doubt viewed the breakdown of public order in Turkey in the late 1970s as a political opportunity, but Moscow's overriding interests in the country are not necessarily served or promoted by terrorism. Moscow must balance the benefits of weakening a key NATO ally through terrorist activity with the risk of provoking a violent, rightwing reaction or the intervention of solidly pro-Western officers. To be sure, Moscow would derive some benefit from the strains likely to arise between an authoritarian regime and Turkey's allies, but in the past the Soviets have clearly shown their dislike for military rule.*

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*We believe Soviet influence over Turkish militants is limited. Despite their avowed link to Lenin, most Turkish groups appear to have more in common ideologically with Mao and Marcuse. Turkish terrorist groups feature rapidly shifting and charismatic leaderships and a predilection toward action instead of the establishment of a broad basis of support within the labor movement. These factors help explain why the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party remains a marginal factor in the country's politics. Throughout its 60 years of existence as an illegal party, the TKP has focused its efforts on unifying divergent leftist parties as a cover for its own activities. The latest version of this approach is an attempt to unite Turkish workers in West Germany. The strategy has failed to produce any significant electoral support or control over antisystem movements.*

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*Still, the Turkish Communist Party and the Soviets have enjoyed a certain degree of success in influencing Turkish public attitudes. The key targets of the Soviets are the nonviolent, left-of-center elite, including writers, intellectuals, some student leaders, and labor bosses. In turn, these Turks have promoted Communist ideas, if not always identification with Moscow. It is to this general group of Turks that Moscow probably looks as the best hope for enhancing Soviet manipulation.*

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
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**Police Capabilities**

The ability of the security forces, and particularly the police, to cope with the threat posed by terrorism will be crucial to the Ozal government. The Turkish National Police, which has primary responsibility for internal security, was discredited by its failure to put down extremist violence in the 1970s. As a first step in its rehabilitation after the 1980 military intervention [redacted] the NSC disbanded competing leftist and rightist police unions and purged extremists within police ranks. Officers with poor records and a history of political activity were exiled to outposts in eastern Turkey. The NSC also equipped the police with better weapons and obligated more financial resources to the TNP in order to improve housing and discourage influence peddling (see inset, "Turkish Police"). [redacted]

In perhaps the most significant change [redacted] NSC appointed Army officers to administer police training programs. While this has made some policemen unhappy, it has also tended to foster greater cooperation between police and Army officers, and the training programs' emphasis on commando techniques has improved the TNP's ability to operate in the rugged, rural areas where terrorism has shifted to avoid urban dragnets. [redacted]



The effect of these changes has been an upsurge in confidence among TNP officers, [redacted]

The development of better communications between TNP headquarters in Ankara and the provinces allows more efficient and timely dissemination of information on terrorist groups. [redacted]

While substantial progress has been made to rebuild the TNP since 1980, it is still hindered by material

**Turkish Police**

*The Turkish National Police (TNP) and the gendarme have primary responsibility for law enforcement in Turkey. The TNP has 90,000 to 100,000 personnel devoted to maintaining order in urban areas. It conducts antiterrorist sweeps, antismuggling operations, security investigations, and penetrations of extremist groups and is responsible for surveillance of foreigners in collaboration with the intelligence service. The TNP is subordinate to the Interior Ministry, and its key officials are appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the President. The key role played by Evren and the military's role in reshaping the organization, plus the continuance of martial law, give the military considerable influence over the TNP. Chief officials include Saffet Arikan Beduk, director general, and Rennan Gurman, deputy director.* [redacted]

*The 125,000-member gendarme is responsible for maintaining order in rural areas and villages, guarding prisons and major industrial installations, and protecting the country's frontiers. Unlike the TNP, the gendarme's involvement in intelligence and investigative activities is limited. Although the gendarme falls under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry in peacetime, the Turkish General Staff would take control in wartime. New laws also make the General Staff responsible for training and educating gendarme personnel. Because its leaders have always been Army officers—General Celasun of the President's Council was one of the five members of the former National Security Council—and its personnel consist exclusively of soldiers, the military has more informal power over the institution than it has over the TNP.* [redacted]

and personnel shortcomings. [redacted] despite additional funding, the police have not fully recovered from the traumatic 1970s. [redacted]

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
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police to scatter their resources. In addition, Turkish terrorists are highly motivated and by and large appear to have a higher level of education than their TNP opponents. The militants' access to sophisticated Western weapons also puts the police at a disadvantage on occasion. [redacted]

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There are indications, too, that radical officers still exist within TNP and military ranks. The US Consul in Izmir reported in February that a large-scale police sweep through several Aegean provinces was conducted entirely by the Izmir police because of concerns that local forces had been penetrated [redacted]

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[redacted] TNP officers were dismayed that the militants appeared to have had warning of the police raids. About 500 military officers reportedly have been tried in military courts since 1980 for political activity, and retired and active duty military officers have been arrested for membership in Marxist groups such as the "Third Way" and the "Union of Young Kemalists Officers." Information on these groups is virtually nonexistent. [redacted]

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**Ozal, Evren, and Security Prerogatives**

The Ozal-Evren relationship, which has never been entirely cordial, will be a critical factor in determining the ability of the government to deal with internal security problems. At present, there are no apparent problems. Ozal has a solid majority in Parliament and an established working relationship with Evren. The two men have similar philosophical outlooks, and they appear to have an informal arrangement whereby Evren takes a greater degree of responsibility for foreign and security affairs, while Ozal concentrates on economic policy. According to press reports, Evren chairs monthly meetings of the new National Security Council consisting of Ozal; the ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs; the chief of the General Staff; force commanders; and the commander of the gendarme. [redacted]

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In our own view, it is questionable whether the police can gain the upper hand over terrorism, both because of their own shortcomings and because of the inherent advantages of extremist groups in this kind of struggle.<sup>4</sup> The lack of cohesiveness and homogeneity among Turkish terrorist groups—their small size, highly personalized organization, and tight cell structure—makes them extremely resilient. The fragmentation of leftist extremists into more than 50 groups—not all of which engage in violent activities—also forces the


We expect the formulation of internal security policy to become progressively more difficult as Ozal's political imperatives come into conflict with Evren's interest in security and in maintaining the authority of the military. Ozal probably will want to gain a greater

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degree of control over the national and local bureaucracy as a means of strengthening his hold on power and ensuring that his controversial economic policies are carried out. Evren, on the other hand, will probably oppose any such effort, especially if it involves the removal of former military officers serving, for example, as provincial governors. [redacted]




An early test of the Ozal-Evren relationship could come through the issue of amnesty for prison inmates. Opposition parties in parliament have advocated the release of sizable numbers of prisoners to deal with overcrowded jails. Evren and other military leaders are firmly opposed, and Ozal has been reluctant to take a clear stand. In our judgment, Ozal's sympathies probably are with his fellow politicians; we believe there is a better-than-even chance that he will eventually propose some limited form of pardon for juveniles and nonviolent offenders as a compromise. Even this could cause unease among the military. [redacted]

**Outlook**

In our judgment, the most likely outlook for Turkey is a gradual resurgence of terrorism and violence. The government under the best of circumstances will be unable to eliminate the deep-seated roots of violence. As importantly, it may not be able to convince the public that headway is being made since strains are likely to emerge in the Ozal-Evren relationship, creating uncertainty within the bureaucracy. Tensions between Ozal and Evren could also conceivably sap the dynamism of the antiterrorist effort. Both are strong-willed men, and Ozal clearly is intent on asserting his own authority. [redacted]

While we expect a gradual worsening of the terrorist problem, we do not expect the problem to become so severe over the next one to two years as to threaten political stability in Turkey. Martial law remains in effect throughout most of the country, and the government and security forces have ample authority to take action under new laws. The powers and authority of the president are, in our judgment, the best assurance of a strong government approach to the problem, and Evren's mandate runs until 1989. [redacted]

Even a modest revival of terrorism, however, could pose fresh risks for US personnel in Turkey. In the year or so before the military takeover, several US servicemen were killed by Marxist terrorists. [redacted]



[redacted] Because the United States was perceived as a staunch supporter of the former military government, we believe Turkish militants could well attempt to exact revenge by seeking out US personnel. Such incidents would provide them with a great deal of propaganda and a way of demonstrating the new government's weaknesses. We also believe there is an increasing threat from non-Turkish terrorists entering the country from neighboring Arab countries. [redacted]

Broader US interests will be damaged if Turkey proves unable over the longer term to master the twin challenges of the return to democracy and the suppression of terrorism. A revival of terrorism and political instability would again produce some of the political vacillation that characterized Ankara's foreign and domestic policies during the 1970s and make it less willing to support US policy in the region. Moreover, if Turkey reverts to authoritarian means to deal with terrorism, relations with its allies would suffer because of the setback to democratic development, and its ability to play a constructive role in the defense of Europe would be weakened. [redacted]

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