




DIRECTORATE OF
Intelligence



Political Unrest and Economic Conditions: A Preliminary Look

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A Research Paper

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September 1984

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Political Unrest and Economic Conditions: A Preliminary Look

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A Research Paper

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September 1984

**Political Unrest and
Economic Conditions:
A Preliminary Look**

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Summary

*Information available
as of 1 August 1984
was used in this report.*

Political unrest, particularly in the Third World, continues to threaten US policies and interests. Although many factors contribute to political unrest, poor economic performance has long been considered an aggravating factor. If economic conditions per se do trigger unrest, then a significant rise in unrest could occur over the next several years given the marked deterioration of the Third World economies.

To determine whether deteriorating economic conditions are an important element provoking political unrest, we searched for systematic linkages between periods of political unrest and periods of poor economic performance. Contrary to conventional thought, deteriorating economic conditions alone have not been found to be a dominant cause of political unrest. In particular, we were unable to identify a direct linkage between periods of severe political unrest and measures of general economic deterioration such as recession, inflation, and falling imports. It appears, therefore, that economic conditions are simply one factor among many affecting Third World political stability. Our analysis strongly indicates that only when other destabilizing conditions are present are they likely to produce regime-threatening instability.

At the same time, while general economic conditions can worsen substantially without sparking unrest, government measures designed to address economic problems can provide a rallying point for public discontent. The timing and presentation of sudden policy changes can help determine the intensity of public reaction. In our review of Third World countries, we found that cuts in subsidies on key consumer commodities—rice, bread, and petroleum products, for example—and government-mandated wage controls seem to be two key trigger points for strong political backlash.

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Scope Note

This research paper is part of the Directorate's ongoing study of Third World political instability. This report takes a preliminary look at the role of economic conditions. Based on the results of this paper, research will focus on more specific linkages between economics and political unrest as we look more closely at the role of LDCs' domestic economic policies. For example, we plan to examine the role of subsidies, analyzing their inflationary nature, the distortions they cause in the domestic economy, and the potential for unrest caused when subsidies are reduced or eliminated. Further, we will look, in detail, at the relationship between government- or IMF-generated austerity and political unrest by examining major debtors that have undertaken multiyear economic adjustment programs.

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Political Unrest and Economic Conditions: A Preliminary Look

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Introduction

Political unrest—demonstrations, riots, strikes, political assassinations, and, in the extreme, irregular changes of government—in Third World countries has been a recurring problem for US interests. Since the start of the 1960s, for example, conflict among struggling factions of these new states led to nearly 200 coups or coup attempts. Continued efforts to find early indicators of political instability on sudden regime changes have increasingly focused attention on economics. This paper examines the impact general economic conditions and the response of Third World governments to economic problems have on political unrest. We focused on 28 countries that are either strategically located, suppliers of strategic resources, or strategic Third World allies.¹ To measure the extent and timing of instability or unrest in these countries, we used several indicators—protest demonstrations, riots, strikes, armed attacks, deaths from political violence, assassinations, political executions, and successful and unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government.

- Loyalties to a subnational group such as the Basques in Spain, the French separatists in Quebec, and the Sikhs in the Punjab.
- Dissatisfaction among elites such as between the military and the businessmen or between the intellectuals and the government.
- Externally inspired and financed instability such as the Syrian support for various factions in Lebanon and the Iranian-backed terrorism in Lebanon.

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Economic Factors. Without discounting the noneconomic factors, many think economic conditions play an important role in creating unrest in a number of ways. Many experts believe that unrest caused by economic motivations is quite likely after an abrupt interruption in economic growth. According to this theory, in the least developed nations energies are devoted to subsisting, and people expect and demand very little. On the other hand, in wealthier societies most people act to maintain the status quo. The developing nations in which rapid growth has occurred are the most volatile. In these countries, many people have benefited from rapid economic growth, and many more have seen its promise. Therefore, when economic growth slows or reverses, expectations continue to rise, a large expectation gap is formed, and a potential source of unrest is created (see figure).³

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Causes of Unrest

According to experts, a number of factors explain political unrest; some are economic, others are sociological or political.²

Noneconomic Factors. Noneconomic factors thought to contribute to political unrest include:

- Tensions between various ethnic and racial groups such as the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka, various tribal factions in Africa, and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia and their respective indigenous populations.
- Conflict between competing religious factions such as the Shia and Sunni Muslims, the Hindus and Muslims of India, and the Catholics and Protestants of Northern Ireland.

¹ They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zaire.

² Appendix D presents a bibliography of literature dealing with this subject.

The Historical Impact of Economic Conditions

To systematically examine Third World unrest and its relationship with economic conditions, we devised an overall measure of unrest using a political events data base on protest demonstrations, riots, strikes, armed attacks, deaths from domestic violence, assassinations,

³ Some observers argue the reverse, that is, that economic growth itself is destabilizing. According to this view, economic growth, at least in the LDCs, destroys traditional values and relationships—for example, in villages and extended families—which offsets the monetary gains and causes instability. If true, and reversible, an economic recession offsets the destabilizing effects as people return (temporarily) to a more traditional setting.

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
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Economic Expectations and Political Unrest

Consumption and Expectations

High



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political executions, and successful and unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the government.⁴ To examine the connection between economic conditions and political unrest, we analyzed the association between key measures of economic stability and our measure of unrest. Specifically, we calculated the statistical linkages between the measure of political unrest and the change in consumer prices, the level of and changes in real per capita income, and the level of and changes in real per capita imports.⁵ These measures were chosen because they reflect general economic conditions both in terms of overall production and prices. In addition, they should reflect other economic variables that bear on political unrest, but for which data are not readily available. Changes in unemployment, for example, should be inversely related to the movement in per capita income levels. Likewise, changes in industrial production and import requirements should coincide.

⁴ For a description of the data base and how we used it, see the inset. For 1971-82 trends in the nine indicators of unrest for these countries, see appendix C. Because this measure does not capture the level or intensity of particular disruptions, it cannot be used to make intercountry comparisons. Rather it is intended to focus on stability levels within a given country over a specified period.

⁵ Appendix B presents these economic data.

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The Political Events Data Base

The political events data base used in this study to quantify Third World political unrest is an updating of data in World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Second Edition, Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson; and World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Charles L. Taylor and David A. Jodice. This data base is a compilation from a variety of worldwide news sources, of information on domestic political events from 1948 to early 1983. It contains information on the number, size, and duration of some 40 categories of events, ranging from discrete government policy shifts—such as imposition or relaxation of censorship and martial law—to numbers of riots, strikes, and political demonstrations. It includes the nine political unrest indicators we focused on in our study.

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Although the Taylor data base is the most comprehensive, if not the only, systematic compilation of political events data, and has been used by a number of private-sector researchers examining this area, it does have weaknesses. The most important is undercounting, which occurs in large part because the data base draws heavily on press reports. Consequently, in countries where press coverage is constrained by censorship or where little foreign press attention is focused, political events may systematically be understated or largely ignored.

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To minimize distortions, we based the statistical analysis on a discrete transformation of the political events data. Specifically:

- We aggregated the nine political events into a composite number.
- If the composite events number exceeded the threshold level we established, a country was identified as being unstable for that period.
- To guard against biases, we varied the threshold level to test the sensitivity of the results to such variations.

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In our analysis, we looked at the political and economic data from 1971 to 1982 in three different ways. First, we looked at the data head-on: political data for 1981, for instance, were studied against economic data for that same year. We then approached the data using a lag of one year to see if the economic conditions of 1981 affected political unrest in 1982. This allowed time for the impact of, perhaps, a rising inflation rate. Often a deterioration in economic conditions is not felt by the general public for several months; therefore, any negative reaction—in this case political unrest—would be delayed. [redacted]

We also looked at fluctuations in political and economic data and compared them with what is typical in an individual country. For example, if a country has a traditionally low rate of inflation, a rise of a few points would be considered significant; whereas, in a country with a high rate of inflation, only a fluctuation of 10 points or more would be considered significant. Likewise, one or two protests in a highly repressive country would have a greater impact on stability than 10 demonstrations in a society that allows freedom of expression. [redacted]

In all approaches, the analysis indicated few linkages historically between periods of unrest and periods of deteriorating economic conditions. These results were consistent for each of the 28 countries we examined and for each political instability threshold case we used. Our findings showed that, although over the past 10 years economic deterioration occasionally has led to unrest, there have been just as many times when it did not. Sharply increasing prices, or declining real income and employment levels by themselves, therefore, are not particularly good predictors of political, military, or social upheavals; they are poor indicators of regime-threatening problems. [redacted]

Importance of Government Policy Shifts

Although aggregate economic performance is not closely related to political instability, specific economic events can spark unrest. In particular, sudden government economic policy changes—sometimes designed to deal with general economic difficulties—are more likely to generate a public reaction than broad negative economic developments. Numerous anecdotal examples in press and Embassy reporting support this conclusion:

- In May and June 1983, over 100,000 Brazilian civil servants marched to protest austerity measures that included wage adjustments and cuts in public jobs spending.
- In Egypt, increased bread prices, caused by subsidy cuts, led to bloody urban rioting in 1977. The price hikes were rescinded.
- Guatemalan land reform in 1978, viewed by many as tantamount to collusion between wealthy landowners and the government, led to protests. Media reports indicate 100 campesinos were killed. 25X1
- In June 1981 a cut in food subsidies led to riots in Morocco; 100 were killed and 300 were injured. Again, in 1983, austerity measures led to a 25-percent increase in food prices, and riots left over 100 dead.
- Earlier this year in Tunisia, the government removed subsidies on wheat and bread. Rioting resulted in 100 deaths. 25X1
- In Sudan, a 1982 decision to lower sugar subsidies by 60 percent led to demonstrations and 21 deaths.
- Last fall, austerity-inspired policy changes by the Bolivian Government led to widespread protests. Early this year, labor unions led a 72-hour strike to protest cuts in spending and dramatic increases in the price of government-subsidized food.
- In April 1984, bloodshed resulted in the Dominican Republic during food riots protesting government-mandated price increases. 25X1

Although these examples do not indicate that each change in economic policy leads to political instability, they are evidence that specific policy measure that hit key interest groups can have serious political repercussions [redacted] 25X1

Conclusions and Implications

We believe the link between economic conditions and political unrest is unreliable and indirect, and caution should be used when tying economic malaise to political instability. Our preliminary evidence has shown no statistically significant relationship between general economic conditions, such as recession and inflation, and political unrest. Several factors are probably at work, including the impact of the extended family as a support mechanism and the lack of a specific causal agency to rally against. [redacted]

Although more sophisticated modeling that considers different economic and political systems may show a more direct linkage, we do not expect such an outcome. We do believe, however, specific government economic measures that directly hurt large populations stand a much greater risk of leading to political unrest. We believe the different outcome here is that action by a government agency provides a tangible rallying point for opposition, which, in fact, could even reverse the policy. [redacted]

If the latter conclusion is correct, given the extent to which LDC governments are being forced to initiate austerity measures as opposed to simply allowing economic erosion, we expect more economically induced unrest in this decade. Indeed, adjustment programs—whether self-imposed or coordinated with the IMF—although designed to stabilize economies, could precipitate increased unrest since the policy changes required by austerity programs are the type that trigger protests and uprisings. Although these programs vary in emphasis and degree, they do not vary in substance. Generally, they rely on higher taxes, increased fuel and utility prices, and decreased government spending and subsidies—the sort of direct government actions that can lead to direct public reaction. Furthermore, an IMF-supported austerity program can provoke nationalistic reactions as the domestic government is seen as subservient to Western and especially US interests. Conditionality programs also make the IMF—and often the United States by association—an actor in domestic politics; opposition parties can accuse the government of selling out to foreign interests. [redacted]

Although we believe the deteriorated Third World economic conditions likely to prevail in this decade will lead to increasing unrest, we are less certain they

Mexico: The Jury Is Out

Mexico is a rare example of a country in which austere economic policies have not led to substantial unrest. De la Madrid has successfully walked a political and economic tightrope. Austerity measures quickly hurt millions of Mexicans whose expectations had been raised by the country's oil boom. Federal subsidies have been slashed, government spending has been cut by 20 percent, the rates for gas, telephones, and electricity have doubled, and price controls on many goods have been lifted. Even the 40-percent increase in the price of tortillas failed to spark riots. [redacted]

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In our judgment, however, the pressure on de la Madrid appears to be mounting. A key to his success has been keeping the loyalty of organized labor, but, as the purchasing power of wages continues to fall, union leaders will have increased demands from the rank and file. Further, many experts believe that only recently have household savings been emptied. They expect the impact of the austerity program to worsen. Lastly, de la Madrid's time may be running out. His administration's grace period is ending, and he may be forced to show the populace the benefits of his austerity measures. [redacted]

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A recent study of the Mexican situation—Mexico: Growing Challenges to Current Stability—reaches a similar conclusion using an Instability Forecasting Model developed by the Data Resources and Policon Corporations. This model confirms our analysis that de la Madrid will face increasing trouble on economic issues, but, because of strong positions in other areas, he is in a relatively strong position to retain control in the short run. [redacted]

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will cause substantially more regime-threatening instability. Political reactions to deteriorated economic conditions have generally been confined to riots, strikes, and demonstrations. Without ethnic tensions, insurgencies, and traditionally weak governments, the increase in unrest likely to be associated with LDC government austerity measures seems unlikely to produce major rises in regime change in Third World countries. [redacted]

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Appendix A

Testing for Economic Linkages

Tables A-1 and A-2 present the calculated correlation coefficients between various measures of economic activity and our overall measure of instability defined under changing requirements as to the number of events needed at each threshold. Table A-1 presents the results of the unlagged economic variables; table A-2 presents the lagged results.

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Table A-1
Correlation Between Unrest and Economic Variables

	Thresholds for Events of Unrest													
	1	6	12	25	50	100	200	400	500	600	700	800	1,600	3,200
Economic variables														
Change in real per capita income (percent)	-0.096	-0.075	-0.083	-0.093	-0.116	-0.064	-0.067	0.022	-0.078	-0.070	-0.079	-0.079	-0.066	-0.020
Real per capita income (1980 US \$)	0.064	0.069	0.057	0.131	0.111	-0.023	0.003	-0.068	-0.058	-0.042	-0.031	-0.031	-0.047	-0.045
Deviation from trend in real per capita income (percent)	-0.027	-0.009	0.024	0.079	0.046	-0.028	-0.011	-0.023	-0.050	-0.049	-0.053	-0.053	-0.062	0.004
Change in real per capita imports (percent)	0.026	0.017	-0.004	-0.018	-0.064	-0.055	-0.018	0.040	-0.026	-0.060	-0.056	-0.056	-0.012	-0.052
Real per capita imports (1980 US \$)	-0.041	-0.071	-0.084	-0.017	0.002	-0.068	-0.044	-0.064	-0.057	-0.050	-0.045	-0.045	-0.040	-0.032
Deviation from trend in real per capita imports (percent)	-0.030	-0.025	-0.028	-0.020	-0.042	-0.099	-0.042	-0.045	-0.060	-0.080	-0.080	-0.080	-0.050	0.007
Change in nominal exports (percent)	-0.042	0.009	-0.012	0.014	0.021	-0.007	0.028	0.111	0.033	0.046	0.048	0.048	0.031	-0.005
Nominal exports (US \$)	-0.043	-0.097	-0.094	-0.033	-0.006	-0.058	-0.039	-0.035	-0.034	-0.028	-0.025	-0.025	-0.020	-0.015
Deviation from trend in nominal exports (percent)	-0.018	-0.070	-0.079	-0.013	-0.063	-0.044	-0.002	0.020	-0.023	-0.056	-0.059	-0.059	-0.051	-0.048
Consumer price inflation (percent)	0.013	0.133	0.154	0.219	0.197	0.201	0.189	0.217	0.240	0.281	0.314	0.314	0.037	-0.025
Instances of instability	276	202	163	103	71	43	25	13	10	7	6	6	4	1

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Table A-2
Correlation Between Unrest and Lagged Economic Variables

	Thresholds for Events of Unrest													
	1	6	12	25	50	100	200	400	500	600	800	1,600	2,000	2,500
Lagged economic variables														
Change in real per capita income (percent)	-0.032	-0.097	-0.083	-0.082	-0.133	-0.092	-0.078	-0.066	-0.083	-0.093	-0.105	-0.109	-0.132	-0.031
Real per capita income (1980 US \$)	0.091	0.089	0.082	0.163	0.155	-0.004	0.028	-0.061	-0.041	-0.023	-0.009	-0.025	-0.002	0.015
Deviation from trend in real per capita income (percent)	0.008	0.021	0.051	0.062	0.085	-0.013	0.024	-0.048	-0.019	-0.027	-0.028	-0.050	-0.049	-0.007
Change in real per capita imports (percent)	0.011	-0.013	-0.040	-0.105	-0.117	-0.123	-0.055	-0.092	-0.082	-0.092	-0.093	-0.076	-0.072	-0.089
Real per capita imports (1980 US \$)	-0.011	-0.051	-0.072	-0.008	0.022	-0.061	-0.036	-0.064	-0.050	-0.042	-0.035	-0.032	-0.020	-0.020
Deviation from trend in real per capita imports (percent)	-0.049	-0.048	-0.034	0.038	-0.008	-0.066	-0.023	-0.096	-0.071	-0.060	-0.067	-0.095	-0.093	-0.078
Change in nominal exports (percent)	0.067	-0.016	-0.017	0.019	-0.040	-0.009	-0.001	-0.041	-0.059	-0.102	-0.103	-0.058	-0.046	-0.017
Nominal exports (US \$)	-0.030	-0.122	-0.110	-0.060	-0.033	-0.059	-0.041	-0.038	-0.032	-0.026	-0.023	-0.015	-0.008	-0.010
Deviation from trend in nominal exports (percent)	0.015	-0.088	-0.079	-0.038	-0.080	-0.046	-0.025	-0.098	-0.082	-0.127	-0.129	-0.097	-0.074	-0.028
Consumer price inflation (percent)	0.084	0.082	0.108	0.156	0.159	0.173	0.111	0.157	0.174	0.217	0.250	0.213	0.278	0.408
Instances of instability	253	184	149	98	68	41	24	12	9	6	5	3	2	1

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Appendix B

Indicators of Political Unrest

Table B-1
Argentina

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	20	6	2	1	0	0	0	1	1
1972	43	21	6	1	0	6	2	0	0
1973	7	37	4	2	0	19	10	0	0
1974	30	97	3	2	0	9	12	0	0
1975	72	278	4	8	0	8	19	0	1
1976	49	1,314	0	0	0	7	16	1	0
1977	20	2,750	1	0	0	3	2	0	0
1978	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
1979	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1980	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	7	0	5	0	0	0
1982	1	0	3	1	0	8	1	0	0

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Table B-2
Brazil

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	6	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	5	11	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1973	4	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	1	0	21	1	0	0	0
1975	1	3	0	2	1	1	0	0	0
1976	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1977	1	0	5	2	0	2	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	4	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Table B-3
Chile

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	2	6	6	2	0	1	1	0	0
1972	1	3	18	4	1	3	1	0	0
1973	15	537	23	18	465	1	1	1	1
1974	2	16	0	0	15	0	0	0	0
1975	0	120	0	0	6	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1978	1	0	1	1	1	10	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	0
1980	5	23	1	1	0	5	2	0	0
1981	7	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
1982	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0

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Table B-4
Colombia

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	15	2	2	0	1	0	0	0
1972	8	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
1973	1	7	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1974	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	9	21	5	0	0	5	1	0	0
1976	1	13	5	3	0	8	2	0	0
1977	7	20	7	1	0	0	1	0	0
1978	7	0	3	2	0	10	0	0	0
1979	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1980	233	0	0	0	0	185	0	0	0
1981	10	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Table B-5
Egypt

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
1972	1	2	5	0	0	5	0	0	0
1973	0	0	3	2	0	4	0	0	1
1974	1	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
1975	1	1	2	0	2	1	0	0	0
1976	9	8	1	0	0	5	0	0	0
1977	9	45	1	0	0	4	1	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
1981	4	0	13	0	0	1	1	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	5	7	0	0	0

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Table B-6
El Salvador

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	3	19	2	0	0	4	2	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
1980	36	0	3	2	0	2	2	0	0
1981	130	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1982	91	0	0	0	0	8	14	0	0

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Table B-7
Greece

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	9	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	0
1972	4	0	20	2	0	5	0	0	0
1973	21	21	35	6	0	35	0	2	1
1974	1	2	8	2	0	25	0	0	0
1975	2	3	11	0	0	29	1	0	0
1976	6	3	4	3	0	4	0	0	0
1977	13	1	2	1	0	4	0	0	0
1978	67	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1979	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
1980	0	3	2	0	0	1	3	0	0
1981	6	0	0	0	0	46	0	0	0
1982	14	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-8
Guatemala

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	5	0	1	0	2	2	0	0
1972	1	11	0	0	0	1	5	0	0
1973	1	22	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
1974	3	1	5	0	0	0	1	0	0
1975	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
1976	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
1978	5	0	3	1	0	3	2	0	0
1979	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
1980	31	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
1981	46	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	56	0	0	0	4	1	0	1	0

25X1

Table B-9
Honduras

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	3	29	1	0	0	2	0	1	0
1976	1	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1980	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1981	7	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	14	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-10
Indonesia

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	10	3	0	0	1	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1981	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-11**Iran**

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	1	0	0	18	0	0	0	0
1972	8	3	0	0	15	0	0	0	0
1973	2	3	0	0	14	0	1	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	8	1	0	10	2	2	0	0
1976	17	38	0	0	19	0	2	0	0
1977	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
1978	12	0	62	8	0	12	1	0	0
1979	62	0	59	2	121	48	10	0	0
1980	35	0	20	1	164	34	0	0	0
1981	55	0	11	0	2,155	14	10	0	0
1982	70	0	1	0	159	1	4	0	0

25X1

Table B-12**Iraq**

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	4	110	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	4	16	0	1	67	0	1	0	2
1974	17	455	0	0	15	2	1	0	0
1975	8	151	0	0	88	0	0	0	0
1976	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1977	4	2	2	0	107	1	1	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	1
1979	1	0	0	0	25	0	0	0	0
1980	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-13
Kenya

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1972	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	38	3	2	0	3	1	0	0
1976	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

25X1

Table B-14
Mexico

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	14	3	0	0	3	0	0	0
1972	1	14	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	8	24	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1974	17	45	5	0	0	2	1	0	0
1975	15	46	0	1	0	1	2	0	0
1976	19	99	1	0	0	2	0	0	0
1977	15	34	4	3	0	4	0	0	0
1978	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1980	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-15
Morocco

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	0	1	1	9	0	0	0	1
1972	1	8	1	4	0	1	0	0	1
1973	1	0	0	2	11	1	0	0	1
1974	0	0	0	1	22	0	0	0	0
1975	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
1982	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-16
Nigeria

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	2	3	0	9	1	0	0	0
1972	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
1973	1	14	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0
1975	3	14	0	17	0	1	0	1	0
1976	1	16	6	0	37	2	1	0	1
1977	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	3	2	0	2	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1980	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	3	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
1982	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-17
Pakistan

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	424	307,013	26	12	97	34	15	0	2
1972	2	84	18	4	0	5	2	0	0
1973	7	155	6	0	0	4	1	0	0
1974	7	502	7	0	0	1	2	0	0
1975	2	11	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
1976	3	302	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
1977	10	153	26	5	0	17	1	1	0
1978	3	0	6	6	0	13	0	0	0
1979	1	0	13	1	5	2	0	0	0
1980	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	5	0	2	2	0	4	0	0	0
1982	3	0	3	3	0	4	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-18
Panama

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
1978	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0
1979	0	0	4	1	0	2	0	0	0
1980	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1981	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-19
Philippines

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	20	117	6	1	0	8	1	0	0
1972	48	352	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	32	1,671	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
1974	21	557	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
1975	21	291	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
1976	9	112	1	0	0	5	0	0	0
1977	12	605	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
1978	3	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
1979	4	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0
1980	45	94	0	0	0	5	1	0	0
1981	7	0	3	0	0	7	0	0	0
1982	6	0	1	0	0	8	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-20
Peru

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	6	5	3	0	0	0	0	0
1974	2	4	5	1	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	100	4	1	0	0	0	1	0
1976	0	6	10	3	0	1	0	0	1
1977	1	36	6	7	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	7	5	0	2	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0
1980	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
1981	7	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
1982	17	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0

25X1

Table B-21
Saudi Arabia

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	4	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	63	0	0	0	0
1981	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-22
Somalia

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	1
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-23
South Africa

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	0	18	3	0	7	1	0	0	0
1972	2	38	7	0	0	8	0	0	0
1973	0	78	10	3	0	1	0	0	0
1974	1	29	9	3	0	1	0	0	0
1975	2	17	1	0	0	2	0	0	0
1976	20	437	51	9	3	6	0	0	0
1977	28	65	31	3	0	5	0	0	0
1978	6	0	3	1	0	5	0	0	0
1979	2	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	0
1980	8	0	16	6	0	16	0	0	0
1981	11	0	8	3	0	4	0	0	0
1982	9	0	1	1	0	5	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-24
South Korea

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	8	31	7	0	0	5	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1973	0	2	16	9	0	29	0	0	0
1974	1	2	14	1	1	26	0	0	1
1975	2	6	6	2	9	12	0	0	0
1976	2	0	1	1	0	5	0	0	0
1977	1	0	6	0	0	3	0	0	0
1978	1	0	1	0	0	10	0	0	0
1979	4	0	2	0	0	8	1	1	0
1980	3	0	5	0	6	9	0	0	0
1981	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	0	0
1982	3	0	5	0	0	3	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-25
Spain

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1972	21	7	7	7	0	12	0	0	0
1973	31	13	3	1	0	23	1	0	0
1974	19	14	29	5	1	21	0	0	0
1975	57	42	29	71	5	91	1	0	0
1976	43	40	60	24	0	61	2	0	0
1977	62	43	60	11	0	41	2	0	0
1978	64	0	13	2	0	156	2	0	0
1979	92	0	12	5	0	17	6	0	0
1980	67	0	4	1	0	2	2	0	0
1981	47	0	3	3	0	30	1	0	1
1982	51	0	2	2	0	5	1	0	0

25X1

Table B-26
Turkey

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	12	8	2	0	0	1	0	1	0
1972	12	16	0	0	4	1	0	0	0
1973	4	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0
1975	6	18	8	4	0	5	0	0	0
1976	3	31	8	1	0	0	0	0	0
1977	15	63	4	0	0	2	0	0	0
1978	10	0	9	1	0	1	3	0	0
1979	51	0	4	0	0	3	3	0	0
1980	28	1	15	3	3	15	11	1	0
1981	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-27
Venezuela

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0
1972	3	12	2	0	0	1	3	0	0
1973	1	3	4	0	0	1	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
1977	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Table B-28
Zaire

	Armed Attacks	Deaths From Violence	Riots	Strikes	Political Executions	Protest Demonstrations	Assassinations	Successful Coups	Unsuccessful Coups
1971	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	8	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	5	0	1	0	26	1	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

25X1

Appendix C

Economic Conditions

Table C-1
Argentina

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-3	269.5	2.8	2,524	3.9	34.9
1972	10	247.9	-8.0	2,582	2.3	58.9
1973	66	232.8	-6.1	2,668	3.3	61.2
1974	19	269.7	15.9	2,821	5.7	23.3
1975	-26	265.2	-1.7	2,743	-2.8	182.5
1976	30	196.6	-25.9	2,623	-4.4	443.2
1977	42	243.9	24.1	2,695	2.7	176.1
1978	11	201.3	-17.5	2,547	-5.5	175.5
1979	20	293.9	46.0	2,720	6.8	159.5
1980	1	381.3	29.7	2,669	-1.9	100.8
1981	12	339.2	-11.0	2,469	-7.5	104.5
1982	-18	196.0	-42.2	2,292	-7.2	164.8

25X1

Table C-2
Brazil

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	3	131.0	19.7	1,618	10.4	20.2
1972	34	151.1	15.3	1,740	7.6	16.5
1973	52	175.5	16.2	1,959	12.6	12.7
1974	25	249.7	42.3	2,099	7.1	27.6
1975	6	214.9	-14.0	2,164	3.1	28.9
1976	14	207.7	-3.3	2,307	6.6	42.0
1977	17	180.0	-13.3	2,359	2.3	43.7
1978	2	181.8	1.0	2,442	3.5	38.7
1979	18	198.3	9.1	2,539	4.0	52.7
1980	29	205.2	3.4	2,687	5.8	82.8
1981	13	195.9	-4.5	2,540	-5.5	105.5
1982	-15	174.1	-11.1	2,488	-2.0	98.0

25X1

Table C-3
Chile

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-22	357.4	-3.2	2,351	5.8	19.4
1972	-16	308.8	-13.6	2,308	-1.8	79.1
1973	41	288.0	-6.7	2,189	-5.2	351.9
1974	98	355.0	23.3	2,239	2.3	506.0
1975	-38	224.7	-36.7	1,951	-12.8	374.2
1976	32	266.2	18.5	1,926	-1.3	211.8
1977	4	331.3	24.5	2,061	7.0	91.9
1978	11	394.9	19.2	2,179	5.7	40.1
1979	55	464.1	17.5	2,330	6.9	33.4
1980	18	465.2	0.2	2,444	4.9	35.1
1981	-18	575.0	23.6	2,558	4.7	19.7
1982	-4	325.5	-43.4	2,164	-15.4	20.7

25X1

Table C-4
Colombia

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-9	146.9	1.6	1,098	3.1	8.4
1972	22	121.3	-17.4	1,156	5.3	13.4
1973	33	119.2	-1.8	1,215	5.1	20.6
1974	18	126.4	6.1	1,266	4.2	24.3
1975	1	106.4	-15.9	1,293	2.1	22.9
1976	17	116.6	9.6	1,323	2.4	20.4
1977	37	124.6	6.8	1,372	3.7	33.1
1978	20	155.3	24.7	1,451	5.8	17.7
1979	8	147.3	-5.2	1,514	4.3	24.7
1980	17	174.3	18.3	1,572	3.8	26.5
1981	-27	192.4	10.4	1,578	0.4	27.5
1982	3	205.8	7.0	1,563	-1.0	24.6

25X1

Table C-5
Egypt

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	1	94.9	8.3	1,046	1.6	3.1
1972	2	83.2	-12.4	995	-4.9	2.1
1973	33	67.4	-18.9	937	-5.9	4.3
1974	32	122.0	81.0	1,019	8.8	10.9
1975	-10	183.0	50.0	1,002	-1.7	9.7
1976	6	169.2	-7.6	938	-6.3	10.3
1977	9	191.5	13.2	1,081	15.2	12.7
1978	-1	237.1	23.8	1,139	5.3	11.1
1979	3	111.7	-52.9	1,197	5.1	9.9
1980	61	115.6	3.5	1,261	5.3	20.7
1981	3	205.8	78.0	1,328	5.3	10.4
1982	-6	215.0	4.5	1,372	3.4	14.8

25X1

Table C-6
El Salvador

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	0	233.4	6.4	992	1.6	0.5
1972	20	233.0	-0.2	1,017	2.5	1.5
1973	15	247.6	6.3	1,039	2.1	6.4
1974	25	261.2	5.5	1,074	3.4	16.9
1975	12	247.5	-5.3	1,102	2.6	19.2
1976	36	289.8	17.1	1,114	1.1	7.0
1977	27	327.0	12.8	1,138	2.2	11.9
1978	-20	319.3	-2.3	1,153	1.3	13.2
1979	37	266.0	-16.7	1,081	-6.3	15.9
1980	-7	201.1	-24.4	958	-11.4	17.4
1981	-28	202.8	0.8	952	-0.6	14.8
1982	-14	183.8	-9.4	877	-7.9	11.7

25X1

Table C-7
Greece

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	2	826.2	0.9	4,370	6.6	27.1
1972	30	840.9	1.8	4,726	8.1	28.3
1973	67	1,008.3	19.9	5,112	8.2	32.7
1974	39	913.4	-9.4	4,849	-5.2	41.5
1975	11	1,008.3	10.4	4,731	-2.4	47.1
1976	11	1,110.6	10.1	4,391	-7.2	53.3
1977	6	1,142.0	2.8	4,454	1.4	59.8
1978	21	1,175.9	3.0	4,718	5.9	67.3
1979	14	1,214.3	3.3	4,807	1.9	80.1
1980	32	1,094.1	-9.9	4,163	-13.4	100.0
1981	-19	914.8	-16.4	3,159	-24.1	124.5
1982	1	1,072.8	17.3	2,604	-17.6	150.6

25X1

Table C-8
Guatemala

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-5	195.0	-1.8	1,283	2.8	-0.5
1972	13	185.1	-5.1	1,337	4.2	0.6
1973	27	194.4	5.0	1,386	3.6	13.6
1974	27	220.9	13.6	1,430	3.2	16.6
1975	7	206.1	-6.7	1,417	-1.0	13.1
1976	19	225.5	9.4	1,483	4.7	10.7
1977	52	252.2	11.8	1,641	10.6	12.6
1978	-12	272.0	7.8	1,675	2.1	7.9
1979	11	262.1	-3.6	1,698	1.4	11.5
1980	19	226.4	-13.6	1,706	0.4	10.7
1981	-22	232.5	2.7	1,672	-2.0	11.4
1982	-9	194.0	-16.6	1,566	-6.4	0.4

25X1

Table C-9
Honduras

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	4	243.0	-19.6	1,104	0.3	2.3
1972	4	214.3	-11.8	1,106	0.2	5.3
1973	21	229.2	6.9	1,124	1.7	4.5
1974	9	231.4	1.0	1,095	-2.6	13.4
1975	0	218.4	-5.6	1,041	-4.9	6.4
1976	26	231.7	6.1	1,083	4.1	4.9
1977	26	263.0	13.5	1,119	3.3	8.3
1978	14	279.1	6.1	1,167	4.2	5.7
1979	16	270.4	-3.1	1,203	3.1	12.5
1980	9	267.9	-0.9	1,188	-1.2	15.6
1981	-11	246.6	-8.0	1,154	-2.9	10.2
1982	-14	185.9	-24.6	1,104	-4.3	9.9

25X1

Table C-10
Indonesia

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	9	30.6	1.9	415	23.2	4.6
1972	41	38.8	26.8	434	4.5	6.3
1973	77	53.9	39.1	532	22.7	31.1
1974	126	53.6	-0.7	673	26.5	40.5
1975	-6	59.9	11.8	740	9.9	19.1
1976	18	68.4	14.3	775	4.7	19.8
1977	24	67.7	-1.1	807	4.1	11.1
1978	5	64.8	-4.2	848	5.1	8.1
1979	31	58.1	-10.4	872	2.9	21.9
1980	38	71.7	23.4	918	5.3	18.5
1981	0	86.9	21.2	967	5.4	12.2
1982	-2	112.0	29.0	976	0.9	9.5

25X1

Table C-11.
Iran

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	42	219.1	3.6	1,529	40.2	4.2
1972	3	250.9	14.5	1,726	12.9	6.5
1973	49	279.5	11.4	2,090	21.1	9.8
1974	238	313.3	12.1	2,804	34.2	14.3
1975	-9	532.1	69.8	2,968	5.8	12.8
1976	13	631.4	18.7	3,304	11.3	11.3
1977	0	639.5	1.3	3,286	-0.6	27.2
1978	-12	522.6	-18.3	2,702	-17.8	11.7
1979	-12	310.5	-40.6	2,122	-21.5	10.5
1980	-32	316.3	1.9	1,465	-30.9	20.7
1981	-14	318.7	0.8	1,039	-29.1	24.2
1982	38	239.9	-24.7	983	-5.3	18.7

25X1

Table C-12
Iraq

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	30	249.1	26.2	1,080	5.3	76.4
1972	-6	221.4	-11.1	1,057	-2.1	80.4
1973	70	220.7	-0.3	1,105	4.6	84.7
1974	226	407.2	84.5	1,896	71.5	91.3
1975	21	642.6	57.8	2,067	9.0	100.0
1976	8	501.1	-22.0	2,154	4.2	112.8
1977	1	499.8	-0.3	2,165	0.5	123.1
1978	11	475.0	-5.0	2,238	3.4	128.8
1979	87	647.9	36.4	2,627	17.4	130.0
1980	18	1,021.3	57.6	2,665	1.5	140.0
1981	-61	1,391.9	36.3	1,803	-32.4	150.0
1982	-6	1,443.8	3.7	1,706	-5.4	160.0

25X1

Table C-13
Kenya

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	0	167.2	15.7	650	3.4	3.9
1972	14	146.2	-12.6	670	3.1	5.8
1973	34	135.6	-7.2	682	1.8	9.2
1974	23	147.5	8.8	684	0.3	18.0
1975	-6	125.6	-14.9	664	-3.0	19.0
1976	23	116.7	-7.1	671	1.1	11.4
1977	39	136.2	16.7	634	-5.4	14.9
1978	-18	158.6	16.5	634	-0.1	16.9
1979	4	125.6	-20.8	628	-1.0	8.0
1980	24	146.3	16.5	634	1.0	13.8
1981	-16	133.9	-8.5	640	1.0	11.8
1982	-12	112.3	-16.1	656	2.4	20.4

25X1

Table C-14
Mexico

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	4	151.4	-16.2	2,075	0.2	5.1
1972	9	162.3	7.2	2,158	4.0	5.0
1973	29	179.4	10.6	2,249	4.2	12.1
1974	28	198.9	10.9	2,307	2.6	23.6
1975	-6	192.0	-3.5	2,326	0.8	15.2
1976	14	167.4	-12.8	2,302	-1.0	15.8
1977	28	145.8	-12.9	2,309	0.3	29.1
1978	28	165.7	13.7	2,404	4.1	17.3
1979	47	219.3	32.3	2,530	5.2	18.2
1980	69	288.3	31.4	2,657	5.0	26.4
1981	21	351.1	21.8	2,796	5.2	27.9
1982	8	214.5	-38.9	2,719	-2.8	58.9

25X1

Table C-15
Morocco

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	0	149.3	-5.6	854	2.1	4.2
1972	25	148.0	-0.9	874	2.3	3.8
1973	38	172.2	16.4	864	-1.2	2.7
1974	83	200.9	16.7	924	7.0	17.5
1975	-12	242.2	20.5	930	0.6	7.9
1976	-21	235.4	-2.8	956	2.8	8.5
1977	0	257.0	9.2	966	1.1	12.6
1978	13	211.0	-17.9	976	1.1	9.7
1979	26	215.6	2.2	977	0.1	8.4
1980	21	203.0	-5.8	968	-0.9	9.4
1981	-5	206.0	1.5	925	-4.4	12.5
1982	-16	203.4	-1.2	939	1.5	10.5

25X1

Table C-16
Nigeria

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	43	92.1	33.3	636	16.7	16.1
1972	15	80.0	-13.1	580	-8.8	2.6
1973	57	78.1	-2.4	607	4.8	5.7
1974	171	82.7	5.8	778	28.1	12.5
1975	-24	157.8	90.8	839	7.8	34.7
1976	26	203.7	29.2	899	7.1	24.3
1977	13	245.0	20.3	1,000	11.2	19.3
1978	-13	249.6	1.9	1,016	1.7	18.7
1979	62	163.7	-34.4	1,058	4.1	11.1
1980	46	215.8	31.8	1,126	6.4	11.4
1981	-29	265.3	22.9	1,063	-5.6	20.8
1982	-19	183.8	-30.7	916	-13.9	25.0

25X1

Table C-17
Pakistan

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	14	34.9	-14.6	434	-2.6	10.1
1972	41	30.6	-12.5	428	-1.3	5.2
1973	38	35.3	15.5	448	4.6	23.1
1974	13	44.1	24.8	466	3.9	26.7
1975	-8	49.2	11.5	463	-0.6	20.9
1976	8	47.4	-3.6	472	2.0	7.2
1977	-1	47.5	0.3	472	-0.1	11.6
1978	21	56.5	18.9	496	5.1	6.1
1979	35	57.6	1.9	512	3.3	8.3
1980	24	61.9	7.4	526	2.7	11.9
1981	7	62.7	1.4	540	2.6	11.9
1982	-21	61.6	-1.7	557	3.2	5.9

25X1

Table C-18
Panama

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	4	894.9	2.1	1,805	4.1	2.0
1972	2	886.9	-0.9	1,910	5.8	5.3
1973	9	801.0	-9.7	1,977	3.5	6.9
1974	49	919.1	14.8	2,046	3.5	16.9
1975	33	894.0	-2.7	2,049	0.1	5.5
1976	-19	813.0	-9.1	1,999	-2.5	4.0
1977	3	741.9	-8.7	1,987	-0.6	4.5
1978	0	722.0	-2.7	1,994	0.4	4.2
1979	16	753.2	4.3	2,018	1.2	7.9
1980	17	757.6	0.6	2,183	8.2	13.8
1981	-11	798.5	5.4	2,219	1.6	7.3
1982	11	827.7	3.7	2,199	-0.9	4.3

25X1

Table C-19
Philippines

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	3	119.3	-1.4	681	2.9	15.1
1972	-3	113.8	-4.6	694	1.8	10.0
1973	67	114.2	0.4	740	6.7	14.0
1974	41	154.5	35.3	768	3.7	33.5
1975	-18	149.6	-3.2	798	4.0	8.1
1976	8	149.9	0.2	830	3.9	6.2
1977	19	145.4	-3.0	860	3.6	7.9
1978	6	155.5	6.9	876	1.9	7.5
1979	31	164.5	5.8	921	5.2	18.9
1980	24	171.8	4.5	954	3.6	17.8
1981	-3	175.1	1.9	978	2.5	13.3
1982	-13	175.1	0.0	992	1.3	11.0

25X1

Table C-20
Peru

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-16	188.5	11.3	1,462	3.0	6.9
1972	3	177.8	-5.7	1,504	2.9	7.1
1973	14	180.0	1.2	1,555	3.3	9.5
1974	32	189.6	5.4	1,617	4.0	16.9
1975	-16	282.5	49.0	1,626	0.5	23.6
1976	3	215.5	-23.7	1,633	0.5	33.5
1977	24	181.1	-16.0	1,573	-3.7	38.1
1978	10	164.7	-9.0	1,507	-4.2	57.8
1979	75	126.6	-23.1	1,520	0.9	66.7
1980	9	141.9	12.1	1,555	2.3	59.2
1981	-19	192.7	35.8	1,575	1.2	75.4
1982	-1	203.3	5.5	1,538	-2.4	64.4

25X1

Table C-21
Saudi Arabia

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	49	454.9	7.6	2,253	16.3	4.5
1972	35	571.3	25.6	2,726	21.0	4.3
1973	70	797.9	39.7	3,544	30.0	16.5
1974	293	822.2	3.0	7,808	120.3	21.4
1975	-6	1,099.1	33.7	9,461	21.2	34.6
1976	29	2,195.3	99.7	9,658	2.1	31.6
1977	12	3,358.3	53.0	10,109	4.7	11.4
1978	-15	4,191.1	24.8	10,572	4.6	-1.6
1979	53	4,188.2	-0.1	11,232	6.2	1.9
1980	72	4,309.4	2.9	11,980	6.7	3.7
1981	10	5,027.5	16.7	12,789	6.8	2.4
1982	-34	5,933.5	18.0	13,515	5.7	0.0

25X1

Table C-22
Somalia

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	8	76.0	28.7	314	3.2	-0.6
1972	21	81.2	6.7	332	5.8	-3.0
1973	23	87.7	8.0	309	-6.9	6.5
1974	12	78.4	-10.6	295	-4.5	18.3
1975	39	84.1	7.2	282	-4.5	19.4
1976	4	81.0	-3.7	275	-2.4	14.1
1977	-35	106.2	31.2	263	-4.5	10.6
1978	65	100.0	-5.8	249	-5.3	9.9
1979	2	98.5	-1.5	236	-5.2	24.3
1980	24	77.6	-21.3	244	3.2	58.8
1981	39	55.4	-28.6	241	-1.2	44.4
1982	-8	74.6	34.6	238	-1.2	23.6

25X1

Table C-23
South Africa

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	2	658.9	4.8	2,759	2.6	38.6
1972	16	531.0	-19.4	2,547	-7.7	41.1
1973	42	550.3	3.6	2,857	12.2	45.0
1974	40	588.4	6.9	3,048	6.7	50.3
1975	0	558.3	-5.1	2,802	-8.1	57.0
1976	-13	468.6	-16.1	2,357	-15.9	63.4
1977	21	359.5	-23.3	2,286	-3.0	70.5
1978	25	386.5	7.5	2,288	0.0	77.7
1979	39	376.7	-2.5	2,391	4.5	87.9
1980	36	657.3	74.5	2,711	13.4	100.0
1981	-21	758.4	15.4	2,456	-9.4	115.2
1982	-18	626.0	-17.5	1,903	-22.5	132.1

25X1

Table C-24
South Korea

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	25	246.3	11.4	805	6.1	13.4
1972	49	232.1	-5.8	832	3.3	11.7
1973	94	310.8	33.9	935	12.5	3.2
1974	36	355.0	14.2	991	5.9	24.3
1975	12	340.1	-4.2	1,043	5.2	25.3
1976	49	395.7	16.3	1,180	13.2	15.3
1977	28	440.7	11.4	1,281	8.5	10.2
1978	24	546.5	24.0	1,406	9.8	14.5
1979	17	620.3	13.5	1,472	4.7	18.3
1980	14	560.6	-9.6	1,387	-5.8	28.7
1981	20	653.2	16.5	1,452	4.7	21.3
1982	1	618.4	-5.3	1,506	3.7	7.3

25X1

Confidential

34

Table C-25
Spain

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	23	510.4	-1.2	4,655	4.7	26.7
1972	27	630.4	23.5	5,384	15.7	28.9
1973	35	718.2	13.9	6,338	17.7	32.2
1974	35	817.5	13.8	6,698	5.7	37.3
1975	7	783.4	-4.2	6,732	0.5	43.6
1976	12	816.6	4.2	5,889	-12.5	50.2
1977	16	757.9	-7.2	5,302	-10.0	62.4
1978	27	715.2	-5.6	5,291	-0.2	74.8
1979	37	816.6	14.2	6,002	13.4	86.5
1980	13	910.5	11.5	5,647	-5.9	100.0
1981	-2	862.9	-5.2	4,373	-22.6	114.5
1982	0	869.0	0.7	3,981	-9.0	131.0

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Table C-26
Turkey

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	12	112.4	13.9	5,504	-17.2	7.8
1972	28	134.0	19.2	6,081	10.5	8.7
1973	45	141.9	5.9	6,250	2.8	10.0
1974	13	180.6	27.2	6,649	6.4	11.6
1975	-11	202.7	12.2	6,741	1.4	13.8
1976	37	210.7	3.9	6,398	-5.1	16.2
1977	-12	214.3	1.7	5,982	-6.5	20.6
1978	28	151.7	-29.2	4,220	-29.5	30.0
1979	-3	139.0	-8.3	3,314	-21.5	47.6
1980	26	172.5	24.1	1,312	-60.4	100.0
1981	58	198.4	15.0	916	-30.2	136.6
1982	20	200.0	0.8	641	-30.0	178.7

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Table C-27
Venezuela

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	14	650.6	2.5	2,455	4.5	3.3
1972	-2	674.1	3.6	2,492	1.5	2.8
1973	45	609.7	-9.6	2,679	7.5	4.1
1974	126	628.4	3.1	3,654	36.4	8.4
1975	-23	809.2	28.8	3,286	-10.1	10.1
1976	2	979.3	21.0	3,096	-5.8	7.7
1977	-1	1,241.8	26.8	3,281	6.0	7.7
1978	-7	1,176.2	-5.3	3,365	2.5	7.2
1979	51	875.9	-25.5	3,375	0.3	12.4
1980	30	787.2	-10.1	3,396	0.6	21.6
1981	1	853.1	8.4	3,320	-2.3	16.2
1982	-21	821.2	-3.7	3,142	-5.4	9.9

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Table C-28
Zaire

	Change in Nominal Exports (percent)	Real Per Capita Imports (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Imports (percent)	Real Per Capita Income (1980 US \$)	Change in Real Per Capita Income (percent)	Change in Consumer Prices (percent)
1971	-15	96.6	6.1	408	2.8	5.8
1972	4	86.8	-10.1	406	-0.4	15.9
1973	33	82.7	-4.7	419	3.2	15.6
1974	32	80.6	-2.5	421	0.5	27.5
1975	-39	62.0	-23.1	385	-8.6	29.0
1976	0	43.6	-29.8	369	-4.2	88.2
1977	9	35.8	-17.8	366	-0.7	63.1
1978	-9	30.5	-14.8	346	-5.7	48.5
1979	38	25.4	-16.8	331	-4.3	108.6
1980	20	28.9	13.8	315	-4.8	42.1
1981	-61	22.7	-21.5	313	-0.5	34.7
1982	-16	16.4	-27.7	298	-4.8	37.2

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Appendix D**Related Open-Source Publications**

Bishop, Vaughn, and J. William Meszaros, *Comparing Nations*, (esp. Chapter 11), DC Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1980.

Hibbs, Douglas A., *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis*, Wiley, New York, 1973.

Looney, Robert, *Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution*, Pergamon Press, New York, 1982.

Lundberg, Erik, *Instability and Economic Growth*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968.

Olson, Mancur, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.

Williamson, John (editor), *IMF Conditionality*, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 1983.

Zimmerman, Ekkart, *Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and Research*, Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983.



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