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# AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY NEWSLETTER

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## The New American Foreign Policy Debate by G. L. Ulmen

The events that coincided with the new American foreign policy debate, the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran on November 4, 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, underscored the loss of a critical American presence and the gain of a critical Soviet presence in the most volatile region in the world—the Persian Gulf. The aborted attempt to rescue the hostages underscored the decline in American military power and the hesitancy to use it after the Vietnam debacle; the Soviet invasion underscored the greatly advanced Soviet military capability and readiness to use it outside the Soviet bloc. This situation led Robert W. Tucker to remark that the security interests in the Persian Gulf today are essentially the same as those that were at stake in Europe in the immediate post-World War II years.<sup>1</sup> A similar argument was advanced by Norman Podhoretz in his book, *The Present Danger: "Do We have the Will to Reverse the Decline of American Power?"*, which underpinned the Reagan administration's foreign policy by rejecting "the general idea that before Iran and Afghanistan we had moved from 'cold war' to 'detente' and that the old political struggle between the 'East' and the 'West' was yielding in importance to a new economic conflict between 'North' and 'South.'" Podhoretz supported his proposal for the restoration of "containment" by referring to George Kennan's 1947 *Foreign Affairs* article that provided the rationale for the post-war policy of containment. Recent calls for an "open-society bloc" and the drawing of "lines of demarcation" are also predicated on the assumption that the cold war never ended and that the "illusions of detente" are responsible for the present decline of American military power. The debate raises fundamental questions: Are the security interests of the United States in Europe

and the Persian Gulf essentially the same as those in 1947, or have present realities changed those interests, requiring the reformulation of the concept and the restructuring of the conduct of United States foreign policy? Is detente in fact responsible for the tilt in the balance of power toward the Soviet Union, or has detente been made the scapegoat for the refusal to recognize realities and adjust United States foreign policy to meet changed conditions?

When the debate was joined in 1980, it engaged those who strongly criticized or rejected outright the major preoccupations of United States foreign policy since the 1960s—detente, the emphasis on human rights, and the north-south agenda—and those who attempted to justify these concerns in whole or in part. Both sides recognized that there had occurred a tilt in the balance of power toward the Soviet Union and that the United States needed to take measures to offset it. The debate was not a clash between hawks and doves but a ventilation of differences between proponents of

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The views of G. L. Ulmen do not necessarily reflect those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

conflicting views of the national interest. Emphasis was placed on American security and the related question of energy, in particular oil and the power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. Indicative of the salience of the debate was a conference on the goals of United States foreign policy held in the fall of 1980. The conferees did not evince any specific concern with Europe, the focal point of the cold war and the policy of containment, or with Southeast Asia, the focal point of American military and political involvement in the years when detente was being pursued vigorously.<sup>2</sup> The first omission can most likely be attributed to the legitimation of postwar European borders in the 1975 Helsinki Agreements; the second, to the conclusion of the Vietnam War. Other more fundamental issues, which have become sharper in 1982, were in evidence.

The emphasis has shifted to the security of the whole "free world"; the related issue is not confined to energy and oil but encompasses the gamut of economic relations among the allies and between the allies and the Soviet Union. The reasons for this shift have as much to do with the growing awareness of the new realities confronting the Western world as they do with those faced by the Eastern world. Contributing to the growth of awareness were the diverse reactions of the Western allies to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, to U. S. involvement in El Salvador, and to President Reagan's opposition to the Soviet-European natural gas pipeline and his extension of sanctions in June 1982 to overseas subsidiaries of American companies and non-American firms producing equipment under United States licenses, exacerbating problems in trans-Atlantic relations. During the Falklands crisis, the United States backed a European power (Great Britain) against a hemisphere power (Argentina) for the first time since the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated in 1823, exacerbating tensions in inter-American relations.

Implicit in the present debate is the question of the future of the United States as a world power—the whole spectrum of United States relations with the world. Underscoring the importance of the debate are recent United States actions that have raised the essential political question of the criterion for distinguishing between friends and enemies and what follows or should follow therefrom in light of the present realities.

### The Decline of the Superpowers

The reality that circumscribes all others is the decline in influence of both the United States and the Soviet Union — relatively with respect to their blocs and absolutely with respect to the third

world — brought about by the advent of nuclear parity, the fact that the superpowers have lost their statuses as model societies, the growth of the European Economic Community, the growing restiveness in Eastern Europe, and the fact that the will to independence has become the strongest political force in the third world.

The Reagan administration continues to equate the decline of American influence with the decline of American power and seeks to regain a preponderance of influence by strengthening its nuclear arsenal and its conventional military forces as well. But its policymakers have not demonstrated that they understand the reasons for the present situation. With respect to the advent of nuclear parity, the blame has been laid to detente rather than to the fact that American predominance had to give way to parity once the Soviet Union succeeded in creating a nuclear arsenal after World War II. It would have been economically and politically prohibitive for the United States to attempt to maintain its nuclear superiority had there been no detente. American predominance was the result of historical circumstances following World War II. It formed no real basis for a balance of power and it is ill-suited to the maintenance of peace and stability in the contemporary world. The failure of the United States and its allies to maintain parity in conventional forces reflects the illusions of nuclear predominance rather than the illusions of detente. The decline of the United States in world affairs can be laid to the shattering of the illusions of predominance, nuclear as well as economic.

Nuclear parity has negated nuclear power as a military option short of mutual annihilation, reinforcing the central role of politics in international relations. Because the Soviet challenge to American and Western interests has always been more political than military, the present Soviet buildup serves to heighten the political factor. The antinuclear movement in Western Europe is indicative of fundamental changes that have occurred on the Continent, which in turn have affected the respective influence of the superpowers. The United States lost its predominance in the Atlantic alliance primarily because of the success of its policies, whereas the Soviet Union is losing its ideological hold on Eastern Europe primarily because of the failure of its policies.

The United States and the Soviet Union also face problems associated with their declining influence in the third world, to which Helmut Schmidt called attention last spring in *Foreign Affairs*: "The troubled beginning of the 1980s has made it apparent that the will for independence, self-reliance and nonalignment has become the strongest political force in the countries of the third world — perhaps the only one uniting

them.”<sup>3</sup> In his June 1982 Phi Beta Kappa oration at Harvard University John Kenneth Galbraith maintained that the superpowers must understand that “. . . the age of imperialism, both old and new, is indeed over” and that what we call weakness is nothing more or less than accommodation to this new reality.<sup>4</sup> Galbraith concluded by suggesting that the decline of the superpowers spells, or, it is to be hoped, will spell the decline of the major power blocs: “The image of the world divided into spheres of influence — an American orbit, a Soviet orbit — is strong. Strategists, telling themselves of their hard-nosed realism, will continue to look at a map and assign countries to one great power or the other. Let the rest of us agree that, in the real world, anything that smacks of domination is a two-edged sword that, sooner rather than later, smites those who wield it. . . . Let us recognize and conclude, accordingly, that we are not on a collision course with the Soviets in the new lands, unless, in error, we will it so. The commitment to independence is imposing withdrawal on us both.”

Recognizing one reality, Galbraith appears to have ignored the others. He seems to have dismissed power as irrelevant to the will to independence. History has changed but not to the extent that Galbraith would have us believe. Powerholders do not willingly accept the diminution of power in the face of new realities. They can and will adjust to new realities when they are confronted with challenges posed by opposing power. Whether in Europe or the third world, what the Soviet Union euphemistically calls the “competition between the two systems” will be accommodated to the “will to independence” only to the extent that that will can be galvanized to meet that competition. Precisely because of the “will to independence,” the United States should use its power in partnership with its allies to bring to reality the world of which Galbraith dreams.

## New Prospects for Western Security

In February 1981 the directors of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), the Research Institute of the German Society of Foreign Relations (Bonn), the French Institute of International Relations (Paris), and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), together with an advisory group of international experts on foreign policy, published a report, *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?*<sup>5</sup> The questions raised by the authors of the report reflect a consensus that the challenges facing the Western nations in the 1980s are formidable precisely because of new realities. The statement of these new realities is as significant as the proposals:

the enhanced Soviet military capability in Europe and the third world; the heightened importance of the third world for Western security, that is, the realization that Western security can no longer be limited to events occurring in and threats posed to the NATO countries, nor can security be isolated from crises arising in other regions vital to the West economically and militarily; the prolonged worldwide economic crisis that has sharpened north-south tensions and increased competition among the Western nations, exacerbating social tensions within the Western alliance; the domestic political problems that are constraining the ability of Western European countries to devote more of their resources to defense and other efforts needed to respond effectively to external challenges and the discrepancy in “burden sharing” that has triggered new strains in the alliance. The current trans-Atlantic crisis encompasses issues ranging from economics to defense to basic questions of foreign policy. It is new in the sense that it has generated a great deal of public disagreement and has contributed to mutual suspicions, misperceptions, and misunderstandings, resulting in accusations of “self-neutralization” or “self-Finlandization” on one side and policies of “incoherence” and “zig-zag” on the other.

Because the report is focused on East-West relations in Europe and in the third world and their effects on European-American relations, it proceeds from a diagnosis of the current trans-Atlantic crisis to Western relations with the Soviet Union, Western security concerns in the third world, and ways to improve the coordination of policy inside and outside NATO. Notable is the analysis of structural trends dividing Americans and Europeans. There has occurred a gradual evolution of the United States away from a Europe-centered foreign policy to a more global approach, reflecting the rise to power of new political elites and even more important, the development of a nationalistic mood associated with the decline of America's stature in the world as a result of Vietnam. This mood is reflected in a growing impatience with and irritation at the third world, Soviet behavior, and the European allies for “not doing enough.” The younger political elites in Western Europe view the U.S. decline as the result of the Vietnam debacle, the economic power of Western Europe, and the concomitant desire of Western European states to assert themselves in world affairs. But, as the authors of the report note, the growth of European economic power has not been accompanied by a change in the security relationship between the allies. The greatly increased Soviet military capability (nuclear and conventional) has increased Europe's dependence on the United States, sharpening the

contradiction in the trans-Atlantic relationship in which "the protege has become as rich as the protector and more reluctant to follow its lead and yet does not assume the political and military responsibilities which come with its newly acquired economic might." In short, the relative decline in the capacity of the United States to exert leadership has not been offset by a rise in European leadership, thus weakening the structural basis of Western power. Moreover, increased Soviet leverage in Western Europe as well as Western European doubts about the United States security guarantee have increased strains among the allies.

The upshot of these international realities is that neither the United States nor Europe can face the challenges of the 1980s alone; a new "trans-Atlantic bargain" must be struck. The authors of the report seek to promote the establishment of coresponsibility by defining common objectives. They speak of "a political alliance of like-minded states" and propose an approach centered on a small number of "principal nations" willing and able to take a direct role in dealing with a particular problem. The principal nations would vary according to the issue at hand, but the "core group" would consist of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. Consultations among these nations should encompass both economic and political issues, which would serve to coordinate East-West relations, as well as relations with the third world.

Another proposal for revitalizing the Western alliance calls for an "open-society bloc" and drawing "lines of demarcation." First advanced in 1980 by George Schwab in this *Newsletter* and elsewhere<sup>6</sup> and expanded on by John H. Herz in the August 1982 issue of this *Newsletter*,<sup>7</sup> its similarities to and dissimilarities from the Western Security Report are as significant as those between Schwab and Herz in what they reveal about the challenges confronting United States foreign policymakers in the 1980s. There is an apparent similarity between "a political alliance of like-minded states" and an "open-society bloc," for the authors of the report and Schwab and Herz speak of "core countries"; but whereas the concepts formulated in the report are based mainly on an analysis of new realities, those of Schwab and Herz also owe a debt to the German political theorist Carl Schmitt, who can legitimately be called the gray eminence of American political realism because his ideas have influenced Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger as well as many other European emigré scholars and political commentators on the American political scene from the 1930s to the present.<sup>8</sup>

In this *Newsletter* Schwab employed Schmitt's concept of homogeneity, which refers to a histor-

ically developed community (in this case, states) sharing a common heritage, tradition, and values. In May 1982, shortly before his resignation, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., put forward his own concept of homogeneity.<sup>9</sup> About the same time, Helmut Rumpf, the leading German authority on Schmitt, published "Ideological Homogeneity in Alliances" in the journal *Aussenpolitik* (Foreign Policy).<sup>10</sup> It is clear that the concept has wide implications—ideological as well as historical.

Schwab has something quite specific in mind. Because the United States alone can no longer confront the Soviet Union and inasmuch as the Soviet challenge is common to the non-Soviet world in general and to the "free world" in particular, "the immediate overriding foreign policy goal of the United States must be to forge an alliance of the open-society countries that would be anchored in a loosely-knit but well-orchestrated open-society bloc." Such a bloc would consist of "core" countries sharing a fundamental commitment to positive freedoms and human values. Its members would determine which other "marginal" countries (whose societies tend toward being "open") should be included in security zones defined by "lines of demarcation." Because contention between the East and the West is worldwide in scope, such lines would be drawn accordingly. Unlike the boundaries proposed in the Western Security Report, which are to be comprised of "core" countries within the Atlantic alliance, Schwab's "core" countries include all "open societies" in the Western hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

Like Schwab, Herz credits Carl Schmitt with having rediscovered the "amity lines" drawn by the European states in the "age of discoveries" to separate a European system based on the mutual recognition of territorial status and the acquisition of land from the newly discovered world "beyond the line." Although Herz notes that Schmitt gave due recognition to the "power bloc" defined by the Monroe Doctrine, he comments that in a later work Schmitt "strangely ignored" the attempts of Germany and Japan to establish power blocs in the 1930s.<sup>11</sup> But Nazi Germany's acquisition of *Lebensraum* (living space) and militarist Japan's East Asia Coprosperity Sphere were manifestly not what Schmitt had in mind when he formulated his concept of a *Grossraumordnung*—literally, a large-space order; actually, an extraterritorial order. The Axis blocs were not defensive but aggressive in nature; Schmitt's extraterritorial order was conceived to be defensive in nature. The unique character of the Monroe Doctrine, flowing from the geopolitical position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, allowed the United States to draw a

defensive line of demarcation around the New World that did not depend on the consent of the countries within or beyond this line.<sup>12</sup> For Schmitt the core of the Monroe Doctrine was "the union of a politically awakened people, a political idea, and the exclusion of foreign intervention from the area [*Grossraum*] ruled politically by this idea." Moreover, Schmitt averred, it was not the substance of the doctrine but the concept of *Grossraumordnung* in international law that was transferrable to other areas, other situations, and other "friend-enemy arrangements." Nevertheless, Schmitt rejected attempts to "universalize" his concept—to extend the geopolitical principle of an extraterritorial order to a global order.<sup>13</sup>

Schwab's and Herz's "open-society bloc," drawing on the concepts of homogeneity, extraterritorial order, and amity lines, constitutes a new concept for a global order. Unlike Schwab, Herz conceives of both the Soviet bloc and the "open-society bloc" as defensive in nature; but like Schwab, Herz distinguishes an "open society" as "characterized by cultural pluralism, the free competition of opinions and of groups promoting them, and at least some social rights." The common geopolitical denominator in their conceptions appears to be the drawing of "lines of demarcation" that would prevent Soviet or other outside power intervention at the risk of armed conflict. Implicit in the formulation is the understanding that an "open-society bloc" would refrain from intervening beyond similar lines of demarcation drawn by the Soviet Union.

Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, the fundamental question raised in both the Western Security Report and the proposals of Schwab and Herz is whether like-mindedness or the commitment to "open societies," historically and/or ideologically understood, is sufficient in the absence of agreement about the nature and goals of the common enemy to revitalize and sustain the Western alliance.

## From Containment to Counteroffensive

Reviewing the conduct of United States foreign policy at the end of 1981, Robert E. Osgood characterized the main ideological thrust of the Reagan administration as "the Revitalization of Containment."<sup>14</sup> Several leading members of the Reagan administration either are or have been attached to the Committee for the Free World, founded by Podhoretz and a group of intellectuals in the United States, Canada, England, France, and Italy at the end of 1980. The original purpose of the Committee was "to conduct a battle of ideas in defense of Western values and institu-

tions," indeed to "defend and preserve" the "free world" against the rising menace of totalitarian barbarism. On January 10, 1982, the committee called on Americans "to seize the historic opportunity now presented by the Polish crisis" to attempt to break the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe by denying Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union "Western loans, Western grain and, above all, Western technology." In so doing, the United States could presumably "further the process of disintegration from within that may mark the beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire."<sup>15</sup>

President Reagan assumed a similarly offensive stance in his address to Parliament on June 8, 1982.<sup>16</sup> Noting the fact that since 1917 the Soviet Union has given political training and assistance to Marxist-Leninists in many countries, thereby promoting violence and subversion, Reagan announced his intention to offer "open assistance to fraternal, political, and social institutions to bring about peaceful and democratic progress." He revealed that the chairmen and other leaders of both the Republican and Democratic party organizations were preparing to initiate a study with the bipartisan American Political Foundation "to determine how the United States can contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force." His message resembled the rhetoric of "rollback" advanced by John Foster Dulles three decades ago: "What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long-term—the march of freedom and democracy, which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifled the freedom and muzzled the self-expression of the people." In the subsequent exchange of toasts, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher characterized the speech as "putting freedom on the offensive." She was soon to learn, as were our other European allies, that the Reagan administration would do more to offend the friends of freedom than its enemies.

The principal new element in President Reagan's revised national security policy is "the determination to prevail over the Soviet Union." The key word *prevail* is defined as "turning back the Soviet Union, reversing the geographic expansion of Soviet political influence and military presence but not winning in the World War II sense of unconditional surrender."<sup>17</sup> This concept animates the strategic guidelines approved for the armed forces and the administration's strategy for protracted nuclear war. It also serves to justify the use of economic pressures as a way to persuade the Soviet Union to halt its military expansion. But, as Steven Rattner noted, economic pressures backfire: "Once again, economic warfare with all its attendant bitterness seems to have broken out. Only this time, the combatants

are not political antagonists but traditional allies, the United States and Europe. Last week tensions of several months' standing over the Soviet natural gas pipeline and European steel exports to the American market developed into a breach that appears unlikely to be healed quickly."<sup>18</sup> George W. Ball recently noted that the opponents of the pipeline "are motivated less by logic than by a vindictive desire to discipline upstart Europeans who challenge the President's *diktat*."<sup>19</sup> Indeed, questions beyond economics and law are at issue: Far more critical questions can be raised about the political sense of the Reagan administration and the political unity of the Western alliance. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the French minister of Research and Industry, characterized his government's decision to reject the sanctions as an "act of sovereignty,"<sup>20</sup> and such a characterization can also be applied to similar rejections made by Britain and West Germany. Reassertions of sovereignty underlined the failure of the United States to recognize new realities. Helmut Schmidt captured the essence of the changed relationship when he remarked that "we Europeans are aware that only in its alliance with Western Europe can the United States meet its responsibility as a world power. . . . Only in close cooperation, mobilizing each partner's potential for the common cause, will Europeans and Americans be able to make their contributions to the world's political and economic balance."<sup>21</sup>

### Toward a New "Year of Europe"

When Nixon and Kissinger designated 1973 the Year of Europe, both the Americans and the Europeans were reluctant to deal with the implications of projected nuclear parity and strains in economic relations connected with the growing power of the European Community. As Kissinger observed, "for many years no attempt had been made to define what was fundamental. Nor had any American leader been required to live with the reality of an assertive Europe. . . . Neither side of the Atlantic had addressed seriously the issues that would determine the West's future: How much unity do we need? How much diversity can we stand?"<sup>22</sup> The questions were right on target, even though the timing was wrong. Kissinger revealed that his Year of Europe speech was copied self-consciously from Secretary of State George C. Marshall's announcement of the U.S. plan for European recovery and reconstruction and that both Nixon and he were "seduced by our own nostalgia for historic initiative," which led them to run afoul of "conditions that had changed drastically since 1947." Whereas the Marshall Plan provided massive American aid for the

reconstruction of Europe, the Nixon-Kissinger Atlantic Declaration offered no immediate tangible benefits.

The European leaders of 1973 perceived a conflict between European identity and Atlantic unity. Although the conflict is still apparent today, some of the impediments to unity, namely, Vietnam and Watergate, have been removed since then. The tenth anniversary of the Year of Europe offers new possibilities for tying the United States and Europe into a coherent system to resolve both economic and security questions. Japan was included in the larger community of "industrial democracies" envisioned by the proponents of the Year of Europe, even though its interest in the defense and political issues wracking the "free world" was minimal compared to its interest in the economic disputes. The Western Security Report takes economic relations into consideration; the proposals for an "open-society bloc" do not. But both include Japan in the Western security system.

Because the original Year of Europe was proposed during the heyday of detente—the issue around which all the others turn in this new debate—a new Year of Europe would necessarily have to deal with the question of relations with the Soviet bloc. In 1973 the Soviet strategy of "differential detente," setting the democracies against one another and dividing Europe from America, was elucidated by Nixon in his appeal to the Europeans: "What I see, if we do not seize this moment, is a race to Moscow—each country in the West and in Europe going to Moscow to negotiate and make deals. Of course there must be individual meetings, but there must be some underlying philosophy that animates us all. Otherwise, those shrewd and determined men in the Kremlin will eat us one by one. They cannot digest us altogether, but they can pick at us one by one. That is why it is so important that we maintain the Atlantic Community. . . ."<sup>23</sup> The moment was not seized, and the race to Moscow began, discrediting detente.

Not detente but the lack of "some underlying philosophy" to unite the Western alliance brought East-West relations to the present crisis in Europe and in the third world. If the past decade has demonstrated that detente is unworkable without some unifying philosophy or principle underlying the Western alliance, whether it be the commitment to open societies, Western security, or other objectives, the events of the past few months have demonstrated that the economic and political realities facing the West have exacerbated differences about reducing tensions between the East and the West. A realistic concept of detente—in the context of deterrence—is the basis for forging a new trans-Atlantic bargain.

## Notes

1. Robert W. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1980/81, p. 249.
2. See the author's "Introduction" and "Conclusion" to *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads*, edited by George Schwab. Westport, Conn., 1982, pp. xix-xxvii, 217-238.
3. Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, pp. 749 and 745. See also in the same issue David P. Calleo, "Inflation and American Power"; Pierre Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense"; and Josef Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis."
4. John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second Imperial Requiem," *Harvard Magazine*, September-October 1982, pp. 29-33.
5. Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, and David Watt, *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981.
6. See George Schwab, "From Quantity and Heterogeneity to Quality and Homogeneity: Toward a New Foreign Policy" in the August/October 1980 issue of this *Newsletter*; "American Foreign Politics at the Crossroads: Idealism versus Realism" in *Innen- und Aussenpolitik: Primat oder Interdependenz?* (Bern/Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 223-228, and "Toward an Open-Society Bloc" in *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads*, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-63.
7. See John H. Herz, "Foreign Policy in the Framework of an Open-Society Bloc," August 1982.
8. See George Schwab, *The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936* (Berlin, 1970); and Joseph W. Bendersky, *Constitutional Stability and Dictatorship: A Political Biography of Carl Schmitt*, forthcoming later this year from Princeton University Press. The explicit link between Schmitt and Morgenthau was forged in the latter's critique [in *La Notion de "politique" et la Theorie des differends internationaux* (Paris, 1933), pp. 35-37 and 44-64] of Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion elaborated in "Der Begriff des Politischen," published in 1927 in *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 1-33, and further elaborated on in a book of the same title in 1932. See Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Translation, Introduction, and Notes by George Schwab (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976). Schmitt's influence is implicit in all the editions of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* and many of his other writings. In his review of the first volume of Kissinger's memoirs *White House Years*, entitled "The Case of Dr. Kissinger," *New York Review of Books*, December 6, 1979, pp. 22 ff., Stanley Hoffmann drew attention to the influence of Schmitt's friend-enemy criterion on Kissinger's notion of constant and inevitable struggle.
9. See *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.
10. See *Aussenpolitik* 33, 2, 1982.
11. See Carl Schmitt, *Voelkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot fuer raumtremde Maechte* (Berlin-Vienna, 1939); and *Der Nomos der Erde im Voelkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Berlin, 1950, 1974).
12. Alejandro Alvarez, *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World*, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law (Washington) by Oxford University Press (New York, 1924), pp. 22 ff.
13. Schmitt, *Grossraumordnung*, pp. 17 ff.
14. Osgood's article appears in the special issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "America and the World, 1981," vol. 60, no. 3, 1982.
15. See "Poland: Choosing Sides," *The New York Times*, January 10, 1982.
16. "Address of the President to Both Houses of Parliament," the Palace of Westminster; and "Exchange of Toasts Between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Reception and Luncheon Honoring the President," No. 10 Downing Street, both issued by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary (London, England), June 8, 1982.
17. "Revised U.S. Policy Said to Focus on 'Prevailing' over the Russians," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1982. See Caspar Weinberger's letter to forty newspapers in Europe, Australia, and America concerning the Reagan administration's nuclear strategy and one representative European reaction that touches on the wider issues of relations between the United States and NATO: Caspar Weinberger, "Unsere Politik ist Frieden: Das Paradoxen der Abschreckung" (Our Policy is Peace: The Paradoxes of Deterrence), and Theo Sommer, "Frieden ja—aber wie?: Die Ungereimtheiten der US-Verteidigungsplanung" (Peace Yes—But at What Price?: The Absurdities of U.S. Defense Planning) in *Die Zeit*, no. 36-10, September 1982. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Schultz Foresees Upsets in Communist Nations," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1982.
18. Steven Rattner, "Europeans Felt They Had Assurances on Gas and Steel," *The New York Times*, Sunday, August 29, 1982.
19. George W. Ball, "The Case Against Sanctions," *The New York Times Magazine*, Sunday, September 12, 1982. Harry J. Gray, Chairman of United Technologies Corp., also opposed U.S. sanctions against the pipeline. See his speech entitled "Technology, Trade, and Industrial Transition" of October 6, 1982 presented at Convergence '82.
20. Quoted in Rattner, *op. cit.*
21. See Helmut Schmidt, "A Policy of Reliable Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981. See also Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom, and Progress," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 42-66.
22. See "The Year of Europe" in Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston/Toronto, 1982), pp. 128-194.
23. *Ibid.*

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## FOR THE RECORD

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, concerned by the lack of definition of American national interests, recommends that the United States act on the basis of clearly established priorities:

1. The committee urges that the administration modify its behavior toward friends and allies regarding the formulation of a common policy toward the Soviet Union. The committee therefore suggests that the administration initiate a dialogue with America's friends and allies so that a common approach to the problem can be formulated and pursued.

2. In the view of the committee, it is in the United States' interest that Central America become politically and economically stable. The administration must endeavor to eliminate Soviet influence there. The national interest dictates that in order to attain stability, peace, and progress in Central America, the United States should promote the development of the political center that is committed to achieving political pluralism and a mixed economy.



## National Committee News

**RECENT EVENTS:** On September 29, 1982, the National Committee held its annual dinner meeting at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. In the course of the evening the following were elected officers for 1982-1983:

Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, *Honorary President*  
 Ambassador Arnold Saltzman, *Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committee*  
 Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg, *President*  
 Albert Bildner, *Vice President, Management and Administration*  
 Dr. Mordecai Hachohen, *Vice President, Academic Affairs*  
 Prof. George Schwab, *Vice President, Policy Issues and Publications*  
 Joan Peters, *Secretary*

*The following were elected to the executive committee for 1982-1983:*

Morris Abram, Esq.	Harriette Levine
Floyd Abrams	Professor F. H. Littell
Professor H. Adelson	Jerome Lipper, Esq.
Harold S. Ames	Hon. John Loeb, Jr.
Joanne Cummings	Prof. Vojtech Mastny
Jeffrey Endervelt	William Pickens III
Jac Friedgut	Hon. Maxwell Rabb
Mrs. Herbert Gussman	Prof. Fred Singer
Frederick I. Haber	Herbert Singer
Hon. Ira Hirschman	Maurice Sonnenberg

*The following were elected to the board of directors for 1982-1983:*

Prof. Gil Carl Alroy	George L. Knox
Cleveland Amory	Helen Lange
Henry H. Arnold	Albert List
Prof. Kenneth J. Arrow	Dean John M. Lowe
Saul Bellow	Winston McGuire
Dr. Bruno Bettelheim	Robert Myers
Prof. Albert P. Blaustein	Msgr. John M. Oesterreicher
Prof. Bernard E. Brown	Prof. Richard Pipes
Hon. Harland Cleveland	Prof. John P. Roche
Hon. Guilford Dudley, Jr.	Dean Henry Rosovsky
Dr. A. Roy Eckhardt	Bayard Rustin
Sheldon H. Elsen, Esq.	Robert W. Sarnoff
Steven R. Fenster	Prof. Paul Seabury
Dr. J. S. Feynman	Prof. David Sidorsky
Prof. Seymour M. Finger	Alan Siegel
Lawrence P. Fraiberg	Dr. Arnold Soloway
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh (Ret.)	Jacob Stein
Samuel Givelber	Peggy Tishman
Fitzhugh Green	Terence Todman, Jr.
Prof. Franz B. Gross	Prof. Robert W. Tucker
Dean Edmund A. Gullion	G. L. Ulmen
Hon. Roger Hilsman	Jay Wells
Dr. Rael Jean Isaac	Prof. Eugene P. Wigner
Leon I. Jacobson, Esq.	William Woodward
Eric M. Javits	

## Notes on Members

Professor Bernard E. Brown is the author of *Socialism of a Different Kind, Reshaping the Left in France*. The book is part of Professor George Schwab's series entitled *Global Perspectives in History and Politics*, published by Greenwood Press.

Viola Herms Drath is the author of "The Other Helmut," which appeared in *Handelsblatt* on September 20. Miss Drath has been invited to participate in the fourth American-German Economic Conference of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Reston, Virginia. It will be held in November, and the topic to be considered is "Free World Trade at Stake."

Professor Seymour Maxwell Finger was recently interviewed on the ABC Television network's program "The United Nations: Peacekeeping, Refugees, and Human Rights."

Professor Stephanie Neuman has just completed a report for the Department of State on military industries in the third world. Dr. Neuman will participate in October in a UNESCO colloquium in Paris on "Armament — Development — Human Rights — Disarmament."

**FUTURE EVENTS:** On November 1, 1982, Ambassador Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid of the permanent mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the U.N. will speak on the latest developments in the Middle East. The breakfast meeting will be held in the Racquet and Tennis Club, 370 Park Avenue.

The National Committee is sponsoring a fact-finding mission to Paris, Bonn, and Copenhagen. For further information about the November 5-14 trip, please phone the office: (212) 563-6651.

On November 23, 1982, Ambassador Sir John Thomson of the permanent mission of Great Britain to the U.N. will speak on "The U.N.—Does It work?" The breakfast meeting will be held at the Racquet and Tennis Club.

### NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Hon. Angier Biddle Duke <i>Honorary President</i>	Hon. Arnold Saltzman <i>Chairman of the Board Chairman of the Executive Committee</i>	Prof. George Schwab <i>Vice President Policy Issues and Publications</i>
Hon. Francis L. Kellogg <i>President</i>	Dr. Mordecai Hachohen <i>Vice President Academic Affairs</i>	Albert Bildner <i>Vice President Management and Administration</i>
Joan Peters <i>Secretary</i>		Herbert D. Spivack <i>Executive Director</i>

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