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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 11, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: White House - Mr. William P. Clark
CIA
OSD - Col John Stanford
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell

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SUBJECT: Interagency Review Group Meeting on NSSD 1-82,
US National Security Strategy

Attached is a discussion paper on the role of the Allies. Also included is a summary of that paper, and two issues papers. These papers reflect interagency discussion of an earlier draft and highlight the issues which agencies believe should be discussed at Saturday's Review Group meeting. Some additional points on Africa may be provided tomorrow.

L. Paul Bremer III
L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated

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TOP SECRETThe Role of Allies and Others

Summary

Europe

From a military perspective, the size of our commitment of combat forces to NATO depends more upon our global force requirements than it does on the commitments of other NATO nations. We do, however, depend heavily upon the European allies for logistical support and infrastructure in-theater. Politically, our own NATO-related improvements are designed to elicit similar allied improvements. Our own defense efforts in other areas are likewise relatively independent of what our allies contribute because of our uncertainty about the dependability and magnitude of their out-of-area activities.

Germany, the UK, and Benelux countries have agreed to provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed Line-of-Communications (LOC) and Co-located Operating Base (COB) agreements with almost all of the NATO countries (which also involve substantial HNS). Our allies also have agreed to make available their own civilian airlift and sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe (although there is room for further improvement in this area).

There is a difference of views about whether and in what ways we should ask the allies to help meet out-of-area Soviet threats. One view is that we should encourage all allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, while actively encouraging those who can (e.g., the UK and France) to contribute outside Europe by preferentially allocating their marginal resources to defense capabilities which could support out-of-area missions. Another view is that we should not press the allies to participate in out-of-area combat operations, notably those which might occur in Southwest Asia (SWA). There is a consensus that en route access is a function to which almost every NATO nation can contribute.

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Southwest Asia (SWA)

We should support the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats, with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly

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Pakistan for regional intervention roles. The US would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift for such forces.

We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets, relying upon the regional states for infrastructure and certain types of logistical support, and upon regional states (and perhaps external allies) for augmenting our combat capabilities, as well as for providing en route and in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

The US will require access to regional facilities and support from host governments, including HNS and facilities at which to preposition certain types of US equipment and supplies. Given current political realities and military requirements, we should concentrate on access and improvements to sites in Egypt and Oman. In Saudi Arabia, contingency discussions should seek to identify as quickly as possible the facilities and support which would be available to deploying US forces.

We should also continue to examine the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional contingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression against Pakistan. In Turkey, improvements at the co-located operating bases need to be carried out for both NATO and SWA contingencies, but a successful effort to draw Turkey more deeply into SWA security planning will require a major US diplomatic and financial effort.

Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

While the threats to US interests in the region have not diminished, many believe that the gap between threats and the combined US/friendly capabilities to meet them is not nearly so great in East Asia as it is in Europe, Southwest Asia, and perhaps the Caribbean. In particular, the US can increasingly look to Japan and the ROK to bear greater resource responsibilities for their own defense, thereby easing the strains

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on our own force commitments. Nevertheless, the US has major security and economic interests in the region which demand the continued presence of US forces and active security relationships.

Japan has agreed to be responsible for its own self-defense and to protect the US-Japanese sea lanes out to 1000 miles from the Home Islands. We should not ask the Japanese to assume any active defense roles beyond the already agreed geographical boundaries. The Japanese might be asked to make available facilities for US deployments to the region or to Southwest Asia. Japan ought to be pressed to increase its war reserve stocks. We should make a major effort to encourage the Japanese to make available relevant technology to us which has dual-use or defense potential.

It is unlikely that we can bring about significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union and tie down additional Soviet resources so long as China is unwilling to divert substantial resources of its own to that purpose. We should seek closer US-PRC coordination on security relations with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through China. The US and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet equipment inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from Soviet arms relationships.

The ROK should be able to continue to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the US force presence, a US security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. It is not realistic, however, to expect any significant level of direct defense cooperation between Japan and Korea.

In Southeast Asia, the US relies primarily on local states to deal directly with internal instability. Should internal security problems require outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government's own efforts, maintaining our own flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

Latin America

The US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention of external allies. (Although we should seek to

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keep the remaining UK and French presence in the region.) US military forces therefore represent the essential fallback. In some instances, we may seek facilities access (e.g., Honduras) to allow us to project power into the region.

Africa

Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia can provide facilities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US rapid reaction forces.

Against local and regional threats (other than Libya), we will rely primarily on local and regional forces. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security and peacekeeping efforts would almost certainly be necessary.

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The Role of Allies and Others

This paper surveys the international security environment and assesses cooperative defense roles for US allies and friends. The survey is by region (Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia and the Pacific Basin, Latin America and Africa) with reference to transregional cooperation where appropriate. In each section, the paper will seek to illuminate the extent to which US programs and resource allocation decisions are dependent on the defense programs and military capabilities of our allies and friends. It will also examine the extent to which the nature and size of allied and friendly contributions affect our common ability to deter and defend.

Introduction

Since the establishment of a Western security framework in the years immediately following World War II, global power relationships have shifted in several ways. First, there has been a shift in the East-West balance from clear US superiority to a state of rough parity with the prospect of US inferiority. Equally marked, however, is the altered balance, especially in economic and political terms, between the US and its industrial allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably larger share of the world product than the US. In addition, the post World War II decolonization process has made the industrial democracies dependent for a number of critical resources upon over 100 independent states in the Third World, many of which are suspicious, if not actively hostile, toward the United States.

As a result of these shifting relationships, the US must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power and to protect interests threatened from other sources as well. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

In brief, the US faces an inescapable dilemma. On the one hand, we cannot protect all our vital interests without the assistance and support of others. At the same time, we cannot rely completely on our allies and friends.

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Europe

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. Although US conventional military power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense and that we can no longer expect to dictate Alliance actions. Generally, we must seek the support of others before setting forth new policy proposals, and we must choose carefully the times we take controversial positions in order to galvanize our Allies into action.

Western interests require the improvement of the defense capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during periods of economic difficulty. The US must emphasize the need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to redress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. We should press for Alliance implementation of key enhancement programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, re-inforcement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW, and C³), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while the US and the Soviets continue to negotiate an INF Agreement in Geneva. The US should also adhere to its commitment to provide a total of six division sets of POMCUS in Europe by 1987 and to be able to reinforce Europe ten days following a decision to do so with six Army divisions (for a total of ten), sixty Air Force tacair squadrons, and 5/9 of a MAF.

In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, member nations must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their defense efforts beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense of national preferences. To that end, we should pursue opportunities with our Allies for the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments which yield increased combat effectiveness and more efficient use of defense resources.

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As a further effort at cooperation and integration, we have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) from our NATO Allies. Germany has agreed to establish a 93,000 man contingent in their Army reserve to provide wartime HNS for US forces. The UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have agreed to provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed Line-of-Communications (LOC) and Co-located Operating Base (COB) agreements with almost all of the NATO countries (these agreements also involve substantial HNS). Our European Allies also have agreed to make available their own civilian airlift and sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe (although there is room for further improvement in this area).

Because the balance is at such a high level of military power in Europe, the Soviets are likely to pursue less risky and costly opportunities elsewhere, hoping to erode the political base of the Alliance rather than attacking it directly. The region where events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA). The West faces two interrelated sort of threats in SWA. The larger threat is that of direct Soviet military intervention. The more proximate threats, however, arise out of regional conflict and domestic instability in the regional states. Only the United States has the power to deter or defeat Soviet intervention. European support for such efforts is of more political than military utility. European powers, acting in concert with regional states, have the capability of responding to some lower order threats, however, and may in some cases be better placed to do so. Additionally, intervention by European as opposed to American forces, would generally be a less escalatory step, less likely to legitimize and stimulate Soviet intervention in a regional conflict.

Thus, many believe that in addition to asking the Allies to improve the defense posture in Europe, we must continue to urge those Allies in a position to do so to share the burdens outside Europe in areas where regional conflicts and Soviet threats could harm Western interests. Those who hold this view argue that our strategy should be one which encourages all Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities which could support out-of-area missions.

Others, however, believe that we should not encourage the Allies to participate in out-of-area combat operations, notably those which might occur in Southwest Asia (SWA). They believe the Europeans can add little to American capabilities

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in SWA, and can better utilize any marginal resources in the defense of Europe. [redacted]

We also need mobility support for US forces that might be deployed to either theater, including en route access through European transit facilities for forces deploying to SWA. Building upon their political and economic contacts with countries in SWA, the Allies can provide security and economic assistance and training to local states. According to their capabilities, certain Allies can cooperate in maintaining peacetime military presence in SWA and enhancing their capabilities for military operations in the event of hostilities. In addition, we would expect former colonial powers to play a leading role in external security assistance in Africa.

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We must, however, recognize that only a few European countries, e.g., the UK and France, have the capabilities to influence events outside Europe. The FRG has the capabilities but is inhibited by its history and the current legal interpretation of its constitution from such a role, except for economic and in some cases security assistance.

At the same time, en route access is a function that almost every NATO nation can contribute. The UK, the FRG, France, and the nations of the Southern Region can all assist. We should also encourage the Allies to help improve Turkish military capabilities given Turkey's role in European defense and its potential contribution to security in Southwest Asia. Equally important, we should foster among all NATO members a political climate which applauds rather than criticizes out-of-area efforts and which eventually gives specific credit (e.g., through NATO force goals) for such efforts.

Finally, it is important to recognize that, from a military perspective, the size of our commitment of combat forces to NATO depends more upon our global force requirements than it does on the commitments of other NATO nations. We do, however, depend heavily upon the Europeans for logistical support and infrastructure in-theater. Politically, it is important to note that our own improvements within NATO are designed to elicit similar Allied improvements, and the continuation of our improvements depends heavily upon the domestic political (and especially the Congressional) perception that the Europeans are carrying a fair share of the burden. Our own efforts in other areas are likewise relatively independent of what our Allies contribute, because of uncertainty about of their out-of-area activities.

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Southwest Asia (SWA)

The security environment in SWA bears little resemblance to that in Europe. The more likely possibilities of regional conflicts and/or internal instabilities considerably complicate the problems of security planning. Moreover, not only is there no formal security framework, but the Arab-Israeli and other regional conflicts sometime set our regional friends against one another. Nonetheless, while an alliance structure is unobtainable, a set of well-defined bilateral security cooperation relationships are clearly required.

In response to regional conflicts and local instability, the US will rely primarily upon forces indigenous to the region, with the possibility in appropriate circumstances of ultimately backing them up with quick reaction forces from our European Allies and if necessary from the US. Such a division of responsibility is both politically advisable and necessary to preserve the flexibility of US forces for involvement in contingencies with the Soviets. In order to contain such crises and ensure that direct US military involvement is not required or is minimal, regional states will require capabilities which are sufficient to respond to contingencies without outside augmentation. To that end, regional states will need access to arms, logistical support, technological expertise, and training. Some states, e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan, will require security assistance to pay for these arms and associated transfers. Some will also require economic assistance to help maintain stability and absorb the impact of military spending. The United States, together with other external allies and the more affluent states of the region, must be prepared to provide such assistance.

Should external military assistance be necessary to maintain the security of a friendly regional state from a local or regional threat and/or to foreclose opportunities for subversion or intervention by Soviet surrogates, the prime candidates to aid embattled governments should be other regional states. To ensure that such capabilities exist within the region, the US will support the establishment and maintenance of appropriate intervention capabilities by Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Pakistan. The US would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift. If additional or alternative assistance is necessary, US allies from outside the region, e.g., the UK or France, may be preferable to the US both politically (for the recipient) and in order to avoid escalating to the possibility of a superpower confrontation (recognizing that

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there is a difference of views about the desirability of out-of-area military activities by the Allies). If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not be necessary, however, to tailor significant US forces to hedge against such contingencies.

In response to the less likely threat of direct Soviet aggression, only the US can provide full spectrum of capabilities necessary to deter or counter a Soviet attack. However, the US cannot stand alone. Without the cooperation and participation of friendly regional states and external allies, we are unlikely either to deter the Soviets or to contain conflict to the region. In this regard, the capabilities of regional states (and possibly of certain European Allies) to respond to lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will also contribute to deterring or countering the Soviets. Nonetheless, the US will have to provide core forces for resisting the Soviets, while we look to others to respond, in the first instance, to lower level but more proximate threats arising from regional conflict and internal instability.

As in Europe, the US cannot militarily help regional states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the value of facilities access during contingencies, such cooperation must be manifest in peacetime, if possible. In some cases, access will require augmentation only by contingency planning and occasional exercising. In other instances, infrastructure improvements will also be necessary, most likely involving US military construction funds. In addition, both to demonstrate cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities militarily, the US must seek host nation logistical support (HNS) and facilities at which to preposition certain types of US equipment and supplies.

Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations. Consequently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be pursued with both persistence and flexibility.

In Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we will need to maintain and develop the facilities to which we have access, as quickly as possible. In Saudi Arabia, contingency discussions

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between USMTM and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) should seek to identify as quickly as possible the facilities and support which would be available to deploying US forces. Saudi concerns regarding more visible contingencies, e.g., the threat from Iran and recent associated events, may improve the prospects for engaging them in a more purposeful dialogue with us on security cooperation. Following on our strengthening of US-Pakistani security relations over the past year, we should also continue to examine the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional contingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression against Pakistan (taking care not to increase Indian anxieties about, or to incite retaliatory actions against, Pakistan in the process). In Turkey, improvements at the co-located operating bases need to be carried out for both NATO and SWA contingencies, but an effort to draw Turkey more deeply into SWA security planning with any real prospect of success will require a major US diplomatic and financial effort.

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Overall, given the combination of military requirements and political feasibility, we should concentrate US defense resources allocated for facilities access and improvements in the region in Egypt and Oman. If, however, the political feasibility were to increase, Saudi Arabia (to the extent that US resources were necessary) and Turkey should receive the same priority as Egypt and Oman. (While this section focuses on contingencies in SWA, Israeli capabilities might be able to make a contribution in a war involving US and Soviet naval/air forces in the Mediterranean.)

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To bolster both our capability and our credibility with regional states regarding our intent to participate in their defense against Soviet threats, the US will need to maintain an important peacetime presence in the region. For the time being such presence is almost exclusively naval and afloat Marine forces (AWACS in Saudi Arabia being the prime exception). Occasional exercises will place additional forces ashore temporarily. In time, however, we should extend our cooperation with regional states to include increasingly frequent tacair visits (and perhaps ground force units) to improve our quick reaction capabilities. We will also wish to station a forward headquarters of the RDF in the region at some future date, should the political environment there permit.

In conclusion, we should support (through our own and allied security assistance) the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local

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and regional threats, with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan for regional intervention roles. We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets, relying upon the regional states for infrastructure and certain types of logistical support and upon regional states (and perhaps external allies) for augmenting our combat capabilities, as well as for providing en route and in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

Japan is limited by its constitution and history in the amount and extent of its defense effort. Nevertheless, Japan and the US have agreed that Japan will be responsible for its own self-defense and will protect the US-Japanese sea lanes out to 1000 miles from the Home Islands. The Japanese can and should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. To the extent that their contribution does increase, it will increase the flexibility to use US forces for other missions in the Pacific or elsewhere.

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Beyond expanding their self-defense effort to enhance the overall air/naval balance in the north Pacific, the Japanese might be asked to make available facilities for US deployments to the region or to Southwest Asia. Japan ought to be pressed to bring its POL, munitions, and other war reserve stocks up to full inventory objective levels. We should make a major effort to encourage the Japanese to make available relevant technology to us which has dual-use or defense potential. As a priority, Japan should also increase further its overseas development assistance, particularly to critical states in Southwest Asia such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Sudan, though not at the expense of its defense effort.

On the other hand, we cannot reasonably expect any significant level of direct defense cooperation between Japan and Korea, nor should we ask Japan to assume any other active defense roles beyond the already agreed geographical boundaries. Rather, we should concentrate on ways to make increased Japanese financial resources available to ourselves and others for defense purposes.

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The PRC causes the Soviets to devote resources against it that might otherwise go elsewhere. In addition, it provides a constraint upon Vietnamese actions against Thailand. It also lends political-military support and Third World credibility to US opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola (though not in other areas such as Latin America).

We can (if they are interested) improve Chinese capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union and tie down additional Soviet resources by supplying appropriate arms and other military technology, by associated training, and by military exchanges; however, over the short- and mid-term, it is unlikely that we can bring about significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities so long as China is unwilling to divert substantial resources of its own to that purpose. We also should seek closer US-PRC coordination on security relations with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through China for a Pacific air line of communication to Southwest Asia. The US and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet equipment inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from Soviet arms relationships.

In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a beneficial role in supporting US interests in East Asia. By virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with currently forward deployed US forces in the region, maintains a rough balance on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic strength of its economy (despite its current problems) is such that the ROK should be able to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the US force presence, security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. Any increases in Korean defense investment, however, should maintain the current division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair.)

In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both Australia and New Zealand are seeking to improve security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally and through the Five Power Defense Arrangement which includes the UK. Such cooperation strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/Soviet threat in the region. Australia also could provide expanded base and other support facilities, in addition to its potential direct military contribution in the Indian Ocean as well as the Southeast Asian region.

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The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which are important to US security interests in Asia. The Philippines provides a major and perhaps irreplaceable US base network for support of our military posture in the region and en route access to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en route access. In return the US helps these two countries deal with their security problems, essentially through security assistance.

As in Southwest Asia, the US relies in Southeast Asia primarily on local states to deal directly with internal instability. Should internal security problems require outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government's own efforts, maintaining our own flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

In sum, while the threats to US interests in the region have not diminished, many believe that the gap between threats and the combined US/friendly capabilities to meet them is not nearly so great in East Asia as it is in Europe, Southwest Asia, ^{Other regions like} and perhaps the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the US has major security and economic interests in the region which demand the continued presence of US forces and an active security relationship. The US can increasingly look to Japan and the ROK to bear greater resource responsibilities for their own defense, thereby easing the strains on our own force commitments. At the same time, the maintenance of adequate US military strength is an essential ingredient of continued regional stability. In Southeast Asia, given the present military balance, continued security assistance programs, as well as continuing attention to the maintenance of our present security relationships, should be sufficient. However, our basic security posture already factors in China as a strategic counterweight, and a visible drawdown in the US security presence or a visible lessening of our present security role would be seriously destabilizing.

Latin America

The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet Union, US military forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba as a potential base for operations against the US or its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a staging area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean or Pacific lines of communication, the US would also be responsible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic,

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Brazil and Argentina might contribute to the defense of sea lines of communication, through access for US forces and the employment of their own naval forces. Additional analysis, however, is required to determine the parameters of such cooperation.

As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political support and emphasize security and economic assistance. In some instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to project power into the region. We should also seek to keep the remaining UK and French presence in the region.

Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America, and we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot gain their support.

US military forces, therefore, represent the essential fallback should local forces be unable to counter the insurgencies. We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ US forces under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio Treaty or a sub-regional grouping such as the Central American Democratic Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Because threats in the region have been limited in the past, US forces dedicated exclusively to regional roles have also been limited. In considering the use of US forces in Central America or elsewhere in the region, we must measure the benefits and costs of diverting those forces from missions in other regions or consider increasing US force size overall to undertake tasks that friends and allies cannot or will not take on.

Africa

The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa through the use of numerous surrogates, chief among them Libya and Cuba. Because of Libya's international behavior, the US has sought directly, through political and military means, to rein in its activities. While we would prefer to deal with Libyan threats exclusively through friendly states, we must be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it.

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Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states of the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater. In Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and Liberia, in addition to our providing security assistance, host nations can provide facilities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US rapid reaction forces.

Against other local and regional threats, we rely primarily on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist with security and economic assistance, and we ask our external allies and affluent friends to do the same. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. France, the UK, and Belgium are the major actors in that regard. We also support regional peacekeeping efforts such as the OAU in Chad. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security efforts would almost certainly be necessary.

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Should the NATO Allies be encouraged to contribute combat forces for contingencies in Southwest Asia (SWA)?

Options

1. The Allies should be encouraged to plan to contribute combat forces for contingencies in SWA involving either direct Soviet aggression or regional hostilities or local instabilities.
2. The Allies should not be asked to contribute combat forces for any contingencies in SWA.

Discussion/Pro-Con Analysis

Option 1: Some believe that, if forthcoming, Allied contributions could add both to deterrence and warfighting capabilities on a political (European involvement/Alliance cohesion) as well as military level. In addition, encouraging European combat contributions would demonstrate our intent and add to our capabilities to contain any conflict to the region, thus responding to an Allied fear that any conflict in SWA would immediately escalate. European forces have the potential to move to SWA more quickly than CONUS-based forces, thus increasing initial Western combat capabilities in any SWA conflict. Also European participation would certainly make European overflight and en route facilities access available for US efforts in SWA. Even if European contributions were small, the solidarity of US-European opposition would indicate to the Soviets that they could not seek to outflank the Alliance militarily or divide the Alliance politically by attacks outside the Treaty area. In regional/local contingencies requiring extraregional assistance, instances could arise (French support for the Mecca Mosque incident) in which European assistance would be more politically acceptable locally and/or less likely to raise tensions to the level of superpower confrontation. In addition, proponents of this option believe that defense resources allocated to SWA (which can also be used in Europe) have a greater marginal value than those devoted exclusively to Europe. Moreover, those Europeans who could contribute could be more easily encouraged to devote additional resources for defense in areas of greater marginal return, e.g., dual-use European/SWA security forces.

Option 2: Combined efforts complicate operational planning considerably in the negotiation of roles and missions, force size contribution, command and control arrangements, etc. Given the limited forces likely to be made available by contributing Allies, the technical/operational problems of planning for coalition warfare appear to some to outweigh the potential benefits of a coalition strategy. Moreover, these efforts would be further complicated by the uncertainty of Allied participation in an actual SWA contingency. In addition, those who argue for this option submit that additional European resource allocations are more needed in Europe than SWA and that they are more likely to be encouraged for political reasons for missions tied exclusively to Europe.

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TOP SECRETIssue Paper: Role of Allies and Others

Is the balance between Soviet threats and US/friendly capabilities less in East Asia than Europe, Southwest Asia, and possibly the Caribbean? Does this judgement, in combination with the reliability of friends in East Asia, afford the US some flexibility to allocate marginal defense and security assistance resources to other regions?

Options

1. The US should allocate ^{to} marginal defense and security assistance resources ~~in~~ regions other than East Asia.
2. The US should continue to allocate marginal defense and security assistance resources to East Asia at roughly its existing proportion of defense and security assistance increases.

Discussion/Pro-Con Analysis

Option 1: Some believe that, while current programs, force levels, and commitments in the region ought not to be diminished, there are more pressing unmet requirements in other regions. The Sino-Soviet balance, Japanese and Korean resource capabilities and the security contributions of Australia and New Zealand, together with the existing US presence in the region, offer a regional balance less threatening than those in Europe, Southwest Asia, and possibly the Caribbean. Consequently, in reviewing allocations for the FY 84 defense and security assistance budget, decision makers should guide program planners away from initiating new or major additive programs in East Asia.

Option 2: Others believe that the current power balance in the region is neither so tranquil as some would suggest nor so certain to remain in its current state. To reinforce the intent of regional states to oppose the Soviets and to serve as a hedge against unfavorable regional shifts of interest, proponents of this view would argue additive resources and new programs are needed.

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