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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: DoD Input to the SIG-I National Intelligence Topics for 1983-1984 (U)

(S) The enclosed Department of Defense submission for the National Intelligence Topics of Current Interest, 1983-1984 is forwarded for consideration by the Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence. Our five primary topics are:

- USSR: Strategic Conflict
- USSR/Warsaw Pact-NATO: Conventional War Readiness
- USSR: Advanced Technologies
- USSR/NATO: Responses to NATO Modernization
- USSR: Politico-Economic Impacts on Military Policy

Additionally we have included a sixth topic on "Latin America: Politico-Military Policy." The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided you a related topic on Latin America, but the two are not duplicative. In order to limit the DoD list to five topics, I suggest the SIG-I consider adding the DoD proposal on Latin America to what the JCS provided on the Caribbean Basin.

  
Paul Thayer

Attachment

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**SECRET**DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INPUT TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TOPICS, 1983-1984CATEGORYUSSR: Strategic Conflict

1. Extended nuclear conflict
  - a. Soviet capabilities projected for engagement in extended nuclear conflict against the US after an initial major exchange
    - (1) Soviet systems to be held in strategic reserve B
    - (2) Soviet capabilities to sustain enduring C<sup>3</sup>I facilities, communications links, etc. B
    - (3) Projections of the deployment locations for mobile ballistic missiles B
    - (4) Dispersal/Recovery bases outside the USSR B
2. Soviet perception of North American offensive/defensive balance
  - a. Soviet perception/assessment of US strategic offensive posture A
  - b. Soviet perception/assessment of North American strategic defensive posture A
  - c. Soviet perception/assessment of future US ballistic missile defense BMD capabilities B
  - d. Soviet planning for future strategic policies and capabilities
    - (1) Potential shifts in plans and strategy for employment of recallable strategic offensive forces A
    - (2) Strategy and employment doctrine for wartime use of new long-range offensive cruise missiles B
3. Soviet intentions in space, both offensive and defensive
  - a. Shifts in Soviet space policy B
  - b. Soviet space weapons programs
    - (1) Directed energy weapons B
    - (2) Enhancement of space vehicle survivability B
    - (3) Soviet strategy, doctrine, and capabilities for attacking critical high-altitude US satellites A

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CATEGORY

USSR/Warsaw Pact/NATO: Conventional War Readiness

1. Warning time
  - a. The amount of warning time available to us before commitment of Soviet conventional combat forces
    - (1) In Europe A
    - (2) In Southwest Asia B
2. Level of hostilities at initiation of conventional conflict
  - a. Soviet ability to generate and prepare ground forces for combat A
  - b. Level of Soviet emphasis on early conventional air operations
    - (1) Repair capabilities and limitations A
    - (2) Manpower constraints A
    - (3) Availability of pilots, munitions, fuel, and spare parts A
3. Extent of Soviet biological, toxin, and chemical warfare readiness
  - a. Extent of Soviet stockpiling against NATO B
  - b. Soviet readiness and doctrine for the employment of biological/toxin/chemical munitions against NATO B
  - c. Extent, if any, Soviet behavior has been affected by the international arms control regime B
  - d. Incidents involving use of these weapons elsewhere in the world (e.g., "yellow rain," etc.) B
4. Assessment of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces training (USSR, East Germany, FRG, and UK)
  - a. Level of personnel experience and average service tenure B
    - (1) Officers
    - (2) Non-Commissioned officers
    - (3) Enlisted

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CATEGORY

- b. Rank/structure and skill levels B
  - (1) Commanders of given unit sizes
  - (2) Training experience of unit commanders
- c. Degree of combined arms training B
  - (1) Number and quality of field training exercises
  - (2) Extent of other field training
  - (3) Extent of multi-national training
- d. Quantity/Quality of Command Post Exercises B
  - (1) Number
  - (2) Frequency
  - (3) Degree of realism
  - (4) Reliance on simulation
- e. Weapons proficiency B
  - (1) Quantity of standard and sub-caliber firing performed annually
  - (2) Degree of realism attained
  - (3) Number, quality, and frequency of the use of simulators
- f. Combat Service Support and logistics B
  - (1) Degree of participation in field and command post training exercises B
  - (2) Degree of realism and frequency of participation in training exercises B
- 5. Sustainability of Soviet conventional forces
  - a. Performance of combat service support units in dealing with potential combat conditions and workloads B
  - b. Levels of spares or replacements available to support units. B
  - c. Number of days the Soviets can sustain combat in Europe and/or Southwest Asia A

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6. Soviet intentions in Latin America.

- a. Intentions to establish a permanent military presence in the Caribbean Basin and therefore impact on NATO reinforcement capability. A
- b. Soviet perceptions of US willingness/ability to counter Soviet expansion into the Caribbean. B
- c. Soviet intentions to enter mutual defense pact with Cuba and Nicaragua. B

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CATEGORY

USSR: Advanced Technologies

1. Soviet RDT&E initiatives and potential breakthroughs and their impact on Soviet policy/doctrine
  - a. Strategic communications jamming
    - (1) ELF communications jamming B
    - (2) Air Force/Navy VLF/LF jamming B
    - (3) HF Fleet Broadcast jamming B
    - (4) Ground Wave Emergency Network jamming B
  - b. Low Observables Technology
    - (1) Modernization of strategic aerodynamic attack forces A
    - (2) Tactical and strategic cruise missiles for land-based targets A
    - (3) Anti-shipping cruise missiles A
  - c. Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems A
  - d. Directed Energy Systems
    - (1) Lasers B
    - (2) Charged Particle Beams B
    - (3) Power sources B
  - e. Data Automation Systems
    - (1) Artificial Intelligence and its impact on Soviet C<sup>3</sup>I B
    - (2) Next generation hardware development or acquisition via technology transfer B
    - (3) Broad use of improved software in military planning and operations B
2. Soviet responses to Western advanced technologies
  - a. Soviet RDT&E activities in response to US initiatives for defense against ballistic missiles
    - (1) Ground based US ballistic missile defense systems B
    - (2) Space-based US ballistic missile defense systems B

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## CATEGORY

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- b. Soviet RDT&E activities responding to US Low-observable technology
    - (1) Advanced Technology Bomber B
    - (2) Advanced Cruise Missile B
    - (3) Other B
  - c. Prospects for increased hardening and mobility of the Soviet target base in response to hard-target-capable MX and D-5 missiles
    - (1) Mobile ICBM testing/deployment B
    - (2) Mobile C<sup>3</sup>I B
  - 3. Extent and status of military and space RDT&E programs
    - a. Systems in full scale development A
    - b. System and subsystem concept studies B
    - c. Trends and systems in military sponsored technology development projects B
    - d. Trends and asymmetries in military and space RDT&E (full-scale development systems, development projects and concept studies) B
    - e. Prospects for development of space-based weapons to be employed against terrestrial targets
      - (1) Manned space stations for surveillance, command and control, and as weapon platforms B
      - (2) Space-based jammers, including those intended for use against down-links B
      - (3) Other B
    - f. Programs to enhance Soviet satellite survivability
      - (1) Physical and electronic hardening A
      - (2) Evasive maneuver A
      - (3) Protection from directed energy weapon systems A
    - g. Programs to improve anti-satellite capabilities A

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## CATEGORY

USSR/NATO: Responses to NATO Modernization

1. Possibility and impact of a Soviet "analogous response" to Pershing II/ Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) deployments in Western Europe
  - a. Possibility of further IRBM deployments for targeting NATO A
  - b. Evidence of development/deployment of a Soviet "neutron warhead" A
  - c. Carribbean deployment options A
  - d. Periodic ALCM/SLCM deployments A
2. Quality and quantity of Soviet conventional tactical ballistic missile threat (SS-21, SS-22, SS-23)
  - a. Terminal guidance A
  - b. Improved Conventional Munitions A
  - c. Consequences for NATO defenses A
3. Soviet intentions for development, deployment and wartime use of long range cruise missiles
  - a. Strategy and doctrine for employment
    - (1) Share of cruise missile assets intended for Soviet inter-continental forces A
    - (2) Share intended for theater employment A
    - (3) Doctrine, targeting systems and tactics for long-range cruise missiles B
  - b. Impact on arms control negotiations B
4. Western Europe's international policies and military capabilities
  - a. Impact and significance of anti-nuclear movement on NATO's cohesion, military integrity, and operational strategy A
  - b. Compatibility of NATO's military objectives versus defense budget allocations A

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CATEGORY

USSR: Politico-Economic Impacts on Military Policy

1. Extent of any Soviet redirection of defense resources to domestic needs
  - a. Areas of defense resource reductions and targets of domestic spending increases B
  - b. Degree of disruption of military production, including specific weapons systems B
  - c. Effect of any resource redirection on the planned growth in the quantity and quality of Soviet Eurasian forces B
2. Evidence of slowing growth in Soviet force projection capabilities A
3. Evidence of any changes in Soviet foreign arms sales policies A
4. Indications that East Europeans may be required to assume a larger responsibility for Warsaw Pact military modernization A
5. Soviet dependence on foreign energy sources
  - a. Projections of the percentage of total Soviet energy requirements that will be met with foreign sources B
  - b. Capacity and vulnerability of transportation routes and storage area for Soviet energy imports
    - (1) Inside the USSR B
    - (2) Outside the USSR B
  - c. Effect on Soviet capabilities to wage conventional war, given curtailment of their foreign supplies of energy B
6. Impact of acquisition of advanced foreign technology or equipment
  - a. Plans and strategies of the USSR and other Communist countries to acquire dual-use strategically significant technologies from the United States, Japan, Western Europe and such sources as newly industrializing states A
  - b. Technologies and equipment on which Soviet interest is primarily focused B
  - c. Overt and clandestine acquisition techniques on which Soviets are putting particular emphasis B
  - d. Near-term impact of Soviet success in acquiring foreign technologies and equipment on critical military and economic capabilities B

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ADDITIONAL (SIXTH) TOPIC

CATEGORY

Latin America: Politico-Military Policy

1. Prospects for non-Communist alternatives for social and economic development in Latin America

- a. Entities favoring economic reform, democratic institutions, long-term stability, and US policy in the region B
  - (1) Key personalities
  - (2) Politico-Military organizations
  - (3) Institutions
  - (4) Media
  
- b. Entities that support Soviet and Cuban operations, objectives, and policies in the region B
  - (1) Key personalities
  - (2) Politico-Military organizations
  - (3) Institutions
  - (4) Media

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