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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 8581-83

29 November 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Representatives

FROM: John Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Update of Interagency Intelligence Assessment:
GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs requested an update of our 10 November Interagency Intelligence Assessment on the Security Threat in Grenada. The paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. [redacted] of DDI's Office of African and Latin American Analysis was the principal drafter.

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2. NFIB representatives met on 29 November and coordinated the assessment forwarded herewith.

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UPDATE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
29 November 1983

GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

I. KEY JUDGMENTS

- The security situation in Grenada is stable. There have been only a few isolated incidents since 10 November and there is no evidence that any Cubans have eluded capture.
- The Castro regime undoubtedly is reassessing its overall policy in the eastern Caribbean and is likely to be more selective and careful in its actions during the coming months.
- There is an increasing anxiety among Grenadians over a deterioration of the security situation after the departure of US forces. Many citizens fear that radical elements still at large will challenge the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force after the US military personnel have departed.
- The Caribbean security forces, however, are rated as reasonably effective by US military personnel familiar with their operations. Because of Grenada's small size and the disarray among radical elements we believe these forces will be able to maintain public order for the next six months. Given popular anxieties, however, the security climate would be improved if a small contingent of US military police remained on the island for several months. Continued US military presence, however, would have some adverse diplomatic and political side effects.
- As US forces depart, political stability increasingly will depend on the ability of the interim government to demonstrate its competence. In order to gain the population's confidence the Grenadian authorities would have to deal rapidly and effectively with the imprisoned leaders of the Bishop regime and should demonstrate that it is taking concrete steps toward holding general elections.
- Major economic problems also pose obstacles to the maintenance of political stability over the coming six months. These difficulties include unemployment and filling a serious short-term financial gap.

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II. Current Situation

The situation in Grenada remains calm. US forces are continuing to withdraw and there have been only a few isolated incidents since 10 November. None of these appear to have been ambushes or deliberately planned attacks, but have resulted from inadvertent encounters with armed individuals. The most serious of these incidents occurred on Green Island, northeast of Grenada, when a US military patrol was fired upon after it challenged four or five people who were unloading a boat. The general population, however, remains highly supportive of the US presence and continues to cooperate with US and Caribbean forces in identifying subversive elements. According to US officials in Grenada, the present level of danger to US and Caribbean forces there is low. There is the possibility of isolated terrorist or sniper activity, but that threat is low as long as US forces remain on the island. [REDACTED]

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III. The Security Outlook Over the Next Six MonthsA. Cuban Stay Behinds

Although it is possible that a few Cubans have eluded capture, there is no hard evidence that such is the case. As of mid-November, there was no hard evidence of any clandestine communications activity. There has been no confirmed visual sighting of Cuban stragglers. We believe that if any Cuban stragglers remain, they would be few in number, and they would be more intent on escaping the island than organizing a guerrilla or terrorist force. [REDACTED]

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We do not discount the possibility of an isolated terrorist action, but doubt that the Castro regime intends to sponsor covert infiltrations or a terrorist campaign in Grenada over the next six months. Havana is well aware that the disarray among Grenadian leftists would make such attempts ineffective and highly vulnerable to disclosure. Revelation of Cuban sponsorship could, in Cuba's view, provide a pretext for punitive actions by the US. [REDACTED]

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Havana is undoubtedly reassessing its overall policy toward the eastern Caribbean and its ties to leftist movements in the area. Cuba's failure in Grenada, which President Castro has publicly blamed on serious errors by Grenadian revolutionary leaders, probably will lead Havana to be more selective and careful and to reemphasize to leftist groups the need for organization, unity, training, and political and propaganda work. [REDACTED]

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B. Perceptions of the Grenadian Population

A growing anxiety prevails among the Grenadians over a deterioration of the security situation after the departure of US forces. Many fear acts of terrorism by hard-core elements of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) against those who helped US forces capture PRA soldiers who had gone into hiding. The popular perception among Grenadians is that some former PRA members are hiding in St. Georges and the countryside with caches of weapons and ammunition.* This anxiety of the populace is compounded by their lack of confidence in the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force. Grenadians fear that the PRA members still at large will challenge the Caribbean forces after the US military personnel have departed. If the populace feels threatened by a significant deterioration in the security situation following the US military departure, they might accuse the US of abandoning them. [REDACTED]

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C. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces

Reports by US military personnel in Grenada concerning the competence of the Caribbean Peacekeeping Forces are mixed. Given Grenada's small size and the current disorganization and lack of support for any potential violent opposition, we believe these forces ought to be able to maintain public order for the next six months. Because of popular concerns in Grenada and lack of confidence in the CPF, however, the security climate would be significantly improved if a small contingent of US military police remained on the island for several months. Nevertheless continued presence of US forces could become politically controversial within Grenada and would work against the interim government's efforts to achieve domestic and international credibility. [REDACTED]

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One of the two Jamaican companies of the CPF was rotated back home and is scheduled to be replaced on 1 December. Prime Minister Seaga's call for early elections in Jamaica could interfere with this commitment. The Jamaican Defense Force is expecting violence, has called up its reservists, and will not be able to return the company to Grenada until after the December 15th election. [REDACTED]

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D. Capabilities of the Grenadian Government

As US forces depart, the population's perceptions of the security situation will depend increasingly on the performance of the interim government. So far, the Advisory Council appointed by Governor General Scoon has been preoccupied with legal constitutional and administrative problems and has not yet been able to assume all its responsibilities as

*According to US officials, there are approximately 70 PRA personnel who have not been accounted for by the military. These individuals are believed to be low level soldiers.

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an interim government. With no effective security force of its own, the government is totally dependent on the US and Caribbean forces. The formation and training of a new Grenadian police force probably will take at least a year, leaving a significant need in the medium term for a reliable security force. [REDACTED]

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The security of Grenada and the popular perception of the situation will depend on the ability of the Advisory Council to demonstrate that it is making progress in the establishment of the country's own security force and legal system. The inability of the Chairman-designate Alister McIntyre to assume his position because of health problems has caused a major setback for the Council and the development of an effective leadership for the Council will be hampered by the paucity of administrative talent. Moreover, Scoon reportedly regrets two of his appointments whom he now views as undesirable because of their leftist ties. [REDACTED]

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In order to gain the population's confidence, the government will have to deal effectively -- within a legal framework -- with the remnants of the Bishop regime currently imprisoned at Richmond Hill. Some of the leaders--such as Bernard Coard--reportedly seem to believe that there is insufficient evidence to convict them for Bishop's death. Their ability to contest the charges has been enhanced by the reportedly lax conditions of their imprisonment. Several of the detainees, such as Coard, Leon James, and Hudson Austin, reportedly are able to communicate with each other and to send political messages out through persons who are visiting them. Although popular disgust with these individuals is strong, they would pose serious problems for the new government should they be released. [REDACTED]

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Popular confidence in the government also will depend on its ability to soon begin taking concrete and well-organized steps toward the holding of general elections, and its ability to deal effectively with the politically sensitive issues of participation by the New Jewel Movement and Eric Gairy. [REDACTED]

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Severe economic difficulties threaten Grenadian security over the next six months. We believe these problems can be reduced if new foreign aid flows become available quickly and are effectively used. Although labor-intensive public works projects -- funded by US grant aid -- eased the immediate unemployment burden, hundreds more remain out of work. A significant problem is that of the unemployed former members of the People's Revolutionary Army. The cash-short government must meet November payrolls, and other expenses incurred by the Bishop regime. Funds that had been expected from the IMF have been withheld because of the uncertain

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political climate. Finally, the new government needs to obtain foreign exchange quickly to keep imports of basic necessities near normal levels. Unless sufficient new sources of foreign exchange are found, the projected drop in tourism earnings over the next few months could lead to cutbacks of essential agricultural inputs and other intermediate and capital goods. Lack of visible progress in these areas will undermine confidence in the Advisory Council which could lead to popular dissatisfaction exploitable by extremist elements.

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