The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 2

NFIB-13.1/212 1 December 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR:	National	Foreign	Intelligence	Board	Principa	115

FROM:

Charles E. Waterman

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT:

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: GRENADA:

RETROSPECTIVE ON A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Pursuant to NSDD 112, dated 15 November 1983, the President has directed the Intelligence Community to produce an in-depth, comprehensive analysis of the data obtained from Grenada. Attached are the draft Concept Paper and Terms of Reference for an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, GRENADA: RETROSPECTIVE ON A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

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2. A formal coordination meeting involving the NFIB Representatives has been scheduled for Monday, 5 December, at 1300 hours in Room 7E32, CIA

Headquarters. Please pass the name of your representative and the clearances of those who will be attending to by COB Friday,

2 December.

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3. The IIM will be prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. from the NIC/Analytic Group will serve as the principal drafter. DIA and the DDI's Office of African and Latin American Analysis, as well as the Office of Soviet Analysis, will make major contributions to the paper. Other Offices in the DDI -- European Analysis, Near East and South Asia Analysis, East Asia, and Global Issues -- have agreed to make additional inputs as appropriate.

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4. We have set the first quarter of 1984 as the target date for completion of the IIM.

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Charles E. Waterman

Attachments: As stated

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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

GRENADA: RETROSPECTIVE ON A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Concept Paper

The documents acquired and information obtained as a result of the U.S. invasion of Grenada on 25 October 1983 represent a unique resource which is of significant potential value to U.S. national security interests. The purpose of this Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is to exploit this store of data fully, providing as comprehensive a view as possible of the workings of the Grenadian government dating from 13 March 1979 when a coup put Maurice Bishop in power to 25 October 1983 when U.S. and East Caribbean forces landed on the island. In addition to what was already known before the invasion, this study will draw upon captured documents; an analysis of captured weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment; an analysis of cryptographic systems; and the statements of Grenadian. Cuban and other foreign personnel interviewed on the island.

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Particular emphasis will be given to answering the following questions:

- --How did the New Jewel Movement and the government function; what were the internal dynamics?
- --What was the extent of popular support and how did the government deal with domestic opposition?
- --What were the functions and missions of the security forces?
- --What was the extent and purpose of the military build-up in Grenada?
- --How did the Soviets, East Europeans, Cubans, Libyans, North Koreans, Palestinians, and any other non-Grenadian Marxist/Leninist groups obtain influence in Grenada and how did they use Grenada to export subversion?
- --How did the New Jewel Movement and the government try to discredit the U.S. as well as governments, parties, and individuals friendly to the United States in Europe and Central America?
- --What was the nature of the Soviet and Cuban relationship with Grenada and to what extent, if any, did their objectives differ?

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The paper will conclude with a discussion of lessons learned in Grenada, noting in particular those areas where information obtained as a result of the invasion necessitated a reevaluation of previous intelligence judgments, such as the size and functions of the Cuban contingent on the island. The memorandum will discuss how these lessons are applicable to intelligence collection and analysis in general, as well as in the specific case of Nicaragua.

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