

SECRET

25X1

25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
10 November 1983

GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

OUTLINE

Preface

- I. Key Judgments
- II. Current Situation
- III. Capabilities and Intentions of Opponents of the Interim Government
 - A. Cuban Staybehinds
 - B. Opposition from Grenadians on Island
 - C. Exile Activities
 - D. Infiltration
 - E. Other Potential Sources of Opposition
- IV. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces

*This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. It was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the US Army, the US Marine Corps, the US Air Force, the US Navy, the National Security Agency, and the Department of State. Information available as of 1500 hours on 10 November 1983 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.

25X1

SECRET

25X1
25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
10 November 1983

GRENADA: THE SECURITY THREAT

Preface

The intention to remove US forces as soon as possible and the need to ensure security in Grenada until a Peacekeeping Force is capable of taking over led Assistant Secretary Langhorne Motley to ask for this Interagency Intelligence Assessment of the short-term security threat in Grenada. This paper will focus primarily on the immediate security threat -- up to the end of this year.

25X1

KEY JUDGMENTS

- There is no confirmed evidence of any staybehind or guerrilla force on Grenada, whether made up of Cubans or of Grenadians. Cubans would be unable to operate independently in Grenada for more than a brief time. Opportunities for subversive actions in Grenada, however, will increase as US forces depart.
- The Cubans are not likely to infiltrate a landing party of any description during the period of this estimate to initiate guerrilla warfare in Grenada or to link up with any form of organized resistance in Grenada. Cuban attacks on the interim government will continue in the diplomatic and propaganda fields, however, questioning its legitimacy and trying to prevent other governments from extending formal recognition.
- The People's Revolutionary Army and the militia are shattered organizations and the New Jewel Movement is no longer viable. The disposition of the great majority of Grenadians is to accept the interim government with relief, as they accepted the invasion itself. Few if any would support subversion at this time and many would probably report what they detect. Most surviving members of the People's Revolutionary Army and the New Jewel Movement on the island have been interviewed or are under detention, and most of those suspected of criminal acts are expected to remain in detention until judicial proceedings are finished. Members of the People's Revolutionary Army are afraid of reprisals from the people for their actions in the past.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1
25X1
25X1

[REDACTED]

-- Aside from problems of public order that could be handled by a police force, a small combat unit with sea and air lift capability for getting around the island would be needed mostly to investigate the rumored threats that can be expected to continue in the current excited state of the island. This unit is needed both to deal with security problems and to give confidence to the interim government, the population, and Caribbean forces there until the Combined Peacekeeping Force is in place. [REDACTED]

25X1

Order may be disturbed in the short term by individual acts of protest or other unsettling events such as sabotage, sniper attacks, or other terrorist acts. During the period of this estimate, such actions against the interim government are not likely to be undertaken by displaced members of the New Jewel Movement. Some crimes of a grudge-settling nature may be seen as political, even though they may not be. [REDACTED]

25X1

II. Current Situation

Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, in coordination with the US Embassy and US and Caribbean forces on the island, has made major progress toward restoring order in Grenada. St. Georges harbor reopened on 2 November, commercial air traffic resumed at Pearls Airport on 7 November, and full operations were to be restored there on 11 November. Some telecommunications service has been reestablished, the schools are open, and commercial life is returning to normal. [REDACTED]

25X1

A multitude of reports from various sources including observations by US military, intelligence, and diplomatic officials state that Grenadian civilians are openly cooperative and supportive of US actions in Grenada. Those civilians who did not support the invasion have been fairly mild in their criticism. US forces say that civilians continue to report on the activities of PRA deserters and are bringing in abandoned weapons. [REDACTED]

25X1

We are aware of only one report of a potentially hostile action aimed at US forces or the interim government. US Embassy officials received an unconfirmed report that a bomb -- not further described -- was found at a boys school in Grenada on 7 November, as well as a false report of a bomb threat at the telephone company in St. Georges. Since 31 October, there have been occasional reports of sniper fire on US forces, some of which were later proven inaccurate. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

III. Capabilities and Intentions of Opponents of the Interim Government

A. Cuban Staybehinds

We believe that few, if any, Cubans have eluded capture in Grenada.

25X1

According to US officials and press reports, 742 Cubans had returned to Cuba as of 9 November, and 3 Cubans -- a diplomat, a communicator, and a cook -- remain at the Cuban Mission. The number of Cuban dead most likely is less than 50. Cuban officials reportedly believe that at least 25 Cubans were killed in the fighting, and the State Department spokesman on the island claims to have identified 42 probable Cuban bodies.

25X1

25X1

25X1

We doubt [redacted] reports that as many as 20 to 40 Cubans are still at large, especially in areas heavily patrolled by US forces such as those cited in the reports.* In our view, Cubans that still might be on the island are incapable of launching a coordinated or significant attack on US or other forces, although they could carry out isolated bombings or other acts of terrorism. We cannot rule out the possibility, however, that some Cubans or Grenadians on the island were -- or still are -- communicating clandestinely with Cuban personnel on or off the island. If the Cubans had intended to leave a force on the island to harass US forces, Colonel Tortolo would have been a natural candidate to lead such a group. His decision to seek refuge in the Soviet Mission -- along with 52 other Cubans, most of whom had automatic weapons -- argues against the existence of such a group. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

* State/INR believes that it is too soon to dismiss the possibility that some 20 to 40 Cubans may still be at large on the island.

25X1

B. Opposition from Grenadians on Island

There is little likelihood of a major threat from former members of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) or militia members. The PRA and the militia are shattered organizations. US Commanders judge that the PRA lost heart after the initial fighting, and many members took off their uniforms and went home. The militia did not even respond to General Hudson Austin's call-up when the US invasion became apparent. There is one reference in a document taken at the house of LTC Liam James, Chief of PRA Security Forces, to have someone ". . . go underground in case the enemy takes the country. He will organize resistance." Yet in none of the documents captured are there contingency plans for insurgent or terrorist activity in the event the PRG were overthrown.

25X1

-- US forces have accounted for nearly a thousand PRA/militia members.* As of 9 November, 400 PRA cadre have been screened, and 230 of those were held over for further interviews. Of those, 170 have been released. While this leaves hundreds of persons with military training not yet accounted for, they are not considered to be a threat during the period of this estimate. The US forces have lists of names and addresses of most of these persons. All PRA staff officers, save one, are under detention, and he was to be picked up on 9 November. Actually, it is the PRA members themselves who fear reprisals from the people

25X1

-- The New Jewel Movement is in a similar state. Almost all the major leaders are either dead or under detention. The event of October, interviews, and documents show that there were deep rifts in the NJM before Maurice Bishop's death and much deeper ones thereafter. The NJM is no longer a viable party with the death of its charismatic leader and the consequent shattering of the Central Committee. In the wake of the party's demise, center-left politics and social democratic philosophy are likely to prosper.

25X1

C. Exile Activities

We have reliable reports that some former Grenadian Ambassadors and High Commissioners have agreed to establish a government-in-exile which will have as its principal aim the disruption of future elections through terrorist acts carried out by remnants of the Armed Forces or New Jewel Movement still on the island. The Cubans will play a role in helping to organize such a group, in establishing contact with sympathizers on the island, arranging meetings, facilitating communications and transportation, and providing advice and other

*Before the invasion we estimated that Grenada had 1,000 - 1,200 individuals in its army and 2,000 - 4,000 militia members. Evidence that the military was plagued by dissension and that militia morale was at a low ebb contribute to our judgment that those members of the armed forces still at large do not pose a viable threat in the near term.

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

support. The Cubans also are likely to offer their island as a refuge for such exiles in hopes this will help unify the resistance while enhancing Cuban influence over their activities. Havana may have already organized one such meeting in Havana which reportedly was attended by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, and the wife of Grenada's former Ambassador to Cuba, Valerie Cornwall, who has now declared herself the new Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba. [REDACTED]

25X1

With the remnants of the Bishop regime in disarray, discussions abroad over the New Jewel Movement's future are just beginning. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Grenada's former Ambassador to the European Communities, George Bullen, believes that the party should push for the total exclusion of Bernard Coard and his Marxist supporters from the Movement, as well as completely sever the party's ties with Cuba and the USSR. At least two officials have also rejected invitations by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the USSR to attend an organizational meeting of Grenadian diplomats in Moscow. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

We doubt that Cuba would be able to use such exile groups effectively over the short term to threaten security in Grenada. New leaders will have to be identified; new groups, political parties, and front groups formed; and new relationships established before the Cubans can implement an effective program. In the next few months, the Cubans probably will lack the assets and the subversive network in the region to influence political developments in Grenada significantly other than through random terrorist acts. [REDACTED]

25X1

D. Infiltration

Cuban or Grenadian capabilities to infiltrate insurgents or saboteurs at this time appear slight, although the opportunities will probably increase as US forces depart. Individuals or a small team probably could be infiltrated clandestinely with the necessary supplies to carry out isolated acts of sabotage or terrorism. Moreover, there are many Grenadians overseas with legitimate reasons to return who could become vehicles for Cuban operations. [REDACTED]

25X1

It would be extremely difficult, however, to sustain an organized resistance or establish a guerrilla movement on the island. Such a force would be easy to detect because of the smallness of the island; the dearth of popular support for radical leftists; possible language and cultural differences if any non-Grenadians were involved; and the alertness of the interim government to such a threat. Moreover, the nucleus from which such a movement would draw support -- the New Jewel Movement and the army -- has been shattered, and potential Cuban, Soviet and other communist bloc advisers have been expelled from the island. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

6
SECRET

E. Other Potential Sources of Opposition

Guyana's President Forbes Burnham, who was sharply critical of the US intervention and supportive of Cuba's role, might be willing to provide training, advice, or other support to former New Jewel Movement members seeking to destabilize the new government. Prospects for close cooperation between Guyana and Cuba in such an endeavor, however, must be viewed against the background of considerable mistrust that has characterized relations between the two governments. Over time, Burnham must also weigh the risk that such a course of action will further isolate him in the Caribbean Community.

25X1

The Cubans and the Guyanese have close ties to other radical and Marxist East Caribbean activists, such as George Odium of Saint Lucia, Bobby Clarke of Barbados, Tim Hector of Antigua, and Roosevelt Douglas in Dominica. These individuals and organizations probably could help in the propaganda field, but they lack the resources to conduct any major subversive operations in Grenada. Trevor Munroe's Jamaican Marxist Workers' Party might also provide a base for anti-Grenadian activity, but a dominant Jamaican hand in such operations would almost certainly be resented by Grenadian radicals involved. Moreover, Havana and Moscow reportedly have criticized Munroe and other Marxists in Jamaica for their role in the Grenadian revolution, and the Cubans and the Soviets reportedly have decided to cut off financial support to them, shifting it to Michael Manley's party.

25X1

IV. Capabilities of Caribbean Forces

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados are the only governments in the English-speaking Caribbean that are capable of making a meaningful contribution to a joint security force. The small island states such as Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent have small constabularies and could make only symbolic contributions. Any drawdown of these forces would impact on security needs at home.

25X1

The largest component of any joint security force would probably have to come from Jamaica. The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) has a strength of about 3,400 personnel (including some 1,000 reserves) and the Jamaican Constabulary (JCF) consists of over 6,000 active personnel and 4,000 reserves.* Although Kingston probably could provide several hundred individuals temporarily, both the JDF and JCF already are stretched thin. We judge that the JDF and JCF are capable of coping with most contingencies likely to arise in Grenada over the short term. Both benefit from competent and professional leadership at the top and are instilled with the British tradition of apolitical behavior. The JCF has had considerable experience in dealing with political violence and crime.

25X1

*Trinidad and Tobago has a defense force of about 2,000 personnel, including its Coast Guard, and a police force of about 2,400, including auxiliaries -- private sector security personnel. (S/NF)

25X1

Barbados has a small defense force consisting of about 275 (plus about 300 reserves) and a 90-man Coast Guard. Its police force numbers about 165. Prime Minister Seaga and Grenadian Governor General Scoon oppose any military role for Trinidad and Tobago because Prime Minister Chambers originally opposed the intervention, but they may be amenable to participation by Trinidadian police officers. Scoon also would be strongly opposed to any participation by Guyana and is unwilling to relinquish control over the composition of the peacekeeping force to the Commonwealth Secretariat.

25X1

A joint security force that consists of personnel from Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and some of the small eastern Caribbean states would require considerable external logistical support, and financing, and some training. Air mobility could be a key shortcoming. The Jamaican security forces have only a few helicopters and an unknown number of qualified pilots. It is unlikely that the helicopters could be spared unless they were quickly replaced. The Caribbean governments also will have some difficulty in providing more than a few coastal patrol vessels. Other likely requirements would include medical facilities and personnel as well as field engineering equipment.

25X1

Page Denied