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DCI/ICS 82-4222 28 April 1982

Director, Intelligence Community Staff SUBJECT: Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) Study on Terrorism 1. Action Requested: See Paragraph 4. 2. Background: The attached CIPC study (Attachment A) contains, in my view, valid recommendations and conclusions. These are strikingly similar to those contained in earlier studies (e.g., the Critical Collection Problems Committee 1977 Report: Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism). While it can be debated why the problems identified in 1977 still exist, a key factor, I believe, was the lack of aggressive implementation of the recommendations through an authoritative IC mechanism. The newly created Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) can serve as the IC vehicle to take action on the recommendations, and I believe strong encouragement from you would assist the IICT in its efforts. With this in mind. I have attached a memorandum from you to the Chairman, IICT (Attachment B). In a similar vein, aggressive action is needed at the national level to develop clear policy guidance and procedures for a USG counterterrorism program upon which all concerned agencies can focus. Paragraph 5 of National Security Decision Directive #30 (Attachment C) provides that the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by State, should have responsibility to develop such a program. While this is a step in the right direction, in all candor, similar efforts have been attempted in the past with limited success. As far back as 1972 a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT) was established by Presidential Memorandum. National level organizational and management issues regarding USG counterterrorism efforts were addressed in Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 30 in August 1977. I believe it would be useful for you to encourage action at the national level and I have included a memorandum from you to Judge Clark to urge such action	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence
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3. <u>Staff Coordination</u> : None required. Actions are based on coordinated positions derived from the subject CIPC study.					
4.	4. Recommendations:				
	Α.	Approve circulation of the attached study to NFIC for review and comment.	25X1		
	В.	Upon receipt of NFIC views. approve and sign the attached memoranda.	25X1		
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