


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NIO/NESA		X		
21	C/NESA/DDO		X		
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Remarks: Please keep ADCI advised as appropriate.


 Executive Secretary
 21 October 83
 Date

3637 (10-81)

NSC review completed.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

October 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. MCMAHON
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JR., USN
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS

SUBJECT: Readiness to Respond to a Crisis in the Persian Gulf (S)

Current developments in the Iran-Iraq War and recent public threats from Iran dictate an urgent review of our readiness for contingencies in the Persian Gulf. The impending transfer of the Super Etendard aircraft to Iraq, the transit of the Iran MEEAD to Iran and the forecast Iranian offensive underscore the urgency of this review. In addition to the issues of readiness, we should also focus on whether the current environment in the Gulf provides opportunities for accelerating certain long term presence requirements important for enhancing our position in the region more generally. (TS/S)

To provide better focus for the interagency process, the NSC staff has prepared a set of questions for your consideration.
(C)

We intend to call a Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) together in the very near future and have tentatively scheduled a meeting for Monday, October 24, 1983, at 3:00 p.m. It is important that the group have responses to the attached questions before we meet. To that end, it would be appreciated if the designated Department or Agency could distribute their written responses to CPPG members... directly and on an "Eyes Only" basis by COB Saturday, October 22.
(S)


John M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

CC: Donald Gregg

CIA TS 830193

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91219KEY QUESTIONS AND ISSUES CONCERNING
READINESS TO COPE WITH A CRISIS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF (U)

I. Intelligence Issues (DCI)

A. What are the plausible warning indicators of impending Iraqi air attacks on:

- Terminal facilities at Kharg Island?
- Tankers bound for Iranian ports and facilities? (S)

B. Is it our judgement that the forecast Iranian offensive in the MERAHAN district is likely to trigger Iraqi air strikes on Iranian transshipment facilities and shipping bound for Iran? (S)

C. What is the current IIAF order of battle and what is our estimate of the types and numbers of tactical aircraft that might be diverted to:

- Air strikes against Gulf Arab oil facilities?
- International shipping bound for Gulf Arab ports? (S)

D. What is the current IIN order of battle and how do we assess Iran's capabilities for seaborne attacks against international shipping in the Gulf? (S)

E. What are the plausible warning indicators and likely warning time of impending Iranian air attacks on Gulf oil facilities or international shipping in the Gulf? (S)

F. What is our assessment of Iran's capabilities to mount sapper attacks against Gulf oil facilities:

- In Saudi Arabia?
- In Kuwait?
- In Bahrain?

G. What is the likelihood of Iranian-incited subversion by Shia groups in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere? (C)

H. How quickly could Iran procure, assemble and make ready a substantial number of naval mines? (S)

I. Are we confident of our capabilities to monitor Iranian mining capabilities? (S)

J. Could heavy artillery be positioned on Larak and Qeshm (or lesser) islands so as to pose a significant threat to tanker traffic in the northern traffic separation scheme of the Strait? (S)

K. What is our assessment of indigenous Gulf Arab defenses to:

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- Protect production and terminal facilities against Iranian air attacks?
- Defend shipping in the Gulf against Iranian air and seaborne attacks? (S)
- Cope with Iranian sapper attacks against critical facilities? (S)

II. Diplomatic and Political Considerations (State)

A. What are the considerations which bear on the timing of our decision to approach Gulf Arab states on coordinated or combined measures to cope with Iranian threats:

- To Gulf ports and oil facilities?
- To international shipping in the Gulf?
- To international air traffic?
- To close the Strait of Hormuz? (S)

B. What might we do in the immediate future to increase the visibility of our political and military cooperation with key Arab States? (S)

C. How should we deal with Iraq? (S)

D. What considerations bear on decisions to collaborate more directly (and more visibly) with our key allies? (S)

III. Military Judgements (DoD)

A. Is our current (and planned) naval posture in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea deemed adequate and proportionate to the threat? (S)

B. Have we reviewed applicable operation plans for the most likely contingencies involving likely Iranian threats and are they deemed adequate? (S)

C. Are current force closure times commensurate with the warning time we are likely to have of:

- Mining threats?
- Air attacks on shipping?
- Seaborne attacks? (S)

D. Does the current situation argue for the early deployment of a USCINCENT FHE? (S)

E. Have we undertaken military consultations with key allies on possible joint or coordinated responses to various Iranian threats? (S)

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F. What considerations bear on the initiation and timing of such consultations? (S)

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