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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Brig Gen George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Pentagon

Colonel (P) John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Ambassador Edward Rowny 25X1
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

[Redacted]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on START -- Thursday, September 29, 1983 (S)

Attached at Tab A is a paper on potential modifications to the US START position. It was prepared by the START Interagency Group for discussion at the National Security Planning Group meeting to be held in the White House Situation Room on Thursday, September 29, 1983 from 2:00-3:00 p.m. Also provided at Tab A is an agenda for the NSPG meeting itself. Tab B is a paper intended to provide additional background on the first of the substantive issues to be discussed, SLCM limits. (S)

Attendance at the meeting is principals only. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments as Noted

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AGENDA
FOR
NSPG MEETING ON START

- A. Introduction -- Judge Clark
- B. Discussion of Potential Modifications to the US START position for Round V -- All Principals

Discussion of the potential modifications to the US START position as presented in the Interagency Group paper on the same subject. Discussion should focus on the following questions:

1. Should the US at this time indicate a position on limiting SLCMs in START?
2. Should the US modify or eliminate the current proposed 2,500 sub-limit on ICBM warheads?
3. Should the US be willing to explore further limits on the size of ALCM forces in the context of reciprocal Soviet flexibility?
4. Is there agreement with the Interagency Group recommendations that the US should:
 - (1) propose a ban on ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads; and
 - (2) begin exploratory discussions of procedures for the destruction or dismantling of systems?

- C. Closing Remarks -- Judge Clark

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