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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 4860-83 5 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Special Assistant to the DCI for Interdepartmental Affairs

FROM:

Constantine C. Menges

National Intelligence Officer for Political Paramilitary

Threats

SUBJECT:

SIG on Central America Scheduled for Today

- 1. I am attaching a copy of the latest State paper which has the suggested changes of Fred Ikle and Jeane Kirkpatrick written into the text (TAB A). Kirkpatrick and Ikle worked this past weekend to do this and it has not yet been typed up but I think you will find it legible. In addition, I am attaching a three page critique of the paper with suggestions for action written by Ambassador Kirkpatrick (TAB B).
 - 2. My critique of the paper will be familiar to you:
 - a. Nicaragua/Cuba -- The paper fails to reflect the latest intelligence that the Cubans will build up their forces to defeat (not ("wait out") the anti-Sandinistas. The paper lacks a sense of urgency and practicality about how to keep additional Cuban troops out now (my answer: start destroying some of the 30 new Nicaraguan military bases, command centers, military communications, docks, airfields, etc.).
 - b. The paper fails to establish a clear time line for the democratization of Nicaragua unless it meets the three conditions and therefore it continues the open-ended harassment strategy that has failed for two years; (my recommendation set a November 1983 goal for democratization through Sandinista implementation of the July 1979 OAS promises or the US will recognize an alternative democratic government).
 - c. Anti-Sandinista program the paper calls for "Boland plus symmetry" but fails to provide for an alternative in case Congress does not agree. I think Boland plus symmetry will be unworkable in the

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winter/spring of 83/84 either due to Nicaragua/Cuban deception or as a result of Congressional isolationists rejecting CIA analysis and judgments that Nicaragua continues exporting subversion (my five reasons are given on page 2 of my 23 June paper). Also, the paper should provide for "symmetry up" in the event Cuba puts more troops in and Nicaragua does more exporting of subversion. If Congress refuses the President should use the diplomatic recognition of an FDN based government as the alternative.

d. El Salvador/violent right - the paper does not address the urgent need to formulate a practical action plan to neutralize the violent right in El Salvador (pursuasion, economic incentives/sanctions other... including appropriate FBI/INS action in the US, e.g., no residence for members of the left or right who promote illegal violence in El Salvador).

At TAB C you will find my 23 June paper on this issue.

Constantine C. Menges

Attachments: As stated

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