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Remarks:

Executive Secretary
7/15/83
 Date

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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July 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

LT. COL. W. RICHARD HIGGINS
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

MS. JACKIE TILLMAN
Executive Assistant to the United States
Representative to the United Nations

COL. GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting, Friday, July 15, 1983

Attached is a paper for the subject meeting, prepared by an interagency group chaired by the Department of State.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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Subject: How to Handle Israeli Partial Withdrawal in Lebanon

During the Secretary's visit to Israel, Defense Minister Arens described Israel's burden in Lebanon--longer reserve duty for its soldiers, financial costs of the presence, and continuing casualties--as not justified by Israel's security concerns. The burden, Arens stated, needed to be shared by the Lebanese and possibly by the Multinational Forces (MNF). It is inevitable, he said, that in the very near future Israel would undertake a "redeployment" of its forces, i.e. a partial withdrawal, in the direction of putatively more secure areas in Lebanon. The IDF briefed U.S. officials July 14 on its preferred option of withdrawal to the Awali and dig in for the long term (see attachment 3).

The Israelis are portraying redeployment as essential to convince Syria that U.S.-Lebanese-Israeli cooperation is close and vigorous enough so that Syria cannot hope to achieve its aims of controlling Lebanon as it did in the past and of destroying the Lebanon-Israel Agreement. The Israelis feel that redeployment should, therefore, be a first step in implementation of the Agreement, and that pressure on Syria should consist of four elements:

Maintainance of the IDF poised in areas of Lebanon only 22 kilometers from Damascus (the southern Bekaa Valley);

Greater Lebanese-Israeli cooperation, including bringing the Agreement into force and coordinating IDF redeployment;

Greater diplomatic and political isolation of Syria; and,

Greater "costs and penalties" for the Syrian presence, presumably unorthodox military actions.

The bottom line of the Israeli position is an IDF redeployment in the context of bringing the Agreement into force, effected in coordination with the LAF, and, possibly, involving the MNF. It is doubtful that Israel envisions implementation of all aspects of the Agreement, especially portions of the security arrangements annex.

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Israeli redeployment, which has been brought to the fore as an issue because of Syria's intransigence on withdrawal and mounting pressure in Israel to cut casualties and costs, presents fundamental policy issues for the U.S. in three critical and interrelated areas. First, bearing in mind Syria's intransigent posture on negotiations with Lebanon and/or the U.S., we need to decide what the U.S. position will be on a redeployment/partial withdrawal by Israeli forces in Lebanon. Second, we need to consider our stance on implementation of the Agreement in the context of an Israeli redeployment, as it is clear that Israel will seek to have the U.S. press Lebanon to implement the Agreement. Finally, and irrespective of our views on the implementation of the Agreement, we must consider how to respond to the Lebanese request that the MNF deploy in association with the LAF in the event of an Israeli redeployment. These issues bear on one another, so we will consider each in detail.

A. Israeli Redeployment

As the visits to Washington by President Gemayel and Prime Minister Begin approach, the Lebanese and the Israelis are diametrically divided on the issue of a possible Israeli redeployment. Moreover, the prominence of this issue has been heightened by Syria's continuing obduracy on any negotiations for Syrian withdrawal. There is great political pressure in Israel on the Begin government as a consequence of the steady casualty toll in Lebanon and the apparently dim prospects for any relief soon of Israel's troubling involvement there.

On the other hand, Lebanon vehemently opposes any Israeli redeployment that is not linked to a full withdrawal. President Gemayel's fear is that a redeployment would lead to consolidation of both the Syrian and Israeli occupation forces, resulting in de facto partition and removing the incentive for any further Israeli and Syrian withdrawal which results from their respective current positions of confrontation. As an objective matter, there is indeed grave risk of de facto partition as both Israel and Syria appear equally prepared to remain in Lebanon indefinitely. Lebanon's weak government might not be able to withstand this challenge in its present form.

With regard to the Syrians, Assad remains adamantly opposed to the Agreement. He is content to watch pressure for Israeli withdrawal increase along with Israeli casualties and Lebanese frustration. Assad would interpret any redeployment

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as a partial withdrawal and a vindication of his intransigent policy, thus reducing the incentive for negotiations and increasing the incentive to inflict even greater casualties on the Israelis. Furthermore, there is no current indication that any sort of Israeli redeployment would be matched in any fashion by the Syrians. In fact, the Syrians are likely to stand pat and might even oppose LAF expansion into areas vacated by the Israelis by causing problems with the Druze or by exerting military pressure of their own, directly or through groups under their control. They would claim that the Israelis are achieving major "gains" in order to justify their position.

There are other problems associated with IDF redeployment. First, it is by no means certain that the GOL could arrange a political/security agreement for the strife-ridden Shuf area if the Israelis were to leave the Shuf. The Druze are demanding withdrawal of all rival "Lebanese Forces" (Christian militia) from all parts of the Shuf, but it would be impossible for the GOL to enforce such an arrangement if the IDF did not pull completely out of all areas. Moreover, the Lebanese Forces militia has not so far expressed any willingness to leave its positions in the Shuf. The GOL believes its ability to broker, implement and enforce a successful "deal" in the Shuf requires an Israeli withdrawal completely out of the area in a short timeframe. Second, Lebanon's Shia, the least represented but most numerous of Lebanon's confessional groups, would be most alienated by an Israeli redeployment, which would leave predominantly Shia southern Lebanon in the hands of the Israelis. Third, the ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to effectively control the Shuf area would be uncertain given that the LAF would move without the surety of agreements for Israeli and Syrian full withdrawal.

At the same time, there are different redeployment options, ranging from minor adjustments of the IDF presence in the greater Beirut area to a phased pullback to the Awali River, just north of Sidon. There is an inverse range of political risk for the GOL, with an Israeli redeployment which did not include the sensitive Shuf area and Jumblatt's home village of Mukhtara presenting the greatest difficulty. The U.S. reaction to Israeli redeployment will, therefore, need to be conditioned on the extent of the IDF pullback. It should be underscored that any redeployment should be conducted in a fashion which both permits the GOL to establish the necessary political accommodations and minimizes the difficulties for the LAF as it moves into sensitive areas.

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Since the Israeli invasion last June, U.S. policy has been to achieve the full departure of all external forces; during the negotiations, this policy was a basic principle underlying our mediatory role. For the U.S. now to support a redeployment/partial withdrawal would be read by many in the area as an admission of failure in meeting our original policy goals as well as an invitation for the Israelis and Syrians to stay. On the other hand, Israel is unquestionably moving toward a unilateral redeployment, preferably with U.S. and Lebanese collaboration, but without it if necessary. If casualties continue, we will probably not be able to do more than persuade Israel to delay somewhat in acting. It could be beneficial for Lebanon successfully to gain control over more of its national territory. It could also be argued that this kind of partial withdrawal would not lessen the two aspects of Israel's occupation which put the most pressure on the Syrians: the presence of Israeli military forces in the southern Bekaa and the threat that long term occupation of southern Lebanon will turn it into another West Bank.

Finally, it should be noted that our Embassy in Beirut has conveyed its belief that "U.S. support for any partial pullback in the absence of a firm commitment for full withdrawal will place U.S. interests at serious risk regardless of the specific role of U.S. troops."

OPTIONS

In addition to other diplomatic efforts:

1. Continue current U.S. policy of seeking the full withdrawal of all external forces and firmly oppose any redeployment/partial withdrawal, citing risks and disadvantages to U.S. interests. Israel would be told that the U.S. would not support implementation of the Agreement in these circumstances and would not agree to any change in the status of the MNF.
2. Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by available means (Agreement, MNF), but only if it is linked to a scheduled full withdrawal by a date certain.
3. Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by all available means and press the Lebanese to agree that it be done in implementation of the Agreement.
4. Recognize an Israeli redeployment/partial withdrawal as inevitable and work with the Lebanese to ensure its smooth

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and effective implementation, but not under the Agreement. Try to package it to keep the focus on full withdrawal of all external forces.

B. Status of the Agreement in the Event of IDF Redeployment

The preferred Israeli scenario, which they raised but did not press during the Secretary's visit, calls for bringing the Agreement into force, and portraying the redeployment as the first step in its implementation. The Israeli concept would allow implementation of certain parts of the Agreement and not others. The exchange of instruments of ratification would trigger certain portions of the Agreement--for example, termination of the state of war, Israel's right to open a liaison office in Beirut--which would highlight for the Arabs some of the objectionable parts of the Agreement, without achieving the withdrawal of all Israeli forces. Entry into force of the Agreement would also trigger U.S. assurances under the U.S.-Israel MOA and the Reagan-Gemayel letter.

Other important political considerations associated with entry into force of the Agreement include:

-- The Lebanese Parliament has taken a position against implementation of the Agreement unless it is in the context of a full Israeli withdrawal.

-- The Shi'a in southern Lebanon would resent the Gemayel government for "freeing" the Druze in the Shuf by a redeployment, while leaving them under the yoke of the Israeli occupation. This would have serious negative implications for efforts to maintain internal consensus.

-- If the Agreement is brought into force, Israel will be obligated to complete its withdrawal in 12 weeks. If it does not, Lebanon has reserved the right to "suspend", or even declare "null and void", the Agreement. As time passes with no further Israeli withdrawals, pressure would increase on Gemayel to take such steps.

Gemayel has decided for now that he would agree to put the Agreement into force only if there is the prospect of full Israeli withdrawal, unilateral or simultaneous. This decision appears firm. The Israelis argue, on the other hand, that until the Agreement actually goes into effect, Syria will continue to hope that it can block the process. On balance, there appear to be more problems than advantages to us if we try to force Lebanon to implement the Agreement for a partial Israel withdrawal.

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At the same time, Israel has reacted negatively to an alternative presented by Phil Habib just before the Secretary's trip to the area. Angered by an unfortunate leak, the Israelis resisted the suggestion that we work to secure a verifiable and assured departure (not necessarily simultaneous) by all external forces in conjunction with decoupling the withdrawal and agreement issues. Despite this strong Israeli reaction, the GOI has now been exposed to the fact that we have been thinking along these lines and we could try a variant: that we would accept implementation of the Agreement in the context of a redeployment/partial withdrawal only if Israel provided at the same time a date certain--whether the 12 weeks specified in the Agreement or another agreed date, say six months or a year -- by which all of its forces will have been withdrawn. (Certain elements of the Agreement -- for example, the initiation of discussions on movement of persons and goods, and the implementation of the interim arrangements in this area -- are tied to the completion of Israeli withdrawal and would hence automatically be deferred if the 12 week period were extended.) The risk of deferring Israel's obligation to withdraw, while allowing the Israelis to receive political and economic "gains" and to overcome the domestic crisis over casualties, is substantial. Six months to a year from now, the Administration will be under election-related pressure to cooperate with the Israeli government if the Israelis inform us that they do not intend to honor the withdrawal commitment.

The options on implementing the Agreement clearly depend on our decision on a policy toward Israeli redeployment.

OPTIONS

1. Oppose any implementation of the Agreement in the context of a redeployment. (Options 1 and 4 on redeployment).
2. Support implementation of the Agreement in the event of Israeli redeployment. (Option 3 on redeployment.)
3. Propose to Israel and Lebanon an implementation of the Agreement in the context of a scheduled Israeli full withdrawal, of which the redeployment would be the first step. (Option 2 on redeployment).

C. MNP Options

Until now we have assumed that the MNP contributors would face the problem of a change in the MNP's area of operations

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and size only in the context of a full withdrawal of all external forces. However, the Lebanese have now officially requested decisions from the MNF contributing countries on their role in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the LAF moves to replace Israeli forces in areas from which the Israelis might withdraw. (The Israelis also appear favorable to the idea of an MNF role with the LAF, but probably have refrained from pressing forcefully on the point because they expect to GOL to do so). In addition, a decision on our response is required because of the growing prospect of a redeployment-- whether or not it is linked to a scheduled full withdrawal--and the need for contingency planning. This decision is required irrespective of our views on implementation of the Agreement under any of the scenarios contemplated, or our position of supporting or opposing Israel's partial withdrawal.

Whatever its formal position on an Israeli redeployment, the GOL would be compelled to take any opportunity to gain control over more of Lebanon's national territory. Moreover, if the LAF does not move into the areas vacated by the Israelis, serious factional fighting between Lebanese Druze and Christians would probably erupt, threatening the integrity of President Amin Gemayel's government. It is also conceivable that the Syrians and PLO would attempt to move into the vacuum. The LAF fully intends to move in behind the withdrawing Israelis, but wants MNF support and considers U.S. participation essential; otherwise, the Syrians may not be deterred and the local population in the affected areas may not have confidence in the GOL's political/security arrangements.

We envision a similar role for the MNF as the current one in Beirut--not a combat or internal security role, but one of support for the LAF by presence. The basic objective of strengthening the authority and control of the central Lebanese government would remain the primary task of the MNF. However, the GOL, in proposing a mission for the U.S. MNF in the event of an IDF redeployment and subsequent LAF move, has proposed that the U.S. contingent would "support the LAF in securing roads" and in keeping "infiltrators" out. For the U.S. contingent, the road specified is the coastal road south from Beirut to Sidon. We must receive a better understanding from the GOL on the true meaning of their proposed mission of "support...in securing...", as this might result in a combat or combat support role for the U.S. contingent.

Our Embassy in Beirut has also raised the issue of protection of the Palestinians resident along the Beirut-Sidon

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road, noting that: "It would be essential for us to identify fully all areas along the highway where Palestinians are resident and assure ourselves that adequate measures for their protection were being taken before assuming the implicit responsibility for their safety that our presence in the area would suggest."

There are appreciable difficulties with any move of the MNF from its current duties into an area between two belligerents and where serious factional conflict is imminent or underway. The relatively benign environment of Beirut in which the MNF now operates would be very different, and possibly hostile, in the event of an Israeli partial withdrawal which occurs in the absence of any agreements for full Israeli and/or Syrian withdrawal. Moreover, some Lebanese elements are likely to react violently to the redeployment as meaning de facto partition with MNF, and especially American, support. Serious Congressional concern over our decision is certain, especially as it will appear that the MNF is taking over in areas where Israel would not stay because of its costs. It will be clear that in this situation our forces would be engaged in Lebanon for an indefinite duration and in the context of uncertain political and security arrangements. Also, the risk of taking casualties will undoubtedly increase. The threat against the US MNF will increase if the IDF continues to use the Beirut-Sidon highway and Old Sidon road for resupply of its liaison office in Yarze or if the LAF allow the LF to continue to resupply LF forces in Alay/Shuf using the Beirut-Sidon Road. There is little "military" need for the LAF's proposed mission for the US MNF along the coastal road; however, it does provide the desired political support for LAF deployment.

A changed deployment of the U.S. contingent of the MNF will raise two Congressional questions. Most importantly, any substantial change will require the Executive Branch to seek authorization from Congress. The 1983 Lebanon supplemental requires the President to "obtain statutory authorization from the Congress with respect to any substantial expansion in the number or role in Lebanon of U.S. Armed Forces, including any introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Lebanon in conjunction with agreements providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and for the creation of a new multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon." (Key floor statements indicate that this provision would apply if the number of Americans were increased by several hundred or more, if the nature of their current functions were changed, or if they were deployed outside the "Beirut area". The Executive Branch

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acquiesced in this provision. While the Lebanon supplemental does not require that authorization be obtained prior to redeploying the U.S. contingent or increasing its size, the keen interest displayed by the SPAC and the HFAC in this issue would argue for broad consultations with the Congress as soon as the outlines of the changes are known and for the early submission of proposed legislation.

The second Congressional question involves the War Powers Resolution. The Executive Branch will be required to make a report to Congress under the War Powers Resolution if redeployment of the MNF in connection with a partial Israeli withdrawal (a) constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces into a situation "where imminent involvement in hostilities is indicated by the circumstances" (section 4 (a)(1)) and/or (b) constitutes an introduction of U.S. forces "in numbers which substantially enlarge U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation" (section 4 (a)(3)). Under section 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution, an introduction of U.S. troops abroad into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is indicated purportedly requires a withdrawal of the U.S. forces within sixty days unless Congressional authorization for their retention is obtained. While the recent Supreme Court decision in the Chadha decision concerning legislative vetoes has invalidated section 5 (c) which permitted Congress to direct the President by concurrent resolution to remove U.S. troops engaged in hostilities abroad, it does not resolve the question of the relative authority of the President and the Congress to regulate the introduction of U.S. troops abroad with is involved in section 5 (b). Introduction of U.S. troops into areas where Israeli troops have been taking casualties is certain to raise questions in Congress as to whether U.S. troops have been introduced into situations of "imminent hostilities" and whether the sixty-day period is running. Under these circumstances, if an authorization has not been sought and obtained within sixty days after the redeployment, the entire U.S. participation in the MNF could be placed in jeopardy.

On the other hand, the imminence of an Israeli redeployment requires that we undertake adequate planning and preparations now if we do decide on U.S. participation with the MNF in backing up the LAF in the areas Israel leaves. We need to begin urgent consultations with our MNF co-contributors--France, Italy, and Great Britain--on the principles of a joint response to the Israeli and Lebanese requests, making clear that we are engaging only in contingency planning. It is not clear at this time how our MNF

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co-contributors view the prospect of an expanded role, particularly as the Lebanese appear to expect a more active French and Italian role. In addition, we may wish to see what we can do to help work out an agreement with the Druze and to try to secure Syrian cooperation, or at least acquiescence in the redeployment, perhaps through the newly-established joint U.S.-Syrian working group. For these reasons, a decision is needed soon.

The extent of Israeli redeployment will affect the requirement for additional U.S. forces. Under some circumstances, such as an IDF departure from greater Beirut, no expansion would be required.

OPTIONS

1. Status Quo. The US MNF remains in place with the same force size and mission.

2. MNF Deploys Beyond Beirut - No Expansion. Without expanding, the current MNF deploys along key lines of communication (LOCs), as requested by the GOL. The US MNF continues its presence at Beirut International Airport (BIA) while deploying elements in support of LAF operations to establish a presence along the coastal road south of BIA to the Israeli line of withdrawal. No change in mission.

3. MNF Expands and Deploys Beyond Beirut. US and other contributors expand as necessary and deploy along LOCs as requested by the GOL. The US MNF continues its presence at BIA while deploying elements to establish a presence along the coastal road south of BIA to the Israeli line of withdrawal.

a. No change in mission;

or,

b. MNF mission changed to allow prevention of infiltration (GOL request).

4. UNIFIL Employed as Interposition Force. GOL requests and UN approves a new mandate for UNIFIL allowing UNIFIL units to be deployed, in coordination with the LAF, as an interposition force in areas from which the IDF and/or Syrians withdraw. MNF forces remain in place and continue their current mission.

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5. MNF Deploys as Interposition Force. MNF deploys with LAF as an interposition into areas vacated by IDF.

A brief description of each option is contained in the Annex on MNF Deployment Options.

Attachments:

U.S. Position on Redeployment - Spread Sheet
MNF Deployment Options
IDF Proposed Redeployment Plan

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U.S. POSITION ON REDEPLOYMENT -- IMPLICATIONS OF OPTIONS FOR AGREEMENT, MNP

	<u>Continue current U.S. policy of seeking the full withdrawal of all external forces and oppose any redeployment/partial withdrawal because it would be detrimental to this end.</u>	<u>Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by available means (Agreement, MNP), but only if it is linked to a scheduled full withdrawal.</u>	<u>Offer to support an Israeli redeployment by all available means and press the Lebanese to agree that it be done in implementation of the Agreement.</u>	<u>Recognize an Israeli redeployment/partial withdrawal as inevitable and work with the Lebanese to ensure smooth and effective implementation, but not under the Agreement. Try to package it to keep the focus on full withdrawal of all external forces.</u>
Agreement	No implementation	Support implementation	Support implementation	No implementation
MNP	No change.	Possible expansion of size and role	Possible expansion of size and role.	Possible expansion of size and role.

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MNF DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS

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Status quo.

ADVANTAGES

- No expansion of MNF required.
- Forces LAF to accept responsibility for exercising governmental authority.
- No increase in risk to MNF.

DISADVANTAGES

- As a political concern, does not satisfy GOL request for MNF deployment beyond Beirut in support of LAF.
- Could deter other MNF contributors from expanded deployment.
- If other MNF contributors deployed beyond Beirut, US would be seen as failing to support needs of GOL (Note: US can point out the burden of the extensive efforts/expenses that US has been expending in LAF Modernization Program).

MNF Deploys Beyond
ut.

- No expansion of MNF forces.
- Provides political and symbolic military support for GOL.
- Maximizes use of available forces.

- Possible War Powers Resolution.
- Requires Congressional authorization.
- Presence mission is less than that implied by GOL request.
- Some increased risk to MNF.
- Could be construed as support for Christian government or partition.

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1. NMF expands and
joys beyond Beirut.
Change in Mission.

- Provides political and symbolic
military support for OOL.

- Possible War Powers Resolution.
- Requires Congressional authorization.

- Requires additional forces and
possibly additional logistics support.

- As a political concern, presence
mission is less than that
implied by OOL request.

- Increased indication of permanence.

- Could be construed as support for
Christian government or partition.

- Allows for another expansion of NMF
for IDP total withdrawal.

- Increased risk to NMF

- Satisfies OOL request.

- War Powers Resolution.

- Requires Congressional authorization.

- Hard to do without taking action
that may alienate population.

- Risk of hostilities and risk to NMF
increased significantly.

- Larger expansion likely for more
active mission.

- Increased indication of permanence.

- Could be construed as support for
Christian government or partition.

- Participation by other NMF
contributors not assured, although

IP Expands and
beyond
- NMF Mission
and to Allow for
tion of
ation.

UNIPIL Employed as
at Protection Force.

- Forces available and already
in Lebanon.

- Hard to do. Requires high-level
effort.

- No expansion of UNIPIL.

- Plus to accomplish is key
factor

- No increased risk to UNIPIL.

- Invites Soviet role, either to veto
or to participate.

- Gets UNIPIL out of Southern
Lebanon.

- May help convince PLO that
Palestinian population will have
internationally-sanctioned
protection after withdrawal.

- UNIPIL may be more acceptable
to Syrians.

UNIPIL Deploys as
the Protection Force

- Provides strong signal of
support for GOL.

In addition to J.B. disadvantages:

- Larger expansion required.

- Very high risk to UNIPIL if political
accommodation between GOL and Druze
not achieved.

- Continues to assist UNIPIL in doing their
job.

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SECRET**IDF Proposed Redeployment Plan**

General Meron, together with General Simhony from the Israeli Embassy, presented the IDF's proposed redeployment plan in Lebanon to State, Defense and NSC representatives on Wednesday. Meron characterized the plan as the IDF's favored option which would most likely be accepted by the Israeli Government. It provides for IDF withdrawal south to the Awali River, along a line that turns north along Nahr al Baruk, extended along the Western base of the ridge to the current IDF lines -- which run east-west below the road to Damascus. The withdrawal is thus limited to the area south of Beirut and into the Shuf. It cuts through the Druze area in the Shuf (Walid Jumblatt's town of Al Mukhtarah remains under IDF control) and leaves the IDF in control of central, eastern and southern Lebanon.

Meron stressed the Israeli desire to coordinate withdrawal with the Lebanese Government and the US, and their willingness to execute redeployment over a period of six to eight weeks if necessary to meet the needs of the LAF. The IDF want withdrawal to be completed by October.

Meron defended the plan as consistent with the Israeli objective of reducing casualties, while leaving Syria with an incentive to eventually withdraw. He noted that with the IDF line in the east remaining less than thirty kilometers from Damascus and only a few kilometers from the road, and with the new line in the Western sector substantially easing IDF operational problems, Syria would recognize that Israel was prepared to sustain its presence in Lebanon. Meron offered his personal view, however, that the Syrians would not withdraw until forced to by political, military or economic pressure.

When asked for their judgment about whether the LAF would be able to maintain internal security in the area evacuated by the IDF, General Simhony said that provided the necessary arrangements are made between the Christians and Druze, he thought one LAF Brigade, with tanks, could control the area and deal with the infiltration problem. He noted that the area was relatively small, withdrawal could be phased (e.g. first line south to Damur), the MNP would be in Beirut, and the IDF would be very close and ready to provide support if necessary.


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Maron left a clear message that the modalities of withdrawal and arrangements with the LAF following redeployment were not fixed and could be dealt with in consultation with the US and the GOL. For example, while Simhony said that the IDF would want to continue to use the Beirut-Sidon road to resupply the IDF company at the MFA liaison at Yarze, Maron corrected him to say that such matters were open to discussion and that in this particular case the LAF might take up the task. Similarly, on issues such as continuing Haddad's position at the Awwali, or eventual LAF presence south of the Awwali in the IDF controlled area, Maron indicated that no firm decisions had been made. With respect to overflight for reconnaissance, however, Maron was emphatic about IDF intension to continue to use the airspace over the vacated area.

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Lebanese-Israeli Withdrawal Lines



Secret NOFORN

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

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