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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3162
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EXDIS
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 GENEVA FOR JSIVF
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, INF, SE
 SUBJ: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S BRIEFING OF CHANCELLOR KOHL
 1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR NITZE BRIEFED CHANCELLOR KOHL ON THE STATUS OF THE INF NEGOTIATION ON JUNE 30. THE CHANCELLOR EXPLAINED WHAT HE EXPECTED TO ENCOUNTER DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, JULY 4-8. AMBASSADOR NITZE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE FRG GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO DEBATE INF IN THE BUNDESTAG AND EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE NEGOTIATION IN GENEVA TO HOLD FIRMLY TO INF DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES. THE CHANCELLOR AGREED, EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION TO DEBATE INF IN THE BUNDESTAG, AND STRESSED THE NEED TO BE SENSITIVE TO FRG POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF INF DEPLOYMENTS. END SUMMARY.
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 3. AMBASSADOR NITZE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BURNS AND AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN, BRIEFED CHANCELLOR KOHL JUNE 30 ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE CHANCELLOR HAD ASKED FOR THE BRIEFING EARLIER TO

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PREPARE HIM FOR HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW JULY 4-8. (AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S BRIEFING OF THE CHANCELLOR WILL BE REPORTED SEPT...)

4. THE CHANCELLOR WELCOMED AMBASSADORS NITZE AND KAMPELMAN SAYING HE WANTED THEIR VIEWS ON THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO PREPARE HIM FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. ON THE QUESTION OF INF, THE CHANCELLOR EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD CONFINE HIS REMARKS IN MOSCOW TO DISCUSSIONS ON THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE FRG MUST BE ATTENTIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR IT IS THE SOVIET UNION'S CLOSEST NEIGHBOR WITH RESPECT TO INF DEPLOYMENTS. BERLIN IS ALSO VULNERABLE. THEREFORE THE FRG IS THE COUNTRY MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO DIRECT SOVIET BLACKMAIL.

5. HE SAID HE GOES TO MOSCOW WITH SOME ADVANTAGES FOR EUROPE IS UNITED AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. GOOD. RECENT ELECTIONS HAVE SOLIDIFIED THE DETERMINATION OF WESTERN LEADERS TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID HE FEARED THE SOVIETS DO NOT UNDERSTAND FREE SOCIETIES, HOWEVER, AND THEY MAY WELL MISTAKE THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN KREFELD AS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR WEST GERMANY RATHER THAN A SMALL GROUP OF ROUNDLIES. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDABLE BUT FOR THE MISTAKES OF THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT OF NORTH RHEIN WESTFALIA.

6. IN GENERAL THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD USE BOTH "CARROTS" AND "STICKS" DURING HIS VISIT. THE "STICKS" WILL PROBABLY BE SOME BLUSTER ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF INF DEPLOYMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE GDR AND THE SITUATION IN BERLIN AS WELL AS SOME TIGHTENING UP ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SELECT EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE EXPECTED ONE OF THE "CARROTS" TO BE AN OFFER TO DISMANTLE A BATTERY OF SS-20'S IN RETURN FOR A 5 MONTH MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENTS. HE NOTED THAT SUCH A POSITION WOULD BE A CHANGE OVER WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD SAID IN GENEVA AND SAID HE WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH SOVIET OVERTURES BY TELLING THEM TO PUT THEIR POSITION ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA. HE ALSO THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD OFFER SOME RELIEF IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMMIGRATION IN RETURN FOR A DEPLOYMENT MORATORIUM. HE SAID HE INTENDS TO BE TOUGH AND IS DETERMINED NOT TO YIELD BUT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN GERMANY DOES MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR HIM. HE EXPLAINED THE RECENT BUNDESTAG DECISION TO DEBATE THE INF ISSUE IS RELATED TO THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM. HE POINTED OUT THAT PROCEDURALLY HE COULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED DEBATE EVEN IF HE HAD WANTED TO.

7. AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD DINNER THE PREVIOUS EVENING WITH KVITSINSKY AND DISCUSSED INF AND OTHER SUBJECTS FOR 3 HOURS. DURING THAT DISCUSSION KVITSINSKY HAD SAID THAT MOSCOW EXPECTED KOHL TO FULLY BACK THE U.S. POSITION ON INF WHILE IN MOSCOW. THE CHANCELLOR INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THAT WAS HELPFUL. NITZE SAID KVITSINSKY HAD TOLD BARR THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT INF EXDIS TO BE THE SUBJECT OF MUCH DISCUSSION FOR THERE WAS LITTLE GIVE IN THE POSITIONS ON EITHER SIDE. AMBASSADOR NITZE NOTED THAT FROM WHAT KVITSINSKY HAD SAID THE

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 SOVIETS WOULD HAVE FEW "CARROTS" TO OFFER BUT WOULD
 RATHER CONCENTRATE ON "STICKS". HE ADDED THAT HE DID
 NOT KNOW IF KVIKINSKY WAS FULLY INFORMED ON MOSCOW'S
 THINKING; HE WAS MERELY REPORTING HIS (KVIKINSKY'S)
 IMPRESSIONS.

AMBASSADOR NITZE NOTED THAT DESPITE LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS
 HE WAS NOT ABLE TO REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN
 THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED SOME VERY
 SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS IN THEIR POSITION BUT THEY DID NOT
 AMOUNT TO ANY REAL CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE. HE NOTED THAT
 THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN TRYING TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE
 AREA OF SHORT RANGE INF (SRINF) AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER
 RECIPROCAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SRINF WEAPONS TO THE U.S.
 AND THE USSR. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO INCLUDE
 THEIR SS23 SYSTEMS; THEY WOULD NOT GO BEYOND INCLUDING THE
 SS12. HE SAID THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION,
 SUMMARIZING THE POSITION HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO TAKE
 ON ON-SITE INSPECTION AND BROADCASTING OF TEST DATA.
 AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID THAT ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS THE
 SOVIET POSITION REGARDING THE INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND
 FRENCH SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS THE SUBJECT OF GLOBAL CONSTRAINTS
 THE USSR WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING. HE
 SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT
 WHICH WILL NOT PERMIT ANY U.S. LRINF DEPLOYMENTS. HE
 SAID THEY HAD INDICATED THEY MAY GO BELOW THE 162 SS-20
 SYSTEM IF THE U.S. WOULD AGREE TO FORGO DEPLOYMENT BUT
 WOULD GIVE NO PRECISE INFORMATION AS TO HOW FAR BELOW.
 AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID THAT HE ASKED IF THEY WOULD BE
 PREPARED TO GO TO 54 SS-20'S WHICH ON ONE COMPUTATION
 WOULD BE THE EQUIVALENT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS,
 BUT RECEIVED NO ANSWER.

8. THE CHANCELLOR ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY
 THAT THE "WALK IN THE WOODS AGREEMENT" MAY BE RESUBMITTED.
 AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE SOVIETS
 WOULD OFFER TO DO SO BUT THE U.S. WOULD STILL NEED
 ASSURANCES ON THE LEVEL OF CEILINGS IN THE FAR EAST
 AND ON THE FREEDOM OF THE U.S. TO MIX P-II'S AND GLCH'S.

9. AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID HE HAD ONE FINAL POINT TO MAKE
 ON INF WHICH HE CONSIDERED TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.
 HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR THE FRG GOVERNMENT'S
 DECISION TO DEBATE INF IN THE BUNDESTAG BUT POINTED OUT
 THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ANY CHANGE IN INF DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
 WOULD HAVE ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHANCELLOR AGREED
 AND EMPHASIZED THAT HOLDING TO THE FINAL DEPLOYMENT DATE
 WAS DECISIVE FOR SUCCESS. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE PERSONALLY
 WAS UNAWARE OF THE PRESENT DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE CONTENDING
 THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND
 THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE FILE ON THEIR DECISION PREVIOUSLY.
 HE SAID THE NOVEMBER DATE WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE SPD PARTY
 CONVENTION IN APRIL 1982 AS THE TIME FOR DECISION WHICH
 WAS WHY THE GOVERNMENT AGREED TO A DEBATE AT THAT TIME.
 HE SAID THAT THE SPD PUBLIC POSITION ON INF WAS DECEITFUL
 FOR THE SPD (NEW WEL. THE SPD GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON
 DEPLOYMENT. INDEED THE FACT THAT THE SPD KNOWS OF THE
 DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM AND
 HIS GOVERNMENT TO HANDLE THE PUBLIC SIDE OF THE INF DEBATE.
 HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL

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PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED AND NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF P-II
ERECTOR-LAUNCHER CONVERSIONS MUST BE DECIDED SOON. HE
SAID THE REAL QUESTION IS WHERE, WHEN AND HOW SUCH TECHNICAL
QUESTIONS MAY BEST BE ADDRESSED. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT
TO PREPARE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT BUT TO DO SO IN A WISE AND
SENSITIVE POLITICAL MANNER. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT
FOR HIM TO BE FRANK REGARDING FRG NEEDS IN THIS RESPECT
AND SAID IF ANY DUMMY P-II ROCKETS APPEARED IN THE FRG
BEFORE THE NOVEMBER DEBATE THERE WOULD BE A HUGE
PUBLIC OUTCRY. HE SAID IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT
NOT TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION DURING THIS
CRITICAL PHASE. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR RUTH,
DR. TELTSCHIK AND OTHERS WOULD DISCUSS TECHNICAL DETAILS
OF DEPLOYMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES.
10. FRG DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR RUTH, MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR
PFEFFER, AND THE CHANCELLOR'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY
ADVISOR TELTSCHIK ACCOMPANIED THE CHANCELLOR. POLCOJNS
BARKLEY ATTENDED ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.
BURNS

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SECRET