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→ Vally may ask MAN to ask for info on ground forces present to NATO

BRIEFING PAPER FOR GENERAL SPIVY - 1000 Hours, 19 January 1967

I. SUBJECT: Warsaw Pact Data Base Study - 1967

II. PROBLEM: To determine the impact of DIA's Warsaw Pact Data Base Study - 1967, on existing National Estimates of capabilities of Soviet and East European general purpose ground forces against the Central Region of NATO, particularly to deploy about an 80-division force into the Central Region in about three to four weeks with 11 to 15 days warning to NATO.

III. BACKGROUND:

1. NIE 11-14-66, dated 3 November 1966, was the basis for the US position on the Warsaw Pact Threat in the Tripartite Talks held in November 1966.

2. The Dr. Halperin paper, which was presented to Mr. McClay, included views which were critical of the National Estimate 11-14-66 and generally concluded that the Warsaw Pact threat as presented was an exaggeration.

3. OASD (Systems Analysis) will probably use DIA's Warsaw Pact Data Base Study - 1967 in an attempt to support the Halperin paper and present a greatly reduced Warsaw Pact threat to NATO.

IV. MAJOR POINTS IN STUDY:

1. Order of battle on divisions:

a. Soviet:

|              | <u>Categories</u> |           |            | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|--------------|
|              | <u>I</u>          | <u>II</u> | <u>III</u> |              |
| NIE 11-14-66 | 61                | 48        | 32         | 141          |
| Study - 1967 | 56                | 48        | 39         | 143          |

→ Hold the numbers

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b. The total number of Category I and II divisions in the Western USSR (4 M.D.s) did not change and remains at 34, although there are two less Category I and two more Category II divisions in this total.

c. The readiness status of some of the 20 Soviet Category I divisions in East Germany cannot be established with certainty.

d. East German, Polish and Czech divisions-- No change in readiness status was made as a result of this study.

2. Nondivisional Combat and Service Support Units.

a. The 80-division force requirement is as follows:

3 Soviet Fronts (1-GSFG, 2-USSR)  
18 Armies (5-GSFG, 8-USSR, 5-EE)

b. Armies within the USSR-- About 40% of the combat support units required in the DIA estimated wartime TOE have been identified as subordinate to these armies. Additional combat support units exist under Military District subordination.

c. Armies within GSFG -- Data deficiencies exist at Army level similar to divisions.

d. Armies in East Europe -- Adequate combat support units exist.

e. The overall assessment of identified combat support for the 80-division force is as follows:

Artillery -- Adequate for estimated TOE.

Signal -- Adequate for estimated TOE.

Engineer -- 50% of estimated TOE.

Ponton Units -- 75% of estimated TOE

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f. Service Support Units -- It is impossible to identify these units on the ground. See also: NIE 11-14-66 para 8, page 7; para 17, page 9; and para 81, page 25.

V. MANNING AND EQUIPMENT LEVELS

The data base project has resulted in the assembly of considerable additional information from which to judge manning and equipment levels. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainties still remain due to the fact that the DIA holdings on TOEs are estimates (we have no actual Soviet or EE TOE's) and our TOE holdings do not reflect differences which would result from the tailoring of forces for mission. Thus, there is an uncertain yardstick against which the always difficult problem of assessing manning and equipment levels must be undertaken.

VI. HALPERIN PAPER EXTRACTS

1. "Our own judgment...is that it would take the Pact something like 50-90 days to assemble and deploy a combat-ready force of 80-85 divisions." (page 2).

2. "...it now appears that NATO could expect to receive at least 3 to 4 weeks' warning, and possibly more." (page 7).

VI. DIA'S CONCLUSIONS

1. The Warsaw Pact Data Base Study -1967 does not provide a basis for changing the reinforcement estimate as presented in NIE 11-14-66 (80-division threat in about 3-4 weeks).

2. The DIA warning of buildup to NATO of 11-15 days is derived directly from the 3-4 week reinforcement period and therefore no basis is provided to change the warning element.

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Strom - Usely says threat of NATO exaggerated.

- > He may have intended to brief JCS directly on GSF6,
- > Now may ask for a SNE

- size?  
 - combat readiness

Not longer pushing combat support only, but also size of GSF6 and its combat readiness.

GSF6 >  
 20 divs  
 = all Cat I  
 = 4 poss Cat I?

= Dresden  
 = 6 G Mtz Rif  
 Bremer  
 = 6 GT Div  
 w: Hamburg

Division comparison

- US -
- NATO -
- Sov -
- WP -

Sect III = Posture statement to Congress on 68 budget  
 - incl 5 Fr Div  
 720,000 in Cent. Region

Tac air comparison

Soviet reserve system