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Chief, CGS Comments on the [ ] Review of the IG Recommendations  
Regarding Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements

RECOMMENDATION 1 and 2 - The PNIO's

Chief, CGS Comments:

Concur. The combination of the new DCID 1/3--PNIO's--and DCID 1/2--CNIO's--should incorporate those subjects and geographical areas which do not warrant the development and allocation of intelligence resources. This would go a long way toward setting a base for a more consistent process of validating requirements and, within broad limits, of setting priorities. The success of this will depend on the clarity and brevity of the "national survival" DCID 1/3.

I urge strongly that, whatever the composition of the ad hoc group and of the "suitable mechanism ... to recommend to USIB specific ... actions", CGS be included from the outset. The "suitable mechanism" might very well be the production-conscious membership of the Collection Guidance Advisory Group recommended in No. 8, together with representatives of collection elements for this specific purpose. Such a body might begin upon the task of bringing about better synchronization than seems now possible between the programming of intelligence production and that of related collection.

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A cautionary note, however: My experience with the PNIO Review Group under [ ] in 1963 and the abortive Collection Guidance Committee which [ ] tried to set up indicates that the problems of communication within such a group as is recommended here, the disparity of interests among the members, and the ephemeral nature of its tasks makes its successful operation quite problematical. The Collection Guidance Committee met only twice. I would suggest that CGS, aware of both substantive needs and collection capabilities might be of considerable assistance to the chairman in structuring agendas, marshalling contributions and clarifying varying views. CGS' service in the past to D/DCI/NIPE recommends our participation as suggested under Comment (d) on a community-wide basis.

We concur in the proposal to rescind the need for annual and quarterly revisions. If the initial group can be kept concerned and involved, with CGS functioning as its day-by-day continuity, it should be able to revise these documents as real-world events dictate, at least for the first round or so. After that, who knows; it might revert to the BNE.

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**RECOMMENDATION 4 - The IPC**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

Agree with Bruce's comments on Recommendation 4. We can prepare and coordinate the proposed notice, but the function and responsibilities of the CIA Member of the IPC will need considerable expansion and detailed description which in turn will need substantial working out with DI/P. We can take the initiative in this after DCID 5/5 has been revised.

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**RECOMMENDATION 5 - FI Staff**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

Though this is not among those considered by [redacted] group, it seems to me necessary for CGS to play some role with respect to FI Staff's rejection of "ad hoc requirements which do not clearly satisfy the criteria for clandestine collection". I recommend that FI Staff be specifically directed to discuss questionable requirements with CGS before finally rejecting them; it may merely be a matter of rewording or highlighting that part of the problem susceptible for clandestine collection. This raises the question of the CGS role in screening requirements from the DD/I and DD/S&T and from DIA and other agencies bound for clandestine collection. We feel we should be able to indicate where some of these requirements might be covered by other collectors--DCS, [redacted] system, or even COMOR or NSA, and thus serve as shield for DD/P and FI Staff. We should do this at least for all requirements on DD/P originating within CIA.

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**RECOMMENDATION 6 - Form 986**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

Concur with the revised recommendation, except to change "encourage" to "ensure". I strongly agree that the implementation of other recommendations will have more to do with general improvement than the mechanical revision of Form 986. Nevertheless, I differ with Bruce's implication that "few persons feel it necessary or useful to meet the validation criteria conscientiously." This is a comment of major importance buried with a minor recommendation. A large number of the deficiencies noted in the IG Report would be alleviated, if not cured, by more consistent application of validation criteria all along the line, but this depends upon some authority somewhere to say "no" to an "invalid" requirement. Neither the IG's Report nor the revision of recommendations by [redacted] has fixed this responsibility to say no. Under proposals here, it is diffused among "supervisors", the Collection Guidance Advisory Group, CGS and the line authority of office chiefs and others. Until this responsibility is fixed and has been made operational, the need for applying validation criteria will not be taken seriously among those who originate and endorse requirements. More on this below.

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RECOMMENDATION 7 - Analyst-Collector Communication

Chief, CGS Comments:

Concur in the reworded recommendation with the additional stipulation that the appropriate element of CGS be kept informed of the general trend of analyst-collector interchange and of any commitments arising therefrom. Paragraph 66 on Page III-38, which precedes this recommendation, notes that the effort to persuade the collector to mount a collection operation should be between the director of an office and his counterpart in Clandestine Services or the  I submit that it is impossible for CGS to do its work in monitoring the flow of requirements and responses thereto if CGS is not made party to the dialogue between a production office and a collector. We have never interposed any barrier to analyst-collector communication and in fact have encouraged it wherever it seemed helpful to either side. One of the difficulties referred to in the IG Report is the fact that numerous requirements are served upon collectors directly, bypassing CGS, preempting collection resources which could be better used for satisfaction of other, perhaps of higher priority, needs. In short, it is damn difficult to know what can be done to meet a requirement if we are unable to know how much a collector's capacities have already been taxed in private bilateral deals. Analyst-collector contacts are good and useful; we ask only that contacts be on established programs and that we be kept in the loop.

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RECOMMENDATION 8 - CGS and the Collection Guidance Advisory Group

Chief, CGS Comments

I agree that collection requirements problems are the common problems of intelligence producers attempting to make collection machinery work effectively for their needs, and in this sense CGS should bear the same functional relationship to the producing offices of DD/S&T as we do to those of DD/I. In a way the proposed Collection Guidance Advisory Group is a device to offset the fact that the production offices are not in a single directorate and therefore require some bridge for common action across directorate lines. The effectiveness of this recommendation as revised depends heavily upon two factors: the effectiveness of the proposed Collection Guidance Advisory Group and the ultimate agreement of all involved as to what is and is not included in the term "technical assistance". We would prefer the term "specialized assistance" to avoid confusion with technical matters of resolution, frequencies, etc. Further, inasmuch as Bruce's comments recognize CGS responsibilities for handling the requirements process, and in keeping with the intent of the report, we suggest that the recommendation be phrased as follows:

" ... hold the Collection Guidance Staff responsible for managing the collection requirements process and providing specialized assistance in the field of collection guidance to their producing offices so as to:

- a. Mitigate the deleterious effects of the Information Explosion that are already being felt.
- b. Apply strict selective criteria to all foreign intelligence requirements in order to prevent the Information Explosion from getting completely out of hand.
- c. Introduce progressively more order and system into human-source requirements.

There is in the Charter of CGS (DDI Notice 1-130-20 of 6 May 1964) a list of our functions which would form one definition of what is subsumed under "technical assistance". In practice over the intervening years these bare-bone descriptions of functions have been fleshed out to establish for CGS a major role in intelligence management. This role includes, in addition to the mechanical steps of our original Charter, the tasks of formulating and recommending collection programs, costing alternative collection proposals, developing specifications for technical collection systems, recommending collection policy positions within the Agency and before USIB, evaluating collection system performance and bringing together analysts,

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R&D people and collectors in imaginative programs to develop new ways of answering old and tough problems. Through all these roles, CGS has evolved well beyond the routine tasks of its predecessor units in transmitting "blue ditto" requirements from the analysts to the collectors. As the complexity of both production and collection problems has increased during our years, these management functions have emerged in response. Today's collection world requires that these functions be performed somewhere; CGS is the logical place.

I have some concerns about the Collection Guidance Advisory Group (CGAG). By its membership this group will be composed of busy men among whose duties the requirements problem and collection management occupy a relatively minor place. Requirements will be the least sexy of their concerns for the most part, and the tendency to delegate representation downward in their organizations will be very great indeed. Whatever the initial enthusiasm and resolve of the members, it seems likely that the job will pass from the deputy directors' offices down to special assistants and from them probably even further down. This means the membership of this group will not be able to take actions or make decisions without reference to authorities in their own offices, and so, progressively, the group will be reduced to a discussion body and actions will have to be worked out between CGS and the office concerned. The variety of roles proposed for the CGAG in Bruce's recommendations means that there will be a large number of topics to be discussed at a CGAG meeting, relayed back to the deputy director by his stand-in, further discussion without benefit of the group's views, further reference to the office director, and then a subsequent meeting in order to take action. While it is true that all the production offices listed in the revised recommendation have collection problems, there is very little commonality in substance among those problems. While both FMSAC and OCI, or OSI and ORR will have requirements to take up with CGS, those requirements will be for quite different answers and will involve quite different resources. While the CGAG would probably be of great use in adopting common procedures, in recognizing common mechanical problems, and in working out uniform criteria in general terms, it is more than likely that substantive requirements and their management will require bilateral discussions between CGS and the substantive office concerned. I am willing to give the proposal a try and I'm hopeful that useful results will be obtained, but this will depend on the continuity of senior representation from the offices and in the durability of their interest in the problems and intricacies of collection management.

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If any progress is to be made in confining the information explosion and in screening the chaff out of the requirements system, then this CGAG must be given explicit powers to say no to requirements it considers invalid. If it can do this and this alone, it might very well be a major answer to the deficiencies the IG group scolds so about.

Incidentally, if the intent of this revised recommendation is to be served, it would be useful to propose rescinding the  era "Special Relationship" paper which puts CGS' role in relation to DD/S&T offices on an "as requested" basis. The CGAG will not work if there is a conspicuous difference among its members in their relationship to CGS.

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RECOMMENDATION 9 - Personnel Exchange

Chief, CGS Comments:

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I share with [ ] his reservations as to the efficacy of exchanging personnel with FI Staff in improving our communications with them. I concur in his substitute recommendation that we attempt a series of regular meetings with FI Staff first, and on the basis of our experience with that process then decide whether personnel exchanges would be further beneficial. If the IPC List and Committee revive, contacts with FI Staff under that aegis could serve this exploratory purpose also. CGS is anxious for more productive contact with FI Staff but has increasingly come to realize that direct contact with the DD/P divisions is often necessary to get the job done. As analyst-collector contacts should be encouraged, so too should be contacts between CGS and collectors.

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**RECOMMENDATION 10 - CIRL Notice**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

Agree that this is minor, but would also note that this would be a first and useful step on the way to giving the CIRL official status required to solve some of the problems we have in obtaining analyst participation in reviewing and updating the contents. This would be no minor improvement.

**RECOMMENDATION 11 - CIRL "Preface"**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

Concur with 25X1A revised recommendation and also the idea of handling this on a trial basis at first. The CGAG should be brought into this process to maintain balance among the "more important needs". I would substitute the CGAG for the "informal meeting of representatives from each office".

**RECOMMENDATION 12 - CIRL Background Statements**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

As with No. 10 above, any measure which brings about participation in the production of the CIRL by senior and responsible members of the production offices is a step forward. I would recommend that CGS be charged to initiate and perhaps do first drafts of background statements (their scope and nature to be defined by experience). With the collaboration of office analysts, who should take final responsibility for the statements, these should then be reviewed by the CGAG as suggested in my change to Recommendation 11.

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RECOMMENDATION 13 - Collection Guides

Chief, CGS Comments:

I have always had strong reservations about the virtues of standard comprehensive collection guidance documents. If they relate to any real and active substantive problems they are subject to rapid obsolescence. A few examples, carefully matched to collectors' capabilities, have been useful--viz. the Cuban Handbook. The reworded recommendation is acceptable as stated, provided careful controls are exercised over "as needed" and "selected intelligence problems". Perhaps the whole approach could be tried out initially on an aspect of one of the "national survival" PNIO's generated under Recommendations 1 and 2. For uniformity in approach, criteria and format it might be well to put the responsibility for production on CGS in collaboration with the producing offices, rather than the other way around. Decisions about need and topic might be made a responsibility of CGAG, so that all issuances of this kind come under a central control.

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RECOMMENDATION 14 - DCS

Chief, CGS Comments:

25X6 I concur in Bruce's observations, particularly the point that changes resulting from other recommendations should benefit DCS, at least on an interim basis. I should observe also that we have already had some experience with collection guidance programs with the DCS, notably on [ ] atomic energy developments. One question comes to mind however: DCS has indeed been successful in responding to substantive requirements, but there is some question in our minds as to whether those requirements were valid; the symbiotic relationship between the General and Life Sciences Divisions of OSI and DCS may mean that DCS has been chasing a number of requirements which probably could not stand much examination for validity. This, incidentally, is a good example of the dangers involved in unfettered analyst-collector communication.

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**RECOMMENDATION 16 and 17 - SIGINT Problems**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

The substance and focus of IG recommendations regarding technical collection systems show a marked change from those bearing on human source collection. In the main, the former are superficial and deal with relatively minor aspects of the deep and complex problems we have with collection guidance for SIGINT and reconnaissance satellites. The problem adverted to in Recommendation 17 is being progressively dealt with by the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee of the USIB SIGINT Committee on which CGS represents CIA. The overhaul of COMINT requirements for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa took into account at every step the capacities of human source collection, and the SIGINT requirements were revised accordingly. This process will continue as other free world Subelements are addressed.

The solution to the problem in Recommendation 16--Technical Training and Access--meets only a part of what the real problem is. This is one of relations between NSA and CIA and, indeed, between NSA and the rest of the intelligence community. The problems descend from NSA's defensiveness about its status in the community and the declining productivity of COMINT. It is suspicious and resentful of any efforts on our part to get closer to it or to deal in detail with the problems of information, collection and exploitation which NSA is encountering. The kind of trust and sharing of problems which is needed here cannot be legislated. Recommendation 16 as reworded by Bruce is perfectly acceptable, although I have scant hope of its producing any useful results.

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RECOMMENDATION 20 - SIGINT Satellites

Chief, CGS Comments:

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I expect that the language of this requirement will be overtaken shortly by the transfer to the SIGINT Committee of responsibility for SIGINT satellites in conjunction with the conversion of COMOR into COMIREX. The original intent of Recommendation 20 was to deal with requirements for SIGINT satellite collection. I suggest that [ ] rewording be amended "to direct CGS, with the assistance of producing offices, to establish ... " and to include in the last line "CIA Members of COMOR and SIGINT Committee Working Groups". I should like to see established the point that CGS has the responsibility for processing all CIA SIGINT satellite requirements and that CGS provide the CIA Member of the SIGINT Satellite Working Group, whether it be in COMOR or the SIGINT Committee. This would conform to the principles in Recommendation 8 that CGS is the locus for the requirements handling process. Because it may be useful to draw upon the CGAG to assist in the formulation of long-term satellite collection requirements and because SIGINT satellites are of material concern to OEL, it might be helpful to include OEL in the membership of the CGAG, if only on an ad hoc basis when ELINT matters are to be taken up.

**RECOMMENDATION 23 - COMOR**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

I believe a careful distinction needs to be made between the functions of the informal group sponsored by Chairman, COMOR, and the A/DD/I on the one hand and the regular in-Agency machinery for formulating and coordinating Agency positions on COMOR matters on the other. The former was created to deal with temporary problems and technical matters often quite outside subjects on COMOR agendas; the latter existed before this group was formed, has operated during the former group's existence and will undoubtedly continue to exist after the informal arrangements have been dispensed with. There need be no bar to discussing Agency positions in the informal group but those positions should be arrived at outside it. Responsibility for the development of these positions should continue to rest in CGS, with the advice and counsel of other interested Agency elements in the DD/I and DD/S&T. This is the way the CIA position is worked out for other USIB collection committees, and I see no reason why COMOR or COMIREX should be an exception. I would suggest that Recommendation 23 be reworded to state "the DD/I and DD/S&T direct CGS to formulate and coordinate CIA positions on requirements for overhead reconnaissance with the assistance of their producing offices." I do not believe that this recommendation should or needs to deal with the status of the informal COMOR-A/DD/I discussion group.

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**RECOMMENDATION 24 and 25 - Practical Measures**

**Chief, CGS Comments:**

I concur with Bruce's comments and with the rewording of the recommendation, except that I would have the DD/I and DD/S&T charge CGS, with the assistance of the CGAG, with devising, etc. This is consistent with the recommended change for 26 and places the responsibility where it belongs, on us. In all cases in these recommendations, I strongly believe that CGS should be charged with these tasks, turning to the membership of the CGAG, individually or collectively, for advice and assistance in getting the job done. The many steps suggested by the IG Survey for division heads and, in 26, for office heads to improve the requirements situation may very well be the right ones, but to expect this to be accomplished in the same way by each division head is unrealistic. I believe that with the assistance of the CGAG we can work out practical measures, which may not be the same for all offices, whereby the process of review and validation of requirements can be actively carried on. What is necessary is the methodical attack Bruce refers to on the problems of collection management, and for this CGS would carry the main responsibility. Division heads and office heads have other more pressing concerns; we do not.

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RECOMMENDATION 26 - Necessary Support

Chief, CGS Comments:

Concur in the revision and hope for continuing support from the DD/I and DD/S&T in our efforts to contain the "information explosion". Suggest that the recommendation be revised to state:

"the DD/I and the DD/S&T designate the Chief, Collection Guidance Staff, in collaboration with the Collection Guidance Advisory Group, to be responsible for managing the collection guidance process and for continuing review and such other efforts necessary to:

- a. As is.
- b. As is.
- c. As is.

These efforts shall be for the purpose of identifying efficiencies and making recommendations for appropriate action to the DD/I and DD/S&T." I believe that the revision establishes the responsibility right where it needs to be for the long term--on us. If the CGAG carries out its part actively, imaginatively and consistently, problems of "authority within the line structure" need not arise; we would look to members of the CGAG to exercise their line authority to help solve problems at the analyst level. Meanwhile this recommendation, reworded, gives us room to evolve and develop new and better procedures and techniques and to bring them before the DD/I and the DD/S&T for approval and adoption. I feel this recommendation gives us the necessary flexibility to improve without the rigorous "legislation" that some might recommend.

RECOMMENDATION 27 - Training

Chief, CGS Comments:

Concur in restatement.