

TCS-7880-66

~~HANDLE WITH TALENT-KEYHOLE CHARACTERS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

From [redacted]

Draft
9 August 1966

COMMENT ON JIIRG REPORT

1. COMEX Proposal

The reasoning and motives which led JIIRG to recommend that imagery exploitation be coordinated and managed by a USIB authority are sound. I cannot agree, however, that a new separate USIB committee (COMEX) should be established to exercise that authority. The following considerations have caused me to disagree:

a. I believe that coordination and management of all aspects of overhead reconnaissance should be subordinated to a single authority responsible ^{to} *the DCI and* USIB. In our experience with satellite reconnaissance programs and their products, targeting and exploitation are sufficiently interrelated to demand subordination to central management. The fact that exploitation has been managed separately from the business of COMOR in the past has been one cause of the growing need for exploitation management.

It can be argued by others that two separate and equal USIB committees (COMOR and COMEX) could operate in concert. I believe they

~~TOP SECRET~~
-2-

probably could in a static situation in which the only routine business was being transacted. But, satellite reconnaissance is a dynamic business and will continue to be so for a long time to come.

b. Perhaps the real reason for JIIRG's recommendation for a COMEX was that COMOR, as presently organized, would find it difficult to cope with both targeting and exploitation responsibilities. I think this would be so, and I agree with the reasoning that two separate groups should conduct targeting and exploitation respectively. But, the two groups would function most effectively if they worked under the supervision of a single authority, a single authority responsible to the DCI and USIB.

I do not favor constituting a new committee or the COMOR as this authority. While COMOR has worked surprisingly well, it has shown the usual weaknesses of the committee approach to policy decisions and operational management. If we are to introduce exploitation management and if it is to be conducted in teamwork with targeting, then both functions should be conducted under the authority of a permanent manager as permanent and expert staffs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

2. I would recommend, therefore, that:

a. A satellite reconnaissance manager or director be appointed by and directly responsible to the DCI and USIB. A deputy should also be appointed, with USIB agreement that a CIA officer and a military officer would be rotated in the two positions.

b. Two permanent and full-time staffs be established under the manager, one for targeting (replacing COMOR and its Photo Working Group), and one for exploitation (replacing ADCOM, etc). The two staffs each would be composed of officers from the member agencies of USIB, with the addition of an NRO officer to the targeting staff, and an NPIC officer to the exploitation staff.

3. An additional advantage to this arrangement would be that an authority organized along such command lines would operate more effectively in time of war under the Defense Department and JCS. Another advantages would be that CIA at least could assign to the two staffs officers who were experienced in and sensitive to the changing needs of producing intelligence offices.

~~TOP SECRET~~
-4-

4. OPICs

It is suggested that the OPICs should be under the management of NPIC, and that, in whole or in part, they should be staffed by NPIC, NPIC management and staffing would ensure that the quality of work would be uniformly high, with NPIC being in a position to choose and supply the best of training and equipment, and able to rotate experienced personnel between NPIC headquarters and OPICs as needed.

5. Man-hours

The report states (p. 7, para 6) that imagery interpretation manhours
25X9A1

25X9A1 expended for national needs during FY 1965 were:



25X9A1

~~TOP SECRET~~
-5-


 This is the kind of problem

that could be attacked by a permanent exploitation management staff, but would be difficult to handle in a committee situation.

6. Increased Requirement

There are two additional points in support of the NIIRG finding (p. 9, para 13) that the magnitude of the effort required from 1967 to 1971 will be substantially less than forecast:

25X9A1

 Even the estimate that there will be a cumulative increase on the order of 30 percent over the next five year period should be considered with caution and doubt. As coverage, photo quality and expertise in interpretation have progressed over the past three years, intelligence problem areas have narrowed.

~~TOP SECRET~~
-6-

It is reasonable to expect that major technical advances coming into being will ~~substantially~~ facilitate further the finding of needed answers, and increase the rapidity with which new types of targets are covered and satisfactorily analyzed. New uses and needs for satellite reconnaissance will develop as capabilities improve, but we should be able to transfer to these some of the resources devoted to past uses and needs.