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SPEAKER: [REDACTED]

Plenary Session, 19 September 1966

SUBJECT: Role of Intelligence During the Cuban Missile Crisis

It was the fall of 1962, an election year, and a silver-haired senator of the opposition was taxing the Administration with its failure to "do something" in light of all the reports he had about Soviet missiles in Cuba. Asked about this at a news conference, President Kennedy responded with this statement: "... To persuade our allies to come with us, to hazard... the security... as well as the peace of the free world, we have to move with hard intelligence."

How the intelligence community provided the President with hard intelligence throughout those fateful days in October is the subject of my talk.

This afternoon I would like, first, to revisit the days of the Cuban missile crisis and review the unfolding of events in Cuba as we were able to watch them through the unblinking eye of the airborne camera. Then I will describe some of the actions taking place within the Washington intelligence community to meet the extraordinary demands of the President and his advisers.

We have here in the room men who had an intimate part in the functioning of US intelligence throughout the crisis period: Sherman Kent,

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who accompanied Dean Acheson on the mission to France to inform DeGaulle of the US actions and the evidence behind them; and Jack Smith, who together with Ambassador Dowling carried the message to Chancellor Adenauer. I'm sure both Mr. Smith and Mr. Kent will be ready to comment and respond to questions after my talk.

Now, let's look back in time.

It was some time in 1961 that the idea of placing strategic missiles in Cuba began to suggest itself to Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership. They had several problems that the successful establishment of a Soviet missile base in Cuba would help to solve: it would improve the USSR's inferior strategic position; it would push the West toward some concessions in negotiations, especially on recognition of East Germany and the status of Berlin; it would ensure control of Cuba and prevent the US invasion so feared by Castro; and it would demonstrate to the Communist world the strength of Soviet action as opposed to the weakness of Chinese words, fierce though they may be.

When did the decision to move take place? We're not able to say precisely but it probably was late in 1961 or early 1962. Certainly by the Spring of 1962, the planning was complete. In late July 1962, the first Soviet arms carriers connected with the buildup began to arrive in Cuba. This is the Soviet freighter Sovetskaya Gavan as it neared Cuba

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in August with four Komar guided missile patrol boats topside.

The Soviets had ambitious plans for their military presence in Cuba. Basically, they intended to export a miniature of the Soviet military establishment at home, with everything from motorized infantry to strategic missiles. The program as we saw it unfold was to include the following elements, with a total of at least 20,000 personnel.

- Four composite ground forces units equipped with the latest Soviet armor and tactical missiles.
- An air defense system consisting of advanced radars, 24 SA-2 sites, and a regiment of 42 MIG-21s.
- A naval and coastal defense force consisting of four coastal defense cruise missile units and 12 Komar patrol boats.
- And a strategic missile force consisting of at least 24 MRBM launchers and 12 to 16 IRBM launchers located as shown on this map.

Although the different parts of the program began to develop in Cuba at different times, the concept basically was the concurrent deployment of both offensive and defensive systems. The target date for completion of the program--with the exception of the IRBMs--was the first half of November.

The first ships to arrive--in late July--brought in the first of the

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SA-2 units and probably many of the general logistics and headquarters personnel. We knew the ships were coming in, and we identified them as arms carriers. We didn't know, however, what the arms were or that this was just the beginning.

During the month of August about a dozen SA-2 sites were deployed to cover western Cuba. On 5 August a U-2 flew over most of the island, but it was a day or so too early to catch the first SAM sites being deployed. The next U-2 mission didn't come until the end of August, but by the middle of the month refugee [REDACTED] indicated that SA-2 units were being deployed in Cuba.

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During the latter half of August equipment for the ground troops was beginning to come in, and two of the four camps were probably being set up. The first of the MIG-21s arrived during this period.

At the end of August we began to get a better picture of the size and scope of the Soviet effort in Cuba. A U-2 mission on the 29th found eight SA-2 sites and the eight Komars delivered so far. As this picture from that mission shows, the sites were quickly laid out.

This mission also photographed the future locations of some of the Soviet long-range surface-to-surface missile bases, but they were still woods and farmland with no discernible indications of what they were shortly to become. Here is what the Guanajay IRBM site west of Havana

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looked like on 29 August.

The program which had begun to shape up in August--both in Cuba itself and in the eyes of US intelligence--really got rolling in September. The SA-2 program was well underway, other conventional weapons were coming in, and the heart of the Soviet program--the strategic missiles--began to arrive.

A U-2 mission on 5 September showed us that the Soviets had brought in MIG-21s to join the earlier MIG models they had given the Cubans. This picture of Santa Clara airfield was the first to tell us that there were MIG-21s in Cuba. From the photography we also determined that coastal defense cruise missile sites, with relatively short range capability, were going in.

We think the first MRBMs came to Cuba the first half of September, possibly as early as the 7th. On the 15th the first confirmed missile carrier--the Poltava, shown here as it reached Cuban waters--disgorged its cargo at Mariel. The ships that carried the MRBMs to Cuba were new Soviet ships with large hatches--70-80 feet long--built for the timber trade. As they made their voyage to Cuba, they rode high in the water indicating bulky equipment below deck.

By the end of September we were beginning to receive agent and refugee reporting which reflected the deployment of strategic missiles,

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but the missiles were coming in faster than the reporting. By mid-September construction work was probably under way at all the missile sites.

U-2 missions took place next on 26 and 29 September. These showed us the growing extent of the Soviet deployment of the SA-2 system and other conventional forces. Unfortunately these missions gave us no evidence of the strategic missile deployment, then in its early stages.

Thus, during September we had had four U-2 flights. One early in the month showed us some SA-2 sites, but was too early to detect the strategic missiles. For the rest of the month the overflight program was hampered by bad weather. The next flight--on the 17th--encountered heavy cloud cover over virtually all of its targets. The two missions flown at the end of the month enjoyed good weather, but the flight patterns didn't take them over the strategic missile deployment areas.

And so we come to the month of the crunch. By mid-October the Soviet program was going full blast. U-2 missions were planned for the 3rd and the 6th, but weather caused the first to be cancelled and the second failed to reach Cuba because of mechanical difficulties. A couple of peripheral flights turned up some more SA-2 sites, but mean-

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while time was passing and agent reports were coming in that focused our attention on the San Cristobal area southwest of Havana.

Finally on Sunday, October 14th, a U-2 mission got off. It flew over San Cristobal and this is one of the pictures it took. Here, scattered about a Cuban field, was the equipment that could mean only that Soviet MRBMs for the first time had been sent out of the Soviet Union. Let me call your attention particularly to the oxidizer tank trailers lined up in the center of the picture; we'll see them again shortly.

This is one of the pictures that went first to the Acting Director, Gen. Carter, then to McGeorge Bundy late on Monday, the 15th. Mr. Bundy made the decision to hold the pictures from the President until morning. On the 16th, the President saw this picture and the others from the Sunday flight--and the crisis was on.

As we were soon to discover, two other MRBM units were going in at San Cristobal and two at Sagua La Grande. The progress being made was brought home by this picture of Sagua La Grande taken on Wednesday, the 17th. All six MRBM units--a total of 24 launchers--were about at the same stage of construction, and a couple of sites were probably already capable of launching some of their missiles. We still don't know whether the warheads were in Cuba then, but it was an easy assumption to make at the time.

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The other part of the strategic missile program--the IRBM deployment--required the construction of fairly elaborate fixed sites. I showed you earlier a picture of the Guanajay IRBM site taken on 29 August. Here is part of that field seen from a U-2 on 17 October. Here at site number one we see four launch pads, control bunkers, and a war-head storage site under construction. In all, two IRBM units--each with four pads--were going in at Guanajay. The first of these could have achieved an initial capability by about mid-November and full readiness later that month. The other unit at Guanajay wouldn't have been ready to fire until December.

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One other IRBM unit was going in near Remedios. Its construction roughly paralleled that of Guanajay No. 2. It would also have been ready in December. If, as seems likely, another unit was planned for the Remedios area, it wouldn't have been ready until early 1963.

However, the readiness of the IRBM units never became a real problem in the Cuban crisis, since no IRBM apparently ever arrived in Cuba. They almost certainly were on the ships that turned back on 23 October. Some of the support equipment was seen, however.

In the first week after the discovery, 17 U-2 missions covered 97% of the island area with photography and the scope of the whole Soviet program was discerned. The Soviets in Cuba must have had some

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inkling of the stepped-up U-2 surveillance after the 14th. However, they kept on with the slow but steady pace of their program.

The crisis surfaced for the world with the President's speech on Monday, 22 October. Following the speech, the Soviets in Cuba showed a little more life. By then, assuming they had warheads for their missiles, they could probably have launched at least 16 MRBMs at targets in the US. They were also making some attempts to camouflage the sites.

The day after the speech the US began launching extensive low level reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Our basic picture of the deployments didn't change, but we saw a lot of details.

--Here is a close-up view of the soggy field at San Cristobal No. 1.

This is the same site you saw earlier in the 14 October U-2 photograph. The missile erector is covered for protection against the rain. The oxidizer tank trailers are still lined up in a row.

--This is how Guanajay site No. 1 looked down close. The greater demands of the IRBM system for fixed installations are evident in building of the control bunker and the launch pads.

The Soviets hurried to bring their 24 SA-2 sites into operational status as an air defense system. Bulldozers worked torevet the sites, like the one shown here at Bahia Honda with its six launchers surrounding the guidance control vans and radar.

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La Coloma

By Saturday, 27 October, the SAM system was operational. A surface-to-air missile brought down one of the U-2s, killing the pilot. It was Major Anderson who had been the pilot on the historic mission of 14 October.

From the 23rd to the 28th of October, this was the week that was. This was the week of standing eyeball to eyeball.

The initial Soviet reaction was to deny that missiles in Cuba served any but the noblest of defensive purposes. It was not clear for several days what was going on in the Kremlin, but it became clear on Wednesday the 24th that 12 of the 25 Soviet ships heading for Cuba had turned around and were not going to risk running the US quarantine line. The messages went back and forth between Moscow and Washington as Khrushchev tried to get out of his predicament.

On Saturday the 27th, the President sent his letter to Khrushchev accepting the Soviet "proposal" to remove the offensive weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate UN supervision. The US for its part agreed, once adequate UN arrangements were established, to lift the quarantine and to assure against an invasion of Cuba. "But," said the President, "the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable. . ."

On a crisp, beautiful October Sunday--two weeks to the day after

the U-2 took the picture of MRBM equipment present on a field in Cuba-- the message from Khrushchev arrived: "... the Soviet Government... has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union."


Photography on the 29th showed a little change, but some of the sites definitely still had some operational capability. This is how one of the sites at San Cristobal looked. Although the erectors had been drawn back from their launch positions, some construction work was continuing.

By Thursday, the 1st of November, however, low-altitude missions found the Soviets quickly packing up and going home. At San Cristobal two of the missile ready tents had gone, a third was coming down, and the launch positions were empty.

Another low-flying reconnaissance aircraft found the launch positions at Sagua La Grande empty and a convoy forming for departure.

By the next Sunday, the 4th of November, the equipment from the MRBM and IRBM sites had shown up in the Cuban ports. Here at Mariel we counted four launch stands, 17 missile erectors, and various trucks and vans.

One of the aircraft took a picture of its own shadow as it flew over a Soviet freighter with six missiles on their transporters lashed on the open deck, and personnel lined up waiting to go aboard.



Casilda


The Soviets didn't have any large hatch ships available to take the missiles back right away, so they loaded them aboard anything they had in Cuban waters. By Saturday, 9 November, the last of the MRBMs delivered to Cuba before the quarantine were on their way out. The well-being of these Soviet ships, their cargo and their crew, was tenderly watched over by the US Navy practically all the way home. Here is a Navy destroyer inspecting the Vogoles as it leaves Cuban waters.

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That put an end--in a manner of speaking--to the strategic missile episode in Cuba. (Of refugee and exile reports that Soviet strategic missiles and their warheads remain in Cuba, there is no end. And the resources of the government and the intelligence community continue the inspection that Castro denied the United Nations to make.

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Although the removal of missiles was effectively the end of the Cuban missile crisis, the demand that the IL-28 jet light bombers be removed kept the Russians on the run, and caused them no end of trouble with Castro.

The first IL-28s had begun to arrive in the last half of September. However, we didn't know about it in Washington until 10 October, when

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the first photos of IL-28 crates on the Kasimov arrived in town.
(Although the picture was taken on 28 September, when the Kasimov was still in Mediterranean waters, it was in slower-moving operational channels and not available for intelligence exploitation until 10 October.)

The IL-28s were apparently intended for the Cuban air force. Cubans had been training on them in the USSR, and there were several trainer versions among the 42 aircraft delivered. This was the picture at San Julian airfield on 27 October as work assembling the Beagles continued.

The Soviets at first refused to take the bombers out because they belonged to the Cubans. At the time of the missile crisis, however, the US considered the question of ownership irrelevant. The US kept the pressure on and by mid-November the Soviets had stopped putting the IL-28s together. Activity at San Julian appeared to cease as Mikoyan argued with an irate Castro.

Finally on 20 November, Khrushchev was able to announce that the bombers would also be withdrawn, and by 7 December they were all on Soviet ships going back to the USSR under the watchful eye of the Navy. The Soviets didn't bother to crate those that had been assembled but shipped them, as here, as deck cargo.

Today, only some 2,000 of the original 20,000 or so Soviet troops are still in Cuba--these 2,000 are advisers, instructors, and maintenance personnel. All the Soviet weapons that were not withdrawn--

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VU-GRAF OFF
LIGHTS ON


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the Komar missile boats, the cruise missiles, the MIG-21s and the SAMs, and the ground forces equipment--are now being operated by the Cuban armed forces.

Let me now turn to some of the things that happened in the intelligence community in Washington before, during, and after the crisis period. I shall not attempt to recount what took place in the councils of the most high as the intelligence product was received by them and acted upon. This has already been done by such authors as Ted Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in their "I was there" books. Rather I want to revisit some of the events and undertakings that made it possible for US intelligence to play the crucial role that it did in the Cuban missile crisis.

I think the place to start is with the realization that the events of September and October 1962 did not burst upon an intelligence community only dimly aware of Cuba and the problems it posed. In a way, the community without realizing it had been gearing itself for the crisis to come since late 1961. As the result of directives from Mr. McCone,

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The U-2 over-

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flight program was increased from one flight per month to two.

This attention to greater collection of information was matched by developments within the intelligence producing offices. In the Office of Research and Reports in CIA, for example, a Cuba Branch was established in the Economic Research Area and the Latin American Branch of Geographic Research Area began to concentrate its efforts almost entirely on Cuba. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service increased its coverage of Cuban radio broadcasts and began to issue an analysis of these broadcasts prepared by the Radio Propaganda Branch. The National Photographic Interpretation Center added to the number of photo interpreters working on Cuban photographs. And in March of 1962 the Office of Current Intelligence began to publish a Daily Summary devoted entirely to Cuba. This summary contained information of all classifications and was designed to bring persons working directly on Cuban matters all pertinent information. In the beginning, the Daily Summary had a rather restricted audience but, as the number of persons immediately involved in Cuban matters increased, this changed.

The build-up of analytical capabilities in the community only barely kept pace with the influx of information. One of the unsolved problems throughout the pre-crisis period was how successfully to cope with the

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vast volume of reporting.

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By August an increasing proportion of this flow of reporting was starting to speak of military cargoes being unloaded under conditions of security, and of the arrival of large numbers of Soviet personnel.

One response of the community to this reporting was the preparation of a special national intelligence estimate on the military buildup in Cuba. The estimate was passed by USIB on 19 September and it concluded, in brief, that the main purpose of the buildup was to strengthen the Castro regime against any attempt by the US to overthrow it. The estimate noted that the Soviet arms would substantially improve the air defense and coastal defense capabilities of the Cubans, strengthening the regime and discouraging its opponents at home and in exile. The estimate also noted that the Soviets might be tempted to establish light bombers or short-range surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba but that their decision would depend heavily on the Soviet estimate of a US military reaction. Finally, the estimate observed that the Soviets would benefit militarily from placing medium and intermediate range

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ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from establishing a submarine base there. Either development was incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as it was then estimated to be. In short, the thrust of the estimate was that the Soviets would be unlikely to introduce strategic offensive weapons into Cuba.

The position taken by the USIB on the 19th of September was indeed the consensus of the community. It was not until shortly after mid-September that a few ground observer reports began coming in which were specifically descriptive or suggestive of the arrival of strategic missiles in Cuba. Before then, the SA-2s, the coastal defense cruise missiles, and the MIG-21s seemed to indicate only a Soviet intent to give Castro a formidable defensive capability. That the Soviets would build Cuba into what the US could only regard as a Soviet strategic base went against all precedents in Soviet foreign policy.

As Mr. Kent has written in a review of the estimate:

On 15 October we realized that our estimate of the Soviets' understanding of the mood of the United States and its probable reaction was wrong. On 28 October we realized that the Soviets had realized they had misjudged the United States. In between we verified that our own feeling for the mood of the United States and its probable reaction had been correct. In a way our misestimate of Soviet intentions got an ex post facto validation.

As it happened, the research and analytical work which usually precedes the final coordination of any NIE was going on at the very time that the first MRBM units were arriving in Cuba. Although a

few ground observer reports were received that in retrospect appear to speak of offensive missiles, there was nothing between the USIB meeting on 19 September and the 14 October photography of San Cristobal that clearly and unequivocally justified reversing the thrust of the estimate. For one thing, as Mr. Kent has written, "it is not as if these new data had no egress to the world of policy people except through National Intelligence Estimates. The information was current intelligence when it came in and it promptly went out to the key customers as such."

This brings us to the problem of providing current intelligence and to what can properly be called the crisis period. At this point all the staffs and instrumentalities of the intelligence leaders in Washington organized themselves to do one thing before all others: to provide the most rapid possible processing, assessment, and publication of intelligence related to the problems of the President. As current as the intelligence was, it was never current enough. Every way was sought to minimize the time between the arrival of information in Washington and its presentation--in meaningful form and with judgment--to the President and his advisers. One of the fastest shows in town throughout this period was that of the National Photographic Interpretation Center and its peripatetic director, Art Lundahl, as he shuttled back and forth between the White House, the State Department, USIB meetings, and NPIC, briefing

on the results of the latest photography. Some of you may recall seeing him as you entered the Headquarters building at Langley for the second day of the 1962 Intelligence Methods Conference. He was leaving with Ray Cline for the first meeting with President Kennedy.

The prescient Mr. McCone, who had suspected strategic missiles from the first days of the arms buildup, called on 16 October for a special all-source publication to provide him with all the current information pertinent to the crisis. This meant not only military developments in Cuba and the status of Soviet shipping to Cuba, but also Soviet political and diplomatic developments, the status of Soviet military forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, other developments in Cuba, and world reactions to the events taking place. As you can see, this was a most comprehensive undertaking and one that was to be ready for the Director by 7 o'clock each morning, in time for his 8:30 meeting with USIB and the 10 o'clock meeting of the Executive Committee at the White House.

To meet this request of the Director, the Office of Current Intelligence initiated the Cuban Crisis Memorandum on the 17th of October. The publication was issued at least once a day, and sometimes two, for about six weeks. The information was current as of 6 o'clock in the morning and normally included the highlights of the initial findings

reported by NPIC on the photography taken the day before.

Two subjects were of especially great importance in the first two weeks of the crisis: the status of Soviet shipping, and the status of Soviet strategic weapons in Cuba. OCI established a situation room manned around the clock to bring the analysts concerned with current reporting on these two subjects together, accessible to each other and to others needing the information. It was out of this situation room that much of the material for the Cuban Crisis Memorandum was pulled together starting about 4 in the morning to meet the 7 o'clock deadline to the Director.

Soviet shipping and the operation of the US quarantine were the reporting responsibility of what Mr. McCone called "my shipping central"--an ORR task force which moved into the OCI situation room and worked in close cooperation with the Pentagon to maintain continuing surveillance of Soviet shipping not only on the approaches to Cuba, but

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[REDACTED] This task force dealt with [REDACTED] photography, alongside inspection by US Naval units, low-level photography and inspection by US military aircraft supporting the quarantine, and whatever other eyeball information might help determine the cargo of the suspect ships.

The purpose was to determine as nearly as possible the cargo-- human or materiel--of the ships, and to maintain a 24-hour pinpoint

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track of each ship from its home port to Cuba and back again.

It was one of the analysts on this task force who first alerted the community to the fact that the Soviet ships heading for Cuba had turned around after the President's speech of 22 October. You may be interested in the story behind the story. In the spring of 1962, an expensive automated system to account for Soviet ship movements had been set up in Washington. The crisis obviously was the test for this system, for the Soviet reaction to the US decision to blockade Cuba was crucial to the next US course of action. As Washington waited anxiously for evidence of the Soviet reaction, the computer spewed forth reams of data on Soviet ship operations and positions, but nothing on the direction of movement. It was an experienced lady analyst on the task force, working with the same data on the dog-eared 5x8 cards she had been using for years, who first noted that the key Soviet ships now were headed east and north, not west and south.

For the essential current analysis of the status of Soviet offensive systems in Cuba, an unusual development took place: two interagency committees began to sit in concert practically 24 hours a day. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee took up residence together in the work space of NPIC in downtown Washington. Beginning on the 18th of

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October, the two committees worked throughout the night, reviewing each day's photography as it came direct from the photo interpreters next door, and preparing a joint evaluation of the Soviet offensive forces in Cuba. This report went to the Director in time for his morning meetings. Portions were summarized for inclusion in the Cuban Crisis Memorandum being prepared concurrently in OCI in Langley. There was an extraordinary amount of hurried travel back and forth between NPIC, the Pentagon, and CIA Headquarters in the small hours of the night as people strived to meet the deadlines for publication that the meetings of USIB and the Executive Committee required.

The joint meetings of GMAIC and JAEIC called together not only the regular members but also advisory personnel from such outfits as the Army Missile Command and specialists in such matters as Soviet merchant shipping. In the early days of the crisis just prior to and following the President's speech, the main focus of the two committees was the readiness of the missile sites to fire and the availability of nuclear warheads. When the withdrawal phase began, the focus shifted to the substantiation of the actual movement out of the missiles and their supporting equipment. The committees ended their excursion into the production of current intelligence on 11 November, after meeting daily for over three weeks and issuing 22 reports.

I might note that one of the unique aspects of preparing the daily Cuban Crisis Memorandum was the desire of the Director that he be given a document that had all the information the President and the Executive Committee ought to have. This meant information on US military dispositions and actions that had a bearing on the Cuban and Soviet developments being reported. Under the pressure of the times, the operations and planning parts of the Pentagon were persuaded to make more information available to intelligence than they ever had before, at least on a regular basis. This was the beginning of a trend in the preparation of senior level intelligence publications that continues today.

Many of the activities that took place during the crisis ended when it ended. The joint meetings running through the night no longer were necessary, the situation room wasn't needed 24 hours a day, the special publications could turn their reporting role over to the regular publications. Gradually most of the ad hoc machinery of the crisis period was put away, but not all. The intelligence collection resources were charged with monitoring the Soviet fulfillment of the agreement with the US. The failure of U Thant to obtain Castro's agreement to the joint US-Soviet proposal for United Nations on-site inspection meant that US would continue its overflights.

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With the missiles and IL-28s gone, attention was concentrated on the status of the other Soviet forces and equipment in Cuba. Slowly the Cubans were trained in the operation of the SAMs and the MIG-21s

and the Komar boats and control of these items passed out of Soviet hands.

Right up to today, Cuban reporting continues to receive special attention. Reports of missiles or missile-related activity continue to come in through a variety of sources, mostly exiles and agents in Cuba. Now, as then, these reports are carefully checked against shipping reports and the current take of the U-2 overflights. I don't think anyone expects the Soviets, having been once burned, to be twice foolish, but then we didn't expect them to be once foolish either.

The words of President Kennedy in mid-December of 1962 as he reflected on the crisis speak to one of the lessons of the times:

"I think, looking back on Cuba, what is of concern is the fact that both governments were so far out of contact, really. I don't think that we expected that Khrushchey would put the missiles in Cuba, because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take, as it was later proved. Now, he obviously must have thought that he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it. So that he did not judge our intentions accurately.

What are some of the other lessons we can draw from the role of intelligence during the Cuban missile crisis? There are many, but I will suggest only a few.

One is the importance of enabling intelligence analysts working with one part of a problem to communicate with those working in related areas. In the Cuban missile crisis, the shipping analysts had information of

import to those concerned with military and political matters and the timely sharing of this information was vital. A more difficult kind of separation to overcome is that that divides the intelligence analyst from the collector. This most often occurs where new collection systems or highly sensitive sources are involved. At times, it almost seems--to the analyst, at least--that the collector regards collection as an end in itself. It isn't, of course, and the solution to this kind of obstacle to intelligence analysis and reporting is the mutual problem of the collector and the analyst.

Another lesson is the need for great flexibility in structuring the response demanded of intelligence at the time of crisis. Our normal organization is designed to insure accuracy and completeness within operating deadlines. It is in these times that we add to our fund of knowledge and expertise. But this normal organization is rarely well-suited to the kinds of actions necessary to meet a crisis head on. Nor are plans for crisis management drawn up in advance of the crisis usually of much help. The crisis imposes its own shape, its own schedules, its own questions, and its own answers. In short, the intelligence manager best prepares for crisis by filling up the fund of knowledge and ability when he can and by using it as efficiently and as imaginatively as he knows how when the crisis breaks.

Finally, let me return to the question raised at the beginning by

President Kennedy's statement that "we have to move with hard intelligence." I think it is clear that the US Government was able to act with precision and certainty in the crisis because, at the crucial stage, its intelligence on military developments in Cuba and elsewhere was hard. There are some who have interpreted this to mean that it was photographic evidence. I believe this exaggerates the role of photography in intelligence reporting, as important as it is. I believe that one lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is the absolute indispensability of all sources--human and technical--and all intelligence techniques and methodologies to the accomplishment of hard intelligence. If there is one lesson we should have learned by now, it is the danger of single source intelligence, no matter what the surface promise and attractiveness of that source may be.