

**CONFIDENTIAL****ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

**SUBJECT:** (Optional) A Review of Federal Protective Officer Performance and Possible Alternatives to the GSA Guard Force at CIA

<b>FROM:</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></span> Chief, HSB		<b>EXTENSION</b> <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 20px;"></span>		<b>NO.</b>
				<b>DATE</b> 02 NOV 1983
<b>TO:</b> (Officer designation, room number, and building)	<b>DATE</b>		<b>OFFICER'S INITIALS</b>	<b>COMMENTS</b> (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/PSD				<p>Attached is a rewrite of the HSB study on eliminating the FPO's. Paragraph 1.g. and related attachments have been changed to reflect an exact SLUC charge for certain FPO positions. Although this exact charge is slightly less, the study is essentially unchanged. <u>The exact SLUC charges, however, may be important during discussions with GSA and OMB.</u></p> <p style="text-align: right;">LDA</p>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

VIA: Deputy Director of Security, PTAS  
Chief, Physical Security Division

FROM:

[Redacted]

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Chief, Headquarters Security Branch

SUBJECT: A Review of Federal Protective Officer  
Performance and Possible Alternatives  
to the GSA Guard Force at CIA [Redacted]

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1. During the last several months, the Headquarters Security Branch (HSB) has been reviewing activities of the Federal Protective Officers (FPOs) assigned to CIA facilities in the metropolitan area, and consulting with security representatives from other government agencies and private industry about possible alternatives to using a General Services Administration (GSA) guard force. Results indicate the following:

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function of the guard force at CIA is access control. The guard force must also understand exceptions to the rule, special requirements, and the traditional Office of Security (OS) helping hand philosophy. Presently, the FPS guard force concentrates with a vengeance on enforcing traffic rules. They look down on guard duties, and have little identification with the CIA mission or OS philosophy.

b. FPS leaders are disillusioned about their ability to improve service. Because of unrealistic personnel requirements levied by GSA and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), FPS is forced to process candidates whom they know to be unacceptable. FPS employs about 600 personnel elsewhere in the metropolitan area but few can be assigned to CIA because of previous security disapprovals from various other government agencies. Any candidate who is security disapproved by CIA must be placed elsewhere in FPS.

The local FPS regional director has informally and confidentially counseled OS to seriously look for an alternative to the GSA guard force. This same official believes that a real threat exists that the Reagan administration will discontinue FPS in favor of private industry doing the same work. Concurrently, FPS is making a strong internal move toward strict law enforcement service while eliminating support for guard duties.

c. Inefficient GSA staffing methods are not likely to improve. Historically, GSA has normally experienced about a 30% vacancy rate at most facilities served by FPS. This is presently true at CIA, NSA, State and DoD. In the last 12 months at CIA, GSA has made absolutely no progress in reducing vacancies [ ] despite the fact that OS has made a considerable effort to expedite security processing. Although 29 candidates were approved, 29 other FPOs on duty at CIA facilities departed, resulting in no net increase. Of the 190 candidates processed, 85% were either cancelled during processing or security disapproved. The constant strain of vacancies has caused excessive overtime, undermined morale, and affected physical fitness.

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d. CIA staff employees are the only alternative to FPS. Even if a non-CIA guard force could identify more closely with the needs of CIA, the vital factor of direct control would not be present. Conversations with other security representatives found no favorable impressions of commercial guard forces by NSA, State, or DoD. State, in fact, is returning to an exclusive FPS guard force as a better alternative than private industry. FPS, who administers numerous GSA commercial guard contracts, is frustrated by a lack of control and strongly recommends a CIA guard force vis-a-vis private industry. The greatest fear from a private industry contract is the consequence of recontracting should a contractor's services become unacceptable. This likely possibility alone makes such an alternative unacceptable.

If CIA seeks an alternative to GSA, the quality of a guard force composed of CIA staff employees can be as superior as the quality of their managers, because of direct supervision. Staff guard forces at [ ] have been highly successful. At these locations vacancies are always at a minimum, performance is high, and control is direct.

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e. CIA staffing must be realistic. CIA separation from the GSA guard force would be like trying to dig a hole without falling in. The critical issue to a successful CIA guard force is realistic staffing concepts. The contrasting experience in the CIA recruiting [ ] guards at the GS-5/GS-6 level and GSA recruiting guards for Headquarters at the GS-4/GS-5 level clearly demonstrates that a GS-5 "entry" level and GS-6 "experienced" level must be established to successfully draw manpower from the metropolitan labor market. The only time [ ] has ever experienced vacancies was after Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD) dropped the [ ] "entry" level back to GS-4 and "experienced" level back to GS-5, which is exactly the GSA standard for Headquarters guard positions. A successful appeal and re-establishment of the original levels eliminated the vacancy problem at [ ] Other appealing features to CIA guard force applicants would be a CIA career, upward mobility, and transfer possibilities after basic commitments. Attachment I outlines the necessary grade levels for a successful CIA guard force.

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Full-time staff positions are necessary to reduce turnover and retain long term employees in what has historically been an unattractive career field. One year contract employees convertible to staff are recommended to purge marginal performers. If these realistic concepts cannot be accepted, CIA should not assume guard force responsibilities. The probability of failure, for the same reasons GSA has experienced, is simply too great.

f. Replacement of the GSA guard force should occur in three phases. (See Attachment II.)

(1) Phase I - First Year: Takeover of all easily assumed posts of least difficulty. In most cases this would involve situations where posts would be shared with another, more experienced FPO or one of the Security Assistants now employed by OS, or in a position where a situation requiring arrest power is least likely. No Standard Level User Charge (SLUC) positions would be eliminated. Requirements for this phase would involve reduction of FPS by [ ] positions. Weapons and arrest power would not be assumed during this phase. Backup emergency response would continue through FPS and Fairfax County Police.

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(2) Phase II - Second Year: Takeover of most internal posts, including outlying buildings. This would leave at least one armed FPO at each outlying building, all vehicle patrols and all exterior gates. Weapons responsibility and arrest authority would still not be assumed. Some SLUC positions could be assumed during this phase. FPS requirements would be reduced by another [ ] positions. Backup emergency response would continue through FPS and Fairfax County Police.

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(3) Phase III - Third Year: Assumption of law enforcement responsibilities, weapons responsibilities, arrest authority, and traffic ticket functions. CIA would assume the remaining FPS [ ] positions during this phase. Backup emergency response would continue through Fairfax County Police.

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g. Uniform Concepts - The blazer concept at CIA has been very successful in positions where weapons are not required. It should be continued. Since most guard forces draw from a high turnover labor force, complicated uniform concepts become wasteful and time consuming. However, Phase III integration, where weapons responsibility is assumed, would require military/police type uniforms by about 1/3 of the guards to allow exposure of weapons when worn. The cost of two blazers is estimated at \$300 per position while the full uniform, similar to that at [ ] would cost about \$600 per position.

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h. Additional Equipment - Should CIA assume guard duties, additional equipment costs of \$200,000 or less should be expected. (See Attachment III.)

i. Space Requirements - OS would require no additional space for managing a CIA guard force. Headquarters space now occupied by FPS would be assumed as integration during Phases I, II and III occurs. Cost for this space is paid by the Office of Logistics under SLUC and would not be passed on to OS.

j. Comparative Costs of a CIA Guard Force versus a GSA Guard Force.

(1) Federal Protection Charges. Presently, the FPS is funded by GSA though SLUC by adding an additional charge for federal protection to other charges for space. This Agency paid [ ] in federal protection charges in FY83 and will pay [ ] in FY84 for the same services due to a scheduled rate increase (See Attachments IV D and E). In theory, for this charge GSA makes a variety of protection services available to government agencies, including guard protection, a tactical response force and security surveys. The standard federal protection charge applies whether or not customers need or use the services offered.

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In FY85, GSA will drop the SLUC concept in favor of the Fair Annual Increment Rate (FAIR). Under this concept, FPS will be separately funded by GSA. GSA will supposedly continue providing the same level of protection services, but GSA will absorb the cost and agencies will not be

billed for federal protection services. GSA officials tentatively believe this standard policy will apply to the Agency even though  manhours are involved.

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(2) Comparative Overall One Year Personnel Costs at FY83 Rates. Attachment V reflects a comparison between actual FY83 total FPO Personnel Costs (See Attachment IV A-C) and the total cost of performing the same function with CIA staff employees as recommended in this study. The comparison reflects a 17.45% saving by use of CIA staff employees. The same comparison was essentially unchanged when FY84 rates with a 10% inflation factor were used. In fact over a 10% saving is realized even if the SLUC federal protection charges are not included, as it might not be after FY84.

(3) Comparative First Year Personnel Cost at FY83 Rates. Attachment VI reflects a comparison between first year Phase I integration costs [see para 1.f.(1) above and Attachment II] and standard FPO costs. The comparison shows a first year savings of 11.98% when CIA staff employees are used to replace GSA guards. It is important to note that no SLUC positions would be affected during Phase I integration.

2. Recommendation. It is obvious that CIA needs to regain controls of guard force responsibilities. This study clearly demonstrates that such can easily be done by use of CIA staff employees and a saving realized in the process. It is the recommendation of the Headquarters Security Branch that OS proceed immediately with a recommendation to the Director of Central Intelligence to assume guard responsibilities for CIA within the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area under the conditions outlined above.

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Attachments

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