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[Redacted]

DDR Chron-2

NRO review(s) completed.

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CUBAN CRISIS

TS-185134

7 Nov 1962

DDR to DCI Subj: Comments on Lehman Paper

Generally believes subj paper excellent presentation of facts insofar as he knows them. ...a few corrections:

a. P. 12 para 23, This sentence implies that there was some external directive that the flts shld be carried out [Redacted] Neither I nor Col Ledford know of any such directive. In fact, all missions which the Agency ran over Cuba either before or after Sept 5 were designed to have maximum altitude over target with the only compensating factor being the rqmt for sufficient fuel after coast-out to reach the refueling point or alternate landing field.

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b. Page 26, para 49. Criteria for launch was Cat II (2/8 cloud cover) or better over critical target areas. In some cases flts were authorized with Category III over appreciable parts of the flt.

c. Page 28, para 53. Documentation on the presentations made to the SG can probably be pulldd together--actual recommendations were NRO recommendations as opposed to unilateral CIA recommendations. However, these were concurred in by CIA. Primary objective was to cover suspect MRBM site on western end of Cuba and at same time pass over one of the SAM sites which was considered most nearly operational. [Redacted] to determine opnl status in order to assess risk to further U-2 mnsns required to get complete coverage of Cuba asap. MRBM site at San Cristobal was not a secondary objective.

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It was considered at least if not more important than the SAM coverage. I do not believe it was true that the mission would not have flown over San Cristobal if the most likely candidate for an opnl SAM site had not been in Western Cuba. In fact, the coverage of the SAM site was only desired to see if one could fly with impunity over western Cuba.

d. Page 28, para 54. I would suggest deletion of the words "by the Pres." in the 3rd line since I believe this was a unilateral DOD decision rather than a Presidential decision.

↑
(McNamara?)
+
Steakley

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25X1 DD/R - CUBAN Crisis [redacted] Staff Meeting Minutes 13 Nov 62
(Soviet military in Cuba)

3. -- ~~In a brief review of the current negotiations wi~~

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[redacted] (DDR SMM)

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DD/R - Cuban Missile Crisis

[redacted]

SMM 13 Nov 1962

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DD/R announced to staff that an inquiry would be made into the intelligence coverage and reporting of the missile build-up in Cuba and said that a post mortem from the standpoint of how more timely and precise intelligence might have been achieved would be a good idea. His fear was that there might be some buckpassing and he wanted OSA to review carefully all factors leading up to the 14 October date, (when missiles were actually discovered) taking into account all requirements, COMOR actions, Special Group actions, weather factors, etc.

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By 14 November 1962 the Chairman of COMOR (JCR) addressed COMOR members with regard to long range planning for aerial reconnaissance of Cuba saying that evidence of deactivation of the IRBM and MRBM sites coupled with observation of missiles and missile associated equipment either on the docks or aboard ships made daily coverage of the deactivated sites no longer necessary. Coverage of ports should be continued and coverage of ports when ships capable of carrying missiles are in port. Suspect caves to be covered once each and low level night photography, and the entire island covered once a week by BRASS KNOB photography.

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Ch/JCS (Gen Taylor) notified DCI on 4 Nov 62 that nothing should be done to the U-2's in the way of installing ECM equipment until Gen Powers, CINSAC completes a study on implications of installing this equipmt in these a/c.