

NRO review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9

SOURCE MATERIAL - DDS&T FILES in RECORDS CENTER

<u>Job No.</u>	<u>Description of Contents</u>	<u>Date Retired</u>
✓ 66-R-638 (1 box)	DD/R--DD/S&T Organization, Delegation of Authority (1962); Staff Mtg. Minutes, Chronos, (1962-63)	5/17/66
✗ 67-B-25 (1 box)	DD/S&T Admin. (1962)	7/15/66
✗ 66-B-560 (1 box)	DD/S&T Admin & Ops (1963)	3/4/66
✓ 66-R-546 (2 boxes)	Policy, Planning, Coordination, Direction (1963); Chronos (1963); Committees, Boards and Panels	2/28/66
✗ 67-B-558 (1 box)	DDS&T Admin, committees, panels etc. (1964)	2/3/67
✓ 1+2 ✓ 3+4 67-R-587 (4 boxes)	DDS&T Subject files (1964); Miscel. Admin. and Aerial Recon Action Memos	2/27/67
✗ 68-R-530 (4 boxes)	DDS&T Subject files (1965); Budget, Security, Training, Logistics, etc.	1/29/68
✓ 69-B-596 (1 box)	DDS&T Subject files (1965-66)	2/26/69
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✓ 69-R-599 (2 boxes)	DDS&T Chronos (1965)	2/26/69
✓ 69-R-600	DDS&T chronos (1966)	2/26/69
STAT		
✓ 70-R-435 (2 boxes)	DDS&T Chrono (1967)	1/29/70
✓ 70-R-465	DDS&T Subj files (1967) Budget, Logs, Personnel, Security, Liaison, Travel	2/5/70

X	70-B-501 (1 box)	DDS&T Policy Files (1967)	2/10/70
X	70-B-511 (1 box)	DDS&T Policy Files (1958-68) (Wheelon, 1963; History 1962-65; Basic Policy Agreements)	2/16/70
No	70-543 (2 boxes)	1. Project Officers' Manual, 11 copies 2. "Energy Sources and Conversion" 39 copies	2/24/70

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Does Dr. Chamberlain have any recollection of how Dr. Wheelon came to be recruited as AD/SI in early summer 1962 to replace Dr. Scoville?

Who recommended him?
Was PFIAB (or any of its members) involved?
Who approached him?

Dr. Cline was then DD/I -- What part did he play in Wheelon's appointment?

STAT Dr. Wheelon was the TRW (then Space Technology Labs) manager [redacted] in 1961-62 and as such well known to Dr. Scoville and many of us in OS1. It was Dr. Scoville who talked Dr. Wheelon into taking the job with assistance from John McCone. Others who played a part were Jimmy Eoo. Little (STR Board Member) and Rube Mettler (then a senior v. p. at STL) both of whom knew us well. I don't know about PFIAB members (Maybe Killian was consulted).
I'd say Ray Cline played a near zero part in Wheelon's appointment and in a short time they were not what you call dear friends.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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New York Times - Dateline Los Angeles, June 14

"McCone is Opposed to 'One-Man Rule'"

A.E.C. Nominee is Expected to Keep Strauss Policy
on Power and Tests

-----By Gladwin Hill, Special to the New York Times

Los Angeles, June 14.

(McCone nominated last week to Chair AEC; Strauss retiring
30 June.

Interview in L.A. brought out following views from
Mr. McCone:

Basic research in science should proceed hand in hand with
applied, or immediately practical studies.

While scientists are not infallible, their participation in
policy formulation is a "healthy" and progressive application
of the nation's brain power.

A well-informed public is a very important factor in the
adoption of national policies.

He was quoted, with regard to his part in the writing of
the report by the Presidential Air Policy Commission,
known as the Finletter Report, that he took pride in the
report which was as applicable in 1958 as when it was
written in 1947.

At a time when top scientists didn't think the
Russians would have an atomic bomb, the report
anticipated the early development by other nations
of supersonic bombers, atomic weapons and guided
missiles--possibly ahead of the United States--and
urged that this country bestir itself in those
fields.


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DD/R - DD/S&T ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Feb. 1962 - Sept. 1966




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The end design of DD/S&T's myriad of activities is to provide the Director of Central Intelligence, and through him the U. S. Intelligence Board, the National Security Council and the President, with the best possible intelligence on science and technology worldwide, to aid them in the formulation of national security policy.

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Directorate of Science and Technology




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FIGURE 4

(October 1965)



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



Figure 5

THE NRO ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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October 1965



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TOP SECRET

11 Nov 1955

of materiel, existing and newly built facilities at overseas bases and operational support which will probably cost more than the direct operational activities for which we have budgeted. Accordingly, I must recommend to you in the very strongest terms I can employ that we either budget ourselves for the direct cost of this project for Fiscal Year 1957 or set in motion immediately the turn over of the full control of the project to the Air Force. Only a fiscal theorist could even seriously suggest an intermediate alternative.

3. The foregoing recommendation defines the practical question that must be decided at this time. Contemplation of this practical question, however, inevitably involves thought as to what is to be the ultimate fate of AQUATONE (if it turns out to be feasible to continue the operation of this project for a number of years) or of the successor activities which surely must be contemplated if AQUATONE itself turns out to have a short life. Moreover, this question cannot be disentangled from that of the manner in which similar activities are organized and carried out within the Air Force. In short, it is hard to chart a sensible course for AQUATONE without trying to decide how all activities of this sort could best be organized within the U.S. Government.

4. Without attempting to lead you through extensive argumentation, I will summarize my own views on this matter as follows. I might say that these are concurred in by Colonel Ritland and I believe they are regarded as sensible by Colonel Berg.

a. The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby activities of the sort here under discussion are being carried on by USAFE, FEAF, SAC, and ourselves is uneconomic and involves considerable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.

b. The argument against the conduct of overflights by strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of

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T O P S E C R E T

the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization responsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great an extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gathering operations.

c. The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular military services though drawing extensive support from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the common stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as minority stockholders.

d. One further argument in favor of some such arrangement as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission.

5. The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do with the ultimate organization (and by inference, financing) of overflight activities. | Meanwhile, how is AQUATONE to be carried on for another fiscal year? The following considerations, I submit, all suggest that the present arrangement should be continued through Fiscal Year 1957 or until such time as a more permanent arrangement can be arrived at.

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

a. At the present time it would be difficult if not impossible for the Air Force to take over the responsibility for AQUATONE and to carry the project on in anything approaching the present fashion. Air Force procurement procedures differ sharply from those that have been employed in this project. The Air Force is less well organized to make use of a predominantly civilian maintenance and support organization, which has been developed in this case for well considered and solid reasons. Within the Air Force an operational activity of this sort would undoubtedly be made the responsibility of SAC or of another operational command. In this way the project would become a direct military activity and the advantages of plausible denial by the military establishment and of attributability only to the civilian intelligence arm would be lost.

b. Although the present arrangement cannot be regarded as a permanent one, it will take time to evolve either the pattern proposed above, or any other arrangement that will perpetuate certain of the advantages of the present one. The surest way to encourage some sound and well-thought-through plan of overflight organizations is to maintain the status quo long enough (a) to prove (or disprove) the AQUATONE capability and (b) to allow the emergence of a carefully-thought-out plan for the longer run.

c. Regardless of these considerations, grave practical difficulties would confront a shift of responsibility as early as the summer of 1956. The end of this fiscal year will occur only two and a half months after the target date for the initiation of operations. It is vital that command channels and organizational arrangements not be disturbed at that point. Nine or twelve months later it is to be hoped that the organization conducting the project will be seasoned, its equipment accumulated and the phasing out of civilian personnel in favor of the military will be feasible (if it is then desirable). Indeed, the risks involved in a major change some nine and a half months from now are so great that I believe the shift might well be undertaken at once if it is going to have to be made so soon.

6. I am not closing my eyes to the practical problem of getting money from the Bureau of the Budget and from Congress. I would emphasize three points, however, that bear directly upon this ugly task.

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

First: I believe it should be made absolutely clear to the Director of the Budget that, as stated in paragraph 2 above, the issue is not merely a financial one of which Agency shall budget for a required expenditure but is basically one of organization and ultimate responsibility. If the Bureau of the Budget recommends Air Force financing it is in fact making a recommendation about the character of and the responsibility for this project. The issue should be discussed in these terms.

Second: It should be kept in mind at all times by all concerned that we are making a choice between [redacted]

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Third: No matter how the accounts are set up, this project should be supported before the Bureau and before Congress by the Air Force and the CIA jointly and their joint support should be in such terms as to make it unmistakably clear that they are agreed on the urgency of the requirement, the size of the budget, and the organizational arrangements under which the project is being carried on. If this is done, I believe there is little bearing on purely political grounds between one choice of financing and another.

7. In the light of the above I recommend:

a. That you propose to Messrs. Quarles and Gardner that they undertake an examination of the organization of overflight reconnaissance activities, the CIA to join in their discussions insofar as CIA activities and interests are concerned, and that we endeavor to arrive, after full consideration, at a rational and orderly pattern for the longer run.

b. That, pending the outcome of such study, AQUATONE be continued under the present organizational arrangement in Fiscal Year

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T O P S E C R E T

BOARDS, COMMITTEES, PANELS

Science Advisory Committee - advisory to the President. (SAC)
Established under Office of Defense Mobilization by Presidential
order on 20 April 1951.

Reconstituted as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC)
22 November 1957 and effective 1 December 1957 was transferred to
the White House.

ORGANIZATION

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TS 16463
Memo for DCI from ESO [redacted] at time of his leaving the CIA
Subj: Organization for Exploitation of Advanced Technology in
Support of Critical Intelligence Problems

1. My departure from the Agency impels me to go back and review about 15 years involvement with the problem of scientific and technical intelligence, with particular emphasis on electronics as a factor in key national security problems and to make some recommendations concerning the needs of the future in these fields.

2. In the long-term perspective of science and related scientific intelligence since the beginning of World War II, the following points should be borne in mind. The wartime developments in electronics and the application of nuclear energy were the most important scientific contributions to the winning of the war. From the end of the War until the hydrogen reaction was proven by the AEC and until August 1953 when the Soviets first demonstrated their capabilities to explode a fusion device, this field merited first priority, both in r&d and intel with respect to r&d. Electronics, particularly as related to long range navigation and bombing systems and to the r&d of missiles, ran a close second.

3. Once the Soviets demonstrated their capability to produce the reactions which are essential to the production of multi-megaton weapons, the key question became the development of delivery systems, first manned aircraft systems and then missile systems. Electronics became the single most critical technology involved in both systems.

4. The fact that our opponents in the international game do not recognize the importance of electronics much better than we is indicated by a statement made by A. N. Nesneyanov, Pres. of the Academy of Sciences, USSR at the general meeting of the Academy on 26 Dec 1956. He stated, "The most important of the technical sciences, and that which requires first priority development, is radio engineering and electronics." He also said, "...as a whole, in the field of radio electronics we lag considerably behind the leading capitalist countries, especially in the realm of research which opens up new possibilities for engineering."

5. During the War, there was little American scientific-technical intelligence activity worthy of the name carried on within the intelligence organizations of the Army and Navy. American scientific-technical intelligence was largely initiated and guided by the organizations that were consumers of this critical information, i.e. the Manhattan Project, certain divisions of OSRD and the Technical Services or Bureaus of the Army and the Navy. The people in OSRD and the Services who made this effort a success during the War were almost all engineers and scientists from industry and academic life (those in the Services being Reserve Officers) who were managing programs concerned with the development and application of new weapons. The effort was well coordinated through the Committees of the Communications Board under the Joint Chiefs and various informal Service-OSRD Committees. With the end of the War and the return of most of these technical people to civil pursuits, the effort collapsed.

6. Out of the shambles of late 1945 and early 1946 came the Joint Research and Development Board and in early 1947 the Scientific Advisors to the Board reviewed

the situation of scientific and technical intelligence and made it their first priority for attention. This finding was endorsed by the policy group advising the Chairman of the Board (Gen. Norstad and Adm. Sherman). An arrangement was then made with the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, Gen. Vandenberg, under which CIG was to establish a group to provide the Board with scientific intelligence.

7. Today, there is a tremendous effort in scientific and technical intelligence by many of the members of the intelligence community. In the field of ELINT, the Services and the Agency are operating an extensive intelligence collection program, a major coordinating mechanism and a sizeable processing center (to which we are all contributing) at a very large cost to the Government. The efficiency and results, in my opinion, judged against our wartime accomplishments, or the British effort and results, are pitiful.

8. The reason for the generally poor performance is that the United States lacks an effective mechanism for coordinating the conduct of scientific and technical intelligence operations, both in terms of scientific intelligence collection and production, and for the systematic development and application of new scientific and technical methods to general intelligence collection and production problems.

9. The Agency, as presently organized, suffers from the same lack in that there are several separate subdivisions concerned with r&d, with the application of new methods and equipments, and the efforts of many co-equal and independent organizations must be

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coordinated if an effective program is to be launched in any field.

10. The exception to this general situation in both the community and the Agency has been the Agency performance on a recent major project in which the best technical brains of the U.S. were brought to bear under a single, purposeful, effectively managed organization. This activity has had plenty of elbow room to exploit the most advanced technology in all relevant fields. Under this project the Agency in less than 18 months developed an intelligence collection system which has been of inestimable value to the community. The secret of the success of the project is in the unity and freedom of the command and in the very close coupling between three major areas - r&d, operations and the consumer requirements - with the most candid interchange between the three in order that the development of capabilities can exploit the latest in technology in direct response to stated consumer needs. Then operational capabilities and opportunities can be adjusted against requirements and new research and development on a continuing basis.

11. The potential of science and technology as an aid to intelligence operations required to meet the highest priority of national intelligence objectives can not be overestimated, and with arms inspection or other possible major changes in the situation of East versus West, continuing knowledge on the part of U.S. planners of the technological capabilities and plans of the Soviet orbit continues to increase in importance.

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12. The Agency can make a unique contribution to the application of advanced technology to collecting the vital information needed to produce this intelligence. To accomplish this, however, the Agency needs to establish some sort of continuing single organization which can bring together the three key areas of intelligence activity aforementioned; i.e., requirements, r&d, and operations. This whole effort should then be supported by a continuing operations research organization (not unlike those now considered essential by the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Secretary of Defense) to apply the latest in operations analysis and research techniques to the problems that baffle us in intelligence.

13. Such an over-all organization should have wide latitude to exploit new methods such as advanced ELINT, communications intelligence, photographic, radar, infra-red, sonic or seismic and possibly other sensing systems needed to maintain surveillance of Soviet programs such as the IRBM and ICBM missile systems, the air defense system, etc.

14. An organization within the Agency to accomplish this challenging mission cannot be established as an appendage to DD/P, DD/I or DD/S. Rather it must be an independent continuing operation similar to the ACUATONE project which has demonstrated anew practices proven by the Manhattan District, our major electronics projects and most of our scientific intelligence projects during World War II.

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6.

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15. Such an organization within the Agency should be headed by a Deputy Director for possibly "New Intelligence Systems". He should be either a top scientist or engineer or someone like the present Special Assistant for Policy and Coordination who understands these matters well and can be assisted by a Deputy who has the scientific and technical qualifications and is responsible for r&d and technical planning. The organization should include those parts of the current DD/I, DD/P and DD/S functions which deal with scientific-technical requirements, research and development and operations in technical intelligence collection methods.

16. The survival of the West may well rest on the Agency's ability to establish such a program and see it through to success.

[Redacted]

ELINT Staff Officer

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KISTIAKOWSKY, George B.

Served as Spec Asst to Pres.(DDE)for Science and Technology
" " Chairman of Sci. Adv. Committee (SAC) at same time
15 July 1959 - 20 January 1961

6 Jan 1961 DDE letter to GBK accept his resignation eff 20 Jan 61

Sci. Adv. Comm establ
20 Apr 1951 (Truman)
advisory to the Pres.
& to the Off of Def. Mobil.
in matters relating to
scient. R&D for defense.

Dr. James Rhyne Killian

? 9 Oct 1954, ODM established Technical Capabilities Panel
Killian named Chairman of "Surprise Attack" Committee,
by Arthur S. Fleming, ~~XXXXX~~ Director of ODM.
(check NYT, 9 Oct 54, p. 10, col. 1)

13 Jan 1956, Killian ~~na~~ announced by DDE as head of Pres. Bd.
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
8 Nov 1957, appointed Spec Asst to Pres. for S&T (DDE)

16 November 1957, sworn in as SA to Pres. for S&T

21 Aug 1958, named to attend the Geneva Conference on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

7 Feb 1960 Appt. ~~✓~~
Spring 1960 - served on Commission on National Goals (DDE)

10 Jan 1961 - Resigned from Sci. Adv. Com.

2 May 1961 - Dr. Killian named Chairman of PFIAB by JFK.
Reestablishment of PFIAB by JFK viewed as attempt to restore
confidence in CIA after U-2 and Bay of Pigs, and to ward off
attempts to establish a Congressional watch-dog committee
to oversee CIA's activities.

~~8~~

24 Apr 1963 - Resignation from PFIAB effective, Clark M.
Clifford followed him as Chairman of PFIAB.

SCIENCE PANEL SET UP

Federal Group to Study Ways to Mobilize Resources

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 8.—A panel of scientists to study more effective ways of mobilizing scientific resources in the event of an emergency is being set up by the Office of Defense Mobilization, it was announced today. Arthur E. Flemming, head of the defense agency, said he had named James R. Killian Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to head the panel.

After the panel submits its report, probably several months from now, it will be reviewed by the O. D. M. science advisory committee and Mr. Flemming said then will be submitted to the President.

The panel will be made up of engineers and scientists from universities, industry and various Federal agencies, it was added.

POST FOR KILLIAN CONFIRMED BY U.S.

White House Announces New Central Intelligence Panel

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8.—The White House announced today that the Central Intelligence Agency will name a new board to replace the one headed by Dr. James R. Killian Jr. of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was named in 1953 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The White House press secretary said today.

The board of monitors, established in 1953, has been inactive since President Dwight D. Eisenhower left office. Dr. Killian will replace its former chairman, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. Gen. LeMay, former commander of the United States forces in the Far East, General Hull, it is understood, will remain as a member of the board, but the rest of the membership, which will be revised, remains uncertain.

Reactivation of the board is regarded here as part of an attempt to restore confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency and to dampen demands for closer Congressional supervision and investigation that might subject the agency to a reorganization.

A Senate resolution to create a joint Congressional "watchdog" committee to keep the intelligence agency under permanent Congressional supervision is attracting considerable Congressional support. The measure is sponsored by Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota.

Several similar resolutions have been introduced in the House of Representatives. The latest was introduced today by Mr. Hiestand, Republican of California.

Mr. Hiestand said it was wrong to have the Central Intelligence Agency alone for the "mess" of the unsuccessful rebel landings in Cuba last month. He added, Congress should create a situation in which the agency operates "unhindered" and "unfettered" and "uncontrolled" and "unmonitored".

His Republican counterpart, Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, in a talk yesterday at the National Press Club, spoke strongly against any move for a Congressional investigation of the agency in light of the Cuban affair and showed little enthusiasm for the "watchdog" committee.

If there has to be a Congressional study, he said, it should be conducted by "a few men of knowledge and discernment" representing both parties, who might make "a quiet investigation" and report to the President.

For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R0004

PRESIDENT NAMES BOARD TO REVIEW U. S. INTELLIGENCE

Killian Heads Watchdog Unit That Will Check on C.I.A. and Other Agencies

By ANTHONY LEVIERO

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13—

President Eisenhower announced a watchdog board of eight citizens today to monitor the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and other units gathering security information.

The President acted on a recommendation of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, headed by former President Herbert Hoover.

The part-time board of eight members will have the duty to "supervise and coordinate the activities of the various committees and subcommittees."

The President also desired that the board meet not less than once every six months for several days at a time.

The James R. Killian Jr. president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was named chairman of the board.

Other members of the board include the former director of the Air Force Research and Development Command, Benjamin F. Foy, director and member of the Senate Intelligence Committee of the 85th Congress.

Other members of the board include the former president of the Manufacturing Chemists Association, Joseph P. Kennedy Sr., former Ambassador to Portugal, Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of State, and Edward L. Rusk, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Other members of the board include the former chairman of the National Science Foundation, Harold Stearns.

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President Selects Killian To Oversee Intelligence

By WALLACE CARROLL
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, May 2—President Kennedy has selected Dr. James R. Killian Jr. to lead the permanent Presidential board that monitors the Government's foreign intelligence activities. Dr. Killian is chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The selection is the latest of a number of steps taken by President Kennedy to restore confidence in the intelligence services after last month's unsuccessful attempt to set off a counter-revolution in Cuba.

There were two developments relating to intelligence problems today on Capitol Hill:

1. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session questioned Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, on the agency's role in the Cuban rebel landings. The committee also questioned Richard M. Bissell Jr., a deputy director who was in general charge of the Cuban operation.

Support increased in the Senate for a resolution introduced by Eugene McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, to set up a joint congressional committee to "watchdog" over the Government's intelligence and information programs.

The House of Advisors

The post for which President Kennedy has selected Dr. Killian is the chairmanship of the permanent board of advisors on foreign intelligence, established in 1957 by President Eisenhower to keep permanent watch over the Central Intelligence Agency and all other agencies engaged in foreign intelligence.

Dr. Killian was the board's first chairman and served from 1955 to 1958. He was succeeded by Gen. John E. Hull (retired), former commander of the United States forces in the Far East and president of the Manufacturing Chemists Association. Now he will succeed General Hull.

Other members of the board are Dr. William O. Baker, vice president for research, Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Dr. Robert A. Serber, director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

Continued on Page 5, Column 5

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1961

KILLIAN RECEIVES INTELLIGENCE POST



Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

phone Laboratories, Murray Hill, N. J.; Admiral Richard L. Conolly, president of Long Island University, Greenvale, L. I.; Colgate W. Darden, former Governor of Virginia, Norfolk, Va.

Also Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle, chairman of the board, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Los Angeles; Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, New York, and Edward L. Ryerson, former chairman of the Inland Steel Company, Chicago.

Some of these members will be replaced by President Kennedy. The new board will be announced in a few days.

The board is a continuing body and is supposed to report to the President every six months. It is thus distinct from the temporary group under Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, whom the President appointed to conduct an investigation of the intelligence activities with special reference to the Cuban landing.

President Eisenhower set up the board for two purposes.

The first was to meet criticisms of a Hoover Commission task force that found a number of administrative weaknesses in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The second was to head off just such a move in Congress as that now under way to set up a congressional "watchdog committee" over the intelligence services.

The board's principal concern was the Central Intelligence Agency, but it was also asked to keep watch on at least thirty other intelligence activities, including those conducted by the

CHIEF OF BOARD: Dr. James R. Killian Jr., to head the board monitoring the Government's foreign intelligence activities.

armed services, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and some units of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Eisenhower Opposed Unit

General Eisenhower was unalterably opposed to a Congressional watchdog committee. So was the Central Intelligence Agency director, Mr. Dulles.

This presidential opposition and the personal popularity of Mr. Dulles in Congress helped to defeat a Senate resolution in 1956 to set up such a committee.

The resolution was introduced by Senator Mike Mans-

field, Democrat of Massachusetts, who introduced a bill in the United States Mr. Dulles had been named and a

The bill was passed by the Eisenhower administration. It was based on the very first day Kennedy would not object to Soviet

joint Congressional committee. The handling of this incident involved the agency in much criticism at the time. The attempt to overthrow Premier Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba revived and increased Congressional uneasiness over the agency's activities.

Congressional concern over the Central Intelligence Agency arises from the fact that it is one of the few Government agencies that largely avoid Congressional scrutiny. It is also one of the agencies that by the nature of its mysterious operations can involve the United States in the most serious embarrassments and risks.

BOURGUIBA DUE IN U.S. Opens Tour Today—Will Ask Investment in Tunisia

MONTEREAL, May 2 (Canadian Press) — President Habib Bourguiba made a brief visit to Montreal today near the end of his two-day visit to Canada.

At a news conference before he flew back to Ottawa, the North African leader discussed his forthcoming tour of the United States, which begins tomorrow. He said one purpose of the trip was to invite extensive American investment in Tunisia.

Mr. Bourguiba said he hoped that the investment "might be in the order of \$600,000,000 dinars [\$1,920,000,000] over the next ten years." [A dispatch printed in The New York Times Monday quoted Mr. Bourguiba as having said his ten-year program for economic and social development of Tunisia had a budget of \$800,000,000.]

Size of Staff Secret

Its budget and the size of its staff are secret. Only a few members of Congress have an idea of how much money it receives and spends. Its headquarters staff is scattered throughout Washington in thirty or more buildings but it will eventually move into a new building almost as large as the Pentagon on the Virginia side of the Potomac.

One of its projects that became known was the development of the U-2 plane, equipped to take remarkably clear pictures of ground installations from great altitudes.

These planes were used over the Soviet Union to take pictures of rocket launching sites and other military and industrial installations.

A Correction

The name of Herbert W. Mintz, a lawyer, of 217 Broadway, was misspelled in the list of lawyers admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, which was published yesterday in The Times.

New York Times

LATE CITY EDITION
 Weather Bureau Report: Fair and cool today. Partly fair and seasonable tomorrow.
 Temp. range: 70-52 Yesterday: 74-55

NEW YORK, SUNDAY

SECTION ONE
TWENTY-FIVE CENTS



HARRIS & EWING
PRESENTS PROPOSALS:
 Dr. James R. Killian Jr.,
 head of President's Science
 Advisory Committee.

U.S. SCIENCE UNIT ADVISORY BOARD EDUCATION

Training Is Vital
 Survival of Nation
ADULT STUDY STRESSED
 Millian Group Asks Higher
 Intellectual Content for
 Courses in All Fields

Enclosure's Statement and
 Summary of Report, Page 14.

BY BESS FURMAN

WASHINGTON, May 23 — President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee reconvened today that the nation's education system must be improved at least as much as the

Education for the Age of Science" the committee said. "A broad base of education is needed to make America a better place in which to live—and a stronger nation more likely to survive."

The committee, headed by Dr. James R. Killian Jr., the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. The report was prepared by the committee's nine-member panel on science and engineering education.

The report noted that the American people were spending about 4 per cent of the Gross National Product on education—roughly \$18,000,000,000

year. Doubling our current annual investment in education is

Address Recalled

...repre... of the... upon science in education that the President initiated in his Oklahoma City speech on Nov. 13, 1957, following the launching of the Soviet earth satellite.

But the authors of the report made clear that all education, and not merely science education, must be strengthened. There must, the report said, be higher intellectual content in high school and college courses and a modernization of textbooks if American scientists and engineers are to meet today's world competition. It opposed "frill" courses.

Moreover, the report urged science education for adults as well as high school and college students. More knowledge of science, the committee held, is essential to the making of decisions on public policy questions that will confront citizens in the next few years.

The report, which was held by educators, stated that personal achievement and

...SUNDAY, MAY

OUTLAYS ON SCHOOLS URGED

...Page 1, Col. 8
...at the expense of intellectual subjects. It held that in teacher training more stress must be placed on knowledge of subject and less on methods of teaching.

TALENTED YOUTH:—

There is no need for gifted students to take twelve years to complete public school and four years to complete college. Often two or more years can be saved. Highest priority should be given to seeking talented youths to be science teachers and leaders.

WOMEN:—

Women constitute an enormous potential source for research, science and teaching which has not even begun to be tapped. They should begin consciously to assist them to make full use of the talents of which they are so rich. Girls and women should be brought into science education.

SCIENCE TEACHERS

...of atoms and molecules. Subjects can properly engage to 20 percent of every student's time. A general laureate degree should not be held behind. They

...by reading their non-routine tasks, including the... providing them with... teaching aids and a higher... minority status.

SCIENCE MAJORS

...minimum secondary school requirements, a science major should bring to college should be four years of English, two of science, three of one modern language, and two of social studies including history.

SCIENCE IN LIBERAL ARTS

...Courses are needed to help a student think his way through and appreciate such great concepts as the origin and evolution of the universe and of life, the nature and behavior of energy and matter, and radiation and the structure of atoms and molecules. Such subjects can properly engage to 20 percent of every student's time. A general laureate degree should not be held behind. They

...REPORT

...The report says that... education in science... and requires... More good... publications on science... with their circulation...

...REPORT

...The report says that... education in science... and requires... More good... publications on science... with their circulation...

...REPORT

...The report says that... education in science... and requires... More good... publications on science... with their circulation...

Psychiatric Facility Dedicated

Stockbridge, Mass., May 23—The Austen Riggs Center this morning dedicated its new building for psychiatric research and treatment. The structure is named for the late Dr. Austen Fox Riggs, a psychiatrist who in 1906 developed a rehabilitation program for the mentally ill.

The CIA Organizational Chart following the 1949 reorganization of the Agency indicated that scientific intelligence had advanced in priority to the extent that it ranked then as one of six "Offices" reporting through its own Assistant Director to the DCI. The Office of Scientific Intelligence constituted four staffs (Scientific Services, Administrative, Coordinating, and Production Staffs), and seven substantive branches (Biology, Physics and Electronics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Statistics, Aeronautics, Ordnance, and Navigation).

The ~~substantive~~ functions of OSI as shown in the 1949 Table of Organization were:

As the CIA component with primary responsibility for scientific intelligence analysis, evaluation, production and presentation, the Office of Scientific Intelligence under the direction of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence:

1. Prepares scientific intelligence reports and estimates designed to present and interpret the status, progress and significance of foreign scientific research and developments which affect the capabilities and potentials of all foreign nations.
2. Makes substantive review of basic scientific intelligence produced by other agencies and advises ORE [Office of Reports and Estimates] on its adequacy for inclusion in the National Intelligence Surveys.
3. Formulates the national scientific intelligence objectives in collaboration with the IAC agencies [State, Army, Navy, Air Force, AEC, JIG/JS] and under the guidance of the NSC.
4. Evaluates available scientific intelligence information and intelligence; assesses its adequacy, accuracy and timeliness and prepares reports of assessments for the guidance of collection, source exploitation and producing agencies to assure that all significant fields of scientific intelligence bearing on the national security are adequately covered.

5. Formulates requirements for the collection and exploitation of scientific intelligence data in order to insure receipt of materials necessary for fulfillment of production requirements.

6. In collaboration with appropriate CIA components and the IAC agencies, advises and aids in the development coordination and execution of the overall plans and policies for inter-agency scientific intelligence production.

7. Advises the Director of Central Intelligence on programs, plans, policies and procedures for the production of national scientific intelligence.

8. Assists ICAPS [Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff *] in preparation of plans, policies, and procedures for interagency scientific intelligence coordination.

The July 1950 Table of Organization added to the AD/SI's functions that of providing chairmanship and support for the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC) and its working committees.

The December 1950 T/O showed the addition of two Deputy Directors (Operations and Administration), but OSI and the other five "Offices" still reported directly to the DCI through the DDCI. At that time OSI consisted of one Staff (Plans and Production) and eight Divisions. An additional function had been formalized: the provision of scientific and technical estimates, reports, and guidance to non-intelligence agencies such as the Research and Development Board, the Weapons systems Evaluation Group, and the National Security Resources Board.

* Forerunner of USEIB (?)

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OSI Develops

The CIA organizational chart of 15 October 1947 showed Scientific Branch under the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, consisting of six "Groups:" Nuclear Energy, Air, Munitions, Chemistry and Biology, Electronics, and Technical. As a result of the pressures generated by high-level investigations and recommendations for improvement of scientific intelligence, the 1948 reorganization undertaken within CIA included the enlargement of the Scientific Branch through consolidation of all scientific activities at a higher organizational level as the Office of Scientific Intelligence.

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External pressure of high level boards and committees

1946 (fall) CIG's Office of Research and Evaluation at the insistence of JRDB established a small Scientific Branch within the Estimates Division, which later inherited the talents of the Foreign Intelligence Branch of MED (the Nuclear Energy Group) on 28 March 1947. A year later the NEG went over to OSO of CIA which operated the Clandestine Services.

In 1948 the Hoover Commission's Eberstadt Committee expressed concern in a report to the President (on its own findings and as a result of testimony given to it by the JRDB in the persons of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, and Mr. Ralph L. Clark, Director of the Programs Division, JRDB.

Parallel with the Eberstadt Committee's review of U.S. intelligence capabilities, a group appointed by the National Security Council was also looking into the U.S. need for more and better scientific intelligence and recommended centralization and/or closer coordination among all agencies, and a strengthening of the Scientific Branch in CIA.

As a result of these pressures, when the CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and began to reorganize the assets inherited from the C.I.G.,
.....

The NEG on 5 March 1948 was transferred to the Office of Special Operations, the clandestine side of CIA, in deference to the sensitive nature of nuclear energy operations; after OSI was established effective 1 January 1949, the NEG was transferred to OSI on 1 January 1949.

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Date + order no. establishing
Scient. Br. in ORE, Estimates Div., of C.I.G.
[redacted] listed 12 Aug 1948, as Ch/SB -

STAT

Date + order no. establishing
OSI in DD/I -
31 Dec 1948, OSI established,
under DCI, replacing Scient. Br. -
eff. 1 Jan. 1949 =

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9

Jt. Research and Development Board re-established as Research and Development Board by PL 253, 80th Congress, 1st Session, and placed in the National Military Establishment, set up under the National Security Act of 1947; the JRDB then ceased to exist. All its records and personnel were transferred to the new RDB.

26 July 1947

The NSA of 1947 ordered that all personnel, records, and property of the C. I. G. ~~xxx~~ be transferred to the CIA, and the CIG ceased to exist. (Transfer took until August __, 1947 when CIA *re-established.*)

Atomic Energy Commission, established by Atomic Energy Act of 1946, approved 1 August 1946.

President Truman favored replacing military control over atomic energy with civilian control.

U.S. Army control of the assets of the Manhattan District of Army Engineers passed to the newly-appointed Atomic Energy Commission on 29 October 1946.

(See NYT, 29 Oct 1946, page 1, col. 6)

(USA/AAF)

Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, /named Director of Central Intelligence 10 June 1946; returned to Army 30 Apr 1947.

RAdm. Sidney W. Souers, appointed first Director of Central Intelligence by Presidential letter (Truman) on 23 January 1946.

L. Gen , Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9

National Intelligence Authority

Combined intelligence services of State, War, Navy and the White House in a manner so that the information will be available to all four for the transaction of Government business.

"Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities, 22 January 1946" - President Truman.

Souers appointed first DCI under the NIA, which also established the interim CIG.

STAT The Foreign Intelligence Branch of Manhattan Engineering District (MED) transferred to C.I.G. 25 February 1947 and assigned to Scientific Branch as the Nuclear Energy Group by order of the DDCI 28 March 1947 /taken from History of OSI, [redacted] TS/(pages 3-4). On 5 March 1948 it was reassigned to OSO, the Office which controlled the Clandestine Services of CIA.

Hillenkoetter in _____ 1948 agreed with Dr. Bush of RDB that the old agreement between JRDB and CIG be set aside; Bush felt the scientific intelligence furnished the Board had not been adequate and continued to push for a greater effort and better organization for producing scientific intelligence.

US Government Organization Manual 1946 First Edition

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The National Intelligence Authority was established by Presidential directive of January 22, 1946. The directive designated as members of the Authority the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and one other person to be named by the President as his personal representative.

The directive also provided for a Central Intelligence Group, to be composed of persons assigned from the Departments of State, War, and Navy, under a Director of Central Intelligence, and for an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.

Purpose.—The National Intelligence Authority was established to plan, develop, and coordinate Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security.

Approved.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS
 Director of Central Intelligence

Office of Price Administration

Federal Office Building 1, Second and D Streets SW.
 REpublic 7590

OFFICIALS

Administrator-----	PAUL A. PORTER
Executive Assistant to the Administrator-----	MAURICE W. LEE
Deputy Administrator-----	JAMES G. ROGERS, JR.
Assistant to the Administrator-----	MAX McCULLOUGH
Assistant to the Administrator-----	LEON BOSCH
Assistant to the Administrator-----	JOSEPH A. KERSHAW
Assistant to the Administrator in charge of Price Boards-----	CHARLES H. ABBOTT

V. WYATT
 Housing Agency

Pre-NIA

Public Papers of the Præsidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945. USGPO, Washington: 1961; pp. 293-294; Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period. September 6, 1945. Item 128.

Under Point 12. Research --

Truman asked Congress to adopt legislation for establish~~ing~~ ment of a single federal research agency which would, among other functions "Promote and support fundamental research and development projects in all matters pertaining to the defense and security of the nation." He asked the OSRD and the Research Board for National Security to continue their work in the interim.

Office of Scientific Research and Development, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, created within the Office for Emergency Management by Executive Order 8807, 28 June 1941, for the purpose of assuring adequate provision for research on scientific and medical problems relating to the national defense. The Manhattan Project, for one, was set up originally under OSRD during its research period, prior to the time when the Army Engineers were given the job of construction.

Most of the scientific talent available for government service during the war had returned to civilian pursuits as their wartime agencies were deactivated. Continued government employment would have meant further financial sacrifice to many of them, even had the government been organized to make use of their talents.

BACKGROUND

Scientific Intelligence - World War II to Establishment of CIA

During World War II, American scientific and technical intelligence was largely initiated and guided by the organizations that were consumers of this critical information, i.e., the Manhattan Project, certain divisions of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and the technical services of the Army and the Navy. The people who made these efforts successful were principally engineers and scientists from industry and the academic world, and Reserve Officers from the military services, who managed programs concerned mainly with the development and application of new weapons. Coordination of these activities was handled through various committees and boards under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as informal Service/OSRD committees. With the end of the war and the return of most of the people who had served in these war-connected activities to their civil pursuits, the U.S. Government's scientific intelligence effort came near disintegration. 1/

On the initiative of the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) was established 6 June 1946, with Dr. Vannevar Bush as Chairman, and with the purpose to advise the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy in fields of scientific research related to national defense. One of the first matters reviewed by this Board was the current status of scientific and technical intelligence. As a

result, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)* under the direction of General Hoyt S. Vendenberg was asked to establish a unit under its cognizance which would provide the JRDB with scientific intelligence. With the passage of the National Security Act of 26 July 1947, this CIG unit along with all CIG's personnel, property and records was transferred to the new Central Intelligence Agency.

The first CIA Organization Chart, dated 15 October 1947, provided for a "Scientific Branch" under the Assistant Director of the Office of Reports and Estimates, who reported directly to the DCI. Functions assigned the Scientific Branch were:

1. As the fundamental intelligence evaluation, research, and production unit dealing with scientific matters, acts as the intelligence agency of the Research and Development Board** and of the Atomic Energy Commission and such other scientific agencies as may be assigned.

2. Formulates the National Intelligence Requirements relating to scientific matters and forwards requests for intelligence information calculated to fulfill these requirements.

3. Evaluates all available intelligence information and intelligence relating to scientific matters; assesses its adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness and utilizes it in the production of scientific intelligence in accordance with the Intelligence Production Plan.

The original Scientific Branch consisted of six "Groups" dealing principally with military fields of science: Nuclear Energy, Air, Munitions, Chemistry

* Established 5 Feb 46.

** Successor to JRDB.

and Biology, Electronics, and Technical Groups. The first major reorganization of CIA in 1948 advanced scientific intelligence in organizational priority to equal rank with the five other major areas of activity in which CIA was engaged. Each of the six "Offices" was headed by an Assistant Director, reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. The Office of Scientific Intelligence at the time of its establishment in January 1949, was made up of four staffs (Scientific Services, Administrative, Collection, and Production Staffs), and seven substantive branches (Biology, Physics and Electronics, Chemistry, Medical, "A" Branch (for Comint exploitation), Ordnance and Navigation).