


**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 November 1982

Mr. Laurence G. Pickering  
Director, Office of Systematic Review  
Bureau of Administration  
The Department of State  
Room 1239, New State Building  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Larry:

In response to your request, we discussed Ambassador Peurifoy's telegram dated December 23, 1953 with the Latin American Division in the Directorate of Operations. This document appears on pages 764 and 765 of the galley proofs for Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Volume IV "The American Republics," and is classified SECRET. All of the essential points contained in this telegram have been described previously in unofficial and unclassified histories, including "The Declassified Eisenhower." 25X1  
25X1



Sincerely,



Chief, Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Directorate of Administration 25X1

Enclosures:

- 1. Galley Proofs pgs 764-766
- 2. "The Declassified Eisenhower"

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee w/encls
- 1 - FRUS, Vol IV, 1952-54 w/encls
- 1 - Liaison w/State w/o encls
- 1 - Chrono w/o encls

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

25 October 1982

Mr. Laurence G. Pickering  
Director, Office of Systematic Review  
Bureau of Administration  
The Department of State  
Room 1239, New State Building  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Larry:

The Classification Review Division and the Operations Directorate have reviewed your proposed revisions (see enclosure) to the Subject Guidelines for the Review of Department of State Intelligence Information (1950-54), which refine the indicators of intelligence information, and we are in complete agreement with them.

Sincerely,



Chief, Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Directorate of Administration

STAT

Enclosure:  
Proposed Revisions to Guidelines

Distribution:  
Orig - Addressee w/encl  
1 - Liaison w/State w/encl  
1 - Chrono w/o encl



STAT

Proposed Revisions to Guidelines

During the 1950-54 period the Office of the Special Assistant - Intelligence (R) and its subordinate components produced a great number of reports and other material. Many of the formal reports of the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) were labeled "intelligence reports" or "intelligence research reports," as opposed to "policy" reports, in order that "R" could express its independent judgment and conclusions without having to clear its reports with the substantive bureaus. Some of the "intelligence reports" produced by OIR referred to or included information that originated from the intelligence activities of other agencies or foreign governments. However, other "intelligence reports" of OIR merely reflected the analysis and judgment of the OIR analysts based solely on public knowledge and Foreign Service reporting. The reports during this period carried no special indicators which might warn of the use of sensitive intelligence information including that which was obtained from other agencies or foreign governments.

INDICATORS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The following terms, symbols, or types of documents usually indicate the presence of intelligence information in a document. Documents in category 1a below (consisting mainly of reports by the Office of Intelligence Research in "R") should be carefully reviewed but should be referred to the Department of State for further review only if they contain indicators listed in category 2 or information listed under Categories of Intelligence Information. Documents containing one or more of the indicators in category 2 require further review by the Department of State.

1. Indicators Not Requiring Automatic Review by Department of State
  - a. Documents produced by INR's predecessor (Special Assistant - Intelligence (R)) and its subsidiary offices and divisions, especially the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR). (See the last paragraph of the Introduction.)
2. Indicators Requiring Further Review by the Department of State
  - a. Documents or information which are clearly labeled "Intelligence" (except for item 1a. above) or which refer specifically to covert, clandestine, or intelligence activities, sources, or methods as described below under Categories of Intelligence Information.
  - b. Documents or information generated by intelligence organizations of the U.S. (excluding item 1a. above) or foreign governments.

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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Subject Guidelines for the Review of  
Department of State Intelligence Information, 1950-1954

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of these subject guidelines is to aid in the identification of indicators and categories of information on intelligence activities, sources and methods which should be referred to the Department of State for further review; however, these guidelines provide no authority to declassify any information. The guidelines cover all intelligence information of whatever origin found in records of the Department of State for the period 1950-1954 as well as intelligence information generated by the Department of State which may be found in the records of other government agencies or departments. If there is any question as to whether a document contains information falling within these guidelines, the document should be referred to the Department of State for review. (U)

These guidelines are to be applied in the context of the "Guidelines for Systematic Review of Department of State Records Dated 1950-54" and of any other pertinent country or subject guideline for that period. An intelligence-related document usually needs to be reviewed also in the light of other subject or country guidelines. (U)

During World War II the United States built up a large foreign intelligence program, of which the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) handled most of the overall coordination and analysis. With the end of the war two important branches of the OSS were transferred to the Department of State by Executive Order effective October 1, 1945 with the aim of making State the chief intelligence coordinator of the U.S. Government. In January, 1946 however, State lost its interdepartmental intelligence coordinating role, and a much smaller departmental organization was established under a Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (its symbol was SA-MC: SA for Special Assistant, and MC for Alfred McCormack who held the position). In 1947 the intelligence unit was strengthened again, and in 1948 W. Park Armstrong, Jr., was named Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence with the organizational symbol of "R". From 1950 through 1956 the organization of the unit was as follows:

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RDS-3 10/29/91 (Pickering, Laurence G.)

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Page 2

Office of the Special Assistant - Intelligence (R)  
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)  
(Broken down into geographic and functional  
Divisions which produced analytical  
intelligence and reports)

Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition (OLI)  
Division of Acquisition and Distribution (IAD)  
(Included CIA and Military Liaison Branches)

Division of Biographic Information  
(With Geographic branches)


Division of Library and Reference Services (LR)  
(U)

INDICATORS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The following terms, symbols, or characteristics usually indicate the presence of intelligence information in a document. A document with one or more of the following indicators (except for the first item) should be referred to the Department of State for review; documents produced by INR's predecessor should be reviewed in the light of the categories of intelligence information listed below. (U)

1. Documents produced by INR's predecessor: Special Assistant - Intelligence (R), and its subsidiary offices and divisions. (U)
2. Documents or information which are clearly labeled "intelligence" or which refer specifically to covert, clandestine, or intelligence activities, sources, or methods. (U)
3. Documents or information generated by intelligence organizations of the U.S. or foreign governments. (U). 25X1

4.



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
Page 3

5. Communications addressed primarily to U.S. Intelligence Community agencies or to foreign government intelligence agencies. (U)
6. Documents marked with four or five letter code words in addition to the normal security classification, or which have special markings such as "Handle Via \_\_\_\_\_ Channels Only". Such markings generally indicate the presence of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which is defined as information and material requiring restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems. (U)

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10. Documents carrying one or more markings intended to control its use and dissemination. The appearance of one or more of the following controls on a document indicates that intelligence information is included therein (these controls were used prior to 1962 in conjunction with a classification marking): (U)

INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY (i.e. CIA, State, Defense FBI, AEC, and military intelligence units)  
LIMITED (same as INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS ONLY, but limited to full-time employees excluding consultants and contractors)  
NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (U)

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Page 4

11. Documents which carry any of the following Department of State file numbers (usually in the right-hand margin):

101.21  
102.31  
103.1102  
121.\*\*3  
122.\*\*\*3  
123  
700.52  
711.5200 (E)  
711.5200 (FAMILY)

Note that these files are sometimes followed by additional numbers to indicate further filing divisions. (U)

CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

A. Intelligence Activities

1. Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Classified information which identifies, describes or comments on any aspect of the past present or proposed foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including the participation of any U.S. Government or foreign government agency or personnel. This includes, but is not limited to, "special activities" which are defined in Section 4-212 of E.O. 12036 as:

"activities conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives which are designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad and which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including diplomatic activity or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions". (U)

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Page 5

2. Intelligence Organizations and Programs. Classified information on the organizational structure, number and assignments of personnel, size and composition of budget, security (procedures, techniques and activities), training and personnel (policies, methods, sites, techniques and materials), and communications (policies, methods and security) of any intelligence agency, as well as any other classified data which could reveal the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities, degree of success, scope or thrust of any intelligence agency activity, including the missions, functions and locations of such agency components or installations which are under any form of cover. Information pertaining to contractual relationships with private individuals, commercial concerns, or non-governmental institutions or entities which such a relationship involves a specific intelligence interest, or reveals the extent of knowledge of technical expertise possessed by an intelligence agency or when disclosure of the relationship could jeopardize the contractor's willingness or ability to provide services to such an agency. (U)
3. Cooperation with foreign government intelligence agencies regarding intelligence activities, sources and methods. This includes the confirmation of the fact of such cooperation. (U)
4.


25X1

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Page 6

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B. Intelligence Sources

Information which could reveal or identify intelligence sources, whether a person, organization, group, technical system, mechanism, device or any other means or instrument. This includes references to specific governments as the source of intelligence information. (U)

C. Intelligence Methods and Techniques

1. Classified information which could reveal or identify the existence, nature, scope, target, and degree of success of (a) techniques, procedures, and equipment employed for clandestine and covert operations or communications; (b) human and technical surveillance and counter-surveillance devices, strategies, and operations; (c) the recruitment, training, compensation, and method of operation of intelligence agents; (d) escape and evasion techniques; and (e) handling of sensitive defector cases. (U)

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Page 7

3. Classified information on intelligence support activities, including the assignments, travel, and activities of covert American intelligence personnel. However, information on overt intelligence activities -- such as travel expense vouchers of military attaches -- does not require protection beyond 20 years. The identification of individuals whose connection with covert organizations has been officially acknowledged by the U.S. Intelligence Community needs no continued protection.

4. Signals Intelligence, Photographic Intelligence, Cryptography and Related Activities. Information concerning or revealing the process, techniques, technical material or equipment, sites, facilities, particular operations, and overall scope of signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and cryptographic security, including documents which came from the collection or exploitation of foreign signals and thus reveal the direction and success of such efforts. Some of this material may be SCI-see item 6 in the Indicators of Intelligence Information. (U)

Attachment:

Special Guidelines for Declassification Review of  
Special Program Materials.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

27 September 1982

Barbara Ennis  
Director, Policy Development and  
Coordination Staff  
Classification/Declassification  
Center (A/CDC)

Dear Ms. Ennis:

This is in response to your memorandum of 9 July 1982, regarding "Microform Project - Secretary's Appointments 1950-52," in which you requested concurrence for the release of four items. We have reviewed the four items and have no objection to the release of the following:

- a. The biographic data statement on Walther Moreira Salles, Brazilian Ambassador Designate to the U.S., dated 5 June 1952;
- b. The memorandum from Durward V. Sandifer to the Secretary of State concerning the subject "Your Meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles," dated 29 August 1952;
- c. The memorandum from Durward V. Sandifer to the Secretary of State concerning the subject "Meeting with Members of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament," dated 5 September 1952.

We have determined that the fourth document, a biographic data statement on Jacques Nicolas Leger, may not be released at this time. Executive Order 12356 exemptions Sec 1.3(a)(4) and (5) apply.

Your copies of the four documents are returned herewith.

Sincerely,



Chief, Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Directorate of Administration

25X1

Enclosures

- 1. Memo dtd 6/5/52
- 2. Memo dtd 8/29/52
- 3. Memo dtd 9/5/52

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee w/encls
- 1 - Liaison w/State w/encls
- 1 - Chrono w/o encls

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM  
ENCLOSURES

SECRET

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED

ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)  
Request for Concurrence in Release STAT

<b>FROM:</b> DDA/OIS/IPD 1107 Ames Bldg.	<b>EXTENSION</b>  	<b>NO.</b>  	STAT
		<b>DATE</b> 10 September 1982	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)	
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED			
1. Chief, CRD Attn: <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 50px; height: 15px;"></span> 322 Ames Bldg.	21 Sept 82			The attached State Department documents were sent to our office by mistake.	STAT
2. <i>C/EB</i>		21 Sept			STAT
3.					STAT
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					



~~State to the recipient~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

IPD Registry

~~FBI 0331~~

25X1

JUL 13 11 47 AM '82 Rec'd in IPD

F

JUL -9 1982

D'

SECRET

(Unclassified When Removed  
From Attachments)

MEMORANDUM

TO:

[Redacted]

25X1

Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM:

Barbara Ennis *B per 92*  
Director, Policy Development and  
Coordination Staff  
Classification/Declassification  
Center (A/CDC)

SUBJECT: Request for Concurrence in Release

The attached Department of State documents appear to be of interest to your agency. They are part of a file on the "Secretary's Appointments, 1950-52" which the Historical Office of the Department of State wishes to publish as a microform supplement to Foreign Relations of the United States.

The Department of State, after reviewing the attached material, has no objection to declassification and release of the following:

1. Biographic data statement on Walther Moreira Salles, Brazilian Ambassador Designate to the United States -- attached to 6/5/52 Memorandum from Miller to Secretary of State, "Information for Appointment with Brazilian Ambassador-designate, Walther Moreira Salles, on Thursday, June 5, 2:30 p.m.
2. 8/29/52 Memorandum from Sandifer to Secretary of State, "Your Meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles".
3. 9/5/52 Memorandum from Sandifer to Secretary of State, "Meeting with Members of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament".

In addition, the Department of State has no objection to declassification and release in part of the following:

4. Biographic data statement on Jacques Nicolas Leger, Newly Appointed Haitian Ambassador to the United States -- attached to 5/5/52 Memorandum from Miller to Under Secretary of State, "Appointment of Haitian Ambassador with you on Friday, May 9".

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Please inform us whether you see any objection to release of the material on the basis indicated. If you believe any of the material should be withheld, other than as suggested in the preceding paragraph, please specify. In your reply, please refer to "Microform Project - Secretary's Appointments, 1950-52".

Attachment:

Copies of four documents  
(as listed)

SECRET

(Unclassified When Removed From Attachments)

# PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	REQUEST NUMBER	STAT
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		F 82-0554	
1.  DDI/FIO				DATE SENT 30 August 1982	STAT
2.  DDA/IPD				SUSPENSE DATE	
3.				FROM: Clarus W. Rice Director of Central Reference	

**COMMENTS**

1. OCR reviewed the two biographic reports on Walther Moreira Salles of Brazil and Jacques Nicolas Leger of Haiti which were referred to CIA by State.

4. I have completed worksheets for each report. OCR action on F 82-0554 is complete.

Clarus W. Rice

SEP 2 1 26 PM '82



# PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)  
 Department of State  
 STATE REFERRAL  
 RE: Declassification of "Secretary's"

**REQUEST NUMBER**  
 F82-0554

**FROM:** [Redacted] **EXTENSION** **DATE SENT**  
 23 July 1982

DDA/OIS/IPD 1107 Ames

**SUSPENSE DATE**

STAT

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	

**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. <del>DDI/IRO - [Redacted]</del> 2E6104, HQS.				
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STAT

2.				
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STAT

3. DDI/IRO - [Redacted] 2E6104, HQS.				
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STAT

4. [Redacted]				
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5. [Redacted] OCC				
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STAT

6. ISG/LA Brazil				
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7. Haiti				
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STAT

8.				
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9.				
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STAT

10.				
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11. CD/OCR				
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12. DDI/FIO				
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**RETURN TO:** DDA/OIS/IPD 1107 Ames

**ACTION:** DDI

**INFO:** DDI/IRO

DDI/IRO

# PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

STAT

STAT



State is the requester  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

IPD Registry

F82-0554



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SECRET

(Unclassified When Removed  
From Attachments)

MEMORANDUM

TO:



Classification Review Division  
Office of Information Services  
Central Intelligence Agency

25X1

FROM:

Barbara Ennis *B p. 91*  
Director, Policy Development and  
Coordination Staff  
Classification/Declassification  
Center (A/CDC)

SUBJECT: Request for Concurrence in Release

The attached Department of State documents appear to be of interest to your agency. They are part of a file on the "Secretary's Appointments, 1950-52" which the Historical Office of the Department of State wishes to publish as a microform supplement to Foreign Relations of the United States.

The Department of State, after reviewing the attached material, has no objection to declassification and release of the following:

1. Biographic data statement on Walther Moreira Salles, Brazilian Ambassador Designate to the United States -- attached to 6/5/52 Memorandum from Miller to Secretary of State, "Information for Appointment with Brazilian Ambassador-designate, Walther Moreira Salles, on Thursday, June 5, 2:30 p.m.
2. 8/29/52 Memorandum from Sandifer to Secretary of State, "Your Meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles".
3. 9/5/52 Memorandum from Sandifer to Secretary of State, "Meeting with Members of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament".

In addition, the Department of State has no objection to declassification and release in part of the following:

4. Biographic data statement on Jacques Nicolas Leger, Newly Appointed Haitian Ambassador to the United States -- attached to 5/5/52 Memorandum from Miller to Under Secretary of State, "Appointment of Haitian Ambassador with you on Friday, May 9".

25X1

Please inform us whether you see any objection to release of the material on the basis indicated. If you believe any of the material should be withheld, other than as suggested in the preceding paragraph, please specify. In your reply, please refer to "Microform Project - Secretary's Appointments, 1950-52".

Attachment

Copies of four documents  
(as listed)

SECRET

(Unclassified When Removed From Attachments)

*See [unclear] [unclear]*  
*to saw*

August 29, 1952



TO : S - The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S *fern*  
FROM : UNA - Durward V. Sandifer *J.*  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Mr. Allen Dulles.

25X1

Problem:

Mr. Allen Dulles, of CIA, is seeing you on Tuesday, September 2, at 4:00 P.M., to "discuss arrangements for a report by the Disarmament Panel".

Discussion:

1. The Panel of Consultants on Disarmament consists of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Joseph E. Johnson, John Dickey, and Mr. Dulles.

2. The Panel was employed to advise the Department on the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, specifically with respect to developing a comprehensive report for armed forces and non-atomic armaments comparable to the United Nations atomic energy plan.

3. You met with the Panel on April 28, 1952 and suggested various lines of approach which the Panel might wish to take. You indicated that the Panel might want to look at our current armaments program to see where it is headed and what alternative roads might be open to us.

4. The Panel met once more in the Department on May 6 for general discussion and the only official contact we have had with them since that time has involved one visit to Mr. Hickerson by Dr. Oppenheimer, aside from the continuing liaison on general arrangements, orientation, and so forth, which we have had with McGeorge Bundy, the Panel's Secretary.

5. The lack of contact has been based on the Panel's wish to conduct its deliberations without involvement in day-to-day Departmental operations and in an atmosphere of fairly unlimited inquiry. We made no attempt to discourage this but have tried to keep the

members

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

members informed, through Mr. Bundy and through our talk with Dr. Oppenheimer, of the problems which the Department sees in this field, of the developments as they are taking place in the United Nations and of the factors from our standpoint (such as the Seventh United Nations General Assembly) which might affect the timing of their findings. In this connection we have excluded the possibility of counting on recommendations from them in time to influence our General Assembly position and have assumed that their target date would be at some time around the end of the year.

6. I understand the Panel has had fairly continuous sessions in Princeton and Cambridge since August 11 and that individual members of the Panel may visit various officers of the Department for consultation in the next month or so preliminary to preparation of recommendations.

Recommendation:

1. It is recommended that you ascertain from Mr. Diles any information he can furnish at this time as to the development of the thinking and intentions of the Panel.

For comment:

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CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

*See below* 0749*See copy of original***SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION**

-25X1

September 5, 1952.

To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S *FEM*  
 From : Durward V. Sandifer, UNA  
 Subject: Meeting with Members of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

Problem:

To advise Messrs. Robert Oppenheimer and John Dickey of the views of the Department concerning a report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament.

Discussions:

1. Mr. Allen Dulles saw you on September 2 to arrange an appointment with you for Saturday, September 6, for Messrs. Oppenheimer and Dickey in order that they might discuss the following with you:

(a) "What is the wise thing for the Panel to do?" (b) "Should the Panel make a report?" (c) "Should the Panel terminate its work until the advent of the new administration or should it continue?"

2. It is difficult to answer any of these questions because of our lack of information concerning the work of the Panel to Date. We do know that the Panel concluded at an early stage that it would be necessary to examine the whole range of arguments in a broad context of political relationships rather than to deal with any of the specific problems confronting us in the United Nations. We have not attempted to discourage this expanded approach, and we have accepted the necessity of awaiting their findings before knowing to what practical use they could be put in our disarmament operations.

3. We are as yet uninformed as to the tenor of their thinking, the flavor of their conclusions, and the timing of their recommendations, if any. It is our feeling that we cannot advise them regarding their report until we have some idea of what that report might contain.

Recommendations:**SECRET- SECURITY INFORMATION**

~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

-2-

Recommendations:

In this setting, our reactions to the three specific questions put to you by Mr. Dulles are as follows:

1. "What is the wise thing for the Panel to do?"

The Panel should indicate to the Department in any manner it sees fit what the results have been of its deliberations in order that the Department can then advise as to the next step.

2. "Should the Panel make a report?"

We have been expecting a report of their work but until we know what their conclusions are we cannot advise as to the nature and use of the report. With regard to the problem of press leaks, our major concern is that there be no premature publicity on possible revisions in the UN atomic energy plan. If the report is Top Secret it should certainly be assured of adequate security. UNA's primary concern, as the action office with respect to the disarmament program in the United Nations, is to have useful ideas from the Panel which will facilitate the discharge of our responsibilities. Whether the report is written or oral is essentially immaterial. It occurs to us that their hesitation on this score may be due to a reluctance to submit negative findings. We can only repeat that we seek enlightenment and assistance from them, whatever their findings may be.

3. "Should the Panel terminate its work on all the advent of the new administration or should it continue?"

It is difficult to recommend on this without full knowledge of implications or repercussions which the Panel may have in mind. The timing of their report is a matter which they themselves would doubtless want to weigh carefully in the light of its potential usefulness to the government. It is conceivable that recommendations involving any major new approach to the problem are not feasible until the end of the year. Their concern regarding timing should of course be considered in that light, and clearly they would share the Department's conviction that disarmament must not become a political football. Needless to say, the Department would not want to be in the position of appearing to suppress any report the Panel may make. We have not in fact seen that there is any necessary connection between the elections, and either the work of the Panel or our efforts in the UN.

In this connection, we feel very strongly that the US Government has maintained a successful initiative in this field and has an unusually favorable position vis-a-vis the USSR as a result of our efforts to date. We recommend that no steps be taken or decision reached which would affect this initiative without the most careful examination of all aspects of the problem.

Comments:

S/AE

UNA:LPE:lccrfield:em

9/5/52

~~SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

*See apppt*CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1

May 6, 1962

To : The Under Secretary

Through : B/S

From : ARA - Mr. Miller

Subject : Appointment of Haitian Ambassador with you on/  
Wednesday, May 7Discussion *Friday*

A memorandum containing biographical data on Ambassador Leger is attached.

For your information, in case Ambassador Leger should bring any substantive matters during his call upon you, the Ambassador referred to the following problems in his first call upon me on April 30:

1. Transfer by United States to Haiti of Sovereignty of the Island of Navassa. The Ambassador stressed the increasing interest of the Haitian Government in obtaining sovereignty over Navassa, a guano island off the southwestern coast of Haiti in the important Windward Passage, on which there is an automatic lighthouse established by the United States Coast Guard. In response to his request for the Department's views, I explained that transfer of the island to Haiti would require legislation by Congress; that we are not aware that such legislation has yet been introduced and that there is little likelihood that any will be introduced during the current session of Congress; that if legislation were introduced, the views of the Department and other interested agencies would be requested; and that we have been consulting other Departments with a view to formulating our position.

2. Eximbank Loan for the Development of the Artibonite Valley. The Ambassador confirmed his Government's disappointment over the delay in getting this irrigation and reclamation project under way. The opening of bids and the award of a contract were delayed by the Eximbank several months ago when engineering surveys indicated that the site of a proposed dam might have to be moved. The Haitian Government proposed that the bids should be opened as scheduled, with bidders being permitted to amend bids if necessary, and declared that any other course would prejudice the bidders, cause injury to the Haitian economy and provoke adverse public reaction. The Eximbank did not find this proposal practicable, however.

3.

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3. Haitian Government Debt for Purchase of Medical Supplies from War Assets Administration. The Ambassador indicated that the supplies purchased in 1948 were for the most part worthless, expressed the view that speculators had maneuvered the transaction to their advantage and asked for a consideration of reduction or cancellation of the indebtedness. He was informed that the records of General Services Administration on this matter were being studied.

4. Claims of United States Nationals against the Government of Haiti. The Ambassador briefly touched on this matter, indicating that both he and his Government were interested in a settlement of the claims. Our Embassy at Port-au-Prince has been unsuccessful hitherto in inducing the Haitian Government to negotiate with claimants the settlement of certain claims based on expropriation of property, illegal imprisonment, etc.

5. Ambassador Leger also indicated in a conversation with a Department officer on April 30 his Government's interest in negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States. The desirability of an immediate approach to the Haitian Government is under consideration.

Attachment

Biographic data on Ambassador Leger.

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ARA:KID:RRJellman:dwb

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LEGER, Jacques NicolasHAITI

Newly Appointed Haitian Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Leger is an experienced diplomat who is considered to be very friendly to the United States and well qualified for his present assignment. He is competent, believed to be personally honest despite the prevalence of corruption in his Government, and enjoys the full confidence of President Magloire. As Foreign Minister, his previous assignment, he earned the high regard of United States Ambassador Travers.

Ambassador Leger has represented Haiti in Latin America for almost ten years. Prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister in December 1950 he served as Ambassador to Argentina. He had previously served as Secretary of Legation in Bogota and Caracas and as Minister to Venezuela and Cuba. He was not acquainted with President Magloire at the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister. He was assigned this post on the recommendation of General Levert, then member of the Junta which governed Haiti for seven months after the overthrow of President Estimé in May 1950 and now Chief of the General Staff.

Ambassador Leger is a very light mulatto and a member of one of the elite and most highly regarded families of Haiti. His father, Abel Leger, and his grandfather, Nicolas Leger, both served as Foreign Ministers.

Ambassador Leger is married to Rénée Mangones and has three children.

Ambassador Leger is a lawyer, and speaks good French and hesitant English in addition to his native French.

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TSC No. : \_\_\_\_\_  
Request No.: F82-0554  
Part \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_  
Document Identification \_\_\_\_\_  
Item No. (If applicable): \_\_\_\_\_  
Document Description: \_\_\_\_\_  
State Bio Report, Apr 52  
Legn, Jacques Nicolas

Return to:

Information and Privacy Staff  
Room 2E-42, Headquarters Building

REVIEW WORKSHEET  
(Do not detach from document)

Expendable Copy: X Yes  
No

PART I. Findings and Recommendations

a. No objection to declassification and/or release. Clearances should be obtained from the following CIA components or agencies of the U.S. Government (leave blank if no further clearances are required): \_\_\_\_\_

b. Declassification is impossible at this time. The applicable provisions of E.O. 12065, 1-301, are (circle one or more) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g). (See back of form for an explanation of these provisions.) The unauthorized disclosure of this information could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security. The appropriate classification guide citations are (enter one or more) \_\_\_\_\_  
9c.1 9d.2 (Go to PART II.)

c. (Do not use this portion of form for mandatory classification review requests referred to the Agency from Presidential Libraries.) The document must be withheld, in whole or in part, pursuant to the exemption provisions of FOIA subsections (circle one or more): (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7) \_\_\_\_\_  
(Go to PART II.)

PART II. Sanitization

a. Sanitization is impossible or inadvisable.

b. Sanitized version may be released provided that certain information is excised. (If "Expendable Copy," bracket material to be deleted in red. If not an "Expendable Copy," indicate material to be deleted in the space below, citing page, paragraph, line etc. Use continuation sheet if needed.) Release of segregable portions must be cleared with the following CIA components or agencies of the U.S. Government (leave blank if no further clearances are required): \_\_\_\_\_

Haitian exile who, as of 1975, was UNDP Resident Representative in Kuwait.

Downgraded to \_\_\_\_\_  
when detached

Reviewer \_\_\_\_\_  
Name or Employee No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Component DDI/OCR  
Date of Review 30 Aug 82

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Classification Requirements, 1-3, Executive Order 12065

1-301. Information may not be considered for classification unless it concerns:

- (a) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- (b) foreign government information;
- (c) intelligence activities, sources or methods;
- (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
- (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; or
- (g) other categories of information which are related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President, by a person designated by the President pursuant to Section 1-201, or by an agency head. (See your Directorate's classification guide for the categories of information so designated by the DCI.)

Classification Guide Citations

We no longer are required to mark documents being returned to Presidential Libraries to conform with the provisions of the Executive order currently in force. We ask that you indicate the applicable classification guide provisions, however, in order to pinpoint the precise reasons why the classification of each document must be retained. This determination must be made by an Agency official who has been delegated either original or derivative classification authority.

A few of the DDO classification guide categories which presumably will often be applicable are listed below:

- D9a.2 - Foreign weapons (Review 20 years)
- D9b.1 - Foreign liaison information (Review 30 years)
- D9c.1 - Sources (Review 20 years)
- D9c.3 - Stations (Review 20 years)
- D9c.4 - Identities of CIA personnel, code designation, etc. (Review 20 years)
- D9c.5 - Cover agreements between the CIA and other government agencies (Review 20 years)
- D9c.9 - Sigint (Review 20 years)
- D9c.12 - Official and non-official cover, when cover organization is identified (Review 20 years)
- D9c.13 - Identification of CIA personnel under official cover, when cover organization is not identified (Review 20 years)
- D9d.2 - Impair the conduct of U.S. foreign policies (Review 20 years)
- D9d.4 - Plans (Review 20 years)
- D9d.5 - Activities conducted abroad (Review 20 years)
- D9d.6 - Information revealing that the United States has obtained or seeks to obtain data concerning a foreign nation which could adversely affect U.S. foreign relations (Review 20 years)

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Document Identification \_\_\_\_\_  
Item No. (If applicable): \_\_\_\_\_

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Information and Privacy Staff  
Room 2E-42, Headquarters Building

Document Description:  
State Bio Rpt, 5 June 1952  
SALES, Walter Moreira

REVIEW WORKSHEET  
(Do not detach from document)

Expendable Copy: \_\_\_\_\_ Yes  
\_\_\_\_\_ No

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Downgraded to \_\_\_\_\_  
when detached

Reviewer \_\_\_\_\_  
Name or Employee No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Component DDI/DAI  
Date of Review 30 Aug 82

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STAT

**WALTHER MOREIRA SALLES****BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO THE UNITED STATES**

Walther Moreira Salles is 40 years of age and a member of a wealthy Minas Gerais family. He is primarily a banker and businessman and has had no previous experience in the diplomatic field. At the time of his appointment as Ambassador to the United States, he was serving as Executive Director of the Superintendency of Money and Credit, a semi-autonomous agency under the Minister of Finance. A wealthy man, he is a major stockholder in a Brazilian company which is the distributor in Rio de Janeiro for several American machinery companies; in the important Banco Moreira Salles, S.A.; in two coffee exporting firms. He also owns stock in several other companies.

Salles' financial and commercial interests have placed him in close association with United States firms.

Salles was an economic counselor on the Brazilian delegation to the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of American States held in Washington in 1951. You met him at that time. His role was secondary, but he worked closely with the principal counselor for economic affairs of the Brazilian delegation and was helpful in personal talks in keeping the United States representatives informed on Brazilian thinking. He was also a member of the Brazilian group headed by Finance Minister Horacio Lafer which attended the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington in 1951.

Salles, who speaks English fluently, is a good personal friend of Assistant Secretary Miller. He has given ample evidence of being very friendly to the United States and has held reasonable views, supporting those of Finance Minister Lafer, on the question of remittances of profits on foreign investments, which question has been a vital one in United States--Brazilian relations in the past several months. His experience in business and banking made his appointment particularly appropriate in view of the financial and commercial problems which are currently so important in Brazil's relations with the United States.

Salles

-2-

Salles is a handsome, youthful appearing man of somewhat under average height, with straight black hair and dark complexion. He has a great deal of personal charm and enjoys social functions. Americans who have had official contact with him have found him to have a sharp mind and to be extremely capable in business and finance.

Salles is divorced from his wife, who is of French descent.

Salles has placed his handsome, modern home in Rio de Janeiro at the Brazilian Government's disposal, and you have been asked to stay there during your visit to Rio.

From the day following his arrival in Washington, June 2, Salles has been very active in talking informally with both the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank. He has already showed clearly his usefulness to his Government and to ours in the furtherance of our mutual interests.

Salles has informed Mr. Miller that he plans to present the official invitation for you to visit Brazil when he calls on you on June 5.



CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

June 5, 1952

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Through: S - The Secretary  
S/S  
ARA - Mr. Miller

Information for Appointment with Brazilian Ambassador-designate, Walther Moreira Salles, on Thursday, June 5, 2:30 p.m.

Attached is a briefing memorandum for Ambassador Moreira Salles' visit this afternoon. He will no doubt bring up the question of your visit to Brazil since he has told me that he has been officially authorized by the Foreign Minister to invite you officially to visit Brazil any time at your convenience. In accordance with the decisions at our meeting yesterday, I suggest that you reply to him as follows:

1) You will be delighted to visit Brazil following your forthcoming trip to Europe. According to present plans you would be leaving Vienna about June 30, proceeding to Rio via Dakar and Recife.

2) You will be accompanied by Mrs. Ahnson and members of your staff and will be flying in the Independence. You hope that the Ambassador can meet you at Recife so as to proceed to Rio with you. Presumably the Ambassador would be accompanied to Recife by myself and my wife.

3) You will be delighted to accept the offer of the Ambassador's private residence in Rio de Janeiro and also to be the guest of Finance Minister Lafer in Sao Paulo.

4) You have looked over the tentative schedule for the visit as suggested to Ambassador Johnson by the Foreign Minister (see letter attached) which provides for a three-day visit to Rio and a two-day visit to Sao Paulo. You might say that this seems generally satisfactory except that it will probably be necessary for you to eliminate the second day in Sao Paulo.

You might compliment the Ambassador for getting off to a very quick start in negotiations with the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank, which are proceeding in a most satisfactory manner.

## Attachments:

- ✓ Biographical data statement.
- 5/23/52 to Mr. Miller from Ambassador Johnson.

ARA: RMiller, Jr.:mk

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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